In Re: Plagiarism Charges Against Castillo
Plagiarism A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC (2010)
Topic. Plagiarism
Case. Resolution for a plagiarism charge against
a sitting judge
Facts. Justice Castillo was the sitting judge for
the Vinuya case. Said case concerned the plight
of Filipino comfort women from the Japanese
occupation to compel President to help them
claim apology and reparations in an
international court. In the decision he rendered,
Justice Castillo ruled against the petitioners
arguing that the court cannot compel the
President to do so because the discretion on
that is solely on the President’s and that the
President is not under any obligation to forward
their claims.
Thereafter, counsel of the petitioners, Harry
Roque, published in his online blog that his
clients would file a motion for reconsideration
about Justice Castillo’s plagiarized decision.
Media published Roque’s announcements.
Petitioners finally filed their supplemental
motion and alleged Justice Castillo of
plagiarizing “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens”
by Criddle-Descent, “Breaking the Silence: Rape
as an International Crime” by Ellis, and
“Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations” by Tams.
Court en banc took on the case. Meanwhile, the
authors of the journals used in Justice Castillo’s
ponencia wrote separately that the ponencia
twisted concepts and arguments they
espoused. As well, UP Law declared the
plagiarism as a “reprehensible act of
dishonesty.”
Court began to hear the case. Justice del
Castillo’s counsel presented a researcher who
admitted to the plagiarism saying it was
unintended with the earlier draft having
citations.
Issue. (1) Did Justice del Castillo plagiarize the
works? -No
(2) Did Justice del Castillo twist the ideas
therein to fit the Vinuya court decision? -No
Ratio. (1) No because there was no intent and
the Justice did not pass the ideas off as his own.
Plagiarism, as propounded by a renowned
dictionary, is defined as “deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person’s
original expression as one’s own.” In this case,
intent has been shown to be missing since the
researcher admitted that she had meant to
attribute the ideas to the authors but
accidentally deleted them in the course of
writing the decision. To explain, the researcher
lifted passages from X’s paper. But the passages
had a different author Y, meaning X lifted the
idea from another author. Hence, the
researcher inserted the passage from X’s paper
but cited Y. Above this passage, to cue her that
it is sourced from another, she had put a
subject tag plugging that it is from X and that X
be cited. In the course writing the draft,
however, she accidentally deleted the subject
tag which altogether deleted the citation to X.
Normally, this would be case of plagiarism, but
as shown, the researcher had every intent to
cite and no intent to pass the ideas of as her or
the Justice’s own. Lack of intent cancels out
plagiarism.
Apart from the lack of intent, the court noted
that even though X was not cited, the passage
were not passed off as the researcher or
Justice’s own ideas. As shown, citations to the
original author were made. This alone suffices
to clear out the passing off aspect of plagiarism.
(2) To the court, no twisting of ideas occurred
because first, provided that there was a mishap
in the citation, it is impossible to connect the
ideas to the supposed authors and second the
ideas constituted of neutral data that could
support either side of the debate on whether
judiciary could compel executive to sue.
Side issue: Stare desis
There is a basic reason for individual judges of
whatever level of courts, including the Supreme
Court, not to use original or unique language
when reinstating the laws involved in the cases
they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as
these are written. But laws include, under the
doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations
of such laws as are applied to specific situations.
Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by
precedent and not to disturb settled point."
Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it to all
future cases, where facts are substantially the
same; regardless of whether the parties or
property are the same."6
And because judicial precedents are not always
clearly delineated, they are quite often
entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even
in contradictions, prompting experts in the law
to build up regarding such matters a large body
of commentaries or annotations that, in
themselves, often become part of legal writings
upon which lawyers and judges draw materials
for their theories or solutions in particular
cases. And, because of the need to be precise
and correct, judges and practitioners alike, by
practice and tradition, usually lift passages from
such precedents and writings, at times omitting,
without malicious intent, attributions to the
originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for
the International Bar Association puts it
succinctly. When practicing lawyers (which
include judges) write about the law, they
effectively place their ideas, their language, and
their work in the public domain, to be affirmed,
adopted, criticized, or rejected. Being in the
public domain, other lawyers can thus freely
use these without fear of committing some
wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily
explicable. In law accuracy of words is
everything. Legal disputes often centre round
the way in which obligations have been
expressed in legal documents and how the facts
of the real world fit the meaning of the words in
which the obligation is contained. This, in
conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers
means that refuge will often be sought in
articulations that have been tried and tested. In
a sense therefore the community of lawyers
have together contributed to this body of
knowledge, language, and expression which is
common property and may be utilized,
developed and bettered by anyone.7
The implicit right of judges to use legal
materials regarded as belonging to the public
domain is not unique to the Philippines. As
Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes
Sereno cites in her dissenting opinion, observed
in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether
trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from
a law review article, novel thoughts published in
a legal periodical or language from a party’s
brief are used without giving attribution. Thus
judges are free to use whatever sources they
deem appropriate to resolve the matter before
them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption
applies to judicial writings intended to decide
cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a
literary work and, more importantly, the
purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As
a result, judges adjudicating cases are not
subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.8
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of
plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the
time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the
present, it is likely to discover that it has not on
occasion acknowledged the originators of
passages and views found in its decisions. These
omissions are true for many of the decisions
that have been penned and are being penned
daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals,
the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with
them, the municipal trial courts and other first
level courts. Never in the judiciary’s more than
100 years of history has the lack of attribution
been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our
courts are mere copycats. They are not. Their
decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of
each case and sort out the relevant from the
irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue
or issues that need to be resolved and evaluate
each of the laws, rulings, principles, or
authorities that the parties to the case invoke.
The decisions then draw their apt conclusions
regarding whether or not such laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities apply to the particular
cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced
in writing, are the product of the judges’
creativity. It is here—actually the substance of
their decisions—that their genius, originality,
and honest labor can be found, of which they
should be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and
summarized the facts as seen by the opposing
sides in a way that no one has ever done. He
identified and formulated the core of the issues
that the parties raised. And when he had done
this, he discussed the state of the law relevant
to their resolution. It was here that he drew
materials from various sources, including the
three foreign authors cited in the charges
against him. He compared the divergent views
these present as they developed in history. He
then explained why the Court must reject some
views in light of the peculiar facts of the case
and applied those that suit such facts. Finally,
he drew from his discussions of the facts and
the law the right solution to the dispute in the
case. On the whole, his work was original. He
had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with
established practice in the Philippines and
elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to
annul the decisions promulgated by its judges
or expose them to charges of plagiarism for
honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as
well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all
lawyers handling cases before courts and
administrative tribunals, cannot object to this.
Although as a rule they receive compensation
for every pleading or paper they file in court or
for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers
also need to strive for technical accuracy in
their writings. They should not be exposed to
charges of plagiarism in what they write so long
as they do not depart, as officers of the court,
from the objective of assisting the Court in the
administration of justice.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has
not been proved.
G.R. Nos. 174813-15 581 SCRA 320
Hipos vs Bay
FACTS: Two Informations for the crime of rape
and one Information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners
Darryl Hipos et al., before Branch 86 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioners
filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the
Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They
claimed that there was no probable cause to
hold them liable for the crimes charged. The
Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
on the reinvestigation affirming the
Informations.
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de
Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to
Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August
2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated
10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of
probable cause. On the same date, the City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay
denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in
an Order of even date.
Issue: W/N Judge Bay err in denying the Motion
to Withdraw Informations
Doctrine Relevant discussion in line with Legal
Researc: In a seemingly desperate attempt on
the part of petitioners' counsel, he tries to
convince us that a judge is allowed to deny a
Motion to Withdraw Informations from the
prosecution only when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutors
moving for such withdrawal; and that, where
there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to
Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners'
counsel states in the Memorandum:
Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006
of the Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9
pages which was attached to the URGENT
PETITION did not point out any iota of grave
abuse of discretion committed by Asst. City
Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his Resolution in
favor of the sons of the Petitioners. Hence, the
ORDER issued by RJBAY is NULL and VOID in
view of the recent ruling of the Hon. Supreme
Court in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113216, September 5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278
SCRA 657 which states that:
"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of
discretion, the court's bare denial of a motion
to withdraw information pursuant to the
Secretary's resolution is void."(Underscoring
ours).
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of
the OSG because of its falsity.16
This statement of petitioners' counsel is utterly
misleading. There is no such statement in our
Decision in Ledesma.17 The excerpt from
Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance
to the statement allegedly quoted from said
case, provides:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and
Martinez; and considering that the issue of the
correctness of the justice secretary's resolution
has been amply threshed out in petitioner's
letter, the information, the resolution of the
secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and
even the exhaustive discussion in the motion
for reconsideration - all of which were
submitted to the court - the trial judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the motion to withdraw the information,
based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance
on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent
with our repetitive calls for an independent and
competent assessment of the issue(s)
presented in the motion to dismiss.The trial
judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's
recommendation finding the absence of
probable cause to hold petitioner criminally
liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely
ruled to proceed with the trial without stating
his reasons for disregarding the secretary's
recommendation.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
It very much appears that the counsel of
petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in
violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repel or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has
not been proved.
Counsel's use of block quotation and quotation
marks signifies that he intends to make it
appear that the passages are the exact words of
the Court. Furthermore, putting the words
"Underscoring ours" after the text implies that,
except for the underscoring, the text is a
faithful reproduction of the original.
Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S.
Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar.
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a
judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Information from the prosecution only when
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal.
Neither did we rule therein that where there is
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to
Withdraw Information is void. What we held
therein is that a trial judge commits grave
abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to
Withdraw Information without an
independent and complete assessment of the
issues presented in such Motion. Thus, the
opening paragraph of Ledesma states:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an
information on the ground of lack of probable
cause based on a resolution of the secretary of
justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to
make an independent assessment of the merits
of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction
over the case, the trial court is not bound by
such resolution but is required to evaluate it
before proceeding further with the trial. While
the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts. A trial court, however,
commits reversible error or even grave abuse of
discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such
recommendation and simply insists on
proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of
having already acquired jurisdiction over the
criminal action.19 (Emphases supplied.)
Allied Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 144412 (2003)
topic. Other unethical conduct
Case. Petition for certiorari assailing CA decision
dismissing Galanida
Facts. Allied Bank Corporation (ABC) hired
Galanida as accountant book-keeper with
conditions that the Bank has right to transfer
employees whenever public necessity requires.
Galanida every now and then got transferred
and promoted. One day, ABC sought his
transfer to Bacolod. Galanida refused through a
letter arguing that the transfer would impede
his family relationships in Cebu. Thereafter,
Galanida filed a complaint in the Labor Arbiter
for constructive dismissal. ABC transferred
Galanida to Tagbiliran citing its Employee
Discipline Policy and Procedure which provides
that refusal to transfer is insubordination and
insubordination is punishable by suspension to
dismissal. Galanida retaliated in a letter
asserting discrimination and favoritism
practices by the management. Bank Memo fired
him.
Labor arbiter issued a decision in favor of
Galanida citing Dosch v. NLRC which supposedly
pens that “refusal to obey a transfer order
cannot be considered insubordination where
employee cited reason for said refusal, such as
that of being away from the family.” National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed
Labor Arbiter decision via same Dosch case. CA
affirmed the same.
Issue. Was Galanida illegally dismissed? -No
Ratio. No because the dismissal was within
ABC’s power and there appears to be no
discrimination in the action as transfers in the
bank are routine.
Doctrine. Relevant discussion in line with Legal
Research pertains to the citation of Dosch. The
present court asserts that the Labor Arbiter,
NLRC, and CA misquoted the decision in Dosch.
The above cited phrase, the court says, was
lifted from the syllabus of the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA). The Court
in Dosch did not rule anything of the kind as
proposed by the SCRA. SCRA does not reflect
the opinion of the Court as they are mere works
of reporters and lawyers beyond the Judiciary’s
ambit. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that a
lawyer should not misquote or misrepresent
court decision texts. Having cited these portions
of the report, the lawyers in Labor Arbiter,
NLRC, and CA violated said provision.
COMELEC v. Noynay Case
[G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998]
FACTS:
Pursuant to a minute resolution by the
COMELEC on October 29, 1996, nine
informations for violation of Sec. 261(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code were filed with Branch
23 of the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar.
In an Order issued on August 25, 1997, public
respondent, presiding judge of Branch 23, motu
proprio ordered the records of the cases to be
withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law
Department to file the cases with the
appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the
ground that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction
over the cases since the maximum imposable
penalty in each of the cases does not exceed
six years of imprisonment.

All the accused are uniformly charged for
Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code, which carries a penalty of not less than
one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of
imprisonment and not subject to Probation
plus disqualification to hold public office or
deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Motions for reconsiderations filed by the
COMELEC have been denied. Petitioners then
filed the instant petition.
In its Manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor
General, it is “adopting” the instant petition on
the ground that the challenged orders of public
respondent “are clearly not in accordance with
existing laws and jurisprudence.”
Public respondent avers that it is the duty of
counsel for private respondents interested in
sustaining the challenged orders to appear for
and defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents
maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the
Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over
offenses where the imposable penalty is not
more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover,
R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws,
decrees, and orders inconsistent with its
provisions are deemed repealed or modified
accordingly. They then conclude that since the
election offense in question is punishable with
imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is
cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
In relation to Legal Research, this case is
relevant in that it zoomed in on the judge’s
misreading of the law and on the petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of
the Code except those relating to the offense
of failure to register or failure to vote.6 It reads
as follows:
SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional
trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceedings for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote which shall
be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan
or municipal trial courts. From the decision of
the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal
cases.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read
at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune
time, as any, to remind him, as well as other
judges, of his duty to be studious of the
principles of law,10 to administer his office with
due regard to the integrity of the system of the
law itself,11 to be faithful to the law, and to
maintain professional competence.
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
Similarly, Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that
lawyers should not misquote or represent court
rulings. In its MR, COMELEC through its counsel
Atty. Balbuena cited Alberto v. Judge Lavilles. In
this citation, however, the present court finds
that errors persist. One, that the plaintiff in the
case is Alberto Naldoza not Alberto Naldeza or
Alberto as used by the COMELEC lawyer. Two,
that that case is 254 of SCRA not 245. And third,
in its ascription of a Court Administrator’s
Memo as the Court’s ruling. Atty. Balbuena is
admonished.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration

and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately
made it appear that the quoted portions were
our findings or rulings, or, put a little differently,
our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion
is just a part of the memorandum of the Court
Administrator quoted in the decision.