CASE DIGEST

I.Constitutional Supremacy

a. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

II. Power of Judicial Review

a. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009

III. Political questions are ordinarily outside the pale of judicial review

a. Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
b. Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 16, 1998

ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE

Aviso,Mirafel C.
BPA 2
Prof:Lily Rose Del Rosario
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, Manila Hotel Corporation,
Committee on Privatization and Office of The Government Corporate Counsel
G.R. No.: 122156
03 February 1997
Bellosillo, J.

Facts:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program
of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic
Manila Hotel. There were two bidders that participated in the bidding. The first one is petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Subsequently, MPHC, in a letter to GSIS, matched the bid price tendered by

RenonBerhad. Thereafter, it sent a manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank as Bid Security to
match the bid of RenongBerhad, however, GSIS refused to accept it. This led MPHC to file a
writ of prohibition and mandamus to the Supreme Court to which the latter issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining GSIS from perfecting and consummating the sale to RenongBerhad.

MPHC invoked Section 10 (2), Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It also argues that since
51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is
owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business
of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies. Moreover, they argued that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.

On the part of GSIS, it argued that the said Constitutional provision is not self-executing,
and thus, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done.

Issues:

1. Whether Section 10 (2), Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing

2. Whether Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony
3. Whether petitioner MPHC should be given preference in the sale of the controlling
shares of MHC

Ruling:
 1. YES, Section 10(2), Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing. Sec. 10,
second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated
statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

Respondents argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII
is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing.The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation
of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another. 

Moreover, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable when our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that
— qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

2. YES, Manila Hotel forms part of the patrimony of our nation. In its plain and ordinary
meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands.The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution
also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.
 The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is
only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure
faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which
evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of
a judicial remedy. The Court cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the
failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation.

3. YES, MPHC should be preferred over RenongBerhad.It should be stressed that while
the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
"Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the
winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of
which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional

provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for
being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid
in terms of price pershare.Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, the Court cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have
to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a
foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning
to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the

1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be
enforced; so must it be enforced. The Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will
never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of
this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far
from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions
the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution.
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners, vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
G.R.No.134577
November 18,1998
Panganiban J.

Facts
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared
the duly elected President of the Senate.
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate “minority,” Sen. Juan M.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering
seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question
continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issue
Whether or not the question of who was the rightful Senate President is a political or
justiciable question.

Ruling
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not
depend on the Senate’s “full discretionary authority,” but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and
determine the issue.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEÑA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO,
LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M.
ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO,
MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M.
DELA PEÑA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA
ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA
B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M.
HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PEÑA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA, ESPERANZA
MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO,
EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B.
BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA
C. DELA PEÑA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C.
GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P.
DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ,
ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL,
MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C.
MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA,
MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA
Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. In their capacity and as
members of the "Malaya Lolas Organization", Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.
G.R.No.162230
April 28,2010
Del Castillo J.

Facts

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims
of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in
the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already
been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.
 Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the
war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.

Issue

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

Ruling

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that "the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision." are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are
and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In
this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
 The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be
inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where
such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our
consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and
whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to
persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one
of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that
their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can
do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus
cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus
cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as
a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA of the 2nd District of Bataan, Petitioner, vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL
CORPORATION Respondents.
G.R.No.157584
April 2, 2009
Brion J.

Facts

Petitioner Garcia asks the court to examine the constitutionality of sec 19 of RA 8479 or
the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998. The petitioner raise that implementing full deregulation by
removing the system of price control in local downstream oil industry have ruled before. On
March 1996 the Philippine government pursue a policy of deregulation by enacting the RA 8180
or the Downstream Oil industry deregulation act of 1996, however, the court conclude on the
case of tatadvs secretary of Department of Energy, that the law was invalid because the three key
provision intended to promote free competition shows the opposite result that it was contrary to
its intent encourage monopolistic power and interfered with the free interaction of market forces
the court declared that the RA 8180 needs a provision to vouchsafe free and fair competition.

The big three companies shell, petron and Caltex had no real competitors but did not have
a free run on the market because the government control the pricing and non-pricing of the oil
industry. On February 10, 1998, the congress respond to the court decision in tatad and enact a
new oil deregulation law RA 8479. The petitioner sought to declare that the new deregulation
law was unconstitutional because it violates the Art XII Sec 19 of the constitution. The petitioner
objected that Sec 19 of RA 8479 in essence, prescribe period for removal of price control on
gasoline and other finished petroleum products and set the time for full deregulation of the local
downstream oil industry.

According to Sec 19 of 8479 “Full deregulation of the Industry shall start five (5) months
following the effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, That when the public interest so
requires, the President may accelerate the start of full deregulation upon the recommendation of
the DOE and the Department of Finance (DOF) when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and the value of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable, taking into account relevant trends and prospects; Provided, further, That the foregoing
provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-month Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG,
regular gasoline and kerosene as socially-sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum
products shall be covered by the automatic pricing mechanism during the said period.

Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein, the Transition Phase is deemed
terminated and the following laws are repealed:

a) Republic Act No. 6173, as amended;

b) Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended;

c) Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984;

d) Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as amended;

e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985;

f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and

g) Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137

Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price control the
market is still dominated and controlled by oligopoly and wold contrary to public interest and
would provide an opportunity for the big 3 companies to engage in price fixing and over pricing
the petitioner also stated that the Sec 19 of RA 8479 is pro oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-
people. And ask the court to declare that the provision is unconstitutional. On December 17,
1999 the court denied the petitioners plea for nullity and decline to rule on constitutionality of
Sec 19 or RA 8479. The court is not concerned whether or not there should be deregulation, it is
outside the court’s jurisdiction only the congress can reverse it.

Issue
Whether or not the court can exercise its power of judicial review.

Ruling
The petitioner invokes to exercise to the court its power of judicial review to declare the
Sec 19 of RA 8479 as unconstitutional which expressly recognize under Sec 4 Art VIII of the
constitution, the power of judicial review is the power of the court to ask the validity of
executive and legislative acts for conformity with the constitution. The judiciary enforces and
upholds the supremacy of the constitution. For the court to exercise its judicial power there are
certain requirements must met:

(1) Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) Person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement;

(3) Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

(4) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lismotaof the case( actual case controversy)

The petitioners fails to satisfy these requirements the existence of an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. An actual case or controversy is one that
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.It is not the mere existence of a conflict or
controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review; more
importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded from
these are questions of policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions it is refer "to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of governmentif an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as
matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves
then it is held to be a political question.

A political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the

issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on the one question.

The petitioner insist by adopting a policy of full deregulation through removal of price
control at the time that oligopoly exists. The Sec 19of RA 8479 contravenes the constitutional
directive to regulate or prohibit monopolies under Art XII sec 19 of the constitution. The
constitutional provision does not declare an outright prohibition of monopolies and it allows the
state to act when public interest is so requires. There are no outright prohibition is mandated. The
state may choose to regulate rather than prohibit. There must be two elements before monopoly
can be regulated or prohibited: 1. there in fact exists a monopoly or an oligopoly, and 2. Public
interest requires its regulation or prohibition.

Whether a monopoly exists is a question of factthe questions of (1) what public interest
requires and (2) what the State reaction shall be essentially require the exercise of discretion on
the part of the State. Petitioner Garcia raises as an issue is the propriety of immediately and fully
deregulating the oil industry. The issue is not for the court to resolve. The court cannot rule on
when and to what extent deregulation should take place without passing upon the wisdom of the
policy of deregulation that Congress has decided upon. Petitioner Garcia asks requires "an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion"; the branch of government that
was given by the people the full discretionary authority to formulate the policy is the legislative
department.in tatad the court declares that the fundamental principle espoused by Section 19,
Article XII of the Constitution is competition. Congress, by enacting R.A. No. 8479, determined
that this objective is better realized by liberalizing the oil market, instead of continuing with a
highly regulated system enforced by means of restrictive prior controls. This legislative
determination was a lawful exercise of Congress’ prerogative and one that this Court must
respect and uphold. Regardless of the individual opinions of the Members of this Court, we
cannot, acting as a body, question the wisdom of a co-equal department’s acts. The courts do not
involve themselves with or delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute;it sits, not to review or
revise legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will. For the Court to resolve a clearly non-
justiciable matter would be to debase the principle of separation of powers that has been tightly
woven by the Constitution into our republican system of government. Wherefore the court
dismiss the petition.