76. Lopez vs.

CA, 34 SCRA 116

Facts:
On January 1956 – Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle à Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector assigned to
the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce planes which forwarded such message to Manila
o An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of the island which
contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in
Manila that the locals were living in terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since
Christmas of 1955. o Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the babuyan
claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only fabricated the story
about the killings to get attention. Cruz merely wanted transportation home to Manila. o Major
Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a “hoax” à the same word to be used by the newspapers who covered
the same o January 13, 1956 – This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton
devoted a pictorial article to it.

It claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the people living in
that place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write and food and clothing
being scarce o January 29, 1956 – This Week Magazineà in the “January News Quiz” made reference to
Cruz as “a health inspector who suddenly felt “lonely” in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a
murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization.” à Called
it “Hoax of the year” o In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a
different person of the same name à Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa
Maria, Bulacan o January 27, 1957 à published statements correcting their misprint and explained that
confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13th issue’s deadline o Cruz sued herein
petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral,
1k attorney’s fees) o CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case

Issue:
o WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruz’s photo in
relation to the “hoax of the year”? o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to
prosper?

Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00

Ratio:
1. Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face by the fact that it
exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant. o Citing
Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui à libel is “malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by
signs or pictures, or the like, …, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby
“pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,” o Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and
Libel à “Publication of a person’s photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a
libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such
person.” o In this case à 3rd person was Cruz à his picture being published beside the article imputes him
as the purveyor of the hoax of the year.

77. New york times vs. Sullivan 376 U.S 254

Facts:

The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was
defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The advertisement was entitled, “Heed Their
Rising Voices” and it charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror had been directed against those
who participated in the civil rights movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the advertisement
were false. Although the advertisement did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed that it referred
to him indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant claimed that it
authorized publication of the advertisement because it did not have any reason to believe that its contents
were false. There was no independent effort to check its accuracy. The Plaintiff demanded that the
Defendant retract the advertisement. The Defendant was puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the
advertisement reflected adversely on him. The jury found the adlibelous per se and actionable without
proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed. The Defendant appealed.

Issue: Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an advertisement, which criticized a public
official’s official conduct?

Rulings:

The constitutional guarantees (1st Amendment) require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.

Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution (Constitution) in a libel action brought by a public official against critics
of his official conduct
Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are
to have the breathing space that the need to survive.

The Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public
officials against critics of their official conduct. In this case, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is
applicable.
The Defendant’s failure to retract the advertisement upon the Plaintiff’s demand is not adequate evidence
of malice for constitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not adequate evidence of malice that the Defendant
failed to check the advertisements accuracy against the news stories in the Defendant’s own files.

Black (J. Black) The First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution do not merely “delimit” a
State’s power to award damages, but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power. The
Defendant had an absolute, unconditional right to publish criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and
officials.
In order for a public official to recover in a defamation action involving his official conduct, malice must
be proved. Without the showing of malice, the Supreme Court felt that a defamation action in this case
would severely cripple the safeguards of freedom speech and expression that are guaranteed in the First
Amendment of the Constitution and applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.

78. Liwayway Publishing vs. PCGG April 15,1988

Facts:

In G.R. 77422, the Commission had issued on February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration, one
addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Automotive sequestering the
President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the Liwayway as of April 15, 1986, and the other addressed to
the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway sequestering all shares of stocks pertaining to U.S.
Automotive in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986.

On the same date, the Commission requested the Central Bank to instruct all commercial banks and non-
bank financial institutions not to allow any withdrawals, transfers or remittances from funds or assets
under any type of deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or money market placements, including safety
deposit boxes, stocks and bonds, bearer certificates and unnumbered accounts, except those which may
pertain to payment of regular salaries and wages of Liwayway and HM Holding and Management, Inc.
(hereafter, HMH&M).

Petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 26, 1987, the hearing being
limited to whether a restraining order should issue to restrain the Commission against denying Liwayway
the use and availment of its funds in the banks to put out its regular publications as well as against the
Commission's interference or intervention in the management or operations of Liwayway, considering the
Central Bank's blanket memorandum, at the Commission's behest, to all banks not to allow any
withdrawals or remittances from its funds, except for "payment of regular salaries and wages" which
would virtually shut down its publications.

The then Solicitor General, now Secretary of Justice, Sedfrey Ordonez, as well as the Commission's then
Vice-Chairman, now Chairman, Ramon Diaz, assured the Court that Liwayway's funds would not be
choked off and that the Commission would not in any way interfere or intervene in the management or
operations of the publication nor with its editorial policy or reportage or in any way impinge upon its
freedom. It was brought out that Liwayway made over P8 million in 1986 and paid more than half of that
in income tax, and they agreed further to preserve the status quo ante pending joining of the issues on the
merits or a showing of some irregularity that would warrant the Commission's intervention.

On February 27, 1987, the Solicitor General filed his manifestation as undertaken by him, submitting a
copy of the Commission's letter dated February 26, 1987, to the CB Governor, Jose Fernandez, modifying
its previous memorandum of February 12th and asking him to instruct all banks to honor all checks of
Liwayway and further stating that "(A)lthough mention is made in the letter of the naming of a fiscal
agent, respondent Commission is not naming anyone at this time.
Issue:

Whether unwarranted intervention of the Commission and impairment of press freedom?

Rulings:

The Solicitor General's pledge at the hearing that the Commission will not in any way act in such a way
as to impinge upon the freedom of expression or freedom to publish the newspaper. The Court gave due
faith and credence thereto and the above-cited undertakings of the Commission. Accordingly, in lieu of a
temporary restraining order which has been rendered unnecessary by the Commission's manifestation and
undertakings, the Court enjoined faithful compliance therewith by all concerned.

This renders moot this particular issue of unwarranted intervention of the Commission and impairment of
press freedom. But with the closing out of this case, as hereafter ordered and the denial of petitioner's plea
to lift the sequestration orders, the Court will formalize the parties' agreement through the issuance of an
injunction to the same effect, to assure compliance regardless of any change in the composition of the
Commission or of other public officials concerned.

This renders moot this particular issue of unwarranted intervention of the Commission and impairment of
press freedom. But with the closing out of this case, as hereafter ordered and the denial of petitioner's plea
to lift the sequestration orders, the Court will formalize the parties' agreement through the issuance of an
injunction to the same effect, to assure compliance regardless of any change in the composition of the
Commission or of other public officials concerned.

ACCORDINGLY, in the Liwayway case, G.R. No. 77422, judgment is rendered

1. As per agreement of the parties as set forth in the Resolution of March 3, 1987, enjoining the
Commission from any act interfering or intervening in any way or manner with the management
or operations or affairs of petitioner Liwayway Publishing, Inc.; and

2. Dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondents from enforcing in any
manner the writs of sequestration heretofore issued over the questioned Liwayway shares whose
ownership will have to be tried and determined in the Sandiganbayan.

79. Fortune vs. Quinsayas GR No. 194578

Facts:

On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao vice-
mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and journalists, was on their way to the
Commission on Elections office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatu's Certificate of Candidacy when
they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan
town, some four to ten kilometers from their destination. The group was taken hostage and brought to a
hilly and sparsely-populated part of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan, Maguindanao. The
gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was later discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were
systematically killed by shooting them at close range with automatic weapons, and their bodies and
vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a backhoe. These gruesome killings
became known as the Maguindanao Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30 of them journalists.
Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-
162652, and Q-10-163766. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan, Jr.), the
principal accused in the murder cases.

In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before this
Court.

Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website posted an article, written
by Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of Ampatuan lawyer," a portion of which
reads:

On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four others filed a 33 page
complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they accused of "engaging in every conceivable
chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the proceedings by using and abusing legal remedies available."
On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article, written by Torres, which
according to petitioner also stated details of the disbarment case, as follows:

"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to obstruct, impede and degrade the
administration of justice by filing countless causes of action, all in the hope of burying the principal issue
of his client's participation or guilt in the murder of 57 people that ill-fated day of November 23, 2009,"
the petitioners said.

Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an article, written by Punay,
which gave details of the disbarment allegations, thus:

"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under under the rules, muddled
the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the cases, read the complaint.

Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment
complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and personalities
conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential materials on their respective media
platforms. Petitioner pointed out that Drilon discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in
a television program viewed nationwide.

Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him exposed this Court
and its investigators to outside influence and public interference. Petitioner alleged that opinion writers
wrote about and commented on the disbarment complaint which opened his professional and personal
reputation to attack. He alleged that the purpose of respondents in publishing the disbarment complaint
was to malign his personal and professional reputation, considering the following: (1) the bases of the
charges were not new but were based on incidents that supposedly took place in January 2010; (2) it was
timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn
for Ampatuan, Jr. and his counsel and violated the accused's right to presumption of innocence and due
process; (3) it was published following articles written about petitioner's advocacy for the rights of an
accused and negated the impact of these articles on the public; and (4) respondents knew that the charges
were baseless as petitioner always opted for speedy trial and protection of the accused's rights at trial.
Petitioner further alleged that in announcing their "causes of action" in the disbarment case, respondents
were only seeking the approval and sympathy of the public against him and Ampatuan, Jr.

Issue:
Whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of
guilt for indirect contempt of court.

Rulings:

First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt. In People v.
Godoy, this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be
done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against
organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue
between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the
proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of
private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of
the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be
punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the
contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the
defendant's intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to
violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt.

GMA Network's defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication where the article could be printed;
it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television station; and that the publication was already
completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint to the media.

GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment complaint on its website. It merely
said that it has no publication where the article could be printed and that the news was not televised.
Online posting, however, is already publication considering that it was done on GMA Network's online
news website.

PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a syndication. PDI attached a
photocopy of the syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication agreements between PDI and
Inquirer.net, some articles published in PDI may not appear in Inquirer.net." [14]

A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
the Philippines' most widely circulated broadsheet, and a member of the Inquirer Group of
Companies."[15] PDI was not able to fully establish that it has a separate personality from Inquirer.net.
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have interlocking directors, SNN has its
own juridical personality separate from its parent company. ABS-CBN alleged that SNN controls the
line-up of shows of ANC.

We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has an independent and separate
juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company and that any suit against the the latter does
not bind the former and vice-versa.[16] A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from that of other corporations to which it may be connected. [17] Hence,
SNN, not ABS-CBN, should have been made respondent in this case.

Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the program about the Maguindanao
Massacre was aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production. Ressa's defense was supported by
a certification from the Human Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN, stating that Ressa went on terminal
leave beginning 30 October 2010.[18] This was not disputed by petitioner.

Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay was that the disbarment
complaint was published without any comment, in good faith and without malice; that petitioner is a
public figure; that the Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of public interest; and that there was no
conspiracy on their part in publishing the disbarment complaint. They also argued that the news reports
were part of privileged communication.

In Drilon's case, she further alleged that the television program was a commemoration of the
Maguindanao Massacre and not solely about the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner. Even as
the disbarment complaint was briefly discussed in her program, petitioner's name was not mentioned at all
in the program.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However,
the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free from any
extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of
administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable.
Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment
or both at the discretion of the Court. x x x[19]
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However,
the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free from any
extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of
administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable.
Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment
or both at the discretion of the Court. x x x[19]

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas alleged that petitioner was not
able to establish the posting and publication of the articles about the disbarment complaint, and that
assuming the posting and publication had been established, petitioner failed to support his allegation that
they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint. They further alleged that they did not
cause the publication of the news articles and thus, they did not violate the rule on privacy and
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings.

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for distributing
copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media and we
order her to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

80. Adiong vs. Comelec March 31, 1992 207 SCRA 712 G.R. No. 103956

Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or
private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails
the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury
with this prohibition.

Issue: Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition unconstitutional.

Held: The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred
freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called
balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other —
is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific
authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to
know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free
elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of
election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in
time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of
his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no
clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger
any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to
justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and
present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought
to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be
stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying
it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the
car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the
owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers
should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law.

The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in
the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.