Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.

— The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an
original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a
protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit
any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with
respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect
the civil status of persons.

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in
the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or
any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or
to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any
of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article, or in any of the
foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in
degree.

(Real Estate Mortgage Without Separate Promissory Note)

REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Real Estate Mortgage, made by and between:
_____________, of legal age, (single / married / widow), and a resident of _____________,
Philippines (hereinafter known as the MORTGAGOR);
- and -
_____________, of legal age, (single / married / widow), and a resident of _____________,
Philippines (hereinafter known as the MORTGAGEE);
WITNESSETH; That:
The MORTGAGOR is indebted unto the MORTGAGEE in the sum of _____________
(P__________), Philippine Currency, receipt of which is acknowledged by the MORTGAGOR
upon the signing of this instrument, payable to the order of the MORGAGEE without
need of prior demand or notice within a period of _____________ (years/months/weeks/days),
at _____________ (P__________) (monthly/weekly/daily) starting on _____________ and on
every _____________ thereafter until fully paid, with interest thereon at the
rate of_____________ (______%) percent per (month/annum).
NOW, THEREFORE, for and consideration of the afore-mentioned indebtedness, and to assure
the performance ofsaid obligation to pay, the MORTGAGOR does hereby convey and DELIVER
by way of MORTGAGE unto the MORTGAGEE, (his/her) heirs, successors and as signs, the
following parcel of land, together with all the improvements found and standing thereon, more
particularly described as follows:
(Technical Description of Property)
That it is the condition of this Mortgage that should the MORTGAGOR perform the obligation to
pay the afore-cited indebtedness of _____________ together with accrued interest thereon,
within the agreed term, this Real Estate Mortgage shall be discharged and shall at once become
null and void and of no effect whatsoever, otherwise, it shall subsist and remain in full force
and effect and be subject to foreclosure in the manner and form prescribed by law.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have have hereunto set their hands, this _____________ at
_____________, Philippines.
MORTGAGOR MORTGAGEE
With my Marital Conformity:
Mortgagor's Spouse
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
_________________ __________________
(ACKNOWLEDGMENT)
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

DANILO D. ANSALDO, G.R. No. 159381

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. March 26, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------
--x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

For a complex crime of estafa through falsification of a public document to prosper, all the
elements of both the crimes of estafa and falsification of a public document must exist. In this
case, not all the elements of the crime of falsification of a public document are
present. Consequently, petitioner can only be found guilty of estafa.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 20, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 25122 which affirmed with modification the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21 in Criminal Case No.
97-156477, finding petitioner Danilo D. Ansaldo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public/official document. Likewise assailed is the
Resolution dated July 24, 2003 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

The Information against the petitioner and his wife, Rosalinda Ansaldo, contained the following
accusatory allegations:

That [on] or about February 15, 1995 or sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together, and mutually
helping each other, being private individuals, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit estafa thru falsification of public/official document, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, with intent to defraud and cause damage, forged and falsified
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage which was subsequently notarized by Notary Public Juan N.
Domingo and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 47; Page No. 59; Book No. VI; Series of
1995 and therefore a public and/or official document, by then and there misrepresenting that
they are the real spouses Nina Z. Ramirez and Mariano Ramirez, the registered and absolute
owners of a piece of land described as TCT No. 188686 situated in Barrio Bagbagan,
Municipality ofMuntinlupa, Province of Rizal valued at P500,000.00 by signing, feigning or
simulating or causing to be signed, feigned and simulated the signatures of spouses Nia Z.
Ramirez and Mariano Z. Ramirez, thereby making it appear as it did appear that spouses Nia Z.
Ramirez & Mariano Ramirez participated and intervened in the preparation and execution of
the aforesaid Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, said accused well knowing that such was not the
case, in that said spouses did not participate and execute the same, much less signed the said
document, nor did they authorized [sic] herein accused or anybody else for that matter to sign
and affix their signatures in said document, which is an outright forgery and falsification; that
after the said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was forged and falsified in the manner above set-
forth, accused presented the same to one Nora L. Herrera, who, believing in the authenticity
and genuineness of the same as represented to her by the said accused, gave and delivered the
mortgage consideration in the amount of P300,000.00 to the said accused, who, once in their
possession thereof, with abuse of trust and confidence and with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of Nia Z. Ramirez in the amount
of P500,000.00, the value of the property in question.[3]

On arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. However, his wife and co-accused,
remains at large. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

Nia Z. Ramirez (Ramirez) wanted to subdivide her lot in Muntinlupa City. In 1993, her niece,
Edna Tadeo introduced the petitioner and his wife while they were inside her store in 509 Plaza
Sta. Cruz, Manila, as the people who could help with her problem. Petitioner and his wife
represented themselves as having direct connections with the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
and assured Ramirez that they could have her property subdivided. Ramirez thus entrusted to
them her owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 188686, which covered
the said lot, on condition that it would be returned after a month.This prerequisite is evidenced
by an Acknowledgment Receipt dated January 5, 1995.[4]

The one-month period agreed upon elapsed with the petitioner and his wife failing to inform
Ramirez of the status of the anticipated subdivision. Ramirez repeatedly demanded them to
return her owners duplicate title of the land to no avail. Ramirez was later surprised to find out
that the land covered by her TCT was the subject of a document in which it appeared that she
mortgaged the same to a certain Nora Herrera. The deed was even annotated at the back of the
TCT. However, Ramirez claimed that her signature in the document was a forgery. At the time
of the mortgage, there were no other persons other than the petitioner and his wife to whom
she entrusted her TCT.

The Version of the Petitioner

Petitioner denied that he was introduced to Ramirez in 1993. He claimed that in the early
morning of January 5, 1995, he was in his house when he saw Ramirez talking to his wife. He
had no knowledge of the topic of their conversation. He later signed a piece of paper without
reading the contents thereof since Ramirez assured him that it was merely for formality. The
paper turned out to be the Acknowledgment Receipt.

Petitioner denied participation in the preparation, execution and registration of the deed of
real estate mortgage. He also denied residing at the address where Ramirez sent a demand
letter for the return of her TCT. However, he admitted that his wife was engaged in the
registration and follow-up of documents covering real property.

According to the petitioner, he went to Japan with his wife on June 7, 1998. He came home but
his wife stayed behind. Upon his arrival, he was apprehended.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 6, 2000, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of
falsification. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the above observations and findings, accused Danilo Ansaldo is hereby
convicted of the crime charged in the information, defined and punished under Article 172
paragraph 1 without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attendant in its commission,
granting the accused the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prision term from six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum as
minimum to four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional medium as maximum and to
pay a fine of P5,000.00 and to indemnify the complainant the sum of P300,000.00 representing
the amount received by the Ansaldos in mortgaging the property.

Accused Danilo Ansaldo shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. The bond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby
cancelled.

Danilo Ansaldos body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City through the City Jail Warden of Manila.

The charge against Rosalinda Ansaldo is hereby archived to be brought back to the active
calendar of the court upon her apprehension. Let warrant of arrest be issued for that purpose.
The complainant is hereby ordered to pay the docket fee corresponding to the civil damages
awarded.

SO ORDERED.[5]

In finding petitioner guilty of falsification, the trial court noted that no other person was in
possession of the TCT prior to the falsification other than petitioner and his wife. Based
thereon, the court a quo concluded that petitioner and his wife were the ones who mortgaged
the property by pretending to be the spouses Ramirez.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA which affirmed with modification the Decision of
the RTC. The appellate court found petitioner guilty of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a public document. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime
of Estafa through Falsification of a Public Document and ordering him to pay the fine in the
amount of P5,000.00 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed
upon him. Accordingly, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance to consider,
accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional maximum as Minimum, to ten (10) years
of Prision Mayor medium as Maximum. He is further ordered to cause the release/discharge of
the mortgage constituted on the property in the amount of P300,000.00 and return to private
complainant Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188686 free from liens and encumbrances. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2003.

Issues

Hence, this petition for review raising the following issues:

1.) Whether x x x the trial courts ruling, as affirmed by [the] court a quo erroneously applied the
legal presumption that the possessor or user of a forged document is the author of the
forgery in arriving at its findings that the petitioner (and his wife) committed the complex crime
of Estafa by the act of falsifying the subject Deed of Real Estate Mortgage.

2.) Whether x x x the court a quo, seriously erred in affirming [the] trial courts ruling which
accorded probative value to a mere certified true copy of a document entitled Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage in support of the latters factual conclusion that the signatures respectively
written above the printed names of Nia Z. Ramirez and that of her husband (which appear
therein as the parties-mortgagors) were forged.

3.) Whether x x x the court a quo committed serious error in its assailed Decision in affirming
the factual findings and rulings of the trial court, and in further modifying the latters decision
by increasing the original sentence from an imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor
maximum as minimum to four (4) years two (2) months of prision correctional medium as
maximum to a longer prison term of [four] (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
ofPrision Correctional maximum as Minimum, to ten (10) years of Prision Mayor medium as
Maximum (and also in further ordering the petitioner to cause the release/discharge of the
mortgage constituted on the property in the amount ofP300,000.00 and to return to private
complainant Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188686 free from liens and encumbrances)
declaring the conviction of the petitioner for complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of a
Public Document despite the fact that the appealed decision of the trial court clearly shows that
the petitioner was found guilty of committing only the simple crime of Falsification of a Public
Document penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

4.) Whether x x x the court a quo has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the trial court, as to call for an exercise of
the power of supervision, when it -- failed to carefully evaluate and weigh the evidence
presented by prosecution which clearly does not support the judgment of conviction against
the petitioner; -- overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if properly considered,
would certainly affect the outcome of the case; -- based its findings on misapprehension of
facts, from erroneous inferences, and surmises or conjectures; and -- rendered its rulings
contrary to law, the rules on evidence, and existing jurisprudence in violation of the petitioners
constitutional rights to due process and to be presumed innocent.

5.) Whether x x x the court a quo has also departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings when it failed to squarely resolve or pass upon each and every assignment
of error and properly consider supporting arguments set forth by the petitioner herein in
his Appellants Brief, as well as the specific grounds and corresponding arguments set forth in
his Motion for Reconsideration.[8]

Our Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

For petitioner to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document committed in the manner described in the Information, all the elements of the two
crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist.[9]
To secure a conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the following requisites must concur:

(1) The accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;

(2) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of the fraud;

(3) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which
induced the offended party to part with his money or property;

(4) That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[10]

It is undisputed that petitioner committed estafa. He and his wife falsely represented to
Ramirez that they had the influence and capability to cause the subdivision of the lot. In view of
said false representation, Ramirez was induced to part with the owners copy of her TCT on the
condition that the same would be returned after a month as evidenced by the Acknowledgment
Receipt.

However, petitioner and his wife never complied with their obligations. It is also on record that
Ramirez made a formal demand for the return of the TCT but petitioner and his wife failed to
comply. Their failure to return the said title despite demand is evidence of deceit that resulted
in damages to Ramirez. It was also established that the property covered by TCT No. 188686
was eventually mortgaged for P300,000.00 to a third person without the knowledge and
consent of Ramirez.

The following testimony of Ramirez clearly established that petitioner falsely represented that
he has the capacity to cause the subdivision of the property; that false pretenses induced her
(Ramirez) to entrust her TCT to petitioner; and that as a result thereof, Ramirez suffered
damage to the extent of P300,000.00, thus:

Q Tell us when did you come to meet both Rosalinda and Danilo Ansaldo?
A In 1993.

Q Where did you meet these people?

A They went to my stall.

Q Where is your stall located?

A 509 Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Q How did it happen that the accused came to meet you?
A She was introduced to me by my niece.

Q What is the name of your niece?

A Edna Tadeo.

Q And why [were] these persons introduced to you by your niece?

A I might need the help of the spouses, I can trust them.

Q Help is a general term would you be more specific?

A According to my niece if I have problems about land I can ask the help of these spouses.

Q What about the spouses did they tell you anything?

A According to them they can help regarding [my problem with my lot].

Q Did you not elaborate to them the kind of problem you [were] having with the lot?
A If they can help me subdivide my lot in Muntinlupa with title no. 188686.

Q In whose name is the title?

A In our name, the two of us.

PROS GLORIOSO:
Witness producing a certified Xerox copy of Transfer Certificate of Title 188686 in the name of
Nia Ramirez which we request that this be marked Exhibit B, the second page Exhibit B-1.

COURT:
Mark them.

PROS GLORIOSO:
Q Did you believe in their representations?
A Yes, sir, because of their good words.

Q Immediately on that first meeting you believe in them?

A Yes, sir.

Q And so after that what did you do?

A I endorsed to them the title of my land because according to them they can help me.

Q On that first meeting you endorsed to them the title?

A We first talked with each other.

Q In other words you are telling us there [were] so many things that transpired before you
finally surrendered to them the title?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long [after . . .] from that first meeting up to the time that you gave the title to them?
A About two years.

Q What kind of copy did you give to them?

A The original owners copy.

Q When did you give it to them?

A January 5, 1995.

Q Why do you say that it was on January 5, 1995 that this original copy was given to them?
A They signed an acknowledgement receipt
(witness producing a document and handing the same to the prosecutor).

PROS GLORIOSO:
Witness producing a receipt which she handed to this representation.

Q There are signatures appearing at the bottom portion like received by a certain Ansaldo who
is this?
A Rosalinda Ansaldo.

Q Why did you say that?

A She signed in my presence.

Q And there is another signature contained on the left portion whose is this?
A Danilo Ansaldo.

Q Why did you say that?

A He signed in [my] presence.

Q They were together when they signed this acknowledgement receipt?

A Yes, sir.[11]

Petitioner did not deny his signature on the Acknowledgement Receipt.[12] On the contrary he
claimed that he merely affixed his signature without reading the contents thereof[13] and that
he did not bother to inquire from his wife the contents of the Acknowledgement
Receipt,[14] which we find not worthy of credence. However, he admitted that his wife was
engaged in facilitating the registration of documents involving real property.[15]

On the other hand, we find that we cannot convict petitioner of the crime of falsification of a
public document penalized under Article 172 of the RPC. The following requisites must concur,
to wit:
(1) That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who took
advantage of his official position;

(2) That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code (which in this case involves forging a signature);

(3) That the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.[16]

There is no doubt that petitioner is a private individual,[17] being a businessman. It is likewise

not disputed that the Deed of Mortgage is a public document, having been notarized by a
notary public with the solemnities required by law. However, we find no evidence on record
showing that the petitioner and his wife falsified the subject Deed of Mortgage. There is simply
no evidence showing that petitioner had any participation in the execution of the mortgage
document. There is no proof at all that he was the one who signed the Deed of Mortgage. The
testimony of Ramirez consisted only of the following:

Q How did you come to know that the property was mortgaged?
A A woman came to me named Lina Santos and showed me the document, a mortgage
document.

Q And when was that?

A That same year.

Q Before this Lina Santos came to you were you not bothered when they did not return to you
your title after one month?
A At first I was not bothered because we have an agreement but I [got] worried when
this Lina Santos came to me.

Q What proof can you show us that this lot was mortgaged instead of subdivided as promised
by the accused?
A There is an entry at the back an encumbrance.

PROS GLORIOSO:
We request that this be encircled and marked Exhibit B-2.

COURT:
Mark it.

PROS GLORIOSO:
Q What else aside from this encumbrance?
A Real estate mortgage document.

PROS GLORIOSO:
Witness producing a real estate mortgage consisting of four pages which we request to be
marked Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3, wherein the mortgagors are the spouses Nia Ramirez and
Mariano Ramirez and the mortgagee is one Nora Herrera.

COURT:
Mark them.

PROS GLORIOSO:
Q I noticed that this Exhibit D-2 signatures appearing atop the typewritten name Nia Ramirez
will you tell us whose signature is that?
A I do not know but this is not my signature.

Q What about the signature appearing atop the typewritten name Mariano Ramirez whose
signature is that?
A I do not know but definitely this is not the signature of my husband.

Q You deny these are your signatures, will you please show to us your actual signature?
A (Witness signing on a piece of paper handed to her by the prosecutor.)[18]

On cross-examination, Ramirez also narrated that:

Q And due to the alleged failure of both accused to deliver to you the subdivision of the lot that
was the time that you made an inquiry and found out that your lot was already mortgaged, is it
not?
A A woman informed me about it.

Q After informing you what you did was to verify your title at the office of the Register of
Deeds, is it not?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you found out that your lot was actually mortgaged?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you secure a copy, - and [did] you know from that very moment the name in whose favor
your lot was mortgaged?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you secure a copy of the deed of mortgage of your lot?

A It is there.

Q And you noticed the residence of the person in whose favor your lot was mortgaged?
A Yes, sir.
Q The name of the mortgagee was a certain Nora Herrera?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you go to the residence of Nora Herrera?

A No, sir.

Q Did it not occur to your mind to do that in order to tell Nora Herrera that [you were] not the
person who mortgaged the land in her favor?
A Nora Herrera was already informed by somebody that I was not the same person who
mortgaged the lot to her.

Q From the date you discovered that the lot was already mortgaged to Nora Herrera did you
see personally Nora Herrera?
A No, sir, no more.[19]

Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude beyond reasonable doubt that it was petitioner
and his wife who committed the forgery. In the first place, Lina Santos (Santos) was not
presented to corroborate the testimony of Ramirez that she was the one who informed the
latter regarding the mortgage or she could shed light on the circumstances leading to her
alleged discovery that the subject property had been mortgaged. Moreover, as narrated by
Ramirez, Santos did not categorically point to herein petitioner as the author of the forgery. If
at all, Santos only claimed that the property of Ramirez had been mortgaged but did not
mention the personalities involved therein. Likewise, the failure to present the so-called
mortgagee, Nora Herrera, casts doubt as to the participation of the petitioner in the execution
of the mortgage instrument. Undoubtedly, Nora Herrera could have testified on the persons
she dealt with relative to the mortgage.

The denial of Ramirez that she affixed her signature on the Deed of mortgage does not prove
that it was petitioner and his wife who signed in her behalf. Neither could it be considered as
proof that petitioner, together with his wife, falsely represented themselves as the spouses
Ramirez.

For committing the offense of estafa against Ramirez, the petitioner must be penalized in the
manner provided by law. In this regard, Article 315 of the RPC states that the penalty
of prisioncorreccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. Should
the amount exceed the latter sum, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00. However, the total penalty that may be
imposed should not exceed 20 years. In such cases, the penalty shall be referred to
as prision mayor or reclusion temporal.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), whenever an offense is punished by the RPC or its
amendments, the accused shall be sentenced by the court to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which, in view of the attending circumstances, can properly be imposed
under the RPC, while the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense.

The amount defrauded in this case is P300,000.00 which is the mortgage amount. Thus, the
maximum imposable penalty shall be 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the ISL, the
minimum penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods with a range of six
(6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED. Petitioner Danilo D. Ansaldo is hereby found guilty of the crime of estafa and is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
BIENVENIDO GONZALUDO, G.R. No. 150910
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus - AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, February 6, 2006

Respondent.

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:
 Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of
the Court of Appeals (CA) inCA-G.R. CR No. 22185, to wit:

1. Decision dated 19 July 2001,[1] dismissing the appeal thereto taken by the
herein petitioner from a judgment of conviction promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 50, in a criminal case for
estafa thru falsification of public document thereat commenced by the
People against four (4) accused, including the petitioner; and

2. Resolution dated 22 October 2001,[2] denying petitioners motion for

reconsideration.

The material facts may be briefly stated, as follows:

Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the
Bacolod City Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita
Manlangit in Bacolod City.Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulyssess
mother Anastacia Tobongbanua at the latters house at Purok 5,
Mansungay, Bacolod City.

Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City. However, he would

often go home to Bacolod City to supervise his tire-recapping business
thereat.

Meanwhile, his wife Anita secured a teaching job in

Catubig, Samar prompting her to leave Bacolod City and live in Samar.

After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned

to Bacolod City. And, in December of 1978, he was able to buy for P1,500.00
a small house located near that of his mother at Purok 5,
Mansungay, Bacolod City.
Then, in 1985, Ulysses took one Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress and
brought her into the house. In time, improvements were made on the house,
the most substantial of which were those introduced sometime in March
1991. What used to be a small house, which Ulysses bought for
only P1,500.00, was thus transformed into a 2-storey structure partially
made of concrete hollow blocks and with galvanized iron roofing which
thereby enhanced its value to P200,000.00.

After Ulyssess demise in January of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie

Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey house for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner
Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben Gonzaludo, who lives just nearby. Initially,
petitioner was not interested to buy the house because he already had one,
let alone the fact that he did not have enough money for the purpose.
Nonetheless, since the house was being sold for a cheap price, petitioner
convinced the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas, to whom he is
related by affinity, to buy the same. Herein, petitioner introduced the
Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo.

On January 20, 1993, Rosemarie Gelogo and Gregg Canlas executed a

Deed of Sale,[3] witnessed by petitioner. In that deed, Rosemarie Gelogo
signed as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful
owner of the 2-storey house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gregg
Canlas acquired all of Rosemaries rights and interest on the subject house.

Later, upon complaint of Ulyssess widow Anita Manlangit, an

Information dated May 31, 1994[4] was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City charging Rosemarie
Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba
Canlas and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document allegedly committed, as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of January, 1993 in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused,
conspiring, confederating and acting in concert, with intent to gain, defrauded the
herein offended party, Anita Manlangit Vda. de Villaflor, herein represented by her
mother-in-law and Attorney-in-Fact, Anastacia Tobongbanua, in the following
manner, to wit: that accused Rosemarie Gelogo alias Rosemarie G. Villaflor being
the occupant of a house made of concrete materials with a floor area of 40 ft. by 24
ft., with galvanized iron roofing, worth P200,000.00, owned by the deceased
Ulysses Villaflor, husband of the herein offended party, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of falsification by then and there
preparing and/or causing to be prepared a public document denominated as a Deed
of Sale dated January 20, 1993 entered as Doc. No. 402, Page No. 81, Book No.
XVII, Series of 1993 of the Notarial Register of Atty. Ramon B. Clapiz, to the effect
that she is the lawful owner of the said house and affixing or causing to be affixed
thereon her name and signature, Rosemarie G. Villaflor, purportedly as wife
 of the deceased Ulysses Villaflor, thus making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts as accused well know that such was not the case for the deceased
Ulysses Villaflor has a legal wife in the person of the herein offended party, by
reason of which accused was able to effect the sale and eventual occupancy of the
said house to the herein accused Sps. Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas who despite
of their knowledge that such house was not owned by Rosemarie Gelogo bought
the same from her in the amount of P80,000.00 and, herein accused Bienvenido
Gonzaludo alias Ben, despite of his knowledge that such house was not owned by
Rosemarie Gelogo, participated in the commission of the herein offense by causing
his name and signature to be affixed in the said Deed of Sale as witness to the
fraudulent sale entered into by the parties, to the damage and prejudice of the herein
offended party in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P200,000.00), Philippine Currency.

Act contrary to law.

Docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-16532, the Information was raffled

to Branch 50 of the court.
Because accused Rosemarie Gelogo remained at large, only the
spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas and herein petitioner were
arraigned, all of whom entered a plea of Not Guilty.

After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated February 17,
1998, acquitted the Canlas spouses but convicted petitioner of the complex
[5]

crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Document and sentenced him

accordingly. Dispositively, the decision reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Bienvenido
Gonzaludo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as a principal and co-conspirator of
the complex Crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of a Public Document and there
being no extenuating circumstances and pursuant to the provision of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is sentenced to
a prison term of Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor to Twenty (20) years of Reclusion
Temporal. By way of Civil Liability, the accused is sentenced to pay the offended
party the sum of P200,000.00, representing the value of the house and the sum
of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

The case with respect to the accused-Spouses Gregg and Melba Canlas is
ordered dismissed as their guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA via ordinary appeal in CA-G.R.

CR No. 22185.
 As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its decision
dated July 19, 2001, dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal
is hereby ordered DISMISSED, having no merit in fact and in law, and
the decision of the trial court AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in

its resolution of October 22, 2001, petitioner is now with us via the present
recourse on his submissions that the CA erred when it -

I xxx sustained the decision of the trial court convicting the petitioner of the crime
of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as defined and punished under
Paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised Penal Code EVEN IF not any of the
statutory elements of the crime herein charged is present or has been proved
and/or not all of the statutory elements of the offense thus charged are present
or have been proved beyond reasonable doubt;

II xxx sustained the conviction of your petitioner ALTHOUGH the material

allegations in the information filed below have not been proved at all beyond
reasonable doubt;

III xxx sustained the conviction of herein petitioner of a crime not properly charged
in the information;

IV xxx grossly misappreciated the facts and misapplied the law and jurisprudence
concerning the status of the house subject of this case as to whether the same
is totally a conjugal property of Ulysses and Anita or the house wholly or
substantially belongs to Rosemarie Gelogo a.k.a. Rosemarie G. Villaflor.

The petition is partly impressed with merit.

Basic in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that in criminal cases, an appeal

throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues, whether raised or not
by the parties, may be resolved by the appellate court.[6] The Court is duty-
bound to look into the validity of the factual and legal basis relied upon by
the two (2) courts below in convicting petitioner in this case.
 It is worthy to note that petitioner was convicted by the trial court of
the complex crime charged in the Information for allegedly having conspired
with Rosemarie Gelogo, who used the fictitious surname Villaflor for the
purpose of giving her a semblance of authority to sell the house purportedly
owned by her paramour, Ulysses Villaflor, who was legally married to private
complainant, Anita Villaflor.

First and foremost, therefore, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to

establish Rosemarie Gelogos criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document, and thereafter, establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that herein petitioner conspired with Rosemarie in
the commission of the same complex crime. In other words, if Rosemarie
cannot be held liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document under the Information filed in this case, with all the more
reason should it be for petitioner, as alleged co-conspirator.

For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through

falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa
and falsification of public document must exist.

To secure conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of

the Revised Penal Code, the Court has time and again ruled that the following
requisites must concur:
(1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations
as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions;
(2) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
(3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations
constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to part with his
money or property; and
(4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage[7] (Emphasis supplied).

There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are
present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie
Gelogo when she used the fictitious surname Villaflor; the misrepresentation
or false pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud; and private complainant Anita Manlangits right to the subject 2-
storey house was lost or at the very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it
to the Canlases.

It is petitioners thesis, however, that there is here an absence of the

third element, i.e., that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations
constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to part with
his money or property, contending that private complainant Anita Manlangit,
who was the offended party in this case, was never induced to part with any
money or property by means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the
false pretense or fraudulent representation by Rosemarie.

We find merit in petitioners submission.

As early as in the 1903 case of U.S. vs. Mendezona,[8] we held that

therein accused may be convicted for estafa only when the deceit or false
pretenses, committed simultaneously with the fraud, were the efficient
cause or primary consideration which induced the offended party
to part with his money or property.

Thirty (30) years thereafter, the rule remains the same. In the 1933
case of People vs. Lilius,[9] the Court, through then Chief Justice Ramon
Avancea, acquitted the accused of estafa because the deceit did not precede
the defraudation, which means that the deceit was not the cause which could
have induced the damage or prejudice to or loss of property suffered by the
injured party.

In the cases of People vs. Quesada,[10] People vs.

Fortuno, [11]
and People vs. Sabio, [12]
which span more than another forty-
five (45) years after Lilius, the Court continued to apply the same principle
in determining criminal liability for estafa, i.e., that the deceit must have
been committed prior to or simultaneous with the fraudulent act because
this was the only way that said deceit could become the efficient cause or
primary consideration which could have induced the offended party to part
with his money or property.
 The doctrine remains the same a hundred (100) years after the 1903
case of Mendezona. Thus, in the 2003 case of Alcantara vs. Court of
Appeals,[13] this Court acquitted the therein accused of the crime of estafa
explaining, through Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., that the false pretense or
fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, thus:

xxx fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to

deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal
or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to
another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.
It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can
device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over
another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise,
trick, cunning, dissembling and. any unfair way by which another is cheated. And
deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal injury. The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.

We find no cogent reason to depart from this settled principle that the
deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of
defraudation, must be theefficient cause or primary consideration
which induced the offended party to part with his money or
property and rule differently in the present case.

While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by

Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname Villaflor to give her
semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or
deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who
parted with their money when they bought the house.However, the
Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged
damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private
complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient
cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this
case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more reason
must this be for herein petitioner.
 The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily
absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge
of falsification of public documentunder the same Information charging
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. It is
settled doctrine that
When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence
fails to support the charge on one of the component offenses, can the defendant still
be separately convicted of the other offense? The question has long been answered
in the affirmative. In United States vs. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (38 Phil. 330),
the Court has ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of an accused on one of the
offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite
the failure of evidence to hold the accused of the other charge.[14]
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any private individual
who shall commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171
in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document. In turn, Article 171 of the same Code provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic

minister.- The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos [sic]
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in any act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of
an original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a
protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who
shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this
 article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification
may affect the civil status of persons. (Emphasis supplied)

As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with

Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration
of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the
house subject of such sale and signing as Rosemarie Villaflor instead of her
real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas
spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that
Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public document. Likewise,
proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to establish
conspiracy between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brother-in-law of
Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house in this case.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of

Appeals are hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the
complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, but
found GUILTY of the crime of Falsification of Public Document and is
accordingly imposed an indeterminate sentence of 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168163. March 26, 2008.*

LOLITA Y. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Motions to Quash; Arrests; Jurisdictions; Any
irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of
jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any
time before entering her plea, and failure to timely raise this objection
amounts to a waiver of such irregularity, resulting in concomitant submission
to the trial court’s jurisdiction over her person.—Respondent does not
contest petitioner’s claim on the alleged irregularities which attended her
arrest. Nevertheless, such irregularities, assuming they did take place, do
not work to nullify petitioner’s conviction as this Court is neither the proper
forum, nor this appeal the correct remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity
attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over
her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering
her plea. Petitioner’s failure to timely raise this objection amounted to a
waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitant submission to the
trial court’s jurisdiction over her person. Indeed, not only did petitioner submit
to such jurisdiction, she actively invoked it through her participation during
the trial. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim the contrary.
Same; Rights of Suspects; Miranda Warning; Evidence; Failure of the
National Bureau of Investigation agents to inform the suspect of her right to
counsel during custodial investigation attains significance only if the person
under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel and
which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial—in
such case, the tainted confession obtained in violation is inadmissible in
evidence against the accused.—As for the failure of the NBI agents to inform
petitioner of her right to counsel during custodial investigation, this right
attains significance only if the person under investigation makes a
confession in writing without aid of counsel which is then sought to be
admitted against the accused during the trial. In such
_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
434

434
 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eugenio vs. People
case, the tainted confession obtained in violation of Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence against the accused.
Here, petitioner merely alleges that following her arrest, she gave a
“statement” to the NBI agents. The records do not contain a copy of this
“statement” thus we have no way of knowing whether such statement
amounts to a confession under Section 12(3) in relation to Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution. At any rate, no allegation has been made here
that the prosecution submitted such statement in evidence during the trial.
Criminal Law; Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document; Modes;
Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit and (b) the offended party or a
third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.—
To hold petitioner liable for the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
a Public Document, the prosecution must show that she committed Estafa
thru any of the modes of committing Falsification. Under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, Falsification is committed under any of the following
modes: (1) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; (3) Attributing to persons
who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those
in fact made by them; (4) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(5) Altering true dates; (6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning; (7) Issuing in an authenticated form
a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original; or (8) Intercalating any instrument or note
relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book. On the
other hand, Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit and (b) the offended
party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Presumption of Innocence; The presence
of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate
not only the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense as
principal but also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as
accessory or accomplice, the criminal liability of the
435

VOL. 549, MARCH 26, 2008

435
Eugenio vs. People
accused.—True, conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as
the same can be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused. However,
this does not dispense with the requirement that conspiracy, like the felony
itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the presence of a
reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate not
only the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense as
principal but also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as
accessory or accomplice, the criminal liability of the accused.
Same; Same; Presumptions; For the presumption of authorship of
falsification to apply, the possessor must stand to profit or had profited from
the use of the falsified document.—We arrive at the same conclusion on
petitioner’s alleged liability for Estafa using the allegedly falsified TCT No.
92585. Aside from relying on conspiracy to pin petitioner for this charge, the
trial court also anchored its finding on the presumption that petitioner was
party to the falsification of TCT No. 92585 because she had possession of
such title. However, petitioner’s unrebutted testimony on this point is that it
was Ty who brought with her what she represented to be her owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 92585 and which she presented to Mangali. At
any rate, for the presumption of authorship of falsification to apply, the
possessor must stand to profit or had profited from the use of the falsified
document. Here, the extent of petitioner’s participation on Ty’s loan was to
bring Ty (and Ablaza) to Mangali. The prosecution failed to show any proof
that petitioner received a portion of the loan Mangali extended to Ty, just as
there is no proof on record that she received any share from the loan Mangali
extended to Saquitan. Petitioner is not a party to any of the documents
Mangali, Ty, and Saquitan signed.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; When the circumstances
surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences,
one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the
inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional
presumption of her innocence.—In sum, we hold that the lower courts’ rulings
are based on a misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review.
Indeed, when, as here, the circumstances surrounding the alleged
commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring the
innocence of the accused
436

436
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eugenio vs. People
and the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail,
consistent with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
U.P. Office of Legal Aid for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
 CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 30 November 2004

and the Resolution dated 11 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
conviction of petitioner Lolita Y. Eugenio (petitioner) for Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Documents and denying reconsideration, respectively.
The Facts

The prosecution evidence showed that on 14 November 1995,

petitioner went to the house of private complainant Alfredo Mangali (Mangali)
in Tonsuya, Malabon, Metro Manila and introduced Mangali to Epifania
Saquitan (Saquitan), Amalia Ablaza (Ablaza), and another individual.3
Petitioner persuaded Mangali to loan P100,000 to Saquitan with a parcel of
land in Sta. Ana, Metro Manila (Sta. Ana lot) as security for the loan.
Petitioner assured Mangali that the Sta. Ana lot was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 171602 issued in Saquitan’s name. Mangali
asked petitioner to confirm with the Register of Deeds of Manila the validity
of TCT No. 171602. In the afternoon of that same day, petitioner informed
Mangali that she saw the original of TCT No. 171602 on file with the Register
of Deeds of Manila. With this assurance, Mangali agreed to extend the loan
subject to Saquitan’s execution of a “deed of sale” of the Sta. Ana lot in his
favor. Saquitan agreed and after the “deed of sale” was signed, Mangali
released the loan in two tranches to Saquitan which the latter promised to
pay on 21 December 1995.
Subsequently, petitioner, on behalf of one Lourdes Ty (Ty), sought
another P100,000 loan from Mangali, payable in January 1996 with a parcel
of land in Quezon City (Quezon City lot) as security. Petitioner represented
that the property was covered by TCT No. 92585 issued in Ty’s name.
Mangali agreed to extend the loan, again subject to the condition that Ty
execute a “deed of sale” over the Quezon City lot in his favor. After Ty
complied, Mangali released the partial amount of P75,000.
When the loans lapsed and remained unpaid, Mangali inquired from
the Register of Deeds of Manila and Quezon City on the status of TCT No.
171602 and TCT No. 92585, respectively. Mangali discovered that TCT No.
171602 had been cancelled on 5 October 1995 while TCT No. 92585 is not
registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Mangali filed a
complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which arranged an
entrapment operation on 26 February 1996 in Mangali’s house. Mangali
expected to see petitioner that day as petitioner had asked for an additional
P33,000 loan. At the appointed time, petitioner, Ablaza, and two other
unidentified individuals arrived in Mangali’s house. The NBI agents effected
the arrest while petitioner was counting the money. The NBI agents brought
petitioner and the other individuals arrested with her to the NBI office where
petitioner gave a statement.
Upon investigation by the NBI, it was discovered that the “Epifania
Saquitan” who owned the Sta. Ana lot was a 79-year old woman who denied
mortgaging the Sta. Ana lot or knowing petitioner and her co-accused. This
“Epifania Saquitan” executed an affidavit attesting to these facts.
Petitioner, Ablaza, and two other individuals identified only as Jane
Does were charged with Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. The
Information4 against them was filed
That on or about the 14th day of November, 1995, in the Municipality
of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
(sic) and helping one another, after falsifying TCT Nos. 171602 and 92585,
which is (sic) a public document and by misrepresenting that said TCT Title
Nos. were a (sic) genuine duplicate copy from the original induce and
convince, ALFREDO MANGALI y GONZALES, and did induce and convince,
ALFREDO MANGALI y GONZALES to mortgage said TCT Title No. 171602
in the total amount of P100,000.00 and TCT Title No. 92585 in the total
amount of P75,000.00, an accused by using this falsified document with
intent to gain and to defraud and by means of deceit, false pretense,
fraudulent means (sic) and misrepresentation, executed prior to and/or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully (sic) and feloniously mortgage the said TCT Title Nos. to
ALFREDO MANGALI y GONZALES for and in consideration in the total
amount of P175,000.00 and ALFREDO MANGALI y GONZALES, believing
that the said TCT Title Nos. was [sic] genuine and that said accused was the
real owner of the same, parted his P175,000.00 to them and accused once
in possession of the said amount, misappropriate the same to their personal
use and benefit and despite repeated demands accused failed to return the
amount of P175,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of ALFREDO
MANGALI y GONZALES.
This Information is duplicitous as it charges petitioner and her co-
accused with two counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents by
falsifying TCT No. 171602 and TCT No. 92585, and using them, in separate
transactions, as security to induce Mangali to extend loans to Saquitan and
Ty. However, for petitioner’s failure with the Regional Trial Court of Malabon
and raffled to Branch 73 (trial court).5 Petitioner and Ablaza pleaded “not
guilty” to the charges and, upon their application, were admitted to bail.
Ablaza soon went into hiding.
On the part of the defense, petitioner denied taking part in any
conspiracy to swindle Mangali. Petitioner claimed that since 1993, Mangali
had sought her services to run errands for him in the titling of lots and follow-
up of a Social Security System claim. Afterwards, Mangali recruited her as
his commissioned agent in Mangali’s check re-discounting and lending
businesses. Thus, even before 14 November 1995, petitioner had brokered
check rediscounting and loan deals with Mangali.
 On Saquitan’s loan, petitioner claimed that she brokered this deal with
Mangali through Ablaza, an acquaintance. Ablaza informed her that
Saquitan wanted to borrow from Mangali with the Sta. Ana lot as security.
Anticipating a commission from Mangali, petitioner brought Ablaza,
Saquitan, and two other individuals to Mangali. Mangali and Saquitan agreed
on the terms of the loan, that is, the loaned amount will be released in two
tranches of P60,000 and P40,000, with the interest deducted from the
amount first released and Saquitan will execute a “deed of sale” over the Sta.
Ana lot in Mangali’s favor. Mangali then instructed petitioner to confirm with
the Register of Deeds of Manila if the photocopy of TCT No. 171602
Saquitan brought with her was genuine. On the same day, petitioner
obtained from the Register of Deeds of Manila a certified true copy of TCT
No. 171602 and gave it to Mangali. Thus, Mangali released to to move for
the quashal of the Information on this ground, petitioner is deemed to have
waived the objection (Section 3[e] in relation to Section 8, Rule 117, Rules
of Court, now Section 3[f] in relation to Section 9, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
5 The same Information was later filed in Branch 74 of the same court
but Branch 74 dismissed the case as Branch 73 had already taken
cognizance of it. Saquitan P48,000 (P60,000 less interest). Saquitan
acknowledged receipt of the amount and signed the “deed of sale” over the
Sta. Ana lot, which petitioner prepared on Mangali’s instruction. Two weeks
later, Mangali released to Saquitan the second tranch of the loan which
Saquitan promised to pay on 21 December 1995.
On Ty’s loan, petitioner testified that it was also Ablaza who sought her
help, claiming that Ty, whom petitioner did not know, was offering as security
her property in Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 92585 issued in her name.
Again anticipating a commission from Mangali, petitioner brought Ablaza and
Ty to Mangali. Ty had with her what she alleged to be her owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 92585. Mangali wanted to inspect the property covered by
TCT No. 92585 so the group (Mangali, petitioner, Ablaza, and Ty) proceeded
to Filinvest Subdivision in Quezon City. Satisfied with what he saw, Mangali
agreed to loan P75,000 to Ty but not after requiring her to sign a “deed of
sale” over the property in Mangali’s favor which petitioner again prepared on
Mangali’s instruction. Ty complied and received the amount for the loan.
In February 1996, Mangali informed petitioner that TCT No. 171602
and TCT No. 92585 were spurious and demanded to see Ablaza. Petitioner
brought Ablaza to Mangali and the two discussed the validity of the titles.
Ablaza insisted that the titles were genuine. In the course of their meeting,
Ablaza disclosed that she has a property in Baguio City. Mangali offered to
buy a portion of the property. Ablaza was amenable to the deal provided that
Mangali take care of the expenses for the subdivision of the property which
Ablaza placed at P35,000. Mangali gave Ablaza an initial amount for the
subdivision and asked Ablaza to come back on 26 February 1996 for the
balance. On the appointed day, petitioner and Ablaza returned to Mangali’s
house. Before giving the amount to Ablaza, Mangali asked petitioner to count
it. It was while petitioner was in the act of counting the money that the NBI
In its Decision dated 7 September 2001, the trial court (1) found
petitioner guilty with one count of Estafa thru Falsifcation of Public
Documents and sentenced her to 10 years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and (2) ordered
petitioner to pay Mangali P175,005 as actual damages.6 The trial court held:
“Against the clear and convincing evidence that thru
misrepresentations of Eugenio, among others, Mangali extended two loans,
one for Saquitan and the other for Ty, with a cancelled title and a non-existent
one being offered as collaterals, Eugenio’s denial of any knowledge
concerning the irregularity of the transactions of which she played a principal
role and her further claim that in this case she was merely the victim of
circumstances, cannot prevail.
 Add to the foregoing the fact that an entrapment was effected which
resulted in the arrest of Eugenio and Ablaza after they de-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused Lolita Y. Eugenio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged in this case, penalized under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), in relation
to Art. 172, in further relation to Art. 48, all of the Revised Penal Code. In the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in view of the amount of
the damage involved, said accused is hereby sentenced to a prison term
ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Eugenio is also ordered to pay complainant Alfredo Mangali
the sum of P175,005.00 representing the damage sustained by said
complainant.
With respect to at large accused Ablaza and the two others designated
as Jane Does, let this case be archived.
manded for another additional loan, probably with the alleged Ty
property as collateral, too, and the inevitable conclusion would be that
Eugenio is liable as a co-conspirator of the others who are charged with her
in this case.
Two spurious titles were made to appear to be genuine and valid ones
although the same were no longer valid with respect to one and non-existent
and spurious with respect to the other, and with both titles having no legal
basis to exist at all and thus, can be presumed falsified with the possessor
thereof being further presumed as the author of the falsification x x x x and it
would also be concluded that falsification of public document was resorted
to in order to defraud Mangali of the amounts she [sic] gave to the accused
and her co-conspirators.
There was fraud resulting in swindling or estafa because
misrepresentations with intent to defraud and to cause damage
characterized the actuations of all the accused in this case, including the two
designated only as Jane Does.
In this case, Eugenio was in conspiracy with the others because of the
misrepresentations made by her to the effect that Saquitan’s title was really
registered and therefore genuine and because of other acts she did in
connection with the negotiations with Mangali where she actively participated
at every stage of the transactions and played an important and active role.
In fine, the Court is of the view and so holds that the offense charged
in this case has been sufficiently established and that accused Eugenio is
guilty as charged.”7
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 30 November 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

trial court’s ruling. In sustaining the trial court’s finding on petitioner’s vital
role in the scheme to defraud Mangali, the Court of Appeals held:
“[W]e are convinced that the accused-appellant defrauded the private
complainant through her fraudulent misrepresentation. The records of the
instant case show that the accused-appellant knew that her co-accused are
not the real owners of the property mortgaged to the private complainant.
However, knowing that she has gained the trust of the private complainant,
she misrepresented to the latter that the persons she introduced to him are
the real Epifania Saquitan and Lourdes Ty, the true owners of the mortgaged
properties. Were it not for the misrepresentation of the accused-appellant,
the private complainant would not have agreed to the mortgage and
eventually part with his one hundred seventy five thousand pesos
(P175,000.00), to his damage and prejudice.
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the trial court that the
accused-appellant’s fraudulent misrepresentation facilitated the commission
of the crime.”8
 Petitioner sought reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in
the Resolution dated 11 May 2005.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner frames the issues as follows:
A. WHETHER x x x THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PETITIONER EMPLOYED DECEIT IN LEADING PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT ALFREDO MANGALI TO BELIEVE THAT THE TITLES
POSSESSED BY EPIFANIA SAQUITAN AND LOURDES TY, WHICH ARE
MORTGAGED TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, WERE GENUINE.
B. WHETHER x x x THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE PETITIONER EUGENIO MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ALFREDO MANGALI IN BEHALF OF CO-
ACCUSED ABLAZA, SAQUITAN AND TY, CONSTITUTIVE OF
CONSPIRACY.
C. WHETHER x x x THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
COMPLETELY GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO SUBSTANTIAL
PORTIONS OF THE UNCORROBORATED AND IMPROBABLE
ALLEGATIONS OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MANGALI AND TOTALLY
DISMISSING THE CONSISTENT TESTIMONY AND FACTUAL
NARRATION OF PETITIONER EUGENIO.
D. WHETHER x x x THE COURTS A QUO ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
SPECIFICALLY UNDER ARTICLE 315 PAR. 2(A) AND ARTICLE 172 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 48 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
E. WHETHER x x x THE COURTS A QUO ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE PATENT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER.9
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
 1) Whether irregularities attended petitioner’s arrest and
investigation, nullifying her conviction; and
2) Whether petitioner is guilty of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents.
The Ruling of the Court

We set aside the Court of Appeals’ ruling and acquit petitioner of the
charges against her on the ground of reasonable doubt.
On the Alleged Irregularities Attending
Petitioner’s Arrest and Custodial Investigation

Before resolving the question of petitioner’s liability, we first address

petitioner’s contentions on the irregularities attending her arrest and
investigation and their effect on the judgment against her.
Petitioner contends that her arrest following the NBI entrapment
operation was illegal because it was “conducted by a division of the NBI
which does not deal with estafa or fraud” and without the participation of the
police. Petitioner also
_______________

9 Id., at p. 26.
445

VOL. 549, MARCH 26, 2008

445
Eugenio vs. People
alleges that after she was arrested, she was neither informed of her
constitutional right to counsel nor afforded her right to a phone call. Petitioner
concludes that these irregularities tainted the NBI’s entrapment operation,
rendering the same without any “probative value in determining whether or
not a criminal act has been committed.”10
Respondent does not contest petitioner’s claim on the alleged
irregularities which attended her arrest. Nevertheless, such irregularities,
assuming they did take place, do not work to nullify petitioner’s conviction as
this Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the correct remedy, to
raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving
the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion to
quash at any time before entering her plea.11 Petitioner’s failure to timely
raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity12 and resulted
in her concomitant submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction over her person.
Indeed, not only did petitioner submit to such jurisdiction, she actively
invoked it through her participation during the trial. Petitioner cannot now be
heard to claim the contrary.
As for the failure of the NBI agents to inform petitioner of her right to
counsel during custodial investigation, this right attains significance only if
the person under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of
counsel which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the
trial. In such case, the tainted confession obtained in violation of Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence against the
accused.
_______________

10 Id., at pp. 39-41.

11 Section 3(b) in relation to Section 1, Rule 117, Rules of Court,
reproduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
12 Section 3(b) in relation to Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court now
Section 3(b) in relation to Section 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
446
 446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eugenio vs. People
Here, petitioner merely alleges that following her arrest, she gave a
“statement” to the NBI agents. The records do not contain a copy of this
“statement” thus we have no way of knowing whether such statement
amounts to a confession under Section 12(3) in relation to Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution. At any rate, no allegation has been made here
that the prosecution submitted such statement in evidence during the trial.
On Petitioner’s Criminal Liability

The foregoing notwithstanding, we hold that the prosecution failed to

prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Prosecution Failed to Prove
Conspiracy to Render Petitioner
Liable as Principal to Estafa Thru
Falsification of Public Documents
To hold petitioner liable for the complex crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of a Public Document, the prosecution must show that she
committed Estafa thru any of the modes of committing Falsification. Under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification is committed under any
of the following modes:
(1) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
(3) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
(4) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(5) Altering true dates;
 (6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning;
(7) Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
447

VOL. 549, MARCH 26, 2008

447
Eugenio vs. People
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of
the genuine original; or
(8) Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.
On the other hand, Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit and (b) the
offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation.13
The trial court found petitioner guilty of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Documents (which the Court of Appeals sustained) for petitioner’s
“principal role” in the loan transactions between Mangali, on the one hand,
and Saquitan and Ty, on the other hand. In further pinning liability on
petitioner for her role in the alleged falsification of TCT No. 92585, the trial
court, for lack of proof of petitioner’s participation in falsifying such document,
relied on the disputable legal presumption that the possessor of a falsified
document who makes use of such to her advantage is presumed to be the
author of the falsification. In short, petitioner’s conviction below rested on an
implied conspiracy with her co-accused to swindle Mangali, buttressed, as
to one count, by a reliance on a disputable presumption of culpability.
We reverse.
 True, conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same
can be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused.14 However, this
does not dispense with the requirement that conspiracy, like the felony itself,
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.15 Thus, the presence of a
reasonable doubt
_______________

13 People v. Reyes, 346 Phil. 786; 282 SCRA 105 (1997).

14 Orodio v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57519, 13 September 1988, 165
SCRA 316.
15 See Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04, 6 December
1989, 180 SCRA 9.
448

448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eugenio vs. People
as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate not only the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense as principal but
also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as accessory or
accomplice, the criminal liability of the accused.16
Here, petitioner’s acts which the lower courts considered as
constitutive of her complicity in the supposed plot to swindle Mangali
consisted of the following: (1) petitioner was the one who brought Saquitan,
Ty, and Ablaza to Mangali; (2) petitioner was present in all the occasions
Mangali met Saquitan, Ty, and Ablaza; (3) petitioner confirmed that TCT No.
171602 was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila when in fact it
was already cancelled; and (4) the real “Epifania Saquitan” denied
mortgaging the Sta. Ana property to Mangali. By themselves, these
circumstances can plausibly pass muster to prove petitioner’s involvement
in a plan among the accused to swindle Mangali.
However, when petitioner’s side is considered, taking into account
admitted facts and unrebutted claims, her participation in the events leading
to her arrest is cast in an entirely new light raising reasonable doubt as to
her culpability. These facts and unrefuted claims are: (1) petitioner works for
Mangali, on commission basis, in the latter’s check re-discounting and
lending businesses17 and (2) the Civil Register of Manila certified as true
copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 that Saquitan gave petitioner.
As Mangali’s agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers
to Mangali; otherwise, she will not earn commissions. This also explains why
she was present in all the
_______________

16 See People v. Quinao, 336 Phil. 475; 269 SCRA 495 (1997).
17 Mangali initially denied that petitioner brokered check rediscounting
deals for him but he acknowledged such fact upon further questioning (Rollo,
pp. 33-34). Indeed, it appears that when petitioner drew up the “deeds of
sale” Saquitan and Mangali signed on Mangali’s instruction, petitioner merely
performed one of her duties incidental to being Mangali’s commissioned
agent.
449

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449
Eugenio vs. People
ocassions Mangali met Saquitan and Ty – she was pecuniarily
interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to
enable her to receive commission from Mangali.
 On petitioner’s disclosure to Mangali that TCT No. 171602 is registered
with the Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioner merely relied on the
certification by the Register of Deeds of Manila that the photocopy of TCT
No. 171602 she brought with her was a true copy of the title on file in that
office.18 The prosecution did not rebut this.
We arrive at the same conclusion on petitioner’s alleged liability for
Estafa using the allegedly falsified TCT No. 92585. Aside from relying on
conspiracy to pin petitioner for this charge, the trial court also anchored its
finding on the presumption that petitioner was party to the falsification of TCT
No. 92585 because she had possession of such title. However, petitioner’s
unrebutted testimony on this point is that it was Ty who brought with her what
she represented to be her owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 92585 and
which she presented to Mangali.19 At any rate, for the presumption of
authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor must stand to profit or had
profited from the use of the falsified document.20 Here, the extent of
petitioner’s participation on Ty’s loan was to bring Ty (and Ablaza) to
Mangali. The prosecution failed to show any proof that petitioner received a
portion of the loan Mangali extended to Ty, just as there is no proof on record
that she received any share from the loan Mangali extended to Saquitan.
Petitioner is not a party to any of the documents Mangali, Ty, and Saquitan
signed.
_______________

18 Rollo, pp. 19, 127-128.

19 Id., at pp. 128-129.
20 Maliwat v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 732; 256 SCRA 718 (1996);
Sarep v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 68203, 13 September 1989, 177 SCRA
440; People v. Sendaydiego, 171 Phil. 114; 81 SCRA 120 (1978).
450
 450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eugenio vs. People
On the NBI’s finding that the real “Epifania Saquitan” did not mortgage
the Sta. Ana lot to Mangali, we note that such person was never presented
during the trial, rendering her affidavit inadmissible. At any rate, the
prosecution failed to rebut petitioner’s testimony that she was only
acquainted with Ablaza who introduced Saquitan and Ty to her.
In sum, we hold that the lower courts’ rulings are based on a
misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review.21 Indeed, when, as
here, the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are
capable of two inferences, one favoring the innocence of the accused and
the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent
with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence.22
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated 30 November 2004
and the Resolution dated 11 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals. We ACQUIT
petitioner Lolita Y. Eugenio of the charges against her on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Petitioner Lolita Y. Eugenio is hereby ordered released
immediately from confinement unless she is being held for another lawful
cause. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to inform the
Court of the action taken on this ruling within five (5) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Azcuna, Tinga** and Leonardo-De Castro,
JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution set aside, Lolita Y. Eugenio acquitted.
Eugenio vs. People, 549 SCRA 433, G.R. No. 168163 March 26, 2008
FIRST DIVISION

LEONILA BATULANON, G.R. No. 139857

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 15, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
15221, affirming with modification the April 15, 1993 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting
Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29,
1999 Resolution[3] denying the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its

Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving
deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of
loans were discovered.[4]

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed
against Batulanon, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 3625

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with
the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of,
the same, and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of
Erlinda Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was
granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon
the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear
that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in
truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never received the same, and never
signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same
and received the loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and
benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same,
to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine
Currency.[5]

Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said
accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI),
entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position and
with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI
in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that the said
Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line
thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion showing that she received the loan, thus making it
appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan, received the loan of P4,000.00
when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the same, and
never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal
intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself
the same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to
her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of
P4,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Criminal Case No. 3453

That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI),
entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
collection of the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and
with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger
of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the
ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and
was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person
made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in
truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and after
the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again
falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the
signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan
of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the
loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
accused did then and there release to herself the same, and received the amount of P3,500,
and thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and
convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused
and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI)
entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
collection of, the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and
with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger
of one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column
of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the
PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said
person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI
when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never granted
loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and
there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon
by signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis
Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never
received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud
PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive the loan of
P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate
and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.

Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma
as witnesses.

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash
vouchers[9] testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers
representing varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash
Voucher No. 30A[10] for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982,
Cash Voucher No. 237A[11] for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda[12] Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru
Cash Voucher No. 276A[13] was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on
December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No.
374A.[14]

Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for
loan because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative.[15] Ferlyn Arroyo on the
other hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a
loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.[16] Medallo stated
that pursuant to the cooperatives by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed
deposit are eligible for loans.[17]

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in
their respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees and
recipients of the amount stated therein.[18] As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No.
30A, she declared that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.[19]

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since
1979. He corroborated Medallos testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis
Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanons sister-in-law while
Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in
the cooperative is not open to minors.[20]

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its
Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and
Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperatives Credit Committee and PCCIs Board of
Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracions signature on Cash Voucher No.
237A is Batulanons handwriting.[21] Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only
that in Arroyos name was settled.[22]

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a
hostile witness and Batulanon.

Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring
with her the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document
reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify
the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify
only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other
vouchers because the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the
entries.[23]

Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in
the names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants
in her presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money to them; [24] that the
three were members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger;
that the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the
correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the
cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his
absence;[25] that she signed the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon
because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the
documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity;[26] that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr.,
minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are children of regular
members.

Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her sons name because she is no longer
qualified for another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying
off her sons loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the cases were filed
in court.[27] She also declared that one automatically becomes a member when he deposits
money with the cooperative.[28] When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the
cooperative did not have by-laws yet.[29]

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative
had been registered since 1967.[30]
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4
months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify
the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the complaints
until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.[31]

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2,
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen
thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints
until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.[32]

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature
was allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda
Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased
witness such as Medallo.[33] She avers that the crime of falsification of private document
requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been
prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are accounts receivable by the
cooperative.[34]

The petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial
document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-
settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the
offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v.
People,[35] we held:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is
the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense
on the merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all
things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and
important question to him is, Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged? not, Did
you commit a crime named murder? If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the
law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the
accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and
punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 [36] of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except
those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private
document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.[37]

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanons act[38] of falsification falls under
paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of
Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as
payee of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear
that they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan
nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the
name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a
loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is
a member, she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.

Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and
Arroyo in the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually
received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallos credible testimony and her
familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed
the name of Arroyo.Contrary to Batulanons contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to
present the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallos eyewitness account of the
incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person.

Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing
that Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanons letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an
admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in
criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by
law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt.

There is no merit in Batulanons assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan
transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI
only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are
not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in
Ferlyn Arroyos name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to
avoid legal prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the
money is collected from Batulanon.[39]

The Court of Appeals[40] correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and
not commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions[41] nor are they defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.[42] Rather, they are private
documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person
without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which
some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. [43]

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the
crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other
crime necessarily included therein.[44] The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its
burden completely.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,[45] it is

important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private
document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to
commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed
without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus,
in People v. Reyes,[46] the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate
that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he
had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the
wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the
laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante,[47] the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of
the pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter
pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true
value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v.
Chan Tiao,[48] the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas
Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of
said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of
falsification of a private document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625,
3626 and 3453.

Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10)
days. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the range of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1)
day to two (2) years and four (4) months.[49] Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453,
the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional, as maximum, which is
within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.

Since Batulanons conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall
suffer the aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered
to indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans
without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyos mother as the same was
settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is
recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the
complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this judgment. From the time the
decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its
satisfaction.

However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not
falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute
falsification are the following:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document

when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original; or;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.

In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis
Batulanons signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the
name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No.
374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: by:
lbatulanon to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act
does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing
untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the
latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of
making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such
representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will
make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below
to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private document with respect
to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis.[50]

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element
is not necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant) [51]

Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,[52] the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by
misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of
P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced said
cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail
Road Company until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted, the check of
appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An
inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the
afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to cover
the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:

Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary
element of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the
conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself
sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men
misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the
offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x

Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary
elements of estafa x x x. That the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was
received by him for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the
responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such had immediate control of the
current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same.
That he, in the exercise of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the
case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if
he had acted on his own responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same funds and
thus have become guilty of estafa.

Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds
entrusted to him for safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions
that the checks were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant
misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks did not constitute cash and
as long as they were retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control they
were of no value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver
them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.

xxxx

But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently
misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in
cases of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though
authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of trust
funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this
interpretation of the law to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to
their own use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character.
The statute is clear and makes no distinction between permanent misappropriations and
temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case why it should not be applied in its
literal sense.

The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The
appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the
Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however,
well settled by former adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property rights caused
by the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within
the meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil.,
821.)[53]

In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for
administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan,
she fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from
PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as
she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by
Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused
to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to
qualified members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in
property rights caused by Batulaonos misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury
within the meaning of Article 315.

Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable
provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, where
the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no
modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate
penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three
counts of falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit
Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum
shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight
(8) months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok
Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per
annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.