1. Genato vs. Bayhon G.R. No.
17035, August 24, 2009 Issue:
Facts:
1. Respondents Bayhon filed an action before the RTC seeking the declaration of nullity of
a dacion en pago allegedly executed by respondent Benjamin Bayhon in favor of petitioner
Genato
2. Bayhon alleged that he obtained from the petitioner a loan and that to cover the loan, he
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property however, such execution was
conditioned upon petitioner’s assurance that the instrument is only a private memorandum of indebtedness
and would neither be notarized or enforced against its tenor.
3. Respondent further alleged that he filed a separate proceeding for the reconstitution
4. Genato filed an Answer in Intervention and attached a copy of an alleged dacion en
pago covering said lot.
5. Respondent assailed the dacion en pago as a forgery alleging that neither he nor his wife, who
had died 3 years earlier, had executed it
6. Genato denied the claim of respondent alleging that on the date that the real estate mortgage
was to be signed, respondent introduced to him a woman as his wife and He allegedly signed
the dacion en pago
7. Genato filed an action for specific performance, before the RTC allegeing that respondent
obtained a loan from him and that respondent failed to pay the loan and executed a dacion en
pago in favor of the petitioner
[The dacion en pago was inscribed and recorded with the Registry of Deeds ]
8. The two cases were consolidated and the trial court rendered its Decision. It found that
respondent obtained a loan
With respect to the dacion en pago, the trial court held that the parties have novated the agreement
Of the principal amounts some sums were already paid. All payments were made after the purported
execution of the dacion en pago.
9. Respondents appealed before the Court of Appeals. Bayhon died while the case was still
pending decision
10. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the trial court.
[The Court of Appeals held that the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were both void since
at the time when both were executed, the wife of respondent Benjamin Bayhon was already dead.]
[Thus, she could not have participated in the execution of the two documents.]
11. Hence this petition
Whether or not the dacion en pago was valid
Whether or not the obligation to pay the principal loan is extinguished upon Bayhon’s death
Held:
I.
No, We affirm the ruling of the appellate court that the subject dacion en pago is a simulated or
fictitious contract, and hence void. The evidence shows that at the time it was allegedly signed by the
wife of the respondent, his wife was already dead
II.
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received
from the decedent.1avvphi1
"ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law."
"ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death."
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors
The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case was pending before the
Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against
his estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt
has first been satisfied
The procedure in vindicating monetary claims involving a defendant who dies before final
judgment is governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of
final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person
Pursuant to this provision, petitioner’s remedy lies in filing a claim against the estate of the deceased
respondent.
Interest is excessive:
5% per month, or 60% per annum. This is unconscionable, hence cannot be enforced
in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals,30 at 12% per annum
 1. SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO vs. CA, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG,
CARMELITA JUGO
FACTS
In 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a last Will and Testament. In said Will, the testator named petitioner
as executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had
been estranged from his lawful wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact
testator and petitioner were married before a Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced
heirs, his legal wife and children, his entire estate, and the free portion thereof to petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary. Private respondents filed an opposition. Lower court denied the probate of the Will.
Petitioner appealed to respondent court, which set aside lower court’s decision. Respondent court
declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant
to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision in favor of petitioner
RATIO DECIDENDI
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner
null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
The rule, however, is not absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited
her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would
be null and void. Separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
There is no dispute over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties agree it was executed with all
the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary
provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, litigation will be
protracted; probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper
court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his
office.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
Nepomuceno contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally
married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:
1) will expressly admits on its face the relationship between testator and petitioner, the devisee; and 2)
petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status
of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator.
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the
inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
2. Seangio v Reyes 508 SCRA 177 (2006)
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006 DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and
VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, vs.HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D.
SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
FACTS There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated
as “Kasulatan sa pag - aalis ng mana.” The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of
Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the
definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only
showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else;
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there
was preterition which would result to intestacy. Private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred
from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the authority
of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply
because Segundo’s will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for
certiorari was filed by petitioners.
Issue:
Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
Held:
Petition granted. The questioned will is a holographic will. Testate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms
to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention
of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed more
liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act
and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
3. De Roma vs. CA
G.R. No. L-46903 152 SCRA 205
July 23, 1987
CRUZ, J:
Testator: Candelaria de Roma, April 30,1971
Proponent: Felicidad Caringal
Oppositor: Rosalinda de Roma
Type of Succession: Intestate
FACTS:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was
appointed administrator and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by
Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits
thereof, had not been included
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land, what the parties cannot
agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues
that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims
she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was
not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
 Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor
should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the
donation should be reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of Buhay, which held that the decedent, when she made the
donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in the free portion of Candelaria's
estate.
On appeal, the Court held that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to
collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net
estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate.
RULING:
None, there is nothing in the deed of donation executed by Candelaria that expressly prohibits
the collation of the donated properties.
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng
aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang,
mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo
sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat
sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan
ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa
ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at
kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan,
datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at
mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing
muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express
prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the
subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article
1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were
imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the
question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or
not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE:
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
4. MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted
by the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition
should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each
compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a
partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties
as devises to the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each
compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the
nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which
reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has
reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a
negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of
practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary
dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the
tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate
children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the appellants
1. Valdez left a will executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries were the
7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million) which
included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceased’s estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her testamentary
disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her
entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more
than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised of
cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the
cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where
Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907 NCC
specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed.
 The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will substantially result in
a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held
that "the intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the
fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of
the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and
to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in
his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied
with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts
may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for partition
cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition.
In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as
the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my
wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren
to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and
authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a person make a
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project of partition as the oppositors were
adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her will and
the differential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and
Tomas, who were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's
project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed
by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by
the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises and legacies, to
one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of
the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a
distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of
the property adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the
latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to specific heirs
cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and the
dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already
noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through
her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications
to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account
of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her
will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH:
I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die
before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I
bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of the
entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her
lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some
properties by will which would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from
the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the
executrix-appellee.
5. LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant vs DELFIN N.
JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the TESTATE ESTATE of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee
GR L-15737, February 28, 1962
Ponente: Justice JBL Reyes
Principles/Doctrines: Interpretation of Wills and Testaments: Intent of testator must govern
Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing
plaintiff-appellant’s complaint for recovery of certain properties that were originally owned by the
plaintiff’s granduncle Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Fausta Nepomuceno.
Date of Death: MARCH 3, 1922 (Nicolas) May 1, 1956 (Fausta)
Kind of Succession: TESTATE-HOLOGRAPHIC WILL (Nicolas) NOT MENTIONED (Fausta)
Cause of Death: NOT MENTIONED
FACTS:
On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolás Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in
Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villaflor. Clause 6th of the will contains the institution of heirs while the 12th clause provided
that the 6th and 7th clause would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Fausta
Nepomuceno. On March 3, 1922, Nicolas died without begetting any child with his wife Fausta.
Already widowed, Fausta instituted a special proceeding before the CFI of Zambales for the settlement
of her husband’s estate where she was appointed as judicial administratrix. A project of partition was
approved by the court and the proceeding was thereafter declared closed. By virtue of the approval of
such partition, Fausta received the use and possession (NOT OWNERSHIP) of all the real and
personal properties mentioned in the will.
On May 1, 1956, Fausta died without having contracted a second marriage and without having
begotten a child. An estate proceeding ensued where defendant Delfin N. Juico was appointed as
judicial administrator.
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda de Villanueva, the great niece, is admitted to be the same Leonor
Villaflor mentioned by Nicolas in his will. He filed an action for recovery of certain properties against
the administrator of the estate of Fausta. Plaintiff LEONOR contends that upon the widow’s death,
he became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late
Nicolas, pursuant to the 8th clause. Defendant DELFIN’s position, which was adopted by the lower
court, is that the title to the properties became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death on
account of the fact that she never remarried.
The lower court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff now comes before the court seeking an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the interpretation of the will by the lower court showed the intent of the testator.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as
manifested in the will of Nicolas, was to invest his widow only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the 7th clause, subject to the condition that if the widow remarried, her rights would
thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a
life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used
by the deceased uso y , posesi mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the
phrase "usoy , posesión " instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The
testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the
right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her life time. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother
The Supreme Court, in holding Leonor as reversionary legatee that could succeed to the properties
bequeathed by Nicolas, discarded the expression “mientras viva” (while alive) and considered the
words “uso y, posesio n” (use and possession). The ruling of the lower court is in violation of Article
791.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy."
It is well noted that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-marriage of his
widow, the words “use and possession while alive” would have been unnecessary, since the widow
could remarry during her lifetime. Article 790 of the NCC provides:
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless
a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained."
"Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
The Supreme Court finally held that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed
in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.
Consequently, the legacies should pass to Leonor, upon Fausta’s death. Fausta had no right to retain
or dispose of the said properties and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for the return.
The decision appealed was reversed and LEONOR was declared entitled to the ownership and fruits
of the properties described in the will.
6. BALANAY v MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-39247
June 27, 1975
Topic: Preterition
Petitioner: Felix Balanay, Jr.
Respondent: Hon. Antonio Martinez, CFI-Davao, Avelina Antonio and Delia Lanaban.
Ponente: , J. Aquino
DOCTRINE: A preterited surviving spouse can validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-
half share of the conjugal partnership, thereby validating the act of preterition and conforming to the
disposition made by his spouse in the will.
FACTS: In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian.
• Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City
at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six
legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina
B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
• Felix Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mother’s notarial will dated Sept. 5, 1070 which
was written in English. In that will, Leodegracia declared that:
o She was the owner of the southern half of 9 conjugal lots;
o She was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from her father; and
 o It was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during the
lifetime of her husband and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties.
o But after her husband’s death, her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands should be
divided and distributed in the manner set forth in her will.
o She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She even
disposed of her husband’s share of the conjugal assets.
• Avelina and Felix Balanay Sr. opposed the probate of the will on the ground of lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper
partition of the conjugal estate.
• However, in Felix Jr.’s reply, he attached an affidavit of Felix Sr. The affidavit stated that he
was withdrawing his opposition to probate and he had signed an instrument entitled
“Confirmation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights.” In the Conformity, Felix
Sr. renounced his hereditary rights in favor of his 6 children in order to conform with his
wife’s wishes in the will.
• Avelina, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and instrument of renunciation are void.
• The CFI denied the opposition and set the case for hearing. It gave effect to the affidavit and
conformity. The CFI eventually appointed a special administrator. It also denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Avelina.
• In the meantime, one Atty. David Montaña Sr. claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Jr. filed a
motion for “leave of court to withdraw probate of the alleged will of Leodegraria Julian and
requesting authority to proceed by intestate proceding.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the total omission of the surviving spouse in the will results in preterition
RULING: No, or not in this instance. Although, the surviving spouse, the husband was omitted from
the will, his execution of the “Confirmation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights” had
the effect of validating the act of preterition. The husband validated the partition made in the will
although, without prejudice, to the rights of the creditors and the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
The husband could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal
partnership, but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his
one-half share in the conjugal estate, it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in Articles 750
and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support
and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set
aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower
court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this
opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
7. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children. 11 children :o
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate
in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest
therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." He had
eight (8) legitimate children from two wives and three (3) illegitimate children.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he bequeathed, among
others, an amount of P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each.
On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted
to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The executor of the will paid all the bequests therein including to the three (3) illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00
each in satisfaction of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by
his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Their oppositions were overruled by the
lower court. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which
in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illegitimate children of a person, who is citizen and a domiciliary of a foreign
country, and whose estate in the Philippines had been settled in accordance with a will validly probated
here, are entitled to their respective legitimes.
RULING:
No.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
G.R. No. 61167-68 January 20, 1989
8. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ, DECEASED,
AND PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION: FIDELA DE GUZMAN and EMETERIO DE
GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FRANCISCO BENITEZ, DIONISIA
VALENZUELA and MELQUIADES VALENZUELA respondents.
Petitioners have appealed the decision of CA affirming that of CFI of Laguna disallowing the will of
Francisco Benitez and appointing Dionisia administratix of his intestate estate.
Facts:
• Francisco Benitez died single at the age of 61 years without descendants, nor ascendants, nor
brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen (14) parcels of coconut land in
Laguna, with a total area of 34 hectares, a residential lot in the poblacion of Pagsanjan, Laguna,
and a small savings account (P3,843.08) in the Philippine National Bank.
• Dionisia and her brother Melquiades (first cousins of the deceased Francisco) filed a petition for
administration of his intestate estate and for the issuance of administration to Dionisia who
during the lifetime of Francisco had been administering the said estate as judicial guardian of his
person and property.
• The petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the
deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him (De Guzman) and that a petition for its
probate was docketed in Branch II of the same court. The two cases were later consolidated and
jointly heard in Branch IV of the court.
• In support of the petition for probate, the petitioner Fidel de Guzman (one of the heirs who
substituted Emiterio after he died) and two attesting witnesses of the will, Pelagio Lucena and
Judge Damaso Tengco who prepared the will, gave evidence.
• To oppose, Dionisia and Melquiades presented 6 witnesses who identified the transcript of
testimony by Dr. Jose Fernandez for the guardianship of Francisco for incompetence on account
of insanity. On April 4, 1975, Judge Maximo Maceren (CFI) rendered judgment disallowing the
will and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.
CA Affirmed.
• The pivotal issue hinges on the mental capacity of the supposed testator, Francisco Benitez on
August 18, 1945 when he allegedly executed his last will and testament.
Issue:
1) Did Francisco Benitez possess a sound and disposing mind on August 18, 1945?
2) Whether the petition for review is with merit
Ruling:
1) No. The evidence (Exhibit I and Exhibit H) shows that from January 18, 1929 up to March 12,
1941 Francisco Benitez was confined at the National Mental Hospital for varying periods of time.
The foregoing premises leads this Court to the conclusion that [at] the time Francisco Benitez
executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945 he was not possessed of a sound and disposing
mind. Wherefore the same is not allowed probate.
2) No. Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which the court is not at liberty to review
because in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of
Appeals reveals that that Court carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the
testamentary capacity, or lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no compelling
reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners Fidel,
Crisencia and Rosalia de Guzman.
-Rea
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 61167-68 January 20, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF FRANCISCO
BENITEZ, DECEASED, AND PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION:
FIDELA DE GUZMAN and EMETERIO DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FRANCISCO
BENITEZ, DIONISIA VALENZUELA and MELQUIADES VALENZUELA respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco & Factoran for petitioners.
Tomas P. Anonuevo for respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioners have appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings Nos. SC-347 and 352, disallowing the will of Francisco
Benitez, and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of his intestate estate.
On December 10, 1970, Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother, Melquiades Valenzuela, first-cousins of
the deceased Francisco Benitez, filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch IV, (docketed
as SC-347) a petition for administration of his intestate estate and for the issuance of letters of
administration to Dionisia who, during the lifetime of the deceased, had been administering the said
estate as judicial guardian of his person and property duly appointed on January 22, 1957 in Spl. Proc.
No. SC-29 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Francisco Benitez was the only surviving child of the spouses Tiu Cuaco, alias Pascual Benitez, and
Camila Valenzuela whose brother was the father of private respondents, Dionisia Valenzuela and
Melquiades Valenzuela. He died single at the age of 61 years on November 6, 1970, without
descendants, nor ascendants, nor brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen (14)
parcels of coconut land in Laguna, with a total area of 34 hectares, a residential lot on S. Crisostomo
Street in the poblacion of Pagsanjan, Laguna, and a small savings account (P3,843.08) in the Philippine
National Bank.
The petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the deceased
left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him (De Guzman) and that a petition for its probate was
docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 352 in Branch II of the same court the two cases were later consolidated
and jointly heard in Branch IV of the court.
Emiterio de Guzman died on April 20, 1973 and was substituted by his heirs, Fidel, Cresencia and
Rosalie, all surnamed De Guzman, in both proceedings.
In support of the petition for probate (SC-352), the petitioner Fidel de Guzman and two attesting
witnesses of the will, Pelagio Lucena and Judge Damaso Tengco who prepared the will, gave evidence.
The oppositors (petitioners for administration in SC-347) presented six (6) witnesses, namely, Marcial
Mendoza, Pedro Cabela, Porfirio Reyes, Dionisia Valenzuela, Honoria Recalde Leonardo and
Prudencio Leonardo, who identified the transcript of the testimony given on January 22, 1957 by Dr.
Jose A. Fernandez (since deceased) in the proceedings (SC-29) for the guardianship of Francisco
Benitez for incompetence on account of insanity. Various documentary exhibits were presented by
both sides.
On April 4, 1975, Judge Maximo Maceren rendered judgment disallowing the will and appointing
Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. The pertinent findings of
the trial court are quoted hereunder:
The pivotal issue hinges on the mental capacity of the supposed testator, Francisco
Benitez on August 18, 1945 when he allegedly executed his last will and testament. Did
Francisco Benitez possess a sound and disposing mind on August 18, 1945?
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence (Exhibit I and Exhibit H) shows that from January 18, 1929 up to March
12, 1941 Francisco Benitez was confined at the National Mental Hospital for varying
periods of time as follows:
DATE OF ADMISSION DATE OF DISCHARGE
(a) January 18, 1929 March 12,1929
(b) March 7, 1931 June 6, 1931
(c) November 12,1936 November 29, 1937
(d) February 16, 1938 August 16, 1939
(e) July 9, 1940 March 12, 1941
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing premises leads this Court to the conclusion that [at] the time Francisco
Benitez executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945 he was not possessed of a
sound and disposing mind. Wherefore the same is not allowed probate.' (pp. 123, 124
and 126, Rollo.)
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed by that Court on March 3, 1982 (p. 135,
Rollo).
The petitioners De Guzman assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that:
 The finding that the deceased Francisco Benitez 'was not possessed of a sound and
disposing mind' when he executed his will on August 18, 1945, is grounded merely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures, as well as on hearsay and contradictory, biased,
and obviously incredible testimony. (p. 10, Rollo.)
Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which we are not at liberty to review because in an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of Appeals reveals that that Court
carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the testamentary capacity, or lack of it, of the
deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no compelling reason to disturb the lower court's findings
and conclusions." The resolution of that question hinged on the credibility of the witnesses. The
cardinal rule on that point is that the trial courts, assessment of the credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing
their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall
not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA 582)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners Fidel,
Crisencia and Rosalia de Guzman.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
9. Baltazar vs. Laxa, April 11, 2012
Facts: Paciencia, childless and has no siblings, was a 78 year old spinster. She made her last will and
testament in favor of her nephew Lorenzo Laxa (respondent) and his wife and two children. She
treated Lorenzo as her own son. The said will was executed in the house of a retired judge, Limpin,
and was read twice to Paciencia. Present on the execution of the will were three witnesses and one of
which is Dra. Limpin, the daughter of Judge Limpin. The formalities of signing the will by the testator
and the witnesses were fulfilled. The will remained with Judge Limpin until Lorenzo, four years after
the death of Paciencia, filed a petition for the probate of the will and for the issuance of the letter of
administration. Petitioner Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition averring that the
properties subject to the will belongs to his predecessor in interest, Mangalindahan. Later on, Baltazar
was joined with several other petitioners contending that Paciencia’s will was null and void because
ownership of the properties had not been transferred. Few more reasons raised by the petitioners were
that the will was not executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, and that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the execution.
RTC ruled that Paciencia was of unsound mind during the execution of the will, however, the CA
reversed such decision and granted the probate of the will of Pacencia. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but such was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue(s): (1) Whether or not the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
(2) Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in ruling that petitioners failed to prove
that paciencia was not of sound mind at the time the will was allegedly executed.
Ruling: (1)Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. These
formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of
the Clerk of Court.
The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement
that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and
that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
(2)The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
The appellate court agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness
is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury
or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will.
It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and
substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations.
"The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed
that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that,
if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby." This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the
testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners
apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of
the Will and its allowance for probate.