GR NO. 182839, JUNE 02, 2014
PNB VS. JOSE GARCIA ET. AL. DIGEST
Facts: Jose Sr., without the knowledge and consent of his children executed
SPAs authorizing spouses Garcia to convey a property covered with TCT No. T-44422
to secure a loan from PNB by way of mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of PNB which were inscribed in the title.
The respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the said Amendment against
spouses Garcia and PNB alleging that the property was conjugal, being acquired
during the marriage of Jose Sr. to Ligaya and they became owners pro indivisio
upon the death of Ligaya on 1987.
PNB contends that the subject property was registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who
was described in the as a “widower.
During the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr, Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA dated
May 31, 1996 authorizing Jose Sr. to act attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the
case.
Issue: Whether the subject property was a conjugal or was acquired during
marriage or thereafter.
Ruling: Yes. Article 119 of the Civil Code in line with Article 160 applies.
All properties acquired during marriage are conjugal and the registration of it in the
name of one spouse does not destroy the presumption that it is conjugal. What is
material is the time when the property was acquired.
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership
upon the death of Ligaya thus governed by Article 493 of Civil Code.
The effect of the mortgage with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. Thus, Jose Sr. cannot mortgage the entire property.
Ining v Vega (Succession)
Ining v Vega
GR No. 174727, August 12, 2013
FACTS:
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-
square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela
died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and
Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,
herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo
in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M.
Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short,
herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
(Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).
Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed
that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the
sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in
good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same
from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.
ISSUES BEFORE LOWER COURTS:
1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;
2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or
laches.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC –
1. No. Declared lot to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining
2. Concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez
never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of
Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962.
3. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription (30 years adverse
possession).
(2) CA:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-
interest of Romana Roldan; Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
2. Trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds
of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was
settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same.
3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962,
but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which
amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo.
Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that
“[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,”
ISSUES:
I THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO
REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
LACHES. In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-
ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:
1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled
and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property
remained part of Leon’s estate.
2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
3. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no
prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA
held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980
– when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the
co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus
concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years
counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria;
he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter
and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he
cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed
among the decedent’s heirs.

OTHER NOTES:
1. Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co-
owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession
of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or
co- heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to
deliver the same to his co- owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee
or trustee.
2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held
that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be used to
defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive the
respondents of their rightful inheritance.
3. “A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co- ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-
owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.”
4. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(2) Between parents and children;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
NO. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of
death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Thus, in this case, it
is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to
his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the
succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent
clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported
by valuable consideration (in effect an officious donation inter vivos), the
respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the
ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember,
fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETHUMALI y AMADO,
defendants-appellants.
FACTS:Francisco Manalo, was investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon
Police Department and for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act
was filed against him. He was likewise facing other charges such as concealment
of deadly weapon and other crimes against property. Pat. FelinoNoguerra went to
the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco to identify the source of
the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him in some cases pending
against him. He didnot negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as
he has entered a plea of guilty.Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division
gave Manalo four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buymarijuana from sources known to him.
Few minutes there after, Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which
were allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter,
he was askedby the police investigators to give a statement on the manner and
circumstances of how he wasable to purchase marijuana foils from accused Gloria
Umali.
After securing a search warrant, with
the help of Manalo’s affidavit, supported by the toils of marijuana, the police
operatives, went to the
house of Gloria Umali, in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan, served the search
warrant and wereable to confiscate from the person of Gloria Umali the four P5.00
bills with serial numbers as reflected inthe police blotter and a can of milo,
containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves.Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali
were charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.Upon arraignment,
Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali remained
atlarge. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria Umali
guilty beyondreasonable doubt and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalo’s testimony should be given credit
HELD:The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted
that said court committedreversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness
Francisco Manalo is not reputed to betrustworthy and reliable and that his words
should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, hestressed that said witness has
several charges in court and because of his desire to have some of hiscases
dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that:Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who canperceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to others may
bewitnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a
crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be aground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into
account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons convicted of
falsification of a document, perjury or falsetestimony" are disqualified from being
witnesses to a will." Since the witness Francisco Manalo is notconvicted of any of the
above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does
notinvolve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing
several criminal chargeswhen he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a
witness. The testimony of a witness should begiven full faith and credit, in the
absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive. Hence,in the
absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper
motive, histestimony must be accorded full credence.
TORRES & LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. LOPEZ
GR No. 24569 February 26, 1926
FACTS: Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez, single, died on February, 25, 1924 leaving all his
estate to Vicente Lopez. On August 10, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez designated Vicente
Lopez as administrator of his property due to his feeble health, such was questioned
by Margarita Lopez, CFI of Manila concluded Vicente Lopez as Tomas Rodriguez’s
guardian. Tomas Rodriguez voiced out the need to form a will, and Vicente Lopez
has procured Judge Maximino Mina. Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in
the will, asked the will to be allowed. Such was contested by Manuel Lopez on the
grounds:
(a) that testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of institution he was
suffering “senile dementia” and was under guardianship;
(b) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited; and
(c) that the signature of Rodriguez was obtained through fraud and deceit.(Luz
Lopez allegedly deceived Tomas Rodriguez to sign by stating that such document
he was about to sign was in connection with a complaint against Dr. Boanan, one
of the witness of the signing of the will). Trial Court denied legalization of the will on
the ground of “lack of mental capacity” at the signing of the will by the testator.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to consider
the will valid? (
2) Whether or not there was undue influence in the procurement of the signature of
Tomas Rodriguez in the will?
RULING:
Yes. Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to constitute a will. Though there
was conflict of medical opinions on the soundness of mind of the testator. (Drs.
Calderon, Domingo, Herrera claimed that testator had full understanding of the
acts he was performing and that they were witnesses in the said signing of the will;
Drs. Delos Angeles, Tietze and Burke certified that Rodriguez was of unsound mind
and is diagnosed of senile dementia).
Code of Civil procedure prescribes a requisite that the testator be of “sound mind”,
a sound mind is a disposing mind. One of the grounds of disallowing a will is if the
testator is insane or otherwise incapable of the execution. With such the Court has
adopted a definition of “Testamentary Capacity” as: The capacity to comprehend
the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to
recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in
which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty .The
presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow
the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will
intervene to set aside a testamentary document.
Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD, respondent
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the
childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots of Pilar
Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and
thereafter, she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of
Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such will become effective
upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the
Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that
anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, they
could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.
Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last
will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to
Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death. Thereafter, Maria’s heirs
(herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery
of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido,
alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have
been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The lower
court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon
appeal of Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation
mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration,
the present Petition for Review has been filed.
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such
deed is valid.
If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots in question to
Zenaido Aluad.
The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) one of mortis
causa, it having the following characteristics:
It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor,
or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the
transferor at will, ad nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde
did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during
the former’s lifetime. Further the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the
DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated,” means that Matilde
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the
right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is
an attribute of ownership. The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out
of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the
death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more
witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to
petitioner’s mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were
observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to
Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament,
subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect to the
conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.