Rodriguez v.
Rodriguez Held: YES
Juanito Rodriguez owned a 5-door apartment. In 1983, he executed a “Huling habilin at testamento”
giving petitioner Cresencia Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D and E, and his children
Benjamin (deceased husband of respondent), apartment A; respondent Buenaventura, apartment B;
and Belen, apartment C. However, in 1984, the deceased executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property in favor of the petitioner. In 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
respondents, alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property, and that in 1984, she
allowed respondents to occupy the units. However, without her knowledge and consent, the
respondents separately leased the units to Magpantay, Navarro, and Escota. Respondents claimed
ownership of the property by succession. They alleged that the deed of sale was simulated and void.
The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents. The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. MR denied.
Issue: WON the CA committed reversible error in declaring that the property became the subject of
Juanito Rodriguez’s Huling Habilin at Testamento wherein the property was distributed to his heirs
(herein respondents) including the petitioner
Ruling:
The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving at their respective
decisions: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento 2) Deed of Sale 3) TCT No. in the name of the petitioner;
and 4) Partition Agreement executed by both the respondents and the petitioner. Based on the
foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the
petitioner’s claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at
Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been
probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with
and is a matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.” As the
will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto cannot be given
effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the
determination of the issue of possession. Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor
of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his
heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of
it during his lifetime.
NUGUID vs. NUGUID
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers
and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
Petitioner Remedios Nuguid (sister) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid about 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said
will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void. CFI, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition
without costs. Petitioner’s motion to reconsider thwarted hence this appeal
Issue: WON the will is invalid due to preterition
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Petitioner contends that what we have is a case of disinheritance rather than preterition. This is not
meritorious, as this argument fails to appreciate the distinction between preterition and disinheritance.
Preterition is the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either by not
mentioning them, or although mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will does not explicitly disinherit the parents. It simply
omits their names altogether. Said will rather than being labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one
in which the forced heir suffers from preterition. The effects of preterition are totally different from
disinheritance. Preterition annuls the institution of heirs, except devises and legacies insofar as the
latter are not inofficious. In disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Considering, however that the will before us solely
provides for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same.
The entire will is void.
NEPOMUCENO vs. CA
In 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a last Will and Testament. In said Will, the testator named petitioner
as executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had
been estranged from his lawful wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact
testator and petitioner were married before a Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced
heirs, his legal wife and children, his entire estate, and the free portion thereof to petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary. Private respondents filed an opposition. Lower court denied the probate of the Will.
Petitioner appealed to respondent court, which set aside lower court’s decision. Respondent court
declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to
Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision in favor of petitioner
RULING:
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner
null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to
do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner
as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter
how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate proceedings to determine the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue. There is no dispute over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties agree it was
executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute
his Will. The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary
provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void. We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As
 stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, litigation will be protracted; probability exists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court
in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily
look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides: The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations
inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
Nepomuceno contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was
legally married to the testator. The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As
argued by the private respondents: 1) will expressly admits on its face the relationship between testator
and petitioner, the devisee; and 2) petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged
ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary
evidence. Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted
to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator.
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at
the inception of the case. Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.
Revilla v CA
Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and 6 parcels of land
in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, he executed a 13-page last
will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces including petitioner,
Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after
his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in Bulacan. During his lifetime, Don
Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manila admitted. However, the City Hall of
Manila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. A petition for reconstitution of the
records was filed and it was granted.
After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted Heracio
as sole heir of his uncle’s estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982. The probate was
opposed by Heracio’s 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that:
- Since 1978 up to Cayetano’s death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed in 1978
- The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetano was different
from his usual and customary signature
- Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will
- That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence
- That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or
threats
- Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and he did
not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signature
The trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will.
Held:
When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will
which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He
could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed
there for 2 months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital.
During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a browned envelope
stating “Buksan ito pagkalibing ko” to which Cayetano agreed to open. He recognized the original will
and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records, Cayetano declared that he did not execute
another last will and testament after the original will had been probated.
Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he did not
reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before he testified in the
reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been
Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will.
Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date (September 13,
1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been
procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. Judge
Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters
to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed
around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation
that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of
his second will.
Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano and his
estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents, Heracio
transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house in Quezon City.
The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of
his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue
influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don
Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in
their uncle's estate.
There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with Co,
Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that he made
in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest,
he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he
was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his
being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and
the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself.
That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission of
Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses
and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That provision in his first will, for his personal
benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was
to disinherit his nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything.