Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System (267 SCRA 408), G.R. No.

122156, February 3, 1997

NOTE: Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national
interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned
by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance
with its national goals and priorities.

Facts: Respondent (GSIS) decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation through public bidding as part of the Philippine government's privatization initiative under Proclamation No. 50.

According to its terms, the winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

Only two (2) bidders participated:

a. petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the corporation or 15.3M
shares at P41.58 per share, and

b. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.

In a letter to respondent, petitioner matched Renong Berhad's bid price of P44.00 per share, pending the designation of
Renong Berhad as the winning bidder partner and the execution of the relevant contracts.

In a subsequent letter petitioner sent a manager's check for P33.000.000.00 as Bid Security to match the bid of Renong
Berhad which respondent refused to accept.

Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus. The SC
issued a TRO enjoining respondents from consummating and perfecting the said sale.

The petitioner hinged his arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution. It argued that:

a. Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having become a historical monument for the Filipino nation;
and

b. Because respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51 percent of the corporation’s shares, the hotel business of GSIS, which is part
of the tourism industry, is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Hence, the petitioner claimed that the corporation
is clearly covered by the term national economy under the contemplation of Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:

a. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing legislation

b. While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony

c. But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands

d. the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered by private persons for private purposes is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.

While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as it is consistent
with the Constitution. The SC remarked that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.

The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing and minor details
may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. However, a provision which is complete and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.

Summary of Principles:

1. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation— it is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme Law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. lt prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded.

The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated
by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.

2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature
to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
 Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

3. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self- executing.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have
often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.

4. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be
left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

5. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily
an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing—the rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does
not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further
the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.

The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

6. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed.

If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation
to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.

7. When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
 On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

8. When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject—such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance.

9. When the Constitution speaks of “national patrimony,” it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark—a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has borne mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of
the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

10. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of
the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
TANADA v. ANGARA G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

FACTS: On April 5, 1994, respondent then DTI Sec. Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act of the WTO Agreement in
Marrakesh, Morocco

On August 12 and 14, 1994, the Senate received from the President two letters averring the submission of the Final
Act and WTO Agreement for concurrence

On December 14, 1994, the Senate stated its concurrence to the latter in Resolution No. 97

On December 16, 1994, the President ratified the WTO Agreement (Note: Sec. Navarro only signed the Final Act)

On December 29, 1994, the present petition, which assails the constitutionality of the WTO Agreement, was filed

ISSUES:
Whether the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its annexes contravene the Philippine Constitution.

Whether the said provisions limit or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.

Whether the said provisions impair the exercise of judicial power.

Whether the Senate’s concurrence was sufficient and/or valid.

HELD:

1. YES. Since the assailed act allegedly violates the Constitution, it becomes a jusiticiable controversy that the Court
is mandated to decide. In addition, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are appropriate remedies for
constitutional issues.

2. NO. Petitioners argue that the WTO’s provisions on trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) and trade-
related intellectual property rights (TRIPS), as well as the General Agreement on Trade in Services, violate Sec. 19,
Art. II and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution. However:

Art. II is not self-executing, and thus does not justify a cause of action.

On the other hand, while Art. XII mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods and services, it actually intends to
eliminate unfair foreign competition

The WTO also protects weak economies via equal voting and preferential treatment (ex. 24% tariff reduction)

3. NO. Petitioners hold that the WTO Agreement limits legislative power, specifically taxation. However, the
Constitution and UN Charter, as well as other treaties, recognize the limitation of sovereignty in adopting
international laws.

4. NO. Petitioners aver that Par. 1, Art. 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
TRIPS, which concerns patent infringement, intrudes on the SC’s judicial power. However, a similar presumption
already exists in R.A. No. 165 (Patent Law).

5. YES. The Senate deliberations on August 25, 1994 make it clear that contrary to petitioners’ arguments, it is the
WTO Agreement that is being submitted for ratification.
DOMINO VS. COMELEC
Summary:
A petition to cancel Domino's COC was filed by private respondents arguing that Domino is not a
resident of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. DOMINO maintains that he had
complied with the one-year residence requirement.

Doctrine:

The term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,
pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

Facts: Petitioner Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the Province of Sarangani indicating that he had resided there for 1 year and 2 months immediately
preceding the election. A petition to cancel his COC was filed by private respondents arguing that
Domino is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks
election. For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. COMELEC declared
Domino disqualified as candidate due to lack of the one year residence requirement. Previously,
Domino ran for the same position in Quezon City in 1995.

Issues Ratio:

Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
May 11, 1998 elections

NO, petitioner has not resided in Sarangani for at least 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

The term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,
pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1)
that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and
intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of
domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical
presence without intention.

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of
domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it
does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the
intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract of
lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in
the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.

In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district
one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. Domino's
failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the
COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Other Notes:

Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of petitioner

YES, the COMELEC has jurisdiction.

COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.
Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is
rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the
highest number of votes and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has
taken his oath of office. On the other hand, HRET has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under
Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
HOR.

Considering that Domino has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional
District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the HOR. Hence, it is the
COMELEC and not the HRET which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections

GR No. 161872 April 13, 2004

FACTS:

When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency, the
Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due course. Pamatong requested a
case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied his request. The COMELEC declared
Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are either not
nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political party with national
constituency.” Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities for
public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly
amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most qualified among all
the presidential candidates” and supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged
capacity to wage national and international campaigns, and his government platform.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with the
grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service.

RULING:

NO

The Court noted that the provisions under Article II are generally considered not-self executing. As such,
the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially
enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action” by
presenting ideals/standards through the policies presented. Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege
to run for public office, one that is subject to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are
enforced without discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated. The Court justified the
COMELEC’s need for limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring rational, objective,
and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes a “mockery” if
anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run.
Note: Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for candidacy. The Court
however stated that it is not within their power to make such assessments.
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight
being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.

In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until
November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every
two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check
would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report
to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total
of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job
of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his
weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he
repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination
was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would
thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight
down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, we hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the
service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
“[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national
origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short,
the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid
“provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin
flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as
imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based
on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his
moral character.
Datu Michael Abas Kida vs Senate of the Philippines GR No. 196271, Oct 18, 2011 BRION, J.:

FACTS:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of
the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
The history of ARMM instituted first by the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated
the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras specifically Sections 15 to
22 wherein the congress promulgated the Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 which is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials.
Following aforementioned article is the RA No. 9054 which amended the ARMM Charter and reset the
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time
the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected.
In these consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition and madamus filed directly with the Supreme
Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

2. Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

RULING:

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous
regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to
Local Government.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.

Thus, the Supreme Court fined the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does
not include the regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which refers to the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement.

Before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become law or statute they must pass through
three readings on separate days, with the EXCEPTION of when the President certifies to the necessity of
the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of
the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a
law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following the Tolentino ruling, the Supreme Court held
the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.
Chavez v. JBC

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative
of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Sec. 8, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution)

Facts:

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the Judicial and Bar Council was substantially altered. Instead
of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added as two representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. In 2001, the JBC En Banc, allowed the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Escudero and Congressman Tupas, Jr.
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco Chavez filed a petition
questioning this practice.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC.
The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted
by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a
unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in
the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of
representation, defeating the principle of balance. They further argue that the presence of two (2)
members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are
undeniably presidential appointees.

Issues:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this
case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8
instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch
of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is
not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is
imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice
can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise
screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of
aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly,
the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is
clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the
supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex
officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission
had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in
Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that,
in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to
conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress,
or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly
cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached.
The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the
Constitution itself created while it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every
possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to
break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being
drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional
Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to
amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the
Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule,
however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in
reliance upon a law creating it.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012)
 ITEMS
REQUISITION
JOURNAL