152 Suntay v CA G.R. No. 114950, December 19, 1995 HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

Provisions: ART 1380. Contracts validly agreed upon may be rescinded in the cases established
by law. (1290) ART 1387. All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property by
gratuitous title are presumed to have been entered into in fraud of creditors, when the donor did
not reserve sufficient property to pay all debts contracted before the donation. Alienations by
onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against whom some judgment
has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. The decision or
attachment need not refer to the property alienated and need not have been obtained by the party
seeking the rescission. In addition to these presumptions, the design to defraud creditors may be
proved in any other manner recognized by the law of evidence. (1297a)

Facts:

Federico Suntay owned a parcel of land, with a rice mill, a warehouse, in Bulacan His nephew
layer, Rafael, prepared an absolute deed of sale whereby Federico for 20k would sell to him the
land. The deed was notarized. Less than 3 months later, a counter sale was prepared selling the
land back to Federico for the same price of 20k. However, it was notarized not as a deed of sale
but a certain “real estate mortgage on a parcel of land to secure a loan of 3.5k” Even after the
execution of the first deed, Federico remained in possession of the property. It is noted that
notwithstanding the fact that Rafael had already become the titled owner of the land, he never
made any attempt to take possession thereof, leaving Federico to continue exercising his rights of
absolute ownership over the property Federico now wants the land’s title to be reconveyed back to
him with damages, while Rafael scoffed at the attack and argued that the sale was valid and
genuine. [Trivia] it was a 13 year trial with 6 different judges.

Issue: W/N Rafael’s failure to take exclusive possession of the property from Federico is a clear
badge of fraud - YES

Ruling: YES. The Court held that Rafael’s inaction to take possession of the properties after he
had the ownership of it is a clear badge of fraud. The Court held that it is the most protuberant
index of simulation. After the sale, he should have entered the land and occupied the premises
thereof. He did not even attempt to. If he stood as owner, he would have collected rentals from
Federico for the use and occupation of the land and its improvements. All that the late Rafael had
was a title in his name. To wit: "It is to be emphasized that the Federico never parted with the
ownership and possession of that portion of Lot No 785 x x x nor did the Rafael ever enter into
possession thereof. As earlier stated, the issuance of TCT No. T-1346 did not operate to vest
upon the latter ownership over the Federico’s' property. That act has never been recognized as a
mode of acquiring ownership. As a matter of fact, even the original registration of immovable
property does not vest title thereto; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.
The Torrens system of land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against
the rightful owner of real property." The failure of the late Rafael to take exclusive possession of
the property allegedly sold to him is a clear badge of fraud. The fact that, notwithstanding the title
transfer, Federico remained in actual possession, cultivation and occupation of the disputed lot
from the time the deed of sale was executed until the present, is a circumstance which is
unmistakably added proof of the fictitiousness of the said transfer, the same being contrary to the
principle of ownership. Of course, according to the late Rafael, he allowed Federico to remain in
the premises and enjoy the fruits thereof because of their understanding that Federico may
subsequently repurchase the property. Contrary to what Rafael thought, this in fact is added
reason for simulation. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals on December 15, 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 08179 is hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. Petitioners, the heirs of Rafael G. Suntay, are hereby ordered to reconvey to private
respondent Federico C. Suntay the property described in paragraph 2.1 of the complaint, within
ten (10) days from the finality. IOW, the

deed of sale to Rafael is a simulated contract, and his inaction to take possession of the properties
is a clear badge of fraud.
J.L.T. Agro, Inc., represented by its Manager, Julian L. Teves v. Antonio Balansag
G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005

FACTS:

Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena and had two kids namely
Josefa and Emilio. After her death, he married Milagros Teves and they had four children namely:
Maria Teves, Jose Teves, Milagros Teves and Pedro Teves. The present controversy involves a
parcel of land, known as Lot No. 63, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal
partnership of Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties
involved in an action for partition. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise
Agreement. Section 13 of the compromise states that

“13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to
JosefaTevesEscaño and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda
MedallaMilagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as
including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes
and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their
father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L.
Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda MedallaMilagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated
to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children.”

On November 16, 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets
in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner) which transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, in favor of
petitioner. On April, 14 1974, Don Julian died intestate. A TCT was issued in the name of
petitioner.

Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real
Estate. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children,
Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name
of petitioner, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio. When respondents discovered
that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed
a complaint before the RTC. The trial court ruled that the direct adjudication of the properties listed
in the Compromise Agreement was only in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first
marriage, Josefa and Emilio hence the sale made by Don Julian in favor of petitioner is valid.

The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the two children of Don Julian in the first marriage
acquired full ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the
CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second
marriage became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement,
thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined,
adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death
of Don Julian

RULING:

No. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be
entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition
intervivos referred to in Article 1080. The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is
undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It
was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future
acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest
to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.

Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of
petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot
would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner
of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right
cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been
adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
Homes Acquired Acquisition
Blas vs. Santos
G.R. No. L-14070 March 29, 1961

FACTS: This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate of Maxima
Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties left by Maxima Santos Vda.
de Blas, the greater bulk of which are set forth and described in the project of partition presented
in the proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas, had been
promised by the deceased Maxima Santos to be delivered upon her death and in her will to the
plaintiffs, and requesting that the said properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs. The
complaint also prays for actual damages in the amount of P50,000. The alleged promise of the
deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a document executed by Maxima Santos on December
26, 1936 attached to the complaint as Annex “H” and introduced at the trial as Exhibit “A”. The
complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit certain properties enumerated in
paragraph 3 thereof, situated in Malabon, Rizal and Obando, Bulacan, but which properties have
already been included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and evidently
partitioned and conveyed to his heirs in the proceedings for the administration of his estate.
Spouses Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz have three children they also have grandchildren. One year
after Marta Cruz died, Blas married Maxima Santos but they don’t have children and the properties
that he and his former wife acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated. Simeon Blas
executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the other half for payment of
debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima executed a
document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that she promises
that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties she’ll be acquiring to the heirs and
legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of them depending
upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said heirs. On 1937 Simeon Blas died
while Maxima died on 1956 and Rosalina Santos became administrator of her estate. In the same
year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with three other
grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her
promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she
acquired from Simeon Blas. The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’
property precisely because Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving properties upon her death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs can acquire the properties that Maxima promised with them.

HELD: Yes, they can acquire the properties that Maxima promised with them because it was
stated in Art. 1347 that “No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law.”. In this case the contract was authorized by law because the
promised made by Maxima to their heirs before she died is a valid reason and it should be
enforceable upon her death and her heirs can now acquire the succession of the properties in
issue.
LIGUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-11240 December 18, 1957
Facts Liguez filed a lawsuit against the late Salvador P. Lopez's widow and children to get back
51.84 hectares of land. Plaintiff said that she was the legal owner of the land because the late
owner, Salvador P. Lopez, had given it to her in a deed of gift. The defense said that the donation
was invalid because the plaintiff had sexual relations with Salvador P. Lopez, who was already
married, and that Lopez's property had been given to the appellees as his heirs. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the deed of donation was not valid because (1) Lopez had no right to give his
wife's property to the plaintiff appellant and (2) the donation was tainted with illegal causa or
consideration (an illegal sexual relationship) in which both the donor and the donee took part. The
appellant argues strongly that both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals made a
mistake when they ruled that the donation was null and void because it was made for an illegal
cause or reason. People say that Article 1274 of the Civil Code of 1889, which was in effect in
1943 when the donation was made, says that "in contracts of pure beneficence the consideration
is the liberality of the donor" and that generosity in and of itself can never be illegal because it is
neither against the law nor against morals nor against public policy.
Issue: Whether or not the donation that Lopez made to Liguez was legal.
Ruling: Under Article 1274, the generosity of the donor is only seen as a cause in contracts that
are "pure" beneficence. This means that the only goal of the contract is to help the recipient, not to
make the donor happy. In this case, it's clear that the late Salvador P. Lopez wasn't just trying to
help the appellant Conchita Liguez. He also wanted her to live with him so he could satisfy his
sexual desires. Lopez told the witnesses Rodriguez and Ragay that he loved the appellant, but her
parents wouldn't let him marry her unless he gave her the land in question. So, in reality, the
donation was just one part of a complicated deal (at least with the appellant's parents) that needs
to be looked at as a whole.
Taking all of this into account, it is clear that the conveyance was based on an illegal cause. The
appellant wants to make a difference between Lopez's alleged generosity, which she says was the
cause of the donation in her favor, and his desire to live with her, which she says was the reason
he gave her the money. She uses Manresa and the court's past decisions to show that there
must be a difference between causa and motives.
It is important to note, though, that Manresa himself, while upholding the difference and
saying that the parties' motives can't be used to decide if a contract is valid, makes an
exception to the rule for contracts that depend on either party getting what they want. As the late
donor's heirs, the appellants can't use the donation's immorality or illegality as a defense.
Instead, the donation's total or partial ineffectiveness must be decided by different legal rules.
In this case, the Court of Appeals did the right thing when it said that Lopez couldn't give away all
of the property in dispute, which would hurt his wife Maria Ngo.
The property in question was marital property, and the law is very strict about what a husband can
do with community property. The Supreme Court said that the appellant Conchita Liguez was
entitled to as much of the donated property as could be found after a proper liquidation. This was
done so as not to hurt the widow Maria Ngo's share in the marriage with Salvador P. Lopez or the
rights of the forced heirs of the latter.
Maximino Carrantes vs. Court of Appeals, Bilad Carrantes, Lauro Carrantes, Eduardo Carrantes,
and Michael Tumpao

76 SCRA 514
Facts: Mateo Carantes, original owner of Lot No. 44 situated at Loakan, Baguio City, died in 1913
leaving his widow Ogasia, and six children, namely, Bilad, Lauro, Crispino, Maximino, Apung and
Sianang,. In 1930, the government, in order to expand the landing field of the Loakan Airport, filed
for the expropriation of a portion of Lot. No. 44. Said lot was subdivided into Lots. No. 44A to 44E
for the purpose.
In 1913, Maximino Carrantes (MAX) was appointed the judicial administrator of the estate of
Mateo. Four heirs, namely, Bilad, Lauro, Sianang, and Crisipino, executed a deed denominated
“Assignment of Right to Inheritance” assigning to Max their rights over said lot in 1939. The stated
monetary consideration is P1.00. On same date, Max sold Lot Nos. 44B and 44C to the
government. One year later the Court of First Instance, upon joint petition of the Carrantes heirs,
issued an order cancelling O.C.T. No. 3 and TCT No. 2533 was issued in its place.
On 16 March 1940, Max registered the deed of “Assignment of Right to Inheritance”. Thus, TCT
No. 2533 was cancelled and TCT 2540 was issued in the name of Max. A formal deed of Sale was
also executed by Max on the same date in favor of the government. Hence, TCT 2540 was
cancelled and new TCTs were issued in favor of the government and Max, respectively. On 4
Sept. 1958, Bilad, Lauro, and Crispino, along with the surviving heirs of Apung and Sianang filed
complaint in the CFI.
They claimed that the execution of the deed of assignment was attended by fraud. The trial court
decided that the action of the heirs had already prescribed since an action on fraud prescribes on
four years from discovery of such, in this case, on 16 March 1940 when Max registered the deed
of assignment. The Court of Appeals reversed and found that a constructive trust was created.
Hence, the present petition.

Issue: 1. whether a constructive trust involves a fiduciary relationship? 2. Whether action had
already prescribed?

Held: 1. The court, assuming that there was fraud, and in turn, a constructive trust in favor of the
other heirs, said that constructive trust does not involve a promise nor fiduciary relations. Hence,
the respondent court’s conclusion that the rule on constructive notice does not apply because
there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties lacks the necessary premise.

2. Action had already prescribed because there was constructive notice to the heirs when
Maximino registered the deed of assignment with the register of deeds on 16 March 1940. Such
date is the reckoning point of counting prescription based on fraud.

Anent respondent court’s contention that constructive trust is imprescriptible, the court said that it
is untenable. It is already settled that constructive trusts prescribes in 10 years. In this case, the
ten year period started on 16 March 1940. And since the respondents commenced the action only
on 4 Sept. 1958, the same is barred by prescription.
MAPALO v. MAPALO

G.R. Nos. L-21489 & L-21628

May 19, 1966

Contracts without cause confer NO right and produce NO legal effect whatever. Thus, a contract
which is absolutely simulated or fictitious is inexistent and void. Where there is, in fact, NO
consideration, the statement of one in the contract will NOT suffice to bring it under the rule of Art
1353, NCC as stating a false consideraton.
Facts:

Spouses MIGUEL Mapalo and Candida Quiba, simple illiterate farmers, were registered owners of
a residential land in Manaoag, Pangasinan.
Said spouses out of love for MAXIMO Mapalo—MIGUEL’s brother who was about to get
married—decided to donate the eastern half of the land to him.
As a result, in 1936, they were deceived into signing a deed of absolute sale over the entire land in
MAXIMO’s favor. The document of sale stated a consideration of ₱500 which MIGUEL did NOT
receive anything.
Following the execution of document, MIGUEL and Candida built a fence of permanent structure
in the middle of the land segregating the eastern portion from its western portion.
13 years later, MAXIMO sold for ₱2,500 the entire land in favor of the Narcisos and they
registered the same. Narcisos filed to be declared owners of the entire land with possession of its
western portion.
MIGUEL contend that the deed of sale of 1936 was procured with fraud and the Narcicos were
buyers in bad faith. Also, it was invoked that the deeds of sale be declared null and void as to the
western half of said land for being fictitious.
In reversing the ruling of the CFI, the CA averred that having obtained the deed of sale by fraud,
the same was voidable, not void ab initio and the action to annul the same had already prescribed
which was within 4 years of notice of fraud. While they are definitely victims, they lost their right by
prescription.
Issue/s:

Does the contract involve “NO consideration” or “false consideration”?

Ruling:

The rule under the Civil Code, be it the old or the new, is that contracts without a cause or
consideration produce NO effect whatsoever.
Nonetheless, under the Old Civil Code, the statement of a false consideration renders the contract
voidable, unless it is proven that it is supported by another real and licit consideration. And it is
further provided by the Old Civil Code that the action for annulment of a contract on the ground of
falsity of consideration shall last 4 years, the term to run from the date of the consummation of the
contract.
In the present case, the contract of sale has NO consideration and therefore it is void and
inexistent for the said consideration of ₱500 was totally absent. Purchase price which appears
thereon as paid has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to vendor.
This is contrary to what is meant by a contract that states a false consideration is one that has in
fact a real consideration but the same is NOT the one stated in the document.
Needless to add, the inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable and CANNOT be the
subject of prescription.
Dauden-Hernaez v. De los AngelesG.R. No. L-27010, 30 April 1969
Facts: Petitioner, an actress, filed a complaint against Hollywood Far East Productions Inc., and its
presidentand general manager to recover an amount of P14,700 as fees for her services as
leading actress in twomotion pictures. Respondent court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that the “claim of plaintifwas not evidenced by any written document, either public or private”, and
the complaint was “defective”for violating Articles 1356 and 1358 of the Civil Code.
Issues:Whether or not a contract for personal services involving more than P500.00 was
either invalid orunenforceable under the last paragraph of Article 1358 of the Civil Code.
Held:No. In general, contracts are valid and binding from their perfection regardless or form,
whether they beoral or written. Article 1315 of the Civil Code provides that: “Contracts are
perfected by mere consent, and from thatmoment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment
of what has been expressly stipulated but alsoto all the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage andlaw.” Furthermore, Article 1356 provides that:
Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may havebeen entered into, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present . . ." To this generalrule, sets the exception that
some contracts requires to be in writing (solemn contracts).The contract sued in this case by
petitioner (compensation for service) does not fall under any exception,but Article 1358 nowhere
provides that the absence of written form in this case will make the agreementinvalid or
unenforceable. On the contrary, Article 1357 clearly indicates that contracts covered by
Article1358 are binding and enforceable by action or suit despite the absence of writing.
YANEZA vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 149322 November 28, 2008
Facts: Yaneza is the owner of a parcel of land in San Juan, Baras, Rizal. De Jesus is the owner of
a lot which is adjacent to Yaneza’s lot. De Jesus’ lot has no access to the nearest road except
through a road which they constructed over a portion of Yaneza’s lot. Yaneza informed De Jesus
that he is the owner of Lot 2730-A and that he does not agree with the use of the portion of his lot
as an access road because it will affect the configuration of his property. As an option, petitioner
offered to sell to the respondents the entire property. De Jesus did not agree, so Yaneza agreed to
a perpetual easement of right of way (4 meters wide) and stating that he will prepare the
necessary document to facilitate the transaction for a consideration of P20K. De Jesus found out
that it covered only 175 sq m, not 280 sq m. There was renegotiation and, for an additional
consideration of P40K, Yaneza agreed to sell the entire 280 sq m. De Jesus constructed a road
that is wider than that which was provided in the contract. He constructed a road three meters
wider than what was agreed upon in the deed of sale. Yaneza initially allowed them peaceful
possession and use of the area even when he started constructing his house adjacent to the
access road. Later, a serious misunderstanding took place between Yaneza and respondents’
caretaker, Benjamin Manzano, because Manzano refused to allow Yaneza to tap water and
electricity from the respondents’ property. Petitioner allegedly retaliated and constructed a fence
along the access road, which could not allow trucks to pass through. Yaneza is now praying for
the rescission of the contract for easement of right of way.
Issue: WON Yaneza may validly rescind the contract of for easement of right of way? NO
Held: The construction of the road beyond the stipulated area does not constitute a breach of
contract. Breach of contract implies a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise or
undertaking that forms part of the contract. Although the contract specifically stated the area
covered by the sale, it did not contain a promise by the respondents that they will only occupy
such area. Albeit apparently wrong, petitioner’s cause of action should not have been based on
the contract of sale. Rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach but
only for a substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in
making the agreement. It must be a breach of faith that destroys or violates the reciprocity
between the parties. Besides, the original agreement had already been superseded or novated by
a new contract, an oral one, covering an increased area of 280 sq m. An additional P40K was paid
to the Yaneza which covered the entire 280-sq m area were the access road was laid. The new
contract of sale between the parties is valid despite it not being evidenced by any writing
Teoco v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 162333, December 23, 2008
Facts: Lydia Co, married to Ramon Co, was the registered owner of two parcels of land situated in
Catbalogan, Samar covered by a TCT. Ramon Co, mortgaged said parcels of land to Metrobank
for a sum of P200,000. Said properties were consequently sold to Metrobank in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. one year after the registration of the certificates of sale, the titles to the properties
were consolidated in the name of Metrobank for failure of Ramon Co to redeem the same within
the one year period provided for by law. Ramon Co’s TCTs were cancelled and a new TCT were
issued in favor of Metrobank. Metrobank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
against Ramon Co and Lydia Co (the spouses Co). However, since the spouses Co were no
longer residing in the Philippines at the time the petition was led, the trial court ordered Metrobank,
on January 12, 1994 and again on January 26, 1994 to effect summons by publication against the
spouses Co.

The brothers Teoco led an answer-in-intervention alleging that they are the successors-in-interest
of the spouses Co, and that they had duly and validly redeemed the subject properties within the
reglementary period provided by law. The brothers Teoco thus prayed for the dismissal of
Metrobank’s petition for a writ of possession, and for the nullification of the TCTs issued in the
name of Metrobank. The brothers Teoco further prayed for the issuance in their name of new
certificates of title.

Metrobank, in its reply, alleged that the amount deposited by the brothers Teoco as redemption
price was not sufficient, not being in accordance with Section 78 of the General Banking Act.
Metrobank also said the assignment of the right of redemption by the spouses Co in favor of the
brothers Teoco was not properly executed, as it lacks the necessary authentication from the
Philippine Embassy.

The trial court was informed that the brothers Teoco had deposited the amount of P356,297.57 to
the clerk of court of the RTC in Catbalogan, Samar. The trial court ordered Metrobank to disclose
whether it is allowing the brothers Teoco to redeem the subject properties. Metrobank refused to
accept the amount deposited by the brothers Teoco, alleging that they are obligated to pay the
spouses Co’s subsequent obligations to Metrobank as well. The brothers Teoco claimed that they
are not bound to pay all the obligations of the spouses Co, but only the value of the property sold
during the public auction.
The trial court reiterated its earlier order directing Metrobank to effect summons by publication to
the spouses Co. Metrobank complied with said order by submitting documents showing that it
caused the publication of summons against the spouses Co. The brothers Teoco challenged this
summons by publication, arguing that the newspaper where the summons by publication was
published, the Samar Reporter, was not a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The
brothers Teoco furthermore argued that Metrobank did not present witnesses to identify the
documents to prove summons by publication.

The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Teoco brothers, finding that the Teoco brothers have
validly redeemed the parcels of land. That Metrobank may now withdraw the redemption money
deposited by the Teocos with the clerk of court and it further ordered that the CTCs of Metrobank
be cancelled and a new CTC in favor of the Teoco brothers be issued.
The CA, however, ruled in favor of Metrobank. CA held that the brothers Teoco were not able to
effectively redeem the subject properties, because the amount tendered was insufficient, and the
brothers Teoco have not sufficiently shown that the spouses Co’s right of redemption was properly
transferred to them.

Issue: Whether or not the assignment of right of redemption is admissible in evidence as a public
document?

Held: NO. However, this does not necessarily mean that such document has no probative value.
There are generally three reasons for the necessity of the presentation of public documents. First,
public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in them, as provided for in Section
23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Second, the presentation of a public document dispenses with the need to prove a document’s
due execution and authenticity.
Third, the law may require that certain transactions appear in public instruments, such as Articles
1358 and 1625 of the Civil Code.
The exercise by the brothers Teoco of the right to redeem the properties in question is not
precluded by the fact that the assignment of right of redemption was not contained in a public
document. Metrobank never challenged either the content, the due execution, or the genuineness
of the assignment of the right of redemption. Consequently, Metrobank is deemed to have
admitted the same. Having impliedly admitted the content of the assignment of the right of
redemption, there is no necessity for a prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. In the same
manner, since Metrobank has impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the
assignment of the right of redemption, a private document evidencing the same is admissible in
evidence. True it is that the Civil Code requires certain transactions to appear in public documents.
However, the necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights
over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for convenience;
it is not essential for validity or enforceability.
In the case at bar, Metrobank would not be prejudiced by the assignment by the spouses Co of
their right of redemption in favor of the brothers Teoco. As conceded by Metrobank, the assignees,
the brothers Teoco, would merely step into the shoes of the assignors, the spouses Co. The
brothers Teoco would have to comply with all the requirements imposed by law on the spouses
Co. Metrobank would not lose any security for the satisfaction of any loan obtained from it by the
spouses Co. In fact, the assignment would even prove to be bene cial to Metrobank, as it can
foreclose on the subject properties anew, provided it proves that the subsequent loans entered
into by the spouses Co are covered by the mortgage contract.
CENIDO VS. APACIONADO

GR. 132474

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s claim over the disputable property as a recognized illegitimate child
of the deceased owner, Bonifacio Cenido is valid.FACTS:
Petitioner, Renato Cenido seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
which declared the respondents as the owners of the disputable property in Binangonan, Rizal.
Prior to this, defendant filed a complaint against the petitioner for Declaration of Ownership, Nullity
with Damages. They allegedly state that they are the owners of the parcel of the unregistered
land. They contended that the original owner of the property, Bonifacio Cenido sold the same
property to them. They presented a letter as an evidence of sale with a thumbmark of the
deceased. The petitioner argued that Bonifacio was not capable of executing such letter as his
body is paralyzed down under and the letter was not notarized. Additionally, he stated that he was
the rightful owner as he was an illegitimate child of the deceased which was recognized by the
latter’s brother, Gavino Cenido.
RULING
The petition is denied and the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Tax
Declaration No. 02-6368 in the name of the petitioner was declared null and void. Under the Civil
Code, natural children and illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights only
when they are recognized. Article 285 of the Civil Code states that the action for the recognition of
natural children ma be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents except the
following.If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.If after the
death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
In the case at bar, the petitioner did not present any record of birth, will, or any authentic writing to
show he was voluntarily recognized by Bonifacio Cenido himself as his illegitimate son. In fact,
petitioner admitted on the witness stand that he had no document to prove Bonifacio’s recognition,
much or less his filiation. The voluntary recognition of petitioner’s filiation by Bonifacio’s brother
before the MTC does not qualify as a statement in a court of record. Under the law, this statement
must be made personally by the parent himself, not by any brother, sister, or relative. After all, the
concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, or if the parent refuses, by
judicial authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock.