G.R. No.

217022, June 03, 2019

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. SALVE GONZALES Y TORNO,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT

FACTS:
Salve Gonzales y Torno was charged with parricide. Being then the mother of the victim, with intent to kill, person
of RONALD GONZALES y TORNO, a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there hitting her on his head with the
use of broomstick ("yantok yung wooden na handle niya).

Rhey Gonzales

He was the eldest among appellant's four children and the brother of Ronald Gonzales. Their father was already
dead. At the time of the incident, he was fifteen years old while Ronald was thirteen.

He and Ronald got home from school. Appellant also got home from work around the same time. Shortly after, she
discovered they had no current in the house because Ronald sold the bronze wire connected to the electric meter.
Then, appellant's co-workers came to fetch her. When she came back home, she was drunk. Using a hanger, she hit
Ronald several times until the hanger snapped. Still, she did not stop. She got hold of the broom and using its
wooden handle, hit Ronald's head and body. At that time, Rhey was lying on the lower bunk of their double-deck
bed. He cried when he saw what was going on. His two other siblings Racel and Raymart also cried.

When Rhey woke up around 6 o'clock the next morning, he saw vomit on Ronald's bed and his jogging pants were
wet with urine. Ronald could not eat and looked very weak. Meanwhile, appellant asked Ronald why he sold the
bronze electrical wire. Ronald confessed he sold the bronze electrical wire because he needed money for his project.
She then again took hold of the broom and inserted its handle into Ronald's mouth. Later in the evening, when Rhey
arrived home, he learned that their aunt Glena Gonzales brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center.
Together with his uncle Teody Gonzales, he went to the hospital to check Ronald's condition. Ronald died around 10
o'clock in the evening of September 17, 2009.

The Trial Court's Ruling

Salve is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide defined and penalized under Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court found that the elements of parricide were all present in the case. Rhey
and Racel Gonzales positively testified that appellant severely beat up their brother Ronald first with a hanger until
it broke, and then, with the broom's wooden handle. Appellant hit Ronald all over his body, including his head. This
caused traumatic injuries which resulted in Ronald's death.

The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

Appellant faulted the trial court for finding her guilty of parricide despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She denied killing her son. She insisted Ronald just slipped. She also argued
that even assuming she killed Ronald, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong must be appreciated in her favor.

The Court of Appeal's Ruling

Affirmed the RTC’s decision. It held that appellant's defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of her own children. Also, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong
cannot work in appellant's favor since her acts were reasonably sufficient to cause Ronald's death.

ISSUE:
Whether Salve is guilty of parricide.
HELD:
YES. Article 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished
by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

REQUISITES OF PARRICIDE (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused is the killer; and (3) deceased is either
the legitimate spouse of the accused, or any legitimate or illegitimate parent, child, ascendant or descendant of
the accused.

Here, the presence of the third element is undisputed. Appellant is Ronald's mother. Ronald's birth certificate
showed this fact.

As for the first and second elements, appellant's minor children Rhey and Racel Gonzales categorically identified
appellant as the person who killed Ronald. They each gave an eyewitness account of how appellant inflicted
multiple blows on Ronald's head and body, first using a hanger until it snapped, and then, the broom's wooden
handle.

The testimonies of Rhey and Racel Gonzales pointing to their own mother as the person who, without mercy, beat
up their thirteen-year old brother, and again the next morning, deserve full faith and credence. These children
would not impute such a heinous crime as parricide on their own mother if it were not true. More so because these
children, young as they were, only had appellant to take care of them as their father had already died. The
testimonies of children against their own flesh and blood are given great weight, especially when no ill will is
shown, as in this case.

Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth. It rates highly in the hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. The physical evidence here is compatible with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses but
inconsistent with appellant's defense of denial. These testimonies, therefore, must prevail. In any event, the Court
has invariably ruled that denial is a weak defense which becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification
of the accused by prosecution witnesses.

No mitigating circumstance proven

Appellant argues that the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should be appreciated in her favor.

Appellant was sufficiently shown to have used brute force on Ronald so much so that the hanger she initially used
snapped. Even then, appellant did not stop; she got hold of the broom and using its wooden handle hit Ronald in the
head and all over his body. The following morning, appellant saw Ronald's critical condition. There was vomit on
his bed and on the floor. His jogging pants were wet with urine. He was so weak he could neither get up, nor hold a
spoon. He later fell to the ground. But appellant still did not take pity on her young child. Once more, she got the
broom and pushed its yantok handle inside Ronald's mouth. Rhey's testimony on appellant's heartless assault on her
thirteen-year old child was unwavering

G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO ABARCA

FACTS:

Accused Francisco Abarca was sentenced to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship
apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left
behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte.

On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the
bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip. He
went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and could not
leave. The accused, then proceeded home and found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual
intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The
accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away.

The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of C2C Arturo Talbo. He got Talbo's
M-16 rifle, and went back to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the
"mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at
Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room
adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley Koh
died instantaneously. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet. Lina
Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments.

RTC’s RULING

Francisco Abarca was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48.

It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's wife had illicit relationship
while he was away in Manila; that the accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's
infidelity which disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive
clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation of his death
sentence. Elevated to the SC.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

HELD:

Apply Art. 247.

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person
who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall
suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.

These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under
eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to
the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.

There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit
copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes
the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter. These elements are present in this case.  Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed
between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time
the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing
instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually
motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the
direct by-product of the accused's rage.

It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. The above-quoted article, far
from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically to an exemption
from an adequate punishment — to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the
accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his protection. 

The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The
case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his
rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore
hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that
he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault.
While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") that is not
enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on
his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious
physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was
incapacitated for one and one-half months; there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of
her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical
certificate estimating her recovery period.)

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto
mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty
(than destierro). 

[G.R. No. 47315. April 25, 1941.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERESO DUMON, Defendant-Appellant.

FACTS:

Tereso Dumon, was charged in the CFI of Negros Occidental with the crime of double murder for having shot and
killed, in the municipality of Bacolod, the spouses Manuel Magbanua and Loreto Magalona. The appellant received
in Cebu an anonymous letter informing that his wife, F elicisima Maramara, was staying at No. 16 Smith Street,
Bacolod, Occidental Negros. Armed with a revolver and accompanied by Marcial Hipolito, the appellant hurriedly
left for Bacolod. Upon finding the premises sought, the appellant, through the window, entered the room where
Manuel Magbanua and Loreta Magalona were lying together in one bed and thereafter shot and killed them. It is
conceded on all sides that the appellant mistook the deceased for his wife and her paramour, and the dispute has
reference only to the circumstances under which the fatal shots were fired. Thus, the prosecution claims that the
appellant killed the Magbanua spouses while they were asleep.

RTC- convicted the defendant of double homicide and sentenced him, for each homicide. the trial court found,
upon the appellant's testimony, that after the appellant had entered the room in question had become convinced that
the woman lying in bed was his wife was his wife, he proceeded to lift the mosquito net, whereupon the couple rose
from their bed; that it was only after the appellant saw the woman look for something and after the man had given
him blows on the shoulder and had tried to wrest his gun from him that the appellant fired the fatal shots. After
mature reflection, the Court was inclined to adopt this finding. No eye-witness was presented to contradict in any
way the appellant's testimony during the trial, and the prosecution relies solely upon the appellant's affidavit.

Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals and therein recapitulated his contention as follows: That he should be
discharged from the information on the ground that he acted in self-defense; or he should be given the benefit of the
exceptional circumstance provided in article 247, in relation to article 49 of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly
sentenced only to destierro in the maximum degree; or he should be convicted only of homicide through simple
imprudence, if it be found that he was guilty of some slight negligence in ascertaining in the identity of the deceased
spouses who were killed purely by accident.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused is liable for the same crime considering what was consummated was different from what was
intended.

RULING:

YES. There is no basis for the appellant's further contention that article 365 of the Revised Penal Code may be made
applicable and that he should be convicted only of homicide through simple imprudence, because the act of firing
the fatal shots was intentional on his part and even if the appellant had actually killed his wife and her paramour, he
would still be guilty of a felony. Neither is there basis for the alternative contention that the appellant acted in self-
defense, for the reason that, apart from the circumstance that his intrusion constituted sufficient provocation and the
weapon employed by him was not reasonably necessary, the measures taken by the deceased upon finding appellant
in their room cannot be considered unlawful aggression.

ARTICLE 247, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 49 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; CONSENT. — The
appellant, however, argues the he found the deceased couple in the act of carnal intercourse and that, as he mistook
them for his wife and her paramour, he should be sentenced only to distierro, pursuant to article 247, in relation to
article 49, of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court refused to believe that the deceased were found in the act of
copulation. We do not find it necessary to pass upon this copulation of the lower court in the light of the divided
opinion of this court in People v. Gonzalez, for, even assuming that the deceased were engaged in the sexual act,
article 247 of the Revised Penal Code cannot still be applied, since the appellant had expressly licensed his wife to
commit adultery, in that after the appellant had learned from the very mouth of his wife that the latter was in love
and preferred to live with Delfin Villaluz, he signed a document consenting his wife to look for and live with another
man. In our opinion, this is consent sufficient, under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code to have barred the
appellant for instituting a prosecution against his wife if the latter had in fact committed adultery thereafter.

DWELLING. — The circumstance of dwelling cannot be considered because the house in which the deceased were
killed was not the dwelling place of the appellant’s wife and her paramour whom he believed to have killed.

The aggravating circumstance of night-time cannot be taken into account, on the ground that the appellant,
upon leaving Cebu for Bacolod, did not know the exact time he would arrive at his destination. On the other hand,
the trial court correctly found the presence of the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation and voluntary surrender.

G.R. No. L-12629           December 9, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALFREDO ARAQUEL, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
On January 30, 1955, the acting chief of police of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, filed with the justice of the peace court of
that municipality a complaint for homicide against Alfredo Araquel accusing him of having hacked and killed
Alberto Pagadian with a bolo. On July 3, 1956, while said complaint was still pending in the justice of the peace
court, the chief of police of Narvacan moved for the amendment thereof, alleging that upon reinvestigation of the
facts he found that the crime committed by the accused was not homicide as charged in the original complaint but
that of homicide under exceptional circumstances as provided for in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Finding
the motion to be well taken, the justice of the peace court, on July 16, allowed the filing of the amended complaint
which charged the accused with “the crime of HOMICIDE UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES defined
and punished under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.” That same day, the accused was arraigned under the
amended complaint. And as he entered a plea of “guilty”, the justice of the peace court, also on that same day,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of destierro for a period of one year to any place not within the radius of at least
25 kilometers from the municipal building of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur.

During the service of the sentence by the accused, the acting Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur was informed of the
case through the Department of Justice to which the private prosecutor had lodged a complaint. And after
conducting an investigation, the said acting provincial fiscal on February 16, 1957, filed with Court of First Instance
of the province an information against the accused Alfredo Araquel charging him with homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the killing Alberto Pagadian. On July 9, 1957, the
accused moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy, invoking the previous charge against him
for homicide under exceptional circumstances and the subsequent sentence passed upon him by the justice of the
Peace Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. The fiscal opposed the motion, but the trial court, sustained the plea of double
jeopardy and dismissed the information. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Is the Court of First Instance correct in sustaining the plea of double jeopardy considering the plea of guilty was
already made in the charge of HOMICIDE UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES defined and punished
under Article 247 and a subsequent charge of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code was made for
the same killing of Alberto Pagadian?

HELD:

NO. The plea of jeopardy made by the accused was erroneously sustained by the lower court.

In order that a defendant may legally be placed in jeopardy, one of the necessary and indispensable conditions is
that he should have been tried before a court of competent jurisdiction. (Sec. 9 Rule 113, Rules of Court.) The
court below, in upholding the plea of double jeopardy, held that the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan, Ilocos
Sur, had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for “homicide under exceptional circumstances defined and
punished under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code,” on the theory that “the act defined” in that article “is a
felony” which is penalized with destierro and, consequently, falls under the jurisdiction of the inferior court,
following the ruling laid down in the case of Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan, et al. There can of course be no question
that, under the rule enunciated in the case of Uy Chin Hua offenses penalized with destierro fall under the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts. That rule, however, cannot be made to apply to the
present case, for it is apparent that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define a crime distinct and
separate from homicide, parricide, or murder, as the case may be, depending, in so far as those crimes are concerned,
upon the relationship of the victim to the killer and the manner by which the killing is committed.

We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime,
but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries
under the circumstances therein mentioned. Consequently, a complaint or information charging homicide under
the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 must fall under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First
Instance, the offense charged being actually that of homicide. The fact that the exceptional circumstances are
also pleaded — as was done in the amended complaint filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan —
would not affect the nature of the crime charged. For they are not integral elements of the crime charged but are
matters which the accused has to prove in order to warrant the application of the benefit granted by the law. As
unnecessary and immaterial averments to the crime charged, they may be stricken out as surplusage and still leave
the offense fully described.

Conformably to the above finding, we hold that defendant was not tried by a court of competent jurisdiction
when he was arraigned before the Justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan upon the amended complaint for
“homicide under exceptional circumstances” filed against him by the chief of police of the municipality, and
consequently, has not legally been placed in jeopardy in the present case.

G.R. No. 218581, March 27, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. LARRY LUMAHANG Y TALISAY, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution:
1. On December 14, 2008, around nine o'clock in the evening, Poraso, Velitario and Pornelos were attending a
wake in Joan of Arc Street, Barangay Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City when Talisay appeared fuming mad.
2. Talisay approached Pornelos from behind and stabbed him in a hook motion with knife in his left hand.
Pornelos, who was hit on the buttocks, quickly ran towards an alley. Without warning, appellant then turned
his ire on Velitario and stabbed him repeatedly on different parts of his body.
3. As per Medico Legal Examiner (Dr. Palmero), the cause of Velitario’s death was the multiple stab wounds
he sustained on the abdomen, which among others, hit his left kidney. Dr. Palmero estimated that based on
the depth of the wounds, the assailant was within an arm's length from the victim and that the weapon used
was a bladed knife measuring around eight (8) cm. long.
4. As for Pornelos, he sustained a non fatal wound on his right buttocks requiring treatment for around seven
(7) days. As per medical opinion, the victim was attacked from behind.

Version of the Accused (Lumahang)

1. On December 14, 2008, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Lumahang and his cousin LL were on their
way home from buying barbecue when five (5) bystanders who were under the influence of alcohol blocked
their way.
2. The bystanders approached Lumahang and LL. Suddenly, two (2) of them touched the hands, shoulders
and breasts of LL while the others laughed.
3. The bystanders approached Lumahang and one of them punched him while another pulled out a knife. The
person who drew the knife stabbed the accused but he was able to thwart the thrust. However, he was hit
on his left thigh and they grappled with the knife. When he saw a chance to run away, he ran towards the
direction of his aunt's house with the bystanders running after him. 
4. Augusto Pornelos was identified as one of the bystanders who blocked their way. 
5. When the police was looking for him, he voluntarily surrendered, after which, he was brought to the hospital
and thereafter, to Camp Karingal. He was surprised of the charges of murder and attempted murder against
him because he only grappled with the knife and did not stab anyone.
6. He had also sustained injuries from being punched in the head and had a stab wound on his left thigh. s
proof, he showed to the court a one-inch scar with five stitches on his left thigh. When he voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities, no knife was recovered from him.
RTC’s ruling
1. RTC convicted Lumahang of the crimes of Murder (for Velitario) and Less Serious Physical Injuries (for
Pornelos)- Attended with aggravating and mitigating circumstance
2. The RTC convicted Lumahang on the basis of the testimony of the prosecution eyewitness Poraso, who
positively identified him as the assailant of Velitario and Pornelos. 
i. Porazo was only about a meter and a half away from Lumahang when he saw the
Lumahang stab Pornelos. Also, Porazo was about 3 meters away from Velitario when he
saw appellant turned to stab Velitario. Even if it was already 9:00 in the evening, and he is
not familiar with appellant, Porazo's proximity to the two victims and the Lumahang gave
him unimpeded view of the stabbing incident. Thus, appellant easily and unmistakably
identified appellant in open court as the assailant of the victims.
3. RTC held that the stabbing of Pornelos and the killing of Velitario were attended by treachery because the
attacks were sudden, the victims were unarmed, and they were not able to defend themselves. 

CA’s ruling
1. CA affirmed with modifications the RTC's conviction of Lumahang on the basis of Poraso's testimony.
2. For Lumahang's claim of defense of relative, the CA did not give credence to the claim because the element
of unlawful aggression was insufficiently proven.
3. CA likewise upheld the RTC finding that the attacks were attended with treachery.
a. As to the attack against Pornelos, Lumahang effected the attack from behind. Fortunately,
Pornelos was able to run away before Lumahang could stab him any further
b. As to Velitario, the attack, while made frontally, was made by Lumahang in a sudden, unexpected,
and swift manner.
i. Granted that Velitario noticed the commotion between Pornelos and Lumahang, as he
was not more than 2 meters away from Pornelos, the swiftness and unexpected attack of
Lumahang nonetheless caught Velitario off guard. Thus, instead of running away from
Lumahang, Velitario remained standing and was unable to defend himself. 
4. CA also upheld the RTC's finding that Lumahang was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender because he surrendered to the barangay at the night of the incident after having been convinced
by his aunt.
5. CA convicted Lumahang of only Slight Physical Injuries, as Pornelos needed only seven days of
confinement in the hospital.

Issue: WoN the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present thereby making Lumahang liable for Murder instead
of Homicide
Held: For Pornelos, yes, treachery is present. For Velitario, no, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is not
present, thus Lumahang should be liable for Homicide
1. Treachery undoubtedly exists on the attack against Pornelos because (1) the parties were attending a wake,
and were thus not expecting an attack from happening; (2) the attack was made suddenly and from behind.
2. As for the attack on Velitario, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is
present, where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that he
thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk to himself
arising from the defense that the victim might offer.
 3. It must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a
view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
4. It is true that Velitario was unable to defend himself from Lumahang's attacks not because he was not given
an opportunity to do so, but simply because he was not able to react in time from the initial attack on
Pornelos.
5. The Court stresses that the essence of treachery is where the mode adopted by the assailant is positively
shown to have been knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of the criminal purpose without any
risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer.
6. The mode adopted by Lumahang in this case was not unexpected; it did not necessarily ensure that the act
would be executed without any defense from the victim, or that the victim would not be able to retaliate, as
the latter had the opportunity to run away or even defend himself. 

G.R. No. 229859, June 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JOJIT ARPON Y PONFERRADA @ "MODIO",

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution:
1. At 3:00 a.m. on May 27, 2010, the victim, Rodolfo R. Moriel (Rodolfo) and Bernardo S. Insigne (Bernardo)
were headed home walking side by side when they were accosted by accused-appellant Arpon.
2. Using a short bladed weapon, Arpon stabbed Rodolfo on the left chest.
3. Rodolfo tried to run, but he was stabbed for a second time on the right chest by Arpon until he fell to the
ground.
4. Bernardo fled the scene. On the same day, Bernardo went to the police to report the incident.
5. Rodolfo died due to hypovolemic shock resulting from acute blood loss caused by three multiple stab
wounds - two of which were deemed fatal.

Version of the Accused (Arpon)

1. Arpon testified that he went to Barangay Guindaohan on May 26, 2010.
2. He, along with his friend, Kevin Ponferrada, stayed at the house of Meldy Lucelo, the mother-in-law of his
brother, from 8:00 p.m. on May 26, 2010 to 4:00 a.m. on May 27, 2010

RTC’s ruling
1. RTC found Arpon guilty as charged (Murder)
2. It gave credence to the positive identification of the prosecution eye witness, Bernardo, who was only two
yards away from Rodolfo when Rodolfo was stabbed.
3. On the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the RTC noted that Arpon - who came out of nowhere -
deliberately, suddenly, and unexpectedly attacked Rodolfo - who was then unarmed and completely
unaware of the danger to his life.

CA’s ruling
 1. CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.

Issue: WoN the accused should be charged with Murder or Homicide?

Held: Murder
1. In order to successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established:
a. that a person was killed;
b. the accused killed him or her;
c. the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and
d. the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
2. Treachery attended the commission of the crime. Rodolfo and Bernardo were walking side by side when
they were accosted by accused-appellant who suddenly stabbed Rodolfo with a short bolo. Both Rodolfo
and Bernardo were unarmed and were totally unaware of the impending assault from the accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 239032, June 17, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. GILBERT FLORESTA Y SELENCIO, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution:
1. Around  8:00  in the evening  of December 28, 2012, Jay Lourd was having a drinking session with his friend
Alla and a certain Benjie at the kitchen of his house. 
2. After drinking two (2) shots of gin, Jay Lourd suddenly stood up and said to Allan, " Pare, I was hit, may
tama ako."
3. As Allan was about to hug Jay Lourd, he heard a cracking sound behind him, causing him to run away. 
4. Jay Lourd's wife, Jennifer Bones, was breastfeeding  their youngest  child when she heard the gunshot
coming from the kitchen. She hurriedly went to the kitchen and saw Jay Lourd bloodied on the floor,
prompting her to cover his wound with a piece of cloth.
5. At that moment, he told her, "Panggay, you see if Gilbert is still there?"
6. She proceeded to the hospital where she was informed that Jay Lourd was already dead. Thereafter, she
went to the Masbate City Police Station to tell the authorities that it was Gilbert who shot Jay Lourd.
Consequently, Gilbert was apprehended by the police.

Version of the Accused (Gilbert)

1. From 12:30 until 3:00 in the afternoon of December 28, 2012, he was watching a cockfight in Purok Casili,
Barangay Igang, Masbate City.
2. Afterwards, he proceeded to play cara y cruz until 9:00 in the evening. 
3. He went back to Barangay Malinta and saw a crowd near the house of Jay Lourd. Upon asking the people
what happened, he learned that Jay Lourd was shot to death.
 4. Thereafter, he went home and had dinner. After having dinner, the police officers arrived at his house, and
then, he was investigated, examined, and detained.

RTC’s ruling
1. RTC found Gilbert guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
2. Moreover, the RTC found the killing to have been attended by treachery, as the prosecution was able to
establish that:
a. at the time of the incident, Jay Lourd was drinking with his friends and had no inkling that anyone
would shoot him; and
b. the shooting took place in which he could not properly defend himself.

CA’s ruling
1. CA affirmed Gilbert's conviction. Prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of Murder.

Issue: WoN Gilbert should be charged with Murder

Held: Acquitted
1. To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established:
a. that a person was killed;
b. the accused killed him or her;
c. the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
RPC; and
d. the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
2. Prosecution failed to establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt that Gilbert is the perpetrator who shot
and killed Jay Lourd.
3. The Court agrees that Jay Lourd's utterance – " Panggay, you see if Gilbert is still there?" – should be
admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae, the courts a quo erred in considering the same as direct
evidence of the killing and that Gilbert was the perpetrator thereof. Plainly, Jay Lourd's utterance did not
contain any positive and categorical identification of Gilbert as his assailant. 
4. Records show that aside from Jay Lourd's utterance, there is only one (1) other circumstance that could
possibly point to Gilbert as the assailant, and that is their previous quarrel with one another. However, the
totality of these circumstances is insufficient to produce a moral certainty that it was indeed Gilbert who shot
and killed Jay Lourd.
5. On cross-examination, Allan admitted that it was improbable to see who the shooter was and where the
gunshot came from "because it was very dark." Moreover, he opined that he was not sure if Jay Lourd was
able to see the shooter, as he already ran away. 
6. The prosecution failed to establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt the identity of Jay Lourd's killer.  It is
elementary that in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the
crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established,
there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 227013, June 17, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ARIES REYES Y HILARIO, ARGIE REYES Y HILARIO,
ARTHUR HILARIO, AND DEMETRIO SAHAGUN Y MANALILI, ACCUSED, ARIES REYES Y HILARIO AND
DEMETRIO SAHAGUN Y MANALILI, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution:
1. The victim Jun Balmores, appellants Demetrio and Aries, and accused Argie and Arthur were all vendors
who sold their wares along the stretch of Hidalgo Street, Quiapo, Manila.
2. On August 5, 2007, the police apprehended the illegal vendors in the area.
3. Jun asked brothers Aries and Argie Reyes to allow his mother to leave her wares and vegetables in their
stall. But the Reyes brothers refused. An argument then ensued between them and Jun.
4. In the late afternoon, Jun and his wife Catherine packed up their wares and prepared to go home. But
before leaving the area, Jun went back to Hidalgo Street for the shoulder bag he left.
5. When Aries, Demetrio, Arthur, and Argie saw Jun, they pursued him. As Jun tried to run away, Demetrio hit
him with a plastic chair in the head, causing the former to fall to the ground. 
6. Arthur and Aries then alternately hit him with broomsticks.
7. Jun, nonetheless, managed to get back on his feet and run toward Villalobos Street. But when he reached
the corner of Villalobos Street, Argie was there waiting. Argie stabbed Jun in the left side of his body. 
8. Though wounded, Jun did not stop running. Shortly after, Argie caught up with him and stabbed him a
second time, hitting him in the arm. Jun fell anew. Meantime, Arthur and Aries arrived.
9. Before they could further hit Jun, Catherine stepped in and begged them to stop. 
10. Jun got rushed to the hospital where he was declared dead on arrival.

Version of the Accused (Aries, Demetri, Arthur and Argie)

1. According to them, when the stabbing incident took place, they were playing "pusoy" inside the Picache
Building.
2. The victim came and got into a heated argument with Argie. Jun brandished a small knife at Argie. They
grappled for the knife until Argie succeeded in wresting it from Jun.
3. Jun retreated but Argie gave chase. Argie caught up with and stabbed Jun. After Jun fell to the ground,
Argie ran away. 
4. The incident had already ended when Aries, Demetrio, and Arthur arrived.
5. Before the incident, Rosalina Reyes, mother of the Reyes brothers, received threats from Jun's brothers
regarding a space she bought from Demetrio.

RTC’s ruling
1. RTC finds Aries and Demetrio both guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength and
aggravated by treachery. (Argie and Arthur have remained at large.)

CA’s ruling
1. Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification. It found that treachery attended the killing. As for abuse of
superior strength, it ruled that the same was deemed absorbed in treachery. 

Issue: WoN the charge should be murder

Held: Homicide. There being no qualifying circumstance attendant to the killing of Jun Balmores, appellants may only
be convicted of homicide
1. Murder requires the following elements:
a. a person was killed;
b. the accused killed him or her;
c. the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code;
d. the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
2. The first and fourth elements - A person was killed and the killing is not parricide or infanticide
a. The presence of the first and fourth elements was undisputed. Jun Balmores was killed and the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.
3. The second element - the accused killed the victim
a. Fernando dela Cruz, a vendor in the area, testified in detail how appellants and their co-accused
Argie Reyes and Arthur Hilario acted together in pursuing, hitting, and stabbing Jun Balmores to
death
b. Appellants and their co-accused each took an active part in assaulting Jun Balmores. They in fact
acted in concert toward one common purpose: to kill Jun Balmores. This is conspiracy. In
conspiracy, the parties need not actually come together and agree in express terms to enter into
and pursue a common design. It is enough that at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused or assailants had the same purpose and were united in its execution, as in this case.
c. The fact that it was Argie alone who delivered the final coup de grace on the victim did not diminish
appellants' shared culpability. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
4. The third element - the presence of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code
a. Treachery
i. The essence of treachery is the swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner by which the
offense was committed, affording the victim no opportunity to resist, escape, much less,
defend himself or herself.43 The offender must have planned the mode of attack to ensure
its execution without exposing himself to any danger which may come from the victim's
act of retaliation or self-defense.
ii. There is no showing that appellants and their co-accused knew Jun was going back to
Hidalgo street and that they had planned to attack Jun there and then. Appellants and
their co-accused appeared to have spontaneously acted as soon as they saw Jun back in
the area. They instantaneously pursued him.
iii. Although Jun did not expect the sudden and concerted attack of his assailants who were
each armed with either a chair, broomstick handles, or a knife, he was not rendered totally
defenseless or prevented from escaping his assailants. In fact, he was able to get back on
his feet and run for his life, albeit in the end, he still lost his life due to the stab wound he
sustained in his trunk.
b. Abuse of superior strength
i. Abuse of superior strength, when absorbed in treachery, cannot be appreciated as a
separate qualifying or aggravating circumstance. When treachery is absent, as in this
case, abuse of superior strength may be appreciated as a distinct circumstance which
may qualify the killing to murder.
 ii. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the
aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of
the crime. Evidence must show that the aggressor/s consciously sought the advantage, or
their deliberate intent to use it.
iii. Abuse of superior strength cannot be inferred simply from the fact that Jun was
outnumbered four to one. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of
abuse of superior strength.
iv. Neither can the Court consider as evidence thereof the fact alone that appellants and their
co-accused were each armed either with broomstick handles, plastic chair, or knife.
v. There is no evidence that appellants and their companions planned the attack or
purposely sought the advantage of superior strength by arming themselves to put the
victim in such notorious disadvantage to ensure the commission of the crime

G.R. No. 232338, July 08, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RAMON QUILLO Y ESMANI, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.

Facts:

According to the testimony of the companions of the victim, at about 6:30 p.m. of May 28, 2014,
Michael, Gina, Corazon, and the victim, Vivien Yap-De Castro (Vivien), were walking along Ilang-Ilang
Street towards IBP Road when a black motorcycle of an unknown plate number with two persons
onboard stopped beside them. The back rider shouted "ate!", pointed a gun towards Vivien, and fired
two (2) successive shots immediately killing the victim. The witnesses alleged that they saw the face of
the back rider as he was not wearing any helmet. After about one (1) minute from the time Vivien was
shot, the tandem proceeded to Litex Street. Ramon was later identified as the back rider in Camp
Karingal and in court.

The Medico-Legal Report No. QCA-14-202, issued by Police Chief Inspector Palima MD, and the Autopsy
Report dated May 29, 2014, revealed that the victim sustained two (2) gunshot wounds and the one on
her head caused her death.

Ramon maintained that on May 28, 2014, at the time Vivien was shot, he was initially in Water Hall,
Barangay Payatas B, Quezon City to look for money for his son's school shoes. Thereafter, he went to
Montalban because his first wife, Charito Quillo, was confined at Rodriguez Hospital. 1He also averred
that at about 9:30 p.m. on June 3, 2014, there was a commotion between tricycle drivers and teenagers.
When he scolded them for being noisy, they turned to him and hit him with a bottle of wine on his right
eyebrow. He was then brought to Police Station 6 in Batasan where he saw the persons who mauled him.
They accused him of starting the fight. He was brought back to Barangay Payatas B and was instructed by
the police officer to file a complaint because he sustained an injury. Instead of filing a complaint, he went
to the house of his cousin Jun Bonifacio (Jun) where he slept until about 8:00 a.m. the next day, June 4,
2014, until a barangay mobile arrived at the house of Jun. He was brought to the house of Capt. Guarin
who turned him over to Major Marcelo and Monsalve in Camp Karingal. They allegedly forced him to
admit that he was "Bunso", hit his head about six (6) times with his elbow, and punched him on his left
side.

RTC:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Ramon Quillo y Esmani guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of  reclusion
perpetua.

CA:

In a Decision21 dated August 30, 2016, the CA upheld Ramon's conviction but modified the monetary
award. The CA imposed the legal interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
the judgment until fully paid on the total awarded damages.

Issues:
Whether the prosecution witnesses positively identified Ramon as the assailant; and

Supreme Court:

The lower courts committed reversible error in ruling that the positive identification of Ramon by the
prosecution witnesses established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Teehankee, Jr., the
Court explained the concept of out-of-court identification and the factors to consider in determining its
admissibility and reliability, thus:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-

ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done
thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for
the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-
court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its
fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (Citation omitted
and emphasis in the original)
In this case, the identification was done through a police line-up. Applying the totality of circumstances
test, We find that the out-of-court identification made by Michael, Gina, and Corazon is unreliable and
cannot be made the basis for Ramon's conviction. A comprehensive analysis of their testimonies reveals
that such are dubious and lack probative weight.

G.R. No. 230778

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JUAN CREDO y DE VERGARA and DANIEL CREDO y DE VERGARA, Accused-Appellant

Facts:

According to the prosecution witnesses, Spouses Antonio Asistin (Antonio) and Evangeline Asistin
(Evangeline) operated a computer shop and a store at their residence located at No. 5 Zodiac Ext.
Sagittarius St., Remar Village, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. Daniel and Juan, brothers, are nephews
of Evangeline. At around lunch time on March 16, 2004, Daniel, an assistant at the computer shop,
entertained male customers who wanted to rent tapes. Evangeline instructed Daniel to let the male
customers in. Evangeline got up and asked the men where they are from. One of the men replied, " ano
nga bang lugar iyon?." Evangeline then told them that if they are not from the area, they could just buy
the tapes. Evangeline went back to the table and continued eating her lunch. 

When Evangeline stood up to get water from the refrigerator, Daniel and the two unidentified men
suddenly appeared. One of the unidentified men strangled her. Without saying anything, he pressed the
lanseta and started stabbing her. Evangeline struggled and resisted until she fell to the floor while that
person continued to stab her. Evangeline kicked him so he would not reach her body. Thereafter, the
men who assaulted her left. Evangeline recalled that she sustained eight stab wounds. 

Once the two unidentified men left, Evangeline stood up and saw Antonio standing at the gate with
several stab wounds. Upon seeing Antonio, Evangeline told Daniel to chase the two men who had just
left. According to Evangeline, Daniel did not help her and even watched while she was being stabbed. He
did not go out to chase the two men. 

After being stabbed, Antonio was able to walk to the door of the computer shop. Evangeline and Rufo
Baguio (Baguio), a neighbor, allegedly saw Daniel carry Antonio about two feet from the ground and
then drop him, causing his head to hit the ground.  A few minutes later, Antonio was carried to the
vehicle of a neighbor while Evangeline took a tricycle with neighbor Roy Bischotso to the hospital. 
Antonio was declared dead on arrival.
On March 17, 2004, a follow-up operation was conducted by the police led by Police Officer 2 (PO2)
Victorio B. Guerrero (PO2 Guererro) after Daniel allegedly implicated his brother Juan to the crime. The
operation resulted to the arrest of Juan at his rented room. In his sworn statement, PO2 Guerrero
alleged that Juan was nabbed while stashing in his bag a homemade shot gun (sumpak). The bag also
contained clothing, two live ammunitions for shotgun and a fan knife measuring approximately seven
inches long. He was allegedly in the process of absconding when he was apprehended. 

Juan and Daniel denied the allegations against them. Juan maintained that he sought employment with
Spouses Asistin but was rejected. Juan accepted their decision without any ill-feelings.  On March 16,
2004, at around 1:30 pm, Juan watched television at his rented place in Luzon, Fairview, Quezon City.
Thereafter, from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm, he watched a basketball game about 14 meters away from the
room he was renting. Then, at around 6:30 pm to 6:45 pm, he again watched television at his place. It
was at this time that he heard a noise coming from outside. Suddenly, someone kicked the door of his
room. An armed policeman appeared with his brother Daniel who was in handcuffs. He was asked to go
with them to the police station where he was allegedly tortured into admitting committing the crimes he
is charged with.  He also denied that a shotgun or sumpak was confiscated from him.

On the other hand, Daniel testified that at around 11:00 am on March 16, 2004, he was painting the roof
of the house of Spouses Asistin when he suddenly heard Evangeline shouting for help. Daniel
immediately went down from the roof and saw Antonio lying covered with blood on the ground near the
garage.  He was shocked upon seeing Antonio's state. Daniel testified that he raised Antonio when he
saw him wounded but the latter stood up, went out, and kept cursing. When he went inside, he fell to
the ground so Daniel carried him to a taxi.

RTC:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel
Credo y de Vergara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and they are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reculsion perpetua for the death of Antonio Asistin y Palco.1âшphi1

WHEREFORE, the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de Vergara are hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder committed against Evangeline Cielos-
Asistin, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby acquits the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara of the offense of violation of
Section 32 in relation to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7166 and Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6446, for lack of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and he is hereby imposed
an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum, up to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of  reclusion temporal as
maximum.
CA:

In a Decision  dated October 13, 2016, the CA denied Juan and Daniel's appeal and affirmed their
respective convictions. In affirming their convictions, the CA held that the sworn statement of PO2
Guerrero sufficiently established Juan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of P.D. 1866. The CA
also found the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficient to convict Juan and Daniel of
conniving to commit murder and frustrated murder. The CA did not consider Daniel's non flight as a
badge of innocence sufficient to exculpate him from criminal liability. 

Issue:
Whether the convictions of the accused were upheld.

SC:
Evangeline admitted that neither Daniel nor Juan stabbed her and that she did not see Juan during the
incident. Their complicity was merely based on circumstantial evidence, having been allegedly seen near
the residence of Spouses Asistin, talking to strangers, before the incident took place. The prosecution
witnesses admitted to not knowing nor hearing what Daniel, Juan, and the other men were discussing.
They also admitted not seeing who killed Antonio.

In this case, We find that the prosecution failed to present sufficient proof of concerted action before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which would demonstrate accused-appellants' unity of
design and objective. There is no direct proof nor reliable circumstantial evidence establishing that Juan
and Daniel conspired with the unidentified men who stabbed Spouses Asistin.

The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution - testimonies of Baguio and Ganal claiming
that they saw Juan and Daniel talking to each other moments before the crimes were committed do not
prove conspiracy. Baguio and Ganal insisted seeing three (3) unidentified men and Juan enter the house
of Spouses Asistin. However, neither of the witnesses could confirm to the Court that these men were
the same men who stabbed Spouses Asistin nor could they confirm that they heared their conversation.
Furthermore, the claim of Baguio and Ganal that three (3) unidentified men entered the house of
Spouses Asistin contradicts the statement of Evangeline that only two (2) unidentified men were allowed
by Daniel to enter their house,  and that she did not see Juan.

To Our mind, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when taken as a whole, failed to present a
coherent and consistent narration of the facts. Absent any proof sufficient to connect/relate Daniel and
Juan to the criminal design of killing Spouses Asistin, it cannot be concluded that Daniel and Juan were in
conspiracy with the unidentified aggressors in committing murder and frustrated murder. With their
inconclusive conduct and participation, We cannot conscientiously declare that they were principals or
even accomplices in the crimes charged. The presumption of innocence in their favor has not been
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Juan's conviction of violation of P.D. 1866, based solely on the testimony of arresting officer PO2
Guerrero, is erroneous. We cannot ignore the possibility that the shotgun, ammunitions, and knife
confiscated from Juan were merely planted. It is too coincidental that at the very moment the police
conducted a follow-up operation and made a protective search at the room where Juan was staying, he
was caught packing a bag filled with the seized items.

Furthermore, even if the weapons seized from Juan were not planted, it does not follow that the
prosecution proved Juan's purported participation in the crimes charged against him. Contrary to what
the prosecution would like Us to believe, there appears to be no direct relation between the seized
articles and the weapons used to inflict the stab wounds on Evangeline and Antonio. It was not shown
during trial that the weapons allegedly confiscated from Juan were the same objects used in stabbing
Evangeline and Antonio. In view of the dismissal of the criminal cases for murder and frustrated murder,
there is no reason to consider the items seized from Juan during an alleged protective search on the
person of Juan pursuant to a follow-up operation PO2 Guerrero conducted.

In conclusion, We recognize that the evidence for the defense is not strong because Daniel and Juan
merely denied participating in the brutal stabbing of Spouses Asistin. Their testimonies were
uncorroborated by any other evidence. Admittedly, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been
viewed with disfavor. Nevertheless, the apparent weakness of Juan and Daniel's defense does not add
any strength nor can it help the prosecution's cause. If the prosecution cannot establish, in the first
place, Juan and Daniel's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the need for the defense to adduce evidence in
its behalf in fact never arises. However weak the defense evidence might be, the prosecution's whole
case still falls. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 9, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 219 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-125714, Q-04-125715, Q-04-125717, as well as
the Decision dated October 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06428 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-Appellants Juan Credo y De Vergara and Daniel Credo y De
Vergara are ACQUITTED for failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and are ORDERED to be
immediately released unless they are being held for some other valid or lawful cause. The Director of
Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court of the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.

EDGARDO PATUNGAN, JR. Y LAGUNDI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

At 9 o’clock in the evening of October 13, 2007, sisters Kristine and Gladys went to the store of a certain
Viring located near petitioner’s house in Barangay Centro, Northwest Solana, Cagayan While on their
way back home, they met Richard Ventura (Richard) who shouted “pokpok” at Kristine, and he
proceeded to the house of petitioner. Kristine and Gladys hurriedly went home to report the incident to
their father, Venancio Furigay (Venancio) As Venancio was not in their house, the sisters went to
petitioner’s house to talk to Richard. Kristine and Gladys saw that there was a group of men – composed
of petitioner, Erwin Patungan and Ismael Portina- having a drinking spree at petitioner’s house. Initially,
Richard hid upon seeing Kristine, but eventually went out of petitioner’s house and Kristine, who was
then crying, asked Richard why he called her “pokpok,” but Richard just kept quiet. Petitioner even tried
to cover up for Richard saying that the latter could not have uttered the word ”pokpok” at Kristine.

Later, Venancio arrived at the petitioner’s house to fetch her daughters. Kristine told her father to wait as
she had to confront Richard on why he called her “pokpok.” Venancio had a heated argument with
Richard. Gladys asked Kristine and their father to just go home instead.

However, after Venancio and his daughters had left the place and were already on the road, petitioner,
who was running, suddenly stabbed Venancio on his stomach. Venancio subsequently fell to the ground.
Gladys tried to rescue her father, but Erwin Patungan even boxed him. When Kristine tried to pacify
Erwin, the latter slapped her and so she screamed for help. Their uncle Lauro went to their rescue and
rushed Venancio to the St. Paul Hospital, and was later transferred to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center
where he was operated on because of the stab wound, but he died after the operation.

At 10:30 p.m., PO3 Bago of the Solana Police Station, received a report of an incident in Barangay Centro
Northwest, so he and Special Police Officer (SPO4) Florante Balagan were immediately dispatched to the
area. Upon arriving at the scene of the incident, they were met by Gladys who told them that her father
Venancio was rushed to the hospital as he was stabbed by petitioner. They then proceeded to
petitioner’s house, where the latter voluntarily surrendered and was brought to the police station. PO3
Bago and SPO4 Balagan went to the St. Paul Hospital and asked the victim, Venancio, if he could identify
his assailant to which the victim replied that it was petitioner. PO3 Bago took the victim’s ante-mortem
statement which was reduced to writing. However, the statement was not reflected in PO3 Bago’s
affidavit of arrest nor in the police blotter because according to him, they were running out of time and
had no pen and paper.

RTC:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDGARDO PATUNGAN, JR. y Lagundi
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, appreciating in his [favor] the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby sentences
him to suffer a prison term of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor[,] as minimum[,] to Twelve
(12) years of prision mayor[,] as maximum[,] and to pay the heirs of the deceased Venancio Furigay the
following amounts: P75,000.00, mandatory dal11ages death; P50,000.00 moral damages, P70,000[.]00
as nominal damages; and P1,512,000.00 as unearned salaries.

CA:
On January 17, 2017, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC Judgment.
Issue:
Whether there was no clear identification of the accused during the commission of the crime.

SC:
Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is
best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh
such testimony in light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth
and falsehood. This is especially true when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, because said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, unless it be manifestly
shown that the latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of
significance in the case.[36] Here, we find that petitioner failed to show that the RTC and the CA had
overlooked any significant facts which could affect the result of the case.

A review of the records would show that the prosecution witnesses, Kristine and Gladys, had sufficiently
proven that petitioner was the one who stabbed their father, Venancio.

Kristine and Gladys positively identified petitioner as the one who stabbed their father. They could not
be mistaken on the identity of petitioner as they were just beside their father walking on their way home
when their father was stabbed by petitioner. Notably, petitioner is their neighbor whom they know very
much. We have ruled that the familiarity of the witness to the perpetrator of the crime erased any doubt
that the witness could have erred in identifying him; and that a witness related to the victim of a crime
has a natural tendency to remember the faces of the person involved in the attack on the victim,
because relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and
bringing the malefac or before the law. Moreover, to blame an innocent man for the killing of the victim
would serve them no purpose.

Kristine and Gladys’ positive identification of petitioner as their father’s assailant prevailed over
petitioner’s mere denial, because such denial, being negative and self-serving evidence, was undeserving
of weight by virtue of its lack of substantiation by clear and convincing proof.

Moreover, we find no showing that Kristine and Gladys were motivated by ill feelings towards petitioner
as to impute to him the responsibility of killing their father. It is well settled that where there is nothing
to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
he was not so actuated, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 17, 2017 and the Resolution dated April
4, 2017 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 241557, December 11, 2019

FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts:
In the prosecution's narration of events, on January 21, 2011 at around 1:00 a.m., Garino and an
unknown companion were seated inside a jeepney which was parked in front of Fernandez's house,
when Garino saw someone go out of the gate. When they heard a gunshot, they immediately alighted
from the jeepney, and it was then that Garino saw that the person who fired the shot was Fernandez,
though he did not know the latter's name at the time. As the two ran away, Fernandez fired his gun a
second time, hitting Garino on his right gluteal area, or "buttocks" in layman's terms. Garino was then
brought to the Ospital ng Makati and resultantly underwent immediate surgery. He was confined for
some two weeks and spent almost P200,000.00 for his stay in the hospital.

For its version of the facts, the defense presented Fernandez himself, as well as his son Jayvee, to testify
as witnesses. Fernandez, a retired police officer, vehemently denied the prosecution's version of the
events and claimed that he was sleeping with his wife at the time of the incident and was unaware of
any unusual incident outside his house at the time. According to Fernandez, he was not investigated by
the police or by any barangay official on the alleged shooting, and only learned of the charge for
Frustrated Murder upon receipt of a subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

RTC:

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision 12 on April 27, 2015 convicting Fernandez of the crime charged

CA:

The CA, however, denied Fernandez's appeal for lack of merit, and affirmed with modification
Fernandez's conviction as meted out by the RTC.

Fernandez's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, prompting recourse to the Supreme Court. Hence,
this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not Fernandez is indeed guilty of the crime of Frustrated Murder, for shooting Garino and
failing to kill the latter despite inflicting a deep wound on the victim.
SC:

The Court acquits Fernandez on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lower courts committed grave
abuse of discretion in hastily convicting Fernandez on the basis of questionable evidence.

It is a basic and immutable principle in criminal law that an accused individual cannot be convicted if
there is reasonable doubt in his or her commission of a crime. Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
must be adduced by the prosecution otherwise the accused must be acquitted, even if, on face, he or
she appears to be most suspicious or even if there is no other possible or identifiable perpetrator in the
records despite there having been a crime committed.

Even a casual observer can see that almost the entire case for the prosecution rests exclusively on
Garino, the victim, and his testimony. No other witness was presented to narrate the events of that
fateful night, even though Garino had a companion. A more nuanced glance at the antecedent facts will
unearth several glaring inconsistencies in Garino's testimony as well as the evidence on record. While
these inconsistencies on their own may not be enough to completely decimate his testimony, taken
together with the fact that the prosecution relied solely on the alleged victim's narration of events, these
more than show the presence of reasonable doubt substantial enough to acquit the accused.

Notably, the testimony is anchored on Garino's positive identification of Fernandez as the culprit who
shot him, even though he did not know his name at the time, and only zeroed in on Fernandez after the
incident as a result of Barcenas' own identification. In this regard, the Court finds Garino's testimony to
be highly suspect, and laden with several inconsistencies which militate against Fernandez's culpability
as a suspect.

First, the condition of visibility at the time was not specified to by Garino. The incident happened after
midnight, and there was no mention that the area was illuminated sufficiently in that Garino would be
able to take a good look at his assailant. The need to take a good look at his assailant's features is
indispensable and crucial, as Garino did not know who Fernandez was, and only identified the latter
based on how Garino's description of Fernandez was apparently in sync with Barcenas' own
identification. In this case, apart from Garino's own testimony, no other competent nor corroborative
proof was adduced by the prosecution that would answer the question of visibility.

Second, the Court finds as a misstep on the part of the lower courts that they did not question the
circumstances or even the identity of Garino's alleged companion during the night of the shooting. Even
putting aside his non-presentation during trial as a witness, the Court finds it baffling that Garino did not
even know his name, or at least could not identify him.

Third, the Court finds it puzzling that the prosecution only presented three witnesses: Garino himself, his
brother who was not present and who only assisted in filing the complaint, and Dr. Sanchez, who
testified as to Garino's severity of wounds. The latter two were not even directly involved in the incident.
While the Court is aware as to the jurisprudential pronouncement that it is not in the realm of courts to
decide the order or even the presentation of witnesses, with Garino's testimony suffering. from
infirmities, the Court finds that circumstantial evidence is necessary in order to bolster his narration,
corroborative testimony from either his unnamed companion during the shooting, or even from
Barcenas herself. The lack of this the Court finds troubling especially as a second voice could and should
have shed more light on the truth.

Fourth, it was not shown that Fernandez had any motive for shooting Garino. While motive is generally
immaterial when it comes to considering intent in a criminal case, it can help facilitate the intrusion into
the accused's mind especially when there is an issue as to the identity of the latter.

Fifth, the Court finds that the lower courts hastily brushed off Fernandez's defense of alibi, to the latter's
detriment. After all, considering the fact that the accused and the victim did not know each other and
had not heard about each other prior to the incident, with even Fernandez stating that the first time he
saw Garino was during the trial, it makes complete sense that Fernandez's flat denial that he was a
participant in the offense, and his whereabouts during that time would be his only defenses.

Henceforth, the Court is constrained to reverse the RTC and the CA rulings due to the presence of
lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as
quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Fernandez is entitled to an acquittal, as a
matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 235749, June 19, 2019
RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
An Information was filed against Picardal for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms .
He was caught/accused of having urinated in public, was allegedly frisked, and a caliber
.38 revolver was found at his waist. The rusty [pistol] with a handle made of wood
contained five (5) live ammunitions. After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated
September 24, 2015, the RTC convicted Picardal of the crime charged.

In finding Picardal guilty, the RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of the crime charged, namely: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2)
the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed it, does not have the license or
permit to possess the same. The RTC also held that Picardal's defense of denial was
self-serving and inherently weak.

the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Picardal. Relying on the testimonies of the
apprehending officers, in addition to the certification presented in court which said that
Picardal was "not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind of caliber,"  the CA
held that Picardal was indeed guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Is the accused guily of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms?

Held:

NO. The factual findings of the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are generally final
and conclusive on the Court. The foregoing rule, however, is subject to the following
exceptions:cralawred

(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

   
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
   
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
   
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
   
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
   
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are
based;
   
(7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence
 on record;
   
(8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
   
(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts
that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
   
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
   
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, the ninth exception applies. The CA manifestly overlooked the
undisputed facts that: (1) the firearm subject of this case was seized from Picardal after
he was frisked by the police officers for allegedly urinating in a public place; and (2) the
aforementioned case for "urinating in a public place" filed against Picardal was
subsequently dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.17 The act supposedly
committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place — is punished only by Section 2(a)
of Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Regulation No. 96-00918 (MMDA
Regulation).

The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for a violation of the said
section is only a fine of five hundred pesos (PhP500.00) or community service of one
(1) day. The said regulation did not provide that the violator may be imprisoned for
violating the same, precisely because it is merely a regulation issued by the
MMDA. Stated differently, the MMDA Regulation is, as its name implies, a mere
regulation, and not a law or an ordinance.

Therefore, even if it were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public place,
the police officers involved in this case still conducted an illegal search when they
frisked Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search incidental to a
lawful arrest as there was no or there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must
be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon
the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In
other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search
may be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made — the process cannot be reversed.22 (Emphasis and underscoring
in the original)

Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be
used in any prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. As there is no longer any evidence against Picardal in this case, he must
perforce be acquitted.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 240475, July 24, 2019
JONATHAN DE GUZMAN Y AGUILAR, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
In an Information, De Guzman was charged with illegal possession of a firearm, or of
violating Republic Act No. 10591, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act. On arraignment, De Guzman pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged Trial followed. The prosecution presented its lone witness, Senior Police
Officer 1 Ador Estera (SPO1 Estera).

In a March 1, 2017 Decision,18 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City
convicted De Guzman. According to it, the presentation during trial of a .38 caliber
revolver and ammunition, coupled with SPO1 Estera's identification of them as the
same items obtained from De Guzman, established the elements for conviction of the
charge of illegal possession of a firearm. It added that, in any case, De Guzman himself
admitted to not having a license to own, possess, or carry a .38 caliber revolver or
ammunition.

Aggrieved, De Guzman appealed before the Court of Appeals. He maintained that the
gun and ammunition presented against him were merely "planted evidence."
In its assailed March 21, 2018 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed De Guzman's
conviction with modification. As with the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals lent
credence to the prosecution's evidence, particularly to SPO1 Estera's recollection of
events.

Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' March 21, 2018 Decision convicting him of illegal
possession of a firearm, De Guzman filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of
Appeals denied this in its July 5, 2018 Resolution.

ISSUE:
whether or not petitioner Jonathan De Guzman y Aguilar is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Republic Act No. 10591, or the Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act.

HELD:
NO. It was a serious error for the Court of Appeals to affirm petitioner's conviction.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands moral certainty. The prosecution's reliance on
nothing more than the lone testimony of a witness, who is faulted with a vendetta and
illegal activities allegedly committed against the accused, hardly establishes moral
certainty.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is imperative to sustain a conviction in criminal cases.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:cralawred
SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
This requisite quantum of proof is borne by the constitutional imperative of due process.
It is also in keeping with the presumption of innocence of an accused until the contrary
is proved. While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not demand absolute,
impeccable, and infallible certainty, it still requires moral certainty.

To sustain convictions for illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must show two
(2) essential elements: (1) that the firearm subject of the offense exists; and (2) that the
accused who possessed or owned that firearm had no corresponding license for it.

The Regional Trial Court's reasoning and the Court of Appeals' sustaining it place far
too much faith in the lone prosecution witness' flimsy, self-serving posturing. They come
from a misplaced emphasis on the defense's supposed weakness and, ultimately, fail to
appreciate what proof beyond reasonable doubt demands.

Proving its version of events beyond reasonable doubt made it necessary for the
prosecution to present evidence that not only trumped that of the defense, but even
addressed all the glaring loopholes in its own claims. It was, therefore, inadequate for it
to have relied on the single testimony of the police officer whose credibility had been put
into question not only with respect to the veracity and accuracy of his version of events
leading to petitioner's arrest, but even with respect to a supposed prior vendetta against
petitioner, and an attempt to extort from him. It was the prosecution's duty to show that
its version of events deserves credence, the inadequacies of SPO1 Estera
notwithstanding. It abandoned the chance to discharge this duty when it declined to
present other witnesses to buttress the claims of its single, grossly flawed witness.
This is not to say that petitioner's own allegations against SPO1 Estera are all true. Still,
the requisite of moral certainty demanded that petitioner's reservations against SPO1
Estera be addressed. In what amounted to a contest between two (2) vastly different
accounts, the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been met by
the prosecution by wagering its case on no one but SPO1 Estera.
The prosecution could have presented the testimonies of disinterested witnesses to
prove and expound on the different facets of its narrative: (1) the fleeing of people from
the market; (2) petitioner's going amok or apparent quarrel with another person; (3) the
police officer's pacification of petitioner; (4) petitioner's delivery to the police station; and
(5) the turnover to SPO3 Valdez and SPO3 Valdez's own investigation. It never
bothered to do so. Instead, it saw it fit to rely on no one but the same person who is also
alleged to have extorted from an unwitting seller at a public market.

Here, the trial court gave extraordinary weight to the bare assertion of a police officer,
who was presented as the only witness to an alleged crime that he himself claimed to
have been discovered because of a public disturbance. It trivialized the defense's
version of events, despite being more logical. This, coupled with an assertion of the
motives of the lone prosecution witness—extortion and getting even after losing a bet—
should have been enough to give pause especially because of the fundamental
guarantee for every accused to be presumed innocent.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 222974, March 20, 2019
JEFFREY CALAOAGAN, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
Two separate Informations for violation of R.A. No. 7610 were filed against petitioner
before the RTC for the alleged physical maltreatment of minors AAA and BBB. In its
November 5, 2012 Decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of Other Acts of Child Abuse, as defined and penalized under Sec. 10,
par. (a) of R.A. No. 7610. Accordingly, it sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and eight (8) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, in each of the two (2) cases.

The RTC held that petitioner physically maltreated AAA and BBB. Thus, it ruled that
petitioner committed two (2) counts of violation of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 in
Criminal Case Nos. 4877-R and 4878-R. The RTC gave credence to AAA and BBB's
straightforward testimonies despite the variance between their testimony and the
medical findings.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed petitioner's conviction in

Criminal Case No. 4877-R for physically maltreating AAA. It ruled that petitioner had
struck AAA, then a minor. It accorded respect to the findings of the RTC in giving merit
to the testimonies of AAA and BBB as corroborated by their medical examinations. The
CA opined that despite the variance between the testimonies of AAA and BBB and the
results of the medical examination, there was no cogent reason to discount AAA and
BBB's testimonies. Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 4877-R, it awarded moral
damages in the amount of P20,000.00, with an interest rate of 6% per annum from the
finality of the decision until its full payment.
However, in Criminal Case No. 4878-R, the CA held that petitioner was not liable for
violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 for assaulting BBB. Instead, it ruled that petitioner
was only guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the RPC because BBB
was allegedly already eighteen (18) years old at the time of the incident. Consequently,
in this case, the CA sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of arresto menor and
ordered him to pay P20,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as temperate
damages, with an interest rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until its
full payment.

ISSUE:
Was the trial court and CA correct in finding the PETITIONER GUILTY OF VIOLATION
OF R.A. No. 7610 BY GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE complainant's testimony
which are CONTRARY TO THE MEDICO-LEGAL FINDINGS.

HELD:

NO. The petitioner in this case was found guilty of Slight Physical Injuries under
paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code.
Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes an act when it constitutes as child abuse. In
relation thereto, Sec. 3(b) of the same law highlights that in child abuse, the act by
deeds or words must debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. Debasement is defined as the act of reducing the value,
quality, or purity of something; degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a
person's or thing's character or quality; while demean means to lower in status,
condition, reputation, or character.

When this element of intent to debase, degrade or demean is present, the accused
must be convicted of violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, which carries a heavier
penalty compared to that of slight physical injuries under the RPC.

In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution did not present any iota of evidence to
show petitioner's intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child
victim. The records do not show that petitioner's act of hitting the victims had been
intended to place the latter in an embarrassing, shameful, and demeaning situation.
There was no indication that petitioner had any specific intent to humiliate and degrade
AAA and BBB.
On the contrary, the Court finds that petitioner inflicted the injuries in the heat of
argument. AAA and BBB claim that it was petitioner's group that first annoyed the
former's group; while petitioner claims that it was AAA and BBB's group that initiated the
shouting match. Nevertheless, it is clear that the altercation between AAA, BBB, and
petitioner only occurred when their groups met on the street without any prior
confrontation.

As observed in the cases of Bongalon, Jabalde, and Escolano, when the infliction of

physical injuries against a minor is done at the spur of the moment, it is imperative for
the prosecution to prove a specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic
worth of the child; otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted under Sec. 10(a) of R.A.
No. 7610.

Verily, as the prosecution in this case failed to specify any intent to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth of AAA and BBB, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable
under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

Even though there was no intent to debase, degrade or demean, the Court affirms the
findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner struck AAA with a stone on his shoulder
and hit BBB, causing physical injuries. While there may be some minor inconsistencies
in the exact location of the injuries based on the testimonies of AAA and BBB and the
medical findings of Dr. Castaños, it was established that petitioner assaulted AAA and
BBB. Petitioner even admitted that he swung a bamboo stick towards AAA and BBB in
the altercation.

In Criminal Case No. 4877-R, petitioner is found guilty of slight physical injuries under
the RPC for assaulting AAA. The prosecution was not able to present any evidence of
actual incapacity of AAA for labor or of a required medical attendance as a result; nor
was there proof as to the period of AAA's incapacity for labor or of a required medical
attendance. Nevertheless, under Art. 266 of the RPC, an offender may still commit slight
physical injury even if the inflicted injuries did not require medical assistance or there
was no proof of the victim's incapacity.

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 4878-R, the CA found that BBB was no longer
a minor on the date of the incident on October 31, 2004, because he was already
eighteen (18) years old. However, the CA's finding is incorrect. BBB's Certificate of Live
Birth32 shows that he was born on September 21, 1987. Thus, he was a minor being
only seventeen (17) years, one (1) month, and ten (10) days old at the time of the
incident.

Nonetheless, even if BBB was still a minor, the Court affirms that petitioner is guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 4878-R because the
prosecution failed to prove the specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth of the child. Petitioner's act of hitting BBB resulted in the latter's injuries
requiring medical attendance for one (1) to nine (9) days, which is within the definition of
slight physical injuries.

The crime of slight physical injuries is punishable under Article 266 of the RPC as
amended by R.A. No. 10951,33 to wit:
Section 61. Article 266 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.— The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) day to nine (9) days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period.

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) and
censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the
offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical assistance.

3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any
injury.

Accordingly, in Criminal Case Nos. 4877-R and 4878-R, petitioner committed two (2)
counts of slight physical injuries. Thus, he is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty
of arresto menor of twenty (20) days for each count.

G.R. No. 166441               October 8, 2014

NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

While private complainant AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15) years old, was
sleeping inside the tent along Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused remove her panty
and underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and
breast with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the
accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said
AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party
succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and
prejudice of said offended party.

the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000 finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 2389 .
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of
attempted rape despite the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness
despite the fact that BBB did not testify.
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the
petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of
lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the insufficiency of the
evidence.

ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of attempted rape?

HELD:
NO. The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between
attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such
intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the
offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a
naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis
being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape,
we have to determine the law on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the
petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of. That law was Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as follows:
Article335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal
knowledge is defined simply as "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with
a woman," which explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female. In People v.
Campuhan, the Court has defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the
following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient
and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female
organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by
the penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons pubisor the vaginal
surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath
the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of
the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible
in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the
clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded eminence that becomes
hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia
majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and
the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and
is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has
many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ.
xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of
the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the
pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration
of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the
commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the
offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only
means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a
causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to
lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of
criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape.
He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the
intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show
that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination
without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly
put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the crime of
attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual
intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his
clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully
manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double
interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not
permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury.
Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue,
and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he
should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted
rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his
acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or
internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration
of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such
felony. His preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one
being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his
allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts,
being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not
punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they remained equivocal or of
uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with
certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was.
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the
female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of
lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is
manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of
acts of lasciviousness is committed.

The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and
la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such
allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His
embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent
to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to
penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie
with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from
his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape.
A good illustration of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin, where the accused was
charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means of force
and intimidation, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the
nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on
top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his
own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away."
The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to
commit rape "is not apparent from the act described," and the intent to have sexual
intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court
also pointed out that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to
sexual intercourse."

Case #17

G.R. No. 225642-43

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO

Facts: [AAA], single, housekeeper and a resident of Calinan, Davao City was watching a beauty
contest along with her aunt on February 10, 2009 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening at
Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. The contest was held at a basketball court
where a stage was put up.

She went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong Cooperative near the
basketball court. There were several cacao and durian trees along the way. Amarela was
allegedly waiting for her along the way. Amarela pulled her towards the day care center. He
punched her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Amarela then undressed her. She tried to
resist him but he was stronger. He placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her
vagina and made a push and pull movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came
to help her.

The 3 men brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions so she fled
and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the coast is clear, she proceeded to the
house of Godo Dumandan. She was brought her to the Racho residence because
Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Neneng Racho in turn asked her son Racho
to bring her to her aunt's house instead.

Racho allegedly brought AAA to a shanty along the way and told her to lie down. She
refused so Racho boxed her abdomen. She resisted but he undressed her. Racho then
placed himself on top of AAA. Racho then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. After
relieving himself, Racho went home. AAA went home alone.

When she reached home, her parents were already asleep. She went inside her room and
cried. The following morning, she decided to leave home. Her mother was surprised at
her decision until AAA told her mother about what happened to her.

They reported the to the police and Amarela and Racho were arrested.6

Contention of Defense:

Amarela confirmed that he attended the fiesta celebrations in Maligatong, Baguio

District, Calinan, Davao City. He met AAA at the cooperative building at around 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon. AAA asked him if he knew Eric Dumandan who was allegedly
her boyfriend. After a while, Eric Dumandan passed by and he told him that AAA was
looking for him. He left and went on a drinking spree with his friend Asther Sanchez.
While drinking, fell down from the bench. He was brought to the house of his elder
brother Joey in Tawan-tawan. He slept there and woke up at six o'clock in the morning.7

Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but denied raping her. Racho stated
that he was at the house of his mother on February 10, 2009. At around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, AAA arrived with Godo Dumandan. AAA was asking for help while crying because she
was allegedly raped by three persons in the pineapple plantation.

His mother advised her to take a bath and change clothes and sleep at his brother's house.
But AAA wanted to go home. Racho was instructed by his mother to accompany AAA
going home.

When they reached Caniamo, AAA did not want to be brought to her aunt's house
because she knows the latter would just scold her. Instead, she wanted to be conveyed to
their house at Ventura. Since Ventura was far, Racho did not go with her and instead went
back home.

When asked about the charge of rape against him, Racho said he could not have done that
because his hand is impaired. This was a result allegedly of a hacking incident on
September 21, 2008.

Ruling of RTC

The RTC ruled in favor of AAA since it found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both
Amarela and Racho, to be clear, positive, and straightforward.
Ruling of CA

Amarela and Racho pointed out that although there were other witnesses, the only material
testimony on record was that of AAA. They argued that there were several circumstances casting
doubt on AAA' s claim that she was raped because her testimony does not conform to common
knowledge and to ordinary human experience.

The CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto finding no reason to reverse the trial court's
factual findings.

Issue: Whether the Women’s Honor Doctrine still finds it’s application today.

SC Ruling:

No. In the case of People v. Tana,  the Court affirmed the conviction of three armed robbers who
took turns raping Herminigilda Domingo. The Court ruled that:

It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that
they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to
their natural instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended
party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did
actually take place.

This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. The factual setting back then would have
been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault;
today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved
Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's
dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and
confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.

An accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of that the
testimony is 1) credible, 2) natural,3) convincing, and 4) consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe
beyond reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.

We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before us,
to wit:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the R TC' s evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing
the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in
the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the
RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
lower court's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances,
 affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the
RTC.

After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable
doubt lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth.

First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from
the crowd at the beauty contest and made it easy for Amarela to grab her without
anyone noticing:

Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA

away from the beauty contest stage to the day care center:

It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and
the testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits
being taken ex parte are usually incomplete and inadequate.We usually brush
aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and do not impair the credibility
of the rape victim. In this case, however, the version in AAA's affidavit-complaint
is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims
that she was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says
that she was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed. If we were to
take into account AAA's initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the
vicinity of the stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was
holding a woman against her will. Thus, AAA's version that she was on her way
to the rest room, instead of being pulled away from the crowd watching the
beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA was being
taken away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when
she was grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement reflect another story
that differs from her court testimony? To our mind, AAA's testimony could have
been concocted to just make her story believable rather than sticking to her
original story that Amarela introduced himself and pulled her away from the
stage. We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a minor detail because it
casts some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth - that she was abducted
against her will before she was raped.

Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this

instance already puts AAA's credibility in question. Again, we must remember
that if we were to convict based solely on the lone testimony of the victim, her
testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human
experience. We must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the
testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable.
2) Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the
whole incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was
not illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's face:

From AAA's testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting
conditions in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified
Amarela while she was being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to
clarify as to how she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care
center was dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again
draw reservations from AAA's testimony.

3) Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked, and
then raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience.

From this, AAA would like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and
place himself on top of her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible
for two human beings to move freely under a stage, much more when the other person is trying
to resist sexual advances. Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to
the makeshift stage without any sign of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was being held
against her will, AAA could have easily called for help or simply run away.

4) Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the
medico-legal officer. The medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that
AAA had no pertinent physical findings/or physical injuries:28

Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held that a
medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely
corroborative in nature. In convicting rapists based entirely on the testimony of their victim, we
have said that a medico-legal report is by no means controlling. Thus, since it is merely
corroborative in character, a medico-legal report could even be dispensed with.

A medico-legal's findings are at most corroborative because they are mere opinions that can only
infer possibilities and not absolute necessities. A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual
incident, cannot testify on what exactly happened as his testimony would not be based on
personal knowledge or derived from his own perception. Consequently, a medico-legal's
testimony cannot establish a certain fact as it can only suggest what most likely happened.

In the same way, a medico-legal's findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the
alleged rape victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the
medical examination on AAA, she diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a
blunt force or penetrating trauma.

In a study conducted by Radostina D. Miterva, the most common sites for lacerations were
determined, in rape victims with ring-shaped hymens, lacerations were most commonly located
as followed at dorsal recumbence of the patient: (1) one laceration at 6 o'clock position in
42.02% of cases; (2) two lacerations at 5 and 7 o'clock positions in 24.55% cases; (3) three
lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock positions in 45.36% of cases; and (4) four lacerations at 3, 5, 6
and 9 o'clock positions in 25% of cases."

These findings were supported by an earlier study that described patterns of genital injury
resulting from sexual abuse.

However, in a similar study comparing injuries from consensual and non-consensual intercourse,
the authors discovered that the statistical results of the locations of vaginal laceration are almost
the same. Their findings suggest that the injuries are similar after consensual and non-consensual
intercourse.

From all this, we observe that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish
consensual from non-consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the
frequency of lacerations and whether they are located in different positions) to determine
whether the sexual act was consensual or not. If the frequency of lacerations is located in
different areas of the vaginal orifice, then it would be a good indicator that there was sexual
abuse. On the other hand, if the lacerations are found in a specific area, it could indicate forced
rape, but could also suggest consensual intercourse.

In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the
hymen. Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the
probability that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's
thighs-when she said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have had
consensual intercourse.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of
the female.37 It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a
female is alleged and shown to be without her consent.38 Carnal knowledge of the female with
her consent is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the
law of giving consent.39 The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time
prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and
refusals, prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial
coercion.40

As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases. This means
that both Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony. When we rely on the
testimony of the private complainant in rape cases, we require that her testimony be entirely
credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For when certain parts would seem unbelievable, especially
when it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the victim's testimony as a whole does not
pass the test of credibility. Since we doubt AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela, we
have to consider her testimony against Racho under the same light.

We find it odd that AAA was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Godo
Dumandan's house to seek help. Instead, she was brought to the Racho residence where she told
Neneng Racho what happened. Again, instead of reporting the incident to the police, AAA
insisted that she be brought to her aunt's house nearby. This is way beyond human experience. If
AAA had already told other people what happened, there was no reason for her not to report the
incident to the proper authorities.

# 18

G.R. No. 238176, January 14, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMON BAY-OD

Facts:
A criminal information for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) as qualified by item 5 of the
fifth paragraph of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, was filed against Bay-
od before the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao.

Sometime in 2011, AAA,then 6 years old, was looking for playmates when Bay-od called her to
go inside the his house. Bay-od then forcibly had sex with AAA by removing AAA’s clothes and
by inserting his penis into AAA's vagina. AAA cried and so Bay-od stopped. AAA put on her
clothes and went home but decided not to tell her parents about the incident because she was
afraid of Bay-od. However, she told her brother about what Bay-od did.

Sometime in October 2013, while AAA and her brother were fighting, the victim's mother heard
her son teasing AAA saying "op-opya ah te iniyut da-ah eh Lamon," meaning "shut up because
you were sexually abused by Lamon." BBB immediately asked AAA about what AAA’s brother
said. AAA then admitted that she was raped by the Bay-od.

The prosecution called Dr. Florilyn Joyce Bentrez the municipal health officer of Lagawe, Ifugao
to conduct a physical examination on AAA on November 15, 2013.

Ruling of the RTC:

The RTC found the appellant guilty of qualified statutory rape as charged. In so finding,
the RTC accorded full weight and credence on the version of the prosecution, as relayed
by the testimonies of AAA and BBB.

Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

On October 20, 2017, the Court of Appeals rendered a. Decision dismissing the appellant's
appeal and affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.

Contention of Defense:

The RTC and the CA erred in giving premium to the version of the prosecution. He argues that
such accusation was actually disproved by the results of the medical examination conducted by
Dr. Bentrez on AAA. Bay-od points out that AAA's hymen was medically found to be still intact.
He cites Dr. Bentrez's testimony where the latter stated that she, in her medical examination of
AAA, found no laceration or scar in the latter's hymen.

Issue: Whether the claim of rape is negated by the medical finding that the hymen of AAA
is still intact

Ruling of SC:

No.

The assessment of a trial court in matters pertaining to the credibility of witnesses, especially
when already affirmed by an appellate court on appeal, are accorded great respect - if not binding
significance - on further appeal to this Court. The rationale of this rule is the recognition of the
trial court's unique and distinctive position to be able to observe, first hand, the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witness whose credibility has been put in issue.

While the rule is not absolute, any deviation had only been allowed in light of highly meritorious
circumstances, such as when it is clearly shown that the trial court had "overlooked certain facts
of substance and of value which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the case. This is not
the case here.

1) AAA's Claim of Rape Not Negated By Medical Finding that Her Hymen is Intact

The medical finding of Dr. Bentrez that AAA has no injury in her hymen is not fatal to the
accusation of rape against the appellant. AAA's narration that appellant had intercourse with her
is not, in and of itself, inconsistent with such finding. The SC have affirmed convictions for rape
despite the absence of injury on the victim's hymen in view of the medical possibility for a
hymen to remain intact despite history of sexual intercourse. In People v. Opong, We ran
down some of these cases:

In People v. Gabayron, we sustained the conviction of accused for rape even

though the victim's hymen remained intact after the incidents because medical
researches show that negative findings of lacerations are of no significance, as
 the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. It was noted that many
cases of pregnancy had been reported about women with unruptured
hymens, and that there could still be a finding of rape even if, despite
repeated intercourse over a period of years, the victim still retained an intact
hymen without signs of injury.

In People v. Capt. Llanto, citing People v. Aguinaldo, we likewise affirmed the

conviction of the accused for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victim's
hymen since medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victim's hymen
to remain intact despite repeated sexual intercourse. We elucidated that the
strength and dilatability of the hymen varies from one woman to another,
such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse; on the other hand, it may be so resistant that its surgical
removal is necessary before intercourse can ensue.

In People v. Palicte and in People v. Castro, the rape victims involved were

minors. The medical examination showed that their. hymen remained intact even
after the rape. Even then, we held that such fact is not proof that rape was not
committed.

Moreover, in People v. Pamintuan, We recognized that the absence of injuries in a rape victim's
hymen could also be attributed to a variety of factors that do not at all discount the fact that
rape has been committed. As Pamintuan observed:

The presence or absence of injuries would depend on different factors, such

as the forcefulness of the insertion, the size of the object inserted, the method
by which the injury was caused, the changes occurring in a female child's
body, and the length of healing time, if indeed injuries were caused. Thus, the
fact that AAA did not sustain any injury in her sex organ does not ipso facto mean
that she was not raped.

Accordingly, We find the medical finding of Dr. Bentrez regarding the absence of laceration in
AAA's hymen to be, by itself, insufficient to disprove AAA's claim of rape against the appellant.
The absence of laceration or injury to AAA's hymen during the time she was examined may have
been caused by a number of reasons - none of which, however, would have any definitive
bearing on whether appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA or not.

It should be emphasized at this point that carnal knowledge, as an element of rape under Article
266-A(1) of the RPC, is not synonymous to sexual intercourse in its ordinary sense; it implies
neither the complete penetration of the vagina nor the rupture of the hymen. Indeed,
jurisprudence has held that even the slightest penetration of the victim's genitals - i.e., the
"touching" by the penis of the vagina's labia - is enough to satisfy the element. As People v.
Bormeo held:
Carnal knowledge has been defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman; sexual intercourse. An essential ingredient thereof is
the penetration of the female sexual organ by the sexual organ of the male. In
cases of rape, however, mere proof of the entrance of the male organ into the
labia of the pudendum or lips of the female organ is sufficient to constitute a
basis for conviction.
And in People v. Quiñanola:
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge, unlike its
ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the
vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of
the female organ or, as once so said in a case, by the mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act.

Here, the fact that the appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA had been clearly established by
the latter's testimony. Such testimony stands independently of the medical findings of Dr.
Bentrez.

2) AAA's Testimony is Credible and AAA is a Credible Witness; Appellant's Denial is Unavailing

Our review of AAA's testimony revealed the same to be a clear and categorical account of how
the appellant had carnal knowledge of her. AAA bluntly recalled:

It must also be considered that AAA was only six (6) years old when she was raped and only
nine (9) years old when she took the witness stand. In People v Piosang, We held that
testimonies of child victims, such as AAA, are in general ought to be accorded full weight and
credit:

Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When
the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter
to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges
of truth and sincerity.
All in all, We found no error on the part of the RTC and the CA in according AAA's testimony
full weight and credence. The testimony is categorical and, in conjunction with the other
evidence on record, positively establishes the guilt of the appellant for the crime charged.
Against such testimony, the unsubstantiated denial of the appellant must certainly fail.

Case #19

G.R. No. 225511, March 20, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICENTE VAÑAS Y BALDERAMA

Facts:
"AAA", then 16 years old, was sexually abused by the live-in partner of her mother, Vincent
Vanas.

At around 3:00 a.m. sometime in May 2009 "AAA's" mother went to the market to sell bananas.
She left "AAA" sleeping beside Vanas. "AAA" was awakened by Vanas who caressed her legs
and touched her private parts. Vanas then exposed his penis after removing his underwear. He
threatened to kill "AAA" as he undressed her. He then inserted his penis into "AAA's" vagina
and made coital movements. After that, "AAA" noted that there was blood in her vagina.

The second incident happened at around 6:00 a.m. of June 15, 2009. "AAA's" mother was busy
in the kitchen while AAA and Vanas were in another room. Vanas removed AAA’s clothes,
caressed her legs, inserted his penis into her vagina and made coital movement.

On November 16, 2009, "AAA" underwent a medical examination and discovered that she was
pregnant. She informed her brother about her condition and together, they reported the sexual
misconduct of Vanas to the police. A psychologist of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development also conducted a mental status examination of "AAA". Based on the Psychological
Report, the results showed "AAA" to be mentally impaired with an intelligence quotient (IQ) of
53. She was considered as moderately retarded with a mental age equivalent to an 8-year old
child. During her cross-examination, "AAA" testified that she agreed to have sex with appellant.

Contention of Defense:

Vanas admitted being the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother but denied raping AAA. He
claimed that AAA never stayed in his house. He alleged that the victim filed the case since she
and her siblings disapproved of his relationship with their mother.

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found Vanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC in
Criminal Case No. 6072, and violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 in Criminal Case No. 6073.
The RTC found "AAA's" testimony to be credible and held that appellant's denial and alibi
cannot prevail against "AAA's" positive identification of him as her rapist.

Appellant appealed the RTC's Judgment. In his Brief, Vanas argued that the testimony of the
victim could not be relied upon since it was improbable that he could simultaneously undress
her, hold her hands, and insert his penis into her vagina. He claimed that there was no
evidence of force, threat and intimidation. He shifted his defenses from denial and alibi to
consensual sex, based on the admission of the victim that she did not object to their sexual
congress in both cases.

Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the conviction of appellant in both cases. It ruled that the prosecution
indubitably established the elements of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 6072 and
violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 in Criminal Case No. 6073. The CA did not give credence
to appellant's claim that the sexual intercourse with the victim in both cases was consensual since
a child cannot give a valid consent to sexual intercourse.

Issue: Whether the testimony of the Victim is unreliable:

Whether the sexual intercourse was consensual;

Ruling of SC:

There is partial merit in the appeal.

In Criminal Case No. 6072, the prosecution successfully established the elements of rape by
sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC
(1) the offender is a man;
(2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(3) such act was accompanied by any of the circumstances enumerated thereunder.

Here, it was alleged in the Information that appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim using
force, threat and intimidation. The victim testified that appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina and threatened to kill her after committing the crime.

Vanas must be convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B of the RPC in Criminal Case No.
6072 since the Information alleged, and it was proved during trial, that the victim was a 16-year
old minor and appellant was the live-in partner or common-law spouse of her mother. Appellant
also admitted that he and the victim's mother were living as husband and wife.

Vanas contends that he should be exonerated since AAA admitted during her cross-examination
that she consented to have sexual intercourse with him. However, such a declaration has no
weight in evidence. During the trial, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish that "AAA"
was a mental retardate. The psychologist who conducted a mental status examination found her
to be suffering from moderately impaired/delayed mental abilities with an IQ of 53 and the
mental age of an 8-year old child. There is therefore no doubt that the victim was suffering from
mild mental retardation.

In Criminal Case No. 6073, appellant was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b) of
RA 7610. The elements of this offense are:
(1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
(3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

There was failure to allege in the Information that the sexual intercourse was "performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse". "A child is deemed exploited
or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration, or (b) under the coercion or influence
of any adult, syndicate or group."

However, this established legal precept is not satisfied in this case since the Information
Information did not contain words of similar or identical meaning to describe the offense
allegedly violated.

Thus, appellant cannot be convicted for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 since not all the
elements of this offense were clearly alleged in the Information. To convict him of an offense not
properly alleged in the Information would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. An Information that "does not contain all the
elements constituting the crime charged cannot serve as a means by which said constitutional
requirement is satisfied. The fact that all the elements of the crime were duly proven in trial
cannot cure the defect of a Complaint or Information to serve its constitutional purpose."

Foregoing considered, appellant can only be convicted of qualified rape in Criminal Case No.
6072. He should be acquitted for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 in Criminal Case No.
6073.

Case #20

G.R. No. 208173 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BUCLAO, June 11, 2014

Facts: Buclao was charged with rape before Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, La Trinidad,
Benguet.
AAA, 15 years old at that time, was cleaning their backyard located at Camanggaan, Virac,
Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. It was around 11:00 a.m. on June 3, 2003. Buclao,
the father of AAA called her to go inside their house. AAA went inside, her father closed the
door and pushed her onto the bed. Her father pulled her pants and panties down to her knees then
he undressed himself. AAA’s father moved on top of her, inserted his erect penis into her vagina,
and started pumping or doing a push and pull or an up and down motion. AAA felt pain but she
could not fight back. She just cried while she was being sexually assaulted. Her father left after
the incident. Before he left, he threatened AAA that he would kill her if she told anyone about
what happened.

On the third week of September 2004, AAA was raped for the second time. AAA said that at 12
in the afternoon, she was sleeping on her bed. She was awakened when she felt somebody was
lying on top of her. AAA was shocked to see her father. He pulled down her pants and panties
until they were around her knees. Her father then removed his pants and briefs. AAA’s father
inserted his penis into her vagina and started doing the pumping motion. She cried out in pain,
but she could not fight back. Her father threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the
incident. AAA was afraid so she kept the incident a secret. In 2006 AAA told her maternal
grandmother about the rape. They reported the incident to the police in Binanga, Tuding on April
4, 2006.

Dr. Genalin B. Manipol testified that she examined AAA’s genitalia and found no injuries.
However, the doctor clarified that lack of evident injuries in the genitalia does not negate the
possibility of sexual abuse.

Contention of Defense:

Buclao denied raping his daughter twice. He said that the charges were false. He claimed that it
was his daughter BBB who was with him at their house on June 3, 2003. He also alleged that on
the third week of September 2004, it was his other children, BBB and CCC, who were with him
at their house. Buclao alleged that the animosity between him and his mother-in-law caused his
mother-in-law to prod AAA to file a case of rape against him.

Ruling of RTC:

On August 17, 2011 the trial court rendered a consolidated judgment finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling of CA:

On review, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification 35 the trial court’s decision. It held
that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of rape under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code. AAA was able to narrate in detail the antecedents and the surrounding
circumstances of both rape incidents.

Issues:
1) Whether Dr. Manipol’s examination caused doubt on the testimony of AAA
2) Whether the delay in AAA’s reporting of the incident is enough to have reasonable doubt on
the testimony of AAA.

Ruling of the SC:

Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides the elements of the crime of
rape:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present. . . .52

Rape is qualified when "the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."The elements of qualified
rape are: "(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) [done] by force and without consent; . . .
(4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and (5) the offender is a
parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim."

In this case, both the trial court and Court of Appeals found that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of qualified rape. This court sees no reason to depart from the
findings of the lower courts. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, AAA’s recollection
of the heinous acts of her father was vivid and straightforward. She was able to positively
identify the accused-appellant as her sexual assailant. Her testimony was given in a "categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner."

We recently held that "[i]t is doctrinally settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially
on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal."

1) As to accused-appellant’s argument that the absence of hymenal lacerations admits the

possibility that there was never any sexual abuse, we find our disquisition in People v.
Araojo applicable:
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being,to repeat, an element of the crime
of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a compelling proof of defloration.
[However,] the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim’s testimony and
not the findings of the medico-legal officer.

2) We also disagree with accused-appellant’s argument that private complainant AAA’s delay in
reporting the alleged rape incidents, together with the prodding of AAA’s grandmother, signals
the falsity of the rape allegations. In People v. Delos Reyes, this court ruled that:

The failure to immediately report the dastardly acts to her family or to the authorities at the
soonest possible time or her failure to immediately change her clothes is not enough reason to
cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of [accused]. This Court has repeatedly held that delay in
reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the
victim. Further, it has been written that a rape victim’s actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by
fear rather than by reason. It is this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes
to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim into
silence and submissiveness.

To this court’s mind, there can be no greater source of fear or intimidation than your own father
— one who, generally, has exercised authority over your person since birth.Delay brought by
fear for one’s life cannot be deemed unreasonable. This court has recognized the moral
ascendancy and influence the father has over his child. In cases of qualified rape, moral
ascendancy or influence supplants the element of violence or intimidation. It is not only an
element of the crime, but it is also a factor in evaluating whether the delay in reporting the
incident was unreasonable.

Moreover, "[n]ot even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her own father to
the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him is true." Thus, accused-
appellant’s argument that AAA was forced by her grandmother to fabricate the charges fails to
sway this court.

21. People vs. Siscar, June 3, 2019, GR 218571

FACTS:

The Prosecution's Version

AAA testified that in the afternoon of March 15, 2008, she and her father BBB arrived at
Barangay YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Province of Oriental Mindoro. They went there to join her group do
a house to house solicitation for their attendance and participation in the then forthcoming International
Youth Congress. Siscar's house was among those she visited. After completing her task, she took the road
along the cemetery and walked toward the group's designated meeting place. As she was walking,
however, something hit her head from behind, thrusting her to the ground. Then she felt someone punch
her twice in the stomach. It was Siscar.

He dragged her to a grassy area, forced her to lie down, and undressed her. She tried to shout but
he covered her mouth and punched her again in the stomach. He removed his maong short pants and
white t-shirt, inserted his penis in her vagina and made pumping motions while kissing her lips and
mashing her breast. He also forced his penis into her mouth, kissed her breast, licked her private part, and
spat in her mouth.

After Siscar left, she put on her clothes and proceeded to the group's meeting place where her
father was waiting. After telling her father about the incident, they immediately went to the police. A
police officer readily responded and accompanied them to Siscar's house but he was nowhere in sight.
Outside, she noticed a pair of maong short pants hanging on the clothesline. She at once recognized it was
the same maong short pants appellant wore when he raped her. From appellant's house, they rushed to the
hospital for her physical examination.

Dr. Edelina F. Muñoz-Bae testified that her physical examination of AAA yielded findings of
contusions and abrasions on AAA's lower back, hematoma on her left shoulder, evident signs of injuries
in her genitals, and a stellate-shaped hymenal laceration.

The Defense's Version

Siscar claimed that on the date and time AAA got raped, he was in Sabang, Puerto Galera,
working. On March 17, 2008, while he was in Puerto Galera, his wife texted him that he was a suspect in
a rape case. He immediately went to the police station to inquire about the case. There, he was taken in
custody and no longer allowed to leave. He saw AAA for the first time when she came to the police
station. She initially identified another detainee as her assailant but later pointed him out after the guard
disclosed he was Allan Siscar. The maong short pants hanging on the clothesline belonged to him but the
same went missing the day after the incident.

RTC Ruling: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape punishable under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code; Penalty: Reclusion Perpetua; Indemnity: 100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
75,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. It found that AAA did not identify appellant solely on the basis of the
maong short pants she saw on the clothesline outside his house. It concurred with the trial court's finding
that she positively identified Siscar as the predator who sexually violated her. She clearly recognized him
because earlier that day, she went to his house and personally saw him there. She even handed a
solicitation letter to his wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Ruling

RULING: NO.
CA did not err in affirming appellant's conviction for rape and the penalty of reclusion perpetua
imposed on him. This is in accordance with in Article 266-A, in relation to 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, viz:

Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; xxxx

Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua. xxxx

Alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive and unwavering identification of the accused as the
one who succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her through force and violence. AAA' s testimony
was so replete with sordid details she could not have known them had she not actually experienced them.
The trial court found AAA's testimony positive, straightforward, and categorical. Consequently, even
standing alone, AAA's testimony is sufficient to support appellant's conviction for rape, given the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved. The Court has ruled that it is
instinctive for a young, unmarried woman to protect her honor and it is thus difficult to believe that she
would fabricate a tale of rape, allow the examination of her private parts, and permit herself to be subject
of a public trial had she not really been raped. Moreover, We have consistently held that the testimony of
minor victims is normally given full weight and credit. A hymenal laceration is the best evidence of
forcible sexual penetration. It does not matter whether it is healed or fresh. Indeed, when the rape victim's
detailed, positive and categorical testimony about the sexual violation she experienced solidly conforms
with the medical finding of hymenal laceration, the same is sufficient to support a verdict of conviction.

PENALTY: GUILTY of "Rape" and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. He is further ordered to pay
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. A
six percent interest per annum is imposed on these amounts from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

22. Ramilo vs. People, June 3, 2019, GR 234841

FACTS:
The prosecution presented 6 witnesses – private complainant AAA; private complainant's sister,
BBB; the school principal of Malanday Elementary School, Lino de Guzman; the medico-legal officer,
Dr. Ma. Felicidad Mercedes Aulida; and investigating officers PO1 Bernard Pah-E and PO1 Christian
Bonifacio.

AAA (born on February 5, 2001, 12y/o) testified that on August 27, 2013, she slept beside her
father, Manuel Ramilo (accused), and her one (1) year old sister, and woke up at around 6:00 a.m. the
next day. At that time, CCC (AAA’s mother) was already busy downstairs. AAA was about to go
downstairs with her sister when Manuel held her wrist. She knew that he was going to molest her again
like what he had been doing in the past. According to AAA, she uttered to Manuel, "isusumbong ko kayo
kay mama," but the latter replied "isusumbong mo ako, papatayin kita." Thereafter, Manuel pulled AAA
and forced her to lie on the floor. He embraced her tightly and put his hand inside her shorts and panty.
Then, he inserted his finger inside her vagina, moving it in and out for about five (5) minutes. When
AAA's vagina became painful, she struggled and pushed Manuel's hand away. She stood up, went
downstairs, and had breakfast. She did not tell anybody of the incident because she was scared of
Manuel's threat to kill her. In the afternoon of the same day, AAA went to school at Malanday Elementary
School. When her older sister BBB arrived thereat, she was called to the principal's office. When her
school principal talked to her, AAA disclosed to him the truth, that she was molested by Manuel.
Thereafter, a kagawad, a representative from the DSWD and the police arrived. Subsequently, Manuel
was apprehended. AAA was then brought to a doctor for medical examination.

RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Sexual Assault under Article 266-A,
paragraph 2, of the RPC. Considering that the crime is attended by an aggravating circumstance of
relationship, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further,
consistent with jurisprudence, the accused is ORDERED TO PAY civil indemnity of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (Php50,000.00), moral damages of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php50,000.00), and exemplary
damages of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php30,000.00).
CA Ruling: CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision ordering Manuel to pay six percent (6%)
interest per annum on all the amounts awarded reckoned from the date of finality of the judgment until
the damages are fully paid. According to the CA, there is no reason to overturn the trial court's finding
that AAA's testimony deserves full credence in view of the settled doctrine that when the offended party
is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her testimony for youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Like the RTC, moreover, the CA also held that proof of
hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Thus, the imposition of the penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, by the RTC was
in order, in view of the fact that the sexual assault was committed against a child by her father, which is
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance of relationship, pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the Ramilo’s conviction for Rape under Art. 266-A of
the RPC

RULING:
SC found no reason to reverse the rulings of the RTC and the CA finding Manuel guilty of the
acts charged against him. In view of the circumstances of the instant case, however, a modification of
the penalty imposed, the damages awarded, and the nomenclature of the offense committed is in
order. Thus, instead of rape through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, of the RPC,
Manuel should be held liable for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b),17 Article III of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7610.

In Dimakuta v. People,the Court held that in instances where the lascivious conduct is covered
by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the act
is likewise covered by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is
punishable by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if
the offended party is a child victim. But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender
should be liable under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No. 7610, unless the victim is
at least eighteen (18) years old and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in
which case, the offender may still be held liable of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610. The reason for the
foregoing is that, aside from affording special protection and stronger deterrence against child
abuse, R.A. No. 7610 is a special law which should clearly prevail over R.A. No. 8353, a mere
general law amending the RPC.

To achieve uniformity in designating the proper offense, in People v. Caoili, the SC prescribed the
following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case lascivious conduct is
committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty: (1) The age
of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the offense, and in determining the
imposable penalty; (2) If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime
should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period; and (3) If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or
more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older, but is
unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be
designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
 Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court held in Quimvel v. People that the requisites of acts of lasciviousness as
penalized under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, namely:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present; x x x
3. That said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
4. That the offended party is a child, whether male or female, below 18 years of age.

In view of the presence of all the elements of the crime, Manuel should be convicted of
Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. As duly found by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court, AAA positively and categorically stated that Manuel, her own biological
father, inserted his finger into her vagina, and it was painful. She gave a direct and straightforward
narration of her ordeal in his hands. In a long line of cases, this Court has given full weight and credit to
the testimonies of child victims, considering that their youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity. Indeed, leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are
relating past incidents of abuse.

Important to note:
 "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuas10n, inducement, enticement or coercion of a
child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or
the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
 "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
 In Tulagan, it was explained that on the one hand, the phrase "children exploited in prostitution"
contemplates four (4) scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female who, for money, profit or any
other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child who, for money, profit or any
other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; ( c) a child, whether male or female, who, due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and ( d) a
female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in sexual
intercourse.
 Settled is the rule that in cases where rape is committed by a relative, such as a father,
stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
"force and intimidation" as an essential element of rape.
 Settled is the rule that ill motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible
declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the liability of the accused.

23. People vs. De Vera, June 6, 2019, GR 230624

FACTS:
Three separate Informations were filed against the accused-appellant charging him with acts of
lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. 09-1118 for Nov. 3 incident) and two counts of qualified rape (Criminal Case No.
09-1119 for Nov. 4; Criminal Case No. 09-1121 for Nov. 5), in relation to Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented AAA and Dr. James, Municipal Health Officer of Pataleon Gotladera, Bulan,
Sorsogon, as witnesses.

AAA testified that, on November 3, 2009, at around 11:00 p.m., while inside their house, accused-
appellant approached her while she was lying in bed and proceeded to insert his hands inside her shirt and
touched her breasts, saying that she should let him touch them.

The following day, on November 4, 2009, again at around 11:00 p.m., while inside their house, the
accused-appellant touched AAA's breasts and vagina. He also inserted his finger into her vagina and
proceeded to undress AAA and himself. He then mounted AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.

The next day, on November 5, 2009, while inside their house, the accused-appellant once more
approached AAA while she was sleeping and touched her vagina. However, when he started to undress
AAA, her younger sibling, CCC, woke up and uttered "Papa, Si Neneng", thinking that she was their
other sister, Neneng. CCC noticed that AAA was crying, but she kept pinching CCC so that the former
would not leave. CCC also cried and asked why AAA was crying. CCC wanted to report the incident to
their mother, who at that time was sleeping a little farther from them, but still inside the same bedroom.

The accused-appellant then went inside the comfort room and started banging his head on the wall, which
was witnessed by DDD, AAA's 20-year old brother. DDD also noticed that AAA was crying, and it was at
this time that their mother, BBB, woke up. DDD then asked AAA why she was crying, but because she
did not answer, BBB slapped her. That was when the accused-appellant left the house. When the accused-
appellant returned, he told BBB not to hurt AAA and that it would be better to have him incarcerated as it
was he who did something wrong.

Version of the Defense

The accused-appellant denied having committed any lascivious conduct on AAA on November 3, 2009 or
having raped her on November 4 and 5, 2009. He claimed that AAA filed these cases against him because
he tried to discipline her as she was in the habit of going out at night.

RTC Ruling: accused RONALDO DE VERA y HOLDEM was found GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF QUALIFIED RAPE IN RELATION TO RA. 7610 in Criminal Case
No. 09-1119 and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in Criminal Case Nos. 09-1118 and 09-1121

CA Ruling: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to Criminal Case No. 09-1119; sustained
the conviction of the accused-appellant for two counts of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. 09-
1118 and 09-1121

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Ruling

RULING: NO.

The Court cannot give any credence to the accused-appellant's argument that his identity was never
established by the prosecution. It was clear from AAA's testimony that she was certain that it was her
father who committed the vicious acts against her on November 3, 2009 to November 5, 2009.
We sustain the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of qualified rape in relation to RA No.
7610 in Criminal Case No. 09-1119.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years
of age or is demented. Moreover, rape is qualified when "the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

AAA clearly testified that it was her own biological father, the herein accused-appellant, who sexually
assaulted her on November 4, 2009, without her consent, while she was still a 17-year old minor.
Moreover, AAA's account of the rape was corroborated by Dr. Apin, who testified that his examination
revealed that AAA suffered hymenal lacerations.

As for Criminal Case Nos. 09-1118 and 09-1121, the Court agrees with the CA that the accused-
appellant is guilty in both instances.

To sustain a conviction under Section 5(b), Article III of RA No. 7610, the prosecution must establish
the following elements: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2)
the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse; and (3) the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

However, there is a need to modify the nomenclature of the offenses and the damages imposed, in
light of this Court's ruling in People v. Caoili,to wit:

Conversely, when the victim, at the time the offense was committed is aged twelve (12) years or over but
under eighteen (18), or is eighteen (18) or older but unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition, the nomenclature of the offense should be Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610, since the law no longer refers to Article 336 of the RPC, and the perpetrator is
prosecuted solely under R.A. No. 7610. x x x x

2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period.

3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18)
years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or
protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.

Accordingly, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of two counts of lascivious conduct under
Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to RA No. 7610, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-1118 and 09-1121.

24. People vs. Moya, June 10, 2019, GR 228260

FACTS:
On July 20, 2008, AAA, the victim, then thirteen (13) years old (born on July 25, 1995) and the sister
of appellant, was sleeping in the other room of appellant's house. AAA was awakened when appellant
entered the room. Appellant then placed his hand on AAA's mouth and started to undress her by removing
her shorts and underwear. AAA could not shout for help since appellant had placed his hand on her
mouth.

Thereafter, on July 27, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., the same incident took place. Appellant placed his hand
on AAA's mouth and started to undress her. Afterwards, appellant inserted his penis into AAA's vagina
and ejaculated. AAA did not tell anyone about the incident because she was afraid that no one would
believe her. Appellant likewise threatened AAA by telling her that she would be killed if someone finds
out about the incident.

Again, on August 3, 2008, at around 8:00 p.m., appellant entered the room of AAA and the former placed
his hand on the mouth of the latter. Appellant undressed AAA and, thereafter, appellant ejaculated.

Then on August 14, 2008, at around 8:30p.m., AAA was in the house of appellant and was awakened
when appellant entered her room. Appellant then placed his hand on AAA's face and proceeded to undress
her. Thereafter, appellant inserted his finger into AAA's vagina.

Hence, four (4) separate Informations were filed against appellant: (1) Criminal Case No. 6263; (2)
Criminal Case No. 6264; (3) Criminal Case No. 6265; (4) Criminal Case No. 6266.
RTC Ruling: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A(1), in relation
to Article 266-B, 1st paragraph of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and in relation further to
Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Section 3(g) of its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
sentenced him to suffer, on each count, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole;
and ordered him to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages

CA Ruling: CA affirmed RTC’s decision with modifications. In Criminal Case No. 6263, appellant
was sentenced by the CA to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and
ordered him to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. In Criminal Case Nos. 6264 and 6266, appellant was found guilty of violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresta mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordered
to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, as well as a P15,000.00 fine. In
Criminal Case No. 6265, appellant was found guilty of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault under Article
266-A, in relation to 266-B of the RPC and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor; as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered him to pay AAA P30,000.00
as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in finding Elmer Moya guilty beyond reasonable doubt

RULING: NO.
Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7610 and Section
2(g) of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, provides the following:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into the genital or oral orifice of another person.

Article 266-B Penalty. – xxx xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

From the above provisions of the law, rape can be committed in two ways:

1. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual intercourse, also known as "organ rape" or
"penile rape." The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.18

2. Article 266-A, paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object rape"
or "gender-free rape."19 It must be attended by any of the' circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a)
to (d) of paragraph 1.

In this case, it is indisputable that appellant is the brother of AAA and that AAA testified that she and
appellant had carnal knowledge through force and intimidation on July 27, 2008 (Criminal Case No.
6263), making the appellant guilty of Qualified Rape. To sustain a conviction for qualified rape, the
following elements must concur: a) the victim is a female over 12 years, but under 18 years of age;
b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and c) the
offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when
she was deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or
grave abuse of authority. Likewise, AAA testified that she was sexually assaulted on August 14, 2008
(Criminal Case No. 6265) when appellant inserted his finger into her vagina.

Appellant was also charged in all the Informations with violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610. The following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 must be
established:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploded in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
All the elements are present in this case. As earlier shown, appellant, on August 14, 2008 (Criminal Case
No. 6265) inserted his finger in AAA's vagina, thus, satisfying the first element. This Court, in People v.
Ceferino Villacampa, explained the second element, thus: xxx Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610
punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for
profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed
on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for
profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other
forms of sexual abuse against children.

In this case, having been established that AAA was subjected to sexual abuse, the second element has,
therefore, been met. Anent the third element, the age of AAA at the time of the incidents is undisputed.

The CA, however, is correct in ruling that in Criminal Case Nos. 6264 and 6266, the prosecution failed
to prove the guilt of appellant for the crime of rape.

However, appellant is still guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Section
2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases defines
"lascivious conduct" as follows: [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

The testimony of AAA clearly recounted the lascivious conduct committed by appellant through the
latter's covering of AAA's mouth and undressing her.

In People v. Salvador Tulagan, this Court has emphasized that other forms of acts of lasciviousness or
lascivious conduct committed against a child, such as touching of other delicate parts other than the
private organ or kissing a young girl with malice, are still punished as acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, or lascivious conduct under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7610.

SC affirmed CA’s decision with modification. (Criminal Case No. 6263, of Qualified Rape under
Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B; Criminal Case Nos. 6264, 6265 and 6266, of the crime of
Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610)

Important to note:
Also, in Tulagan, this Court has summarized, for easy reference, the proper designation of crimes and
their corresponding imposable penalties, applying the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A
and Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, thus:

In sum, the following are the applicable laws and penalty for the crimes of acts of lasciviousness or
lascivious conduct and rape by carnal knowledge or sexual assault, depending on the age of the victim, in
view of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A and Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353, and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610:

Designation of the Crime & Imposable Penalty

 12 years old or below
Crime Committed: Age Under 12 years old or
18, or 18 under special 18 years old and above
of Victim: demented
circumstances
Acts of Lasciviousness Acts of Lasciviousness Lascivious Not applicable
33
committed against under Article 336 of the conduct  under Section
children exploited in RPC in relation to 5(b) of R.A. No.
prostitution or other Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610: reclusion
sexual abuse 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium
temporal in its medium period to reclusion
period. perpetua
Sexual Assault Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct Not applicable
committed against Article 266-A(2) of the under Section 5(b) of
children exploited in RPC in relation to R.A. No.
prostitution or other Section 5(b) of R.A. No 7610: reclusion
sexual abuse 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium
temporal in its medium period to reclusion
period perpetua
Sexual Intercourse Rape under Article 266- Sexual Abuse35 under Not applicable
committed against A(1) of the Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
children exploited in RPC: reclusion 7610: reclusion
prostitution or other perpetua, except when temporal in its medium
sexual abuse the victim is below 7 period to reclusion
years old in which case perpetua
death penalty shall be
imposed34
Rape by carnal Rape under Article 266- Rape under Article 266- Rape under Article 266-
knowledge A(1) in relation to Art. A(1) in relation to Art. A(1) of the
266-B of the 266-B of the RPC: reclusion perpetua
RPC: reclusion RPC: reclusion perpetua
perpetua, except when
the victim is below 7
years old in which case
death penalty shall be
imposed
Rape by Sexual Assault Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct Sexual Assault under
Article 266-A(2) of the under Section 5(b) of Article 266-A(2) of the
RPC in relation to R.A. No. RPC: prision mayor
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610: reclusion
7610: reclusion temporal in its medium
temporal in its medium period to reclusion
period perpetua

For the crime of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct, the nomenclature of the crime and the
imposable penalty are based on the guidelines laid down in Caoili. For the crimes of rape by carnal
knowledge and sexual assault under the RPC, as well as sexual intercourse committed against children
under R.A. No. 7610, the designation of the crime and the imposable penalty are based on the discussions
in Dimakuta, Quimvel and Caoili, in line with the policy of R.A. No. 7610 to provide stronger deterrence
and special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, discrimination,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is not amiss to stress that the failure to designate
the offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the
facts constituting the crime charged, for what controls is not the title of the information or the designation
of the offense, but the actual facts recited in the information. Nevertheless, the designation in the
information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford
him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

25. People v Padilla and Bermas

The Facts
During the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses the following:
BBB testified that her daughter AAA was mentally retarded since birth as
manifested by the latter's hardheadedness, AAA’s utterance of senseless
words, inappropriate for her age and unresponsiveness to questions.
Sometimes AAA hits her nephews and nieces without any reason at all while
other times AAA would be out of dimension and not within herself.
Barangay Captain CCC, has been a neighbor of AAA for ten (10) years and
has known AAA to be mentally retarded for she was always smiling and
laughing for no reason and AAA went to a special education school.
On 10 January 2008, AAA went to attend a birthday party near their house.
AAA was watching those having videoke, accused [Bermas] told her to go to
Barangay Captain CCC's house. Upon her arrival, accused [Bermas] and one
Garry Padilla were already at the house of the barangay captain. While at
the stairs of the said house, accused [Bermas] allegedly told her "AAA, wag
kang magsumbong marami ako ritong pera, sige na hubarin mo na ang
panty mo." Both men then removed private complainants' shorts and
underwear. Bermas and Gary had carnal knowledge of AAA.
After the termination of AAA's testimony, the court a quo ordered the
amendment of the Information to include Garry Padilla as co-accused as well
as the issuance of the corresponding warrant for his arrest.
Barangay Captain CCC was awakened by the sound of his hogs and the
barking of dogs. He peeped through his window and saw AAA raising her
shorts as she walked from his pig pen. AAA was with a male companion who
he identified as accused Francisco Bermas. Barangay Captain CCC then went
next door to inform AAA's parents of what he saw.
When BBB saw her daughter, the latter was crying and trembling with fear.
BBB asked who the man she was with. AAA replied that she was with
Francisco Bermas. They then went to the Women's and Children's Desk ng
Himpilan ng Pulisya ng [DDD] Camarines Norte to report the incident.
Dr. Barasona examined AAA on 12 January 2008 and found that there was
an evidence of penetration which happened within 72 hours from
examination. She also referred AAA for psychiatric evaluation as she
suspected her of having Down Syndrome for having features such as low-set
and malformed ears as well as oblique palpebral fissures. Dr. Barasona
observed that private complainant had difficulty in understanding questions.
AAA was not fully responsive to questions and could not fully narrate
incidents.
Evidence of the defense
Accused [Bermas] claimed that on 10 January 2008, he went to Poblacion at
the barangay proper to buy cigarette. He was then invited by his compare
Gary to a birthday party near BBB's house where they had a drinking
session. Gary, however, went home ahead of him. At around 10:00 o clock
in the evening, he was already on his way home when he passed by the
house of Barangay Captain CCC who asked him where he was going. Upon
replying that he was already on his way home, accused [Bermas] saw
private complainant come out of the barangay captain's house. Barangay
Captain CCC then went to private complainant's house and informed the
latter's parents that he saw the private complainant with a male companion.
Apparently, accused [Bermas] was being pinpointed as the male companion
of private complainant. He was thereafter brought to the police station
where he was incarcerated with Gary for allegedly raping private
complainant. Both the accused were released after a period of thirty-six (36)
hours.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found Bermas guilty of rape based on the evidence after thorough
evaluation, both on the testimonial and documentary evidence.
Ruling of the CA
In the appeal, Bermas mainly questioned the RTC's conclusion that AAA was
a mental retardate, and as a result of her mental retardation, that he was,
thus, guilty of rape.
The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A (1) is sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. In this
case, appellant was charged and convicted of rape under Article 266-A (1)
(b). Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape because
a mentally deficient person is considered incapable of giving consent to a
sexual act.
The CA appreciated BBB's testimony as to AAA’s mental condition, and that
medical evidence was not a condition sine qua non to prove that AAA indeed
was a mental retardate.
Issue
Proceeding from the foregoing, for resolution of this Court is the issue of
whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Bermas.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
The Court holds that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not
sufficiently establish the second element of the crime charged, namely, that
he had carnal knowledge of AAA either (a) through force or intimidation, or
(b) when she was deprived of reason.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court observes the following guiding principles:

(1 an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove

) but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;

in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are
(2) usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution;

the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
(3) merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.

In People v Dalandas (Dalandas), the private complainant was a 20-year

old mental retardate who only finished the second grade of elementary
school. As proof of her mental retardation, the private complainant's father,
much like AAA's mother in this case, testified that his daughter has had a
mental defect since childhood. The Court eventually acquitted the accused
therein and, in the process, held that the "claim that his daughter was
suffering from a mental defect since childhood was a mere conclusion."
Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early
childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured
by standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily
demands of the individual's own social environment. Commonly, a mental
retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological,
as well as impaired learning capacity.
In People vs. Cartuano, Jr. the court held that a finding of the victim being
a mental retardate must be based on laboratory and psychometric support
does not preclude the presentation by the prosecution of evidence other
than clinical evidence to prove the mental retardation of the victim. Medical
evidence is not a condition sine qua non in all cases of rape or sexual crimes
for that matter to prove that the victim is a mental retardate or is suffering
from mental deficiency or some form of mental disorder. However, the
conviction of an accused of rape based on the mental retardation of
private complainant must be anchored on proof beyond reasonable
doubt of her mental retardation.
Similar to Dalandas, the records of the present case are likewise bereft of
any evidence conclusively establishing AAA's mental retardation. If at all, the
only evidence offered to prove the said fact were:
(1) BBB's testimony that AAA has had mental retardation since birth;
(2) Barangay Captain CCC's testimony that he has known AAA to have
mental retardation and that she went to a special school; and
(3) Dr. Barasona's testimony that AAA "probably" has Down
Syndrome.
Following Dalandas, however, BBB and CCC's testimonies are but mere
conclusions that do not establish the fact of AAA's mental
retardation. Likewise, Dr. Barasona's testimony cannot be the basis for
such as the said findings were inconclusive.
In making a diagnosis of mental retardation, a thorough evaluation
based on history, physical and laboratory examination made by a
clinician is necessary. 
The psychometric tests which were utilized in evaluating the complainant,
the Goodenough Drawing Test and the Bender Visual Motor Test, are
non-parametric tests of generally low reliability, for visual-motor function
and coordination. The Sack's Sentence Completion Test is of low
reliability and specificity in intelligence assessment and is culture and
language specific and biased. (In the case at bench, the Sack's Sentence
Completion Test was conducted in Tagalog, not in the dialect of the
complainant.)
Deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or
deficiency is enough. However, abnormality or deficiency of whatever
state or degree should be sufficiently and adequately established by
orthodox and reasonably available methods and procedures. It is
possible that complainant could well have been merely on the lower
end of the acceptable mean for her age group, a condition which
would have been aggravated by her lack of education, but this, by
any medical or psychological yardstick, does not itself negate
autonomous choice or decision-making based on reasoning.
AAA testified:
COURT
Did you like what the accused do to you?

A Yes, Your Honor." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As the victim apparently "consented" to the act, the Court necessarily had to
determine whether this consent was vitiated, such that the act would
amount to Rape under Article 266-A(l)(b) for having carnal knowledge with a
woman "deprived of reason." However, as discussed, the prosecution failed
to establish her mental retardation beyond reasonable doubt.
In sum, the second element of the crime charged — that the victim be
"deprived of reason" — was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, in consonance with the constitutional right of presumption of
innocence, the Court acquits Bermas of the crime charged.

26. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v.

ROLANDO DE GUZMAN Y VILLANUEVA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

Antecedent Facts

In two separate Informations dated June 20, 2007, appellant Rolando De

Guzman y Villanueva was charged with rape of his daughter, AAA.

Version of the Prosecution

On the night of May 13, 2006, "AAA," who, at that time was 14 years
old, was at their home in Tarlac City, together with her father (appellant)
and her two brothers. At around 10:30 p.m., she was awakened she felt
someone (who she later discovered was her biological father, the appellant)
was on top of her and kissing her neck. Appellant also kissed her chest and
breast, licked her vagina, and thereafter, removed her bra. "AAA" kept quiet
because appellant had a bladed weapon pointed at her side. He also
threatened to kill her if she made any move. "AAA" asked her father to stop
what he was doing, but to no avail.
Appellant then pulled down "AAA's" underwear and placed the bladed
weapon at the headboard of the bed. After this, he placed "AAA's" clothes on
one side of the bed, leaving her naked. "AAA" tried to shout but her voice
was not loud enough to awaken her brother, who was sleeping in the lower
portion of the double-deck bed she was lying on. She was also unable to
shout aloud because she was afraid of her father. Appellant had carnal
knowledge of her. He then removed his penis and secreted his semen on
"AAA's" stomach.

Sometime in the first week of April 2007, "AAA," then already 15 years old,
was left at home with her brother and appellant because her mother, "BBB,"
was staying in the house of her ("AAA's") aunt.

That evening, "AAA" was watching television when appellant suddenly pulled
her towards the bedroom. While inside the bedroom, appellant told "AAA"
that she should not have a boyfriend, and that she should follow his wishes.
Appellant then had carnal knowledge of her for the second time.

After the incident, "AAA's" brother reported to their mother that something
happened to "AAA". BBB" and "AAA's" aunt confronted "AAA" who eventually
confessed to them that her father (appellant), had indeed raped her.

On April 14, 2007, "AAA" underwent a medical examination which revealed,

among others, that she had "deep healed laceration at 7 o' clock position (+)
complete healed laceration at 5 o'clock position."

Version of the Defense

Appellant used to work in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as a trailer driver and

returned to the Philippines sometime in May 2006. However, he could not
recall if he was already in the Philippines on 13 May 2006, the day he
allegedly first raped his daughter AAA.

Sometime in the first week of April 2007, appellant, who was then living
alone in Tarlac City, went to where his wife, and three (3) children, including
AAA, were residing, and took the mobile phone that he lent to AAA.

On 08 April 2007, appellant went swimming with his wife, children, mother-
in-law, nephews and nieces. He promised AAA that he will return to her the
mobile phone.

Appellant does not know the reason why AAA accused him of raping her. At
the time of the alleged incidents, he had a close relationship with his
children.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC convicted appellant of two counts of qualified rape. It held that the
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority were properly alleged
in the Informations and likewise proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering, however, the proscription on the imposition of the death
penalty, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification as to the amount of

damages and declared appellant not eligible for parole.

Our Ruling

We agree with the CA that appellant is guilty of two counts of qualified rape
considering that the following elements thereof had been duly established
here:

(1) sexual congress;

(2) with a woman;
(3) done by force and without consent;
(4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; and
(5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted) of the victim.

The testimony of ["AAA"] describes vividly every lurid detail of the carnal
knowledge or sexual intercourse between her and the accused, including the
complete penetration of the female organ by the male organ and the
ejaculation thereafter. Her account on how the carnal knowledge/sexual
intercourse had been committed by means of force and intimidation has
been consistent even under grueling cross-examination by the defense
counsel. Her testimony contained the adequate recital of evidentiary facts
constituting the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A.

The medical certificate even indicated that during the internal examination
conducted on the victim, there was a deep healed hymenal laceration at
7:00 o'clock position and a complete healed hymenal laceration at 5:00
o'clock position. The medical examination conducted corroborates the
positive testimony of the victim that she was sexually abused.

The Court holds that "AAA's" positive and categorical testimony must be
accorded full credit because when a woman, especially a minor, testifies that
she had been raped, she testifies to all that is necessary to prove that she
was indeed raped.

27. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. ERNESTO

AVELINO, JR. y GRACILLIAN, * Accused-Appellant

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was criminally charged with rape in relation to Republic Act (RA)
No. 7610, for having carnal knowledge of one AAA, a mental retardate and a
minor, 15 years of age, against her will and without her consent.

Version of the Prosecution

AAA and her family had been renting a house from appellant's father since
May 2006, which house was adjacent to the house where appellant and his
family were staying. 

Sometime in May 2006, AAA was on the second floor of appellant's house
putting the latter's son to sleep. After appellant's son had already fallen
asleep, AAA decided to leave but she was prevented by appellant, who was
armed with a knife. Appellant threatened AAA that he would kill "all" of
them, presumably referring to AAA's family.

While poking a knife at her, appellant told her to lie down and thereafter
undressed her. She resisted but appellant went on undressing her, after
which he removed his own shorts and briefs. Appellant then went on top of
AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. After the sexual intercourse,
appellant told AAA, while poking a knife at her, not to tell her parents about
what had happened.

It was only when she and her family had already transferred to another
house and when she became pregnant that her family learned about the
rape incident. Thereafter, AAA and her family reported the incident to the
police, which led to the filing of the complaint for rape against appellant.

On September 30, 2006, AAA had an anogenital examination where PSI

Antonio, in his Medico-Legal Report, found clear evidence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma. PSI Antonio likewise found that AAA's hymen had a
shallow healed laceration.
PCI Baluyot testified on the findings of PSI Antonio, as the latter was no
longer connected with the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame. PCI
Baluyot categorically stated that the shallow healed laceration in AAA's
hymen, as indicated in Medico-Legal Report No. R06-1894, could have been
caused by a blunt penetrating trauma, such as an erect penis.

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied that he personally knew AAA. While he acknowledged that

AAA's family rented the adjacent house owned by his father, appellant
claimed that he lived with his own family in a two-storey house.

Appellant averred that his wife took care of their two children, ages five and
two, while he was at work and denied that he hired AAA to take care of his
children.

On the day of the alleged rape, he claimed that neither he nor his family left
their house. He did not know of any reason why AAA filed a rape case
against him.

Appellant's father corroborated his son's testimony. He claimed that while

AAA and her family stayed at the adjacent house which he owned and rented
out to AAA's family for P1,500.00 per month.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131, upheld the credible and positive
declaration of the victim as against the weak defense of alibi and denial by
the appellant and sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the appellant's conviction of rape but modified the award of
civil damages.

Issue

Whether or not appellant is guilty of rape.

Appellant raised the inconsistent testimony of AAA, the failure of the RTC to
take into consideration his defense of denial and asserts that the RTC erred
in sentencing him to reclusion perpetua since the proper penalty should have
been that provided for in Section 5 of RA 7610.
 Our Ruling

As to the credibility of AAA

The Court upholds the findings of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA,
that AAA's testimony was credible. It is settled that the RTC's findings on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled great weight and
respect and the same should not be overturned on appeal in the absence of
any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances which would have affected the case.
Questions on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed to the trial court
due to its unique position to observe the witnesses' deportment on the stand
while testifying. In this case, both the RTC and the CA held that AAA was
credible and her testimony categorically identified appellant as the person
who, with the use of a knife, intimidated her and raped her. The Court finds
no reason to doubt the findings of both the RTC and CA, especially since no
evidence was adduced showing that AAA had ill motive to falsely charge
appellant with the crime of rape.

As to appellant’s defense of denial

Denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the
victim identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime of rape. The positive
and categorical testimony of AAA identifying appellant as her rapist should
prevail.

As to the claim of the prosecution that AAA is suffering from mental

retardation

Both the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape.
Although it was alleged in the Information that AAA was suffering from
mental retardation, no evidence was shown to prove such mental
condition. Moreover, it was not also proved that appellant knew of
AAA's mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime.

As to what law should be applied.

Section 5 of RA 7610 is inapplicable because the said law governs criminal

cases where the victims are children exploited in prostitution or other sexual
abuse. In this case, AAA was not an exploited child who indulged in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct for money or profit or any other
consideration; neither was she coerced or influenced by an adult, syndicate,
or group to indulge in the said conduct. Hence, the RTC correctly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua provided for under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code for the crime of simple rape.

28. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. BBB, Accused-

Appellant

Version of Prosecution
In four (4) separate Informations, BBB was charged with two (2) counts of
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the RPC, in relation to R.A. No.
7610, and two (2) counts of child abuse in violation of Section 10, in relation
to Section 3, of R.A. No. 7610.
AAA was born out of wedlock on June 29, 1996. After the death of her
father, her mother remarried. Consequently, AAA was left to be raised by
her maternal grandparents - grandfather BBB and grandmother CCC at
███████ City.
At about 9 o'clock in the evening of April 17, 2012, while CCC was on
vacation in Cebu, AAA was awakened when BBB came close to her AAA was
lying on the bed when BBB kissed her lips, mounted her and pulled up her
sleeveless shirt. As BBB threatened AAA that he will not send her to school
anymore if she will not let him use her, he removed her short pants and
underwear and removed his as well. Then, he sat on her, inserted his finger
in her organ many times, and thereafter inserted his penis in her vagina.
After satisfying his lust, BBB went back to sleep with AAA's 2-year-old
nephew between them.
On June 10, 2012, CCC was sewing clothes at the living room with only a
cabinet dividing it from the sleeping area. At 10 o'clock in the morning of
said day, AAA was looking after her sleeping nephew on the hammock at the
sleeping area with BBB. BBB then asked AAA to sit on his lap, but AAA
refused. Despite this, BBB pulled her close to him, removed her short pants
and underwear, and made her sit on his penis while he was seated upright.
After having coitus with AAA, BBB put his pants back on.
On July 20, 2012, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, while CCC was
sewing clothes at a nipa hut right outside their house, AAA was left again
with BBB and her nephew in the sleeping area. BBB then touched AAA's
breasts, raised her sleeveless shirt while she was lying down and kissed her
nipples. BBB, thereafter, went outside the house while AAA went to the
kitchen.
On July 21, 2012, while AAA was cooking lunch, BBB hugged her from
behind, inserted his hand in her shirt, and squeezed her breasts. BBB,
thereafter, walked away. AAA did not shout as she was scared of her
grandfather. After lunch of the same day, AAA went to her aunt, DDD, to tell
her what happened. Consequently, DDD brought AAA to the Barangay
Kagawad, YYY, to seek for help. BBB was immediately arrested and was
detained at ███████ City Police Station. The next day, AAA was brought to
Misamis Oriental Provincial Hospital in ███████ City for medical
examination conducted by Dra. Marlene K. Coronado who found that AAA's
genitalia showed an old laceration at 3 o'clock and that her hymen was no
longer intact.
Version of Defense
According to BBB, it was only him and AAA's nephew who were in the house
in the evening of April 17, 2012. His wife, CCC, was then in Cebu while AAA
was in ███████ City. AAA left in the morning of April 15, 2012 to look for a
job and returned only on April 24, 2012.
Pacaria further testified that he could not have sexually molested AAA on
June 10, 2012 and July 20, 2012 because there were several persons in the
house and that he and CCC were busy taking turns with the sewing.
As for the July 21, 2012 incident, BBB alleged that he was not at home the
entire day since he left for the Iglesia ni Cristo Church at 5:00 a.m. and
went home at 5:00 p.m.
The RTC rendered its Joint Judgment finding BBB guilty of the crimes
charged.
In its Decision dated February 9, 2017, the CA affirmed, with modification as
to the award of civil damages.
Argument of the accused
AAA's credibility as a witness is objectionable considering that she failed to
immediately disclose to her aunt, DDD, whom she usually confides in. He
added that her contradicting testimonies failed to overturn the constitutional
presumption of innocence in his favor.
Issue: Whether Pacaria is guilty of rape.
Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA.
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts
are guided by three well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused,
though innocent, to disprove;
 (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.
Accordingly, in resolving rape cases, the primordial or single most
important consideration is almost always given to the credibility of
the victim's testimony.
As to inconsistencies and contradictions, We have consistently ruled, a
rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an
accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had
undergone. Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in her testimony are generally
expected. Thus, such fact, alone, cannot automatically result in an accused's
acquittal.
AAA's direct, positive and categorical testimony, absent any ill-motive,
necessarily prevails over BBB's defense of denial. Like alibi, denial is an
inherently weak and easily fabricated defense. It is a self-serving negative
evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the stronger and more
trustworthy affirmative testimony of a credible witness. While BBB denied
the charges against him, he failed to produce any material and competent
evidence to controvert the same and justify an acquittal.
Therefore, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2012-4969 and 2012-4970, We sustain
BBB's conviction of qualified rape defined under Article 266-A, paragraph
1(a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC. Under said Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(a), the crime of rape may be committed:
(1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
Pursuant to Article 266-B, paragraph 1, moreover, the rape is qualified when
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
Thus, the elements of the offense charged are that:
(a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age;
(b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and
(c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through
force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or
grave abuse of authority.
In rape committed by a close kin, moral ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation. This is due to the fact that force, violence, or
intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size,
and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each
other. Indeed, a rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear
rather than reason. It is this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the
perpetrator hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror which
would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and submissiveness.
Incestuous rape magnifies the terror because the perpetrator is the person
normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore,
in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship,
proximity magnifying the sense of helplessness and degree of fear.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that AAA was only fifteen (15) years old
when she was raped by BBB, first on April 17, 2012, and second, on June
10, 2012, as evidenced by the Certification issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registry of ███████ City.
BBB is also liable under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 for his
lascivious conduct committed against AAA, who was only sixteen (16) years
old at the time. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 are:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
At the trial, AAA clearly and unequivocally narrated how BBB sexually
abused her on July 20, 2012 and July 21, 2012.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN NIEVERAD E C I S I O N

The Facts

AAA was 14 years at the time of the alleged rape incidents. Her family lived in a
residential apartment building at [XXX], [YYY], Valenzuela City. AAA and her family lived
on the second floor. Nievera occupied the third floor with his second wife, Liza Alonzo.

On 17 December 2014 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA asked permission
from her mother to visit certain Rachel, her classmate, as they were going to cook
gelatin for their school Christmas party. Before leaving, AAA went to the rooftop to call
her brother. On her way down, she bumped into Nievera who persuaded her to go
inside his apartment on the pretext that he would just show her something. AAA
believed him and so went with him inside his apartment because she had seen that
most of the kids in their apartment building also talked to him. Once inside the
apartment, Nievera grabbed her and then hugged her, uttering, "Sandali lang to".
Forthwith, Nievera escorted AAA inside his room, made her lie down and removed all
her clothing. Frightened, she allowed him to mount her, kiss her and insert his penis into
her vagina. After succumbing to his bestial desires, Nievera removed his penis and AAA
felt his semen coming out. He then uttered, "Kahit anong mangyari wag kang
magsusumbong," and ordered AAA to clean up. On the same day, Nievera brought AAA
to Rachel at Fortune 1 where they were supposed to meet. AAA did not disclose what
happened to anyone out of fear. She was also afraid that if her parents would know, she
would be asked to leave their house.

On 29 December 2014, AAA asked her mother for permission to go to the computer
shop. On her way out, she met Nievera. He made her wait for him at the corner of [XXX]
because they allegedly had somewhere to go. Arriving at the corner of [XXX], Nievera
demanded that AAA board his motorcycle. AAA was unaware that she would be brought
to Meycauayan, Bulacan. Arriving thereat, they went inside Peach Blossom Hotel. When
AAA alighted from the motorcycle, Nievera ordered her not to remove her helmet and
just proceed inside their room. As it happened, AAA was again raped by Nievera. Before
leaving the hotel premises, Nievera showed AAA his gun and she became afraid.

On even date, Nievera drove AAA back to Fortune 1. Afterwards, AAA went home.
Again, out of fear, she did not tell anyone about the incident. When she arrived home,
AAA's mother asked about her whereabouts, to which she replied that she just went to a
computer shop. AAA's mother did not believe her because she went to the said place
but did not find her there. BBB, AAA's older sister, forced her to tell the truth. AAA thus
narrated to BBB the dastardly acts of Nievera.

It turned out that Nievera gave AAA a cellphone. He also promised her that when she
would reach the age of 18, he would marry and support her in case she gets pregnant.
After she was raped, AAA agonized because getting pregnant would leave her no option
but to stop studying.

AAA was brought to the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory in Caloocan City for
examination. Police Chief Inspector Jocelyn Padilla Cruz (PCI Cruz) examined her, and
her Medico-Legal Report divulged that anogenital findings were indicative of blunt force
penetrating trauma to the hymen. AAA was referred to the for counseling. The
examination, however, did not discount the possibility of AAA being a victim of sexual
abuse.

The version of the defense, on the other hand, as likewise summarized by the CA, is as
follows:

As expected, Nievera vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him. He

asserted that the court  had no jurisdiction over the case because the alleged rape
incident happened in Meycauayan, Bulacan and not in Valenzuela.

Nievera averred that he lived on the 3rd floor of their apartment building and not on the
rooftop as claimed by AAA. On the day of the alleged rape incident, he was with his
wife, Grace Nievera, at Palo Alto Street, Marulas, Valenzuela City to collect the debts
due him from some employees of Starwood Factory in Marulas, Valenzuela.

To bolster his defense, Nievera adduced in evidence the sworn Affidavits of Joseph

Valdez, Dominic Ramirez and Neil Nerona to confirm that he was not at the apartment
building at the time the alleged rape took place. Likewise, Nievera adduced the sworn
affidavits of Guillian Grafil Nievera, his first wife, and Liza Alonzo, his third wife. Both
lived in the same apartment building and they also attested that on the fateful date of
the alleged rape, Nievera was in Palo Alto, Marulas, Valenzuela City. Apparently, AAA
filed the case to extort money from him.

Ruling of the RTC

RTC convicted Nievera of the crime charged.

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the
crime, i.e., (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (3) that such act was accomplished by using force or intimidation. The RTC
added that AAA's testimony was corroborated by the medico-legal report, which
indicated the presence of a "deep healed laceration at 7:00 o'clock position in her
hymen." With regard to Nievera's defenses of alibi and denial, the RTC ruled:

Accused's defense is denial. As against the positive assertion of AAA and her positive
identification of the accused, accused['s] denial cannot be given weight. 
Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed Nievera's conviction albeit with modification as to the amount of

damages.

The CA held that AAA's testimony on the rape incident had the hallmarks of truth and
deserved full faith and credence. The CA added that AAA's demeanor after the rape
incident and her failure to immediately report to the authorities were irrelevant,
especially in light of the strength of her testimony in court which, in turn, was bolstered
by the findings of the medico-legal examination. The CA also ruled that Nievera's alibi
and denial could not prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that he
committed the crime. The CA then modified the award of damages in accordance
with People v. Jugueta.

Issue

Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Nievera.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the conviction of Nievera as the prosecution was able to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The two elements of rape — viz., (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the girl,
and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation — are
both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA was able to testify in
detail how Nievera committed the rape. AAA's testimony, found to be clear,
straightforward, and believable, was given due weight and credence not just by the
RTC, but also by the CA upon appeal.

In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated
testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing, and
otherwise consistent with human nature. This is a matter best assigned to the trial court
which had the first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and
observe their demeanor, conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Such matters
cannot be gathered from a mere reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes.
Hence, the trial court's findings carry very great weight and substance.

Nievera, however, raises an issue out of the alleged improbability of AAA's testimony.
According to him, AAA testimony "fails to qualify as clear, positive, convincing, and
otherwise consistent." He argues that AAA clearly testified that she did not resist, and
hence the element of force or intimidation was not established. However, a perusal of
AAA's testimony revealed that there clearly was force or intimidation that enabled
Nievera to consummate the act.
Clear from the testimony of AAA is that while she admittedly did not offer strong
resistance against the advances of Nievera, she communicated to him that she was not
giving her consent to what was being done to her. This absence of consent was shown
by (1) her saying "ayoko po," and (2) using one of her hands to shove Nievera's body
away from her. The sexual acts were, therefore, done to her against her will and without
her consent.

It is important to stress that "[t]he gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A (1) is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent." As the
Court held in the case of People v. Joson:

We are not persuaded by the accused-appellant's insistence that the absence of any
resistance on the part of AAA raised doubts as to whether the sexual congress was
without her consent. The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual
advances of the rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not
be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim
submits herself to her attackers of because of fear.

Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform
reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated
to offer any resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an element of rape and its
absence does not denigrate AAA's claim that the accused-appellant consummated his
bestial act.

Verily, Nievera cannot insist that he should be acquitted of the charge simply on the
basis of the supposed "implied consent" of the victim because she did not offer
tenacious resistance. It is well established that "the failure to shout or offer tenacious
resistance does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the criminal act of the
offender." Notably, the law does not impose on the rape victim the burden of proving
resistance.

It is equally important to note AAA's explanation as to why she was unable to offer
strong resistance. She mentioned that "I did not resist (hindi po ako nanlaban) because
I know that he has a bladed weapon inside his room." Nievera bewails the fact that the
said bladed weapon was not presented in evidence to prove that it exists. Thus,
according to him, the presence of intimidation was not sufficiently proved.

Nievera's contention is, however, untenable.

Jurisprudence is settled that in rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the
light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime and not by any hard and fast rule. AAA in this case was a 14-year-old who was
tricked into being alone in a room by someone she thought she could trust. She was
alone in a locked room with a fully grown man, overcome by the strength of his
embrace, with the knowledge that the same man had in his possession — or at least
owned — a bladed weapon. Viewed from this lens, it is the Court's opinion that AAA was
indeed in an environment where there was sufficient intimidation that would cow her to
submit to the sexual act without offering tenacious resistance.

Nievera then questions AAA's post-rape attitude. According to him:

AAA did not tell anyone what happened because she feared that her parents would hurt
her and throw her out of their house if they learned about it. It is a surprise that despite
the alleged rape, AAA would be concerned more about her parents hurting her and
throwing her out of the house, rather than seeking for help from her parents. It appears
that AAA is trying to hide something, which she knows that her parents might
disapprove.

After the alleged rape, AAA went with accused-appellant, who brought her to Fortune 1.
She boarded the motorcycle of accused-appellant. She did not ask for help, nor did she
try to stay away from the accused. It is contrary to common human experience that AAA
would still go with the accused-appellant despite the alleged attack against her honor.
AAA further stated that she just wanted to go home. However, she prioritized in going to
her classmate. It was merely an afterthought that she wanted to go home when her
classmate was not available at that time. It is absurd that despite the alleged rape, she
would still have the will to go to her classmate and cook. 29

The argument deserves scant consideration.

With regard to the contention that it was — in Nievera's words, a "surprise" — that AAA
did not want to tell her parents initially for fear that they would scold her or kick her out
of the house, the Court notes that this does not come as a surprise at all, especially in
the context of the Philippine society. The Court is not unaware that our society remains,
to a large extent, conservative in its values. As such, our society and its members still
place an importance to a woman's virginity. As a consequence, women who have
supposedly "lost" their "virtue" are undeservedly looked down upon, or worse, are
viewed to have brought disgrace to their families even as — in the case of rape victims
— they only "lost" the same because someone else "took it away" from them. It does
not come as a surprise to the Court, therefore, that AAA in this case thought and acted
the way she did. She cannot be faulted for thinking and acting in a way that could only
be viewed as a reaction to the values system she was born into.

As regards her subsequent actions, i.e., still going to her classmate's house and even
agreeing that Nievera accompany her, AAA was able to explain the same sufficiently.

To the mind of the Court, AAA's actions after the rape, though unexpected, were
acceptable. AAA, then a 14-year-old, was simply confused and thus could not be
expected to act rationally and immediately know what she needed to do after a
traumatizing event. Even adults at times need time to process the events that happen to
them, especially after a startling occurrence such as getting raped. In addition, the Court
has time and again stressed that not all rape victims react the same way. 31 Not every
victim of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the
expectation of mankind. There is no standard or typical reaction or norm of behavior
that ensues forthwith or later from victims of rape. Nievera was thus unreasonable to
demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational experience — which is rape.

Nievera also questions why subsequent to the rape incident, AAA still went with him on
December 29, 2014, which allowed him to have carnal knowledge of her once again.
The Court, however, views this argument as irrelevant for the events of December 29,
2014 are not the ones in question. The Information filed against Nievera clearly states
that the basis of the rape charge are the events of December 17, 2014. In other words,
Nievera is not on trial for having carnal knowledge of AAA on December 29, 2014.
Instead, he was indicted in this case because he forced himself upon AAA on December
17, 2014.

In a last-ditch attempt at tarnishing AAA's credibility, Nievera even brought up the fact
that AAA currently has a 43-year-old common-law husband. Thus:

Lastly, AAA admitted during trial that she has a current live-in partner who is a forty-
three (43) year old Muslim man and is the father of her child. AAA's parents did not
approve of the relationship, so AAA hid from her parents because of her said
relationship. AAA even admitted that she knew that her relationship was forbidden and
that they could not get married because AAA is a minor.

Grasping at straws, Nievera essentially argues that he should be acquitted because

AAA voluntarily entered into sexual relations with older men even at a young age. The
Court, however, only views the foregoing as a desperate attempt, hinged on an
irrelevant point, to seek an acquittal.

Verily, whether AAA entered into a relationship with a significantly older

man subsequent to the rape incident is beside the point. The question before the Court
is simply whether Nievera had carnal knowledge of AAA through force or intimidation on
December 17, 2014. Whatever AAA did subsequently is none of the Court's concern,
not to mention the fact that the same is inadmissible evidence.

In sum, none of Nievera's arguments was able to convince the Court to discredit AAA's
credibility. The Court thus affirms the findings of both the RTC and the CA that AAA's
testimony deserves full faith and credit. Inevitably, Nievera's defense of alibi and denial
should fail in light of this finding. This must be so, for it is well-settled that the defenses
of alibi and denial cannot outweigh the candid and straightforward testimony of the
private complainant that the accused indeed had sexual intercourse with her through
force, intimidation, and against her will.
PEOPLE vs. FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR., 

THE FACTS

AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla. It was 2 December 2000,
eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the plaza, AAA was
dancing with her elder sister, BBB.

AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her
way back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders,
with a knife’s point thrust at her right side. (She come to know the man’s name at the
police station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.) He told her not to move or
ask for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her
back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked
farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the
grassy fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting
tricycle. Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with
Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away
and into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis.

Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At
gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants. When she defied him, he slapped her and
hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching
her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her.
He forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis
inside. "Sayang ka," she heard him whisper at her, as she succumbed to pain and
exhaustion.

When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help,
shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.

At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he
ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her
mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After
satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the
road’s side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth,
punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was
gone. Then she felt Mirandilla’s penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion
warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away.

They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered
with cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her
legs open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina.
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she
suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and
forth from one place to another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to
Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly
on the grassy field right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a
small house in the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times.

One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing
that Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and
ran, crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding
behind a rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out of people’s sight for two
nights. Finally, she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of
Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA
was in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the
police gave her food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals,
she recognized the man’s face – she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla,
Jr., the police told her.

The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah
Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered
hymenal lacerations in different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual
intercourse. Foul smelling pus also oozed from her vagina - AAA had contracted
gonorrhoea.

Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.

Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each
other at the Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They
had a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left
his wife and daughter there for good.Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at
the park. He started courting her, and, after five days, as AAA celebrated her 18th
birthday, they became lovers. Mirandilla was then 33 years old.

Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends’ houses and in cheap
motels. On 24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother’s house in Kilikao, they
met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in front of the park’s comfort room,
near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard. They decided
to elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the back of
Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to them for
₱1,500.00. They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000. From 12
December 2000 until 11 January 2001, Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio
Marcellana’s house, at the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.

Mirandilla and AAA’s nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during
AAA’s menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000. In late
December, however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting his mother in
Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating stomach pain. AAA had
abortion – an inference he drew upon seeing the cover of pills lying beside AAA.
Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled for days until she left him in January 2001 after
quarrelling for days.

Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA
missed her menstruation in December 2000 and that he would not have known she had
an abortion had she not confessed it to him.

THE RTC RULING

Convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through
sexual assault.

THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING

The CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. It found him
guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of kidnapping as the
RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault. It rejected
Mirandilla’s defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual
encounters were consensual. 

Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution’s lone witness, AAA, was not a
credible witness and that he and AAA were live-in partners whose intimacy they
expressed in consensual sex.

SC RULING

We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.

"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven

Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it

must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are
letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.

The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge,

the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only
force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust.

This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the prosecution has successfully
established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who
has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual.
Mirandilla with his version of facts attempted to meet the prosecution’s prima facie case.
To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio
Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend Arlene Moret.

Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard, testified that on
30 October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the park. They approached her
and chatted with her. On cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived
alone two hours earlier, chatting with her first, before AAA finally came. She also
claimed meeting the couple for the first time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict
herself on cross examination with the version that she met them previously, three times
at least, in the previous month. On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first meeting AAA
on 3 October 2000 at the park.

The accused’s mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living
in Kilikao only after his imprisonment. This contradicted Mirandilla’s claim that he visited
his mother several times in Kilikao, from October 2000 until January 2001.

Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood,
agonizing in pain, with the abortifacient pills’ cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled
with his other claim that he came to know AAA’s abortion only through the latter’s
admission.

Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses’ testimonies contradicted each
other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they
concocted stories in a desperate attempt to exonerate the accused.

Crimes and Punishment

The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no
less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and
carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife.

Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1

hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through
force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual
assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his
penis into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.

Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code:

Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx

Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the
Court explained in People v. Larrañaga, this arises where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses.

Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with
rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense
as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A.
7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim
was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed – the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape.

However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not
have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by
forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is
one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction
was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes
distinct and separate count of rape.

It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious illegal
detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several
times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of
death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of death is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
PEOPLE v. JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY and THREE JOHN DOES, Accused;
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

The victim, Cleopatra Changlapon, was nineteen years old and a sophomore student of
B.S. Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central University. On July 14, 1998, she left
school at 6:30 p.m. to go home to Km. 3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she was crossing
Bonifacio Street, Baguio City, she saw a white van approaching so she stopped to let it
pass. Suddenly, the van stopped in front of her. The rear door slid open and Cleopatra
was pulled by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door closed and the van sped
away. Something was sprayed on her face which made her eyes sting and feel dizzy.
She shouted, then she felt a fist blow on her stomach and she fell unconscious.

When she woke up, she was inside a room. She was totally undressed and was lying
flat on her back on a bed. In the room with her were four men. One of them, who had
Bombay features, was also totally naked while the other three were clad in briefs and
smoking cigarettes. The Bombay-looking man lay on top of her. She tried to push him
away but he held her left arm. Another man with long hair, whom she later identified as
Jeffrey Garcia, burned her right chin with a lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but
Jeffrey Garcia held her right arm. While Jeffrey was seated on her right side and holding
her, the Bombay-looking man proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She tried
to kick him and close her legs, but two men were holding her feet. The two men boxed
her thighs and burned her legs with cigarettes.

After the Bombay-looking man finished having sexual intercourse with

Cleopatra, Jeffrey took his turn and went on top of her. One of the men sat on her right
leg and pinned it down, while another held her left leg. Cleopatra tried to punch Jeffrey
with her right hand, but the Bombay-looking man held her right arm. Garcia then had
sexual intercourse with her while holding her left arm.

The third man, whom Cleopatra noted had pimples on his face, went on top of her. The
Bombay-looking man was still holding her right arm, while the man on top of her held
her left arm. She tried to close her legs but someone hit her right thigh, which forced her
to keep her legs apart. The third man with pimples succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her.

The fourth man was next in raping Cleopatra. By that time, she was feeling helpless and
was too tired to struggle. As the fourth man was having sexual intercourse with her, she
saw the Bombay-looking man burning her panties with a lighted cigarette. She closed
her eyes and heard the men laughing. After the fourth man finished raping her, he got
up. She felt dizzy and her private parts were aching. She opened her eyes and tried to
move, but Garcia hit her on the abdomen.
One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatra’s face which made her vision
blurred. She heard somebody say that it was 1:30. After that, she blacked out. When
she regained consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere between Tam-
awan and Longlong. It was still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all
over her body and was unable to move. A taxi passed by and picked her up. Although
she was afraid to ride the taxi, she boarded it just to get home. The taxi brought her to
her house.

Her aunt, Rufina Angog, saw Cleopatra alight the taxi crying. She also noticed that
Cleopatra’s clothes were inverted and she smelled bad. She woke up Cleopatra’s
brothers and cousins. They asked her what happened. Cleopatra just kept crying and
was unable to talk. After some time, when she was able to regain her composure, she
told them that she had been raped by four men.

The following day, July 15, 1998, Cleopatra was brought to the Baguio City Police
Station. After giving her statement to the police, she was brought to the Crime
Laboratory of the Baguio City Police, where she was examined by Dr. Vladimir
Villaseñor.

In his Medico-Legal Report, Dr. Villaseñor concluded that the findings are compatible
with recent loss of virginity.

Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the injuries will resolve in 14-15
days.

The panties that Cleopatra was wearing was also submitted to the Crime Laboratory for
examination. Dr. Villaseñor found cigarette burns and seminal stains, 12 as well as
stains of blood on the panties. The Medico Legal Report states: Biochemical
examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
test for the presence of seminal stains.

On July 17, 1998, Cleopatra went back to the police station and gave a description of
the four rapists to the cartographer. She likewise executed another sworn statement to
the police.

Meanwhile, Garcia was arrested at 4:30 p.m. of July 17, 1998 in connection with
another rape charge against him filed by a certain Gilda Mangyo.

The cartographic sketches were published in the Sun-Star newspaper. Police Officers
Gilbert Bulalit and Archibald Diaz saw the sketches and noticed that one of the suspects
depicted in the cartographic sketch bore a striking resemblance to Garcia, who was in
their custody. Then, Cleopatra was summoned to the police station to identify Garcia.
She was brought to the upper floor of the police building and asked to look below on the
basketball court of the city jail and see if any of the inmates looked familiar to her.
Cleopatra recognized accused-appellant among those watching the basketball game.

POI Bulalit brought Garcia to the office upstairs. When Cleopatra saw Garcia face to
face, she started to tremble and cry. Then she tried to attack him but she was restrained
by the police officers. On the same day, Cleopatra gave a supplemental statement to
the police, confirming her identification of accused-appellant as one of her rapists.

Trial ensued as against him, while the other three unidentified accused remained at
large.

Defense of Garcia:

Garcia testified that he spent the whole day of July 14, 1998 at the boarding house
where his brother-in-law lived at Aurora Hill. His brother-in-law asked him to go there to
take care of his nephew. That evening, while he was in the said house watching
television, some of his friends came over to visit him. They brought a bottle of gin and
began to have a drinking session. Garcia did not join them because his stomach was
upset. Garcia’s brother-in-law arrived a little before midnight, after which his guests left.
When asked about the charges of rape against him, he denied the same.

RTC RULING:

The trial court rendered its decision convicting Garcia of one count of forcible abduction
with rape and three counts of rape.

Meantime, pending their arrests, the case is Archived in respect to the three (3) other
accused whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown to be revived upon their
arrest.

SC RULING:

Garcia assails his conviction based on complainant’s identification. According to him,

the identification was improperly suggested by the police. We are not persuaded. Based
on our own review of the records of this case, we find that complainant was neither
influenced nor induced by the police to point to accused-appellant as one of her
molesters. On the contrary, the transcripts convincingly show that complainant was left
to freely study the faces of the thirty or more inmates on the basketball court below to
see whether she recognized any of them. There was no suggestion from the police to
point to the new detainee, who had just been arrested on another rape charge.

Owing to the gravity of the crime and penalty involved, we have meticulously studied the
testimony of complainant Cleopatra Changlapon and find it to be clear, straightforward
and categorical. The details of her narration are consistent on all material points. Her
actions throughout her ordeal correspond to normal human behavior. We take particular
note of her natural and spontaneous reaction of crying and attacking her molester when
brought before her face to face. The records also eloquently exhibit that she repeatedly
cried throughout her testimony. All of these actuations bear the ring of truth and deserve
full faith and credit.

More importantly, complainant’s narration of the events is well substantiated by the

physical evidence. The second degree burns found on her face, chest and thighs prove
that she was indeed burned with lighted cigarettes whenever she attempted to fight her
assailants. The medico-legal officer confirmed that they were consistent with cigarette
burns. Furthermore, the contusions found on her body were said to be caused by a
blunt instrument like a closed fist. This confirms her testimony that she was repeatedly
hit to stop her from struggling. The medico-legal officer placed the time of infliction of the
external physical injuries on complainant within the last twenty-four hours. The findings
on her genitals — namely the gaping labia majora, the congested and abraded labia
minora, and the lacerations — all suggest the entry of a foreign object, such as a fully
erect male organ. Finally, the presence of spermatozoa further confirms that
complainant recently had sexual intercourse.

In order that the defense of alibi may prosper, Garcia must establish not only that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.
In the case at bar, the place of commission of the rapes — somewhere between Tam-
awan and Longlong — and the boarding house where accused-appellant alleged he
was in the evening of July 14, 1998, are both situated within Baguio City. The distance
between Tam-awan and Aurora Hills, especially at dawn, can be traversed in just a
matter of minutes.

Indeed, as pointed out by the trial court, Accused-appellant’s witnesses failed to

account for his whereabouts after 12:00 midnight. At the time of the rape, complainant
distinctly heard one of her molesters state the time as 1:30. Since it was still dark when
complainant was dropped off on the side of the road, it can safely be assumed that the
crimes were committed at dawn.

The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined
in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will
and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime
that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the
following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented.

In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible abduction,
i. e., the taking of complainant against her against her will and with lewd design. It was
likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired,
confederated and mutually aided one another in having carnal knowledge of
complainant by means of force and intimidation and against her will.

Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly
established that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation.
Moreover, the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant succeeded in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs,
established by the actual rape.

Hence, Accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.

He should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three
co-accused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious
concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records,
all the four accused helped one another in consummating the rape of complainant.
While one of them mounted her, the other three held her arms and legs. They also
burned her face and extremities with lighted cigarettes to stop her from warding off her
aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as well.

However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the
first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate
complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and
considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, Accused-appellant
should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three
separate acts of rape.

The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when
committed by more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.
Thus, Accused-appellant should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for
forcible abduction with rape.

As regards the other three acts of rape, Accused-appellant can only be sentenced to

reclusion perpetua. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, superior strength and motor vehicle. However, these were not alleged in the
information. Under the amended provisions of Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information,
otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if proven at the trial.
Being favorable to accused-appellant, this rule should be applied retroactively in this
case. Hence, there being no aggravating circumstance that may be appreciated, and
with no mitigating circumstance, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be
applied, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
 PEOPLE v. ELMAR SANTOS Y DEL CARMEN

FACTS:

The Prosecution's Version

On August 18, 2009, around 11 o'clock in the evening, Engr. Roman Pugeda was on his
way home from a friend's wake in Tanza, Cavite. While driving, Pugeda noticed a group
of four (4) armed men standing at the corner of Tejero and Cuevas Subdivision. The
group blocked his way and at gunpoint, ordered him to open his car. When he opened
the door, one of the men commanded him to move to the passenger seat, then, he was
again made to move to the back seat. One of the armed men took over in driving
Pugeda's car. At the back, he sat in between two (2) of the kidnappers. Another one sat
at the front passenger seat.

They continued driving and when they reached Malabon, Rosario, Cavite, the man
sitting on his left side blindfolded Pugeda and continued to drive off. After several hours,
they stopped and the men told Pugeda he would be released only upon payment of a
P1,000,000.00 ransom and if he could provide them with a gun. Pugeda told them he
did not have that kind of money and offered to give P50,000.00 instead. The kidnappers
got irritated and one hit Pugeda's head, exclaiming "ganyan na lang ba ang halaga ng
buhay mo?" The kidnappers then inquired where Pugeda's parents, siblings, and wife
worked. The men forcibly took his wristwatch, ring, and wallet containing his company
ID, some money, and ATM card.

The group stopped in one place and the kidnappers asked Pugeda for the PIN of his
ATM card. They called someone to verify his account. That other person found that
Pugeda's account was empty. They drove for around two (2) hours more. When they
stopped, he was instructed to remove his blindfold and bow his head. The sun was
starting to rise by then.

Pugeda could hear the kidnappers talking about taking another vehicle. At that point, the
kidnappers saw, and started to chase another car. As soon as they caught up with the
other car, a black Toyota Fortuner, three (3) of the kidnappers alighted from the
Mitsubishi Adventure – the driver and the man sitting on his left side and the one
occupying the passenger seat. He was left in his car with the man seated on his right
side. They ordered the driver of the Toyota Fortuner to go down, after which, one of the
kidnappers took the driver seat. Pugeda was then transferred to the Toyota Fortuner
and they left his (Pugeda's) car behind. Onboard the Toyota Fortuner were a child, a
woman, and a driver. The child and the woman were made to sit in the passenger seat
while Pugeda and the driver of the Fortuner were made to lie down at the back of the
vehicle.
While in transit, the kidnappers informed Pugeda they had reduced their ransom
demand to P100,000.00. The kidnappers then turned to the woman and asked what
were the jobs of the child's parents. The woman answered that the family owned a
water station and the child's father was a doctor from Bulacan. The kidnappers asked
for the child's home number and immediately called the child's family to demand for
ransom. As for Pugeda, he was left with no choice but to agree to the P100,000.00
ransom. Pugeda asked for a cellphone so he could call his wife. Over the phone,
Pugeda instructed his wife to deposit P100,000.00 to his ATM account. Pugeda noticed
they were traversing the road leading to Maragondon.
Upon reaching Quezon Province, one of the kidnappers informed him that his wife had
deposited P30,000.00 to his ATM account. Pugeda heard the group talking about a
woman who had his ATM in her possession. Apparently, this woman was the one
monitoring the deposit. In the afternoon, Pugeda's wife called the group to inform them
she had completed the P100,000.00 deposit. They had just stopped at a terminal in
Lucena and had ordered food from Jollibee.

The woman in possession of Pugeda's ATM card withdrew only P20,000.00 from his
account. The bank informed the woman that this was the maximum withdrawal amount.
The kidnappers suspected that Pugeda's wife may have alerted the bank to enforce this
limit. So the kidnappers threatened Pugeda that they would have to stay inside the car
for five days until the whole amount was withdrawn.

They were still on the road when Pugeda heard that the child's parents agreed to pay
ransom money so the kidnappers decided to go back to Cavite. They were far from
Lucena by then and were probably traversing the zigzag "bitukang manok" road going
to Bicol. On their way back to Cavite, the kidnappers took alternate routes to avoid the
checkpoints. There was one (1) checkpoint, however, which the kidnappers could not
avoid. So one of them just opened the car window and when the officer manning the
checkpoint saw the woman and child, they let the Toyota Fortuner pass.

Suspicious that the police had already been alerted and taken notice of the Toyota
Fortuner, the kidnappers decided to flag down yet another vehicle. This time, it was
Toyota van driven by a woman. It was around noon time of August 19, 2009. Using the
Toyota Fortuner, the kidnappers blocked the van, then transferred there with the child
and the woman (yaya) and left Pugeda and the driver of the Fortuner at the back of the
latter.

Pugeda and the driver immediately drove back to Noveleta onboard the Toyota
Fortuner. They went to the house of the child where Pugeda was able to talk to a
caretaker and the child's aunt. From there, Pugeda texted his wife. Pugeda learned that
his wife was then at the Imus Police Station to check on his car which had been
recovered by the Imus Police.
Pugeda went to the Imus Police Station to give his statement. There, he saw two (2) of
the four (4) kidnappers – the driver who was identified as Jun Santos and the one (1)
sitting on his left side, identified as Roger Santos. Pugeda learned that Elmar Santos
had been arrested at the Cavite Medical Center while Jun Santos and Roger Santos
were arrested and detained at the Imus Police Station because they held some people
hostage.

PO2 Avila testified that he was the investigator on duty at the Imus Municipal Police
Station on August 19, 2009, around 10:30 in the morning. Then and there, PO2 Avila
personally received a report from a certain Huerta Pugeda about the disappearance of
his brother Roman Pugeda, who last went to Tanza, Cavite onboard his Adventure car
bearing Plate No. WNR-849 on August 18, 2009 but never came home. PO2 Avila
entered in the police blotter the alleged disappearance of Roman Pugeda. On the same
day, a report came in from Police Precinct No. 4 in Bucandala that Roman Pugeda's
Adventure car was recovered in a place within its jurisdiction. The vehicle was brought
to the Imus Municipal Police Station and was released to Roman Pugeda himself on
August 20, 2009 around 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

PO2 Avila clarified that Huerta Pugeda presented his driver's license at the police
station but did not submit a sworn statement regarding his brother's disappearance.

The Defense's Version

As sole witness for the defense, Santos testified that he was being treated for a gunshot
wound at the Cavite Medical Center when police officers arrived on August 21, 2009 to
arrest him for his alleged involvement in kidnapping. Due to his injury, he was not
immediately taken out of the Cavite Medical Center. After a week, however, he was
physically transferred to the Philippine National Police General Hospital where he
continued treatment for his gunshot wound. One month thereafter, he was detained at
the PNP Custodian Center.

Santos denied knowledge, let alone, participation in the alleged kidnapping for ransom
of Roman Pugeda. He, however, did not file a case against the police officers who
arrested him simply because he did not know how to go about it and because he was
still recovering from his injury.

Santos explained that on August 20, 2009, he sustained a gunshot wound after he
accidentally shot himself while holding his uncle's gun. After he accidentally shot
himself, he was brought to the Vista Clinic located in Noveleta, Cavite. He had to be
brought all the way there although there were medical clinics in Cavite City, where the
accident took place, because his uncle's gun did not have a corresponding license.
When asked where his uncle Roperto was, Santos said that the latter was in hiding due
to pending cases against him for robbery and hold-up, murder, and others, none of
which, however, happened on August 18 or 19, 2009.
Santos maintained that he was at home in Bulacan on August 18, 2009. The only
person who could attest to this was his father but he already died. His brother Roger
Santos was detained at the Malolos Provincial Jail for a pending homicide case. Aside
from the present case filed by Roman Pugeda against him, he had another pending
case for kidnapping for ransom filed by a certain Eileen Victa Cruz.

RTC Ruling

Found Santos guilty of kidnapping for ransom.

CA Ruling

It sustained the trial court's factual finding based on the clear, categorical, consistent
and conclusive testimony of Pugeda himself who was proven not to have been impelled
by improper motive to falsely testify against Santos. Pugeda's positive identification
prevailed over Santos's weak defense of alibi. Santos's mere denial cannot overcome
Pugeda's firm and clear declaration that Santos was one of his abductors. Although
Pugeda gave a mere general description of Santos during the investigation, the same
was different from recognition. Description referred only to facility of communication
which not many persons possess. The Court of Appeals, however, modified Santos's
civil liability.

ISSUE:

Did the prosecution establish Santos's guilt of kidnapping for ransom?

RULING:

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, defines
the crime of kidnapping and prescribes the penalty therefor, thus:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As
amended by RA No. 7659).

To sustain a conviction of kidnapping, the prosecution must prove the following

elements: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is
present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention is a minor, or if the crime is perpetrated for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of detention is immaterial. The essence of the crime is
the purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled
with intent.

These elements were indubitably established in this case: Santos is a private individual
who deprived Pugeda of his liberty by restraining him and not allowing him to leave and
go home unless and until ransom was paid in exchange for his freedom. Santos was
positively identified as one of the kidnappers by Pugeda himself. Pugeda had the
opportunity to see Santos's face when his blindfold was removed. He heard Santos's
voice and saw how he moved for they were onboard the same vehicle for many hours.
There is, thus, no reason to doubt Pugeda's identification of Santos as one of his
abductors for the same was made with moral certainty enough to overcome the
presumption of innocence. 

As discussed, Pugeda had the opportunity to take a good look at the faces of his
abductors at some point during the time they held him captive. And with certainty, he
identified them when shown photos by the police officers during investigation. Pugeda
was also able to identify Santos as one of his kidnappers in open court and convincingly
gave a detailed narration of his abduction – how the perpetrators at gunpoint took
control of his car, the conversation between the abductors, the abduction of new victims
while he was still in the custody of Santos and the latter's companions. Given the
situation Santos was in during that fateful night he was kidnapped, it is expected that he
endeavored to see the faces of his kidnappers and it is not likely that he would easily
forget their faces. The Court, thus, ordained:

xxx Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take
place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court
has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see
the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is
committed. x x x. All too often, the face of the assailant and his body movements create
a lasting impression on the victim's mind and cannot thus be easily erased from his
memory. xxx

The Court finds that the prosecution had complied with the totality of circumstances
test: (1) To repeat, Pugeda had the singular opportunity to view his kidnappers face-to-
face; his proximity to them and the amount of time that he was with them inside the car
allowed for such close encounter; (2) being with his abductors continuously for more
than 24 hours, Pugeda was focused on familiarizing himself with his abductors. He
observed their every move and listened in on their conversations. His degree of
attention on them is, thus, indubitable; (3) Pugeda identified Santos when shown a
picture of the latter during investigation at the police station and his unwavering
identification of Santos continued in open court; (4) in identifying Santos in the
photographs and in open court, Pugeda was so certain that Santos was one [1] of the
four [4] persons who abducted him on August 18, 2009 in Cavite; (5) A day after he was
abandoned by his kidnappers, Pugeda positively identified Santos as one [1] of his
abductors; and (6) no proof of suggestiveness was adduced showing that an improper
suggestion on the identity of his kidnappers was made on Pugeda. Verily, any perceived
suggestiveness was stamped out by the certainty by Pugeda's categorical and
unquestionable identification of Santos.

WHEREFORE, Santos is found guilty of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.

33.

34.

35.

36.
37.

G.R. No. 242682, July 01, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. NERISSA MORA A.K.A. NERI BALAGTA

MORA AND MARIA SALOME POLVORIZA, ACCUSED, NERISSA MORA A.K.A. NERI BALAGTA MORA
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution:
1. November 26, 2011, Mora was able to convince AAA, then a minor, to come with her to Buraburan,
Buhi, Camarines Sur. Upon arriving thereat, Mora left AAA at Otoy's Videoke Bar (Otoy's) owned
by Polvoriza
2. Thereafter, Polvoriza locked AAA inside a room therein, prohibited her from going out, and took her
mobile phone and destroyed its SIM card. Polvoriza then made AAA work as an entertainer at
Otoy's under the stage name "Rizza M. Rañada," forcing her to take shabu, dance naked, and
even have sex with the customers. 
3. Eight (8) months later, AAA was able to escape from Polvoriza's custody and return to her father,
to whom she narrated her ordeal. 

Version of the Accused (Mora and Polvoriza)

1. Mora
a. Mora admitted knowing Polvoriza, she denied being close friends with her. She also
averred that she and AAA had been close to each other and even treated the latter as her
own sister. 
b. On November 26, 2011, AAA insisted that she accompany her to Buraburan, Buhi,
Camarines Sur, to which Mora reluctantly agreed.
c. Upon arrival thereat, AAA proceeded inside Otoy's and a few moments later returned
outside to give her P200.00. Thereafter, she returned home.
d. Finally, she claimed that when she first met AAA, she thought that the latter was already of
age based on her physical appearance.
2. Polvoriza
a. She first saw AAA in the evening of November 26, 2011 when the latter went inside Otoy's,
introduced herself as "Rizza M. Rañada," and expressed her desire to work therein. 
b. She initially declined as she did not hire entertainers for her bar, but nonetheless, she let
AAA stay because she was "nice."
c. A few days later, AAA returned to Otoy's and handed her a pink card, which Polvoriza
knew to be a health card secured by entertainers from health centers.
d. Finally, Polvoriza claimed that she only learned of AAA's true identity when she was
arrested in connection with the instant criminal case.
RTC’s ruling

1. RTC found Mora and Polvoriza guilty of Qualified Trafficking in Persons defined and penalized
under Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, 4 otherwise known as
the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."
2. Mora and Polvoriza conspired with each other to take AAA, through deception and by taking
advantage of her minority, to Otoy's where AAA was forced to become a sex worker who, among
others, danced naked in front of male customers and was even coerced into having sex with them.

CA’s ruling
1. CA affirmed the RTC. It held that the prosecution, through AAA's unimpeached testimony, had
successfully established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of the crime
charged.

Issue: WoN Mora's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons should be upheld. (Records do not show
that Polvoriza made an appeal before the Court.)
Held: Yes
1. Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." 
2. Further, the same law provides that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt
of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph." The crime of "Trafficking
in Persons" becomes qualified when, among others, the trafficked person is a child.
3. Mora and Polvoriza are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged as the prosecution
had clearly established the existence of the elements thereof, as seen in the following:
a. Mora, through deception and by taking advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor, was
able to "convince" the latter to go to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur;
b. upon arrival thereat, Mora took AAA to Polvoriza's videoke bar, i.e., Otoy's, and left her
there; and
c. since then and for the next eight (8) months, Polvoriza forced AAA to work as a prostitute
in Otoy's, coercing her to perform lewd acts on a nightly basis, such as dancing naked in
front of male customers and even having sex with them. 
38.

G.R. No. 213760

REYNALDO SANTIAGO, JR. y SANTOS, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution:
1. On September 26 and 27, 2011, TV5 segment producer Espenida and his crew went to Plaza Morga and
Plaza Moriones in Tondo, Manila to investigate the alleged prostitution operations in the area. A confidential
asset, alias "Romeo David" (David) posed as a customer and transact with the alleged pimps for a night with
a minor. During the transaction, the pimps allegedly asked for ₱500.00. Espenida heard the transaction
through the microphone clipped to David.
2. On September 29, 2011, Espenida and his crew filed a Complaint before the Regional Police Intelligence
Operations Unit reporting about the rampant human trafficking in Plaza Morga and Plaza Moriones.
3. Acting on the Complaint, police operatives, headed by Police Senior Inspector Quejada conducted an
entrapment operation in those areas. Later, at around 11:00 p.m., the team and David arrived at Plaza
Morga. David pointed to the pimps, who, upon seeing the police, ran away but were eventually caught and
arrested
4. After the arrest, the team proceeded to the hotel where the trafficked person, AAA, had been waiting.
According to AAA, at around 1:30 a.m. on September 30, 2011, she was about to buy coffee at Plaza
Moriones when Santiago called her, offering to pay her to spend a night with a customer. He allegedly
promised to pay AAA ₱350.00 out of the ₱500.00 that the customer would pay for the transaction. Later,
she and Santiago went to the hotel, which was 15 meters away from Plaza Moriones.
5. AAA later confirmed during trial that Santiago was the pimp, but said that she only saw Castillo and Legazpi
for the first time upon getting into the van bound for the police station

Version of the Accused (Santiago)

1. Around midnight of September 29, 2011, while he was selling coffee at Plaza Morga, around 25 meters
away from Plaza Moriones, he was approached by David, who said that he was looking for a woman.
Santiago said that he ignored the man.
2. Santiago allegedly saw AAA approach David, though he did not hear what the two had talked about. AAA
later waved at Santiago and invited him to accompany her. AAA brought Santiago to a hotel, but as they
were nearing it, the police arrived and arrested him.

RTC’s ruling
1. Santiago is guilty of committing trafficking in persons punished under Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,
or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act.
2. Castillo and Legazpi were acquitted for the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

CA’s ruling
 1. Court of Appeals affirmed Santiago's conviction. It found that all the elements to establish that an accused
had committed trafficking in persons, which were the act, the means, and the exploitative purpose as
provided under the Manual on Law Enforcement and Prosecution of Trafficking in Persons Cases, were
present.

Bakit naging Santiago vs. Pp

1. Santiago filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
2. Santiago points out that the lack of testimony from the confidential informant, David, raises doubts on
whether "petitioner truly offered AAA to him.
3. Santiago also points out that AAA testified that she had not received the alleged consideration for the
transaction, dispelling the prosecution's claim that he was engaged in trafficking.

Issue: WoN Santiago is guilty of violating Section 4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act.
Held: Yes
1. Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, defines the crime of trafficking
in persons:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:

(a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of
threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

2. The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act
No. 9208, thus: (ORIGINAL PROVISION ETO. NOT THE AMENDED)
a. The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."
b. The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another["]; and
c. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs."
3. On February 6, 2013, the law was amended by Republic Act No. 10364. The offense was committed on
September 30, 2011, prior to the amendment. Thus, the original provisions of Republic Act No. 9208 are
applicable.
4. The Information charged petitioner with violation of Section 4(c), in relation to Section 6(c) of the law.
Section 4(c) punishes the act of "[offering] or [contracting] marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of
acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage[.]"
 5. The trial court correctly convicted petitioner for violation of Section 4(a), instead of Section 4(c) of Republic
Act No. 9208.
a. The provision does not allow any person:
i. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.
6. The Information sufficiently averred that: (1) petitioner committed an act of qualified trafficking in persons by
offering AAA to David for sex or exploitation; (2) the act was done for a fee; and (3) for prostitution, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage.
7. It is sufficient that the accused has lured, enticed[,] or engaged its victims or transported them for the
established purpose of exploitation," which was sufficiently shown by the trafficked person's testimony
alone.

39. FERNANDO B. ARAMBULLO,* PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution:
1. Fernando Arambullo and his minor son, Dominique Dimple Arambulo (Dominique), invited the latter's three
(3) schoolmates who were also minors, namely AAA, BBB, and CCC, to their house sometime in 2011. 
2. It was then revealed that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss petitioner's plans to commit robberies
with the help of AAA, BBB, and CCC. 
3. Upon learning about this, CCC expressed his desire to leave but petitioner got angry and punched him;
thus, he was forced to join the group.
4. AAA, BBB, and CCC then similarly testified that not only was petitioner the mastermind of the series of
robberies they subsequently committed against various people, but he was also the driver of their getaway
tricycle.

Version of the Accused (Fernando)

1. The filing of the instant case was merely an act of retaliation by a certain Lt. Hoseña, one (1) of the alleged
victims of the aforesaid robberies, following the dismissal of the theft and obstruction of justice cases filed by
the Lt. Hoseña against Fernando.

RTC’s ruling
1. Fernando B. Arambulo (petitioner) is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons, defined and penalized under Section 4 (k) (4) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9208, otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," as amended by RA 10364,
otherwise known as the "Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.
2. RTC opined that petitioner's acts constitute Qualified Trafficking in Persons not only because the victims
were minors, but also because it is considered "in large scale" as it involved three (3) or more victims.

CA’s ruling
1. CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
Bakit naging Arambulo vs. Pp
1. Fernando elevated the matter before the Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
2. Fernando contends that the acts imputed to him, i.e., recruiting minors to commit a series of robberies,
constitute the crime defined and penalized under Section 4 (k) (4) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364.
3. Since this specific provision was only introduced by the amendatory law in 2013 as the original iteration of
Section 4 of RA 9208 did not contain the same, and the acts imputed to petitioner were committed
sometime in September 2011 to January 12, 2012, it may be said that at the time he committed said acts,
there was no specific provision in RA 9208 in its original form which specifically defines and penalizes the
said acts as Trafficking in Persons. As such, his conviction must be set aside.

Issue: WoN Fernando should be acquitted

Held: No
1. Petitioner correctly pointed out that he cannot be convicted under Section 4 (k) (4)31 of RA 9208 as
amended by RA 10364 since said provision was only enacted on February 28, 2013.
2. However, his acts of recruiting minors for the purpose of committing a series of robberies reasonably fall
under Section 4 (a) of RA 9208 in its original form, which reads:cralawred

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to
commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training
or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage; (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
3. Relatedly, Section 3 (d) of RA 9208 in its original form defines the term "forced labor and slavery" as "the
extraction of work or services from any person by means of enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use
of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-
bondage or deception."
4. The prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements of violation of Section 4 (a) in relation
to Section 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208
a. Fernando, through his minor son, Dominique, recruited three (3) other minors AAA, BBB, and
CCC;
b. Based on AAA, BBB, and CCC's testimonies, petitioner was able to do so by taking advantage of
their vulnerability as minors, particularly through enticement, violence, and use of force and
coercion; and
c. Fernando recruited them for the purpose of engaging them to perform illicit work/services, i.e.,
commit a series of robberies. 

DISCUSSION RE RA 9208 as amended by RA 10364

1. Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
 deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs." The same provision further provides that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in
persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph."
2. The crime becomes qualified when any of the circumstances found under Section 6 of the law is present.
3. It must be clarified that Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 merely provides for the general definition of "Trafficking in
Persons" as the specific acts punishable under the law are found in Sections 4 and 5 of the same (including
Sections 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C if the amendments brought about by RA 10364 are taken into consideration).
4. This is evinced by Section 10 which provides for the penalties and sanctions for committing the enumerated
acts therein. Notably, Section 10 (c) of RA 9208 (renumbered as Section 10 [e] under RA 10364) of the law
also provides for penalties for "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" under Section 6.
5. Nonetheless, since Section 6 only provides for circumstances which would qualify the crime of "Human
Trafficking," reference should always be made to Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5 of the law.
6. Hence, convictions for "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" shall rest on:
a. The commission of any of the acts provided under Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5; and
b. The existence of any of the circumstances listed under Section 6.
7. Otherwise stated, one cannot be convicted of "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" if he is not found to have
committed any of the punishable acts under the law.