Professional Documents
Culture Documents
L-22797,
September 22, 1966 (and Resolution dated November 29,
1966)
2nd Par
II. W/N the share of Filomena should be distributed (1) between her children
only; OR (2) also among her other legitimate descendants (ALSO
AMONG FILOMENA’S OTHER LEGITIMATE DESCENDANTS)
The issue is with regard also to the last sentence of clause 10: does "sus
descendientes legitimos" (their legitimate descendants) refer (1) conjointly to
all living descendant (both children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a
class; or they refer to the (2) descendants nearest in degree?
Onesima: Only the relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz. The legacy
should be divided equally between her and her sister Milagros, to the exclusion
of the latter's sons and daughters, invoking Art. 959: A distribution made in
general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made
in favor of those nearest in degree.
SC: Art. 959 applies only in cases where the beneficiaries are relatives of the
testator, not of the legatee. The law assumes the testator intended to refer to
the rules of intestacy to benefit the relatives closest to him, because, as
according to Manresa, among a testator's relative the closest are dearest.
This, however, does not come into play where the beneficiaries are relatives
of another person (the legatee) and not of the testator. There is no reason to
presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he
precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can
it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to
those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as
mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
Should Article 959 be applied by analogy? There are various reasons against
this:
1. The most important one is that, as recognized by the principal commentators
on the Code of 1889, the nearest relatives exclude all the farther relatives
and right of representation does not operate.
2. Second, the history of provision shows that the right of representation
was deliberately suppressed.
In order to support the claim of Olaguera, the latter must have proven that the
testator intended to impose an order of succession that:
(a) Rejected the right of accretion among co-heirs and co-legatees, as
established by Arts. 1016 and 1019, and he intended to replace it with
representation; (to get a larger share as compared to Milagros’ children)
(b) Refused the rule of Art. 846 which would have ordained that co-heirs inherit
in equal parts, unless otherwise provided; (also to get a larger share) and
(c) Rejected the rule of Art. 1022 which provides that vacancies in the free part
should be filed according to the rules of accretion or substitution, and in
default of these two, by the rules of intestacy.
The testator could have rendered inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he
had so desired but without any other supporting circumstances, SC held that
the testator did not intend to circumvent all the legal provisions with the one
phrase "sus descendientes legitimes." Appellant failed to prove such intention
on the part of the testator.
In the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply
here is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees,
intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with
Art. 846. The legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her
surviving children and grandchidren.