[Resolution, March 18, 1954]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar
of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.
1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO
COURT AND PUBLIC.—By its declared objective,
Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public
interest demands of the legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problems evolved by the times become more difficult.
2.ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION.—In the judicial
system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER
OR SUPPLEMENT RULES.—The Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities governing the admission to the
practice of law. The primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes, continue to reside
in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules
535
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
535
In re: Cunanan, et al.
promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law
and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT OF
SUPREME COURT MAY BE HARMONIZED.—Being
coordinate and independent branches the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal,
alter and supplement them may and should be
exercised with the respect that each owes to the
other, giving careful consideration to the
responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing
rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision
of the practice of the legal profession, should consider
these reforms as the minimum standards for the
elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys-at-
law is realized. They are powers which, exercised
within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other
in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of
the administration of justice.
5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION.—
Republic Act No. 972 is a class legislation. There is no
actual nor reasonable basis to classify unsuccessful
bar candidates by years nor to exclude those of other
years.
6.ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS
PROVISIONS.—Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins. Being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
7.ID.; REPUBLIC ACT No. 972, PART OF SECTION 1
DECLARED TO BE IN FORCE.—There being no
unanimity in the eight Justices who constitute the
majority of the court in this case, that part of article 1
Republic Act No. 972 which refers to the examinations
of 1953 to 1955 shall continue in force.
536
536
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused
so much public interest and concern as Republic Act
No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of
1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission
1
to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission
to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127,
sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the
varying difficulties of the different bar examinations
held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness
with which the examination papers were graded, this
court passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of only 72
per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in
1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74
per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as f ully qualified to practice law
as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
feeling conscious of having been discriminated
against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the
court subscribed to and submitted written comments
adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead,
it approved
537
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
537
In re: Cunanan, et al.
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members
of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law
on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law,
which incidentally was enacted in an election year,
reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT No. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven
of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained
a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-
one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations;
seventy-two per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent
in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a
candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in
any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the
purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as
part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of
seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
f forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive
approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions
for the revision
538
538
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of their examination papers were still pending also
invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought
simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to
be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to
Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should
be applied equally to all concerned whether they
have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the
petitioners, properly classified, affected by this
2
decision, as well as a more detailed account of the 426
history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this 1953
decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more .....................................................................................
readily the effects of the law, the following statistical ............
data are set forth: 2,555
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be 986
benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 284
1,168, classified as follows: Total
1946 (August) .............................................................................
.................................................................................. 12,230
206 5,421
121 1,168
18 Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in
1946 (November) subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
............................................................................. either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to
477 said Republic Act, or mere motions for
228 reconsideration.
43 (2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful
1947 candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
..................................................................................... Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from
............ two to five different
749 539
340
0 VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
1948 539
..................................................................................... In re: Cunanan, et al.
............ examinations, but f ailed to obtain a passing average
899 in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest
409 grades in diff erent subjects in previous examinations,
11 with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
1949 reach the passing average as provided for by Republic
..................................................................................... Act 972.
............ (3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by
1,218 this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only
532 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33
164 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
1950 motions for reconsideration which were denied,
..................................................................................... while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of
............ 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still
1,316 pending because they could be favorably affected by
893 Republic Act No. 972,—although as has been already
26 stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to
1951 reconsider their grades.
..................................................................................... UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
............
2,068 Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-
879 reaching effects on the practice of the legal prof
196 ession and the administration of justice, and because
1952 some doubts have been expressed as to its validity,
..................................................................................... the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned
............ petitions f or admission on the sole question of
2,738 whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
1,033

3
We have been enlightened in the study of this
question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally and in writing,
on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire
Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of
the law, and of the U. P. Women Lawyers' Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique
M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios,
Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V.
Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from
the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs.
Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and
Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and
540
540
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
Galema, themselves, has greatly helped us in this
task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American
jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been
the object of intense deliberation for a long time by
the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the
preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a
new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to
its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
"The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent
passing grade is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy
of the preparation of students who took up law soon
after the liberation."
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations
from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And i&w it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted
(which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public
interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public
interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the
legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve
officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
to dedicate themselves tof
541
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
541
In re: Cunanan, et al.
such a delicate mission is to create a serious social
danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies
were made available to the public during those years
and private enterprises had also published them in
monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official
Gazette has been published continuously. Books and
magazines published abroad have entered without
restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even
with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which
continued to be supplemented by the addition of new
volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is
valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or
from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier
had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is
there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal
history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by
the Congress of the United States, and which we have
preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous juridical history of more than half
a century? From the citations of those defending the
law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a
similar law had been sustained, while those against its
validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re
Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24
Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President
4
which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the proponent of the contested law respects.
542
542
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar
laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them, without force
or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have
examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
as a favorable precedent of the law—that of Cooper
(22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York
revoked the decision of the Supreme Court of that
State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted
to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by
the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that
time provided:
"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office
of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals,
given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void.
They shall not exercise any power of appointment to
public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-
one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and
ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all
the courts of this State." (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the
power of appointing them had previously rested with
the judges, and this was the principal appointing
power which they possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the
section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and
the insertion of the provision respecting the
admission of attorneys, in this particular section of
the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection
with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is
nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power
over this subject, unless the
543
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
543
In re: Cunanan, et al.
Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word 'admission' in the action referred
to it is urged that the admission spoken of must be by
the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and
that the power of granting necessarily implies the
power of refusing, and of course the right of
determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
"These positions may all be conceded, without
affecting the validity of the act." (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the
decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession 01 a diploma of the school of law of
Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that
the constitution required of applicants for admission
to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the
text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law
consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
"The motive for passing the act in question is
apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department
under the charge of able professors, the students in
which department were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law committee of the
institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma as graduates, the
Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered
this examination, together with the preliminary study
required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of
legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by
the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to
which no definite period of preliminary study was
essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
"The act was obviously passed with reference to the
learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the court. It could
have had no other object, and hence no greater scope
should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose
that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense
with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing what-
544
5
544
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
ever to indicate an intention that the authorities of
the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship,
etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The
only rational interpretation of which the act admits is,
that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the
applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it
operates as a modification of preexisting statutes,
and it is to be read in connection with these statutes
and with the Constitution itself in order to determine
the present condition of the law on the subject." (p.
89)
* * * * * * *
"The Legislature has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction Over the question of admission, that has
simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence
in certain cases upon that question." (p. 93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of
the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision
of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction
over the question of admission of attorney at law; in
effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that
of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter
of admission to the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
Even considering the power granted to Congress by
our Constitution to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the prac-
545
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
545
In re: Cunanan, et al.
tice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law is a legislative f
unction, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts
are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to
be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of
this matter had been undertaken in the case of State
vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity
of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be
permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the
following paragraphs:
"This statute presents an assertion of legislative
power without parallel in the history of the English
speaking people so far as we have been able to
ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the
extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the
ultimate qualifications of attorneys at law, but in
England and in every state of the Union the act of
admitting an attorney at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the act of admission has
always been regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law,
and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than
that of preserving in form and substance the exact
form of government set up by the people. (p. 444)
"Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested
in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far
as the prescribing 6f qualifications for admission to
the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets
up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
546
546
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
"But when the Legislature has prescribed those
qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
6
power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted?
(p. 444)
"Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative
departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither
branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty, but each
is supreme in that branch of sovereignty which
properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other
in the discharge of its respective functions. That was
the scheme and thought of the people setting upon
the form of government under which we exist. State
vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel.
Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
"The judicial department of government is
responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to
the judical department of our state government,
under a scheme which it was supposed rendered it
immune from embarrassment or interference by any
other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility for the manner in which the
powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p. 445)
"The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and
intimate relationship. The bar is an attach6 of the
courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the courts
depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its
bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring
the courts themselves into disrepute. (p. 445)
"Through all time courts have exercised a direct and
severe supervision over their bars, at least in the
English speaking countries." (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court
ends thus:
"Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For
more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly
subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of
1688, had exercised the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as
was said in, Matter of the Sergeants at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid
of all titles.' If the courts and the judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent
element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate
547
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
547
In re: Cunanan, et al.
that element and say with assurance that it is either a
part of the inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power exercised by
the court, but that it is a power belonging to the
judicial entity cannot be denied. Our people
borrowed from England this judicial entity and made
of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a
separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the
power traditionally exercised to determine who
should constitute its attorneys at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates
an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of
the f framers of our constitution was to make the
three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department
by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys
at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be
inferred in the absence of, express constitutional
provision. While the Legislature may legislate with
respect to the qualifications of attorneys, its power in
that respect does not rest upon any power possessed
by it to deal exclusively with the subject of the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to
its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate fixing a
standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law
in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications constitute only a minimum standard
and limit the class f rom which the court must make
its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which
the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course for the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to their
bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the
prerogatives of an attorney at law." (p. 450)
"Furthermore it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the
power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the
Legislature may exercise the power of appointment
when it is in pursuance of a legislative f unctions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous
that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of
law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except
7
New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so
far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive
their formal license to practice law by their admission
as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor.
Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565;
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 838, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall
vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed. 285;
548
548
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843,115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A.
519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021,,
130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
"The power of admitting an attorney to practice
having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of a court
in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment
for the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being
most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a
purely judicial f unction, no matter where the power
to determine the qualifications may reside." (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
"It is indispensable to the administration of justice
and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate
learning and sound moral character. This arises from
the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is
highly important, also that the public be protected f
rom incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose
opportunity f or doing mischief is wide. It was said by
Cardoz, C. L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.
Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. R. 851:
'Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with
conditions.' One is admitted to the bar 'for something
more than private gain.' He becomes 'an officer of the
court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due 'whenever justice
would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in
the performance of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the common law, both in
this country and in England. Admission to practice as
an attorney at law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that
end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is
accomplish and made open and notorious by a
decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the
exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a
department of government ultimately to determine
the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice
in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect
itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in
sufficient learning, and those not possessing good
moral char-
549
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1984
549
In re: Cunanan, et al.
acter. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with
finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed.
565, 'It has been well settled, by the rules and practice
of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with
the court to determine who is qualified to become
one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and
for what cause he ought to be removed.' " (p. 727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a
petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE
646), the court said in part:
"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed.
366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to
be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the
attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the
court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and f air
private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of. the
states to which they, respectively, belong, for three
years preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite
legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving
their admission sufficient evidence that their private
and professional character is f fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the
parties possess the requisite qualifications as
attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled to appear
as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only
8
be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte
Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss. 127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield,
20 Cal. 430. Their admission or their exclusion is not
the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the
exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals
of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper
for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. 'Attorneys and
Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only officers of
the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be
intrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing
his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the
exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp.
650-653).
550
550
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent
portions:
"Admission to practice of law is almost without
exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of
a judicial function, and this opinion need not be
burdened with citations in this point. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the exercise of one
of the inherent powers of the court."—Re Bruen, 102
Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
"Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a
judicial function, and is an inherent power of the
court."—A. C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California,
281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R.
1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
"The distinction between the functions of the
legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the
province of the legislature to establish rules that shall
regulate and govern in matters of transactions
occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while
the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power,
and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by
judicial decrees.
"The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall
be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government."—16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the
action of the courts by requiring of them construction
of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it
cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgmentSj compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what
particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a
judicial inquiry."—Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 192.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the
bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average
of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment—
a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court
during the afore-
551
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
551
In re: Cunanan, et al.
cited year affecting the bar candidates concerned;
and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative
nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments
would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the
case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines."—Constitution of the Philippines, Art.
VIII, sec. 13.
9
It will be noted that the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law The primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizescontinue to reside
in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has
not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would
have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but
the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested
in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal
in the exercise of its primary
552
552
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
power on the matter. The Constitution does not say
nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar
or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of
law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on the matter, if
according to its judgment the need for a better
service of the legal profession requires it,. But this
power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility
to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at
law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes
to the other, giving careful consideration to the
responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing
rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision
of the practice of the legal profession, should consider
these reforms as the minimum standards for the
elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law is realized. They are powers which, exercised
within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other
in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of
the administration of justice.
553
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
553
In re: Cunanan, et al.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our
criterion. Guariña took the examination and failed by
a few points to obtain the general average. A recently
enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted
to the practice of law without a previous examination.
The Government appointed Guariña and he
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province.
This Tribunal refused to give his license without
previous examinations. The court said:
"Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No.
1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the
bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on
the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal
for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907,
is as follows:
"SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act
Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and
Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands/ is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws
and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and
regular standing as members of the bar of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the
passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall
have held, under the authority of the United States,
the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of
the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge
of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor
General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant
attorney in the office of the Attorney General,
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, assistant
10
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city
attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without an examination, upon motion before
the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court."
"The records of this court disclose that on a former
occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining
board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received
an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches
of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus
falling four points short of the required percentage of
75. We would be delin-
554
554
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
quent in the performance of our duty to the public
and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the
time when he presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him a license to
practice law in the courts of these Islands, without'
first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to
pass the examination on that occassion, he now
'possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability.'
"But it is contended that under the provisions of the
above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right
to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination 'upon motion before the
Supreme Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof
that he has held and now holds the office of provincial
fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that
having in mind the object which the legislator
apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-
cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view
of the context generally and especially of the fact that
the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically provides
for the admission of certain candidates without
examination, the clause may be licensed to practice
law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without any
examination.' It is contended that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to give
effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and
to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power
exercised."
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the
Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of
Act No. 136, and articles 13 to16 of Act 190, the Court
continued:
"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this
court by the commission and confirmed to it by the
Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and
in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in the
above citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather
than a permissive effect. But any act of the
commission which has the effect of setting at naught
in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or
limiting the power conferred upon the commission is
to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who
were appointed to the positions enumerated, and
with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the
Court held:
555
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
555
In re: Cunanan, et al.
"In the various cases wherein applications for
admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we have
accepted the fact that such appointments had been
made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason
to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
"In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was not ,and
never had been practicing attorney in this or any
other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment
as provincial fiscal, and it further aMrmatively
appears that he was deficient in the required
qualifications at the time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.
"In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency
on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude
therefore that this application for license to practice
in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
"In view, however, of the fact that when he took the
examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice;
and in view also of the fact that since that time he has
11
held the responsible office of the governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence
of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the
consent and approval of the Philippine Commission,
sought to retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we
think we would be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule,
provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special examination which will be
given him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if
he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule."—
(In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license.
The law in questionT like those in the case of Day and
Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal
defect
556
556
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended
to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899
required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of
that year, to grant license for the practice of law to
those students who began studying before November
4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented
a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who
had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three
years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared
that this law was unconstitutional being, among
others, a class legislation. The Court said:
"This is an application to this court for admission to
the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the
general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled 'An act to amend
section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors,' approved
March 28, 1894, in force July 1, 1874.' The
amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting
clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: 'And every applicant for a license who shall
comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard
to admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law, either in a law
office or a law school or college, shall be granted a
license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules'."—In re Day et al.,
54 N. Y., p. 646.
* * * "After said provision there is a double proviso,
one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899,
this court shall grant a license of admittance to the
bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by
any law school regularly organized under the laws of
this state, whose regular course of law studies is two
years, and requiring an attendance by the student of
at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing
that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character. The other branch of
the proviso is that any student who has studied law
for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a
law office, 'and part in the aforesaid law school,' and
whose course of study began prior to November 4,
1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the branches
now required by the rules
557
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
557
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is
by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers
substantial rights and privileges upon the persons
named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar." (p. 647.)
"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment,
it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had
any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts
and take part in the administration of justice, and
could prescribe the character of evidence which
should be received by the court as conclusive of the
requisite learning and ability of persons to practice
law, it could only be done by a general law, and not
by granting special and exclusive privileges to certain
persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2.
The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the
court, and confers upon him the right to appear for
12
litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor,
and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury
services and arrest on civil process while attending
court. The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify
persons so long as the law establishing classes in
general, and has some reasonable relation to the end
sought. There must be some difference which
furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation
as to the different classes, and not a purely arbitrary
one, having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 111. 66,
35 N. E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454;
Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
"The length of time a physician has practiced, and the
skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 111. 48, II N. E.
881); but the place where such physician has resided
and practiced his profession cannot furnish such
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an
enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65
N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes
to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law. and. plainly, any classification
must have some reference to learning, character, or
ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is
limited. first, to a class of persons who began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is
subdivided into two classes—First, those presenting
diplomas issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied
law for the period of two years in a law office, or part
of the time in a
558
558
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
law school and part in a law office, who are to be
admitted upon examination in the subjects specified
in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for
making application for admission. As to both classes,
the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as
between the two different conditions and limits of
time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the
law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may
prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything
with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons
to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study
of law November 4th could qualify themselves to
practice in two years as well as those who began on
the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend
only two years in study, while those who commenced
the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The
one who commenced on the 3d. If possessed of a
diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any
prescribed course of study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma
is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon
any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the
subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is
for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon
certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon,
240 N. W. 441, where the legislature attempted by
law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the
court also held with regards to its aspect of being a
class legislation:
"But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be
granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon
which courts must admit and license those applying
as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised
in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of
the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice
Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U. S.
114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: 'lt is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United
States to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like
age, sex, and condition. This right may in many
respects be considered as a distinguishing feature
559
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
559
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are
all open to every one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes
termed, the 'estate' acquired in thern—that is, the
right to continue their prosecution—is often of great
value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily
13
taken from them, any more than their real or personal
property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under
our system of government that all similarly situated
and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal
opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring examinations to establish the
possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice,
have been challenged, and courts have seriously
considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the
time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this
general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N. C. 643,
28 S. E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs.
Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345; State vs.
Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.
"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to
confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere
matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material
that he had once established his right to practice law
and that one time he possessed the requisite learning
and other qualifications to entitle him to that right.
That fact in no manner affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the great body of the public
an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
"A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c.
424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law without examination, all who had
'serve in the military or naval forces of the United
States during the World War and received an
honorable discharge therefrom and who (were
disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the
Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as
'World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability
is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time
of the passage of this Act." This Act was held
unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated
the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn.
331, 227 N. W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally
acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as
follows:
"The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the
authorities that a classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences
560
560
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
between the person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon
pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from
irrelevant and artificial once. Therefore, any law that
is made applicable to one class of citizens only must
be based on some substantial difference between the
situation of that class and other individuals to which
it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must
be such a difference between the situation and
circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of
the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and
natural reason for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it operates on
all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason
why it is made to operate on that class only, and not
generally on all." (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained
a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar
examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per
cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
that the rules require a minimum general average of
75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by
the above-mentioned authorities, f or this
classification? If there is none, and none has been
given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941
or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has
no record of the unsuccessful ul candidates of those
years. This f act does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years,
from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is
the exclusion of those who failed before said years
under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946
does
561
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
561
In re: Cunanan, et al.
14
not signify that no one concerned may prove by some
other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is
constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in
which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of
candidates who did not obtain the general average of
75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per
cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent;
and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent,
which was considered by the Court as equivalent to
75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable.
These changes in the passing averages during those
years were all that could be objected to or criticized.
Now, is it desired to undo what had been done—
cancel the license that was issued to those who did
not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent? Certainly not.
The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this
Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court
did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of
will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being
cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to
the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year
the general average by one per cent, with the order
that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof
that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment
of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This
is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of
Congress. In other words, the power exercised was
not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue
562
562
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them.
And this power is not included in what the
Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls
within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing
of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into
account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system
that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however,
the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title of the Act. While this law according to its title
will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955,
the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system
for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section
21(1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and
annuls article 2 completely; and because it is
inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affects the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the f ollowing grounds:
first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its
basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby
declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect
for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and
563
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
563
In re: Cunanan, et al.
who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the
aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of
these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present
already prepared to become members of the Bar. It
obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of
the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
15
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that
this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any
time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no
other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do
it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended
to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and
should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely
in the daily performance of judicial functions and is
essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is
theref ore the primary and inherent prerogative of
the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on
who may be admitted and may continue in the
practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to f acts which are of general knowledge and
does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
564
564
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in
the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of
article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that
part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953
to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns
the examinations in those years, shall continue in
force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing
and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at
the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who
since the beginning have announced their decision
not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of
the Court who subscribe to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and
under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No.
972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional
and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that
part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from
1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII
of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions
of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all
candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained
a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without
having a grade below 50 per cent in any subjcet, are
considered as having passed, whether they have filed
petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted
565
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
565
In re: Cunanan, et al.
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the
Chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo,
Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resumé of pertinent facts concerning the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman,
Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero,
Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose
Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates
.....................................................................................
...............
206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
..........................................................
12
73's
.....................................................................................
......................................
16
6 In re: Cunanan, et al.
72's Percentage of success
..................................................................................... ........................................................................ (per
...................................... cent)
6 52.20
Number of candidates who passed Percentage of failure
............................................................................... .......................................................................... (per
85 cent)
Number of candidates who failed 47.80
.................................................................................. Passing grade
121 .....................................................................................
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 (per cent)
..................................................... 72
18 (By resolution of the Court).
Percentage of success ....................................... (per October, 1947
cent) ............................................. Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman,
41.62 Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta,
Percentage of failure ......................................... (per Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B.
cent) ............................................. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
58.74 Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Passing grade .................................................. (per Number of candidates
cent) ............................................... .....................................................................................
72 ..
November, 1946 749
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, Number of candidates whose grades were raised
1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted ..............................................
by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan. 43
Number of candidates 70.55 per cent with 2 subjects below 50 per cent
..................................................................................... ..................................
............... 1
481 69 per cent
Number of candidates whose grades were raised .....................................................................................
........................................................... ..........
19 40
(72 per cent and above but below 73 per cent— 68 per cent
Minutes of March 31, 1947) .....................................................................................
Number of candidates who passed ..........
................................................................................. 2
249 Number of candidates who passed
Number of candidates who failed ....................................................................
................................................................................... 409
228 Number of candidates who failed
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 ......................................................................
...................................................... 340
43 Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972
________________ ................................................
972
1 Designed as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Percentage of success .......................................... (per
Examiners vice Mr. Justice Roman Ozaeta, resigned. cent) .............................
566 54.59
Percentage of failure ..............................................
566 (per cent) ............................
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 45.41

17
Passing grade ........................................................ Passing grade
(per cent) ............................. .....................................................................................
69 . (per cent) .......
(By resolution of the Court). 70
NOTE.—In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 (By resolution of the Court).
per cent and 68.1 per cent respectively, the Court August, 1949
found out that they were not benefited at all by the Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman,
bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law. Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty.
August, 1948 Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe
Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Number of candidates
Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus .....................................................................................
G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce ............
Enrile, Members. 1,218
Number of candidates Number of candidates whose grades were raised
..................................................................................... (74's) .................................................
.. 55
899 Number of candidates who passed
Number of candidates whose grades were raised ...............................................................................
.............................................. 686
64 Number of candidates who failed
71's ................................................................................
..................................................................................... 532
..................... Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
29 ....................................................
70's 164
..................................................................................... Percentage of success
...................... .......................................................... (per cent)
35 ......................
Number of candidates who passed 56.28
..................................................................... Percentage of failure
490 ............................................................. (per cent)
Number of candidates who failed ....................
....................................................................... 43.72
409 Passing grades
Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972 ........................................................................ (per
................................................. cent) ....................
11 74
Percentage of success ............................................ (By resolution of the Court).
(per cent) ............................. August, 1950
62.40 Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,1 Chairman,
567 Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty, Enrique Altavas,
Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty.
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
567 Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno,
In re: Cunanan, et al. Members.
Percentage of failure Number of candidates
........................................................................... (per .....................................................................................
cent) ...... ...............
37.60 1,316
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
..............................................................

18
38 Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo,
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique
recommendation and authority of the examiner in Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon.
Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado). Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, riz, Hon. Enrique
Number of candidates who passed V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
.................................................................................. Number of candidates
423 .....................................................................................
Number of candidates who failed ....................
.................................................................................... 2,068
894 Number of candidates whose grades were raised
_______________ (74's) ......................................................
112
1 In 1946 and 1947, the members of the Supreme Number of candidates who passed
Court were Hon. Manuel V. Moran, Chief Justice, Hon. .....................................................................................
Ricardo Parás, Hon. Felicisimo Feria, Hon. Guillermo .
F. Pablo, Hon. Gregorio Perfecto, Hon. Carlos Hilado, 1,189
Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Hon. Manuel C. Briones, Hon. Number of candidates who failed
Jose Hontiveros, Hon. Sabino Padilla, and Hon. Pedro .....................................................................................
Tuason, Associate Justices. In 1948, Justices ...
Marcelino R. Montemayor and Alex. Reyes took the 879
place of Justice Hilado, resigned, and Hontiveros, Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
retired. Justice Roman Ozaeta was returned to the ...........................................................
Court and Justice Sabino Padilla was appointed 196
Secretary of Justice. In June, 1949, Justice Padilla was Percentage of success
returned to the Tribunal, as Justice Briones resigned. .....................................................................................
In October, 1950, Justices Fernando Jugo and Felix ..(per cent)....
Bautista Angelo were appointed to the Court, as 57.49
Justice Perfecto had died, and Justice Ozaeta had Percentage of failure
resigned. In 1951, Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran .....................................................................................
resigned and Justice Ricardo Parás was appointed ....(per cent)....
Chief Justice. In 1953, Justice Felicisimo R. Feria 42.51
retired. Passing grade
568 .....................................................................................
...............(per cent)....
568 75
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED August, 1952
In re: Cunanan, et al. Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman,
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
................................................................ Atty. . Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty.
26 Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe
Percentage of success Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
..................................................................................... Number of candidates
........(per cent).... .....................................................................................
32.14 ..................
Percentage of failure 2,738
..................................................................................... Number of candidates whose grades were raised
..........(per cent).... (74's) ....................................................
67.86 163
Passing grade Number of candidates who passed
..................................................................................... ....................................................................................
.....................(per cent).... 1,705
75
August, 1951

19
Number of candidates who failed Percentage of failure
..................................................................................... .....................................................................................
. .......... (per cent)....
1,033 38.96
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 Passing grade
......................................................... .....................................................................................
426 ..................... (per cent)....
Percentage of success 75
..................................................................................... A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under
(per cent).... Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which
62.27 they took the bar examinations, with annotations as
Percentage of failure to who had presented motions for reconsideration
..................................................................................... which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere
..(per cent).... motions for reconsidration without invoking said law,
37.73 which are still pending, follows:
Passing grade PETITIONERS UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
.....................................................................................
.............(per cent)....
75 Civ.
August, 1953 Land
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Merc.
Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty, Enrique Altavas, Atty. Int.
Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. Pol.
de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Crim.
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members. Rem.
Number of candidates Leg.
..................................................................................... Gen. Ave.
.................... MRD-
2,555 1.
Number of candidates whose grades were raised Agunod, Filemon L. ...........
(74's) ...................................................... 66
100 71
Number of candidates who passed 61
..................................................................................... 76
1,570 80
Number of candidates who failed 83
..................................................................................... 73
.. 75
986 71.4
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 MRD-
.......................................................... 2.
284 Cunanan Albino ..............
569 76
72
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 74
569 75
In re: Cunanan, et al. 70
Percentage of success 70
..................................................................................... 65
....... (per cent).... 72
61.04 71.45

3.

20
Mejia, Flaviano V. .............. 78
64 68
64 65
65 50
68 69.65
83
74
68 1949
80
69.85

1948

7.
Abaya, Jesus A. ...............
69
79
MRD- 75
4. 75
Orlina, Soledad R. ............ 71
71 89
68 55
66 75
75 70.8
63 MRD-
75 8.
70 Advincula, David D. .........
88 76
69.9 80
MRD- 62
5. 86
Vivero, Antonio Lu. ......... 81
75 72
73 60
73 65
65 70.5
63
66 9.
65 Agraviador, Alfredo L. .....
80 63
69.95 85
MRD- 70
6. 77
Gatchalian, Salud ............. 80
72 81
66 65
71 80
75 71.8

21
 69
10. 80
Alacar, Pascual C. ........... 81
61 83
63 55
83 85
79 72.65
71
85 15.
65 Baldivino, Jose B. ............
80 75
72.05 65
72
11. 82
Amog, Pedro M. ............. 82
75 69
66 60
76 80
78 71.95
81
74 16.
55 Balintona, Bernardo .........
85 75
72.2 80
64
12. 78
Apolinario, Miguel S. ....... 74
75 67
84 65
78 70
78 70
70
70 17.
60 Banawa, Angel L. ............
75 78
71.95 70
70
13. 75
Aquino, Maximo G. ......... 81
82 83
77 60
71 60
77 72.3
76
77 18.
60 Bandala, Anacleto A. .......
75 66
73.15 80
66
14. 71
Asinas, Candido D. .......... 93
75 72
83 55

22
70 75
69.6 72
75
19. 82
Bandon, Alawadin L. ....... 76
74 77
79 65
69 75
77 73.55
91
73 24.
60 Canon, Guillermo ............
80 77
73.35 86
67
20. 88
Baquero, Benjamin .......... 75
76 69
79 70
64 85
77 73.9
85
72 25.
65 Carlos, Estela S. .............
75 75
72.5 81
81
21. 79
Blanco, Jose .................... 72
75 73
75 65
70 70
75 73.8
77
76 26.
60 Cerezo, Gregorio O. ........
90 69
72.5 76
76
22. 79
Buenaluz, Victoriano T. ..... 71
75 80
71 55
72 80
78 70.4
67
82 27.
60 Clarin, Manuel L. .............
75 75
70.85 82
76
23. 81
Canda, Benjamin S. .......... 73

23
69 Leg.
70 Gen. Ave.
75
73.95 31.
Corona, Olvido D ...........
28. 68
Claudio Conrado O. ........ 76
76 73
62 81
78 81
77 72
73 60
72 75
60 71.15
70
71.4 32.
Dizon, Marcial C. ............
29. 76
Condevillamar, Antonio V. ... 86
68 69
65 83
74 75
80 74
85 65
75 80
60 73.1
75
71.65 33.
MRD- Enriquez, Agustin P. .........
30. 75
Cornejo, Crisanto R. ........ 77
72 70
75 81
69 81
82 77
83 65
79 80
65 73.75
80
73.4 34.
570 Espiritu, Irineo E. .............
80
570 88
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 69
In re: Cunanan, et al. 75
76
Civ. 77
Land 65
Merc. 75
Int. 73.8
Pol.
Crim. 35.
Rem. Fernandez, Macario J. ......

24
63 82
82 65
76 75
75 71.85
81
84 40.
65 Garcia, Pedro V. .............
75 76
72.95 82
73
36. 81
Gallardo, Amando C. ....... 74
78 83
79 60
67 85
77 73.6
76
75 41.
60 Garcia, Santiago C. ..........
65 62
70.95 91
79
37. 75
Garcia, Freidrich M. ......... 72
76 75
80 65
66 80
75 71.8
72
70 42.
60 Genoves, Pedro ...............
75 75
69.7 83
70
38. 78
Garcia, Julian L. …........... 87
64 76
77 55
68 80
82 72.7
89
77 43.
65 Gonzales, Amado P. ........
75 75
72.15 71
71
39. 75
Garcia, Leon Mo. ............ 86
77 75
86 60
71 75
80 72.65
60

25
44. 77
Guia, Odon R. de ............ 74
77 64
76 55
66 85
81 70.65
74
76 49.
60 Juares, Nicolas .................
75 77
70.9 84
56
45. 76
Fernandez, Simeon .......... 73
62 82
68 60
71 85
80 70
74
90 50.
65 Kalalang, Remigio ...........
75 65
70.85 75
74
46. 80
Jakosalem, Filoteo ........... 70
82 70
83 65
73 85
82 70.3
61
87 51.
65 Layumas, Vicente L. ........
70 67
73.6 84
65
47. 75
Jesus, Felipe D. de ........... 89
75 66
83 60
67 80
79 70.3
78
85 52.
60 Leyson, Amancio F. ........
75 69
72.45 83
75
48. 76
Jocom, Jacobo M. ........... 81
77 75
77 65
74 75

26
73.15 81
75
53. 72
Libanan, Marcelino .......... 79
71 81
83 55
61 80
77 71
80
81 58.
65 Lopez, Eliezar M. ............
85 77
71.75 75
60
54. 75
Lim, Jose E. .................... 77
77 85
77 60
72 75
76 70.7
72
64 59.
65 Lopez, Nicanor S. ...........
70 72
71.15 71
70
55. 78
Lim, Jose F. .................... 77
70 84
75 60
62 75
83 71.55
80
71 60.
65 Manoleto, Proceso D. ......
80 72
70.4 70
65
56. 78
Linao, Mariano M. .…...... 81
66 90
84 60
76 80
78 71.95
80
75 61.
60 Mancao, Alfredo P. .........
75 67
71.75 64
71
57. 83
Lopez, Angelo P. ............. 76
67 76

27
65 1949
80
70.95

62.
Manera, Mariano A. .........
75
78
75
75
68
79 66.
60 Orosco, Casimiro P. ........
65 72
71 84
69
63. 81
Mercado, Arsenio N. ....... 70
67 82
64 65
71 75
83 71.9
76
76 67.
65 Padua, Manuel C. ............
80 76
70.95 76
68
64. 80
Miranda, Benjamin G. ....... 79
76 79
81 50
67 75
82 70.1
74
77 68.
65 Palang, Basilio S. .............
80 71
72.55 75
82
65. 71
Manad, Andres B. …....... 55
77 87
75 55
68 75
82 69.6
69
72 69.
65 Palma, Cuadrato ..............
75 62
71.15 75
69
93

28
80
79 74.
55 Pido, Serafin C. ................
80 72
69.5 78
63
70. 80
Pañganiban, Jose V. ......... 71
67 85
83 70
61 80
81 72.05
91
74 75.
60 Pimentel, Luis P. ...............
75 77
70.6 75
76
71. 81
Pareja, Felipe .................. 76
66 68
71 55
75 80
81 71.6
67
74 76.
60 Plantilla, Rodrigo C. ..........
70 72
68.75 78
68
72. 89
Patalinjug jug, Eriberto ...... 79
73 81
77 65
78 85
73 73.55
78
71 77.
55 Regalario, Benito B. ..........
75 72
71.25 80
64
73. 80
Paulin, Jose C. .................. 75
66 81
69 55
71 80
77 69.55
83
82 78.
65 Robis, Casto P. ................
75 62
72.1 77

29
74 Pol.
73 Crim.
68 Rem.
80 Leg.
70 Gen. Ave.
80
70.9 82.
Saez, Porfirio D. ..............
79. 75
Rodil, Francisco C. .......... 75
68 72
69 81
70 69
81 77
76 60
75 75
65 71
75
70.75 83.
Saliguma, Crisogono D. ....
80. 79
Rodriguez, Mariano I. ...... 79
80 74
75 78
69 69
80 65
72 65
80 70
65 71.8
80
73.35 84.
Samano, Fortunato A. .....
81. 75
Romero, Crispulo P. ........ 84
78 72
75 77
66 70
77 82
76 60
83 75
65 71.9
75
72.85 85.
571 Santos, Faustina C. .........
71
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 68
571 68
In re: Cunanan, et al. 76
75
Civ. 85
Land 55
Merc. 75
Int. 69.5

30
 63
86. 75
Santos, Josefina R. .......... 82
68 62
69 65
76 63
71 69.65
77
82 91.
65 Torre, Valentin S. de la ...
75 85
72.3 81
71
87. 76
Seludo Ananias G. .......... 69
75 65
80 55
69 70
79 70.4
77
82 92.
65 Torres, Ariston L. ...........
75 78
73.25 71
72
88. 81
Semilia Rafael I. .............. 61
68 84
85 55
55 85
83 70.4
89
79 93.
65 Veyra, Zosimo C. de ......
80 70
71.25 75
71
89. 79
Telan Gaudencio ............. 65
77 80
79 65
70 80
75 70.65
70
75 94.
60 Viado, Jose ..…..............
75 67
70.85 70
74
90. 75
Tesorero, Leocadio T. .... 75
75 90
71 55

31
80 70
70.7 71
78
95. 81
Villacarlos, Delfin A. ....... 76
73 72
87 64
71 96
82 73.4
69
70 99.
75 Española, Pablo S. ..........
85 71
73.85 78
55
96. 76
Villamil, Leonor S. .......... 85
73 69
81 65
76 93
86 70.2
86
73 100.
55 Foronda, Clarencio J. ......
85 60
73.6 78
68
97. 79
Zabala, Amando A. ........ 84
76 88
70 62
67 93
75 71.9
76
76 101.
60 Hechanova, Vicente …....
75 59
70.6 76
75
75
1950 69
68
75
96
71.3
MRD-
102.
Peñalosa, Osias R. ..........
80
78
MRD- 61
98. 76
Cruz, Filomeno de la ....... 61

32
77 106.
66 Abasolo, Romulo ............
85 77
70.2 70
64
103. 65
Sarmiento, Floro A. ........ 76
65 70
86 76
63 64
82 71.7
89
72 107.
60 Adeva, Daniel G. ............
72 75
70.15 59
MRD- 74
104. 65
Torre, Catalino P. ........... 69
75 51
85 78
68 67
78 70.4
69
67 108.
65 Aguilar, Vicente Z. ..........
69 73
70.25 63
68
105. 75
Ungson, Fernando S. ...... 70
61 69
87 75
75 75
70 71.25
57
85 109.
83 Amodia, Juan T. ….........
82 75
72.8 76
66
75
1951 76
60
77
76
72.35
MRD-
110.
Añosa, Pablo S. .............
76
78
63

33
75 71.8
74 MRD-
61 115.
75 Balacuit, Camilo N. .........
79 75
71.6 73
75
111. 70
Antiola, Anastacio R. ..... 72
68 65
76 75
75 76
70 73.25
71
70 116.
81 Barinaga, Jeremias L. …..
66 68
73.05 69
73
112. 70
Aquino, S. Rey A. …....... 74
70 60
71 80
71 79
60 71.2
74 MRD-
62 117.
76 Barrientos, Ambrosio D. ..
77 76
71.1 60
67
113. 55
Atienza, Manuel G. .......... 74
71 63
78 77
68 62
80 70.25
86 MRD-
51 118.
82 Benitez, Tomas P. …........
75 67
73.85 75
75
114. 60
Avanceña, Alfonso .......... 73
71 72
71 75
65 78
75 72.2
70
72 119.
78 Biason, Sixto F. …...........
80 73

34
82 70
67 79
65 72.4
66
72 124.
77 Cacacho, Emilio V. ….....
68
71.25
MRD-
120.
Briñas, Isagani, A. ...........
71
69
74
70
76
52 125.
79 Calilung, Soledad C. .......
72 64
71.95 73
73
121. 80
Buela, Arcadio P. ............ 73
72 57
77 75
61 59
70 6.65
71 MRD-
58 126.
79 Calimlim, Jose B. ............
71 64
69.75 73
73
122. 80
Cabilao, Leonardo S. ...... 73
73 57
50 75
75 59
75 69.65
75
60 127.
71 Calimlim, Pedro B. .........
79 66
71.25 82
69
123. 60
Cabrera, Ireneo M. …..... 69
75 52
66 83
70 75
65 70
72
81 128.

35
Camello, Sotero H. ........ Land
70 Merc.
77 Int.
63 Pol.
65 Crim.
75 Rem.
66 Leg.
84 Gen. Ave
64 MRD-
71.55 132.
Castro, Jesus B. ...................
129. 72
Campos, Juan A. ........... 86
71 72
88 75
70 65
75 75
64 76
69 71
71 72.85
62
70.15 133.
Casuga, Bienvenido B. .........
130. 75
Castillo, Antonio del ........ 72
78 72
78 70
70 69
60 61
79 75
67 60
69 70.95
76
72.65 134.
MRD- Cabangbang, Santiago B. .....
131. 77
Castillo, Dominador Ad. ... 67
75 61
61 80
72 73
75 59
74 83
71 76
67 72.2
66
71.1 135.
572 Cruz, Federico S. ................
69
572 74
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 75
In re: Cunanan, et al. 75
68
Civ. 65

36
76 Farol, Evencia C. ................
70 80
71.65 78
66
136. 75
Dacanay, Eufemio P. ........... 81
70 72
73 62
62 73
75 72.25
72
69 141.
85 Felix, Conrado S. ...............
71 71
72.05 71
75
137. 65
Deysolong, Felisberto .......... 70
66 58
62 75
72 69
75 70.75
70
62 142.
83 Fernan, Pablo L. ................
62 67
70.85 88
MRD- 66
138. 85
Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. .......... 73
78 68
79 78
63 75
75 72.35
73
75 143.
81 Gandioco, Salvador G. ......
59 64
73.5 58
66
139. 65
Espinosa, Domingo L. ......... 76
78 70
63 89
58 75
70 72.1
70
67 144.
87 Gastardo, Crispin B. ..........
63 70
71.6 69
MRD- 68
140. 75

37
78
66 149.
86 Ibarra, Venancio M. .............
72 60
73.9 75
74
145. 70
Genson, Angelo B. ............... 74
75 70
57 80
73 75
65 71.9
67
54 150.
78 Imperial, Monico L. ..........
56 72
69.55 78
75
146. 75
Guiani, Guinaid M. ............... 72
68 56
60 82
75 77
65 73.7
74 MRD-
67 151.
75 Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. ........
77 71
71.5 70
63
147. 85
Guina, Graciano P. ............... 71
66 60
69 85
67 53
60 70.85
78
52 152.
83 Inandan, Fortunato C. ...........
61 77
69.6 77
MRD- 67
148. 53
Homeres, Praxedes P. .......... 73
74 75
74 79
75 57
75 72.5
71
69 153.
75 Jimenez, Florencio C. ........
71 75
73.35 70

38
70 75
75 71.75
72
61 158.
75 Leon, Marcelo D. de ...........
78 63
72.05 73
60
154. 85
Kintanar. Woodrow M. ........ 75
70 75
83 90
72 70
65 72.75
76
73 159.
75 Llanto, Priscilla ....................
69 72
72.95 68
60
155. 65
Languido, Cesar V. .............. 76
63 67
71 84
63 68
85 71.35
70
61 160.
85 Machachor, Oscar ..............
79 68
70.55 59
78
156. 70
Lavilles, Cesar L. ................. 67
61 57
89 75
75 75
55 70.15
73 MRD-
63 161.
75 Magsino, Encarnacion .........
78 77
70.55 66
70
157. 70
Llenos, Francisco U. ............ 76
64 71
70 75
65 61
60 72.75
72 MRD-
65 162.
92 Maligaya, Demetrio M. .......

39
70 63
61 84
75 62
65 70.1
75 MRD-
50 167.
91 Monterroyo, Catalina S. .....
51 70
72.3 80
75
163. 80
Manio, Gregorio ................. 76
67 66
67 82
69 51
80 73.95
71 MRD-
67 168.
75 Montero, Leodegario C. ....
75 73
70.65 67
66
164. 80
Puzon, Eduardo S. .............. 81
72 65
82 81
60 75
60 73.75
69
70 169.
68 Monzon, Candido T. .........
72 70
68.05 72
MRD- 74
165. 75
Marcial, Meynardo R. ......... 67
66 70
75 77
74 69
70 72.05
75
67 170.
81 Natividad, Alberto M. .......
75 73
73.15 79
68
166. 65
Martin, Benjamin S. ............ 73
68 69
72 75
63 79
75 72.2
69 MRD-

40
171. 80
Navallo, Capistrano C. ...... 72
70 63
72 82
68 69
85 7.95
81
66 176.
71 Pogado, Causin O. ..........
74 70
72.1 66
65
172. 70
Nisce, Camilo Z. ............... 75
66 64
66 75
75 70
65 69.95
79
68 177.
85 Ramos-Balmori, Manuela
62 75
73.5 73
62
173. 65
Ocampo, Antonio F. de .... 78
75 59
81 75
76 66
65 70.2
74
67 178.
75 Recinto, Ireneo I. ............
69 73
73.75 76
68
174. 75
Olaviar, Jose O. ............... 74
72 68
70 80
69 53
55 72.3
66 MRD-
70 179.
77 Redor, Francisco K. .......
75 62
70.5 77
MRD- 73
175. 75
Perez, Cesario Z. ............. 69
75 64
76 76
66 69

41
70 91
MRD- 65
180. 75
Regis, Deogracias A. ...... 68
76 68
74 79
68 62
65 72.2
65 573
65
88 VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
75 573
73.35 In re: Cunanan, et al.

181. Civ.
Rigor, Estelita C. ............ Land
67 Merc.
78 Int.
61 Pol.
80 Crim.
71 Rem.
77 Leg.
79 Gen. Ave.
65
70.9 185.
MRD- Saavedra, Felipe .............
182. 73
Rimorin-Gordo, Estela .. 80
70 63
72 75
62 76
60 73
88 68
66 62
67 70.35
79
70.15 186.
Salazar. Alfredo N. .........
183. 66
Rosario, Prisco del ........ 72
70 73
64 75
70 67
70 68
72 77
73 69
85 70.85
57
72.65 187.
Salem, Romulo R. ............
184. 77
Rosario, Vicente D. del . 81
75 72

42
65 73.1
73
60 192.
76 Suico. Samuel .................
75 73
73 79
72
188. 75
Foz, Julita A. ................... 71
75 59
72 84
75 65
75 73.3
65
70 193.
76 Suson, Teodorico ...........
64 74
72.5 68
66
189. 80
Santa Ana, Candido T. .... 66
77 59
69 79
65 67
75 70.35
81
75 194.
70 Tado, Florentino P. ........
75 64
73 76
67
190. 65
Santos, Aquilino .............. 76
72 72
66 76
69 53
65 69.7
63
70 195.
81 Tapayan. Domingo A. ......
71 69
71.7 72
69
191. 70
Santos, Valeriano V. ....... 76
76 73
72 82
75 79
75 73.75
68 MRD-
62 196.
76 Tiausas, Miguel V. ...........
79 67

43
60 65
71 75
75 70.2
79
67 201.
84 Villagonzalo, Job R. ........
60 78
72.7 67
74
197. 65
Torres, Carlos P. ............. 72
68 51
71 69
71 71
70 70.25
70
63 202.
82 Villarama, Jr., Pedro .......
71 75
71.6 74
75
198. 55
Tria, Hipolito ................... 75
69 66
72 67
75 75
60 71.45
69
54
78 1952
66
70.05

199.
Velasco, Avelino A .........
65
72
75
75
71
67 203.
78 Abacon, Pablo .................
76 75
72.1 72
78
200. 81
Villa. Francisco C. .......... 78
65 72
80 64
73 55
75 72.7
68 MHP-
79 204.

44
Abad, Agapito ................. 68
73 59
76 60
73 60
85 71.2
75
63 209.
62 Alano, Fabian T. .............
75 70
70.95 83
MllP- 61
205. 83
Abella, Ludovico B. ......... 72
70 87
81 72
76 70
81 71.9
70 MRP-
66 210.
77 Alcantara, Pablo V. ........
58 71
72.7 79
MRP- 80
206. 81
Abellera, Geronimo F. ..... 73
75 70
79 72
79 62
87 73.65
76
51 211.
63 Arcangel, Agustin Ag. .....
70 75
71.7 85
MRP- 71
207. 73
Abenojar, Agapito N. ...... 76
71 65
72 68
78 65
84 71.85
70
75 212.
69 Acosta, Dionisio N. ........
70 75
72.9 81
78
208. 87
Alandy, Doroteo R. ......... 56
64 65
83 77
93 70
91 72.8

45
MUP- 66
213. 87
Abinguna, Agapito C. ..... 63
66 77
85 75
80 77
84 73.
75 MKP-
58 218.
76 Almeda, Serafin V. .........
75 72
73.65 72
75
214. 81
Adove. Nehemias C. ...... 61
76 67
86 73
78 65
77 70.75
66
78 219.
69 Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad ...
62 73
73.55 71
72
215. 91
Adrias, Inocencio C. ...... 75
75 67
83 65
61 53
88 70.7
76 MRP-
67 220.
79 Amodia, Juan T. ...............
75 75
73.4 79
68
216. 85
Aglugub, Andres R. ....... 62
75 64
83 75
73 78
88 71.4
72 MRP-
62 221.
72 Antonio, Felino A. ............
62 71
72.65 76
81
217. 83
Andrada, Mariano L. ..... 79
76 52
85 72

46
70 75
73.3 78
MRP- 70
222. 81
Antonio, Jose S. ............... 73
75 70
92 67
90 78
68 72.2
65 MRP-
64 227.
68 Azucena, Ceferino D. ......
60 72
73.75 67
78
223. 89
Añonuevo, Ramos B. ....... 72
71 67
87 77
78 65
81 73.95
64
63 228.
74 Atienza, Ricardo .............
76 72
72.7 87
70
224. 79
Aquino, S. Rey A. ........... 66
67 55
77 75
57 75
78 70.85
69
70 229.
69 Balacuit, Camilo N. ........
80 75
67.7 78
89
225. 75
Arteche, Filomeno D. ...... 70
78 54
83 66
50 75
89 7.3
76 MRP-
77 230.
70 Baclig, Cayetano S. ........
70 77
70.8 84
MRP- 83
226. 80
Arribas, Isaac M. ............ 69

47
70 235.
61 Batucan, Jose M. .............
65 66
73 76
78
231. 88
Balcita. Oscar C. ............ 62
75 76
77 67
79 78
90 71.2
64 574
60
67 574
50 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
70.65 In re: Cunanan, et al.

232. Civ.
Barilea, Dominador Z. .... Land
71 Merc.
67 Int.
82 Pol.
77 Crim.
64 Rem.
61 Leg.
65 Gen. Ave.
80
70.5 236.
MRP- Bautista, Atilano C. ..........
233. 70
Banta, Jose Y. ............... 82
75 84
80 85
77 58
81 61
75 71
63 62
71 71.25
75
73.95 237.
MRP- Bautista, Celso J. .............
234. 71
Barrientos, Ambrosio D. ... 68
76 63
70 87
67 80
80 67
67 80
65 70
70 72.75
81
70.7 238.
Belderon, Jose .................

48
76 63
81 68
76 62
92 72.85
70 MRP-
66 243.
67 Beriña, Roger C. ..............
62 70
72.65 80
MRP- 79
239. 79
Belo, Victor B. ................ 68
76 72
77 64
64 78
73 71.85
75 MRP-
71 244.
76 Bihis, Marcelo M. ............
76 75
72.85 86
MRP- 65
240. 92
Bejec, Conceso D. .......... 64
79 64
80 84
73 75
82 73.45
63 MRP-
77 245.
75 Binaoro, Vicente M. ........
50 73
73.15 69
MRP- 78
241. 83
Beltran, Gervasio M. ....... 73
72 59
75 70
81 82
73 72.75
75 MRP-
57 246.
75 Bobila, Rosalio B. ...........
80 76
73.95 86
MRP- 76
242. 83
Benaojan, Robustiano O. .. 68
74 59
84 71
77 78
84 73.05
75

49
247. 89
Buenafe, Avelina R. ........ 58
78 70
80 67
75 51
75 70.5
70 MRP-
55 252.
72 Cabrera, Irineo M. ..........
80 79
72.75 88
53
248. 91
Bueno, Anastacio F. ....... 71
73 85
78 75
71 76
78 73.3
71
67 253.
71 Cabreros, Paulino N. ......
60 71
71.15 79
83
249. 84
Borres, Maximino L. ...... 60
67 62
85 71
62 50
91 70.85
72
63 254.
76 Calayag, Florentino R. ......
80 69
70.9 79
MRP- 66
250. 88
Cabegin, Cesar V. ......... 69
72 75
71 68
76 76
75 70.6
74 MRP-
70 255.
71 Calzada, Cesar de la ........
60 76
72.2 72
MRP- 80
251. 67
Cabello, Melecio F. ......... 62
72 71
78 66
78 62

50
70.85 80
71
256. 89
Canabal, Isabel ................ 70
70 55
82 72
81 75
77 71
78
51 261.
75 Capacio, Jr., Conrado .....
75 67
73.7 78
MRP- 71
257. 90
Cabugao, Pablo N. .......... 65
70 75
87 72
69 60
80 70.65
58
64 262.
78 Capitulo, Alejandro P. ......
75 75
71.8 70
53
258. 87
Calañgi, Mateo C. ........... 78
73 63
93 76
71 91
87 71.2
70 MRP-
66 263.
69 Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo .......
62 75
71.8 93
81
259. 76
Canda, Benjamin S. ......... 64
72 75
71 68
77 56
90 73.15
62 MRP-
75 264.
66 Caluya; Arsenio V. ...........
82 75
71.95 86
70
260. 87
Cantoria, Eulogio ............ 77
71 52

51
77 Castro, Daniel T. ..............
82 65
73.9 75
MRP- 77
265. 76
Campanilla, Mariano B. ..... 85
80 60
75 75
78 69
77 78.15
73
71 270.
63 Cauntay, Gaudencio V. .....
76 70
73.65 78
MRP- 72
266. 73
Campos, Juan A. .............. 77
66 69
85 64
83 80
84 71.2
67
61 271.
80 Castro, Pedro L. de ..........
57 70
78.25 68
69
267. 87
Cardoso, Angelita G. ........ 76
78 75
71 72
73 70
76 78.35
79
56 272.
69 Cerio, Juan A. ..................
60 75
71.8 82
75
268. 86
Cartagena, Herminio R. ..... 60
71 54
72 76
65 75
89 71.75
64
73 273.
80 Colorado, Alfonso R. .......
70 68
71.65 75
MRP- 80
269. 74

52
77
66 278.
67 Crisostomo, Jesus L. .........
80 76
72.6 87
74
274. 76
Chavez, Doroteo M. ........ 62
73 55
65 76
79 66
84 71.45
73 MRP-
69 279.
66 Cornejo, Crisanto R. .........
84 68
78.1 87
78
275. 86
Chavez, Honorato A. ....... 79
77 50
76 80
79 60
86 73.7
74 MRP-
53 280.
71 Cruz, Raymundo ..............
75 75
78.65 81
MRP- 79
276. 85
Cobangbang, Orlando B. ... 72
69 57
81 68
74 75
82 72.95
76 MRP-
61 281.
78 Cunanan, Jose C. .............
80 78
78.85 92
63
277. 83
Cortez, Armando R. .......... 76
78 72
60 68
88 65
86 72.4
60
66 282.
69 Cunanan, Salvador F. .......
64 70
73.1 82

53
64 79
92 71.5
67
75 287.
73 Dacuma, Luis B. ...............
76 71
71.45 67
87
283. 83
Cimafranca, Agustin B. ...... 71
71 50
76 65
76 70
80 71.25
70 MRP-
71 288.
75 Degamo, Pedro R. ............
71 73
73.35 80
82
284. 74
Crisol, Getulio R. ............... 80
70 67
91 67
78 57
85 73.65
68 575
55
71 VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
50 575
70.8 In re: Cunanan, et al.
MRP-
285. Civ.
Dusi, Felicisimo R. ............. Land
76 Merc.
82 Int.
69 Pol.
82 Crim.
66 Rem.
62 Leg.
80 Gen. Ave.
71
72.82 289.
MRP- Delgado, Vicente N. .........
286. 70
Datu, Alfredo J. ................. 84
70 82
75 84
72 77
86 52
80 73
55 50
68 72.65

54
MRP- 63
290. 67
Diolazo, Ernesto A. .......... 64
75 60
83 70
86 72
73 68.35
54 MRP-
54 295.
75 Domingo, Dominador T. ...
75 70
72.25 69
81
291. 82
Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo ..... 68
73 63
84 71
64 75
89 72.2
71
78 296.
75 Ducusin, Agapito B. .........
66 70
72.8 78
MRP- 53
292. 88
Dichoso Alberto M. ......... 75
71 77
71 62
71 76
81 68.05
69 MRP-
75 297.
80 Duque, Antonio S. ...........
70 75
73.65 77
MRP- 78
293. 86
Dipasupil, Claudio R. ....... 76
70 72
76 64
82 75
73 73.9
79
70 298.
72 Duque, Castulo ................
56 75
73.9 80
MRP- 73
294. 83
Delgado, Abner ............... 66
75 67
84 65

55
66 75
70.65 86
73
299. 81
Ebbah, Percival B. ........... 63
70 77
80 69
85 75
76 72.65
66
63 304.
76 Encarnacion, Cesar ...........
75 65
73.95 78
58
300. 68
Edisa, Sulpicio ................. 66
65 64
77 75
75 78
89 67.1
75
62 305.
75 Estoista, Agustin A. ...........
65 78
72 76
74
301. 86
Edradan, Rosa C. ............ 58
70 67
75 70
84 76
84 71.7
71 MRP-
59 306.
69 Fabros, Jose B. ................
86 66
73.4 75
MRP- 80
302. 82
Enage, Jacinto N. ............ 80
66 71
70 67
88 70
93 73.05
72 MRP-
67 307.
65 Fajardo, Balbino P. ..........
75 77
73.2 69
MRP- 82
303. 83
Encarnacion, Alfonso B. .... 65

56
60 312.
75 Favila, Hilario B. ...............
75 71
73.9 84
74
308. 70
Fajardo, Genaro P. .......... 75
70 67
79 73
77 59
79 72.2
79 MRP-
50 313.
73 Feliciano, Alberto I. ..........
75 71
72.5 69
70
309. 85
Evangelista, Felicidad P. .... 69
75 81
75 72
72 70
87 72.25
63 MRP-
63 314.
77 Fernando, Lope F. ...........
70 73
72.15 77
86
310. 79
Familara, Raymundo Z. ..... 70
68 76
75 64
87 50
83 73
64 MRP-
65 315.
68 Flores, Dionisio S. ............
65 78
71.8.5 72
77
311. 83
Fariñas, Dionisio ............... 67
70 60
78 68
89 73
66 72.05
65 MRP-
75 316.
70 Fortich, Benjamin B. .........
50 70
72.75 82
70

57
70 73.75
78
65 321.
64 Galang, Victor N. ..............
75 69
70.35 83
MRP- 84
317. 76
Fuente, Jose S. de la ......... 70
76 57
88 71
72 60
74 71.95
60
71 322.
79 Gaerlan, Manuel L. ...........
79 73
73.55 87
77
318. 90
Fohmantes, Nazario S. ...... 67
72 61
79 72
71 75
77 73.15
68
61 323.
76 Galem, Nestor R. .............
60 72
70.9 79
MRP- 86
319. 78
Fuggan, Lorenzo B. ........... 60
76 61
81 75
74 70
69 73.05
71
71 324.
73 Gallardo, Jose Pe B. ........
60 75
72.85 88
75
320. 75
Gabuya, Jesus S. ............... 63
70 70
83 70
82 65
83 71.85
70 MRP-
63 325.
75 Gallos, Cirilo B. ...............
65 70

58
78 75
84 68
91 70.95
80
51 330.
65 Gannod, Jose A. ..............
70 69
72.85 80
75
326. 81
Galindo, Eulalio D. ........... 68
70 62
89 73
87 68
65 71.25
78 MRP-
71 331.
62 Garcia, Matias N. ............
62 67
73.4 78
74
327. 90
Galman, Patrocinio G. ...... 79
72 59
72 76
80 65
85 72.8
71 MRP-
56 332.
70 Ganete, Carmelo .............
53 75
71.15 87
77
328. 82
Gamalinda, Carlos S. ....... 74
76 57
79 68
81 81
86 73.3
67
63 333.
69 Gilbang, Gaudioso R. .......
55 75
72.55 67
80
329. 82
Gamboa, Antonio G. ....... 67
71 57
67 64
70 70
72 7.5
76
60 334.

59
Gofredo, Claro C. ........... 77
68 59
78 69
72 65
86 73.3
78
52 339.
70 Grageda, Jose M. A. ........
76 70
70.9 85
72
335. 67
Gomez Jose S. ................ 70
71 60
76 73
71 73
81 70.75
76
63 340.
69 Guzman, Juan de ..............
62 75
70.85 86
MRP- 69
336. 84
Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. ...... 64
68 79
93 75
85 76
78 73.6
64 MRP-
69 341.
70 Guzman, Mateo de ...........
54 76
72.35 79
MRP- 79
337. 73
Gonzales, Rafael C. .......... 72
77 69
75 68
71 80
89 73.9
55 576
70
70 576
60 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
70.05 In re: Cunanan, et al.
MRP-
338. Civ.
Gracia, Eulalia L. de .......... Land
66 Merc.
68 Int.
90 Pol.
84 Crim.

60
Rem. Hernandez, Quintin B. .......
Leg. 67
Gen. Ave. 75
72
342. 81
Guzman, Salvador B. ....... 72
71 72
61 66
74 76
72 70.6
61
66
78 1952
75
70.75

343.
Guzman, Salvador T. de .....
75
84
64
81
74
61 347.
78 Homeres, Agustin R. .........
58 73
71.75 84
65
344. 86
Habelito, Geronimo E. ........ 70
71 77
76 63
71 76
87 70.7
73
60 348.
67 Ines, Leonilo F. .................
55 65
69.65 88
71
345. 88
Hedriana. Naterno G. ......... 77
75 73
68 61
84 70
76 70.55
66
58 349.
76 Jamer, Alipio S. ...............
60 68
72.9 75
83
346. 89

61
80 MRP-
61 354.
65 Javier, Aquilino M. ...........
50 75
72 84
MRP- 79
350. 78
Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. .... 77
75 61
65 66
68 66
85 73.05
76
70 355.
83 Jomuad, Francisco ...........
54 75
73.8 75
MRP- 72
351. 88
Jardinico, Jr., Emilio .......... 78
73 58
86 76
72 43
78 72.4
82 MRP-
67 356.
67 Jose, Nestor L. ................
64 78
72.8 61
MRP- 64
352. 73
Jaen, Justiniano F. ............ 68
76 76
75 64
78 80
84 69.7
71
66 357.
70 La O, Jose M. ................
77 75
73.85 71
75
353. 72
Jaring, Antonio S. ............. 70
72 67
77 81
79 59
70 73.5
72
57 358.
71 Leon, Brigido C. de .........
50 67
70.75 75

62
78 75
92 73.2
78
51 363.
72 Luna, Lucito ....................
80 70
72.55 75
69
359. 83
Leones, Constante B. ...... 59
68 53
81 74
79 75
84 68.4
73 MRP-
60 364.
77 Luz, Lauro L. ..................
60 76
73 90
78
360. 88
Liboro, Horacio T. .......... 64
72 58
69 75
80 77
87 73.95
73 MRP-
62 365.
70 Macasaet, Tomas S. .......
61 73
72.4 81
72
361. 83
Llanera, Cesar L. ............ 66
77 75
81 72
80 70
78 72.5
64
59 366.
75 Magbiray, Godofredo V. .
63 80
73 67
84
362. 76
Lomontod, Jose P. .......... 70
75 62
76 65
69 68
70 73.05
73
76 367.
74 Majarais, Rodolfo P. ......

63
70 71
62 65
64 70
82 72.1
88
75 372.
71 Maraña, Arsenio ...........
79 65
7.85 79
MRP- 60
368. 72
Makabenta, Eduardo ..... 73
75 51
90 75
77 86
83 67.9
59
71 373.
72 Marasigan, Napoleon . ....
78 75
73.3 71
MRP- 83
369. 75
Malapit, Justiniano S. ...... 69
74 62
83 69
74 70
89 7.75
58 MRP-
60 374.
72 Marco, Jaime P. ............
76 75
71.1 67
74
370. 76
Maloles, Iluminado M. .... 64
70 75
87 75
73 57
76 71.9
77 MRP-
50 375.
76 Martir, Osmundo P. ......
76 70
72.3 86
76
371. 78
Maniquis, Daniel R. ....... 72
75 71
80 75
73 53
91 72.95
69 MRP-

64
376. 86
Masancay, Amando E. .... 77
73 52
87 79
75 65
77 72.8
72
50 381.
78 Mison, Rafael M. Jr., ......
80 79
73.2 78
MRP- 73
377. 75
Mati-ong, Ignacio T. ....... 71
62 68
87 69
72 53
79 71.95
73 MRP-
76 382.
69 Monponbanua, Antonio D.
77 79
71.3 79
68
378. 88
Mara, Guillermo L. .......... 64
70 78
78 69
78 83
89 73.1
75 MRP-
67 383.
66 Montero, Leodegario C. ..
65 72
7.35 89
MRP- 69
379. 89
Mercado, Felipe A. ........ 70
73 68
77 70
82 75
82 72.15
78
52 384.
69 Morada, Servillano S. ......
85 75
73.9 76
MRP- 67
380. 71
Miculob, Eugenio P. ........ 65
70 66
82 75
73 76

65
70.9 64
64
385. 81
Mocorro, Generoso ......... 73
78 50
84 75
78 75
84 69.15
60 MRP-
73 390.
68 Nazareno, Romeo P. .......
70 67
73 70
MRP- 71
386. 76
Mosquera, Estanislao L. ... 76
75 79
78 75
75 57
85 72.05
72
55 391.
77 Nieto, Benedicto S. .........
66 69
73.15 79
77
387. 77
Motus, Rodentor P. ......... 72
80 62
78 76
70 76
94 72.9
72 MRP-
75 392.
70 Noguera, Raymundo .......
57 71
73.75 86
81
388. 80
Macario, Pedro R. ........... 73
70 56
67 72
74 70
86 73.15
78 577
63
72 VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
66 577
72.15 In re: Cunanan, et al.
MRP-
389. Civ.
Nadela, Geredion T. ........ Land
72 Merc.

66
Int. 60.7
Pol.
Crim. 397.
Rem. Oliveros, Amado A. ..........
Leg. 72
Gen. Ave. 75
MRP- 68
393. 72
Nodado, Domiciano R. .... 84
70 50
70 75
69 79
73 71.9
57
37 398.
64 Opiña, Jr., Pedro .............
72 76
63.6 77
74
394. 67
Nono, Pacifico G. ............ 73
67 66
77 68
78 70
67 71.85
75 MRP-
59 399.
71 Olaviar, Jose O. ..............
76 70
71.35 62
MRP- 85
395. 81
Nuval, Manuel R. ............. 74
78 50
72 68
67 79
90 71.8
72 MRP-
68 400.
78 Olandesca, Per O. ..........
67 70
73.65 91
76
396. 87
Ocampo, Augusto ............ 72
75 66
90 70
77 79
72 73.45
69
55 401.
65 Orden, Apolonio J. ..........
67 72

67
65 75
84 70
86 72.6
66
50 406.
72 Padlan, Crispin M. ...........
68 71
71.45 66
76
402. 79
Ortiz, Melencio T. ........... 68
71 67
75 74
78 66
81 71.65
66
67 407.
70 Padilla, Jose C. ...............
78 70
72.1 65
MRP- 67
403. 82
Pablo, Fedelino S. ........... 78
72 75
64 78
76 75
86 73.3
72
61 408.
76 Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. ..
75 71
72.95 88
78
404. 86
Pacifico, Vicente V. ......... 59
76 75
79 78
69 50
80 72.95
76 MRP-
52 409.
72 Palma, Bartolome ............
80 67
71.95 81
MRP- 80
405. 82
Paderna, Perfecto D. ........ 71
75 75
69 69
72 75
75 73.25
78 MRP-
58 410.

68
Papa, Angel A. ................ 68
75 63
72 77
85 83
85 71.65
77 MRP-
59 415.
63 Paulin, Jose O. ................
71 70
73.45 66
MRP- 80
411. 87
Parayno, Mario V. .......... 75
71 50
88 65
74 80
89 70.9
69 MRP-
66 416.
76 Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. ......
73 79
73.65 87
73
412. 83
Pariña, Santos L. ............. 69
70 71
87 68
85 65
77 73.2
64
67 417.
63 Peña, Jesus ......................
76 75
71.85 75
MRP- 75
413. 62
Pasion, Anastacio ............. 75
63 70
80 60
68 66
81 70.4
82
79 418.
76 Perez, Toribio R. .............
58 71
72.55 64
81
414. 92
Pastrana, Rizal R. ............. 69
69 58
76 67
71 70
76 71.25

69
 75
419. 87
Pestaño, Melquiades ........ 74
77 67
81 64
74 75
87 70.8
59
68 424.
76 Puzon, Eduardo S. ...........
75 72
73.2 80
MRP- 81
420. 69
Pido, Serafin C. .............. 72
77 53
81 67
72 70
82 71.05
69
71 425.
60 Quetulio, Josefina D. ........
75 75
71.15 90
60
421. 93
Pinlac, Filemon ................ 64
67 78
76 76
74 83
86 72.9
65 MRP-
79 426.
65 Quípanes, Melchor V. ......
72 69
70.55 88
79
422. 82
Poblete, Celso B. ............. 65
72 62
79 71
82 66
76 71.55
66 MRP-
64 427.
74 Quietson, Bayani R. .........
50 73
72.15 75
MRP- 76
423. 77
Piza Luz ......................... 70
68 81
70 71

70
53 78
72.85 84
76
428. 90
Racho, Macario D. .......... 48
68 75
75 80
81 65
82 73.45
78 MRP-
53 433.
66 Raro, Celso .....................
54 75
70.55 81
76
429. 67
Ramirez, Sabas P. ............ 75
71 77
80 55
73 77
87 71.4
62 MRP-
62 434.
75 Rayos Victor S. ...............
80 75
71.65 86
MRP- 79
430. 91
Raffiñan, Jose A. ............. 71
80 67
83 67
79 70
79 73.9
62
72 435.
68 Revilla, Mariano S. ...........
65 75
73.25 78
MRP- 81
431. 90
Ramos, Patricio S. ........... 70
75 54
87 69
76 81
75 73.35
72
72 436.
61 Reyes, Abdon L. .............
75 72
72.25 64
MRP- 81
432. 78
Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 76

71
73 441.
69 Rigonan, Cesar V. ............
53 71
72.85 85
65
437. 86
Reyes, Domingo B. .......... 75
72 70
87 76
78 70
83 72.7
72
75 442.
62 Rivera, Honorio ................
70 71
72.7 56
70
438. 90
Reyes, Francisco M. ........ 71
75 65
85 75
84 71
68 71.2
75 MRP-
71 443.
68 Rivero, Buenaventura A. ..
50 72
73.9 88
72
439. 94
Reyes, Lozano M. ............ 68
80 73
57 66
78 80
79 72.6
78 MRP-
65 444.
64 Robles, Enrique ...............
79 75
73.35 77
MRP- 75
440. 77
Reyes, Oscar R. .............. 82
75 64
75 69
82 70
82 73.7
76 578
64
68 578
60 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
73.65 In re: Cunanan, et al.

72
Civ. 65
Land 66
Merc. 63
Int. 72.1
Pol. MRP-
Crim. 449.
Rem. Sabelino, Conrado S. .......
Leg. 71
Gen. Ave. 81
69
445. 75
Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano 77
76 71
75 75
76 70
63 72.96
69
77 450.
65 San Juan, Damaso ............
78 77
72.25 86
72
446. 89
Roldan, Jose V. ................ 69
67 76
80 65
79 72
83 71.6
73
71 451.
75 Sañiel, Felix L. .................
70 72
73.9 93
76
447. 80
Rosario, Adelaida R. del ... 67
80 75
75 66
65 62
70 72.1
68
72 452.
80 Samaniego, Jesus B. .........
70 75
73.15 80
76
448. 72
Rosario, Restituto F. del .... 60
75 67
75 68
79 70
90 70.6
68 MRP-

73
453. 82
Sandoval, Emmanuel M. .... 73
75 76
83 66
70 70
83 73.7
77 MRP-
67 458.
77 Santos, Ruperto M. ..........
60 67
73.96 54
MRP- 69
454. 76
Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. ....... 63
71 64
75 71
81 60
90 66.75
62 MRP-
64 459.
76 Santos, Aquilino C. ..........
68 72
72.95 71
73
455. 79
Santiago, Jr., Cristobal ...... 73
75 79
76 71
84 85
93 73.8
63 MRP-
65 460.
69 Santos, Rufino A. .............
70 75
71.8 81
79
456. 85
Santillan, Juanito Ll. .......... 74
76 72
89 66
83 54
83 73.3
63
58 461.
65 Suanding, Bantas ..............
52 75
71.26 67
MRP- 67
457. 92
Santos, Rodolfo C. ........... 79
75 59
75 76
78 76

74
73.1 70
RTRP- 70
462. 72
Sulit. Feliz M. ................... 75
76 75
79 72
76 60
78 73.06
72
75 467.
68 Tabaque, Benjamin R. .......
67 69
73.5 68
77
463. 79
Songco, Felicisimo G. ....... 74
70 68
68 72
82 60
84 71.85
60 MRP-
69 468.
76 Tan Kiang, Clarita .............
65 81
73.36 79
72
464. 80
Soriano, Aniceto S. .......... 62
64 75
79 73
77 80
80 73.96
80 MRP-
53 469.
70 Tando, Amado T. ............
65 71
70.7 82
78
465. 83
Suarez, Pablo D. .............. 71
73 61
85 71
70 60
87 72
76
70 470.
64 Tasico, Severo E. .............
70 71
71.9 69
MRP- 75
466. 89
Sybico. Jesus L. ............... 70
79 75

75
67 Tobias, Artemio M. ..........
63 69
71.65 58
74
471. 81
Tiburcio, Ismael P. ........... 71
73 55
82 65
72 57
93 67.55
76 MRP-
57 476.
68 Trillana, Jr., Apolonio .......
54 76
71.16 86
MRP- 76
472. 86
Tiongson, Federico T. ...... 70
70 68
70 75
76 50
84 73.8
77 MRP-
75 177.
75 Trinidad, Manuel O. .........
60 66
73.46 91
MRP- 83
473. 75
Tolentino, Jesus C. ........... 63
75 66
89 67
63 65
84 70.8
85
73 478.
73 Trinidad, Pedro O. ...........
50 66
73.4 78
78
474. 85
Torrijas, Alfredo A. .......... 78
77 51
66 64
67 75
83 70.8
68 MRP-
75 479.
71 Udarbe, Flavio J. .............
63 80
71.3 82
MRP- 77
475. 82

76
67
66 484.
68 Varela, Dominador M. .....
75 67
72.6 75
81
480. 86
Umali, Osmundo C. ......... 72
68 57
75 81
81 70
80 73.85
71
69 485.
68 Vega, Macairog L. de ......
60 78
71.7 62
79
481. 87
Umayam, Juanito C. ........ 70
77 70
75 71
87 65
85 73.8
56 MRP-
56 486.
66 Velasco, Emmanuel D. .....
60 71
71 80
MRP- 74
482. 85
Usita, Gelacio U. ............. 60
73 66
72 76
75 76
74 71.85
73
76 487.
71 Velez, Maria E. ................
70 73
73.55 70
89
483. 80
Valin, Francisco M. ......... 56
72 50
81 72
80 67
84 71.05
62 MRP-
78 488.
71 Venal, Artemio V. ............
75 78
73.7 91

77
58 70
67 73.96
76
55 493.
75 Villar, Custodio R. ...........
73 73
73.65 69
70
489. 88
Venus, Conrado B. .......... 76
69 66
81 69
74 50
85 70.75
62 MRP-
66 494.
72 Villaseñor, Leonidas F. .....
77 80
77.05 85
MRP- 67
490. 77
Verzosa, Federico B. ....... 62
75 75
79 76
72 73
88 73.16
76
68 495.
74 Viterbo, Jose H. ...............
59 80
73.7 77
MRP- 65
491. 93
Villafuerte, Eduardo V. ..... 70
5 65
83 65
70 65
76 70.65
64
64 406.
75 Yaranon, Pedro ................
65 70
71.2 77
MRP- 76
492. 85
Villanueva, Cecilio C. ....... 72
75 50
85 75
79 75
88 71.85
66 MRP-
77 497.
67 Yasay, Mariano R. ...........

78
75 70
75 65
72 76
76 79
63 62
77 77
70 69
60 82
71.1 71.3
579
501.
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 Rigonan, Felipe C.
579 70
In re: Cunanan, et al. 79
69
89
76
Civ. 62
Land 71
Merc. 64
Int. 71.2
Pol. A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of
Crim. their grades in subjects passed in previous
Rem. examinations, showing the years in which they took
Leg. the examinations together with their grades and
Gen. Ave. averages, and those who had filed motions for
MRP- reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the
498. initials MRD, follows:
Ygay, Venancio M. PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
73
80
83
84 Civ.
62 Land
69 Merc.
72 Int.
77 Pol.
72.65 Crim.
Rem.
499. Leg.
Yulo, Jr., Teodoro Gen. Ave.
73 1.
82 Amao, Sulpicio M.
78
75
60
81
75
76
73.95

500.
Zamora. Alberto

79
 1946 .................................... 69.75
68
67 1953 ....................................
76 57
76 74
73 68
73 68
49 76
50 52
66.65 71
76
1950 .................................... 66.7
59 3.
80 Blanco, Jose B.
67
77
62
80
71
57
67.4
2.
Baldo, Olegario Ga.

MRD-1949 ...................
75
75
70
75
77
76
60
90
1951 .................................... 72.15
65
76 1951 ....................................
58 64
55 71
59 68
63 65
75 68
72 70
64.9 75
71
1952 ........................…........ 66.95
65 4.
68 Condeno, Mateo
75
84
72
59
73
57

80
 67
75
66
89
1950 …................................ 68.1
71 6.
80 Garcia, Manuel N.
62
75
75
81
55
92
69.3

1951 .....................…...........
70
60 MRD-1949 ............................
61 60
65 70
77 82
64 79
67 70
81 69
67.85 60
5. 80
Ducusin. AsraDito B. 69.25

1950 ....................................
57
65
51
69
54
85
56
84
MRD-1949............................ 60.3
69 7.
70 Luna, Lucito A.
76
73
76
71
55
60
68.65

1950 ....................................
60
71 1946 ....................................
55 63
67 63

81
69
76
75
76
57
69
66.55

1952 ....................................
70
75 1951 ....................................
69 61
83 60
59 58
53 60
74 70
75 63
68.4 75
8. 64
Maraña, Arsenio S. 64.8

1932 ....................................
70
77
65
79
66
52
70
50
1949 .................................... 66.4
72
68 1953 ....................................
68 78
75 64
75 66
72 68
60 81
76 50
69.35 71
78
1952 .................................... 70.65
65 10.
79 Peña, Jesus S.
60
72
73
51
75
86
67.9
9.
Montano, Manuel M.

82
 69
1950 .................................... 67.75
25
75 1951 ....................................
45 65
75 62
45 75
52 60
46 73
71 57
46.2 75
71
1951 .................................... 66.8
74
61
62
65
69
65
75
57
68.2

1952 ....................................
75 580
75
75 580
62 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
75 In re: Cunanan, et al.
70
60
66 Civ.
70.4 Land
11. Merc.
Placido, Sr., Isidro Int.
Pol.
Crim.
Rem.
Leg.
Gen. Ave.
12.
Rementizo, Filemon S.

1950 ....................................
68
78
70
75
69
70
58 1949 ....................................

83
65
75 1953 ....................................
72 65
75 67
60 78
75 74
55 75
85 62
66.65 69
80
1951 .................................... 70.9
68 14.
57 Rodulfa, Juan T.
48
60
91
66
55
75
64.05

1952 ....................................
68
53 1951 ..…..............................
68 67
67 60
58 70
56 65
75 68
64 56
65.7 75
13. 66
Rivera, Eulogio J. 67.75

1952 ....................................
70
71
67
78
67
75
71
70
1952 .................................... 70.1
67 15.
80 Sanchez, Juan J.
51
69
69
77
73
53
66.35

84
 77
66
65
1948 .................................... 66.65
39
69 1953 ....................................
82 73
75 71
76 70
72 65
55 78
50 64
63.5 65
78
MRD-1949 ............................... 70.4
67 17.
56 Santos, Salvador H.
69
75
72
77
60
75
68

1951 ....................................
70
59 1951 ....................................
55 60
60 64
68 55
57 70
78 68
67 52
65.8 70
16. 75
Santos, Constantino 62.85

1952 …................................
75
64
70
81
76
55
61
75
1952 .................................... 69.1
62
76 1953 ....................................
54 70
82 71
72 79

85
65 59
72 72
54 55
66 69
80 65
70 75
18. 75
Sevilla, Macario C. 69.3

1953 ....................................
70
73
74
70
81
56
69
71
MRD-1948................................ 71.05
50 Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953,
64 while some candidates—85 in all—presented
76 motions for reconsideration of their grades, others
66 invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list
66 of those candidates separating those who filed mere
69 motions for reconsideration (56) from those who
60 invoked the aforesaid Republic Act, is as follows:
52 1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION
63.1

MRD-1949 ...............................
47 Civ.
66 Land
78 Merc.
64 Int.
71 Pol.
86 Crim.
65 Rem.
85 Leg.
68 Gen. Ave.
1.
1950 .................................... Acenas, Calixto R. ..............
35 73
65 70
40 68
75 62
63 82
57 51
27 67
49 77
45 73.45
2.
MRD-1951 ............................... Alcantara, Pedro N. ............
68 67

86
70 Bacaiso, Celestino M. ..........
75 71
85 65
87 76
54 68
71 76
80 50
72.8 75
3. 70
Alejandro, Exequiel ............. 70.95
67 581
72
71 VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
75 581
80 In re: Cunanan, et al.
76
75
77 Civ.
73.4 Land
4. Merc.
Andres, Gregorio M. ........... Int.
70 Pol.
73 Crim.
86 Rem.
58 Leg.
79 Gen. Ave.
50 8.
71 Bala, Florencio F. .............
78 64
72.7 82
5. 47
Arnaiz, Antonio E. ............... 70
66 82
80 58
76 75
58 82
79 679.
68 9.
77 Baldo, Olegario A. ............
81 57
73.4 74
6. 68
Asis, Floriano U. de ............. 68
66 76
78 52
75 71
81 76
77 66.7
55 10.
73 Barrios, Benjamin O. .........
69 65
71.25 71
7. 76

87
75 73
80 80
62 71
83 75
73 70
73.95 73
11. 78
Buhay, Eduardo L. ............ 73.95
73 16.
76 Estrellado, Benjamin R. .....
71 67
91 79
76 64
61 73
74 82
78 62
73.35 71
12. 74
Burgos, Dominador C. ...... 70.2
72 17.
80 Fabunan, Edilberto C. .......
89 70
61 72
66 68
37 69
69 77
68 60
70.05 76
13. 74
Cariño, Eldo J. ….............. 71.1
79 18.
81 Feril, Domingo B. .............
60 75
75 71
74 84
74 65
76 70
74 60
73 65
14. 70
Casar, Dimapuro .............. 71.6
67 19.
73 Fernandez, Alejandro G. ...
84 65
79 75
77 87
61 80
71 81
74 63
73.35 61
15. 80
Castañeda, Gregorio ......... 72.8
70 20.

88
Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) .... 69.1
76 25.
80 Ilejay, Abraham I. .............
86 77
77 70
64 76
74 77
66 81
69 62
73.9 70
21. 68
Garcia, Rafael B. .............. 73.7
70 26.
86 Leon, Benjamin La. de .....
70 66
75 66
73 75
63 70
73 77
75 55
71.65 71
22. 82
Gracia, Miguel L. de ......... 70.35
73 27.
68 Lugtu, Felipe L. ................
75 62
69 70
80 78
51 65
72 78
71 56
71 69
23. 81
Gungon, Armando G. ....... 69.9
68 28.
76 Lukman, Abdul-Harnid .....
76 76
84 64
77 67
57 69
77 73
83 59
73.6 73
24. 75
Gutierrez, Antonio S. ........ 70.45
68 29.
77 Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. ..
66 77
70 76
72 68
59 68
71 71
74 51

89
75 75
78 63
70.85 66
30. 85
Maloles, Julius G. ............. 70.95
77 35.
71 Muñoz, Mariano A. …......
60 75
71 80
79 86
62 67
68 74
72 57
69.76 68
31. 76
Mandi, Santiago P. ........... 73.75
65 86.
76 Navarro, Buenaventura M.
70 80
61 75
79 65
68 75
75 83
72 55
71.1 73
82. 79
Margete, Rufino C. …....... 73
70 37.
76 Nodado, Domiciano R. .....
66 60
75 67
85 67
73 50
71 70
75 50
72.75 56
33. 75
Melocoton, Nestorio B. .... 61.7
70 38.
81 Papas, Sisenando B. .........
73 65
78 62
83 71
52 61
72 70
75 56
72.35 66
34. 67
Molina, Manuel C. ............ 66
75 89.
78 Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando ...
70 63
61 75

90
71 76
62 75
83 78
67 61
70 72
72 72
70.4 71
40. 79
Padula, Benjamin C. ......... 73.75
70 45.
77 Publico, Paciano L. ...........
54 68
62 69
74 76
78 76
75 70
68 59
69.05 74
41. 67
Pasno, Enrique M. ............ 70.6
78 46.
72 Radaza, Leovigildo ...........
66 75
54 78
71 76
58 61
72 77
78 50
69.85 71
42. 86
Peña, Jr., Narciso ............. 72.2
70 47.
95 Ramos, Bernardo M. .......
81 64
78 62
67 75
66 93
67 81
73 52
72.55 66
43. 80
Peralta, Rodolfo P. ........... 70.1
70 48.
70 Rabaino Andres D. ...........
52 68
81 72
68 75
63 73
59 78
69 55
63.7 69
44. 76
Pigar, Leopoldo R. ........... 70.65

91
49. 72
Ravanera, Oscar N. .......... 69.55
70 54.
77 Vera, Federico V. de ........
80 60
71 61
82 47
62 77
69 69
78 50
73.6 67
50. 77
Renovilla, Jose M. ............ 60.9
65 55.
75 Viray, Venancio Bustos .....
80 65
68 67
79 67
52 52
62 73
78 64
69.5 71
51. 65
Sabaot, Solomon B. .......... 67.15
69 56.
73 Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) ....
80 63
69 70
82 56
69 75
69 68
79 54
73.85 70
52. 77
Sumaway, Ricardo S. ........ 64.5
66 PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
76
69 1.
76 Ala Narciso ......................
74 70
56 71
72 73
68 59
69.1 73
53. 74
Torrefiel, Sofronio Q. ........ 81
70 77
77 73.5
74 2.
75 Alcantara, Pedro N. …......
73 67
50 70
68 75

92
85 72
87 78.2
54 6.
71 Casuncad, Sulvio P. ..........
80 61
72.8 73
582 82
69
582 81
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 68
In re: Cunanan, et al. 71
84
73.05
Civ. 7.
Land Enriquez, Pelagio y Concepcion
Merc. 84
Int. 69
Pol. 76
Crim. 75
Rem. 82
Leg. 50
Gen. Ave. 58
3. 79
Arellano, Antonio L. …...... 72.05
74 8.
66 Estonina, Severino ............
73 80
60 74
78 64
63 89
78 81
72 66
72.9 68
4. 82
Buhay, Eduardo L. ............ 72.4
73 9.
76 Fernandez, Alejandr Q. ....
71 65
91 75
76 87
61 80
74 81
78 63
73.35 61
5. 80
Calautit, Celestino R. ......... 72.8
71 10.
78 Fernandez, Luis N. ............
84 70
75 75
75 77
61 75
68 78

93
67 78
72 60
73 61
73.35 75
11. 70
Figueroa, Alfredo A. ......... 73.05
70 16.
75 Jacobo, Rafael F. ..............
87 76
78 76
75 75
50 74
68 76
68 50
72.3 72
12. 76
Formilleza. Pedro .............. 72.3
65 17.
75 Macalindong. Reinerio L. ..
89 67
68 77
83 79
51 79
70 74
75 72
73.25 68
13. 77
Garcia, Manuel M. ............ 72.75
69 18.
68 Mangubat. Antonio M. ......
83 70
83 70
73 78
62 61
62 80
70 74
71 62
14. 70
Grospe, Vicente E. ............ 71.45
68 19.
65 Montano. Manuel M. ........
78 78
66 64
79 66
61 68
69 81
82 50
71.6 71
15. 78
Galema, Nestor R. (1952) . 70.65
72 20.
79 Plomantes, Marcos ...........
86 73

94
67 Santos, Constantino P. ......
74 73
58 71
68 70
70 65
76 78
71 64
71.6 65
21. 78
Ramos, Eugenio R. ........... 70.4
70 26.
80 Santos. Salvador H. ..........
76 70
67 71
72 79
69 65
72 72
79 54
72.6 66
22. 80
Reyes. Juan R. .................. 70
71 27.
73 Sevilla, Macario C. ...........
77 70
76 73
81 74
59 70
72 81
74 56
73.2 69
23. 71
Reyes, Santiago R. ............ 71.05
65 28.
78 Villavicencio. Jose A. ........
83 78
60 75
76 70
75 67
70 69
70 77
72.9 64
24. 77
Rivera, Eulogio J. .............. 73.2
65 29.
67 Viray, Ruperto G. .............
78 76
74 73
75 76
62 73
69 80
80 58
70.9 68
25. 83

95
73.25
These are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604
directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they
reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced
to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of August and November of 1946; 69 per
cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950,
but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per
cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951,
in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which
was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the
admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the
profession. The amendments embrace many
interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14
and
583
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
583
In re: Cunanan, et al.
16 immediately concern us. The proposed
amendment is as follows:
"SEC. 14. Passing average.—In order that a candidate
may be deemed to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject. In determining the average, the
foregoing subjects shall be given the following
relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land
Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile
Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political
Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent;
Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall
not be required to take another examination in any
subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per
cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into
account in determining their general average in any
subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if
the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per
cent in his third examination. he shall lose the benefit
of having already passed some subjects and shall be
required to the examination in all the subjects.
"SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful
applicants.—-Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
falling below 50 per cent in any examination held
after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been
otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the
bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
(Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion
pertinent to the matter before us being:
"It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at
bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even
those subjects which they have previously passed.
This is not the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been
amended in this measure to give a candidate due
credit for any subject which he has previously passed
with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress
on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same.
The comment was signed by seven Justices while
three chose to refrain from making any and one took
no part. With regards to the matter that interests us,
the Court said:
584
684
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
"The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127.
One part of this amendment provides that if a bar
candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject,
although failing to pass the examination, he need not
be examined in said subject in his next examination.
This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the
installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a
time. The trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient for
the candidate because he may in an examination
prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to
insure passing them, by the ;time that he has passed
the last required subject, which may be several years
away from the time that he reviewed and passed the
first subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles
and theories contained in those subjects- and
remembers only those of the one or two subjects that
he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly
possible because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar
examinations every year in succession. The only
condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan,
must pass the examination in no more than three
installments; but there is no limitation as to the time
or number of years intervening between each
96
examination taken. This would defeat the object and
the requirements of the law and the Court in
admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and
proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law
subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently
to be able to practice the legal profession and
adequately render the legal service required by
prospective clients. But this would not hold true of
the candidates who may have obtained a passing
grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another
three subjects one year later, and the last two
subjects the present year. We believe that the
present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a
passing general average with no grade in any subject
below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory.
It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all
required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.
* * * * * * *
"We now come to the last amendment, that of
section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that
any applicant who has obtained a general average of
70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other
words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70
per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject,
despite their
585
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
585
In re: Cunanan, et al.
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court
because they failed to obtain a passing general
average in any of those years, will be admitted to the
Bar. This provision is not only prospective but
retroactive in its effects.
"We have already stated in our comment on the next
preceding amendment that we are not exactly in
favor of reducing the passing general average from 75
per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future.
As to the validity of making such reduction
retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should
not lose sight of the fact that after every bar
examinations, the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to the
Bar those who have obtained a passing general
average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have
failed. The present amendment would have the effect
of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme
Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions
of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per
cent or more but less than the general passing
average fixed for that year. It is clear that this
question involves legal implications, and this phase of
the amendment if finally enacted into law might have
to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders
a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the
basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule
then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final
decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in
the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no
effect.
"Another aspect of this question to be considered is
the fact that members of the bar are officers of the
courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar
candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and
qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused
and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that required for
that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally
and impliedly considered and declared that he was
not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be
its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general
average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions
of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect
says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected
by the Court to be its officer becau'Se he was
"unprepared, undeserving and unqualified,
nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and
allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We
repeat, that this is another important aspect of the
question to be carefully and seriously considered."
586
586
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating
the following:
"I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the
bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not
achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely
a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
97
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find
serious fundamental objections.
"Section 5 provides that any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject in any examination held after the 4th day of
July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the
corresponding oath of office. This provision
constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does
specifically one group of persons, namely, the
unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948,
1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
"The same provision undertakes to revoke or set
aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in
accordance with the law then in force. It should be
noted that after every bar examination the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a
passing general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those
who have failed. The provision under consideration
would have the effect of revoking the Supreme
Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions
of those who may have failed to obtain the passing
average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a
bad precedent in that the Government would be
morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those
who have failed in the examinations for admission to
other" prof essions such as medicine, engineering,
architecture and certified public accountancy."
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress
of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote
of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI
of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINA
TIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
bar examinations after July 4, 1946
587
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
537
In re: Cunanan, et al.
up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent
in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953
bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75 per
cent passing general average shall be restored in all
succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more
of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included
as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75
per cent in any subject in any bar examination after
July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the
President and to afford another opportunity to those
who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme
Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would
otherwise have passed the bar examination but were
arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has
been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74
in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing
of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parti6s
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase
in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar
examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination,
71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent;
for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955
bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
passing mark will be restored with the condition that
the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade
of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the
standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the
years immediately after the Japanese occupation has
to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation. It
is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our
students as well as the available reading materials will
be under normal conditions, if not improved from
those years preceding the last world war.
In this bill we eliminated altogether the idea of having
our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well
as the administration
588
98

588
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated
among his objections that the bill would admit to the
practice of law 'a special class who failed in the bar
examination'. He considered the bill a class
legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good
conscience, correct because Congress is merely
supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per
cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for whom
this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as
having passed the bar examination on the strength of
the established precedent of our Supreme Court and
were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties
and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed.
We believe that such precedent cannot or could not
have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme
Court, without giving due consideration to the rights
already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who
took the examination when the precedent was not
yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without
being inconsistent with the principles of their
previous resolutions.
"If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as
a simple curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of
a 'valid classification' as against class legislation, is
very expressed in the following American
Jurisprudence:
" 'A valid classification must include all who naturally
belong to the class, all who possess a common
disability, attribute, or classification, and there must
be a "natural" and substantial differentiation
between those included in the class and those it
leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the
Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then
have the diservered factions of the original unit
designated with different rules established for each.'
" (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465
(1926).
"Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with
its tides brings new conditions which must be cared
for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect
the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute
must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition
affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be
as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not
prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits
them when there are special evils with which the
general laws are incompetent to cope. The special
public purpose will sustain the special form. * * * The
problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy,
with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the
lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there
be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor
589
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
589
In re: Cunanan, et al.
and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed.
1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
"This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute
which always retroacts to the extent of the care or
correction only as in this case from 1946 when the
Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per
cent in the, Rules of Court.
"For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is
earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) "PABLO ANGELES DAVID
"Senator"
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by
Congress as above transcribed. The President again
asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed
the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting
Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information
that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members
of the Court are taking the same views they expressed
on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May,
1951, contained in the first indorsement of the
undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARÁS
The President allowed the period within which the bill
should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue
of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20,
Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times
erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an
election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election,
together, however, they lost in the polls.
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has
always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only
this Court should be allowed to determine admission
thereto in the interest of the principle of the
99
separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial
in the sense that discretion
590
590
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
is used in its exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate rules
which regulate admission. It is only this power (to
promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in
the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of
the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules
on the holding of examInation, the qualifications of
applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the
scope of the legislative power. But the power to
determine when a candidate has made or has not
made the required grade is judicial, and lies
completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise
of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of
the congressional prerogative of amending the rules.
To say that candidates who obtain a general average
of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per
cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed
the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege
and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to
the tribunal to pass candidates for different years
with grades lower than the passing mark. No
reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation
of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is
furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why
should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954
and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower
passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are
not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared
unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within
the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an
undue interference with the power of this Court to
admit members thereof, and because it is
discriminatory.
PARÁS, C. J., dissenting:
Under section 14 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order
that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained
a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling
591
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
591
In re: Cunanan, et al.
below 50 per cent in any subject." This passing mark
has always been adhered to, with certain exception
presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in
August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates
included only those who obtained a general average
of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, 12. candidates with
general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were
raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18,
1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list
first released containing. the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a
general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon
motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per
cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would
indicate that in the original list of successful
candidates those having a general average of 73 per
cent or more but below 75 per cent were included.
After the original list of 1947 successful bar
candidates had been released, and on motion for
reconsideration, all candidates with a general average
of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of
July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations
held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective
of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were
allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus,
for the year 1947 the Court in eff ect made 69 per cent
as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per
cent; and this amounted, without being noticed
perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held
subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly
ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for
reconsideration.
592
592
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and
1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings
where law deans and professors, practising attorneys,
presidents of bar associations, and law graduates
appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved
a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of
the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70
100
per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held
after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the
President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment
of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes,
Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed
another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the
President, with the important difference that in the
later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of
the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation
and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication
of names of the bar examiners before the holding of
the examinations, and (4) the equal division among
the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was
allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required
period; and in doing so the President gave due respect
to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the
people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71
per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in
1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar
examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act
also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a
grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination
after July 4, 1946,
593
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
593
In re: Cunanan, et al.
shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing in any subsequent
examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar
examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act
No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing
average, filed with this Court mass or separate
petitions, praying that they be admitted to the
practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon
the allegation that they have obtained the general
averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the
resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11,
1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the
bar, especially authorized representatives of bar
associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiæ, the reason alleged f or
said hearing being that some doubt had "been
expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and
the matter" involved "a new question of public
interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the
power to regulate the admission to the practice of law
is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the
subject is now governed by the Constitution which in
Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws
on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines."
Under this constitutional provision, while the
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the
Congress has the
594
594
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little
intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the
Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the
admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this
Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior
to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets
aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court
refusing to admit to the practice of law the various
petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion
this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions
on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the
Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after
which they become executory and unalterable.
Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for
reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any given year,
are subject to revision by this Court at any time,
regardless of the period within which the motions
101
were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore.
The obvious reason is that bar examinations and
admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a
judicial function only because said matters happen to
be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of
Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial
function involved, in the strict and constitutional
sense of the word, because bar examinations and the
admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable
cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more
than the function of other examining boards. In the
second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by
the Constitution, except only when they would be ex
post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or
vested rights or would deny due process and equal
protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly
is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to
no one the right to due process and equal protection
of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere
595
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
595
In re: Cunanan, et al.
curative statute intended to correct certain obvious
inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of
different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July
4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we
no longer have any record of those who might have
failed before the war, apart from the circumstance
that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark
during said period. It may also be that there are no
pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those
benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the
matter of classification, the reasonableness must be
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we
can f airly suppose that the classification adopted in
the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived
from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or
encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if
there is any interference erence at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides,
interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the
Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights
of litigants that have already been vested or acquired
in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the
empty purpose of creating appearances of separation
and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced
a case involving two parties and decided by the Court
in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say,
the statute will not affect the previous resolutions
passing bar candidates who had obtained the general
average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law
would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for
instance, it would provide that those who have been
admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general
average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to
practice law, because said statute would then destroy
a right already acquired under previous resolutions of
this Court,
596
596
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
namely, the bar admission of those whose general
averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution
amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the
passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years
before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this
Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates
who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or
more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective
of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it
in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127
retroactively, because during the examinations held
in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing
the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to
be in force. It stands to reason, if we are to admit that
the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent
power to regulate the admission to the practice of
law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule
fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the
ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
since this Court had already adopted as passing
averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations
and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway,
we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law,
since this is a matter that is addressed to the
judgment of the legislators. This Court in many
instances had doubted the propriety of legislative
enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from
nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates
benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
102
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said
Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was
not considered by the Congress. As already stated,
the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound
to assume that the
597
VOL. 94, MARCH 20, 1954
597
Vea vs. Acoba, et al.
legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to
their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances
into account before passing the Act. On the question
of public interest I may observe that the Congress,
representing the people who elected them, should be
more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to
accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the
will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting
that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of
Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the
same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus
left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where
we can and should only hope that the right men are
put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional and should therefore be given effect in
its entirety.
Candidates who in 1953 obtained 71.5 per cent,
without falling below 50 per cent on any subject, are
considered passed.
_______________ In re: Cunanan, et al., 94 Phil. 534,
March 18, 1954
August 15, 1961.
IN RE:PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for
admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the
examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
Philippine Bar; Requisites for Admission.—A Filipino
citizen who had finished the law course in Spain and
thereafter allowed to practice the profession in said
country, is not entitled to practice law in the
Philippines without passing the required bar
examinations provided for in Section 1 of Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court.
Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions; Professionals governed by treaty.—The
Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Republic of the Philippines
and the Spanish State, is intended to govern Filipino
citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain,
and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their
professions in the Philippines. A Filipino citizen
desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines, is not entitled to the privileges extended
to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines.
Same; Treaty cannot modify regulations governing
admission to Philippine bar.—The aforementioned
Treaty could not have been intended to modify the
laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that
the Executive Department may not encroach upon
the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art. VIII,
Philippine Constitution.)
RESOLUTION
BARRERA, J.:
985
VOL. 2, AUGUST 15, 1961
985
In re Garcia
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines without submitting
to the required bar examinations. In his verified
petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino
citizen born in Bacolod City, Province of Negros
Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken
and finished in Spain, the course of “Bachillerato
Superior”; that he was approved, selected and
qualified by the “Instituto de Cervantes” for
admission to the Central University of Madrid where
he studied and finished the law course graduating
there as “Licenciado En Derecho”; that thereafter he
was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain;
and that under the provisions of the Treaty on
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law
profession in the Philippines without submitting to
the required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny
the petition on the following grounds:
(1) The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees
and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic
103
of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not be
invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;
“The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall
have obtained recognition of the validity of their
academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this
Treaty, can practice their professions within the
territory of the Other, x x x.” (Italics supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said
Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the
citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions
in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his
own country and is not entitled to the privileges
extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in
the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part,
provides:
986
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Court of Agrarian Relations
“The nationals of both countries who shall have
obtained degrees or diplomas to practice the liberal
professions in either of the Contracting States, issued
by competent national authorities, shall be deemed
competent to exercise said professions in the
territory of the Other, subject to the laws and
regulations of the latter. x x x”
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in
the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to
exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule
127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof,
which have the force of law, require that before
anyone can practice the legal profession in the
Philippines he must first successfully pass the
required bar examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State
could not have been intended to modify the laws and
regulations governing admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulge
ate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement
such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the
Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
Petition denied.
_______________ In re Garcia, 2 SCRA 984, August
15, 1961
No. L-18727. August 31, 1964.
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA.
CUI, defendant-appellant, ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-
appellant.
Attorneys; "Titulo de Abogado" means membership
in the bar.—The term "titulo de abogado" means not
mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws but membership in the bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of
law.
Same; Possession of law degree not indispensable to
qualify as lawyer.—Possession of the law degree itself
is not ndispensable; completion of the prescribed
courses may be shown n some other way.
756
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cui vs. Cui .
Same; Reinstatement to the roll wipes out
disabilities.—Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys
wipes out the restrictions and disabilities resulting
from a previous disbarment.
Quo warranto; Limitations; One year after right of
plaintiff to hold office arose.—Under Section 16 of
Rule 66 (f formerly Sec, 16 Rule 68, taken from Section
215 of Act 190), and action of quo warranto must be
filed within one (1) year after the right of the plaintiff
to hold the office arose.
Same; Same: Same; Period not to be counted from
date defendant began to discharge duties of office.—
The basis of a quo warranto action being the plaintiff's
own right to office, it is from the time such right arose
that the one-year limitation must be counted and not
from the date the incumbent defendant began to
discharge the duties of said office.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. Canonoy, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for
defendant-appellant.
104
 Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-
appellants
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proceeding in quo warranto originally filed in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April
1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and
appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui,
and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by
the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui,
now deceased, "for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by
legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature
passed 27 November 1926) and endowed with
extensive properties by the said spouses through a
series of donations, principally the deed of donation
executed on 2 January 1926.
757
VOL. 11, AUGUST 31, 1964
757
Cui vs. Cui
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management
to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity
or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2
of the deed of donation provides as follows:
"Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad
para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitimo
sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte
o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la ciudad de
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem.
Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la ciudad de Cebu,
designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino
legitimo Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran
conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI.
A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos
administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que
sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y
Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico,
o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos
titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o
contribucion. En igualdad de circunstancias, sera
preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de
quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando
absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al señor Obispo de Cebu o
quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica,
apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la
cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto,
al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu."
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued
to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui
and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931
and the second, on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr.
Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the
administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series
of controversies and court litigations ensued
concerning the position of administrator, to which, in
so far as they are pertinent to the present case,
reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui
are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of
the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña
Benigna Cui, On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent
758
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cui vs. Cui
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of
Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered
into between them and embodied in a notarial
document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however,
had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his
brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5
September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over
to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not
having been complied with, the plaintiff filed the
complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being
a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the
nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio
in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns
upon their respective qualifications to the position of
administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and
therefore under equal circumstances would be
preferred, pursuant to section 2 of the deed of
donation. However, before the test of age may be
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among
the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein
105
named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos
titulos, el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o
contribucion,"
The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the
term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the
degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of
Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the
Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualif y
him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar, and although disbarred by this
Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No.
141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10
February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed
the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
759
VOL. 11, AUGUST 31, 1964
759
Cui vs. Cui
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the
plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado/'
taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but
that "as used in the deed of donation and considering
the function or purpose of the administrator, it should
not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one,"
and therefore means a law degree or diploma of
Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous
both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion that whether taken alone or in
context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere
possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission
thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In
Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonio o
instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o
profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real
Academia Española, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word
"abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo
que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de
palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos
legales que se le consultan." (Id., p. 5) A Bachelor's
degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does
not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession.
The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attor
ney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of
persons who are by license off icers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the
practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme
Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's
oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of
Court, this certificate being his license to practice the
profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws
in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar,
except as evidence
760
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cui vs. Cui
of compliance with the requirements that an
applicant to the examinations has "successfully
completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school
or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education." For this purpose, however, possession of
the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of
the prescribed courses may be shown in some other
way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under
the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons
who had not gone through any formal legal education
in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations
and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required possession of "the necessary qualifications
of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect
to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de
abogado" because they lack the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili
must have established the foregoing test advisely,
and provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all
these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of al!,
because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees
of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the
government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall
"prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids
and incapacitated and destitute persons may be
admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it
that the rules and conditions promulgated for
admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the
Act; and shall administer properties of considerable
value—for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a
working knowledge of the law and a license to
practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the
plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to
the office of administrator. But it is argued that
106
although the latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of
the deed of donation, which
761
VOL. 11, AUGUST 81, 1964
761
Cui vs. Cui
provides that the administrator may be removed on
the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the
discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral
character. Reference is made to the fact that the
defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is
also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10
February 1960, before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of
his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that
required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
"Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated
rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the
court. The court action will depend, generally
speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public
interest in the orderly and impartial administration of
justice will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity of an attorney
and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court
that he is a person of good moral character—a fit and
proper person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant's character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of
the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application
for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant
is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the
attorney has received a pardon following his
conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement
have been held to be the same as for original
admission to the bar, except that the court may
require a greater degree of proof than in an original
admission." (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p.
815.)
"The decisive questions on an application for
reinstatement are whether applicant is 'of good moral
character' in the sense in which that phrase is used
when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and
proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of
the office of an attorney, and whether his mental
quallifications are such as to enable him to discharge
efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral
attributes are to be regarded as a separate and
distinct from his mental qualifications." (7 C.J.S.,
Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816)."
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard
required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of
762
762
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cui vs. Cui
attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in
paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for
the office which is disputed in this case. When the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already
barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or
laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 68 (formerly sec. 16,
Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind
of action must be filed within one (1) year after the
right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the
office in question as long ago as 1932. On January 26
of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto
against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the
administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931.
Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father, and Antonio Ma.
Cui came in as intervenors, The case was dismissed by
the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the
defendant there to the complaint and complaint in
intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from
the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for
further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The
plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as
indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to
an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as
administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser"
and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as
assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by
a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed
the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1
February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he
had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office
of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up
with another letter dated 4 February, announcing
that he had taken over the administration as of 1
January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of
office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950,
after receiving a re-
763
107
VOL. 11, AUGUST 31, 1964
763
Cui vs. Cui
ply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the
Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he
had already assumed the position as stated in his
communication of 4 February 1950. The rather
muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner
to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3
April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another
opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the
plaintiff, not being a lawyer, was not entitled to the
administration of the Hospicio,
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of
a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio
commenced an action against the Philippine National
Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-
1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's
deposits therein, The Bank then filed a third-party
complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma.
Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as
administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been
deprived of recognition by the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-
party complaint on the ground that he was
relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the
administration of the Hospicio. The motion was
denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6
February 1954 he was able to take another oath of
office as administrator before President Magsaysay,
and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss
in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it
said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court,
stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that
"as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard
the oath" thus taken, The motion to dismiss was
granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case
filed their notice of appeal from the order of of
dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion
to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial
Court again granted the motion. This was on 24
November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a
mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R.
No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to
the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the
appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this
Court was dismissed upon motion
764
764
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cui vs. Cui
of' the parties, who agreed that "the office of
administrator and trustee of the Hospicio x x x should
be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be
initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not
occupying the office but believes he has a right to it"
(G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was'
issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent
administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in
quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus
Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid mo tion for
dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was
reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and on
the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as
administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio"
between them executed on the same date. The next
day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim
judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui
v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial
court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead
of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr.
Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his
failure to file an action in quo warranto against said
Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil
Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed
upon motion of the parties precisely so that the
conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in
such an action—all these circumstances militate
against the plaintiffs present claim in view of the rule
that an action in quo warranto must be filed within
one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the
office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file
an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956
because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the
running of the statutory period. And the fact that this
action was filed within one year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September 1960 does not
make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis
of the action is his own right to the office and it is from
the time such right arose that the one-year limitation
must
765
VOL. 11, AUGUST 81, 1964
765
Cui vs. Cui
be counted, not from the date the incumbent began
to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo
Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente
Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the
108
Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation.
He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant
Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another
one of the said nephews. The deed of donation
provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos
administradores (those appointed in the deed itself)
pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor
de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera
de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio
Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de
abogado x x x En igualdad de circumstancias, sera
preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de
quien tenia ultimamente la administracion." Besides
being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio
Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred
when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The
intervenor contends that the intention of the
founders was to confer the administration by line and
successively to the descendants of the nephews
named in the deed, in the order they are named,
Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr.
Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line,
the next administrator must come from the line of
Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This
interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms
of the deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside,
and the complaint as well as the complaint in
intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against
plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside; complaint as well as
complaint in intervention dismissed.
766
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA
Consolidated Unions
Notes.—Regarding the disputed meaning of "titulo de
abogado" and "admission to the Philippine Bar", it
was recently held that the "Treaty on the Validity of
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Philippine Republic and Spain" merely
extended to diplomas issued or degrees conferred by
educational institutions of Spain the same recognition
and treatment that we accord to similar diplomas or
degrees from local institution of learning; and,
therefore, holders of said Spanish diplomas or
degrees must take the examination prescribed by our
laws for holders of similar diplomas or degrees from
educational institutions in the Philippines (Philippine
Medical Association v. Board of Medical Examiners, et
al, L-25135, Sept. 21, 1968). This reiterates the earlier
ruling in In re Garcia, Resolution dated 15 August
1961, 2 SCRA 984.
Practice of Law to fall within the prohibition of Section
32 of Rule 32 of the Rules of Court has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (People v. Villanueva, L-
19450, May 27, 1965).
Passing the bar examination is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law, taking
the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential (Martinez v. Diao, Adm.
Case No. 244, March 31, 1963).
——oOo—— Cui vs. Cui, 11 SCRA 755, No. L-18727
August 31, 1964
A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 96-1-SDC(P)
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,
Clerk of Court VI, Shari’a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent.
Civil Service Law; Public Officers; Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
[RA 6713] inter alia enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.—The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4
of the Code commands that “(p)ublic officials and
employees ** at all times respect the rights of others,
and ** refrain from doing acts
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
629
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
629
Alawi vs. Alauya
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest.”
More than once has this Court emphasized that “the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee
of an agency involved in the administration of justice,
from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
109
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the
public for the judiciary.
Same; Same; As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.—Now, it does not
appear to the Court consistent with good morals,
good customs or public policy, or respect for the
rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed—however sincerely—to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right
with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or
undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with
good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he “act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.” Righteous indignation, or vindication
of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language,
or downright name-calling. As a member of the
Shari’a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject
to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most
other government workers. As a man of the law, he
may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a
judicial employee, it is expected that his accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had
been grievously wronged.
Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The title
of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing, and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.—As regards Alauya’s use of the title of
“Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to
630
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While
one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that
they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity,
only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney”
is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashary M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a
District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and
used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi’s agency, a contract was
executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya
of one of the housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.);
and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December
15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President
of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He wrote:
“** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and
notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and
your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company’s branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City,
on the grounds that my consent
631
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
631
Alawi vs. Alauya
was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void
ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
110
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to
my rights and interests.”
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail
and quite acerbic language on the “grounds which
could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent **;” and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. “agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you
that I categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and
manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent,
hence the need to annul the controversial contract.”
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President
of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. The envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the
right hand corner above the description of the
addressee, the words, “Free Postage-PD 26,” had
been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also
wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit
& Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,
Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his
contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for
cancellation of his housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable from salary deductions
at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things,
he said:
“** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as
I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
‘manipulated contract’ entered into between me and
the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented
by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without any authority and against my
will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was
632
632
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there
was no meeting of the minds between me and the
swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me.”
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in
some detail what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the
NHMFC, dated February 21,1996, April 15, 1996, and
May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons
already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his
housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from
his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on
January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of
the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by
which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
contracts by “the scheming sales agent.”b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote
to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions
on Alauya’s UHLP loan “effective May 1996,” and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. “for the buy-
back of ** (Alauya’s) mortgage, and ** the refund of
** (his) payments.”c
On learning of Alauya’s letter to Villarosa & Co. of
December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court
a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996—to
which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the
above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten
words, ”Free Postage-PD 26.”1 In that complaint, she
accused Alauya of:
_______________
a Annexes B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya’s Comment dated
June 5, 1996.
b Annexes F and G, id.
c Annex C-2, id.
1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14;
copies of the letter were also furnished the National
Home Mortgage Finance
633
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
633
Alawi vs. Alauya
1. “Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with
no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith;”
2. “Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor
and established reputation;”
3. “Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free
postage **;” and
4. Usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly
use.
111
She deplored Alauya’s references to her as
“unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc.”
without “even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth,” denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, “all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith,” and asserting that all her dealings
with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya “be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately
desciplined (sic) **.”
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on
the complaint. Conformably with established usage
that notices of resolutions emanate from the
corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice
of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo
P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a “Preliminary Comment”3 in
which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan
to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to “a mere Asst. Div.
Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of
Court,” but only to the District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the
suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a
“strong link” between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan’s office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for
being not only “the Executive Clerk of
_______________
Corporation. The Finance Management and Budget
Office and the Financial Division of the Supreme
Court.
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
3 Dated April 19, 1996.
634
634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District
Registrar,” but also “a scion of a Royal Family **.”4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this
time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a
copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of
court were done in good faith and within the confines
of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature,
fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his
salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date
of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who
had suffered “undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
suffering,” considering that in six months, a total of
P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.7 He
declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely
acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of
the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus
transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the
words: “Free Postage-PD 26,” were typewritten on
the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the
_______________
4 Rollo at p. 23.
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the
immemorial practice that NOTICES (or
communications informing) of Resolutions adopted
by the Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions
are sent to the parties by and over the signature of
the corresponding Clerk of Court or his Assistant, the
Court’s Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in
said notices.
6 Dated April 22, 1996.
7 Rollo at p. 28.
8 Id. at p. 60.
635
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
635
Alawi vs. Alauya
use of the money he had given for postage, and if
those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail
of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and
because of an honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the
assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law,” a title to which Shari’a lawyers
have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title
of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken
for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term
“consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the
mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
112
He pleads for the Court’s compassion, alleging that
what he did “is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured.”10 He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend.11 He was induced to sign a
blank contract on Alawi’s assurance that she would
show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite
“numerous letters and follow-ups” he still does not
know where the property—subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi’s principal, Villarosa & Co.—is
situated;12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although she promised to
return it the next day, she did not do so until after
several months. He also claims that in connection
with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those
regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction,
none of which he ever saw.13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done
without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of “fallacious,
malicious and baseless allegations,” and complainant
Alawi having come to the
_______________
9 Id. at p. 32.
10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12 Id. at p. 35.
13 Id.
636
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2)
letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated
April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996—all of
which he signed as “Atty. Ashary M. Alauya”—in his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title
but refers to himself as “DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA.”
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his
aforesaid letters, he made “malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,” resulting
in “undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor
and established reputation.” In those letters, Alauya
had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in
question “by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;”
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal
and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his)
rights and interests;”
3) Alawi was an “unscrupulous (and “swindling”) sales
agent” who had fooled him by “deceit, fraud
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;” and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will,”
and “concealed the real facts **.”
Alauya’s defense essentially is that in making these
statements, he was merely acting in defense of his
rights, and doing only what “is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced
_______________
14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August
21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.
637
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
637
Alawi vs. Alauya
and injured,” who had suffered “mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering,” considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia
enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service.16 Section 4 of the Code commands
that “(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times
respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest.”17 More than once has this Court
emphasized that “the conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to
the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct
must at all times be characterized by, among others,
113
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the respect of the public for the judiciary.”18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with
good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed—however sincerely—
to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, Alauya is
evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against So-
_______________
15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.
16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes
any violation of the Act with (1) a fine not exceeding
the equivalent of six (6) months’ salary, or (2)
suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3)
removal, depending on the gravity of the offense,
after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body
or agency, and even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.
18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo,
Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et
al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et
al., 209 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233
SCRA 68; SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272,
275.
638
638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
phia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that
right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness,
or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent
with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he “act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.”19 Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As
a member of the Shari’a Bar and an officer of a Court,
Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent tan for most other government workers. As
a man of the law, he may not use language which is
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or
otherwise improper.20 As a judicial employee, it is
expected that his accord respect for the person and
the rights of others at all times, and that his every act
and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction
that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this
Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari’a courts.21 While one who
has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is
reserved to those who,
_______________
19 ART. 19, Civil Code.
20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which should apply by analogy to
Members of the Shari’a Bar. The Code also proscribes
behavior in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession (Rule 7.03).
21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5,
1993 in Bar Matter No. 681, entitled “Petition to allow
Shari’a lawyers to exercise their profession at the
regular courts;.” SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of
Court.
639
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997
639
Alawi vs. Alauya
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it
is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
“counsellor” or “counsellor-at-law,” because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term,
or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disincilination to use the title of
“counsellor” does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney. Finally, respecting Alauya’s alleged
unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashary M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that
114
any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
Respondent Ashari M. Alauya reprimanded.
Notes.—Every employee of the judiciary should be an
example of integrity, honesty and uprightness and
sheriffs, in particular, musts show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of their duties
given the delicate task they’re reposed with. (Bora, Sr.
vs. Angeles, 244 SCRA 706 [1995])
The court has reiterated time and again the rule that
the conduct of every employee of the judiciary must
be at all times characterized with propriety and
decorum and above all else,
640
640
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
it must be above and beyond suspicion. (Bilag-Rivera
vs. Flora, 245 SCRA 603 [1995]).
——o0o——
Alawi vs. Alauya, 268 SCRA 628, A.M. SDC-97-2-P
February 24, 1997
[No. L-12426. February 16, 1959]
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
1.ATTORNEYS AT LAW; PRACTICE OF LAW; BEFORE
PATENT OFFICE.—Practice of law in the Philippines
includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or
the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT FURTHER EXAMINATION.—A
member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge
and training should be allowed to practice before the
Patent Office, without further examination or other
qualification.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON.—Under the present law,
members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the
Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing,
may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, for the reason that much of the business in
said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the
patent law and other laws
174
174
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
applicable as well as the presentation of evidence to
establish facts involved. That part of the functions of
the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decision are
under the law taken to the Supreme Court.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition
and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
Pacífico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's
Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a
circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the
said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said
office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified
to take the said examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been holding
similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine
Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the
act of the respondent Director requiring members of
the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass
an examination given by the Patent Office as a
condition precedent to their being allowed to practice
before
175
VOL. 105, FEBRUARY 16, 1959
175
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
115
said office, such as representing applicants in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for
patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the
Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the
practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so
much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only
by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who
pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; * * * that the Rules of Court do not
prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification
from those who would wish to handle cases before
such bodies, as in the prosecution of patent cases
before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application
of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; * * * that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with
Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent
Law of the Philippines, which is similar to the United
States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a
similar examination as that prescribed by respondent.
* * *."
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent
Law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations
to determine as to Who may practice before the
United States Patent Office, the respondent, is
similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,
Republic Act; No. 165. Although as already stated, the
Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have
been holding tests or examinations the passing of
which was imposed as a required qualification to
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge,
this is the first time that the right of the Direc-
176
176
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
tor of Patents to do so, specially as regards members
of the bar, has been questioned formally, or
otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful
thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and
constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and any member of
the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
appearance before the Patent Office and the
preparation and prosecution of patent applications,
etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of
_______________
1 In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz., 1617, prom.
March 18, 1954.
177
VOL. 105, FEBRUARY 16, 1959
177
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
116
an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts.
No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part
of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon
all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N. E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc.
(R. I.) 179 A. 139, 144). (Italics ours)
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for
patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement
of their rights in patent cases. In the first place,
although the transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical
and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such
business has to be conducted and all orders and
decisions of the Director of Patents have to be
rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well
as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with
law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent
Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance
with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance:
Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention
shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order
or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9
says that an invention shall not be considered new or
patentable if it was known or used by others in the
Philippines before the invention thereof by the
inventor named in the application for patent, or if it
was patented or described in any printed publication
in the Philippines or any foreign country more than
178
178
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
one year before the application for a patent therefor,
or if it had been in public use or on sale in the
Philippines for more than one year before the
application for the patent therefor. Section 10
provides that the right to the patent belongs to the
true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns, and Section 12 says that
an application for a patent may be filed only by the
inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Sections 25 and 26 refer to correction of any mistake
in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for
cancellation of a patent; that although any person
may apply for such cancellation. under Section 29, the
Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the
cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the
requirements of a petition for cancellation. Sections
31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the
petition f or cancellation of the patent by the Director
of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted.
Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of
three years from the day the patent was granted, any
person may apply for the grant of a license under a
particular patent on several grounds, such as, if the
patented invention is not being worked in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand
for the patented article in the Philippines is not being
met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or
if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license
on reasonable terms or by reason of the conditions
attached by him to the license, purchase, lease or use
of the patented article or working of the patented
process or machine of production, the establishment
of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is
prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to
food or medicine or is necessary to public health or
public safety. All these things involve the application
of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They
call for legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the
business and many of the acts, orders and decisions
of the Patent
179
VOL. 105, FEBRUARY 16, 1959
179
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and
correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
"* * * . The applicant for a patent or for the
registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to
cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and
any party to any other proceeding in the Office may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the Director."
117
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If
the transaction of business in the Patent Office and
the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal
should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but
rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the
consideration of the nature of the f unctions and acts
of the Head of the Patent Office.
"* * *. The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding
patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions,
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public
records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give
authenticated copies to any person, on payment of
the legal fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Italics supplied).
"* * *. The Commissioner has the only original
initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting
and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide
whether the patent is new and whether it is the
proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding
or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on
an application the commissioner should decide not
only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
whether there has been a prior public use or sale of
the article invented. * * *." (60 C.J.S. 460). (Italics
supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial
or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold
that a member of the bar, because of his legal
knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice
before the Patent Office, without further examination
or other qualification. Of course, the Director of
Patents, if he deems it advisable
180
180
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical
men and scientists in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical
description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly
authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit to an
examination, even if they are already members of the
bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent
Law; and that the U. S. Patent Office in its Rules of
Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which
he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He
invites our attention to the following pro visions of
said Rules of Practice:
"Registration of attorneys and agents.—A register of
attorneys and a register of agents are kept in the
Patent Office on which are entered the names of all
persons recognized as entitled to represent
applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation
and prosecution of applications for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions
of these rules shall only entitle the person registered
to practice before the Patent Office.
"(a) Attorneys at law.—Any attorney at law in good
standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of
these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.
* * * * *
* *
"(c) Requirement for registration.—No person will be
admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply
to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and
furnish all requested information and material; and
shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner
that he is
181
VOL. 105, FEBRUARY 16, 1959
181
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical
qualifications necessary to enable him to render
applicants for patent valuable service, and is
otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the
presentation and prosecution of their application
before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person
seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory
proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical
118
matters must be submitted and an examination which
is held from time to time must be taken and passed.
The taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office."
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules
of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law
itself, which reads as follows:
"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe
rules and regulations governing the recognition of
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing
applicants or other parties before his office, and may
require of such persons, agents, or attorneys., before
being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good
moral character and in good repute, are possessed of
the necessary qualifications to enable them to render
to applicants or other persons valuable service, and
are likewise competent to advise and assist applicants
or other persons in the presentation or prosecution
of their applications or other business before the
Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice
and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude,
either generally or in any particular case, from further
practice before his office any person, agent, or
attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or
guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply
with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with
intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or
threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective
business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or
by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension
or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of
the person so refused recognition or so suspended or
excluded by the district court of the United States for
the District of Columbia under such conditions and
upon such proceedings as the said court may by its
rules determine." (Italics supplied).
182
182
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of
law just reproduced, then he is authorized to
prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit
to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of
comparison:
"SEC. 78. Rules and regulations.—The Director subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business
in the Patent Office."
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by
far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold
examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While
the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they
possess the necessary qualifications and competence
to render valuable service to and advise and assist
their clients in patent cases, which showing may take
the form of a test or examination to be held by the
Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on
this important point. Our attention has not been
called to any express provision of our Patent Law,
giving such authority to determine the qualifications
of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code
authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not
inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service
and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section
608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the
Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, make all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of
said code. Section 338 of the
183
VOL. 105, FEBRUARY 16, 1959
183
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, etc.
National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act
No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of
Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules
and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and
regulations have been promulgated not only for the
Bureaus of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also
for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the
transaction of business in and to enforce the law for
said bureaus.
119
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of
an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to
and pass on examination prescribed by it before they
are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then
there would be no reason why other bureaus specially
the Bureaus of Internal Revenue and Customs, where
the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of
accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs,
may not also require that any lawyer practising before
them or otherwise transacting business with them on
behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law,
members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their pro fession before the Patent Office, for
the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the
functions of the Patent Director are judicial or
quasijudicial, so much so that appeals from his orders
and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.
184
184
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gorospe
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition
is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine
Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the
same before ore being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L., and
Endencia, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
———————— Philippine Lawyer's Association vs.
Agrava, etc., 105 Phil. 173, No. L-12426 February 16,
1959
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.*
RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN
MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC
Chairman; “Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. “To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23) Interpreted in the
light of the various definitions of the term “practice of
law”, particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered
by the Commission on Appointments.—The
Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
________________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
211
Cayetano vs. Monsod
120
PADILLA, J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC
Chairman; Definition of “Practice of Law".—What
constitutes practice of law? As commonly
understood, “practice” refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action. To “practice” law, or any profession for that
matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment
or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or
customarily. Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is
employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the “practice of
medicine.” A certified public accountant who works
as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as
an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC
Chairman; Definition of “Practice of Law".—The
Constitution uses the phrase “engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.” The deliberate choice of
words shows that the practice envisioned is active
and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be “engaged” in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in
something which is the result of one’s decisive choice.
It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
PETITION to review the decision of the Commission
on Appointments.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-
counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court’s
212
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1),
Article IX-C:
“There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.”
(Italics supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section
1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
‘There shall be an independent Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be mem-bers of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.” (Italics supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines “practice of law” as:
“The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where
he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients
in legal matters. negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees
for services rendered by his associate.” (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
213
121
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
213
Cayetano vs. Monsod
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
“x x x for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of
their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts
either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law.” (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v, C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176–177) stated:
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions.” (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Italics supplied)
“Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may
214
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
have no direct connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character;
and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.”
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.], p. 665–666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144).
(Italics ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974–1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling
and public service.
“One may be a practicing attorney in following any
line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute.” (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To
engage in the practice of law is to perfom those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23)
122
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term “practice of law.”
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VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
215
Cayetano vs. Monsod
“MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make
a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review
of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I
be allowed to make a very brief statement? , -. . ..
“THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
“MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that
‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar—I am
quoting from the provision—'who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years/”
“To avoid any misunderstanding which would result
in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean
that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the
COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
“This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that
this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
“MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
“MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
“MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the
COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?
‘MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore,
lawyers who are employed in COA now would have
the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
provision on qualifications under our provisions on
the Commission on Audit. And, therefore. the answer
is yes,
“MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this
is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
“MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
“MR. OPLE. Thank you.”
x x (Italics supplied)
216
216
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (italics supplied)
Corollary to this is the term “private practitioner'' and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
“lawyer.” Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
“an individual or organization engaged in the business
of delivering legal services.” (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called “sole practitioners.”
Groups of lawyers are called “firms.” The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners, Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there
are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys
called “associates.” (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to
traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern
Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986],
p. 593). The practice of law is defined as “the
performance of any acts . .. . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting
Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d
623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would
123
obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op.
cit).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a
client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend
217
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
217
Cayetano vs. Monsod
little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage
spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role
colors much of both the public image and the
selfperception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the
public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance
of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: “Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench
and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in
law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely describe[d] as business counseling: than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described
as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law,
as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where
internal medicine can be effective.” (Business Star,
“Corporate Finance Law/' Jan. 11,1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a
lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types—
a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion
of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer
to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer
skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document
drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation
are both
218
218
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work
or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent
is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate
practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily,
hereinbelow quoted are emerging trends in corporate
law practice, a departure from the traditional concept
of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in
particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate
problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the
corporate law research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate
legal policy formulation, particularly “modelmaking”
and “contingency planning,” has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information
to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences
of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger
124
have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis,
automatic data processing, and electronic computing
equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional
structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a “model”, of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is developed
to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are
regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law
has received relatively little organized and
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formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a
vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law can
be improved through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional contexts and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master’s or doctorate
degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making
now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate
finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, “Corporate Finance Law,” Jan.
11,1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the “abogado de
campanilla.” He is the “big-time” lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons
and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers,
many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms, Many others have
in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter
alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission). and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. (Italics supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling
of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the
work of the organization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first
hand. In short,
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune
to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may
sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of
the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers
to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small
number of companies and law firms. Because working
in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go
to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their “international practice” in law libraries.
(Business Star, “Corporate Law Practice,” May 25,
1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the
lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit:
“A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them.”
(Business Star, “Corporate Finance Law,” Jan.
11,1989, p. 4).
125
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly
needs a “shot in the arm,” so to speak. No longer are
we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code
and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into
the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal
primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which
are of particular significance to the corporate counsel;
(2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills
applicable to a corporate counsel’s management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization
and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as
intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as “intersecting managerial
jurisprudence,” it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel’s total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy
sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required to make,
and the need to think about a corporation’s strategy
at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other—often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
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Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in
decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained
anew role as a stakeholder—in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions
and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. (Italics supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is with governmental
policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness
more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit,
Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is
world famous. (Italics supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the
office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively
revising their knowledge of the environment,
coordinating work with outsiders. promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes,
“In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities
of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations, (Italics supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel,
three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics, The field of systems dynamics
has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems—physical, economic, managerial, social,
and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the systems dynamics principles more
accessible to managers—including corporate
counsels. (Italics supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make
better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can
be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation,
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aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost
and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases,
(Italics supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management
Computer-based models can be used directly by
126
parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of
an international joint venture may be used to
illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management
of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires
special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing
legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework
within which are undertaken those activities of the
firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to
be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to
stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of “law” is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed
in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate
Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in
the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that
knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is
not the understand all of the law’s effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues
if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
“constitution” or makeup of the modern corporation.
“Business Star, “The Corporate Counsel,” April 10,
1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the
bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
aspect of their work, Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional
security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, “Corporate Finance law,”
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1901,' the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18,1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with
a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
its inception in 1972–73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World
Bank Group (1963–1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as
a legal and
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work
involved being knowledgeable In election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod,
in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasijudicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986–1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
“innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House
of Representative.” (pp. 128–129 Rollo) (Italics
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of
which Atty. Monsod used to be a member,
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel
acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, “Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers,” Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Italics supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13),
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in
any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled “Wanted; Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations,” submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on
Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan
World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26–31 ,
1973). 1973). (Italics supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even
more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily,
a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation
of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of
Law, 1987, p. 321). (Italics supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not
only define the responsibilities of both parties, but
must also state the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to
that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine
qua non for foreign loan agreements—an adherence
to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs
of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: “They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of
quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, “The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments,” Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
128
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of
the term “practice of law”, particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a Iawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
“Appointment is an essentially discretionary power
and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have
been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide."(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central
Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:
“It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified,
as in this case, and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but
to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially
within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law.” (Italics supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in
the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14,1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to
give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment,
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.”
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion,
suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of
the practice of law, which modern connotation is
exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of
the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s
definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week
and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a
year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from
the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law practice
" ... is what people ordinar-ily mean by the practice of
law.” True I cited the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by “traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous” or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the
law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the
129
fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over
ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can
even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For
one thing, how can an action or petition be brought
against the President? And even assuming that he is
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following;
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a
nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm
the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the
nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the
confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to
confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the
U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
“We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but
by the spirit that giveth life/'
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah.
Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson.
Delilah agreed on condition that—
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
“No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.”
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was
captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of
what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word.
The procurator calmly replied: “Did any blade touch
his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?” The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, J., See brief concurrence.
Melencio-Herrera, J., In the result, 011 the same
basis as Justice Narvasa.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Padilla, JJ., see dissents.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the
petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Bidin, J., I join in the dissent of Justice Gutierrez.
Sarmiento, J., On leave.
Regalado, J., No part due to intended personal
association with respondent Monsod.
Davide, Jr., J., No part, I was among those who
issued a testimonial in favor of Christian Monsod
which was submitted by him to CA.
CONCURRENCE
NERVASA, J.:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by
Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate
showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments -that the appointment
of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed—was
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Cayetano vs. Monsod
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
The records of this case will show that when the Court
first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not
only to require the respondents to comment on the
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose
in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience
and even embarrassment to all parties concerned
were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover. a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he
had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s
comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of “practice of law for at
least ten (10) years” has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents
deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the
core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to “have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years.” (Art. IX(C),
Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving
the construction of constitutional provisions are best
left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v,
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) “upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries.”
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The Constitution has imposed clear and specific
standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are
that he must have been “engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years.” It is the bounden duty
of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly
understood, “practice” refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge: it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To “practice” law, or any profession for that
matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment
or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or
customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and
is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the “practice of medicine.” A
certified public accountant who works as a clerk,
cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental
agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs.
Villanueva.2
“Practice “Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) x x x” (italics
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent
Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative
of whether a particular activity constitutes “practice
of law.” It states:
________________
1 Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109.
232
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
131
“1.Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice
of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as, a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
exercise (People v, Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Cotner, 127, p; 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2.Compensation. Practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such
as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’
(Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of
a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun
v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, ‘all advice to clients and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the
law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v.
Arthur C. Taylor, 94 A-L.R. 356–359)
3.Application of law, legal principle, practice, or
procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term ‘practice of law’.
(Martin supra)
4.Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the
practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-
client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes
an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his
profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed.,
p. 30).”3
________________
3 Commission on Appointments’ Memorandum
dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT CONSTITUTES
PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6–7.
233
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
233
Cayetano vs. Monsod
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be
useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time
of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks
which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or
habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks
habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST
TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent
Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded
that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so
HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and
activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
“practice of law;” To become engaged in the practice
of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of
acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People
vs. Villanueva:4
“Essentially, the word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.”
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and
to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment to such position.
________________
4 14 SCRA 109.
234
132

234
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
CRUZ,. J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my
brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with
him while of course respecting his viewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from
examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not
a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee’s credentials is made
on the basis of the established facts, not the
discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of
that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was
involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the
same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we
said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign
people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we
cannot disqualify an appointee simply because he has
passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared
ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable
by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason
is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom
of his election but whether or not he was qualified to
be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private
respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase “practice
of law” as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as
embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under
the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely “to become involved in
litigation.”
235
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
235
Cayetano vs. Monsod
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of
law even if his main occupation is another business
and he interprets and applies some law only as an
incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated
by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly
any activity that is not affected by some law or
government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of
a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He
can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve
his knowledge and application of the laws regulating
such transactions. If he operates a public utility
vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still
be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he
must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining
the practice of law as the “performance of any acts, .
, in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law,” which tells us absolutely nothing.
The decision goes on to say that “because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.”
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to
consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or
at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation.
The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be
sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as
required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he
has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing
lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a business-
236
133
236
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
man and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in
Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission
(together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has
not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his
abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no
less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully
vote to grant the petition;
DISSENTING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that
engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in
fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the
result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view
that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of
law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while
on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on
the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was
no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions
left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not
taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult.
First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely
to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to
high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness.
Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses
superior qualifications in terms of executive ability,
proficiency in manage-
237
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
237
Cayetano vs. Monsod
ment, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner.
What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot
shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in
the practice of law for even one year. He is a member
of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is
stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But
if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar
is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have
been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not
only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment
to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind
of Judges or Justices will we have if there main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee,
working in media, or operating a farm with no active
involvement in the law, whether in Government or
private practice, except that in one joyful moment in
the distant past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase “engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.” The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is
active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be “engaged” in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in
something which is the result of one’s decisive choice.
It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise: one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data
submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission
on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if
appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law
except for an alleged one year period after passing
the bar examinations when he worked in his father’s
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been
extremely limited because he was also working for
M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in
238
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
134
Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United
States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
“1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his
passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961–1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate),
University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963–1970: World Bank Group—Economist,
Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle
East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970–1973: Meralco Group—Executive of various
companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973–1976: Yujuico Group—President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976–1978: Finaciera Manila—Chief Executive
Officer
6. 1978–1986: Guevent Group of Companies—Chief
Executive Officer
7. 1986–1987: Philippine Constitutional
Commission—Member
8. 1989–1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the
December 1989 Coup Attempt—Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the
Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
239
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
239
Cayetano vs. Monsod
1. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation”
(Rollo, pp. 21–22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even
remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all
sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a
lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of
giving legal advice of legal services, he was the one
receiving that advice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on
Appointments show an effort to equate “engaged in
the practice of law’? with the use of legal knowledge
in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations,
agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with
a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as
having a familiar and customary well-defined
meaning. Every resident of this country who has
reached the age of discernment has to know, follow,
or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain,
teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market
vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can
these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been “engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.” It is not
satisfied with having been “a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years.”
Some American courts have defined the practice of
law, as follows:
“The practice of law involves not only appearance in
court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the
use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a
will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of
which, under the facts and conditions involved, must
be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass’n v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
240
240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
135
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a
formula or definition of what constitutes the practice
of law. ‘Practicing law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing
as an attorney or counselor at law according to the
laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice
or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm
or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.’ Without adopting
that definition, we referred to it as being substantially
correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v.
People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E.
901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one’s actions to come within the purview of
practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be
performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to
wit:
xxx xxx xxx
“Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to
him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or
not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-
estate transactions where he was not the procuring
agent. He answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In answer to the
question as to how many times he had prepared
contracts for the parties during the twenty-nine years
of his business, he said: ‘I have no idea.’ When asked
if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer
was I suppose.’ Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he
answered: ‘I don’t recall exactly what was said.’ When
asked if he did not remember saying that he had
made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and
contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: ‘Well, I don’t believe so, that is not a
practice/ Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties
where he was not the broker, he finally answered: ‘I
have done about everything that is on the books as
far as real estate is concerned.’
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a
real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but
that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. x
x x.” (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
241
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
241
Cayetano vs. Monsod
“x x x. An attorney, in the most general sense, is a
person designated or employed by another to act in
his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of
persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these
professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-
professional agents are properly styled ‘attorneys in
fact;’ but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto
for another, without being an attorney at law.’ Abb.
Law Dict. ‘Attorney/ ‘A public attorney, or attorney at
law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a court of law,
legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainer of clients. The principal
duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court
and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his
client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to
keep his secrets confided to him as such. x x x His
rights are to be justly compensated for his services.’
Bouv. Law Dict. tit. ‘Attorney.’ The transitive verb
‘practice,’ as defined by Webster, means ‘to door
perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming; x x x to carry on in practice, or repeated
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise,
as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or
medicine,’ etc. x x x.” (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523;
Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of
law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus,
we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA
109 [1965]):
“x x x Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p.
1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. x x ." (at p. 1 12)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment
itself recognizes habituality as a a required
component of the meaning of practice of law in a
Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
“1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v.
136
242
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cayetano vs. Monsod
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v, Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer
before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil., 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent
Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge,
the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and
consists of isolated activities which do not fall under
the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in
the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific
legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines
which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not
within the context of doing business. This was our
ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic
leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background,
competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for
such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office.
The Constitution charges the public respondents no
less than this Court to obey its mandate,
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on
Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomina-
243
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
243
Cayetano vs. Monsod
tion of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—View that the court should not impose its
view on areas within the competence of policy
makers. (Garcia vs. Board of lnvestments, 191 SCRA
288.)
——o0o——
Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210, G.R. No.
100113 September 3, 1991
A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008.*
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE
G. RELLOSA, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies only to a lawyer
who has left government service and in connection
“with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service.”—Respondent cannot be found liable for
violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a
lawyer who has left government service and in
connection “with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service.” In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 455
SCRA 526 (2005) we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which [they] had intervened while in said
service.” Respondent was an incumbent punong
barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that
provision.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
210
Same; Same; Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160);
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713); Section 90 of R.A.
7160, not Section 7(B)(2) of R.A. 6713, governs the
137
practice of profession of elective local officials.—
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials
and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession
“unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions.” This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and
employees. For elective local government officials,
Section 90 of RA 7160 governs: x x x This is a special
provision that applies specifically to the practice of
profession by elective local officials. As a special law
with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an
exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general
law on engaging in the private practice of profession
by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus
derogate generalibus.
Same; Same; Same; Unlike governors, city mayors and
municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular
sessions only at least once a week, and since the law
itself grants them the authority to practice their
professions, engage in any occupation or teach in
schools outside session hours, there is no longer any
need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any
of these purposes.—Of these elective local officials,
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of
their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service.
They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours. In other words, they may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week. Since the law itself grants them the authority
to practice their professions,
211
engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside
session hours, there is no longer any need for them to
secure prior permission or authorization from any
other person or office for any of these purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Service; Public Officers; A
punong barangay is not forbidden to practice his
profession but he should procure prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.—Certain local
elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly
subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice
their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. And this stands
to reason because they are not mandated to serve full
time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed
to hold regular sessions only twice a month.
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was
not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he
should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A punong barangay
who is also a lawyer should obtain the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government before he enters his appearance as
counsel for any party, and his failure to comply with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer—to
obey the laws; Lawyers are servants of the law, vires
legis, men of the law.—As punong barangay,
respondent should have there-fore obtained the prior
written permission of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government before he entered his appearance
as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to
do. The failure of respondent to comply with Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey
the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis,
men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to
obey the law and promote respect for it. To
underscore the primacy and importance of this duty,
it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In acting as counsel for a
party without first securing the required written
permission, respondent not only
212
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also
violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule
1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in un-lawful,
138
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer who
disobeys the law disrespects it.—For not living up to
his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting
ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent
failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: CANON 7. A LAWYER
SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
(emphasis supplied) Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys
the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Professional Misconduct for Violating His Oath as a
Lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Fortunato F.L. Viray for complainant.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1
and the building erected thereon located at 959 San
Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and
brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the
possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio
Pastor3 of one of the units in the
_______________
1Particularly described as lot no. 19, block no. 3, Pas-
14849.
2 Complainant’s sister-in-law.
3 Hereafter, “Elizabeth and Pastor.”
213
building. The latter ignored demands for them to
vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated
against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4
where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723,
summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.5
When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the
filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for
ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants in that case. Because of this,
complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an
act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer
when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite
the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong
barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his
duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints
referred to the barangay’s Lupong Tagapamayapa. As
such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio
against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he
performed his task with utmost objectivity, without
bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The
parties, however, were not able to amicably settle
their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his
legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He
handled her case for free because she was financially
distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission
of a patent injustice against her.
_______________
4 Hereafter, “Barangay 723.”
5 These were scheduled on March 15, 2001, March
26, 2001 and April 3, 2001.
6 Dated July 5, 2002. Rollo, pp. 2-23.
214
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to
thresh out, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective
position papers. After evaluating the contentions of
the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to
discipline respondent.7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that,
as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently,
however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the
ejectment case filed against them by Regina and
Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and
signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and
notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
“Rule 6.03—A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which
he intervened while in said service.”
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent
contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713:8
139
“SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.—In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto.—Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
_______________
7 Report and Recommendation dated October 15,
2004 of Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila of the IBP-
CBD. Id., pp. 103-106.
8 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
215
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions;
x x x” (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent’s violation of
this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
(emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for
one month with a stern warning that the commission
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the
transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility Applies Only
to Former Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has
left government service and in connection “with any
matter in which he intervened while in said service.”
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled
_______________
9 Supra note 7.
10 CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-476 dated
November 4, 2004. Rollo, p. 102.
11 G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 526.
(emphasis in the original)
216
that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service.”
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at
the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The
Practice of Profession of Elective
Local Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials
and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession
“unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions.” This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and
employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of
RA 716012 governs:
“SEC. 90. Practice of Profession.—(a) All governors,
city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions
as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided, That
sanggunian members who are members of the Bar
shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil
case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party;
_______________
12 The Local Government Code of 1992.
217
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein
an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
140
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government
except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their
profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
concerned do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom.”
This is a special provision that applies specifically to
the practice of profession by elective local officials. As
a special law with a definite scope (that is, the
practice of profession by elective local officials), it
constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA
6713, the general law on engaging in the private
practice of profession by public officials and
employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays are the following:
the governor, the vice governor and members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city
mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the
sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal
mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the
punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang
barangay and the members of the sangguniang
kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors
and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other
than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives. This is because they
_______________
13 This rule of statutory construction means that a
special law repeals a general law on the same matter.
218
are required to render full time service. They should
therefore devote all their time and attention to the
performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours. In other words, they may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority
to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours,
there is no longer any need for them to secure prior
permission or authorization from any other person or
office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective
officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a
total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. And this stands
to reason because they are not mandated to serve full
time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed
to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16
_______________
14 Section 52(a), RA 7160. They may also hold special
sessions upon the call of the local chief executive or a
majority of the members of the sanggunian when
public interest so demands. (Section 52[b], id.)
15 This rule of statutory construction means that the
express mention of one thing excludes other things
not mentioned.
16 Id.
219
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was
not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he
should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who
Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law
Must Secure Prior Authority From
The Head Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose
responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the
private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department
concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:
“Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without
a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the Government;
141
Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided,
finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which
do not involve real or apparent conflict between his
private interests and public duties, or in any way
influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he
shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors.” (emphasis supplied)
_______________
17 See Ramos v. Rada, A.M. No. P-202, 22 July 1975,
65 SCRA 179; Zeta v. Malinao, A.M. No. P-220, 20
December 1978, 87 SCRA 303.
220
As punong barangay, respondent should have
therefore obtained the prior written permission of
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government
before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the
law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the
law and promote respect for it. To underscore the
primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined
as the first canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing
the required written permission, respondent not only
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also
violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
“Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” (emphasis
supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not
complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.” (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it.
In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces
the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of
a member of the
221
bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as an attorney for violation of the
lawyer’s oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is
hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six months effective from his receipt of
this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to
heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the
Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the
courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna
and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa suspended from practice of
law for six (6) months for professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility.
_______________ Catu vs. Rellosa, 546 SCRA 209,
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
A.C. No. 5582. January 24, 2017.*
ARTHUR O. MONARES, complainant, vs. ATTY. LEVI P.
MUÑOZ, respondent.
A.C. No. 5604. January 24, 2017.*
ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., complainant, vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, respondent.
A.C. No. 5652. January 24, 2017.*
142
BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE,1 complainant, vs. ATTY.
LEVI P. MUÑOZ, respondent.
Attorneys; Illegal Practice of Law; The sheer volume
of cases handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that
government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of
his private practice, in clear violation of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) authorization and Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).—Muñoz’s DILG
authorization prohibited him from utilizing
government time for his private practice. As correctly
observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws
(Omnibus Rules), requires government officers and
employees of all departments and agencies, except
those covered by special laws, to render not less than
eight (8) hours of work a day for five (5) days a week,
or a total of forty (40) hours a week. The number of
required weekly working hours may not be reduced,
even in cases where the department or agency adopts
a flexible work schedule. Notably, Muñoz did not
deny Monares’ allegation that he made at least
eighty-six (86) court appearances in connection with
at least thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August
1, 2001. He merely alleged that his private practice
did not prejudice the functions of his office. Court
appearances are necessarily made within regular gov-
_______________
* EN BANC.
1 Also referred to as “Benjilieh M. Constante-Reyes”
elsewhere in the records.
238
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Monares vs. Muñoz
ernment working hours, from 8:00 in the morning to
12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon.
Additional time is likewise required to study each
case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer
volume of cases handled by Muñoz clearly indicates
that government time was necessarily utilized in
pursuit of his private practice, in clear violation of the
DILG authorization and Rule 6.02 of the CPR.
Same; Practice of Law; The power to grant authority
to engage in the practice of one’s profession to
officers and employees in the public service lies with
the head of the department, in accordance with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules.—Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4,
1986 (Memorandum 17), which Muñoz himself cites
in his Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. The power to grant authority to
engage in the practice of one’s profession to officers
and employees in the public service lies with the head
of the department, in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which
provides, in part: Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall
engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without
a written permission from the head of Department:
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further,
That if an employee is granted permission to engage
in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee x x x. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) Memorandum 17 was
issued more than nine (9) years prior to Muñoz’s
appointment as Provincial Legal Officer, hence, he
cannot feign ignorance thereof. As a local public
official, it was incumbent upon Muñoz to secure the
proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG not
only for his first term, but also his second and third.
His failure to do so rendered him liable for
unauthorized practice of his profession and violation
of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Same; Conflict of Interests; By representing
conflicting interests without the permission of all
parties involved, Muñoz violated Rules 15.01 and
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).—As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint
Petition, he acted as counsel for ALECO under the
management of the old BOD in the following
239
VOL. 815, JANUARY 24, 2017
239
Monares vs. Muñoz
cases: A. Civil Case No. 10007 — ALECO (Petitioner) v.
Eleuterio Adonay, NEA Project Supervisor and his
team John Catral et. al., a case filed by Oliver O.
Olaybal and his group. For: Injunction, Accounting
with Prayer for Writs of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to stop the
election of the new set of member (sic) of the Board
143
of Directors x x x. B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled
ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. as Petitioner,
also filed by Oliver O. Olaybal, a case for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Receivership, with Preliminary
Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining and Mandatory Orders.
Among others, this Petition was filed to stop the
second scheduled election of the ALECO Board of
Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24, 2002.
(Underscoring omitted; additional emphasis supplied)
Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of
ALECO under the direction of the NEA management
team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his
advice would be sought with respect to the
prosecution of the members of the old BOD,
considering that the latter was deactivated due to
alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest
between Olaybal’s board on one hand, and NEA and
its management team on the other, is apparent. By
representing conflicting interests without the
permission of all parties involved, Muñoz violated
Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Gross
Misconduct and Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CAGUIOA, J.:
For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with
Prayer for Absolution and/or Clemency2 (Joint
Petition) dated May 14, 2009 filed by respondent
Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz), in connection with the
complaints for disbarment filed by Arthur O. Monares
(Monares), Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal (Olaybal)
purportedly representing Albay Electric Cooperative,
Inc.
_______________
2 Rollo (A.C. No. 5582), Vol. II, pp. 614-642.
240
240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Monares vs. Muñoz
(ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante (Constante),
dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002 and March
21, 2002, respectively.
Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed
against Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City. In his complaint,
Monares alleged that Muñoz represented his brother
Ludolfo in the said case during regular government
hours while employed as Provincial Legal Officer of
Albay City.3
Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO’s old
board of directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as retained
counsel sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that
Muñoz did not inform ALECO’s old BOD that he was
employed as Provincial Legal Officer at such time.
Olaybal raised that after its administrator, the
National Electrification Administration (NEA),
deactivated the old BOD on the ground of
mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained counsel
of the NEA-appointed team which took over the
management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged
that Muñoz illegally collected payments in the form of
notarial and professional fees in excess of what was
agreed upon in their retainer agreement.4
Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs
of Sunwest Construction and Development
Corporation (Sunwest). Constante claimed that
Muñoz filed ten (10) cases against Sunwest on
Ludolfo’s behalf before the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) while he was serving as Provincial
Legal Officer.5
All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be
disbarred for unlawfully engaging in private practice.
In addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz’s disbarment for
acts of disloyalty, particularly, for violating the rule
against conflict of interest.6
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 544-545.
4 Id., at p. 545.
5 Id.
6 Id.
241
VOL. 815, JANUARY 24, 2017
241
Monares vs. Muñoz
To support their position, the complainants raised
that Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the
Ombudsman for two (2) counts of unauthorized
practice of profession in OMB-ADM-101-0462, and
was meted the penalty of removal and dismissal from
service. The complainants further manifested that
Muñoz had been convicted by the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Legazpi City in Criminal Case
Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of Section 7(b)(2)
in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713.7
Muñoz’s conviction has since become final pursuant
144
to the Court’s Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in G.R.
No. 160668.8
In his respective comments to the complaints,9
Muñoz claimed that he had requested Governor Al
Francis C. Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to
continue his private practice shortly after his
appointment. This request was granted on July 18,
1995.10 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same
request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary
Alexander P. Aguirre granted Muñoz’s request, under
the following conditions:
1. That no government time, personnel, funds or
supplies shall be utilized in connection (sic) and that
no conflict of interest with your present position as
Provincial Legal Officer shall arise thereby;
2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours,
the place(s) and under what circumstances you can
engage in private employment shall be fixed by the
Governor of Albay to the end that it will not impair in
any way your efficiency; and
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 546, 692-700. OMB-ADM-1-01-0462 is
also referred to as OMB-ADM-1-01-0462-1 in some
parts of the records.
8 Id., at p. 754.
9 Id., at p. 543.
10 Id., Vol. I, pp. 270, 273.
11 Id., at pp. 270, 274.
242
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Monares vs. Muñoz
3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be
a ground for the cancellation and/or revocation of
this authority.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the DILG’s authorization, Governor
Bichara imposed the following conditions upon
Muñoz:
a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of
Albay;
b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic)
working hours provided that the efficiency of the
Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced;
c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your
Daily Time Record considering the limitation already
mentioned above; [and]
d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are to
perform functions subject to limitations in Sec. 481 of
RA 7160.13
Muñoz emphasized that his authority to engage in
private practice was renewed by Governor Bichara on
July 3, 1998 for his second term ending in July 2001,
and again on July 5, 2001 for his third term ending in
July 2004.14
The complaints were separately referred by the Court
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.15 The
complaints were then consolidated through the
Order dated January 16, 2003 issued by
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan.16 Subsequently,
the complaints underwent a series of reassignments,
until finally assigned to Commissioner Dorotea B.
Aguila.17
_______________
12 Id., at p. 276.
13 Id., at p. 277.
14 Id., Vol. II, p. 547.
15 Id., Vol. I, p. 289; id., Vol. II, p. 543.
16 Id., Vol. II, p. 544.
17 Id.
243
VOL. 815, JANUARY 24, 2017
243
Monares vs. Muñoz
In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report),
Commissioner Aguila recommended that Muñoz be
found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for an aggregate
period of four (4) years19 was recommended. On
automatic review, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG) approved and adopted Commissioner Aguila’s
recommendation in a Resolution dated October 22,
2005.20
On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte
Appeal for Mercy, Clemency and Compassion before
the IBP-BOG, praying that the recommended penalty
be reduced to one (1) year.21 This appeal was denied
on January 28, 2006.22
145
Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for
Mercy, Clemency, Forgiveness and Compassion23
(Appeal) dated April 8, 2006 praying for the reduction
of the recommended penalty of suspension for four
(4) years to one (1) year or less, and the dismissal of
the complaints for disbarment filed against him. As an
alternative prayer, Muñoz requested that he be
granted special limited authority to practice law until
all his pending cases are terminated.24
In his Appeal, Muñoz, insisted that when he served as
Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995 to May 2002,
he engaged in private practice pursuant to the three
(3) written authorities issued by Governor Bichara,
and the written authority of the DILG issued during his
first term, which he claims had never been revoked.
Muñoz also argued that no conflict of interest existed
between ALECO’s old BOD and the NEA
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 543-553.
19 Id., at p. 553. Three (3) years for unauthorized
practice of law, plus one (1) year for acts of disloyalty.
20 Id., at pp. 541-542.
21 Id., at pp. 555-557 and 559.
22 Id., at p. 559.
23 Id., at pp. 558-562.
24 Id., at p. 561.
244
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Monares vs. Muñoz
management team, since he was engaged as retained
counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its
management teams.25
On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand
Muñoz’s Appeal to the IBP for disposition.26
Acting on Muñoz’s Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a
Resolution reducing the recommended period of
suspension from four (4) to three (3) years.27
Unsatisfied, Muñoz filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the IBP-BOG denied on
December 11, 2008.28
Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this
Court through this Joint Petition. In fine, Muñoz
reiterates the allegations in his Appeal, with the
additional assertion that the fees he collected from
ALECO were contemplated under their retainer
agreement.29
The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG’s findings and
recommendations.
Muñoz violated the
conditions of his DILG
authorization.
Munoz’s DILG authorization prohibited him from
utilizing government time for his private practice. As
correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires government
officers and employees of all departments and
agencies, except those covered by special laws, to
render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for
five (5) days a
_______________
25 Id., at pp. 559-560.
26 Id., at pp. 570-571.
27 Id., at pp. 597-598.
28 Id., at pp. 595-596.
29 Id., at p. 618.
245
VOL. 815, JANUARY 24, 2017
245
Monares vs. Muñoz
week, or a total of forty (40) hours a week.30 The
number of required weekly working hours may not be
reduced, even in cases where the department or
agency adopts a flexible work schedule.31
Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares’ allegation
that he made at least eighty-six (86) court
appearances in connection with at least thirty (30)
cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He
merely alleged that his private practice did not
prejudice the functions of his office.
Court appearances are necessarily made within
regular government working hours, from 8:00 in the
morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise required to
study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial.
The sheer volume of cases handled by Muñoz clearly
indicates that government time was necessarily
utilized in pursuit of his private practice, in clear
violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.0234 of
the CPR.
Muñoz should have requested
for authority to engage in
private practice from the
146
Secretary of DILG for his sec-
ond and third terms.
Acting Secretary Aguirre’s grant of authority cannot
be unreasonably construed to have been perpetual.
Moreover, Mu-
_______________
30 Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws,
Rule XVII, Section 5.
31 Id., Section 6.
32 Rollo (A.C. No. 5582), Vol. I, pp. 5-12.
33 Id., Vol. II, pp. 608-609.
34 Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 provides:
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall
not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.
246
246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Monares vs. Muñoz
ñoz cannot claim that he believed in good faith that
the authority granted by Governor Bichara for his
second and third terms sufficed.
Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986
(Memorandum 17), which Muñoz himself cites in his
Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. The power to grant authority to
engage in the practice of one’s profession to officers
and employees in the public service lies with the head
of the department, in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which
provides, in part:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without
a written permission from the head of Department:
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further,
That if an employee is granted permission to engage
in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee x x x. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years
prior to Muñoz’s appointment as Provincial Legal
Officer, hence, he cannot feign ignorance thereof. As
a local public official, it was incumbent upon Muñoz
to secure the proper authority from the Secretary of
the DILG not only for his first term, but also his second
and third. His failure to do so rendered him liable for
unauthorized practice of his profession and violation
of Rule 1.0135 of the CPR.
_______________
35 Rule 1.01, Canon 1 provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
247
VOL. 815, JANUARY 24, 2017
247
Monares vs. Muñoz
Muñoz represented
conflicting interests.
Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal’s allegations of
disloyalty. In Mabini Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo,36 the
Court explained the tests to determine the existence
of conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interest if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
147
As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he
acted as counsel for ALECO under the management of
the old BOD in the following cases:
_______________
36 A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015, 763 SCRA 288, 294-
295, citing Hornilla v. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108, 111-112;
405 SCRA 220, 223 (2003).
248
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Monares vs. Muñoz
A. Civil Case No. 10007 — ALECO (Petitioner) v.
Eleuterio Adonay, NEA Project Supervisor and his
team John Catral et. al., a case filed by Oliver O.
Olaybal and his group. For: Injunction, Accounting
with Prayer for Writs of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to stop the
election of the new set of member (sic) of the Board
of Directors x x x.
B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. as Petitioner, also filed by Oliver
O. Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Receivership, with Preliminary Prohibition and
Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
and Mandatory Orders. Among others, this Petition
was filed to stop the second scheduled election of the
ALECO Board of Directors scheduled for February 23,
and 24, 2002.37 (Underscoring omitted; additional
emphasis supplied)
Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of
ALECO under the direction of the NEA management
team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his
advice would be sought with respect to the
prosecution of the members of the old BOD,
considering that the latter was deactivated due to
alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest
between Olaybal’s board on one hand, and NEA and
its management team on the other, is apparent. By
representing conflicting interests without the
permission of all parties involved, Muñoz violated
Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.38
_______________
37 Rollo (A.C. 5582), Vol. II, pp. 629-630.
38 Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of Canon 15 provide:
Rule 15.01 – A lawyer, in conferring with a
prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a
conflict with another client or his own interest, and if
so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
xxxx
249
VOL. 815, JANUARY 24, 2017
249
Monares vs. Muñoz
In Catu v. Rellosa,39 the Court imposed the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months upon a punong
barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an
ejectment case without securing the authority of the
Secretary of DILG. In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40 the
Court imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension
upon a lawyer who accepted a new engagement that
required him to oppose the interests of a party whom
he previously represented. In view of Muñoz’s
multiple infractions, the Court finds the
recommended penalty of suspension for an aggregate
period of three (3) years proper.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02,
15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective
upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of any violation hereunder shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Atty. Levi P. Muñoz suspended from practice of law
for three (3) years for gross misconduct and violation
of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of Code of
Professional Responsibility, with stern warning
against repetition of any violation hereunder.
Notes.—The prohibition against conflict of interest is
founded on principles of public policy, good taste and,
more
_______________
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
39 569 Phil. 539; 546 SCRA 209 (2008).
40 685 Phil. 322; 669 SCRA 76 (2012).
250
148
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Monares vs. Muñoz
importantly, upon necessity; In the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the
facts connected with the client’s case, including its
weak and strong points, which knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. (Pacana, Jr.
vs. Pascual-Lopez, 594 SCRA 1 [2009])
Lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged
in the practice of law—their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of
members of the Bar as the fact of their being law
professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that
they are lawyers. (Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty
Entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,” 644 SCRA
543 [2011])
——o0o—— Monares vs. Muñoz, 815 SCRA 237, A.C.
No. 5582, A.C. No. 5604, A.C. No. 5652 January 24,
2017
Bar Matter No. 712. March 19, 1997.*
RE: Petition of AL ARGOSINO To Take The Lawyer’s
Oath
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The practice of law is a
privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of
lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice.—The practice of
law is a privilege granted only to those who possess
the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. It is
the sworn duty of this Court not only to “weed out”
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble
profession of the law but, also of equal importance,
to prevent “misfits” from taking the lawyer’s oath,
thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers
which in recent years has undoubtedly become less
than irreproachable.
________________
* EN BANC.
27
VOL. 270, MARCH 19, 1997
27
In Re: Al Argosino
Same; Same; Hazing; Parent and Child; The death of
one’s child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience, and the suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death
is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties.—
Before anything else, the Court understands and
shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The
death of one’s child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death
is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The
feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death. Atty.
Camaligan’s statement before the Court manifesting
his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for
a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find
room for forgiveness.
Same; Same; Lawyer’s Oath; In allowing Mr. Argosino
to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that
he is not inherently of bad moral fiber.—After a very
careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer’s
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition: In allowing
Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service. The Court
is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts
to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking
judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be
rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
Same; Same; Same; Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES
weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer’s oath.—We stress to
Mr. Argosino that the lawyer’s oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
according to the sworn promises he makes when
taking the lawyer’s oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer’s oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
Petition to Take the Lawyer’s Oath.
149

28
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Al Argosino
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Rene V. Sarmiento and Benedicto A. Malcontento
for Al C. Argosino.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner’s
conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September
1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The
eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and
upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered
judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each
of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein
petitioner’s application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order
approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by
the Probation Officer recommending petitioner’s
discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a
petition to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath based
on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior
Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to
submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.
29
VOL. 270, MARCH 19, 1997
29
In Re: Al Argosino
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner
submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two
(2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had
been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter’s
family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty.
Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner’s prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath. In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty.
Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical
injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense
therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte’s
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused’s plea of guilt to the
lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the
accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused
who went to their house on Christmas Day 1991 and
Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees,
crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion.
They also told him that the father of one of the
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of
his son’s involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-
accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain
of an untimely demise and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is
now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the
Court.
30
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Al Argosino
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those
who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to “weed out” lawyers who have
become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law
but, also of equal importance, to prevent “misfits”
from taking the lawyer’s oath, thereby further
150
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent
years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a
weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing
or disallowing petitioner’s admission to the practice
of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar since they
were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
“x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding
that the participant [herein petitioner] was then
possessed of good moral character.”1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the
Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and
shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The
death of one’s child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death
is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The
feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death.
________________
1 Resolution, p. 8.
31
VOL. 270, MARCH 19, 1997
31
In Re: Al Argosino
Atty. Camaligan’s statement before the Court
manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less
than praiseworthy and commendable. It is
exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in
this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in
a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be
a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve
to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice
the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the
Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently
of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a
genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted
all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth
to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer’s oath is
NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
according to the sworn promises he makes when
taking the lawyer’s oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer’s oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will
continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer’s
oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll
of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.
32
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tabaco
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino allowed to take
lawyer’s oath.
Notes.—Any act on the part of a lawyer which visibly
tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the
administration of justice is contumacious, calling for
both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting
application of the contempt power. (Masinsin vs.
Albano, 232 SCRA 631 [1994])
A lawyer is not a gun for hire. (Millare vs. Montero,
246 SCRA 1 [1995])
A lawyer, by his deceitful actuations constituting
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
must be subjected to disciplinary measures for his
own good, as well as for the good of the entire
membership of the Bar as a whole. (Igual vs. Javier,
254 SCRA 416 [1996])
——o0o—— In Re: Al Argosino, 270 SCRA 26, Bar
Matter No. 712 March 19, 1997
151
BAR MATTER NO. 135. January 29, 1987.*
PETITION OF SOCORRO KE. LADRERA, 1954
SUCCESSFUL BAR EXAMINEE TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S
OATH.
Attorneys; Thirty-two years of having been denied
admission to the Bar is sufficient chastisement for a
man who, though morally delinquent in his younger
years has made up for it by observing a
________________
* EN BANC.
351
VOL. 147, JANUARY 29, 1987
351
InRe: Socorro Ke. Ladrera
respectable, useful and religious life since then as
attested by prominent citizens and his children from
the three women he married in regard which the
cases against him for bigamy, etc. were resolved in his
favor.—The records show various indorsements of
good character from lawyers, a law professor in
Davao City, a congressman, and others. A priest, Fr.
Emiliano Sabandal attested that Ladrera “is a man of
high moral character, humble and possessed with an
innate religious quality; as a consequence thereof he
is a daily communicant of the blessed sacrament.” In
the 32 years since Ladrera passed the bar
examinations, he has supported and sent through
college all his children by the three women he
married—a daughter by Florencia Orticio, three
children by Lucila Casas, and five children by Socorro
Santos. Some of the children have joined their father
in his many petitions asking for the privilege of taking
his lawyer’s oath.
Same; Same.—Ladrera was a guerrilla officer during
World War II in Bohol and Mindanao. After the war,
he was elected head of the Davao War Veterans
Association and led the veterans’ movement to
acquire some of the lands left by Japanese-owners.
He became a successful businessman in Davao,
acquiring a gasoline station, three corn and rice mills,
and a transportation line called “Ladrera Overland
Transit”. There was moral delinquency in Mr.
Ladrera’s younger days but he has made up for it by
observing a respectable, useful, and religious life
since then. Thirty-two years of rejecting his petitions
are enough for chastisement and retribution.
Considering that the respondent has realized the
wrongfulness of his past conduct and demonstrated a
sincere willingness to make up for that moral lapse,
the Court has decided to admit him to membership in
the Philippine bar.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Socorro Ke. Ladrera passed the 1954 bar
examinations. Before he could participate in the
scheduled oath taking of successful bar examinees, an
administrative complaint for immorality was filed
against him by Lucila C. Casas.
Lucila stated that she and Ladrera were married on
May 23, 1944 and that when she married him, he
represented himself to be single. Sometime in 1948,
Lucila learned that her husband had been previously
married on March 23, 1936 to Florencia
352
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
InRe: Socorro Ke. Ladrera
Orticio by whom he had a child called Monserrat.
Lucila filed a case for annulment of her marriage to
Ladrera on October 5, 1949. A decision was rendered
on February 13,1950 annulling the marriage and
ordering Ladrera to give P40.00 a month for the
support of his three minor children with Lucila.
In 1951, Socorro Ladrera filed a civil case to declare
his first wife, Florencia Orticio as presumptively dead,
In a November 24,1951 decision, the Court of First
Instance of Davao stated that Ladrera and Orticio
were married on March 23, 1936 in the Roman
Catholic church of Capul, Samar. The couple had a
daughter, Monserrat Ladrera, who lived with the
petitioner from birth up to the date of the decision. It
appears that, while the couple were living in Cebu,
Florencia Orticio eloped with a certain Ramon
Esteban and left the conjugal home without the
petitioner’s knowledge. Inspite of allegedly
determined searches by the petitioner in Samar,
Cebu, Bohol, and Manila, Florencia could not be
located or her whereabouts ascertained. The court
therefore ruled “that the petition to declare Florencia
Orticio presumptively dead for all intents and
purposes of law has satisfactorily been established.”
Petitioner Ladrera had three children with his second
wife, Lucila C. Casas.
Sometime after the judicial declaration that his first
wife was presumptively dead, Ladrera married his
third wife, Socorro Santos by whom he has five
children. After Ladrera married a third time, his first
wife showed up and filed a bigamy case against him
with the Court of First Instance of Davao. According
to the immorality complaint filed by Lucila, the
second wife, this bigamy case was later dismissed as
a result of alleged monetary concessions which
152
Ladrera made in favor of Orticio. Incidentally, the
latest information about Florencia Orticio is that she
is quite well off, having inherited properties from her
parents and that she teaches Spanish at the
University of Eastern Philippines in Catarman, Samar.
On the basis of the administrative complaint filed
against Ladrera, this Court suspended his oath taking
and directed him to file an answer to the complaint.
In his Answer, Ladrera alleged that:
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VOL. 147, JANUARY 29, 1987
353
In Re: Socorro Ke. Ladrera
“x x x [W]hen he married complainant, he honestly
believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was
already dead; that complainant in fact knew that
respondent was previously married because
respondent’s child with Florencia Orticio lived with
respondent and complainant after the latter’s
marriage and until its annulment; that respondent
has paid all the monthly pensions to complainant’s
three minor children; that respondent later
discovered that complainant’s motive in suing for
annulment of her marriage to respondent was to get
a share of the properties acquired by respondent, and
as a matter of fact, complainant has squandered and
sold the properties adjudicated to her in Civil Case No.
470, and the money realized from the sales was not
used for the benefit of their children; that the value
of the properties adjudicated to the complainant in
the case for liquidation of conjugal properties was
approximately P37,000.00; that respondent married
Socorro Santos and still lives with her in view of the
decision in Civil Case No. 501, dated November 24,
1951, declaring respondent’s first wife, Florencia
Orticio presumptively dead; that respondent’s
admission in Civil Case No. 399 for annulment of
complainant’s marriage, that Florencia Orticio was
alive and residing in Manila was made in good faith,
he having then received information from his brother,
Fr. Emerardo Ladrera, that Florencia Orticio was in
Manila; that subsequent search and inquiries,
however, led the respondent to believe that Florencia
Orticio was not alive and this resulted in the filing by
respondent of the petition in Civil Case No. 501,
praying that Florencia Orticio be declared
presumptively dead; that Criminal Case No. 1863,
against the respondent for bigamy, was dismissed by
the Court of First Instance of Davao upon motion of
the City Attorney of Davao; that the mere filing of civil
cases against respondent does not necessarily reflect
immorality on his part, not to mention the
circumstances that said cases were settled or
otherwise dismissed; that complainant’s charges
were motivated by hatred and revenge, intended as a
ruse to compel respondent to give to complainant
another ten hectares of first class agricultural land
located in Monteverde, Calinan, Davao City, plus
complainant’s desire to put respondent down
politically.”
The then Supreme Court Clerk of Court, Jose S. de la
Cruz, was ordered to investigate the administrative
charge and to submit his report.
On August 31, 1955, de la Cruz submitted his Report,
the salient portion of which reads:
354
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Socorro Ke. Ladrera
“It is noteworthy that the complainant had chosen
not to testify in the investigation, and that by merely
presenting documentary evidence consisting of
copies of the complaint f or annulment of marriage in
Civil Case No. 399; the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao in said case annulling the marriage
between complainant and respondent; the decision
in Special Case No. 501 wherein the Court of First
Instance of Davao declared respondent’s first wife,
Florencia Orticio, presumptively dead; the order of
the Court of First Instance of Davao in Criminal Case
No. 1863 against respondent for bigamy, dismissing
said case, the complainant is basing her charges of
immorality against respondent upon the latter’s bad
faith arising from the fact that, while in the annulment
proceedings respondent and his attorney admitted
that Florencia Orticio was aHve, in Special Case No.
501 filed in 1951 by respondent, the latter claimed
that said Florencia Orticio could not be located and
was unheard from for several years, and from the fact
that he married for the third time Socorro Santos
while respondent’s first wife was alive, and who, as a
matter of fact, filed a case for bigamy against
respondent.
“Upon the other hand, the respondent testified
during the investigation and declared that he acted in
good faith, first, in marrying complainant; secondly, in
instituting Special Case No. 501; and, thirdly, in
marrying Socorro Santos. He explained that when he
married complainant in 1944, he honestly believed
that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was already dead;
that he had to admit in the annulment proceedings,
Civil Case No. 399, that Florencia was alive because of
a letter he received from his brother, Fr. Ladrera; that
he filed the subsequent Special Case No. 501 after
153
suspecting that complainant’s purpose in annulling
her marriage to respondent was merely to obtain her
share in the conjugal properties, and in order also to
establish definitely his civil status; and that he
married his third wife, Socorro Santos, after the
decision in Special Case No. 501, declaring his first
wife Florencia presumptively dead, had become final.
“While the complainant’s charges are based upon
inferences or assumptions, the testimony of
respondent is unrefuted that he acted in good faith.
In the first place, the fact that no annulment
proceeding was instituted by complainant until after
three children were born to her marriage with
respondent, at least shows that Florencia Orticio was
not generally known to be alive. In the second place,
the admission by respondent and his counsel in the
annulment proceeding that Florencia was alive, is
explained by respondent’s receipt of a letter from his
brother, Fr. Ladrera, to the effect that she might still
be living, which at any rate was the very fact alleged
in the com
355
VOL. 147, JANUARY 29, 1987
355
In Re: Socorro Ke. Ladrera
plaint for annulment. In the third place, respondent
was constrained to file Special Case No. 501 because
he subsequently realized that complainant annulled
her marriage to respondent mainly to get her share of
their conjugal properties, and because he also wanted
to definitely settle his own civil status after failing to
locate the whereabouts of his first wife, Florencia
Orticio; and the respondent undoubtedly had the
right to look for Florencia after his marriage to
complainant was judicially set aside on the ground
that Florencia was alive. It is very significant that no
opposition whatsoever was interposed in Special Case
No. 501 either by complainant or by Florencia inspite
of due publication of the proceedings; and the final
decision therein can be said to have legally paved the
way for respondent’s third marriage to Socorro
Santos. As a matter of fact, in the order of the Court
of First Instance of Davao dismissing the bigamy case
against respondent, it was in effect held that
respondent married Socorro Santos without
fraudulent intent, and said order had become final.
“Complainant’s allegation that respondent has failed
to comply with his obligation to pay the monthly
support of his three children with complainant as
ordered in the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Davao in Civil Case No. 399, is neither touched nor
pressed in complainant’s memorandum. At any rate,
complainant may avail herself of any appropriate civil
remedy for the collection or enforcement (or even
increase) of said support; and respondent has
presented evidence to show that he had complied
with his obligation at least to the date of this
investigation in March, 1955. The claim that
respondent is immoral because of the filing against
him of several civil cases, deserves no serious
consideration since, according to respondent’s
evidence, said cases, aside from having been
dismissed or otherwise settled, do not necessarily
imply moral perversity.
“WHEREFORE, it is recommended that respondent
Socorro Ke. Ladrera be allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath.”
The favorable recommendation, notwithstanding,
this Court, on September 7, 1955 issued a resolution
disqualifying Ladrera from taking the lawyer’s oath, to
wit:
“Acting upon the complaint for immorality filed by
Lucila Casas against Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 1954
successful bar candidate; the answer filed by the
latter; the evidence taken during the investigation;
the report of the investigator; as well as all the
circumstances
356
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Socorro Ke. Ladrera
surrounding the case, the Court RESOLVED to
disqualify respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera from taking
the lawyer’s oath.''
A motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted
resolution was denied in another resolution issued on
October 11,1955.
Up to now or more than thirty-one years after he
passed the bar examinations, Ladrera has not been
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath. All his motions to
allow him to take the oath filed every year without fail
beginning on May 23, 1956 up to September 7, 1982
have been denied. Before us, now is Ladrera’s April
15,1985 urgent motion, to wit:
“NOW COMES your petitioner, by and for himself and
unto this Honorable Supreme Tribunal most
respectfully stated:
“That your petitioner has been deprived from taking
his Lawyer’s Oath as member of the Philippine Bar
since January 20, 1955, because of a petition of Lucila
C. Casas who has long ago withdrawn her complaint
and has in fact attested to the good reputation and
character of the herein respondent;
154
“That considering the time that has elapsed which is
already more than thirty (30) years is more than
sufficient punishment, your respondent now prays
this Honorable Tribunal to grant him the privilege to
take the Lawyer’s Oath together with the new
successful candidates scheduled to take their oath on
April 25, 1985 at the Philippine Convention Center,
Manila.”
On October 4, 1986, he wrote another letter, this time
to the Court Administrator asking for the approval of
his petition of nearly 32 years.
An applicant for admission to the bar must be of good
moral character. (Rule 138, Sec. 2). What constitutes
good moral character within the meaning of the rule
has been elucidated in precedent cases.
In Carmen E. Bacarro v. Ruben M. Pinataca (127 SCRA
218), this Court cited various precedent cases and
ruled:
“One of the indispensable requisites for admission to
the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of
good moral character. This requirement aims to
maintain and uphold the high moral standards and
the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the
ways of achiev
357
VOL. 147, JANUARY 29, 1987
357
InRe: Socorro Ke. Ladrera
ing this end is to admit to the practice of this noble
profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. (Martin,
Ruperto G., ‘Legal & Judicial Ethics,’ 5th ed., p. 15,
citing In Re Parazo, 82 PhiL 230) As a man of law, (a
lawyer) is necessarily a leader of the community,
looked up to as a model citizen.’ (Planza v. Arcangel,
21 SCRA 1, 4). He sets an example to his fellow citizens
not only for his respect for the law, but also for his
clean living. (Martin, supra, p. 36) Thus, becoming a
lawyer is more than just going through a law course
and passing the Bar examinations. One who has the
lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the
power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon the
qualifications, ability and moral character of
candidates for admission to the Bar, that he has
measured up to that rigid and ideal standard of moral
fitness required by his chosen vocation.”
The Court, in the past, consistently denied the annual
petitions of Ladrera that he be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath. He claimed that when he married his
second wife, he sincerely believed that his first wife
was already dead. He married his third wife only after
the first wife had been declared presumptively dead
and after his second marriage had been annulled.
There may have been compliance with a strict or
narrow interpretation of the letter of the law but the
Court was of the view that Ladrera had failed to live
up to the high moral standards required for
membership in the Bar.
All of that, however, is in the past. Ladrera now states
that if he has committed an act which justified the
suspension from taking the lawyer’s oath, the time
that has elapsed is more than sufficient punishment.
He submits that “he humbly believes with all candor
and sincerity that he has more than atoned for it by
living a very moral and exemplary life since then.”
Apart from his marital misadventures, there is
nothing in the records to warrant a permanent denial
of Ladrera’s petition. He worked as a janitor-
messenger in Cebu City while pursuing his college
education at night. He has also served in fairly
important positions in the government such as
Technical Assistant to President Ramon Magsaysay,
Special Assistant to President Carlos P. Garcia, and
member and later Chairman of the Board of People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation. 357
358
358
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Socorro Ke. Ladrera
He has served as Treasurer of the Escolta Walking
Corporation and Director of the Foreign Affairs
Association of the Philippines.
As early as 1960, then Senator Quintin Paredes
endorsed Ladrera’s petition stating that the latter was
“honest, dependable, and trustworthy” and followed
this up with another endorsement in 1966.
In July 13, 1966, Lucila Casas filed a motion for the
withdrawal or dismissal of her complaint. Casas
stated as her “considered opinion” that Ladrera has
been sufficiently punished by the then 12-year
suspension of his oathtaking as a lawyer. Casas stated
that her children by Ladrera—Teresita, graduating
with AB and BSC degrees; Belen, preparatory
medicine student; and Socorro, Jr. an engineering
student—were suffering from the stigma of the
punishment which arose from her complaint. Casas
observed that Ladrera was “behaving well and leading
an exemplary life.”
The records show various indorsements of good
character from lawyers, a law professor in Davao City,
a congressman, and others. A priest, Fr. Emiliano
Sabandal attested that Ladrera “is a man of high
moral character, humble and possessed with an
155
innate religious quality; as a consequence thereof he
is a daily communicant of the blessed sacrament.”
In the 32 years since Ladrera passed the bar
examinations, he has supported and sent through
college all his children by the three women he
married—a daughter by Florencia Orticio, three
children by Lucila Casas, and five children by Socorro
Santos. Some of the children have joined their father
in his many petitions asking for the privilege of taking
his lawyer’s oath.
Ladrera was a guerrilla officer during World War II in
Bohol and Mindanao. After the war, he was elected
head of the Davao War Veterans Association and led
the veterans’ movement to acquire some of the lands
left by Japanese-owners. He became a successful
businessman in Davao, acquiring a gasoline station,
three corn and rice mills, and a transportation line
called “Ladrera Overland Transit”.
There was moral delinquency in Mr. Ladrera’s
younger days
359
VOL. 147, JANUARY 29, 1987
359
People vs. Dela Cruz
but he has made up for it by observing a respectable,
useful, and religious life since then. Thirty-two years
of rejecting his petitions are enough for chastisement
and retribution. Considering that the respondent has
realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and
demonstrated a sincere willingness to make up for
that moral lapse, the Court has decided to admit him
to membership in the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION of Mr. Socorro Ke. Ladrera
to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-
Herrera, Alampay, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla and
Bidin, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., on leave.
Petition granted.
Notes.—Court may suspend or debar a lawyer whose
acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of
the Bar. (Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136
SCRA 112.)
Admission to the Bar obtained under false pretenses
must be revoked. (Diao vs. Martinez, 7 SCRA 475.)
Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys wipes out the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from a previous
disbarment. (Cui vs. Cui, 11 SCRA 755.)
——o0o—— In Re: Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 147 SCRA
350, BAR MATTER NO. 135 January 29, 1987
Bar Matter No. 1036. June 10, 2003.*
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN
L. RANA, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Practice of law means
any activity in or out of court which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience; To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession.—In Cayetano v.
Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law” means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Same; Same; Having held himself out as “counsel”
knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.—Verily, respondent
was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared
in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself “counsel” knowing fully
well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held
himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no
authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Same; Same; The practice of law is a privilege that can
be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.—The right to practice
law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed
the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license.
Same; Same; Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
156
contempt of court.—The regulation of the practice of
law is unques-
_______________
* EN BANC.
343
VOL. 403, JUNE 10, 2003
343
Aguirre vs. Rana
tionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate
passed the bar examinations but had not taken his
oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his
admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.
Same; Same; It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys
that finally makes one a full-pledged lawyer; Fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial.—True, respondent here passed the 2000
Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the
Roll of Attorneys.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
Unauthorized Practice of Law, Grave Misconduct,
Violation of Law, and Grave Misrepresentation.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Percival D. Castillo for complainant.
Raul Tito A. Estrella for respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must
possess the requisite moral integrity for membership
in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity
is of greater importance than possession of legal
learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed
only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally
unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (“respondent”) was among
those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members
of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie
Aguirre (“complainant”) filed against
344
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Rana
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a
member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking
on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys
pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized
practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant
alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed
with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled
Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor.
In this pleading, respondent represented himself as
“counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, George Bunan,” and signed the pleading
as counsel for George Bunan (“Bunan”).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims
that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave, misconduct and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent
of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan (“Bunan”) without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
157
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution
allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the
same resolution, the Court required respondent to
comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan
sought his “specific assistance” to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that “he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer
345
VOL. 403, JUNE 10, 2003
345
Aguirre vs. Rana
but as a person who knows the law.” Respondent
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign
the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an
“attorney” in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of
the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation
dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint
is politically motivated considering that complainant
is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to
respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was
only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily
Estipona-Hao (“Estipona-Hao”) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this
petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEO, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not
taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is “motivated mainly by political
vendetta.”
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (“OBC”) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared
before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minuses of the MBEC proceedings
show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent
appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he
took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a
346
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Rana
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground
to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC
therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant
failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent
resigned as secretary and his resignation was
accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by
Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the
OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission
to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001,
before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in
the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent
signed as “counsel for George Bunan.” In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated
that he was the “(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN” Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May
2001 that he had “authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as
his counsel to represent him” before the MBEC and
similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-
Hao also “retained” respondent as her counsel. On
the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the
158
MBEC that “Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized
by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party
and the candidate of the said party.” Respondent
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his “appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA
LM-PPC” On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before
the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-
Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.
347
VOL. 403, JUNE 10, 2003
347
Aguirre vs. Rana
All these happened even before respondent took the
lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the
Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the
law, incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that “practice
of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law
when he appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to
do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called
himself “counsel” knowing fully well that he was not
a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
“counsel” knowing that he had no authority to
practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness
to be a member of the Philippine Bar.3
The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character
_______________
1 105 Phil. 173 (1959).
2 G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210.
3 Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 211 Phil. 252; 126 SCRA 60
(1983).
348
348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Rana
with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is
an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed
the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license.5
The regulation of the practice of law is
unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not
taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He
was held in contempt of court for practicing law even
before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e)
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages
in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
indirect contempt of court.7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it
is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8
Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the
Roll of Attorneys.9
159
On the charge of violation of law, complainant
contends that the law does not allow respondent to
act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained
of as constituting un-
_______________
4 In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to
Continue Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, etc.,
30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1.
5 Ui v. Bonifacio, Administrative Case No. 3319, 8 June
2000, 333 SCRA 38.
6 Bar Matter No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.
7 People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, 21
December 1999, 321 SCRA 310.
8 Diao v. Martinez, Administrative Case No. 244, 29
March 1963, 7 SCRA 475.
9 Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, 28 March 1983,
121 SCRA 217.
349
VOL. 403, JUNE 10, 2003
349
Aguirre vs. Rana
authorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May
2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent, stated that he was resigning “effective
upon your acceptance.”10 Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May
2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the
charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client
while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan
indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While
there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED
admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
Panganibasn, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Respondent denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
Note.—The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege
or franchise—it is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. (People vs. Santocildes, Jr., 321 SCRA
310 [1999])
——o0o——
Aguirre vs. Rana, 403 SCRA 342, Bar Matter No. 1036
June 10, 2003
A.C. No. 8010. June 16, 2009.*
KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO
A. LIWANAG and WINSTON P.L. ESGUERRA,
complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment;
Respondent cannot defeat the Court’s jurisdiction
over him as a member of the bar nor evade
administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing
his whereabouts.—The respondent did not file any
answer or position
_______________
* EN BANC.
115
VOL. 589, JUNE 16, 2009
115
Stemmerik vs. Mas
paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled
mandatory conference. Respondent in fact
abandoned his last known address, his law office in
Olongapo City, after he committed the
embezzlement. Respondent should not be allowed to
benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither
defeat this Court’s jurisdiction over him as a member
of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the
mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus,
service of the complaint and other orders and
processes on respondent’s office was sufficient notice
to him.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers must update their
records with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) by informing the IBP National Office or their
respective chapters of any change in office or
residential address and other contact details.—
Lawyers must update their records with the IBP by
informing the IBP National Office or their respective
chapters of any change in office or residential address
and other contact details. In case such change is not
duly updated, service of notice on the office or
residential address appearing in the records of the IBP
National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a
lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings
against him.
160
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers, as members of the
noble profession, have the duty to promote respect
for the law and uphold the integrity of the bar;
Exacting standards of the legal profession has been
found wanting on respondent.—Lawyers, as
members of a noble profession, have the duty to
promote respect for the law and uphold the integrity
of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the
law, they must ensure that the law functions to
protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression
or deception. Respondent has been weighed by the
exacting standards of the legal profession and has
been found wanting.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent Attoney Leonuel N.
Mas is disbarred.—Respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas
is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to
immediately strike out the name of respondent from
the Roll of Attorneys.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
116
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stemmerik vs. Mas
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident
of Denmark. In one of his trips to the Philippines, he
was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas.
That was his misfortune.
In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled
at the beauty of the country and expressed his
interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines.
He consulted respondent who advised him that he
could legally acquire and own real property in the
Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998
sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic,
Zambales with the assurance that the property was
alienable.
Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase
the property through respondent as his
representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also
engaged the services of respondent for the
preparation of the necessary documents. For this
purpose, respondent demanded and received a
P400,000 fee.
Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out
his task, complainant returned to Denmark,
entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork
to respondent.
Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell
the property between complainant, represented by
respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the
purported owner of the property.1 Subsequently,
respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in
which de Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a
certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8 million.2 Respondent
also
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 16-17.
2 Id., pp. 18-20. The circumstance of the fictitious sale
to Gonzales was never adequately discussed by the
complainant. However, coupled with the fact that
respondent prepared and notarized another
agreement (this time between Gonzales and
complainant) whereby Gonzales recognized
complainant as the source of funds,
117
VOL. 589, JUNE 16, 2009
117
Stemmerik vs. Mas
drafted and notarized an agreement between
complainant and Gonzales stating that it was
complainant who provided the funds for the purchase
of the property.3 Complainant then gave respondent
the full amount of the purchase price (P3.8 million)
for which respondent issued an acknowledgment
receipt.4
After the various contracts and agreements were
executed, complainant tried to get in touch with
respondent to inquire about when the property could
be registered in his name. However, respondent
suddenly became scarce and refused to answer
complainant’s calls and e-mail messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in
January 2005, he engaged the services of the Jimenez
Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez
Law Office to ascertain the status of the property he
supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that
aliens could not own land under Philippine laws.
Moreover, verification at the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the
property was inalienable as it was situated within the
former US Military Reservation.5 The CENRO also
stated that the property was not subject to
disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No.
141.6
161
Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-
fact,7 exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent for
purposes of holding him accountable for his
fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the Olongapo Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed
that respondent was in arrears in his annual dues and
that he had already abandoned his law office in
_______________
this showed that the sale to Gonzales was a link in the
chain of acts committed by respondent to defraud
complainant.
3 Id., pp. 22-23.
4 Id., p. 21.
5 Certification dated February 7, 2005. Id., p. 24.
6 Id.
7 Attys. Herminio A. Liwanag and Winston P.L.
Esguerra.
118
118
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stemmerik vs. Mas
Olongapo City.8 Search of court records of cases
handled by respondent only yielded his abandoned
office address in Olongapo City.
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the IBP.9 He deplored respondent’s acts of serious
misconduct. In particular, he sought the expulsion of
respondent from the legal profession for gravely
misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire
land in the Philippines and for maliciously absconding
with complainant’s P3.8 million.10
Respondent failed to file his answer and position
paper despite service of notice at his last known
address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled
mandatory conference. In this connection, the CBD
found that respondent abandoned his law practice in
Olongapo City after his transaction with complainant
and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges
against him.11
The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a
lawyer to mislead complainant on the matter of land
ownership by a foreigner.12 He even went through
the motion of preparing falsified and fictitious
contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these
shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from
complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million
and absconded with it.13
The CBD found respondent to be “nothing more than
an embezzler” who misused his professional status as
an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and
absconding with
_______________
8 At the 3rd Floor of the Mely Rose Building at 34-
23rd Street, WBB, Olongapo City.
9 Rollo, pp. 1-8.
10 Id.
11 Report and Recommendation dated March 31,
2008 penned by Investigating Commissioner Rico A.
Limpingco. Id., pp. 45-47.
12 Id.
13 Id.
119
VOL. 589, JUNE 16, 2009
119
Stemmerik vs. Mas
complainant’s money.14 Respondent was dishonest
and deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence
reposed by complainant in him. The CBD
recommended the disbarment of respondent.15
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the
findings and recommendation of the CBD with the
modification that respondent was further required to
return the amount of P4.2 million to respondent.16
We agree with the IBP.
Sufficiency of Notice of the
Disbarment Proceedings
We shall first address a threshold issue: was
respondent properly given notice of the disbarment
proceedings against him? Yes.
The respondent did not file any answer or position
paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled
mandatory conference. Respondent in fact
abandoned his last known address, his law office in
Olongapo City, after he committed the
embezzlement.
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his
disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Court’s
jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor
evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of
concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the
complaint and other orders and processes on
respondent’s office was sufficient notice to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of
notice on him impossible, the notice requirement
cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have
waived it. The law does not require that the
impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impos-
_______________
14 Id.
162
15 Id.
16 Resolution No. XVIII-2008-423 dated May 22,
2008. Id., pp. 43-44.
120
120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stemmerik vs. Mas
sibile.17 The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a
way that they are in accordance with logic, common
sense, reason and practicality.18
In this connection, lawyers must update their records
with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or
their respective chapters19 of any change in office or
residential address and other contact details.20 In
case such change is not duly updated, service of
notice on the office or residential address appearing
in the records of the IBP National Office shall
constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes
of administrative proceedings against him.
Respondent’s Administrative Infractions
and his Liability Therefor
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the
duty to promote respect for the law and uphold the
integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted
with the law, they must ensure that the law functions
to protect liberty and not as an instrument of
oppression or deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting
standards of the legal profession and has been found
wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath
as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of
the Code of
_______________
17 Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corporation, G.R.
No. 170943, 23 September 2008, 566 SCRA 272.
18 Id.
19 In case the update is done in one’s chapter, the
said chapter shall promptly notify the IBP National
Office about the matter.
20 In this connection, the relevant portion of Section
19, Article II of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
Every change after registration in respect to any of
the matters above specified [including office and
residence addresses] shall be reported within sixty
(60) days to the Chapter Secretary, who shall in turn
promptly report the change to the National Office.
121
VOL. 589, JUNE 16, 2009
121
Stemmerik vs. Mas
Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the
legal profession.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution,
to obey the laws and to do no falsehood.21 That oath
is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It
is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept
inviolable at all times.22
Lawyers are servants of the law23 and the law is their
master. They should not simply obey the laws, they
should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto
by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed,
that is the first precept of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
“SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corpora-
_______________
21 The Lawyer’s Oath which is taken by all members
of the bar as a prerequisite for their admission to the
legal profession states:
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as
a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good faith and fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
this voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
22 Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161, 14 April 2004,
427 SCRA 108.
23 Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008,
546 SCRA 209.
122
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stemmerik vs. Mas
tions, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.”
163
This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as
the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,24 to
mean that “under the Constitution, aliens may not
acquire private or agricultural lands, including
residential lands.” The provision is a declaration of
imperative constitutional policy.25
Respondent, in giving advice that directly
contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,
showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross
ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious
documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell
the property to complainant and that de Mesa
thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made
the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he
falsified public documents and knowingly violated the
Anti-Dummy Law.26
Respondent’s misconduct did not end there. By
advising complainant that a foreigner could legally
and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and
by assuring complainant that the property was
alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a
falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to
the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and
misled him into parting with P400,000 for services
that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover,
by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million
given by complainant for the purchase of the
property, respondent committed a fraudulent act
that was criminal in nature.
_______________
24 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
25 Godinez v. Pak Luen, 205 Phil. 176; 120 SCRA 223
(1983).
26 Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 715.
123
VOL. 589, JUNE 16, 2009
123
Stemmerik vs. Mas
Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the
process, he committed unethical act after unethical
act, wantonly violating laws and professional
standards.
For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyer’s
oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He also transgressed the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE
CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
(emphasis supplied)
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to
circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to
further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of
others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule
of law and to the legal system. He does not only
tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays
everything that the legal profession stands for.
It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad
name and make laymen support Dick the Butcher’s
call, “Kill
124
124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stemmerik vs. Mas
all lawyers!”27 A disgrace to their professional
brethren, they must be purged from the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is
hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to
immediately strike out the name of respondent from
the Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to
complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount of P4.2
million with interest at 12% per annum from the date
of promulgation of this resolution until full payment.
Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the
Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days
from payment.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is
ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the appropriate
criminal charges against him. The NBI is further
DIRECTED to regularly report the progress of its action
in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the
164
personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator
who shall inform all courts of the Philippines, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall
disseminate copies to all its chapters and members
and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of
the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ.,
concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., On Official Leave.
Atty. Leonuel N. Mas disbarred.
_______________ Stemmerik vs. Mas, 589 SCRA 114,
A.C. No. 8010 June 16, 2009
A.C. No. 6010. August 28, 2006.*
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL
(SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such
privilege—membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions.—At the threshold, it is
worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only
during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained
_______________
* EN BANC.
615
VOL. 499, AUGUST 28, 2006
615
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.
Without invading any constitutional privilege or right,
an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by
a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering
him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or
disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved
him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and,
thus, to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish an
attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v.
Atty. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 (1997), that the Bar
should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings
honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public
in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath
or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which
include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad
enough to cover practically any misconduct of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
Same; Same; The law profession does not prescribe a
dichotomy of standards among its members.—
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession
does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among
its members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life. This is
because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, not only his professional activities but
even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the courts, may at any time be the
subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.
Same; Same; Possession of good moral character as
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice must be continuous.—One of the conditions
prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Possession of such
moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of
the privilege of law practice must be continuous.
Otherwise, “membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
conduct.”
616
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
165
Same; Same; Disbarment; A disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal
but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers.—Respondent was already a
member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous
second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the
Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the
mandate of the law that before a second marriage
may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting
marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate
court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4
October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or
about five years after respondent contracted his
second marriage. The annulment of respondent’s
second marriage has no bearing to the instant
disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier
emphasized, the an-nulment came after the
respondent’s second bigamous marriage. Secondly,
as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal
but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a
lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an
administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course, then neither will the judgment of annulment
of respondent’s second marriage also exonerate him
from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the
quantum of proof—clear preponderance of
evidence—in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.
Same; Same; Same; Grossly Immoral Conduct; Words
and Phrases; Immoral conduct is “that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community” and what is
“grossly immoral,” that is, “it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”—The Court
has laid down with a common definition of what
constitutes immoral conduct, vis-á-vis, grossly
immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is “that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community” and
what is “grossly immoral,” that is, “it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”
Undoubtedly, respon-dent’s act constitutes immoral
conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his
disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
617
VOL. 499, AUGUST 28, 2006
617
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
Same; Same; Same; The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and may be imposed
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court.—Based on the reasons stated
above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon
him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and may be imposed
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish
the end desired. In line with this philosophy, we find
that a penalty of two years suspension is more
appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension
recommended by the IBP is too light and not
commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
Same; Same; Notarial Law; Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act—it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.—It has been emphatically stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routi-nary
act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
of a private document converts the document into a
public one making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document
is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face
and, for this reason, notaries public must observe
with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined. The
requirements for the issuance of a commission as
notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act
of notarizing documents without the requisite
commission to do so as “reprehensible, constituting
as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime
of falsification of public documents.”
166
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members
and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High
School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz,
principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following
grounds:
618
618
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
1)Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is
a pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly
committed by him against a high school student filed
before the Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio City; a
pending administrative case filed by the Teachers,
Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating
Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional
and unethical acts of misappropriating money
supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor
case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC,
Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal
deduction of salary by respondent.
2)Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage; and
3)Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his
commission. According to complainant, respondent
was legally married to Tere-sita Rivera on 31 May
1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable
Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted
a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua,
before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On
4 October 1994, said second marriage was
subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged
that respondent deliberately subscribed and
notarized certain legal documents on different dates
from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondent’s notarial commission on 31 December
1987. A Certification1 dated 25 May 1999 was issued
by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not
applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the
City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997.
Respondent performed acts of notarization, as
evidenced by the following documents:
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 5.
619
VOL. 499, AUGUST 28, 2006
619
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
1. Affidavit of Ownership2 dated 8 March 1991,
executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
2. Affidavit3 dated 26 September 1992, executed by
Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit4 dated 14 January 1992, executed by
Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit5 dated 23 December 1993, executed by
Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale6 dated 23 June 1993,
executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C.
Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties7 dated 5
March 1994, executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and
Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement8 dated 31 May 1994, executed by
Felimon B. Ri-morin, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of Sale9 dated 17 August 1994, executed by
Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties10 dated
1 June 1994, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and
Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale11 dated 23 March 1995,
executed by Eleanor D. Meridor in favor of Leonardo
N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated 20 December
1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario R.
Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
_______________
2 Id., at p. 6.
3 Id., at pp. 7-8.
4 Id., at p. 9.
5 Id., at p. 10.
6 Id., at p. 11.
167
7 Id., at p. 12.
8 Id., at p. 13.
9 Id., at p. 14.
10 Id., at p. 15.
11 Id., at p. 16.
12 Id., at p. 17.
620
620
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties13
dated 17 April 1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong
and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13. Conditional Deed of Sale14 dated 27 February
1997, executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of
Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Ro-lando Dela
Cruz;
14. Memorandum of Agreement15 dated 19 July
1996, executed by JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny
Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr.
George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment,
denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of
salary and others which are still pending before the
St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutor’s Office. He
did not discuss anything about the allegations of
immorality in contracting a second marriage and
malpractice in notarizing documents despite the
expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred16 the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary
conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their
position paper which is just a reiteration of their
allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his
second marriage despite the existence of his first
marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the
former. He also admitted having notarized certain
documents during the period when his notarial
commission had already expired. However, he
offered some extenuating defenses such as good
faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the
complained acts.
_______________
13 Id., at p. 18.
14 Id., at pp. 19-21.
15 Id., at pp. 22-23.
16 Id., at p. 309.
621
VOL. 499, AUGUST 28, 2006
621
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
After the submission of their position papers, the case
was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco
submitted his report and recommended that:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent be administratively
penalized for the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking
the appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage
annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full
knowledge of the expiration of his notarial
commission, he be suspended from the practice of
law for another one (1) year or for a total of two (2)
years.17
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors,
approved and adopted the recommendation of
Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex “A” and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Respondent contracted a second
marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to
have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela
Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents
despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial
commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for
a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice
of law.18
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to
fault respondent well taken, except as to the penalty
contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice
of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of
_______________
168
17 Id., at p. 477.
18 Id., at p. 472.
622
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege
and right to practice law only during good behavior,
and he can be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.
Without invading any constitutional privilege or right,
an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by
a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering
him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or
disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved
him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and,
thus, to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish an
attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v.
Atty. Cabanting,19 that the Bar should maintain a
high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty
and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from
doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust re-posed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.
Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties
as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to
cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession
does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among
its members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life. This is
because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.20 Thus, not only his professional activities
_______________
19 338 Phil. 912, 916-917; 272 SCRA 408, 413 (1997).
20 In re: Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, 18 February
1970, 31 SCRA 562, 581.
623
VOL. 499, AUGUST 28, 2006
623
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
but even his private life, insofar as the latter may
reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige
of the profession and the courts, may at any time be
the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.21
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is
that an applicant must possess good moral character.
Possession of such moral character as requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be
continuous. Otherwise, “membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral conduct.”22
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that
respondent and Tere-sita Rivera contracted marriage
on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas.
In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their
irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial
recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their
separation in-fact, respondent never knew the
whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all
forms of communication with her. Seven years
thereafter, respondent became attracted to one
Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of
SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in
1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68.
Respondent even admitted this fact. When the
second marriage was entered into, respondent’s prior
marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no
action having been initiated before the court to
obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of
respondent’s prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita
Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when
he contracted the bigamous second marriage in 1989,
having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he
cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that
before a second marriage may be validly contracted,
the first and subsisting marriage must first be
annulled by the appropriate court. The second
marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994
_______________
169
21 Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, A.C. No. 4256,
13 February 2004, 422 SCRA 527, 532.
22 Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865, 878; 7 SCRA 859,
870 (1963).
624
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five
years after respondent contracted his second
marriage. The annulment of respon-dent’s second
marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment
proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the
annulment came after the respondent’s second
bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re:
Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal
action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a
disbarment case does not affect its course, then
neither will the judgment of annulment of
respondent’s second marriage also exonerate him
from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the
quantum of proof—clear preponderance of
evidence—in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.23
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly
immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of
what constitutes immoral conduct, vis-á-vis, grossly
immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is “that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community” and
what is “grossly immoral,” that is, “it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.”24
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes immoral
conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his
disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.25
_______________
23 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 15
September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 317.
24 See Reyes v. Wong, A.C. No. 547, 29 January 1975,
63 SCRA 667, 673.
25 Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957).
625
VOL. 499, AUGUST 28, 2006
625
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
However, measured against the definition, we are not
prepared to consider respondent’s act as grossly
immoral. This finds support in the following
recommendation and observation of the IBP
Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies
any intention to flaunt the law and the high moral
standard of the legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second
marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he
has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble
intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support
his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and
husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they
have parted ways when the mother and child went to
Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained
celibate.26
In the case of Terre v. Terre,27 respondent was
disbarred because his moral character was deeply
flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz.:
he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage
to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she
was legally single and free to marry him. When
complainant and respondent had contracted their
marriage, respondent went through law school while
being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondent’s parents. After
respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the
wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a
hospital.
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,28 respondent
was also dis-barred for his grossly immoral acts such
as: first, he abandoned his
170
_______________
26 Rollo, p. 476.
27 Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 12.
28 Adm. Case No. 2474, 15 September 2004, 438
SCRA 306, 315.
626
626
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an
innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he
mispresented himself as a “bachelor” so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he
availed himself of complainant’s resources by
securing a plane ticket from complainant’s office in
order to marry the latter’s daughter. He did this
without complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he
even had the temerity to assure complainant that
“everything is le-gal.”
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no
less than the respondent himself acknowledged and
declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was
humble enough to offer no defense save for his love
and declaration of his commitment to his wife and
child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the
imposition of dis-barment upon him to be unduly
harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.29 In
line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two
years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of
one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is
too light and not commensurate to the act committed
by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized
several documents during the years 1988-1997 after
his commission as notary public had expired,
respondent humbly admitted having notarized
certain documents despite his knowledge that he no
longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged
that he received no payment in notarizing said
documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the
contrary, it is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of
a private document converts the document into a
public one making it
_______________
29 T’boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Atty.
Solilapsi, 442 Phil. 499, 515; 394 SCRA 269, 285-286
(2002).
627
VOL. 499, AUGUST 28, 2006
627
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. A notar-ial document is by law entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this
reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public
in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.30
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as
notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act
of notarizing documents without the requisite
commission to do so as “reprehensible, constituting
as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime
of falsification of public docu-ments.”31
The Court had occasion to state that where the
notarization of a document is done by a member of
the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender
may be subjected to disciplinary action or one,
performing a notarial act without such commission is
a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not,
he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
“A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” By acting as a notary
public without the proper commission to do so, the
lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code,
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,32 a lawyer was
suspended for one year when he notarized five
documents after his commission as Notary Public had
expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affida-
171
_______________
30 Arrieta v. Llosa, 346 Phil. 932, 937; 282 SCRA 248,
252-253 (1997).
31 Buensuceso v. Barrera, A.C. No. 3727, 11
December 1992, 216 SCRA 309, 312.
32 Id.
628
628
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Louis Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz
vit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a
contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said
case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is
justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent
notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents33
without the requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondent’s misconduct
such as the pending criminal case for child abuse
allegedly committed by him against a high school
student filed before the Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio
City; the pending administrative case filed by the
Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an
Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending
labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC,
Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal
deduction of salary by respondent, need not be
discussed, as they are still pending before the proper
forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence
still prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela
Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his commission
or a total of four (4) years of suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts
of the land through the Court Administrator, as well
as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga,
Garcia and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Corona, J., On Leave.
_______________
33 Supra notes 2-15.
629
VOL. 499, AUGUST 28, 2006
629
Bajar vs. Baterisna
Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz suspended from practice of
law for two (2) years for immoral conduct in disregard
of Code of Professional Responsibility and another
two (2) years for notarizing documents despite
expiration of his commission.
Notes.—The object of a disbarment proceeding is not
so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as
to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove
from the profession of law persons whose disregard
for their oath of office have proved them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar. (Berbano vs. Barcelona, 410
SCRA 258 [2003])
The lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission therefore is reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice but also
the crime of falsification of public documents. (Zoreta
vs. Simpliciano, 443 SCRA 1 [2004])
——o0o—— St. Louis University Laboratory High
School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff vs. Dela Cruz, 499
SCRA 614, A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006
EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 10021, September
18, 2018 ]
AAA,[1] COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
ANTONIO N. DE LOS REYES,
RESPONDENT.
[A.C. No. 10022]
AAA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
ANTONIO N. DE LOS REYES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court are two administrative complaints
filed by complainant AAA seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes (respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes) on the grounds of sexual
harassment and gross immoral conduct. AAA claims
that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he committed
172
acts which are unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful which warrant his disbarment.
The Factual Antecedents
In her undated Complainant's Position Paper, AAA
narrated the following:
Sometime in February 1997, [AAA] was hired as
secretary to [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes], then
Vice-President of the Legal and Administrative Group
of [National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation]
NHMFC.
[AAA] became a permanent employee with a plantilla
position of private secretary 1, pay grade 11, on a co-
terminus status with [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes].
She later learned that it was [respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] who facilitated her rapid promotion to her
position soon after becoming his secretary.
Sometime in the last quarter of 1997, [respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes] offered to take [AAA] home in his
NHMFC issued service vehicle telling her that her
residence on J.P. Rizal Street, Makati was along his
route. From then on it became a daily routine between
them, which continued even after [AAA] moved to
Mandaluyong City.
Sometime in the last quarter of 1998, [AAA] began to
feel very uncomfortable with the situation when she
realized that [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] was
becoming overly possessive and demanding to the
extent that she could not refuse his offer to bring her
home; her telephone calls were being monitored by
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who constantly asked
her who she was talking with on the telephone and
would get mad if she told him that it was a male
person; she would be called to his office during office
hours just to listen to his stories about his life, how he
was raised by a very strict father, a former NBI director,
how unhappy he was with his wife who treated him like
a mere boarder in their house and sometimes just to sit
there doing nothing in particular, simply because he
wanted to see her. He also sent or left her love notes.
[AAA] tried to avoid [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]
who vacillated between being verbally abusive toward
her, cursing and shouting invectives at her whenever
she did, and overly solicitous the next moment,
apparently to placate her.
On 11 December 1998, when she refused his offer to
take her home, he got angry with her and
shouted "putangina mo." She tried to get away from
him but he blocked her path, grabbed her arm and
dragged her to the parking area and pushed her inside
his service vehicle. He drove off, ignoring her cries and
pleas to stop and let her get off. He slapped her twice
and she became hysterical. She opened the car door
and attempted to jump but he was able to grab her
jacket and dropped her off somewhere in Makati. She
reported the incident to the police.
[AAA] did not file a formal report or complaint against
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] as she thought that it
would be futile. She told Atty. Fermin Arzaga [then
Senior Vice-President for Finance at NHMFC] what
happened and showed him her bruises on her wrists.
She told him of her plan to resign and he asked her not
to resign and instead to request for a transfer. Despite
his advice, she sent a resignation letter that was
received by the Personnel Department on 22
December 1998.
On the same date, both the manager and the assistant
manager talked to [AAA] and persuaded her to
reconsider her resignation by promising her that she
would be re-assigned to the Office of the President, as
stated in an Office Order dated 21 January 1999.
On 22 January 1999, [AAA] reported to the Office of the
President. But even before she could start working in
her new assignment, she was told to return to her
former post as private secretary of [respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes].
[AAA] later learned from [respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] that he had called up Atty. Arzaga and told him
not to interfere ("huwag kang makialam"). He told her
that her position was co-terminus with his, being his
private secretary.
Much as she wanted to pursue her plan to resign,
[AAA's] financial position at that time left her with no
choice but to continue working as [respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes'] secretary. [Respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] knew that [AAA] was the sole breadwinner of
her family, as her father had deserted them when she
was but 8 years old, leaving her to care for her sick
mother, a two-year-old niece and two sisters who were
still in school.
[Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] exploited his
knowledge to force [AAA] to continue working for him
as his secretary. He moved in on her steadily, making
it plain to all that she was his property, isolating her
from the other people in the office who did not want to
cross him, dominating and humiliating her. He
eventually made it clear to her that he was determined
to make her his mistress and overpowered her
resistance by leaving her no choice but to succumb to
his advances or lose her job.
From then on, she became his sex slave who was at
his beck and call at all times for all kinds of sexual
services ranging from hand-jobs in his vehicle to sexual
intercourse in his office. She could not even refuse him
without risking physical, verbal and emotional abuse.
173
[AAA] become despondent with her situation, knowing
that she was the object of gossip and ridicule among
her officemates. She felt so helpless and frustrated that
she thought of committing suicide on countless
occasions. Coming to the office was such an ordeal
that she often suffered from all sorts of illnesses such
as fever, stomachaches, sore throat, and migraine
which gave her a convenient reason to absent herself,
but did not deter [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] from
calling and texting her or even. coming to her house to
personally check on her.
[AAA] attempted to put a stop to [respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes's] obsession with her by flaunting an
American as her boyfriend. [Respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] went into a jealous rage when he learned about
it.
x x x x
It seemed that [AAA] could never escape from the
clutches of [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who
always found a way to ensure that she would always
end up being re-assigned to his office, even after she
was assigned to other units. He continued to bring her
home, no matter that her residence was now in
Canlubang, Laguna. He also continued to see her [in]
his office at least twice a day, even sending an
assistant to fetch her when she refused to go.
In January 2003, [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]
continued to keep a tight watch over her even when
[AAA] went on official study leave to attend her CGFNS
review classes. He insisted on personally bringing
[AAA] to and from her classes or he made sure that his
official driver took her there using his official vehicle
when he could not personally accompany her.
[AAA] failed to take her exam in March 2003 and
requested a leave of absence to take the July 2003
exam. She stopped seeing [respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] and refused to see or talk to him completely.
[Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] kept sending [AAA]
text messages that she ignored and even requested for
a change of number of her cell phone. After a month of
not receiving anything from him, she thought he had
already given up on her but she was wrong.
He now trained his sight on [Ma. Victoria] Marivic
Alpajaro, a good friend and officemate of [AAA], who
had now become the object of his ire and jealousy
because of her apparent closeness to [AAA].
His threats to fire Marivic compelled [AAA] to seek him
out and plead with him to spare her friends. On 10 July
2003, they met outside the office and he insisted that
they go back together to the office to show everyone
that everything was still the same between them. She
refused and ran out of the restaurant. He followed and
wrapped his arms around her but she evaded him. He
was shouting "mahal kita" in public, to her great
embarrassment. He attempted to stop her but she
threatened that she will throw herself in the path of
oncoming vehicles if he persisted.[2]
AAA filed another Complaint-Affidavit dated
November 19, 2004, with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes still continued to harass her and her
colleagues (Ma. Victoria Alpajaro and Mercedita
Lorenzana) who agreed to be her witnesses in her
earlier complaint. According to AAA, respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes filed baseless charges against her and
her sympathetic officemates before the Office of the
Ombudsman, and sought their preventive suspension
without affording them due process through an initial
administrative investigation at the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). She added
that because of what respondent Atty. De Los Reyes
did to her, she suffered from various illnesses,
insomnia, listlessness, suicidal feelings, and was
diagnosed as suffering from Major Depressive
Disorder with manifested symptoms of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder by Dr. Norietta Calma-Balderama, a
psychiatrist at the Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Medicine at the University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH).
In his defense, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes denied
AAA's allegations relating to the alleged sexual
harassment and gross immorality for lack of factual
and legal bases. In his Consolidated Position Paper
for the Respondent dated May 16, 2005, respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes contended that AAA's complaint-
affidavits were not sufficient in form and substance as
required under the Rules of Court and should be
dismissed for being mere scraps of paper. According
to respondent Atty. De Los Reyes, the complaints
failed to state the ultimate facts or particulars,
approximate dates, and other details of the sexual
acts or advances that he allegedly committed, in
violation of his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusations against him. He averred that
AAA's lame excuse for her omission allegedly due to
her fear that she would be exposing herself to shame
and humiliation after her colleagues would know of
the details of her complaint is unbelievable.
Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes further stated that
AAA's affidavits were replete with inconsistencies and
unrealistic statements that are contrary to human
nature. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes denied her
allegations and explained the following points:
(a) He offered his service vehicle not only to AAA but
also to other employees of NHMFC who lived along
his route; and it was AAA herself who requested that
she be brought home together with other employees;
(b) NHMFC has corporate policies prohibiting the long
use of telephones by the employees for personal
174
purposes;
(c) The incident reported by AAA that she was
grabbed and dragged into his service vehicle is highly
incredible as it would have been readily noticed by
many employees because it was immediately after
office hours;
(d) He did not ask for any sexual favors in his office or
in his service vehicle considering the location of the
office which was very accessible to other employees
including the security guard by the door that is always
open; and respondent Atty. De Los Reyes always sat
on the front passenger side of his service vehicle with
his driver;
(e) The requests for transfer of assignment made by
AAA did not mention that it was because of
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes or of any sexual
harassment that she suffered at his hands; and
(f) The complaints for disbarment filed by AAA against
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes were purely in
retaliation since he was conducting investigations
against AAA and her two friends at the NHMFC.
Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes also countered the
Certification issued by Dr. Calma-Balderama of the
UP-PGH Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral
Medicine as a mere scrap of paper and without any
probative value since said certification was not made
under oath or subscribed to, and was not supported
by any clinical or psychological report.
Finally, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes asserted that
assuming the alleged grounds for disbarment
regarding the claim for sexual harassment were true,
the same had already prescribed since they occurred
in 1999 or more than three years prior to the
institution of the complaints.
The Findings of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation dated June 6,
2011, the CBD-IBP Commissioner found respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended the penalty of one (1) year suspension.
The Investigating Commissioner opined that there
was no indication that AAA was not telling the truth,
and that she acceded to the numerous incidents of
sexual intercourse because of fear of reprisals or
consequences if she refused. The Commissioner
explained thus:
We also take note that there is an apparent
ambivalence or hesitancy in the use of the word "rape"
by herein complainant. This is because the numerous
sexual intercourse occurred with the complainant's
seeming consent. However, such cannot be
characterized as voluntary. Complainant acceded to
the sexual intercourse because of fear of reprisals or
consequences if she did not. Whether there is actual
rape, as it is defined in the Revised Penal Code, would
not be relevant in this disbarment case since the sexual
intercourse coupled with unspoken threats of dire
consequences would nonetheless constitute grave
misconduct.
Respondent has also raised the argument of
prescription. While there could be a prescriptive period
under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law, there is no
prescriptive period for grave misconduct in disbarment
proceedings and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Disbarment proceedings are sui
generis.[3]
In Resolution No. XX-2012-254 dated July 21, 2012,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and finding Respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Antonio
De Los Reyes is hereby SUSPENDED
[INDEFINITELY].[4]
Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in Resolution No. XX-2013-311 dated
March 21, 2013, thus:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY [respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes'] Motion for Reconsideration, there
being no cogent reason to reverse the Resolution and
it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2012-254
dated July 21, 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.[5]
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes committed acts amounting to
sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct in
175
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which would warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After due consideration, we adopt the findings and
conclusions of the Investigating Commissioner, as
sustained by the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the integrated bar.
x x x x
Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
In Valdez v. Dabon,[6] we explained that the
possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession, to wit:
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court
that possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's
bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality
in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of
the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the
court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as
officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards."
Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it
in his public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.
Thus, lawyers are duty-bound to observe the highest
degree of morality and integrity not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their career
in order to safeguard the reputation of the legal
profession. Any errant behavior, be it in their public or
private life, may subject them to suspension or
disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court expressly states that members of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended for any deceit, grossly
immoral conduct, or violation of their oath.
In Ventura v. Samson,[7] we explained that immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. It is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the community's sense of decency.
Here, we rule that the records of this administrative
case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the CBD-
IBP Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, that indeed respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes committed acts of gross immorality in the
conduct of his personal affairs with AAA that show his
disregard of the lawyer's oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
A perusal of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN) taken during the June 30, 2006 hearing of the
instant case shows AAA's straightforward testimony of
her ordeal at the hands of respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes:
Atty. [Angelito] Lo [Counsel for respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes]:
Q. You said that you were being raped twice a week by
the respondent?
AAA:
A. Yes, sir.
COMM. FUNA:
176
 Twice a week for how many weeks?
COMM. FUNA:
AAA:
There was?
I guess it's from 1999 to more or less 2000.
AAA:
COMM. FUNA:
Yes.
For clarification, what do you mean by rape?
COMM. FUNA:
AAA:
How many times?
I was forced...he forced me to have sex with him.
AAA:
COMM. FUNA:
At most is twice a week.
In what sense? Conversation?
COMM. FUNA:
AAA:
Now, you will be raped and yet you did not report to
Other than that, sir. Most of the time, I was not the police?
allowed...from the very start, I was not allowed to use
the C.R. AAA:

COMM. FUNA: I'm so scared and I don't know kung may

maniniwala sa akin.
No, no, no. Do you know what rape is?
COMM. FUNA:
AAA:
You will be raped and yet you continue to work.
Yes. I was forced to have sex with him. There [were]
some instances that he would go inside the C.R. while AAA:
I'm still inside. He would push me and force me to have
sex with him. Tinutulak nya ako pababa. As I have mentioned in my Affidavit, I am the sole
breadwinner in my family. I tried to leave the office, I
COMM. FUNA: tried to look for a job.

I have to clarify this kasi it's vague. We need to know COMM. FUNA:
exactly what happened. Nagtinginan lang kayo sa
mata, what happened? So when you go to work, you know that you will be
raped...
AAA:
AAA:
I was inside the C.R. I'm using the restroom,
pumasok sya. Because I have to fend [for] my whole family. My
mother is sick. I don't have a father. I have my other
COMM. FUNA: siblings to support, I have my niece. It's really hard for
me but...(Witness crying)
Did he touch any part of your body?
COMM. FUNA:
AAA:
So, iyong subsequent rapes were done with your
Yes. consent? Would you say that?

COMM. FUNA: AAA:

Was there a sexual intercourse between you and It's an exchange to maintain my job.
the respondent?
COMM. FUNA:
AAA:
So you consented because you believe that you will
Yes. lose your job?

177

AAA:
That's what... kasi my position is co-terminus with him.
It's permanent but still co-terminus with him. Sabi nya
nga, I'm working [at] his pleasure. It's up to him anytime
if he wants to fire me. He can do that.
COMM. FUNA:
Atty. Ambrosio, how would you characterize that?
ATTY. [MINERVA] AMBROSIO [Counsel for AAA]:
Which one, sir? She's raped, plain and simple, sir,
sexual harassment.
standing and character as a member of the Bar and
as an officer of the Court. All these deplorable acts of
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes puts the legal
profession in disrepute and places the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, thus warranting
disciplinary action from the Court.[9]
It bears emphasizing that an administrative case for
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief
to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to
cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members for the protection of the public
and of the courts. It is an investigation on the conduct
of the respondent as an officer of the Court and his
fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.[10]

COMM. FUNA: This Court held in Pena v. Aparicio[11] that:

Would you go to this office...(interrupted)

ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Sir, why are you laughing?
COMM. FUNA:
... if you know that you will be raped?
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Sir...(unintelligible) to understand.
COMM. FUNA:
Tomorrow, you know that you will be raped ...
(Comm. Funa and Atty. Ambrosio talking at the same
time)
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
[She's] telling you wala siyang choice. That's the whole
essence of sexual harassment because a woman is
forced to continue working or to continue in this
particular position because she has no choice. If she
doesn't consent to his sexual advances, she gets fired
or she gets demoted or she will get a deduction in her
pay. See, that's plain and simple sexual harassment.
This is...(unintelligible) I do not understand. You're all
laughing here. This is a woman crying telling you...
there's injustice being done to this woman.[8]
Clearly, the above-quoted excerpt from the TSN dated
June 30, 2006, shows that respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes is guilty of "sextortion" which is the abuse of
his position or authority to obtain sexual favors from
his subordinate, the complainant, his unwilling victim
who was not in a position to resist respondent's
demands for fear of losing her means of livelihood.
The sexual exploitation of his subordinate done over a
period of time amounts to gross misbehavior on the
part of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes that affects his
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. x x x Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. x x x.
While we agree with the findings of the IBP, we,
however, consider the recommended penalty of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law not
commensurate with the gravity of the acts committed
by respondent Atty. De Los Reyes.
In a number of administrative cases involving illicit
sexual relations and gross immorality, this Court
imposed upon the erring lawyers various penalties
ranging from suspension to disbarment, depending on
the circumstances. In De Leon v. Pedreña,[12] we
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for
two years for rubbing complainant's leg with his hand,
putting complainant's hand on his crotch area, and
pressing his finger on complainant's private part.
In Tumbaga v. Teoxon,[13] the respondent was
suspended for three years from the practice of law for
committing gross immorality by maintaining an
extramarital affair with complainant. This Court,
in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[14] meted the penalty of
indefinite suspension on Atty. Castillo when he had an

178
illicit relationship with a woman not his wife and sired
a child with her, whom he later on refused to
recognize and support. In Dantes v. Dantes,[15] the
respondent was disbarred when he engaged in illicit
relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to complaint. We also
ruled in Arnobit v. Arnobit,[16] that respondent's act of
leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit ad have
children with another woman constitutes grossly
immoral conduct, for which respondent was disbarred.
Likewise, in Delos Reyes v. Aznar,[17] we disbarred
respondent, Chairman of the College of Medicine, for
his acts of enticing the complainant, who was then a
student in the said college, to have carnal knowledge
with him under the threat that she would fail in all of
her subjects if she refused respondent.
In Ventura v. Samson,[18] this Court has reminded
that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar. Disbarment should not be imposed where a
lesser penalty may accomplish the desired goal of
disciplining an erring lawyer. In the present case,
however, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's actions
show that he lacks the degree of morality required of
him as a member of the legal profession, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment. Respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes is disbarred for his gross
misbehavior, even if it pertains to his private activities,
as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.[19]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Antonio N. De Los Reyes GUILTY of gross immoral
conduct and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule
7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the
records of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, A. Reyes, Jr.,
Gesmundo,and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., on official leave.
Peralta, J., on official business.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., no part.
G.R. No. 104599. March 11, 1994.*
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU
CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
Labor Law; Article 22 of the Labor Code; Technical
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and
equity shall not be controlling in labor cases in the
interest of due process.—Prefatorily, we take
advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the
Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling,
and that every and all reasonable means to speedily
and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall
be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure in the interest of due process.
Same; Same; It is not procedurally objectionable for
the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a
labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who
conducted the hearing.—It is settled that it is not
procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case
to be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that
matter, other than the one who
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
174
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who
heard the case was not the judge who penned the
decision does not impair the validity of the judgment,
provided that he draws up his decision and resolution
with due care and makes certain that they truly and
accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions
on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted
in the case.
Same; Same; Same.—The mere fact that the case was
initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio,
who conducted the hearings therein from December
5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to
Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually
decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity,
especially considering that there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of a public officer’s
179
functions, which petitioner has not successfully
rebutted.
Same; Same; Remedial Law; Rules of procedure must
be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice.—
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in
the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical
rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal
precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted
to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we
cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to
nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments.
The strength of one’s position cannot be hinged on
mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and
jurisprudence.
Same; Security of Tenure; Due Process; The
fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and
due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed
except for just and authorized cause provided by law
and after due process.—The fundamental guarantees
of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and
authorized cause provided by law and after due
process. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates
the causes for which an employer may validly
terminate an employment, to wit: (a) serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative
in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense
by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and (e) other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Same; Same; When employer may terminate the
services of any employee.—The employer may also
terminate the services of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor
Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and
the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with
due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay
rates provided by law. Suffering from a disease by
reason whereof the continued employment of the
employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his
and his co-employee’s health, is also a ground for
termination of his services provided he receives the
prescribed separation pay. On the other hand, it is
well settled that abandonment by an employee of his
work authorizes the employer to effect the former’s
dismissal from employment.
Same; NLRC; Even decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared “final” by law are not
exempt from judicial review when so warranted.—
After a careful review of the records of this case, we
find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming
the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding
that petitioner abandoned his employment and was
not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want of substantial bases, in fact or in law, we cannot
give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally
accorded to the factual findings of an administrative
agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, as
even decisions of administrative agencies which are
declared “final” by law are not exempt from judicial
review when so warranted.
Same; Termination of Employment; Abandonment; It
is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume
employment and not mere absence that is required
to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for
termination of employment.—The disagreement as
to whether or not petitioner’s ailments were so
serious as to necessitate hospitalization and
corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the
point. The fact remains that on account of said
illnesses, the details of which were amply
substantiated by the attending physician, and as the
records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on
the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for
petitioner’s absence from work. We repeat, it is clear,
deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume
employment and not mere absence that is required
to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for
termination of employment.
176
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Labor Standards; Managerial employee; With his
position as a farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao, petitioner may be classified as managerial
employee to whom the law grants an amount of
discretion in the discharge of his duties.—With his
180
position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao,
petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a
managerial employee to whom the law grants an
amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties.
This is why when petitioner stated that “I assigned
myself where I want to go,” he was simply being
candid about what he could do within the sphere of
his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not
strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at
the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to
specific control from his employer in every aspect of
his work. What is essential only is that he runs the
farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model
employee, in this regard he proved to be quite
successful, as there was at least a showing of
increased production during the time that petitioner
was in charge of farm operations.
Same; Elements of abandonment.—In order that a
finding of abandonment may justly be made there
must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the
failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find
dismally wanting in this case.
Labor Law; NLRC; Remedial Law; Witness; Deposition;
Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of
the proceedings, which involves the taking of
testimony, both parties must be afforded equal
opportunity to examine and cross examine a
witness.—We are likewise not impressed by the
deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner
supposedly indicative of the latter’s intention to
abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the
taking of such deposition without the presence of
petitioner’s counsel, and the failure of private
respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its
taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. Private
respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as
certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G.
Ovejera of said office. Fair play dictates that at such
an important stage of the proceedings, which involves
the taking of testimony, both parties must be
afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-
examine a witness.
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Same; Due process; Petitioner was denied his right to
due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds
therefor, much less a chance to be heard.—Private
respondent’s argument is without merit as there can
be no question that petitioner was denied his right to
due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds
therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of
the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due
process in this particular case, he in effect admits that
no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is
corroborated by the certification issued on
September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for
Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice
of termination of the employment of petitioner was
submitted thereto.
Same; Same; While it is conceded that it is the
employer’s prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the
requirements of due process cannot be lightly
taken.—Granting arguendo that there was
abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the
employee sought to be dismissed, as the second
sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing
rules explicitly requires service thereof at the
employee’s last known address, by way of substantial
compliance. While it is conceded that it is the
employer’s prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the
requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken.
The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise
of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect
of undermining the fundamental guarantee of
security of tenure in favor of the employee.
Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Security of Tenure;
Relief available to employee in case of its denial.—
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate
in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to
security of tenure. To give teeth to these
constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor
Code spells out the relief available to an employee in
case of its denial: “Art. 279. Security of Tenure.—In
cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
181
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of actual reinstatement.”
178
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Same; Reinstatement; Where reinstatement is no
longer possible, it is appropriate that the dismissed
employee be given his fair and just share of what the
law accords him.—An employee is entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of
just cause for dismissal. The Court, however, on
numerous occasions has tempered the rigid
application of said provision of the Labor Code,
recognizing that in some cases certain events may
have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder
provided, and declares that where there are strained
relations between the employer and the employee,
payment of back wages and severance pay may be
awarded instead of reinstatement, and more
particularly when managerial employees are
concerned. Thus, where reinstatement is no longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the
dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of
what the law accords him.
Civil Law; Damages; Exemplary damages are not
recoverable as matter of right, it being left to the
court to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.—Moral damages, under Article 2217 of
the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one
for diverse injuries such as mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social
humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a
wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was
the proximate cause thereof. Exemplary damages,
under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being
left to the court to decide whether or not they should
be adjudicated.
Same; Same; It is apparent that each one has a cause
for damages against the other; For this reason we
hold that no moral or exemplary damages can be
rightfully awarded.—In the present case, we find that
both petitioner and private respondent can equally
be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to
and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of
sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their
disparate claims. The records reveal how their
actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the
undeniable enmity between them negates the
likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is
apparent that each one has a cause for damages
against the other. For this reason, we hold that no
moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be
awarded to petitioner.
Ethics; Lawyers; A lawyer should be a mediator for
concord and conciliator for compromise, rather than
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation.—The conduct of the respective counsel of
the
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints
the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well
be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely
presenting their clients’ respective causes in court. It
is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth
over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful
function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation
but to avoid it whenever possible by advising
settlement or withholding suit. He is often called
upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
counsel in every phase of life. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in
the conduct of litigation.
Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; A lawyer
should encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.—Rule
1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.” On this point, we find that
both counsel herein fell short of what was expected
of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the
court. The records do not show that they took pains
to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
rapprochment between their clients. On the contrary,
their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but
have exacerbated the situation even as they may have
found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.
182
Labor Law; Labor Arbiter; A labor arbiter shall exert all
efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor
dispute within his jurisdiction.—In the same manner,
we find that the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the
letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a
labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts towards the
amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction.” If he ever did so, or at least entertained
the thought, the copious records of the proceeding in
this controversy are barren of any reflection of the
same.
PETITION for certiorari to set aside a decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
180
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously
stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding the
vinculum of paternity and filiation between the
parties. It would indeed have been the better part of
reason if herein petitioner and private respondent
had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial
atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of
reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead
for judicial intervention despite the inevitable
acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste,
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve
their dispute with the same reasoned detachment
accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was
employed by his father, herein private respondent, as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April,
1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc.
and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm
administrator was on a fixed salary, with other
allowances covering housing, food, light, power,
telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for
the supervision of daily activities and operations of
the sugarcane farm such as land preparation,
planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with
third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda
and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned
to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he
lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the
house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner
moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted
to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and
August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a
deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which
lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner’s illnesses,
private respondent took care of his medical expenses
and petitioner
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
continued to receive compensation. However, in
April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent
ceased to pay the latter’s salary. Petitioner made oral
and written demands for an explanation for the
sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio
Sumbingco, private respondent’s auditor and legal
adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary.
Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October
17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84,
against private respondent for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth
month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal
was dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner
abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering
private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of
P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of
said termination of employment to the Department
of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court’s
ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al. 2 On appeal to the
183
Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision
was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision
having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed
this petition presenting the following issues for
resolution: (1) whether or not petitioner was illegally
dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
_______________
1 Annex C, Petition; Rollo, 57-68; Original Record, Vol.
II, 248-259; per Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy.
2 G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 69.
3 Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 45-56; Original Record,
400-411; Comm. Irenea E. Ceniza, ponente, Pres.
Comm. Ernesto G. Ladrido III and Comm. Bernabe S.
Batuhan, concurring.
4 Original Record, Vol. II, 412-421.
5 Annex A, Petition, Rollo, 42-44; Original Record, Vol.
II, 466-468.
182
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth
month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not
he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees because of illegal
dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
necessarily subsume the corollary questions
presented by private respondent, such as the exact
date when petitioner ceased to function as farm
administrator, the character of the pecuniary
amounts received by petitioner from private
respondent, that is, whether the same are in the
nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not
there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions
as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the
Solicitor General recommended a modification of the
decision of herein public respondent sustaining the
findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor
Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason
the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on
the petition. In compliance with the Court’s
resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its
comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its
earlier position in support of the findings of the
Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the
observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
“This case is truly unique. What makes this case
unique is the fact that because of the special
relationship of the parties and the nature of the
action involved, this case could very well go down (in)
the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of
its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son,
his father’s namesake, the only child and therefore
the only heir against his own father.”9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
“x x x. After an exhaustive reading of the records, two
(2) observations were noted that may justify why this
labor case deserves special considerations. First, most
of the complaints that petitioner
_______________
6 Rollo, 136-149.
7 Ibid., 151.
8 Ibid., 175-180.
9 Original Record, Vol. I, 248.
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
and private respondent had with each other, were
personal matters affecting father and son
relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints
pertain to their work, they allow their personal
relationship to come in the way.”10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from
employment was illegal because of want of just cause
therefor and nonobservance of the requirements of
due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave
abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did
not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there
was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as
farm administrator, thereby arming private
respondent with a ground to terminate his
employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also
contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question
the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and
the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed
for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking
the dismissal of the instant petition, private
respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer
to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of
stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d)
and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of
Court, which provide that want of page references to
the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of
Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of
184
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling, and that every and all, reasonable
means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts
in each case shall be availed of, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of
due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable
for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge,
or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one
who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge
who heard the case was not the judge who penned
the decision does not impair the validity of the
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision
and resolution
_______________
10 Rollo, 140.
11 Abaya vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 96389, December
11, 1992,
184
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
with due care and makes certain that they truly and
accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions
on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted
in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned
to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted
the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July
11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor
Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case,
presents no procedural infirmity, especially
considering that there is a presumption of regularity
in the performance of a public officer’s functions,13
which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in
the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical
rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal
precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted
to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we
cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to
nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments.
The strength of one’s position cannot be hinged on
mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and
jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and
due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed
except for just and authorized cause provided by law
and after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor
Code enumerates the causes for which an employer
may validly terminate an employment, to wit: (a)
serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; (b) gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c)
fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense
by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and (e) other causes
_______________
216 SCRA 455.
12 LBC Aircargo, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 81815,
October 3, 1990, 190 SCRA 274.
13 Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
14 Sec. 1, Rule XIV, Book V, Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any
employee due to the installation of labor saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for
the purpose of circumventing the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by
law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof
the continued employment of the employee is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-
employee’s health, is also a ground for termination of
his services provided he receives the prescribed
separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well settled
that abandonment by an employee of his work
authorizes the employer to effect the former’s
dismissal from employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we
find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming
the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding
that petitioner abandoned his employment and was
not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want of substantial bases, in fact or in law, we cannot
give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally
accorded to the factual findings of an administrative
185
agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as
even decisions of administrative agencies which are
declared “final” by law are not exempt from judicial
review when so warranted.19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor
General on this point deserve acceptance:
_______________
15 Art. 283, Labor Code.
16 Art. 284, id.
17 A’ Prime Security Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R.
No. 93476, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 142.
18 Cf. Foodmine Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 84688,
August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 748; Artex Development
Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 65045, July 19, 1990,
187 SCRA 611; Tiu vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 83433,
November 12, 1992, 215 SCRA 469.
19 Chung Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 96283, February 25, 1992, 206
SCRA 545.
186
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
“It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his
work from October 1982 to December 1982, cannot
be construed as abandonment of work because he
has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from
perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus
and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio
Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City
(Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
“This fact (was) duly communicated to private
respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda
Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-
50).
“During the period of his illness and recovery,
petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate
thereat and to handle only administrative matters of
the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is
not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside
Hacienda Manucao.
xxx
“After evaluating the evidence within the context of
the special circumstances involved and basic human
experience, petitioner’s illness and strained family
relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be
considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de
Ysasi III’s absence from work during the period of
October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such
absence does not warrant outright dismissal without
notice and hearing.
xxx
“The elements of abandonment as a ground for
dismissal of an employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever
the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara,
Reviewer In Labor and Social Legislation, 1989
edition, p. 133).
“This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates
what constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus
Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that
for abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some
overt act from which it may be inferred that the
employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in
Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184
SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid
cause for termination of employment, there must be
a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment . . . . . Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee
simply does not want to work anymore.
“There are significant indications in this case, that
there is no abandonment. First, petitioner’s absence
and his decision to leave his
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his
illness and strained family relations. Second he has
some medical certificates to show his frail health.
Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter
(Annex ‘J’) informing private respondent of his
intention to assume again his employment. Last, but
not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for
illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly
dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner
had no intention to abandon his employment.”20
The records show that the parties herein do not
dispute the fact of petitioner’s confinement in the
hospital for his various afflictions which required
medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that
private respondent was well aware of petitioner’s
state of health as the former admittedly shouldered
part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised
the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to
work again. The disagreement as to whether or not
petitioner’s ailments were so serious as to necessitate
186
hospitalization and corresponding periods for
recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains
that on account of said illnesses, the details of which
were amply substantiated by the attending
physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any
suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner,
there was justifiable cause for petitioner’s absence
from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and
unjustified refusal to resume employment and not
mere absence that is required to constitute
abandonment as a valid ground for termination of
employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified
as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants
an amount of discretion in the
_______________
20 Rollo, 141, 143-144.
21 TSN, Vol. III, February 19, 1986, 20-43, 60.
22 Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 101858, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 792.
23 Sec. 2(b), Rule I, Book III, Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provides that
employees are considered managerial employees if
they meet all of the following conditions, namely: (1)
Their primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a
department or sub-division thereof; (2) They
customarily and regularly direct the work of two or
more employees therein; (3) They have the authority
to hire or fire other employees
188
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner
stated that “I assigned myself where I want to go,”24
he was simply being candid about what he could do
within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm
administrator did not strictly require him to keep
regular hours or to be at the office premises at all
times, or to be subjected to specific control from his
employer in every aspect of his work. What is
essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently
and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may
definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this
regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was
at least a showing of increased production during the
time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control
over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is
because that was the period when petitioner was
recuperating from illness and on account of which his
attendance and direct involvement in farm
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the
supervision and control exercisable by private
respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It
goes without saying that the control contemplated
refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
administrator and could not extend to petitioner’s
personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of
discharging his duties as farm administrator,
petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm,
there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as
there was no formal employment contract to begin
with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of
his employment or that any transfer of residence
would justify the termination of his employment. That
petitioner changed his residence should not be taken
against him, as this is undeniably among his basic
rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per
se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-
employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as
he was
_______________
of lower rank; or their suggestions and
recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to
the promotion or any other change of status of other
employees are given particular weight.
24 TSN, Vol. II, July 11, 1985, 74-75.
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
yet uncertain of his son’s intention of returning to
work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an
employee of the hacienda for social security
purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the
mandated deductions therefrom until the end of
December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when
he became convinced that petitioner would no longer
return to work that he considered the latter to have
abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer
listed him as an employee. According to private
respondent, whatever amount of money was given to
petitioner from that time until April, 1984 was in the
tenure of a pension or an allowance or mere
gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not
salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were
187
made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that
private respondent completely stopped giving said
pension or allowance when he was angered by what
he heard petitioner had been saying about sending
him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of
one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition
regarding petitioner’s alleged statement to him, “(h)e
quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao” (“I have
burned my bridges with Manucao”) as expressive of
petitioner’s intention to abandon his job. In addition
to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of
petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter
abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his
objectives, private respondent takes the novel
position that the agreement to support his son after
the latter abandoned the administration of the farm
legally converts the initial abandonment to implied
voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private
respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner’s
illness and even paid for his hospital and other
medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment
of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to
the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his
father’s accountant and legal adviser about the
reason why his pension or allowance was
discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of
having recovered and his willingness and capability to
resume his work at the farm
_______________
25 Rollo, 108-112.
190
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26
With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial
how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated,
whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or
without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in
view of his continued service as farm
administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a
finding of abandonment may justly be made there
must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the
failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find
dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself
admitted being unsure of his son’s plans of returning
to work. The absence of petitioner from work since
mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was
not without valid causes of which private respondent
had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him
to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to
work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived
at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent’s claim of
abandonment cannot be given credence as even after
January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly
“became convinced” that petitioner would no longer
work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm
administrator. These are duly and correspondingly
evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28
claiming and paying for additional farm equipment
and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the
payment of the additional cash advances for molasses
for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities,
Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through
_______________
26 Annex I, Petition; Rollo, 45.
27 Rollo, 16-19.
28 Exh. E; Formal Offer of Exhibits for Complainant,
42.
29 Exhs. F, G and H; ibid., 43-45.
30 Exh. I; ibid., 46.
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with
receipts for medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which
petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities
and operations of the farm. True, it is a father’s
prerogative to request or even command his child to
run errands for him. In the present case, however,
considering the nature of these transactions, as well
as the property values and monetary sums involved,
it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the
matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these
matters be handled by someone who can be trusted
188
or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is
familiar with the terms, specifications and other
details relative thereto, such as an employee. If
indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was
considered to have done so by private respondent, it
would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or
to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters
relating to or expected of him with respect to what
would then be his past and terminated employment.
It is hard to imagine what further authority an
employer can have over a dismissed employee so as
to compel him to continue to perform work-related
tasks.
It is also significant that the special power of
attorney32 executed by private respondent on June
26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating—
xxx
“That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married,
and a resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called
and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter,
BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-
member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS’
ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have
check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all
checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as
such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by
these presents I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND
CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT
_______________
31 Exh. J; ibid., 47.
32 Exh. D, ibid., 41.
192
192
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO
GET FOR ME and in my name, place and stead, my
check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT being herein given the power and authority to
sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the
receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED HOWEVER, that my said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said
check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my
proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and
signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be
made a ‘CROSSED CHECK’.”
xxx
remained in force even after petitioner’s employment
was supposed to have been terminated by reason of
abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner’s numerous
requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of
his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of
withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence
reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to
work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint
for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has
abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of
Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent,
ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly
indicative of the latter’s intention to abandon his
work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
such deposition without the presence of petitioner’s
counsel, and the failure of private respondent to
serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said
counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed
to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by
Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said
office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important
stage of the proceedings, which involves the
_______________
33 Exh. BL; ibid., 167.
34 Exhs. BH, BI and BJ; ibid., 153-159.
35 Exh. BK, 160.
36 Original Record, Vol. I, 276.
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded
equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a
witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to
petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension,
allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question
as to petitioner’s entitlement thereto inasmuch as he
continued to perform services in his capacity as farm
administrator. The change in description of said
amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts
prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to
189
be determinative of petitioner’s employment status
in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of
allowances given by a parent out of concern for his
child’s welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts
therefor37 should be necessary and required as if
they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent’s
theory that petitioner’s alleged abandonment was
converted into an implied voluntary resignation on
account of the father’s agreement to support his son
after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this
case, the monthly sums received by petitioner,
regardless of designation, were in consideration for
services rendered emanating from an employer-
employee relationship and were not of a character
that can qualify them as mere civil support given out
of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put
to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly
converted into a voluntary resignation without any
positive act on the part of the employee conveying a
desire to terminate his employment. The very
concept of resignation as a ground for termination by
the employee of his employment38 does not square
with the elements constitutive of aban-
_______________
37 Exhs. AM, AO, AQ, AS, AU, AW, AY; Formal Offer of
Exhibits for the Complainant, 110-128.
38 Sec. 285, Labor Code, provides that employment
may be terminated by the employee without just
cause by serving a written notice on the employer at
least one (1) month in advance. An employee may
also put an end to the relationship without serving
notice on the employer for any of the following just
causes: serious insult by the employer or his
representative on the honor and person of the
employee, inhuman and unbearable treatment
accorded the employee by the employer or his
194
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
donment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that
there was a violation by private respondent of the due
process requirements under the Labor Code for want
of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in
opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
applies only to cases where the employer seeks to
terminate the services of an employee on any of the
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case
where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner
on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly
abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing
applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
in this wise:
“SEC. 2. Notice of Dismissal.—Any employer who
seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
notice stating the particular acts or omission(s)
constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the
worker’s last known address.
xxx
“SEC. 5. Answer and hearing.—The worker may
answer the allegations as stated against him in the
notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so desires.
“SEC. 6. Decision to dismiss.—The employer shall
immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to
dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
“SEC. 7. Right to contest dismissal.—Any decision
taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to
the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the
Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx
_______________
representative, commission of a crime or offense by
the employer or his representative against the person
of the employee or any of the immediate members of
his family, and other causes similar to the foregoing.
39 Rollo, 27-29.
40 Ibid., 111-115.
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VOL. 231, MARCH 11, 1994
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
“SEC. 11. Report of dismissal.—The employer shall
submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having
jurisdiction over the place of work of all dismissals
effected by him during the month, specifying therein
the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for
their dismissal, the dates of commencement and
termination of employment, the positions last held by
190
them and such other information as may be required
by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical
purposes.”
Private respondent’s argument is without merit as
there can be no question that petitioner was denied
his right to due process since he was never given any
notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds
therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of
the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due
process in this particular case, he in effect admits that
no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is
corroborated by the certification issued on
September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for
Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice
of termination of the employment of petitioner was
submitted thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in
this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice
still had to be served upon the employee sought to be
dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the
pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires
service thereof at the employee’s last known address,
by way of substantial compliance. While it is
conceded that it is the employer’s prerogative to
terminate an employee, especially when there is just
cause therefor, the requirements of due process
cannot be lightly taken. The law does not
countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or
prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the
fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor
of the employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter’s misplaced reliance on
the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as
follows:
_______________
41 Exh. BO; Formal Offer of Exhibits for the
Complainant, 175.
42 Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 85919, March 23,
1990, 183 SCRA 651; Kwikway Engineering Works vs.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 85014, March 22, 1991, 195
SCRA 526; Ranara vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100969,
August 14, 1992, 212 SCRA 631.
196
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
“The Labor Arbiter held thus:
‘While we are in full agreement with the respondent
as to his defense of implied resignation and/or
abandonment, records somehow showed that he
failed to notify the Department of Labor and
Employment for his sons’ (sic)/complainants’ (sic)
abandonment as required by BP 130. And for this
failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by
an employer was not complied with. This however,
would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic)
existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of
the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on
the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on
due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12,
Annex ‘C’ Petition), x x x.’
“This is thus a very different case from Wenphil
Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the
rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is
dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded re-
employment and backwages for failure of his
employer to observe procedural due process. The
public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the
employee to do even worse and render a mockery of
the rules of discipline required to be observed.
However, the employer must be penalized for his
infraction of due process. In the present case,
however, not only was petitioner dismissed without
due process, but his dismissal is without just cause.
Petitioner did not abandon his employment because
he has a justifiable excuse.”43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter
erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of
Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an
illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and
back wages, and, instead, affirmed the imposition of
the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for
violation of the due process requirements. Private
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was
error in imposing the fine because that penalty
contemplates the failure to submit the employer’s
report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional
office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11),
Rule XIV of
_______________
43 Rollo, 146-147; See also Hua Bee Shirt Factory vs.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 80389, June 18, 1990, 186 SCRA
586; Cathedral School of Technology, et al. vs. NLRC,
et al., G.R. No. 101438, October 13, 1992, 214 SCRA
551:
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VOL. 231, MARCH 11, 1994
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De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
191
the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve
notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by
the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate
in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to
security of tenure.44 To give teeth to these
constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor
Code spells out the relief available to an employee in
case of its denial:
“Art. 279. Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of actual reinstatement.”
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of
just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on
numerous occasions has tempered the rigid
application of said provision of the Labor Code,
recognizing that in some cases certain events may
have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder
provided, and declares that where there are strained
relations between the employer and the employee,
payment of back wages and severance pay may be
awarded instead of reinstatement,46 and more
particularly when managerial employees are
concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no-longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the
dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of
what the law
_______________
44 Escareal vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 99357, October
2, 1992, 213 SCRA 472.
45 Balasbas vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 85286, August
24, 1992, 212 SCRA 803.
46 Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 101181-84, June 22, 1992, 210
SCRA 222; China City Restaurant vs. NLRC, et al., G.R.
No. 97196, January 22, 1993, 218 SCRA 443.
47 GT Printers, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100749,
April 24, 1992, 208 SCRA 321.
198
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the
Solicitor General’s ratiocination, to wit:
“As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But
in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA
192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to
reinstatement, differences should be made between
managers and the ordinary workingmen. The court
concluded that a company which no longer trusts its
managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and
profitable manner. The NLRC should know the
difference between managers and ordinary
workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and
liberality as that of rank and file workers who had
been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not
be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or
antagonism between the parties (Morales v. NLRC,
188 SCRA 295).
“In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner
should not be reinstated as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of
petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that
a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
relationship is hardly possible.”49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral
damages, arguing that his dismissal from employment
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts
of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code,
may be awarded to compensate one for diverse
injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation,
provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act
or omission of the defendant which was the
proximate cause
_______________
48 Sunday Machine Workers, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R.
No. 95692, March 16, 1992, 207 SCRA 271.
49 Rollo, 147-148.
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192
199
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229,
are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not
recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the
court to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court’s rulings in a number
of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral
damages where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of
exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do
not feel, however, that an award of the damages
prayed for in this petition would be proper even if,
seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal
where moral and exemplary damages were awarded,
the dismissed employees were genuinely without
fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
employers’ capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and
private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning
the flames which gave rise to and ultimately
aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely
negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations
seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable
enmity between them negates the likelihood that
either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that
each one has a cause for damages against the other.
For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary
damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the
validity of the following recommendation of the
Solicitor General:
_______________
50 Guita vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60409,
November 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 576.
51 Art. 2233, Civil Code.
52 Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
G.R. No. 72644, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 435.
53 Spartan Security and Detective Agency, Inc. vs.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 90693, September 3, 1992, 213
SCRA 528.
200
200
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
“The Labor Arbiter’s decision in RAB Case No. 0452-
84 should be modified. There was no voluntary
abandonment in this case because petitioner has a
justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence
does not warrant outright dismissal without notice
and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty
of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay
backwages for a period not exceeding three years
from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month(‘s) salary for every year of service, a
fraction of six months being considered as one (1)
year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr.
vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages
should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at
fault.”54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties,
as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the
Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be
reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal55 goes beyond
merely presenting their clients’ respective causes in
court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not
more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to
smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court
and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful
function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation
but to avoid it whenever possible by advising
settlement or withholding suit. He is often called
upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
counsel in every phase of life. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in
the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.” On this point, we find that
both counsel herein fell short of what was expected
of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the
court. The records do not show that they took pains
to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
rapprochment between their
_______________
54 Rollo, 148.
55 Canon 19, Code of Professional Responsibility.
56 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., 66.
201
193
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201
De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission
clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the
situation even as they may have found favor in the
equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter
who handled this regrettable case has been less than
faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts
towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
within his jurisdiction.”57 If he ever did so, or at least
entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not
particularly relish having been obliged to make. The
task of resolving cases involving disputes among
members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth
and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such
situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the
bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality,
we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father
and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and
that our adherence here to law and duty may
unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the
strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the
Court’s earnest hope, therefore, that with the
impartial exposition and extended explanation of
their respective rights in this decision, the parties may
eventually see their way clear to an ultimate
resolution of their differences on more convivial
terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back
wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years,
without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
_______________
57 See Art. 221, Labor Code.
58 Maranaw Resorts Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103215, November 6, 1992,
215 SCRA 501; JAM Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Flores,
et al., G.R. No. 82829, March 19, 1993, 218 SCRA 114.
202
202
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Commission
on Audit
month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6)
months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Nocon and Puno,
JJ., concur.
Assailed decision set aside.
Note.—The Labor Arbiter has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over claims for moral and other forms of
damages arising from unlawful termination of
employment (Associated Citizens Banks vs. Japson,
196 SCRA 404).
——o0o—— De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 231 SCRA 173, G.R. No. 104599 March
11, 1994
A.C. No. 6387. July 19, 2016.*
(formerly CBD Case No. 11-3001)
GABINO V. TOLENTINO and FLORDELIZA C.
TOLENTINO, complainants, vs. ATTY. HENRY B. SO and
ATTY. FERDINAND L. ANCHETA, respondents.
Attorneys; Disbarment; Suspension; The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of
evidence of the respondent’s misconduct affecting his
standing and moral character as an officer of the
court and member of the bar.—It would have been
prudent for Atty. So to have informed complainants
about his resignation and the eventual reassignment
of their case to another lawyer, although this was not
required. Still, Atty. So’s omission is not of such
gravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension. The serious consequences of disbarment
or suspension should follow only where there is a
clear preponderance of evidence of the respondent’s
misconduct affecting his standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and member of the
bar.
Same; A party cannot blame his or her counsel for
negligence when he or she is guilty of neglect.—
Complainants were not entirely blameless. Had
complainants been indeed vigilant in protecting their
rights, they should have followed up on the status of
their appeal; thus, they would have been informed of
Atty. So’s resignation. Atty. So resigned four (4) years
before the Court of Appeals’ Decision was
194
promulgated. Thus, complainants had ample time to
engage the services of a new lawyer to safeguard
their interests if they chose to do so. A party cannot
blame his or her counsel for negligence when he or
she is guilty of neglect.
Same; A lawyer’s duty to assist in the speedy
administration of justice demands recognition that at
a definite time, issues must be laid to rest and
litigation ended.—A lawyer’s duty to assist in the
speedy administration of justice demands recognition
that at a definite time, issues must be laid to rest and
litigation ended. As such,
_______________
* EN BANC.
107
VOL. 797, JULY 19, 2016
107
Tolentino vs. So
Ancheta should have advised complainants to accept
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and accord
respect to the just claim of the opposite party. He
should have tempered his clients’ propensity to
litigate and save them from additional expense in
pursuing their contemplated action. Instead, he gave
them confident assurances that the case could still be
reopened and even furnished them a copy of his
prepared “motion to reopen case.” Despite his
representation that he would file the motion,
however, he did not do so.
Same; Legal Ethics; Atty. Ancheta’s advice involving
corruption of judicial officers tramps the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and the judicial system
and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.—
Atty. Ancheta’s deceit and evasion of duty is manifest.
He accepted the case though he knew the futility of
an appeal. Despite receipt of the P30,000.00
acceptance fee, he did not act on his client’s case.
Moreover, he prevailed upon complainants to give
him P200,000.00 purportedly to be used to bribe the
Justices of the Court of Appeals in order to secure a
favorable ruling, palpably showing that he himself
was unconvinced of the merits of the case. “A lawyer
shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.” Atty. Ancheta’s misconduct betrays his lack of
appreciation that the practice of law is a profession,
not a money-making trade. As a servant of the law,
Atty. Ancheta’s primary duty was to obey the laws
and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Corollary to this duty is his obligation to abstain from
dishonest or deceitful conduct, as well as from
“activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.” Atty. Ancheta’s
advice involving corruption of judicial officers tramps
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
the judicial system and adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law.
Same; Same; Atty. Ancheta’s deceit in dealing with his
clients constitutes gross professional misconduct and
violates his oath, thus justifying his disbarment under
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.—A lawyer
“must at no time be wanting in probity and moral
fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership therein.”
Atty. Ancheta’s deceit in dealing with his clients
constitutes gross professional misconduct and
violates his oath, thus
108
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. So
justifying his disbarment under Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Atty. Ancheta’s cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
(SC) constitutes utter disrespect of the judicial
institution.—Atty. Ancheta’s cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of this Court
constitutes utter disrespect of the judicial institution.
His conduct shows a high degree of irresponsibility
and betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character.
Indeed, his continued indifference to this Court’s
orders constitutes willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which, under Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court, is in itself a sufficient cause
for suspension or disbarment. The maintenance of a
high standard of legal proficiency, honesty, and fair
dealing is a prerequisite to making the bar an effective
instrument in the proper administration of justice.
Any member, therefore, who fails to live up to the
exacting standards of integrity and morality exposes
himself or herself to administrative liability.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Disbar-ment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
195

This resolves a disbarment case against respondent
Atty. Henry B. So for neglect in handling a case, and
respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta for extorting
P200,000.00 from a client.
Complainant Flordeliza C. Tolentino was the
defendant in Civil Case No. SC-2267 entitled
“Benjamin Caballes v. Flordeliza Caballes,” a case
involving recovery of possession of a parcel of land.1
On June 24, 1991, Branch 26 of the Regional
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 12.
109
VOL. 797, JULY 19, 2016
109
Tolentino vs. So
Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, rendered the
Decision2 against complainant Flordeliza ordering her
to vacate the land.
The case was appealed3 to the Court of Appeals
through complainant Flordeliza’s counsel, Atty.
Edilberto U. Coronado (Atty. Coronado). While the
appeal was pending, Atty. Coronado was replaced by
Atty. Henry B. So (Atty. So), a lawyer of the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of
Agrarian Reform.4
Complainants Flordeliza and Gabino V. Tolentino, her
husband, afterwards learned that the Court of
Appeals affirmed5 the Regional Trial Court Decision
against complainant Flordeliza. Complainants
contend that Atty. So did not inform them nor take
the necessary action to elevate the case to this
Court.6 Thus, they were compelled to secure the legal
services of Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta (Atty. Ancheta),
whom they paid P30,000.00 as acceptance fee.7
Atty. Ancheta allegedly promised them that there was
still a remedy against the adverse Court of Appeals’
Decision, and that he would file a “motion to reopen
appeal case.”8 Atty. Ancheta also inveigled them to
part with the amount of P200,000.00 purportedly to
be used for making arrangements with the Justices of
the Court of Appeals before whom their case was
pending.9
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 12-23. The Decision was penned by Judge
Jose Catral Mendoza (now Associate Justice of this
Court).
3 Id., at p. 24.
4 Id., at p. 133, Notice of Appearance dated August
11, 1993.
5 Id., at pp. 25-37. The Decision was penned by
Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-
Magtolis and Teodoro P. Regino of the Ninth Division,
Court of Appeals, Manila.
6 Id., at p. 2.
7 Id., at p. 38.
8 Id., at p. 2.
9 Id.
110
110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. So
Initially, complainants did not agree to Atty.
Ancheta’s proposal because they did not have the
money and it was against the law.10 However, they
eventually acceded when Atty. An-cheta told them
that it was the only recourse they had to obtain a
favorable judgment.11
Hence, in January 2003, they deposited P200,000.00
to Atty. Ancheta’s Bank Account No. 1221275656
with the United Coconut Planters Bank.12
Complainants were surprised to learn that no
“motion to reopen case” had been filed,13 and the
Court of Appeals’ Decision had become final and
executory.14
Hence, complainants sought to recover the amount of
P200,000.00 from Atty. Ancheta. Through a letter
dated September 10, 200315 by their new counsel,
complainants demanded for the return of the
P200,000.00. However, Atty. Ancheta did not heed
their demand despite receipt of the letter.
On May 17, 2004, complainants filed their
Sinumpaang Sakdal16 praying for the disbarment of
Atty. So for neglect in handling complainant
Flordeliza’s case, and Atty. Ancheta for defrauding
them of the amount of P200,000.00.
Atty. So counters that he was no longer connected
with the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the
Department of Agrarian Reform when the Court of
Appeals’ Decision was promulgated on July 16,
2001.17 He alleges that he worked at the Bureau from
1989 to 1997, and that he resigned to pre-
_______________
196

10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id., at p. 44, Annex L.
14 Id., at p. 45, Annex M.
15 Id., at pp. 46-47.
16 Id., at pp. 1-3.
17 Id., at p. 122, Atty. So’s Comment.
111
VOL. 797, JULY 19, 2016
111
Tolentino vs. So
pare for the elections in his hometown in Western
Samar.18 It was a procedure in the Bureau that once
a handling lawyer resigns or retires, his or her cases
are reassigned to other lawyers of the Bureau.19
Atty. Ancheta did not file a comment despite due
notice. Hence, in this Court’s Resolution dated
February 23, 2011,20 he was deemed to have waived
his right to file a comment. This Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation.21
On June 8, 2011, the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed the
parties to appear for mandatory conference at 10:00
a.m. on July 6, 2011.22 However, on July 6, 2011, only
Atty. So appeared.23 Since there was no showing on
record that complainants and Atty. Ancheta were
notified, the mandatory conference was reset to
August 10, 2011 at 10:00 a.m.24
In the August 10, 2011 mandatory conference,
complainant Flordeliza was represented by her
daughter, Arlyn Tolentino, together with counsel,
Atty. Restituto Mendoza.25 Arlyn Tolentino informed
the Commission that complainant Gabino V.
Tolentino had already died.26 Respondents did not
appear despite due notice.27
Hence, the mandatory conference was terminated,
and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers within a non-
extendible period of 10 days from no-
_______________
18 Id., at p. 121.
19 Id., at p. 122.
20 Id., at p. 194.
21 Id.
22 Id., at p. 196, Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing.
23 Id., at p. 197, Minutes of the Hearing on July 6,
2011.
24 Id., at p. 198, Order dated July 6, 2011.
25 Id., at p. 202, Minutes of the Hearing on August
10, 2011.
26 Id., at pp. 205-207.
27 Id., at p. 203, Order dated August 10, 2011.
112
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. So
tice. After, the case would be submitted for report
and recommendation.28
On September 19, 2011, complainant Flordeliza filed
as her position paper, a Motion for Adoption of the
Pleadings and their Annexes in this Case,29 including
the relevant documents30 in Criminal Case No. SC-
1191 (for estafa) against Atty. Ancheta, which she
filed.
Atty. So filed his Position Paper31 on September 15,
2011. Atty. Ancheta did not file any position paper.32
The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended33
that Atty. So be absolved of the charge against him for
insufficiency of evidence.34 As to Atty. Ancheta, the
Commission found him guilty of serious misconduct
and deceit and recommended his disbarment.35
In the Resolution36 dated December 14, 2014, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
adopted and approved the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.
On January 11, 2016, the Board of Governors
transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final
action, pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.37
_______________
28 Id.
29 Id., at pp. 224-227.
30 Id., at pp. 228-230, Annex “A,” Sinumpaang Sakdal
of complainants; pp. 231-232, Annex “B,”
Sinumpaang Sakdal of Roseline
Caballes; p. 233, Annex “C,” Memorandum of
Preliminary Investigation; p. 234, Annex “D,”
Subpoena; and p. 235, Annex “E,” Warrant of Arrest.
31 Id., at pp. 209-215.
32 Id., at p. 241, Report and Recommendation dated
September 6, 2013.
197
33 Id., at pp. 240-248. The Report and
Recommendation was penned by Commissioner
Romualdo A. Din, Jr.
34 Id., at p. 248.
35 Id.
36 Id., at p. 238.
37 Id., at p. 237.
113
VOL. 797, JULY 19, 2016
113
Tolentino vs. So
This Court accepts and adopts the findings of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.
I omission is not of such gravity that would warrant his
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines correctly
absolved Atty. So of the charge of negligence in the
performance of his duties as counsel of complainant
Flordeliza.
Complainants fault Atty. So for failing to inform them
about the Court of Appeals’ Decision and for not
taking the necessary steps to elevate their case to this
Court.38 However, it is undisputed that Atty. So was
no longer employed at the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance when the Court of Appeals’ Decision was
rendered on July 16, 2001. Atty. So had resigned in
1997, four (4) years before the Decision was
promulgated.39
Atty. So handled the appeal of complainant Flordeliza
in his capacity as a government-employed legal
officer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of
the Department of Agrarian Reform. In his Notice of
Appearance40 dated August 11, 1993 and Motion to
Admit Additional Evidence41 dated November 22,
1993 filed before the Court of Appeals, Atty. So
affixed his signature under the representation of the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance.
Atty. So’s appearance for complainant Flordeliza may
be likened to that of a lawyer assigned to handle a
case for a private law firm’s client. If the counsel
resigns, the firm is simply bound to provide a
replacement.42 Similarly, upon Atty.
_______________
38 Id., at p. 2.
39 Id., at p. 121.
40 Id., at p. 133.
41 Id., at pp. 136-137.
42 Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa v. Eastern
Telecommunications Phils., Inc., 369 Phil. 1, 10; 309
SCRA 566, 574 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
114
114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. So
So’s resignation, the Director of the Bureau merely
reassigned his case assignment to other lawyers in the
Bureau even without complainants’ consent.
It would have been prudent for Atty. So to have
informed complainants about his resignation and the
eventual reassignment of their case to another
lawyer, although this was not required. Still, Atty. So’s
disbarment or suspension. The serious consequences
of disbarment or suspension should follow only
where there is a clear preponderance of evidence of
the respondent’s misconduct affecting his standing
and moral character as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.43
On the other hand, complainants were not entirely
blameless. Had complainants been indeed vigilant in
protecting their rights, they should have followed up
on the status of their appeal; thus, they would have
been informed of Atty. So’s resignation. Atty. So
resigned four (4) years before the Court of Appeals’
Decision was promulgated.44 Thus, complainants had
ample time to engage the services of a new lawyer to
safeguard their interests if they chose to do so. A
party cannot blame his or her counsel for negligence
when he or she is guilty of neglect.45
II
The same conclusion cannot be made with regards
Atty. Ancheta. We agree with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines’ recommendation that he should be
disbarred.
_______________
43 See Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr., 478 Phil. 859, 870;
435 SCRA 1, 10 (2004) [Per CJ. Davide, Jr., First
Division], citing Resurreccion v. Sayson, 360 Phil. 313,
321; 300 SCRA 129, 136 (1998) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
44 Rollo, p. 121.
45 See Macapagal v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 206,
217; 271 SCRA 491, 502 (1997) [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division].
198

115
VOL. 797, JULY 19, 2016
115
Tolentino vs. So
Atty. Ancheta’s repeated failure to comply with
several of this Court’s Resolutions requiring him to
comment on the complaint lends credence to
complainants’ allegations. It manifests his tacit
admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the basis of
complainants’ Sinumpaang Sakdal and its Annexes.
It was established by the evidence on record that (1)
Atty. Ancheta received the acceptance fee of
P30,000.00 on December 9, 2002;46 and (2)
complainants deposited on January 17, 200347 the
amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Ancheta’s bank
account. Atty. Ancheta made false promises to
complainants that something could still be done with
complainant Flordeliza’s case despite the Court of
Appeals’ Decision having already attained finality on
September 22, 2001.48 Worse, he proposed bribing
the Justices of the Court of Appeals in order to solve
their legal dilemma.
Atty. Ancheta should have very well known that a
decision that has attained finality is no longer open
for reversal and should be respected.49 A lawyer’s
duty to assist in the speedy administration of
justice50 demands recognition that at a definite time,
issues must be laid to rest and litigation ended.51 As
such, Ancheta should have advised complainants to
accept the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
accord respect to the just claim of the opposite party.
He should have tempered his clients’ propensity to
litigate and save them from additional expense in
pursuing their contemplated action. Instead, he gave
them confident assurances that the case could still be
reopened and even furnished them a copy of his
prepared
_______________
46 Rollo, p. 38.
47 Id., at p. 43.
48 Id., at p. 45.
49 Alonso v. Relamida, Jr., 640 Phil. 325, 333; 626
SCRA 281, 288-289 (2010) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
50 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 12.
51 In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 311 Phil. 441, 508; 241
SCRA 405, 454 (1995) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
116
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. So
“motion to reopen case.” Despite his representation
that he would file the motion, however, he did not do
so.52
Atty. Ancheta’s deceit and evasion of duty is manifest.
He accepted the case though he knew the futility of
an appeal. Despite receipt of the P30,000.00
acceptance fee, he did not act on his client’s case.
Moreover, he prevailed upon complainants to give
him P200,000.00 purportedly to be used to bribe the
Justices of the Court of Appeals in order to secure a
favorable ruling, palpably showing that he himself
was unconvinced of the merits of the case. “A lawyer
shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.”53 Atty. Ancheta’s misconduct betrays his lack
of appreciation that the practice of law is a
profession, not a money-making trade.54
As a servant of the law, Atty. Ancheta’s primary duty
was to obey the laws and promote respect for the law
and legal processes.55 Corollary to this duty is his
obligation to abstain from dishonest or deceitful
conduct,56 as well as from “activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
_______________
52 Rollo, p. 2.
53 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule
1.03 provides:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive
or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man’s cause.
54 Manzano v. Soriano, 602 Phil. 419, 427; 584 SCRA
1, 3 (2009) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo,
456 Phil. 560, 567; 409 SCRA 299, 303 (2003) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
55 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1
provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.
56 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
117
VOL. 797, JULY 19, 2016
199
117
Tolentino vs. So
the legal system.”57 Atty. Ancheta’s advice involving
corruption of judicial officers tramps the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and the judicial system
and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Complainants eventually found out about his duplicity
and demanded for the return of their money.58 Still,
Atty. Ancheta did not return the P200,000.00 and the
P30,000.00 despite his failure to render any legal
service to his clients.59
Atty. Ancheta breached the following duties
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
....
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
....
Rule 15.05 – A lawyer, when advising his client, shall
give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client’s case, neither
overstating nor understating the prospects of the
case.
Rule 15.06 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he
is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.
_______________
57 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule
1.02 provides:
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
58 Rollo, pp. 46-47.
59 Id.
118
118
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. So
Rule 15.07. – A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.
....
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
....
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand. . . .
....
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE
CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
....
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
A lawyer “must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent
to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership therein.”60
Atty. Ancheta’s deceit in dealing with his clients
constitutes gross professional misconduct61 and
violates his oath, thus justifying his disbarment under
Rule 138, Section 2762 of the Rules of Court.
_______________
60 Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr., supra note 43 at p. 869;
pp. 9-10.
61 Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, 412 Phil. 419, 424-425;
360 SCRA 6, 9-10 (2001) [Per J. Pardo, En Banc].
62 Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 27 provides:
119
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119
Tolentino vs. So
Furthermore, his failure to heed the following
Resolutions of the Court despite notice aggravates his
misconduct:
(1) Resolution63 dated June 21, 2004, requiring him
to comment on the complaint;
(2) Resolution64 dated October 16, 2006, directing
him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply
with the June 21, 2004 Resolution;
(3) Resolution65 dated January 21, 2009, imposing
upon him the penalty of P1,000.00 for failure to
comply with the June 21, 2004 and October 16, 2006
Resolutions;
(4) Resolution66 dated January 27, 2010, imposing an
additional fine of P2,000.00 or a penalty of
200
imprisonment of 10 days for failure to comply with
the January 21, 2009 Resolution; and
_______________
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party without authority to do so[.] See also
Busiños v. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687, 695; 283 SCRA 407,
415 (1997) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
63 Rollo, p. 52. See also Rollo, p. 155, letter of the
Postmaster, Makati Central Post Office, Makati City.
The Resolution was received by a certain Rey Teresa
on August 10, 2004.
64 Id., at p. 157.
65 Id., at p. 173.
66 Id., at p. 175
. SCRA 674, 682 (2010) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
120
120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. So
(5) Resolution67 dated January 12, 2011, ordering his
arrest and directing the National Bureau of
Investigation to arrest and detain him for five (5) days
and until he complied with the previous Resolutions.
Atty. Ancheta’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of this Court constitutes utter
disrespect of the judicial institution. His conduct
shows a high degree of irresponsibility and betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in his character. Indeed, his
continued indifference to this Court’s orders
constitutes willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of this Court, which, under Rule 138, Section 2768 of
the Rules of Court, is in itself a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment.
The maintenance of a high standard of legal
proficiency, honesty, and fair dealing69 is a
prerequisite to making the bar an effective
instrument in the proper administration of justice.70
Any member, therefore, who fails to live up to the
exact-
_______________
67 Id., at p. 179.
68 Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 27 provides:
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
69 Luna v. Galarrita, A.C. No. 10662, July 7, 2015, 762
SCRA 1, 12-13 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
70 Alcantara v. De Vera, 650 Phil. 214, 220-221; 635
121
VOL. 797, JULY 19, 2016
121
Tolentino vs. So
ing standards of integrity and morality exposes
himself or herself to administrative liability.71
Atty. Ancheta’s violations show that he is unfit to
discharge the duties of a member of the legal
profession. Hence, he should be disbarred.72
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty.
Henry B. So is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence. On the other hand, this Court finds
respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta GUILTY of
gross misconduct in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility and
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the
name of Ferdinand L. Ancheta from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Respondent Ancheta is ORDERED to return to
complainants Gabino V. Tolentino and Flordeliza C.
Tolentino, within 30 days from receipt of this
Resolution, the total amount of P230,000.00, with
201
legal interest at 12% per annum from the date of
demand on September 10, 2003 to June 30, 2013, and
at 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.
Respondent Ancheta is further DIRECTED to submit to
this Court proof of payment of the amount within 10
days from payment.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts in the country.
This Resolution takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
71 Villanueva v. Gonzales, 568 Phil. 379, 389; 544
SCRA 410, 420 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Sipin-
Nabor v. Baterina, supra note 61 at p. 424; pp. 9-10;
and Radjaie v. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 17; 337 SCRA 244,
257 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
72 Tan v. Diamante, A.C. No. 7766, August 5, 2014,
732 SCRA 1, 9 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
122
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. So
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., On Leave.
Mendoza, J., On Official Leave.
Complaint against Atty. Henry B. So dismissed, while
respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta disbarred for
gross misconduct.
Notes.—Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires an attorney to exert every
effort and to consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
(Philworth Asia, Inc. vs. Philippine Commercial
International Bank, 697 SCRA 206 [2013])
In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his
client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as
counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts
every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case
and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. (Figueras vs. Jimenez, 718 SCRA 450 [2014])
——o0o—— Tolentino vs. So, 797 SCRA 106, A.C. No.
6387 July 19, 2016
A.C. No. 9067. January 31, 2018.*
MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, complainant, vs.
ATTY. ARISTEDES A. MARAMOT, respondent.
Attorneys; Lawyer’s Oath; Every lawyer before
entering his duties and responsibilities as a member
of the Bar and an officer of the Supreme Court (SC),
professes as a natural course the promises contained
in the Lawyer’s Oath.—Every lawyer before entering
his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Bar
and an officer of the Court, professes as a natural
course the promises contained in the Lawyer’s Oath,
to wit: I do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will
support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as
a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
405
VOL. 853, JANUARY 31, 2018
405
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
my clients, and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. The letter and
spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath are oftentimes forgotten
or taken for granted in the course of the lawyer’s
practice of law. To give teeth thereto, the Court has
adopted and instituted the Code of Professional
Responsibility to govern every lawyer’s relationship
with his profession, the courts, the society, and his
clients.
Same; Same; Dishonesty; At the time of his
preparation of the document, he actually knew that
Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having
then advised that her parents should represent her in
the execution of the document; Nonetheless, he still
indicated in the deed of donation that the donees
202
were of legal age. His doing so, being undeniably
dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to
utter a falsehood.—The respondent prepared the
deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the
document, he actually knew that Princess Anne was a
minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that
her parents should represent her in the execution of
the document. Mommayda was likewise a minor. His
awareness of the latter’s minority at the time was not
disputed because he was also representing
Mommayda in the latter’s adoption proceedings
aside from being Mommayda’s neighbor.
Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed of donation
that the donees were of legal age. His doing so, being
undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a
lawyer not to utter a falsehood. He thereby
consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest
conduct, defying the law and contributing to the
erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.
Same; As a lawyer, he should not invoke good faith
and good intentions as sufficient to excuse him from
discharging his obligation to be truthful and honest in
his professional actions.—The respondent justifies
himself by stating that the persistence of the donor
Margarita prevailed upon him to prepare the deed of
donation as he had done; and adverts to the donor’s
assurance that she would herself procure the
signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the
document. He also submits that the execution of the
deed had redounded to the advantage of the minors;
and that there was no law that prohibited the
donation in favor of minors. The respondent cannot
be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a
lawyer, he should not invoke good faith and good
intentions as sufficient to excuse him from
discharging his obligation to be truthful and honest
406
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility
in that regard were clear and unambiguous. In Young
v. Batuegas, 403 SCRA 123 (2003), this Court
reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the
highest value for attorneys.
Civil Law; Donations; The names of Princess Anne and
Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should
have been included in the notarial acknowledgment
of the deed itself; and, in view of their minority, the
names of their respective parents (or legal guardians)
assisting them should have also been indicated
thereon. This requirement was not complied with.—
The respondent’s denial of having employed any
falsity or dishonesty, or of making untruthful
statements in executing the notarial
acknowledgment does not necessarily save the day
for him. There is no question that a donation can be
accepted in a separate instrument. However, the
deed of donation in question was also the same
instrument that apparently contained the
acceptance. The names of Princess Anne and
Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should
have been included in the notarial acknowledgment
of the deed itself; and, in view of their minority, the
names of their respective parents (or legal guardians)
assisting them should have also been indicated
thereon. This requirement was not complied with.
Moreover, Princess Anne and Mommayda should
have also signed the deed of donation themselves
along with their assisting parents or legal guardians.
The omission indicated that the deed of donation was
not complete. Hence, the notarial acknowledgment
of the deed of donation was improper.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Consenting, Abetting and Participating in Falsifying a
Public Document; Violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and
Violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer is a disciple of truth because he swore upon
his admission to the Bar that he would do no
falsehood nor con-
407
VOL. 853, JANUARY 31, 2018
407
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
sent to the doing of any in court, and that he would
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. His violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath through the commission of falsehood
can be condignly sanctioned.
Antecedents
In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Marjorie A.
Apolinar-Petilo (Marjorie) alleges that the respondent
203
consented to, abetted and participated in the illegal
act of falsifying a public document in violation of
Article 171(4) in relation to Article 172(2) of the
Revised Penal Code; and that he thereby violated the
Lawyer’s Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and
Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The public document in question was the deed of
donation2 executed in favor of Princess Anne
Apolinar-Petilo (Princess Anne) and Ma. Mommayda
V. Apolinar (Mommayda) who were only 12 years old
and 16 1/2 years old, respectively, at the time of its
execution.3 Asserting that the respondent had known
of the minority of the donees, Marjorie insists that he
was thereby guilty of falsification first in his capacity
as a lawyer by preparing the deed of donation and
indicating therein that both donees were then “of
legal age”; and as a notary public by notarizing the
document. She claims that he, being Mommayda’s
counsel in the latter’s adoption case, was aware of
the untruthful statements he made in the deed of
donation because he thereafter submitted the deed
of donation as evidence therein.4
In his answer, the respondent states that Margarita
Apolinar (Margarita) and her sister-in-law Justina
Villanueva-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 2-7.
2 Id., at pp. 9-10.
3 Id., at pp. 2-3.
4 Id., at pp. 66-67.
408
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
Apolinar (Justina) went to his law office sometime in
2000; that Margarita was a grandaunt who owned a
parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro that she
wanted to donate to Princess Anne, Marjorie’s own
daughter, and Mommayda, the adopted daughter of
Justina; that upon learning of Princess Anne’s
minority, he advised that she had to be represented
by either parent;5 that not one to be easily turned
down, Margarita persisted, and prevailed over him;
that he thereupon prepared the deed of donation but
left the date, the document number and page number
blank; that he reserved the notarization for later after
the parties had signed the document; that he allowed
Margarita to bring the deed of donation to Manila
where she was supposedly proceeding in order to
procure the signature of Princess Anne thereon and
as a way of avoiding additional travel expenses; and
that Justina had mentioned to him at the time that
Margarita was then suffering from colon cancer and
had only a little time to live.
The respondent recalled that a month afterwards
Margarita and Justina returned to him with the signed
deed of donation; that he then noticed that the
document did not bear the signatures of Princess
Anne’s parents; that Margarita again offered to
procure the signatures on the document; and that
Margarita and Justina did not anymore return with
the document until the time when he had to enter the
instrument in his notarial book for his monthly report.
Margarita eventually died on April 13, 2003. Later on,
with issues about her properties left unresolved, the
relationship among her relatives quickly turned sour,
and the deed of donation again came to the fore. In
2004, Justina and her husband Tomas went to see the
respondent and confided to him that they were
entangled in a court battle with Marjorie, their niece,
over Margarita’s properties, including the apartment
in Manila where they had been occupying since 1980.
They then learned from the respondent that because
Mom-
_______________
5 Id., at p. 23.
409
VOL. 853, JANUARY 31, 2018
409
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
mayda’s birth certificate had been simulated, they
needed to legally adopt her in order to enable her to
inherit from them. Hence, they filed a petition for the
adoption of Mommayda, which did not sit well with
Marjorie.
Claiming that her successional rights as a niece or heir
to Tomas vis-à-vis would be adversely affected by the
adoption of Mommayda, Marjorie vigorously
opposed the petition for adoption, and argued for its
dismissal on the basis that Tomas and Justina were
not morally capable of adoption as shown by their
simulation of the birth of Mommayda. Marjorie also
brought several criminal cases in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on the ground of the simulation
of the birth and falsification of the birth certificate of
Mommayda in violation of Articles 347, 359, 183 and
184 of the Revised Penal Code.
204
Marjorie’s opposition to the petition for adoption and
her criminal charges were dismissed. Also dismissed
were her opposition to the petition of Tomas and
Justina for the correction of entry in Mommayda’s
birth certificate, as well as Marjorie’s motion to recall
the social worker for cross-examination in the
adoption case. The respondent claims that Marjorie
— exasperated and dissatisfied with the outcome —
then turned against him and instituted the complaint
for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.6
The respondent submits that there was nothing illegal
in the deed of donation; that as the sole owner of the
donated land, Margarita had an absolute right to
dispose of her property by donation; that no law
prohibited donations to minors; and that the filing of
the petition for judicial partition was an express if not
implied ratification of the defect in the donation; and
that in regard to the submission of the simulated birth
certificate in evidence, the purpose of filing the
petition for adoption was to rectify the simulation and
to convert the
_______________
6 Id., at p. 24.
410
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
relationship between Mommayda and her adopting
parents into a legal one.7
During the mandatory conference set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline, Marjo-rie admitted that a petition for
judicial partition involving the donated land was
meanwhile filed; that a compromise agreement8 was
reached; and that Princess Anne sold her share to
Mommayda.9
In his position paper,10 the respondent asserts that
the complaint was pure harassment calculated only to
besmirch and malign his reputation; and that the
complaint was also a premeditated tactic to prolong
or preempt the adoption case considering that a
favorable ruling thereat would adversely affect
Marjorie’s rights as an heir of Mommayda’s parents.
In his resolution dated May 22, 2008,11 the IBP
Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
the undersigned Commissioner finds respondent
Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot to have violated the
Notarial Law, his act having undermined the
confidence of the public on notarial documents; and,
respectfully recommends his suspension from
notarial practice for a period of one (1) year while the
other complaints against him are recommended
dismissed for lack of merit.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent
submitted that he did not employ any falsity because
it was only Margarita — the donor — who had in fact
attested to the
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 23-28.
8 Id., at pp. 98-100.
9 Id., at pp. 101-102.
10 Id., at pp. 96-97.
11 Id., at pp. 107-110.
12 Id., at pp. 109-110.
13 Id., at pp. 111-113.
411
VOL. 853, JANUARY 31, 2018
411
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
execution of the deed of donation in the notarial
acknowledgement of the deed of donation; that it
was inconsequential even if Princess Anne had signed
the deed of donation not in his presence; that in
conveyances, only the person encumbering or
conveying needed to personally appear, sign and
acknowledge the deed before the notary public; and
that Princess Anne and Mommayda’s names were
placed in the document merely for them to accept the
donation.
The respondent pleads for the mitigation of his
liability considering that he has exhibited candor in
admitting his offense. He represents that his act was
not gross enough as to justify suspension; that the
complainant had thereby suffered no damage, but
had actually benefitted from the act; that he had
notarized in good faith; and that with this offense
being his first in his 12 years as a law practitioner and
as notary public, humanitarian considerations should
be considered in his favor because he had children to
support and had been his family’s sole bread winner.
In her comment on the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration,14 Majorie avers that Princess Anne
could not have signed the instrument in Manila
205
because her daughter was then studying in Victoria,
Oriental Mindoro.
In Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report and recommendations of the Commission
on Bar Discipline, but modified the penalty by
recommending the immediate revocation of the
respondent’s notarial commission and his
disqualification from reappointment as a notary for
two years, thus:15
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is here-by
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled
case,
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 116-117.
15 Id., at p. 106.
412
412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and for Respondent’s violation of the Notarial
Law, Atty. Aristedes Maramot is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year, immediate
Revocation of his Notarial Commission if presently
Commissioned and Disqualified from reappointment
as Notary Public for Two (2) years.16
The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s
motion for reconsideration through Resolution No.
XIX-2011-424 dated June 26, 2011,17 thus:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it
being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground or
reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors’
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008 is
hereby AFFIRMED.18
On September 6, 2011, the respondent filed in this
Court his Comment on the IBP Board of Governor’s
Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 and No. XIX-2011-424
dated August 16, 2011.19
In its Report dated June 27, 2012,20 the Office of the
Bar Confidant recommended to treat the comment as
a petition for review.
On February 15, 2012, the respondent filed an
amended comment dated December 5, 2011.21
_______________
16 Id.
17 Id., at p. 136.
18 Id.
19 Id., at pp. 144-148.
20 Id., at p. 163.
21 Id., at p. 153.
413
VOL. 853, JANUARY 31, 2018
413
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
On July 23, 2012, the Court resolved: (1) to direct the
respondent to furnish the IBP a copy of his amended
comment and submit proof of its service within ten
(10) days; and (2) to require the complainant to file
her comment thereon within 15 days from receipt.22
Accordingly, the complaint submitted her comment
on November 9, 2012, opposing the respondent’s
prayer for reconsideration and asking the Court to
uphold the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of
Governors.
A.
As a Lawyer
Every lawyer before entering his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Bar and an officer
of the Court, professes as a natural course the
promises contained in the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:
I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients, and
206
I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations
without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
22 Id., at p. 184.
414
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
The letter and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath are
oftentimes forgotten or taken for granted in the
course of the lawyer’s practice of law. To give teeth
thereto, the Court has adopted and instituted the
Code of Professional Responsibility to govern every
lawyer’s relationship with his profession, the courts,
the society, and his clients.
Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of
Canon 1; and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10, which provide:
CANON 1 – x x x
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 – x x x
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At
the time of his preparation of the document, he
actually knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence,
his claim of having then advised that her parents
should represent her in the execution of the
document. Mommayda was likewise a minor. His
awareness of the latter’s minority at the time was not
disputed because he was also representing
Mommayda in the latter’s adoption proceedings
aside from being Mommayda’s neighbor.
Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed of donation
that the donees were of legal age. His doing so, being
undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a
lawyer not to utter a falsehood. He thereby
consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest
conduct, defying the law and contributing to the
erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.
The respondent’s explanation that it was only
Margarita who actually acknowledged that the deed
of donation was her
415
VOL. 853, JANUARY 31, 2018
415
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
own free act and deed does not extricate him from
responsibility. The deed of donation, whether or not
acknowledged by the donees, should not bear any
false statement upon a material fact. The ages of the
donees were material because they bore on their
capacities to render the donation efficacious. That
neither Princess Anne nor Mommayda acknowledged
the deed of donation did not cure the defect.
The respondent justifies himself by stating that the
persistence of the donor Margarita prevailed upon
him to prepare the deed of donation as he had done;
and adverts to the donor’s assurance that she would
herself procure the signatures of the parents of
Princess Anne on the document. He also submits that
the execution of the deed had redounded to the
advantage of the minors; and that there was no law
that prohibited the donation in favor of minors.
The respondent cannot be relieved by his
justifications and submissions. As a lawyer, he should
not invoke good faith and good intentions as
sufficient to excuse him from discharging his
obligation to be truthful and honest in his
professional actions. His duty and responsibility in
that regard were clear and unambiguous. In Young v.
Batuegas,23 this Court reminded that truthfulness
and honesty had the highest value for attorneys, thus:
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon
his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in
mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation
is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the
facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and plead-
_______________
23 A.C. No. 5379, May 9, 2003, 403 SCRA 123.
207
416
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
ing before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty
to defend his client’s rights and is expected to display
the utmost zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.24
The respondent posits that a donation could be made
in favor of a minor. Such position was not a factor,
however, because whether or not a minor could
benefit from the donation did not determine the
merits of the complaint for his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law. Neither was his
claim that the filing of the petition for judicial
partition amounted to the ratification of the deed of
donation a factor to be considered in his favor. The
decisive consideration is whether or not he
committed a falsehood in his preparation of the deed
of donation. Sadly for him, the answer is in the
affirmative.
Relative to the respondent’s submission of the false
birth certificate of Mommayda in the proceedings for
her adoption, we adopt with approval the following
findings and recommendation made by the IBP
Commissioner absolving the respondent, viz.:
The Certificate of Live Birth of Ma. Mommayda
Villanueva Apolinar is certainly a simulated one where
it was made to appear that she was the biological
child of Spouses Tomas V. Apolinar and Justina P.
Villanueva when she was not. It was not shown,
however, that respondent has a hand when its
contents were given to the employee of the Local Civil
Registrar of Victoria, Mindoro Oriental. From the face
of the document, it appears that Tomas Apolinar
himself gave the details and he signed the Certificate
of Live concerned.
When the respondent used the document in the
adoption case of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar
by the Spouses Tomas and Justina Apolinar (docketed
as Spec. Proc. No. R-04-5396, RTC, Branch 40, Calapan
City,
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 126-127.
417
VOL. 853, JANUARY 31, 2018
417
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
Mindoro Oriental), the respondent did not
misrepresent that Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar is the
biological daughter of the petitioners. In fact, there
was nothing that was misrepresented in the
allegations in the petition. This led to the filing of
another case for the correction of entry in the birth
certificate of the same Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar
docketed as Spec. Proc. CV-05-5445. It was alleged
therein that Leini Villanueva Guerrero and Johnny
Ortega are the biological parents of Ma. Mommayda
Apolinar.25
B.
As a Notary Public
The respondent is also being hereby charged with
having executed the notarial acknowledgment for the
deed of donation despite Princess Anne not having
actually appeared before him.
The respondent explains that he did not employ any
falsity or dishonesty, and that he did not make
untruthful statements in executing the notarial
acknowledgment.
In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:
It cannot be denied that the respondent violated the
Notarial Law when he, by his own admission,
notarized the Deed of Donation which was signed by
at least one of the parties, namely: the donee,
Princess Anne Petilo, who signed not in the presence
of the Notary Public but somewhere in Metro Manila.
This fact the respondent has admitted in his Answer
(Records, p. 22 Statement of Facts, par. 3). For this
reason, notaries public are once again reminded to
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary
public should not notarized a document unless the
_______________
25 Rollo, p. 140.
418
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein (Serzo v. Flores, A.C. No. 6040
208
[formerly CBD 02-972, July 30, 2004] citing Fulgencio
v. Martin, 403, 403 SCRA 216, 220-221).26
The IBP Commissioner obviously rendered his
foregoing observations on the assumption that
Princess Anne had herself acknowledged the
instrument not in the presence of the respondent as
the Notary Public. But, as borne out by the
acknowledgment, only Margarita’s name was
indicated as the person appearing before the
respondent during the notarization of the instrument,
to wit:
BEFORE ME, on the date and at the place afore-cited
personally appeared Margarita V. Apolinar with her
CTC indicated below her name and signature, issued
at Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, all known to me the
same person who executed the foregoing instrument
and she acknowledged to me that the same is her own
free act and deed. (Emphasis supplied)27
Nonetheless, the respondent’s denial of having
employed any falsity or dishonesty, or of making
untruthful statements in executing the notarial
acknowledgment does not necessarily save the day
for him. There is no question that a donation can be
accepted in a separate instrument. However, the
deed of donation in question was also the same
instrument that apparently contained the
acceptance.28 The names of Princess Anne and
Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors,
_______________
26 Id., at p. 108.
27 Id., at p. 10.
28 Id., at p. 9, which contains the relevant portion of
the deed of donation reading as follows:
That the DONEES does hereby accepts this
donation of the above described real property and
does hereby express his gratitude for the liberality of
the DONOR.
419
VOL. 853, JANUARY 31, 2018
419
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
should have been included in the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of
their minority, the names of their respective parents
(or legal guardians) assisting them should have also
been indicated thereon. This requirement was not
complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne and
Mommayda should have also signed the deed of
donation themselves along with their assisting
parents or legal guardians.
The omission indicated that the deed of donation was
not complete. Hence, the notarial acknowledgment
of the deed of donation was improper. Rule II Section
1 of the Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—
“Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an integrally complete instrument or
document.
xxxx
We cannot approve of the recommended penalty of
suspension for one year. The circumstances peculiar
to the complaint call for lenity in favor of the
respondent, but who must nonetheless be sternly
warned against a repetition of the offense at the risk
of suffering a more stringent penalty. We hold that
the penalties commensurate to the offense is
suspension from the practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES
respondent ATTY. ARISTEDES MARAMOT guilty of
violating the Lawyer’s Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial
Practice; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
six months effective from notice of this decision, with
revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from being reappointed as Notary
Public for two years effective upon receipt; and warns
him of a more stringent penalty upon repetition of the
offense.
420
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen and Gesmundo,
JJ., concur.
Martires, J., On Official Business.
Atty. Aristedes Maramot suspended from practice of
law for six (6) months for violating the Lawyer’s Oath,
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Rules on Notarial Practice, with revocation of
his notarial commission and disqualification from
209
being reappointed as Notary Public for two (2) years,
with warning against repetition of similar offense.
Notes.—The Attorney’s Oath mandates a lawyer,
among other duties: (a) to do no falsehood; (b) nor
consent to the doing of the same in court; and (c) to
conduct himself as a lawyer to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the
court. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Miranda,
720 SCRA 1 [2014])
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney,
for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). (Foster vs.
Agtang, 744 SCRA 242 [2014])
——o0o—— Apolinar-Petilo vs. Maramot , 853 SCRA
404, A.C. No. 9067 January 31, 2018
[Adm. Case No. 1117. March 20, 1944]
The Director of Religious Affairs, complainant, vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot, respondent.
Attorneys at Law; Solicitation of Business from the
Public.— It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a fla-grant violation by the respondent
of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of
Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to ad-vertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the prac-
580
580 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Director of Religious Affairs vs. B ayot
tices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar,
he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, * *
* is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
profession-al capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Malpractice.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for
complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
Ozaeta, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged
with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13,
1943, which reads as fol-lows:
"Marriage
"license promptly secured thru our assistance & the
annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired,
and mar-riage arranged to wishes of
parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.
"Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room 105
Tel. 2-41-60."
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first
denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having
caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence
and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat
such professional misconduct in the future and to
abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the
said advertisement was published only once in the
Tribune and that he never had any case at law by
reason thereof.
581
VOL. 74, MARCH 20, 1944 581
Director of Religious Affairs vs. B ayot
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court
for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question
was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation
of business from the public. Section 2§ of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession
who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering
them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old de-filed the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, * *
210
* is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
profes-sional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., 37, the respondent attorney
was suspended from the practice of law for the period
of one month for advertising his services and
soliciting,work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than
this because there the solicita-tions were repeatedly
made and were more elaborate and in-sistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not
to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion
and so decides that the respondent should be, as he
hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C. J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ.,
concur.
Respondent reprimanded.
Director of Religious Affairs vs. B ayot, 74 Phil., 579,
Adm. Case No. 1117 March 20, 1944
A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003.*
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003.*
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP
COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL
G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
respondents.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; The practice of law is
not a business; Lawyering is not primarily meant to be
a money-making venture and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits; Elements
distinguishing the legal profession from a business.—
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of
law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
300
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Khan, Jr. vs. Simbillo
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration. The duty to
public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves. The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business: (1) A
duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money; (2) A relation
as an “officer of the court” to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability; (3) A relation to clients in the highest
degree of fiduciary; and (4) A relation to colleagues at
the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods
of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.
Same; Same; Solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession.—The solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession. If it were made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office
and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of
calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court and
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue
of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which
reads: “ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667.”1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the
Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published
_______________
211

1 Rollo, p. 13.
301
VOL. 409, AUGUST 19, 2003
301
Khan, Jr. vs. Simbillo
telephone number and pretended to be an interested
party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that
her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case
will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable
at the time of filing of the case and the other half after
a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published
in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine
Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed
to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation
per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come
to change our views about the prohibition on
advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the
public is not served by the absolute prohibition on
lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on
lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus,
he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
that advertisement of legal services offered by a
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation
of Rules 2.03 and
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 14-15.
3 Id., at p. 9.
4 Id., at pp. 21-57.
5 Id., at p. 60.
6 Id., at p. 62.
302
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Khan, Jr. vs. Simbillo
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and
suspended him from the practice of law for one (1)
year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts
would be dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11,
2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19,
2002.9
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, “Atty. Rizalino
T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents.” This petition was consolidated with
A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March
4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties
were required to manifest whether or not they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is
submitting the case for its early resolution on the
basis of pleadings and records thereof.11
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-
306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03.—A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01.—A lawyer shall not use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
_______________
7 Id., at p. 72.
212
8 Id., at p. 75.
9 Id., at p. 73.
10 Id., at p. 109.
11 Id., at p. 110.
303
VOL. 409, AUGUST 19, 2003
303
Khan, Jr. vs. Simbillo
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of
law is not a business.12 It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be
a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of
a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14
The duty to public service and to the administration
of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The
following elements distinguish the legal profession
from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is
a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the
acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused
the publication of the advertisements. While he
professes repentance and begs for the
_______________
12 Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18
December 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 253.
13 Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8
August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 174.
14 Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].
15 Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002, 383
SCRA 276.
16 Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30
July 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10; Pineda E.L. LEGAL AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].
304
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Khan, Jr. vs. Simbillo
Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow
considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and
after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again
advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001
issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten
months later, he caused the same advertisement to
be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &
Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that
in advertising himself as a self-styled “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist,” he wittingly or unwittingly
erodes and undermines not only the stability but also
the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring
prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the
filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who
might have otherwise been disinclined and would
have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds,
to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession. If it were made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office
and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of
calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise
213
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic,
Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include
only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names
of his professional associates; ad-
_______________
17 Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41.
18 Id., at p. 110.
19 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.
20 Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.
21 Id., at p. 65.
22 Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378,
407.
305
VOL. 409, AUGUST 19, 2003
305
Khan, Jr. vs. Simbillo
dresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a rare
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list, the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of
his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or
of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name
or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have
his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and
italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record
as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Actg. Chairman), Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Abroad on Official Business.
306
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation vs. Heirs of
Raymundo Baba
Respondent suspended from practice of law for one
(1) year for violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Sec.
27 of the Rules of Court, with stern warning against
repetition of similar offense.
Note.—While indeed the practice of law is not a
business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to
be duly compensated for professional services
rendered (J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises, Inc. vs. De Vera, 317 SCRA 339 [1999])
——o0o—— Khan, Jr. vs. Simbillo, 409 SCRA 299, A.C.
No. 5299, G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
Bar Matter No. 553. June 17, 1993.*
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC,
INC., respondent.
Attorneys; Words and Phrases; Meaning of “Practice
of Law.”—Practice of law means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
214
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by
which legal rights are secured, although such matter
may or may not be pending in a court.
Same; Same; Same.—When a person participates in a
trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises
them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look
after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status
and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of
a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent,
practicing law.
Same; The practice of giving out legal information
constitutes practice of law.—What is palpably clear is
that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention
that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic
is more apparent than real. In providing information,
for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that
all that respondent corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law
and advise him or her on the proper course of action
to be taken as may be provided-for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of “practice of law.”
________________
* EN BANC.
379
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
379
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but
extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract
drafting, and so forth.
Same; Same.—Further, as correctly and appropriately
pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of
respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of
legal services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
Same; Same; The services offered by respondent
cannot be performed by paralegals here as
distinguished from the United States.—Paralegals in
the United States are trained professionals. As
admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in
paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. As the concept of the “paralegal” or “legal
assistant” evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set
up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with
their own code of professional ethics, such as the
National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. In the Philippines, we
still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance
of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed
to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in
scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor.
Same; Lawyers may not advertise their services or
expertise.—Anent the issue on the validity of the
questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor
shall he pay or give something of value to
380
380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of,
or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had
also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
215
advertisements for professional employment, such as R E S O L UT I O N
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or REGALADO, J.:
procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been Petitioner prays this Court “to order the respondent
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes ‘A’
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like and ‘B’ (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
self-laudation. persons or entities from making advertisements
Same; Exceptions.—Of course, not all types of pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons than those allowed by law.”
of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule The advertisements complained of by herein
against advertising or solicitation and define the petitioner are as follows:
extent to which they may be undertaken. The Annex A
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely,
those which are expressly allowed and those which SECRET MARRIAGE?
are necessarily implied from the restrictions.
Same; Same.—The first of such exceptions is the P560.00 for a valid marriage.
publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. ANNULMENT. VISA.
Same; Same.—The use of an ordinary simple
professional card is also permitted. The card may THE
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the Please call: 521-0767,
law firm which he is connected with, address, LEGAL
telephone number and special branch of law 5217232, 5222041
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement CLINIC, INC.
of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the 8:30 am-6:00 pm
partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
objectionable. Annex B
Same; Legal profession here has been under attack on
its integrity.—Secondly, it is our firm belief that with GUAM DIVORCE
the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, DON PARKINSON
to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
used by respondent would only serve to aggravate Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the Friday during office hours.
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
under attack lately by media and the community in Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
importance in the face of such negative, even if Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
level of professional conduct which is beyond Marivic.
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high 382
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. 382
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
381 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
THE
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
381 LEGAL
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc. Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. CLINIC, INC.1

216
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the
fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of “legal support
services” through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the
light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O’Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers’ Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers’
Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of
the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion
Internacional de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda.3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their
valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
________________
1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed
together with and on the left side of “The Legal Clinic,
Inc.” in both advertisements which were published in
a newspaper of general circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 87 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60;
Resolution dated December 10, 1991, Rollo, 328.
383
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
383
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court
are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the
merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda
submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.
1.Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms,
i.e., “legal support services” vis-a-vis “legal services”,
common sense would readily dictate that the same
are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-
government agencies like birth, marriage, property,
or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute
practice of law?
xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not
wish to make issue with respondent’s foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the
view espoused by respondent (to the effect that
today it is alright to advertise one’s legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent’s act of establishing a “legal
clinic” and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed.4
xxx
A. The use of the name “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” gives
the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers
________________
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP
Director for Legal Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo, 209, 218.
384
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
217
and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers
legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent—“The Legal Clinic, Inc.”
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like
a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term “Legal Clinic”
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in
the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever doubt may still remain
as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is
merely offering “legal support services” as claimed by
it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between “legal
services” and “legal support services,” as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in
question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims,
the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. x x x.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
385
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
385
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code
(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it
is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can
be considered “the dark side” of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the
sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02.—A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex “A” of
the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words “Just Married” on its bumper
and seems to address those planning a “secret
marriage,” if not suggesting a “secret marriage,”
makes light of the “special contract of permanent
union,” the inviolable social institution,” which is how
the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive
of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article “Rx for Legal Problems” is to be reviewed,
it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements
in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a
218
bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime
is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the “legal
support services” respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly
386
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services,
as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary
newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves
are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts
which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and
the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.
xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal
forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and
like services will greatly benefit the legal profession
and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of
law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case
at bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of
their having devoted time and effort exclusively to
such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
“encroaching” upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of
law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly,
for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention
of, illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be
offering technical assistance, not legal services.
Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered
to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further
proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
387
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
387
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent’s services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous
or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine Law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the information given,
a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law,
that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular
lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising
should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar,
with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a “paralegal” for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and
without any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a
corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such
219
practice may be considered, the corporation’s Article
of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx
Respondent asserts that it “is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines” (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This
is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent’s acts of
holding out itself to the public under the trade name
“The Legal Clinic, Inc.,” and soliciting employment for
its enumerated services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say
that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to
stretch credulity. Respondent’s own commercial
advertisement which
________________
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon,
Chairman, Committee on Bar Discipline, and Atty.
Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29; Rollo 414-416, 425-
427.
388
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” is
offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court,
but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask
the latter to look after their case in court See Martin,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage
in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme
or device by which respondent “The Legal Clinic, Inc.”
holds out itself to the public and solicits employment
of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice
of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules
of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline
of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its
business name, the persons and the lawyers who act
for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of
law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage
in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur.
270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association:
The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are to wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx
_______________
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera,
Jr., Chairman, Committee on Lawyers’ Rights and
Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario,
President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.
389
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
389
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the
practice of law. It claims that it merely renders “legal
support services” to lawyers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of
its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent’s Comment). But its advertised services,
as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
220
problems, immigration problems; the Investment Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid laws, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as “the practice of law.”7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle:
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court,
paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a
rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-
year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to
take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a
lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to take measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be
dealing with the general public in the guise of being
________________
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong,
President, and Atty. Mariano M. Magsalin, Vice-
President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
390
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
“paralegals” without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be
protected from the dangers which may be brought
about by advertising of legal services. While it appears
that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are
being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity
staffed by “paralegals.” Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services.”8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters, will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent’s name—The Legal Clinic,
Inc.—does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression
that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when
only “paralegals” are involved in the The Legal Clinic,
Inc.
Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the
very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned “Starweek”
article.”9
5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines:
Annexes “A” and “B” of the petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law,
(are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex “A” of the petition is not only illegal in that it is
an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in
that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic,
Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay
________________
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los
Reyes, 1-2; Rollo; 105-106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los
Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.
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Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
221
P560 for a valid marriage in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under
the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and
other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers
to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for
their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of this
petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has
yet to be amended so that such as act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that
seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about
how they could go about having a secret marriage
here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted,
and seek advice on divorce, where in this country
there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against
good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which
by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of
Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme
Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney
by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar.10
6. Federation International de Abogadas:
xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the
practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
“x x x Of necessity, no one xxx acting as a consultant
can render effective service unless he is familiar with
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not
to suggest a course of
_______________
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan,
Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2;
Rollo, 169-170.
392
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
conduct which the law forbids. It seems x x x clear that
(the consultant’s) knowledge of the law, and his use
of that knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures
he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of
law x x x. It is not only presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with the broad features of
the law x x x. Our knowledge of the law—accurate or
inaccurate—moulds our conduct not only when we
are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving
others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This
is not practicing law.
“But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit
a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute.
Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of
some measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no
separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
“It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
“If it were usual for one intending to erect a building
on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the
larger corporate employers, it has been the practice
for some years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matters,
222
and without regard to legal training or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendant have
tendered to the smaller employers the same service
that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
“The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious
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Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that
the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
“In determining whether a man is practicing law, we
should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client’s obligations to his employees, to guide his
client along the path charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law. But such is not the
fact in the case before me. Defendant’s primary
efforts are along economic and psychological lines.
The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me
add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees’ wills.
“Another branch of defendant’s work is the
representation of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or
without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to
accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal
role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite
party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute,
it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since
the situation is not presented by the proofs.
“Defendant also appears to represent the employer
before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is without
394
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
power to interfere with such determination or to
forbid representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear ‘in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative.’ Rules and Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31. ‘Counsel’ here means a licensed
attorney, and ‘other representative’ one not a lawyer.
In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal.” (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A.
2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.)
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice
of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to
a major non-legal problem;
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar;
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work
for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-
lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succinctly states the rule of conduct:
“Rule 15.08—A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.”
223
1.10 In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to
render wedding services (See Annex “A”, Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making
arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is
as complicated as that described in “Rx for Legal
Problems” on the Sharon-Gabby Concepcion-Richard
Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually
the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information
on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes “A” and “B”, Petition). Purely giving
information materials may not constitute practice of
law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the subject
and determines by himself
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395
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from
purely giving information, the Legal Clinic’s paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
“ It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal
text which purports to say what the law is amounts to
legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem does not
affect this. x x x Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be
filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But
that is the situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey’s book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that
relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL
OF LEGAL PRACTICE—THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes
to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant’s publication does
not purport ‘to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation—in the publication
and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitute the unlawful practice of law x x x. There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for
the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial
law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant
having an, interest in any publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser’s asserted matrimonial cause of action or
pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with refer-
396
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
ence to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed.” (State v. Winder, 348 NYS 2d 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services
are “strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory.” It is not
controverted, however, that if the services “involve
giving legal advice or counseling,” such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may
be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx
2.10. Annex “A” may be ethically objectionable in that
it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex “B” may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which
is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails
224
to state the limitation that only “paralegal services”
or “legal support services”, and not legal services are
available.”11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase
“practice of law” becomes exigent for a proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at
bar. On this score, we note that the clause “practice
of law” has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we
now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill.12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of
________________
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe,
President, and Atty. Barbara Anne C. Migallos, 8-12,
23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
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VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
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Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be
pending in a court.13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney
at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to
clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law.14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises
himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.15 One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney
and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is
also practicing law.16 Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and
the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law.17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod,19 after
citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the
test to determine whether certain acts constitute
“practice of law,” thus:
Black defines “practice of law” as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court,
_______________
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420,
144 W.Va. 504; Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile
Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men.,
Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS
46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
398
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of
all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.”
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
“x x x for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising persons, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of
225
their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts
either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852).”
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
399
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
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Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
“Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon
all attorneys (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144).”
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree
with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute “practice of
law.”
The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied
by respondent’s own description of the services it has
been offering, to wit:
“Legal support services basically consist of giving
ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as
computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared
by laymen or lawyers; document
400
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or
witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational of employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they
may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to that foreign country, and other matters
that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs,
226
or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and
other entities engaged in dispensing or administering
legal services.20
While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and
non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign
laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish
a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to
the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or
her on the proper course of action to be taken as may
be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it
will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
“practice of law.” Such a conclusion will not be altered
by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to
court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
________________
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.
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VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
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Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by
an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine
Star, entitled “Rx for Legal Problems,” where an
insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its
own “proprietor,” Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday
at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of
the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client’s problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who,
like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can
take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired
by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients.
“When they come, we start by analyzing the problem.
That’s what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what’s bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms,
and so on. That’s how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it’s referred to
one of our specialists.”
There are cases which do not, in medical terms,
require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. “Things
like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of
loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital, the residents or the interns. We can take
care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang
ma-confine. It’s just like a common cold or diarrhea,”
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive
“treatment” are dealt with accordingly. “If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich relative’s
will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to
402
402
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
support the case.”21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
227
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which
thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by
the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law.22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services
being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.24
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction
wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support
for his thesis.
________________
21 Rollo, 130-131.
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-
373.
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
24 Phil. Ass’n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs.
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al., 42 SCRA 302
(1971).
403
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
403
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law
is limited to those who meet the requirements for,
and have been admitted to, the bar, and various
statutes or rules specifically so provide.25 The
practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the
conditions required by statute and the rules of court.
Only those persons are allowed to practice law who,
by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the
courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with,
protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law.26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law
those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject
respondent’s position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from
the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but
be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial
rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none
in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the “paralegal”
or “legal assistant” evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the
general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval
of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associa-
_______________
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, 863, 864.
26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
27 Lowell Bar Ass’n. vs. Loeb, 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass.
176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client 64, 865.
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
404
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
tions of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National
228
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept
and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law,
rules or regulations granting permission therefor.30
________________
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle
(WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974)
and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession, Oceana
Publications, 1977, Appendix II & III; Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations: (a) A law student who has successfully
completed his third year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school’s clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court (Rule 138-
A, Rules of Court);
(b) An official or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines in a case in which the
government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138, id.);
(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a
municipal court for the purpose of conducting the
litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
(d) A person, resident of the province and of good
repute for probity and ability, who is appointed
counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities
where members of the bar are not available (Sec. 4,
Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to
practice in the Philippine Patent Office (now known as
the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer) in trademark, service mark and trade name
cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National
Labor Relations Commission or any Labor Arbiter only
if (1) he represents himself as a party to the case; (2)
he represents an organization or its members,
provided that he shall be made to present written
proof that he is properly authorized; or (3) he is a
duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly
recognized by
405
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
405
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial
policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered
by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and
unskilled person into the practice of law.31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state.32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts.33 He is not supposed to use or permit the
use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.34
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of,
or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.35
Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had
also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer
________________
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter
(New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot
owner or claimant in a case falling under the Cadastral
Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where
completion and passing the studies of law in a
reputable university or school of law is deemed
sufficient qualification for appointment (Sec. 233,
Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, 866; Johnstown Coal &
Coke Co. of New York vs. U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
406
406
229
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other
like self-laudation.36
The standards of the legal profession codemn the
lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession,
advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to
a merchant advertising his goods.37 The proscription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the
case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao
R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question
was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession. It being a brazen solicitation
of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that “the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.” It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession
who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering
them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
“The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, * * * is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced but must be the outcome of the character
and conduct.” (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
________________
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
39 The advertisement in said case was as follows:
“Marriage license promptly secured thru our
assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes
of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.
407
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
407
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service
to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda.40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation
are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising
or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions.41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. “Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement
of the lawyer’s name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-
public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of
listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly
represented.”42
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published
________________
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.
41 Op cit., 80.
230
42 Op cit., 80, citing Canon 27, Canons of Professional
Ethics.
408
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical
and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower the dignity or standing of the profession.43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of
his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or
of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name
or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have
his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law.44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a
quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona,45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements
by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an
initial consultation or the availability upon request of
a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
________________
43 Op cit., 80, 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 69 (Mar. 19, 1932);
A.B.A. Op. 133 (Mar. 13, 1935); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24,
1930); and Canon 43, Canons of Professional Ethics.
44 Op cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927);
A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec. 14,
1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241 (Feb.
21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952).
45 Supra, Fn. 2.
409
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
409
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics
or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are “not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state.”46 This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can
be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates,
on the attitude of the public about lawyers after
viewing television commercials, it was found that
public opinion dropped significantly47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy.................................................................
..
from 71% to 14%
Professional..................................................................
from 71% to 14%
Honest..........................................................................
.
from 65% to 14%
Dignified.......................................................................
from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present
situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of
the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise
his services
_______________
231
46 Id., 810, 825.
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association,
12, citing the American Bar Association Journal,
January 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.
410
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
except in allowable instances48 or to aid a layman in
the unauthorized practice of law.49 Considering that
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of
The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar,
he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to
the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the
Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon
and determined, we are constrained to refrain from
lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly
not within the adjudicative parameters of the present
proceeding which is merely administrative in nature.
It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law
and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized
for or engage in the practice of law in this country.
This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some
so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this
prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action,50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for
the grant of respondent’s corporate charter, in light
of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General
for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of
any advertisement in any form which is of the same
or similar tenor and purpose as
________________
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of
Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney & Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People
vs. Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to
Sec. 6(1), P.D. No. 902-A and Sec. 121, Corporation
Code.
411
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
411
Mendoza vs. Mabutas
Annexes “A” and “B” of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Respondent restrained and enjoined from issuing or
causing the publication of the questioned
advertisement.
Notes.—Lawyers may not engage in forum-shopping
by splitting actions or appeals (Tan vs. Court of
Appeals, 199 SCRA 212).
Reason for award of attorney’s fees must be stated in
the court’s decision (Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals,
194 SCRA 729).
——o0o—— Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378,
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
Adm. Case No. 2131. May 10, 1985.*
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant, vs. BAKER &
MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS, JR., LUIS MA.
GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R.
SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR.,
respondents.
Attorneys; Use by Philippine lawyers of the firm name
of an American law firm is unethical.—We hold that
Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules
of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partner ship organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with
members and associates in 30 cities around the
world. Respondents, aside from being members of
the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of
232
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of
Baker & McKenzie.
Same; Same.—As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, respondents’ use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a
_______________
* EN BANC.
350
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie
representation that being associated with the firm
they could “render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment” (p.
3, respondents’ memo). This is unethical because
Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law
here.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and in his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law
Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in
1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin
Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie,
a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent
Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten
lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7,
1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He
requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of
Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie “and if not, what is your
purpose in using the letterhead of another law
office.” Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law
firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the
respondents in their memorandum, Baker &
McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in
1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates
in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside
from being members of the Philippine bar, practising
under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are
members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
351
VOL. 136, MAY 10, 1985
351
Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents’
use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm
they could “render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment” (p.
3, respondents’ memo). This is unethical because
Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law
here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p.
115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from
practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Acting C.J.), Makasiar, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., on official leave.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
Plana, J., no part.
Respondents are enjoined from practising law under
the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
Notes.—Double role of an attorney is not regarded as
unduly prejudicial to the other accused. (People vs.
Nierra, 96 SCRA 1.)
An attorney client relationship can be created by
implied agreement, as when the attorney actually
rendered legal services for a person who is a close
friend. The obligation of such a person to pay
attorney’s fees is based on the law of
contracts/concept of facio des (I do and you give).
(Corpus vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 424.)
——o0o——
Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie, 136 SCRA 349, Adm.
Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005.*
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., as
represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR, complainant,
vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, respondent.
Attorneys; Duties; Conflict of Interest; As long as the
lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or
233
more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his
oath.—The lack of opposition does not mean tacit
consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is
guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that
a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for
respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C.
No. 4783.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s
faith in the legal profession.— Membership in the
legal profession is a special privilege burdened with
conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are
not only learned in law, but also known to possess
good moral character. Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
public’s faith in the legal profession. To say that
lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law
is to state the obvious, but such statement can never
be overemphasized. Considering that, “of all classes
and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to
uphold the law,” it is imperative that they live by the
law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and
engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal
profession.
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; Disbarment is the
most severe form of disciplinary sanction.—
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar
must always be exercised with great caution, for only
the most im-
_______________
* EN BANC.
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San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos
perative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of
the bar.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roque, Butuyan & Gangoso Law Offices for
complainant.
PER CURIAM:
This is a Petition1 for disbarment against Atty.
Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly representing
conflicting interests and for using the title “Judge”
despite having been found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.2
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, respondent represented San Jose
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the
Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in
a case3 against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for
violation of the Subdivision and Condominium
Buyer’s Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged
that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the
subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of
Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon
and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school
site.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent
represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in
requesting for SJHAI’s conformity to construct a
school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from
Durano.
When the request was denied, respondent applied
for clearance before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 1-14.
2 312 Phil. 679; 242 SCRA 593 (1995).
3 HSRC Case No. REM-021082-0822 (NHA-80-309).
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San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos
(HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioner’s Board
of Directors terminated respondent’s services as
counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the
association.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No.
18014 entitled “San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano
and Corp., Inc.” filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a
disbarment case against respondent for representing
conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case
No. 4783.
In her Report4 dated August 3, 1998, Investigating
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on
234
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) made the following findings:
. . . Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness
in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the
Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant
wherein he had previously been not only an active
board member but its corporate secretary having
access to all its documents confidential or otherwise
and its counsel in handling the implementation of the
writ of execution against its developer and owner,
Durano and Co. Inc.
Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the
substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between
the latter and the Complainant became so revealing
and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the
former.
...
For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as
the same wasn’t controverted by the Complainant
which was his first offense; Respondent must be given
the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to
the condition that should he commit the same in the
future; severe penalty will be imposed upon him.5
_______________
4 Rollo, pp. 15-20.
5Id., at pp. 19-20.
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The Investigating Commissioner recommended
dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that
respondent should observe extra care and diligence
in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity
and integrity beyond reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, which we noted in a resolution dated
March 8, 1999.
Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent
continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez
before the Court of Appeals6 and this Court7 and
even moved for the execution of the decision.
Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against
respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999
Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged
deceitful conduct in using the title “Judge” although
he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.
Respondent used the title “Judge” in his office
letterhead, correspondences and billboards which
was erected in several areas within the San Jose
Subdivision sometime in October 2001.
In his Comment and Explanation,8 respondent
claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez against petitioner despite the March 8,
1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the
second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that
the instant petition is a rehash of the first disbarment
case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the
title “Judge,” respondent stated that since the filing
of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the
title to his name.
_______________
6 “San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board, et al.,” docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 67844.
7 “San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board, et al.,” docketed as
G.R. No. 153980.
8 Rollo, pp. 31-33.
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San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos
On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.9
Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
reported that respondent did not violate the
admonition because it referred to future cases only
and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides,
petitioner never questioned the propriety of
respondent’s continued representation of Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was
terminated.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed
that respondent was deceitful when he used the title
“Judge”, thus creating a false impression that he was
an incumbent.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this
Commissioner respectfully recommends the
following penalty range to be deliberated upon by the
Board for imposition on Respondent: minimum
penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four
(4) months suspension. It is further recommended
that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern
warning be given to Respondent in that should he
violate his undertaking/promise not to handle any
case in the future where the Complainant would be
the adverse party and/or should he again use the title
of “Judge” which would create an impression that he
235
is still connected to the judiciary, a more severe
penalty shall be imposed on him by the Commission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The IBP Board of Governors approved with
modification the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respon-
_______________
9Id., at p. 46.
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San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos
dent’s violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Roberto
Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months with a WARNING that should he
violate his undertaking/promise a more severe
penalty shall be imposed against him.
Undoubtedly, respondent represented the
inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres.
Respondent was admonished yet he continued to
represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned
the propriety of respondent’s continued
representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of
opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as
the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
(2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating
his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for
respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C.
No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondent’s continued
use of the title “Judge” violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting
a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from
using any misleading statement or claim regarding
qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial
notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself
as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to
mislead the public into believing that the order was
issued in his capacity as a judge when he was
dishonorably stripped of the privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the
judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the
pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he
was eventually found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct and would have been dismissed from the
service had he not resigned.
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San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal
solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party
litigant. We ruled thus:
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto
B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct affecting his integrity and
honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of
dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious
attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds,
tendered his resignation during the pendency of this
case. . . . Consequently, we are now precluded from
dismissing respondent from the service.
Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135
SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge
likewise resigned before the case could be resolved,
finds application in this case. Therein it was held that
the rule that the resignation or retirement of a
respondent judge in an administrative case renders
the case moot and academic, is not a hard and fast
rule . . . .
...
“ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding
that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave
and serious misconduct which would have warranted
his dismissal from the service had he not resigned
during the pendency of this case, and it appearing
that respondent has yet to apply for his retirement
benefits and other privileges if any; the Court,
consistent with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela
(supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave
and retirement benefits and privileges to which
herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled
WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or
controlled agencies or corporations.
SO ORDERED.”10
236
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and
privileges to which he may be entitled with prejudice
to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of government, including
government-owned or controlled agen-
_______________
10 Supra, note 2, pp. 692-693.
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San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos
cies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title
‘Judge’ is one of such privileges.
We have previously declared that the use of titles
such as “Justice” is reserved to incumbent and retired
members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any
other official of the Republic, including those given
the rank of “Justice.”11 By analogy, the title “Judge”
should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and
retired, and not to those who were dishonorably
discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out
by the Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain
and use said title applies only to the aforementioned
members of the bench and no other, and certainly not
to those who were removed or dismissed from the
judiciary, such as respondent.
Membership in the legal profession is a special
privilege burdened with conditions.12 It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but
also known to possess good moral character.13
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach,
in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal
profession.14
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and
respect the law is to state the obvious, but such
statement can never be overemphasized. Considering
that, “of all classes and professions, [lawyers are]
most sacredly bound to uphold the law,” it is
imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly,
_______________
11 JBC No. 001: Re JBC Emoluments, July 20, 1989.
12 Lao v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, 1 July 2003, 405 SCRA
227, 235; Eustaquio v. Rimorin, A.C. No. 5081, 24
March 2003, 399 SCRA 422, 429; Sebastian v. Atty.
Calis, 372 Phil. 673, 681; 314 SCRA 1, 8; Marcelo v.
Javier, Sr., Adm. Case No. 3248, 18 September 1992,
214 SCRA 1, 16.
13 Ernesto L. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1999),
p. 22.
14 Malecdan v. Pekas, A.C. No. 5830, 26 January 2004,
421 SCRA 7, 21; Rivera v. Corral, Adm. Case No. 3548,
4 July 2002, 384 SCRA 1, 11.
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San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos
lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful
conduct have no place in the legal profession.15
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar
must always be exercised with great caution, for only
the most imperative reasons,16 and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
as a member of the bar.17
This is not respondent’s first infraction as an officer of
the court and a member of the legal profession. He
was stripped of his retirement benefits and other
privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.18 In A.C. No.
4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition.
Considering his previous infractions, respondent
should have adhered to the tenets of his profession
with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the
contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our
mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the
laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his
office and unworthy of the trust and confidence
reposed on him as an officer of the court. His
disbarment is consequently warranted.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly
_______________
15 De Guzman v. De Dios, A.C. No. 4943, 26 January
2001, 350 SCRA 320, 326.
16 De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554, 558 (1939).
17 Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.C.
No. 4215, 21 May 2001, 358 SCRA 1, 10.
18 In National Bureau of Investigation v. Reyes, A.M.
No. MTJ-97-1120, 21 February 2000, 326 SCRA 109,
respondent judge therein was found guilty of bribery.
He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the
service and further disbarred from the practice of law.
237
114
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San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Romanillos
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos
is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
be entered in respondent’s record as a member of the
Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is disbarred.
Note.—The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations
and violation thereof is a ground for suspension,
disbarment, or other disciplinary action. (De Guzman
vs. De Dios, 350 SCRA 320 [2001])
——o0o——
San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs.
Romanillos, 460 SCRA 105, A.C. No. 5580 June 15,
2005
BAR Matter No. 491. October 6, 1989.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989
ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
Attorneys; Integrated Bar; Candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3,
1989 violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws.—From
all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in
which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3,
1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and
made a travesty of the idea of a “strictly non-political”
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
Same; Same; Same; Candidates and many of the
participants in the election not only violated the By-
Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal
profession imposed on all lawyers.—The candidates
and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the ByLaws of the IBP but also the ethics of
the legal profession imposes on all lawyers, as a
corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
constitution and the laws, the duty to “promote
respect for law and legal processes” and to abstain
from “activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system” (Rule 1.02,
Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility).
Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush
aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their
observance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Investigation conducted
revealed that the parties had been less than candid
with the Court and seem to have conspired among
themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
information from it to conceal the irregularities
committed during the campaign.—The Court notes
with grave concern what appear to be the evasions,
denials and outright prevarications that tainted the
statements of the witnesses, including some of the
candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it
before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this
Committee has revealed that those parties had been
less than candid with the Court and seem to have
conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least
withhold vital information from it to conceal the
irregularities
_______________
* EN BANC.
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committed during the campaign.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter “IBP”)
238
held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International
Convention Center (or PICC), the following were
elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120
chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:
NAME
POSITION
Atty. Violeta Drilon
President
Atty. Bella Tiro Executive
Vice-President
Atty. Salvador Lao
Chairman, House of Delegates
Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo
Secretary, House of Delegates
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy
Treasurer, House of Delegates
Atty. Oscar Badelles
Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Delegates
Atty. Justiniano Cortes
Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza
Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon
Atty. Mario Jalandoni
Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon
Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon
Atty. Teodoro Almine
Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco
Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas
Atty. Ricardo Teruel
Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas
Atty. Gladys Tiongco
Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao
Atty. Simeon Datumanong
Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao
The newly-elected officers were set to take their oath
of office on July 4, 1989, before the Supreme Court en
banc. However,
400
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disturbed by the widespread reports received by
some members of the Court from lawyers who had
witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the
adverse comments published in the columns of some
newspapers about the intensive electioneering and
overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo,
Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of
certain public officials to influence the voting, all of
which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which
prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court en banc,
exercising its power of supervision over the
Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking
of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election
process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the
“IBP Comelec,” headed by Justice Reynato Puno of
the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by
the participants and observers to be above board. For
Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards
to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the
ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern
was the reported electioneering and extravagance
that characterized the campaign conducted by the
three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.—
Emil Jurado, in his column “IBP Group Questions
Drilon Election” (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17,
1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: “The
Invertebrated Bar” (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and “The
Disintegrating Bar” (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and
Teodoro Locsin, Jr. in an article, entitled “Pam-Pam”
(The Philippines Free Press, July 8, 1989), and the
editorial, entitled “Wrong Forum” of the Daily Globe
(June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the “vote-
buying and pressure tactics” allegedly employed in
the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys.
Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce
who reportedly “poured heart, soul, money and
influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates.”
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VOL. 178, OCTOBER 6, 1989
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Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
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Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty.
Drilon’s rivals who felt at a disadvantage because
Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-
flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay
Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of
having regional directors and labor arbiters of the
Department of Labor and Employment (who had
been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the
Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado’s
239
informants alleged that there was rampant vote-
buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho
Fraternity (Secretary Drilon’s fraternity), as well as by
some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz,
Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
employed, and that government positions were
promised to others by the office of the Labor
Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same
matters and, in addition, mentioned “talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially
conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos,
giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon’s)
candidacy,” the billeting of out-of-town delegates in
plush hotels where they were reportedly “wined and
dined continuously, womened, and subjected to
endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x”
which allegedly “ranged from P15,000 to P20,000,
and, on the day of the election, some twelve to
twenty votes which were believed crucial,
appreciated to P50,000.”
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned “how
a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself
in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself
with campaigners as they plotted their election
strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine
International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x.”
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially
reechoed Mauricio’s reports with some
embellishments.
II. THE COURT’S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.—
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en
banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the
outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of
Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the
House of Delegates to appear
402
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
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before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o’clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of
the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for
the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and
strengthening adherence to the fundamental
principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court “call[ed] to mind that a
basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that
the IBP shall be non-political in character and that
there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the
choice of members of the Board of Governors and of
the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers,
national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental
assumption was that officers, delegates and
governors would be chosen on the basis of
professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve.”
The resolution went on to say that the “Court is
deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the
election of members of the Board of Governors and
of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread
belief, based on reports carried by media and
transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was
extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates
for IBP positions as well as expenditure of
considerable sums of money by candidates, including
vote-buying, direct or indirect.”
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP
President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the
dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel
and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc
on the one hand, and the outgoing and in-coming IBP
officers on the other, was an informal one.
Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal
inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and
activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were
committed before and during the 1989 elections of
IBP’s national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and
designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro
R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento,
and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to
conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel
Martinez, acted as the committee’s Recording
Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and
testified in
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Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
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response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed
light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of
three five-star hotels—the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt,
and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their
respective headquarters and where they billeted their
240
supporters—were summoned. The officer of the
Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office
were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that
an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her
slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places
in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The
Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on
the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to
delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor
Department were also called to enable the Court to
ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials
openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty.
Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio,
Jesus Bigornia, and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to
determine the nature of their sources of information
relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based,
they said, on letters, phone calls and personal
interviews with persons who claimed to have
knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the
Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after
receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given
by such persons as were perceived to have direct and
personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the
Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to
accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-
LAWS.—
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the
“strictly non-political” character of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, thus:
“SEC. 4. Non-political Bar.—The Integrated Bar is
strictly nonpolitical, and every activity tending to
impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall
be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office
in the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
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Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or
appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or
any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or
employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.”
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the
prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:
“SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to
elections.—The following acts and practices relative
to election are prohibited, whether committed by a
candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar
or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any
form or manner, by himself or through another
person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election
campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign
material other than a statement of the biodata of a
candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size
sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such
statement to be done by persons other than those
authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations
of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a
member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against
a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other
indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food,
drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of
value, or any similar consideration to any person; or
(3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be
made, offered or promised to any person.”
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for
violations of the above rules:
“(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and
practices defined in Section 14 (Prohibited Acts and
Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of
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the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from
office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition
of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
Bylaws of the Integrated Bar.”
241
At the formal investigation which was conducted by
the investigating committee, the following violations
were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes
by the candidates for president, executive vice-
president, the officers of the House of Delegates and
Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP president—Drilon, Nisce
and Paculdo—began travelling around the country to
solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989.
Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr.
(t.s.n., July 13, 1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench
and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference
of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,
1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47)
where they announced their candidacies and met the
chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country
seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting
their votes, and securing their written endorsements.
He personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill
up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment
to his nomination for IBP President. He started
campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in
March 1989 after the chapter elections which
determined the membership of the House of
Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty
(40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his
nomination forms which read:
“Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
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Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
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National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
_______________
_______________
Chapter
Signature”
Among those who signed the nomination forms were:
Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V.
Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico, Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria
C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco,
Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras,
Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G.
Clarin, Julius Z. Neri, Roem J. Arbolado, Democrito M.
Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr.,
Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano, Dionisio E.
Bala, Jr., Ernesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco,
Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C.
Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar
C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel,
Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C.
Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo,
Romualdo A. Din, Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo, Jr., and Manuel
S. Pecson.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the
Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had
obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments,
he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June
29, 1989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that some of
those who had committed their votes to him were
“manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or
remunerated” (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 86-95; Exhibit
“M-4-Nisce,” t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-104).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.—
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-
1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of
Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a
plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol
CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development)
Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane
manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon,
Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment
and
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Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys
Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest
of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she “hitched” a ride on a
PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty.
Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,
1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive
vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
242
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking
from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of
his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to
follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR,
he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on
an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As
Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he
asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could
hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was
granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess
their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company
talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga,
and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July
10, 1989, pp. 5-49).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use
of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He
recalled that on May 23, 1989, DENR Secretary
Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor
certain regional development projects there and to
survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in
the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a
fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the
Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and
requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant
Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which
included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic
Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi
the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr.,
an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-
69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.—
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon,
admitted
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Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
having formed their own slates for the election of IBP
national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo’s slate consisted of: himself for
President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President;
and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern
Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario
C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la
Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas),
Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat
(Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern
Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of: Violeta C. Drilon for
President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President,
Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates,
and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern Luzon),
Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro
Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro
Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys
Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong
(Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce’s line-up listed himself and
Confessor B. Sansano, Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Antonio L. Nalapo, Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin, Jr.,
Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea,
Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa,
Jesus T. Albacite, and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town
delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for
some delegates to the convention. He mentioned
Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to
Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate.
Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him
(Nisce) “sigurado na ’yan, h’wag mo nang
papirmahin.”
Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce’s
ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane
tickets, but he (Badelles) said that he did not use
them, because if he
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did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he
(Badelles) did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,
1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was
his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of
Zamboanga.
Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty.
Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr.
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica),
Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte
(Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3-Calica),
and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
243
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce’s
candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as
Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p.
161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks,
entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO—
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular
rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which
served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be
occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP
delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by
himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association,
and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the
hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a
room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday
Inn were: Ernesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan, Judge
Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar,
Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto
Villanueva, Serapio Cribe, Juanito Subia, Teodorico J.
Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo
Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad,
Teodoro Quicoy, Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera,
Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco
Felizmenio, Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral,
Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes,
Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta,
Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores,
Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario
Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo, Bella Tiro, Antonio
Santos, Tiburcio Edano, James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse
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Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos
Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven
Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn’s credit manager,
testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms,
including the presidential suite, which was used as the
Secretariat. The group book-ings were made by Atty.
Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June
28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89
was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were
billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40
rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms.
Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions
manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with
the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the “IBP
c/ o Atty. Callanta.”
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine
Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who
first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She
suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate.
He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would
make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto
turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty.
Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid
balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez’s last telephone conversation with Ms.
Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for
40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His “working sheet”
showed that the following persons contributed for
that down payment:
(a) Nilo Peña (Quasha Law Office)
—P25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio
—20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)
—10,000
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(d) Jay Castro
—10,000
(e) Danny Deen
—20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)
—10,000
(g) Alfonso Reyno
—20,000
(h) Cosme Rossel
—15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons
have been contributing money every time the IBP
embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so
that their partners or associates could attend the legal
aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
244
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty.
Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine
Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name
the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask
for a room where she could rest during the
convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for
her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through
Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3, 1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the
rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine
Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C.
Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto, Ador Lao, Victoria
Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Peña, Tiu, Gallardo,
Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao, Caingat,
Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson,
Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon, Macalalag,
Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto,
Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula, Array Corot, Dimakuta
Corot, Romeo Fortez, Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma,
Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta,
Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad, Espina, Guerrero,
Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis
Formilleza, Felix Macalag, Mariano Benedicto, II,
Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Peña admitted that the Quasha Law Office
of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to
Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that
some members of his law firm could campaign for the
Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5, 1989, pp. 76-78) during the
legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the
members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of
Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma
Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to
the candidacy of Atty. Drilon
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and the members of her slate, two of whom,—Jose
Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong—are Sigma
Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a “sigma rho
sister,” her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a
room for the members of his own firm who attended
the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made
the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he
paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign
during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite, his former
teacher (but the latter was already committed to
Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in
the U.P. College of Law (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29,
39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras,
entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total
of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He
made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May
10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr.
Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit
manager, and reservation manager, respectively of
the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce’s bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits
E-Flores, F-Jacinto, G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he
reserved rooms for those who committed themselves
to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos,
Dennis Habanel, B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo
Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din,
Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin,
Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto,
Asuncion, Q. Pilotin, Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo
Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo,
Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop
Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C.
Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg,
Onofre Tejada.
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(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta
Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against “campaigning
for or against a candidate while holding an elective,
judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government” (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano
E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of
Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave
of absence from his office to attend the IBP
convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the
Drilon group admittedly to give “some moral
assistance” to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because
he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When
asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary
Benedicto explained: “More than the husband of Mrs.
Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the
husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho.”
245
He cheered up Mrs. Drilon when her spirits were low.
He talked to her immediate circle which included Art
Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Peña, Amy Wong, Atty.
Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They
assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured
the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups.
The group had sessions as early as the later part of
May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant
Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during
the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113
phone calls (amounting to P1,356) were recorded as
emanating from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite,
listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco
(candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy
Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These
two rooms served as the “action center” or “war
room” where campaign strategies were discussed
before and during the convention. It was in these
rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like
Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and
the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any
member (Sec. 14[e], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that
she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of
lawyers who prom-
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ised to vote for or support them, but she has no way
of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid
the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts
are issued in the name of the member for whom
payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of
payments in March, April, May during any election
year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000
over that of last year (a nonelection year)—from
P1,413,425 to P1,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of
not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper
(Sec. 14[a], IBP ByLaws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election,
Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data
and copies of a leaflet entitled “My Quest,” as well as,
the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly
distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from
P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own
printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done
by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute
his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty.
Carpio noted that there were more campaign
materials distributed at the convention site this year
than in previous years. The election was more heated
and expensive (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President
of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman
of the House of Delegates on Nisce’s ticket, testified
that campaign materials were distributed during the
convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members
of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon
(t.s.n. July 3, 1989, pp. 142-145).
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(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his
vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e],
IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty.
Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and
to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon’s slate, but he
declined (t.s.n. July 3, 1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos, personnel director of the Hyatt
Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-
Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week
of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the
Department of Labor & Employment at the Green
Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1,
Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala. Atty. Drilon
solicited her (Atty. Agunos’) vote and invited her to
stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be
available for her. Atty Paculdo also tried to enlist her
support during the chapter presidents’ meeting to
choose their nominee for governor for the Northern
Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13, 1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate,
Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote
to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a
judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly
hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the
alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an
246
offer. Nisce’s informant was Antonio G. Nalapo, an
IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from
the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29,
1989, p. 104).
Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce’s candidate for
Governor became Paculdo’s candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue
in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went
around saying, “I am not campaigning, but my wife is
a candidate.”
Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters
informed him that labor officials were campaigning
for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, pp. 109-110). He
mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly
campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce’s supporter and candidate for
gover-
416
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
nor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some
delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He
testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic
Airport he was met by an assistant regional director
of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine
Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid
seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the
Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for
him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp.
102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete
City, he already knew that the three candidates had
their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the
Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce,
at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week
before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon
went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned
Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office,
accompanied by Atty. Julve, the Assistant Regional
Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete
City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL
tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza
(t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty.
Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila
on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy,
approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already
committed to Nisce. He did not receive any plane
tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two
companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had
earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July
4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000
during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this
amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was
the chapter president) contributed about P150,000.
The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar
association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of
his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga,
Abra, Mountain
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Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce’s hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to
P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for
his campaign which began several months before the
June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane
tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel,
headquarters of Atty. Drilon’s camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and
beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon’s supporters, but
still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention’s
end.
FINDINGS.—
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner
in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3,
1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and
made a travesty of the idea of a “strictly non-political”
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three
principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in
five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn
and The Hyatt—the better for them to corral and
entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island-
hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents
who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates
that elects the national officers and regional
247
governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups
of candidates for the other elective positions aligned
with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce;
the procurement of written commitments and the
distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in
three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential
candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some
members of her ticket to enable them to “assess their
chances” among the chapter presidents in the Bicol
provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and
bio-data of the candidates which in the case of
Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by
Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the conven-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
tion floor on the day of the election; the giving of
assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs.
Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet
delegates at the airport and escort them to the
Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane
tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and
some families who accompanied them) in exchange
for their support; the pirating of some candidates by
inducing them to “hop” or “flipflop” from one ticket
to another for some rumored consideration; all these
practices made a political circus of the proceedings
and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that
election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but
also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes
on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to
obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the
duty to “promote respect for law and legal processes”
and to abstain from “activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system”
(Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded
when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates
pursued the presidency of the association detracted
from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle
of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or
another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the
profession nor elevate it in the public’s esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to
be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications
that tainted the statements of the witnesses,
including some of the candidates, during the initial
hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding
committee was created. The subsequent
investigation conducted by this Committee has
revealed that those parties had been less than candid
with the Court and seem to have conspired among
themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
information from it to conceal the irregularities
committed during the campaign.
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CONCLUSIONS.—
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that
the provision in the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 8, Art.
VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed
of seven (7) members among whom is “a
representative of the Integrated Bar,” tasked to
participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may
be the reason why the position of IBP president has
attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The
much coveted “power” erroneously perceived to be
inherent in that office might have caused the
corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the
participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness
of the misconduct which attended it and the stern
disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and
to restore the non-political character of the IBP and
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive
electioneering for the top positions in the
organization which, as the recently concluded
elections revealed, spawned unethical practices
which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as
an association of the practitioners of a noble and
honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1.The IBP elections held on June 3, 1989 should be as
they are hereby annulled.
2.The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct
election by the House of Delegates (approved by this
Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) of the following national officers:
(a)the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b)the IBP president; and
(c)the executive vice-president,
248
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend,
modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section
77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3.The former system of having the IBP President and
Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9]
IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in
Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP ByLaws) should be
restored. The right of automatic succession by the
Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expira-
420
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
tion of their two-year term (which was abolished by
this Court’s resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President’s two-year term, the
Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed
to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President
from among themselves. The position of Executive
Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP
regions. One who has served as president may not run
for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have
been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin
anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read
as follows:
“Section 47. National Officers.—The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines shall have a President and Executive
Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as
much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The
governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and
Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board.”
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby
amended as follows:
“(b)The President and Executive Vice President of the
IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the House of Delegates. The
Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
House of Delegates.”
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions
of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby
repealed.
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Section 37. Composition of the Board.—The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by
a Board of Governors consisting
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of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each
region to be elected by the members of the House of
Delegates from that region only. The position of
Governor should be rotated among the different
Chapters in the region.”
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
“Section 39. Nomination and election of the
Governors.—At least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region
shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.”
10. Section 33(a), Article V hereby is amended by
adding the following provision as part of the first
paragraph:
“No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the
general membership shall be held prior to any
election in an election year.”
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7)
of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its
amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court
of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or
modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall
be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3)
months after the promulgation of the Court’s
resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days
thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the
IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive
vice-president. In these special elections, the
candidates in the election of the national officers held
on June 3, 1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3
of this Resolution entitled “Formation of Tickets and
Single Slates,” as well as those identified in this
Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities
249
attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may
not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board
shall
422
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals
be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of
the IBP.
The Court makes clear that the dispositions here
made are without prejudice to its adoption in due
time of such further and other measures as are
warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-
Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., No part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., On leave.
Notes.—Membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. By far, the most important
of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of
the Court. (In re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722.)
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to
the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of
good moral character. This requirement aims to
maintain and uphold the high moral standards and
the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the
ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice
of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest and to possess good moral
character. (Bacarro vs. Pinatacan, 127 SCRA 218.)
——o0o—— Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, 178 SCRA 398, BAR Matter No. 491
October 6, 1989
Adm. Case No. 4749. January 20, 2000.*
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY.
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; Senior Citizens; A lawyer can engage in
the practice of law only by paying his Integrated Bar
of the Philippines dues, and it does not matter that his
practice is “limited”; The exemption from payment of
income tax granted to senior citizens by Republic Act
No. 7432 does not include payment of membership or
association dues.—In accordance with these
provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of
law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter
that his practice is “limited.” While it is true that R.A.
No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens “exemption from
the payment of individual income taxes: provided,
that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,”
the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer, by indicating
“Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Rizal 259060” in his
pleadings, thereby misrepresenting to the public and
the courts that he had paid his Integrated Bar of the
Philippines due, is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.—By indicating “IBP-Rizal
259060” in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting
to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP
dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides: Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7—A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. CANON 10—A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01—A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
530
530
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to pay his
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty.—
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in
view of respondent’s advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law, we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
Misrepresentation and non-payment of IBP
Membership Dues.
250
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Soliman Santos, Jr. for and in his own behalf.
Francisco R. Llamas for and in his own behalf.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-
payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8,
1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a
member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your
attention and appropriate sanction the matter of
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years
now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R.
Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates “IBP Rizal
259060” but he has been using this for at least three
years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and
1997: (originals available)
Annex A—“Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission”
dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC
531
VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000
531
Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas
Annex B—“Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion”
dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC
Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM
Annex C—“An Urgent and Respectful Plea for
extension of Time to File Required Comment and
Opposition” dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not
Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule
138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly
admitted member of the bar “who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.” There is
also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
“default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.”
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification)
and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and
with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty.
Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates “IBP
Rizal 259060” sometimes, he does not indicate any
PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27
and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not
only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also
copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court
Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on
October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30,
1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM
(see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,
1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court
of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings
dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and
January 17, 1997
532
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end
thereof, what appears to be respondent’s signature
above his name, address and the receipt number “IBP
Rizal 259060.”1 Also attached was a copy of the
order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge
Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No.
11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3
dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R.
Macalinao-Javier, that respondent’s “last payment of
his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid
or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees
up to the present.”
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to
comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to
the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,4
dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5
3. That with respect to the complainant’s absurd
claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same
251
O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is
automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only
an admitted member of the bar who is in good
standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant’s basis in claiming that the
undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as
above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court
decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995
conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.
________________
1 Rollo, pp. 4-9.
2 Id., p. 11.
3 Id., p. 13.
4 Records, pp. 35-42.
5 Id., pp. 39-40.
533
VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000
533
Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court
dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of
Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br.
150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in
Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if
indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never
set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of
conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that
respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear
per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he
had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his
Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a
farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and
pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent
being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in
1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in
view of his detachment from a total practice of law,
but only in a limited practice, the subsequent
payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never
exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be
voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being
covered by the exemption and if only to show that he
never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed
and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing
at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with
interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is
ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for
allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the
complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality
if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite
his candor and honest belief in all good faith, to the
contrary.
534
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors
passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to
Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is
here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondent’s suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as
follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown
“respondent’s non-indication of the proper IBP O.R.
and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes “A,” “B”
and “C” of the letter complaint, more particularly his
use of “IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years.”
The records also show a “Certification dated March
24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R.
Makahinud Javier that respondent’s last payment of
his IBP dues was in 1991.”
While these allegations are neither denied nor
categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked
and cited that “being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example.”
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in
the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he
252
is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
“undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear
per his Income tax Return up to the present time that
he had only a limited practice of law.” (par. 4 of
Respondent’s Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his
yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that
respondent has misled the court about his standing in
the IBP by using the same
________________
6 Records, p. 57.
7 Rollo, p. 38.
535
VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000
535
Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas
IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years
and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he
has engaged in law practice without having paid his
IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated “IBP-Rizal 259060” in the pleadings he filed
in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997,
thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
membership and receipt number for the years in
which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however,
that he is only engaged in a “limited” practice and that
he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No.
7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues.—Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval
of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter
shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.—Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can
engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues,
and it does not matter that his practice is “limited.”
While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior
citizens “exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable
income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,” the
exemption does not include payment of membership
or association dues.
536
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas
Second. By indicating “IBP-Rizal 259060” in his
pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7—A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10—A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01—A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in
view of respondent’s advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law,8 we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty.
Llamas’ personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
_________________
253
8 Comment-Memorandum, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 40-
41.
537

VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000

537
Valenzuela vs. Bellosillo
Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, Jr. suspended
for one (1) year from the practice of law, or until he
has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
Notes.—A lawyer deserves to be suspended for using,
apparently through negligence, the IBP official receipt
number of another lawyer. (Bongalonta vs. Castillo,
240 SCRA 310 [1995])
Integrated Bar of the Philippines decisions ordering
suspension or disbarment of lawyers are merely
recommendatory. (Investment and Management
Services Corporation vs. Roxas, 256 SCRA 229 [1996])
A Clerk of Court is liable for Misconduct for
attempting to recruit court employees in the
furtherance of the cause of a local chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines—the court
employees have no involvement and should not be
thrown into the controversy concerning alleged
irregularities in the designation of judges. (Re:
Suspension of Clerk of Court Rogelio R. Joboco, 294
SCRA 119 [1998])
——o0o—— Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas, 322 SCRA 529,
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000

254