Industry Releasable Threat Assessment

Current as of 1st Sep 2019

This Threat Assessment is released to the maritime community in confidence. It is not to be further
disseminated without permission.

Information Cut-Off Date (ICOD): 15 Aug 19

POC: CMF N2 Strategic Assessment Manager

1 of 13
References:

A. IRTA released 01 Jun 19, ICOD 15 May 19.

B. IRTB 014 released 18 May 19, reported sabotage on several MVs off Fujairah (UAE).
C. IRTB 015 released 14 Jun 19, attack on two MVs in the Gulf of Oman.
D. IRTB 016 released 24 Jun 19, follow on regarding IRTB 014 and 015.

Introduction

1. The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and European Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR Somalia)
have written this Industry Releasable Threat Assessment (IRTA). It is intended to inform risk
management decision making for merchant and large commercial fishing shipping operators that are
transiting through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden (GoA) and the Western Indian Ocean

2. This IRTA presents a common understanding of the current threat actors in these areas and
offers the combined military perspective on assessed future maritime threats and trends. It updates
and complements the previous IRTA released on 01 Jun 19 (Ref A).

3. Three IRTBs were issued during the reporting period 15 May 19 to 15 Aug 19 (Ref B, C and
D). The information cut-off date (ICOD) for this IRTA is 15 Aug 19.

Situation in Somalia

4. The continuing breakdown in relations between Somalia’s Federal Member States (FMS) and
the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) remains an issue of concern. The upcoming elections in
Jubbaland (scheduled for late August) and Galmudug as well as the persistent tension between the
FGS and the Somaliland administration shall determine the Somali internal political and security
dynamics over the coming period. Due to these complicated relations, the security situation across
Somalia remains unstable and fragile. The ongoing dispute between Puntland and Somaliland
regarding their border demarcation is another important issue, further compounded by the fact that
both states hold the entirety of the strategic northern coastline of Somalia, with the disputed area
having, in the heydays of piracy, harboured pirate anchorages. These issues will, in the short term,
continue to prevent the formation of a stable and secure environment on land critical for the
eradication of Somali piracy.

5. Despite these internal political issues within Somalia, the effectiveness and capabilities of local
maritime security forces on the northern coastline, in both Somaliland and Puntland, appears to be
improving. Similar improvements have not been seen on the southern coastline where maritime
security, due to equipment and training limitations and the lack of coordination and support from local
authorities, remains ineffective. The more effective and capable maritime security along the northern
coastline is linked to both Somaliland’s and Puntland’s intent to attract legitimate trade and
international commercial investors to key areas of interest, such as Berbera in Somaliland and

2 of 13
Bosasso in Puntland. It is LIKELY that further development of local maritime security forces, especially
in the south, will be dependent on further investment by foreign and domestic interests.

6. Maritime crime adjacent to the Horn of Africa (HoA) continues to be a persistent threat in one
of the world’s busiest commercial traffic lanes. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that criminal groups that were
previously involved in piracy have switched to other, lower risk activities to meet their financial
objectives - although as the last piracy event in April 2019 shows, criminal networks retain the intent
and capability to conduct pirate attacks. Al Shabaab, in the coastal areas that remain under their
control, is also LIKELY taxing illicit maritime activities such as the smuggling of weapons, narcotics,
charcoal and people.

7. The situation on the ground continues to be unstable with the Al Shabaab terrorist group
maintaining a presence in vast swathes of Somalia. Security operations are ongoing with the Somali
National Army (SNA) achieving positive results through offensive action against Al Shabaab,
alongside African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, in Middle and Lower Shabelle. When
faced against a conventional force Al Shabaab consistently displays an inability to hold ground,
resorting to asymmetric tactics.

8. The implementation of a comprehensive security plan in Mogadishu in Mar 19 suffered a

notable setback with the July bombing, by Al Shabaab, of Mogadishu’s civil administration
headquarters, which also killed the mayor of the city. Although no further incidents have occurred, the
bombing demonstrated that the well-informed and deeply ingrained opposition/terrorist organization
will HIGHLY LIKELY continue to attempt periodic attacks targeting government officials and,
potentially, members of the international community. Although new security measures have VERY
LIKELY curtailed Al Shabaab’s freedom of movement in the city, it is not clear how sustainable such
measures are in the longer term and it is UNLIKELY that they alone will be effective in quashing the
group’s influence in the city. Considered critical for the stability and sustainability of a federal Somalia,
Mogadishu remains the seat of power of the FGS.

9. The maritime border dispute between Somalia and Kenya persists, consisting of an area of
62,000 square miles of EEZ potentially rich in oil and gas resources. In 2014, Somalia filed a request
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication of the case, which Kenya has consistently
been trying to have dismissed. The ICJ hearing is scheduled to occur in Sep 2019 but both countries
have accused the other of offering up ‘blocks’, within the disputed area, for auction to prospectors. In
Aug 19 a motion, concerning the maritime boundary dispute, was proposed in the Kenyan parliament,
which included a provision enabling the deployment of the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) to enforce
Kenya’s borders. If the motion is passed, it will ALMOST CERTAINLY heighten tensions between the
two countries, especially within the maritime domain.

3 of 13
Situation in Yemen

10. The war in Yemen has been ongoing since 2015 and although some progress has been made
to reduce conflict in specific areas, such as the City and Governate of Hodeida, there is still
widespread fighting and the situation across the country remains volatile.

11. The Government of Yemen (GoY) and the Houthi militia accepted a detailed plan for the two-
phase redeployment of their respective forces from the vital port city of Hodeida. The Redeployment
Plan, and subsequent Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) agreed on 17 Feb 19, is a
critical part of the original ceasefire agreed in Stockholm, Sweden, in Dec 18 that called on the
government and Houthis to move forces away from the key ports of Hodeida, Saleef and Ras Isa and
key infrastructure including the Red Sea Mills.

12. On 16 Jan 19 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2452, establishing the
UN Mission to support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) for an initial period of six months. The
mandate of this mission, comprising up to 75 monitors, is to lead and support the functioning of the
RCC, to monitor the parties’ compliance with the ceasefire in Hodeida Governorate and the mutual
redeployment of forces.

13. The ceasefire in Hodeida Governorate is tentatively holding, despite numerous reported
violations by both sides. On 11 May 19 the Houthis indicated that they had started their withdrawal
from Hodeida and Saleef and on 15 May the UN stated that the withdrawal was complete, with the
ports handed over to the Yemeni Coast Guard; the GoY has disputed the validity of the UN
assessment. On 15 Jul 19 a further meeting took place between the GoY and Houthis to discuss the
situation in Hodeida. Both parties reaffirmed their support to the ceasefire and the UN announced it
would extend its monitoring period for a further 6 months.

14. Historically, Houthi militants have demonstrated the capability to engage surface vessels
within the southern Red Sea but no attacks have been conducted against shipping in this area since
24 Jul 18 (KSA flagged tanker MV ARSAN incident). The threat related to these types of attack is
LIKELY to remain LOW as long as the Stockholm Agreement holds.

15. Between 8 and 10 Aug 19, Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC) managed to take
control of the city of Aden. The STC, although part of the internationally recognised GoY, are ultimately
striving for independence in the southern part of the country. The impact of this event is yet to play
out, however it is LIKELY that a fractured Yemen government will further complicate resolution of the
Yemen crisis.

4 of 13
Activity since 15 MAY 19

Piracy

16. There have been no piracy incidents in this reporting period. The last piracy attack occurred
on the Republic of Korea flagged FV ADRIA and the Spanish flagged FV TXORI ARGI on 21 Apr 19
in the Somali Basin1.

Conflict Related

17. There have been no conflict related incidents. The last conflict related incident occurred on 26
Jan 19, as reported by WFP MV VOS APOLLO near the Hodeida anchorages.

Non-Maritime Security Events

18. 20 May 19. MV MANA reported a suspicious approach by two skiffs each with ten persons on-
board (POB) 11nm east of Assab (Eritrea). When the embarked private armed security team (PAST)
showed their weapons, the skiffs turned away. No piracy tripwires were present. Ship and crew were
reported safe.

19. 23 May 19. MV KOTA KABAT reported a suspicious approach by one skiff with six POB 29nm
east of Djibouti. Aside from a ladder observed on board the skiff, no piracy tripwires were present.
After the MV sounded the horn, the skiff ceased its approach. Ship and crew were reported safe.

20. 26 May 19. MV DELTA FIVE made a security call on seeing one dhow and three skiffs 103nm
southwest of Balhaf (Yemen). The MV was not approached and no piracy tripwires were noted.

21. 26 May 19. MV GULF ANGEL initially reported being attacked but later reported that she had
(only) been followed by two skiffs for one hour and thirty minutes, 98nm south of Balhaf (Yemen). No
piracy tripwires were present. Ship and crew were reported safe.

22. 12 Jun 19. MV GLOBAL TOMORROW reported being followed by a skiff 750nm east of
Mogadishu. After the MV increased speed and opened distance from the skiff, the skiff stopped
following. No piracy tripwires were present. Ship and crew were reported safe.

23. 23 Jun 19. MV FWN SOLIDE reported being approached by one speedboat with six POB
28nm northeast of Assab (Eritrea). When embarked PAST showed their weapons, the speedboat
turned away. No piracy tripwires were present. Ship and crew were reported safe.

1 As described in IRTB 013 and IRTA released 1 Jun 19.

5 of 13
24. 1 Jul 19. Oil tanker JABER IX reported being approached by three skiffs with five POB each,
12nm southeast of Assab (Eritrea). Aside from carriage of small arms, no piracy tripwires were present
on board the skiffs. When embarked PAST showed their weapons, the skiffs moved away. Ship and
crew were reported safe.

25. 5 Jul 19. MV NORD KAITAN reported being approached by four skiffs 96nm southeast of
Aden. When embarked PAST showed their weapons, the skiffs retreated. No piracy tripwires were
present. Ship and crew were reported safe.

26. 23 Jul 19. Bulk Carrier DAYTONA BEACH reported being approached by a suspicious skiff
27nm southeast of Assab (Eritrea). When the MV started zigzag manoeuvres, the skiff turned away.
No piracy tripwires were present. Ship and crew were reported safe.

Figure 1: Geographic location of Non-Maritime Security Events

Outlook

Piracy

27. The last pirate attack occurred in the Somali Basin some 380nm off the coast of Somalia on
21 Apr 19 and was directed at three FVs. The attack demonstrated that the Hobyo-Haradhere piracy
network is still active, still capable and retains the intent to strike if they see an opportunity. Opportunity

6 of 13
is only denied through the presence of naval vessels in conjunction with the adherence by the
maritime industry to BMP5 measures and the employment of PAST on board. Had the fishing vessels
in this case not employed PAST, this situation would VERY LIKELY have ended with a seizure of a
ship. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that just one successful seizure, leading to ransom negotiations, could
encourage financiers in Somalia to re-invest in piracy action, thereby triggering a re-emergence of
Somali piracy.

28. It is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that piracy activity could resume in early September, as the
southwest monsoon ends and weather conditions improve. However, it is HIGHLY LIKELY that such
activity will continue to be sporadic and infrequent. It remains the case that lower risk opportunities in
other criminal enterprises such as the smuggling of people, narcotics, weapons and charcoal have
HIGHLY LIKELY reduced the appetite and desire for local actors to conduct piracy. However the
piracy attack of 21 Apr is a stark reminder that the threat from piracy is only suppressed, not
eliminated.

29. On 1 Aug 19, Somaliland authorities released 19 imprisoned pirates before they had served
their full sentences. These prisoners were convicted in the Seychelles and, under a bilateral
agreement, transferred to Somaliland in 2012. Their early release potentially jeopardizes the judicial
deterrent that comes with effective sentencing and jail time, especially if it encourages other states to
make similar early releases. In response, the Seychelles government sent a Note Verbale to
Somaliland and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) released a
communique condemning the release of the pirates from Somaliland and informed the UNSC of the
issue. The EU Delegation to Somalia, together with Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States, issued a statement to Somaliland President Muse Bihi
Abdi, regretting the decision. In order to prevent the same occurrence, the signatories also addressed
a letter to the Minister of Religious Affairs and Rehabilitation of Puntland, calling on the authorities in
Puntland to abide by existing agreements and relevant resolutions, which have allowed the transfer
of convicted pirates from the Seychelles to Puntland.

30. EU NAVFOR Somalia and CMF will continue to monitor the situation closely; however, it is
HIGHLY UNLIKELY that the early release will result in an immediate increase in pirate activity. It is
unknown whether the released individuals even intend to return to pirate activity.

Attacks linked to the Yemen Conflict

31. Although the Houthis continue to launch attacks against land-based and coastal Saudi Led
Coalition (SLC) targets, while the ceasefire in Hodeida remains in effect it is UNLIKELY that they will
attack merchant vessels in the shipping lanes of the Southern Red Sea (SRS) and Yemeni coastal

7 of 13
waters. This would ALMOST CERTAINLY create a negative perception of their organisation and
cause.

32. However, due to the fragility of the ceasefire in Hodeida and the ongoing conflict in other parts
of Yemen, there is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that the threat to SLC warships and SLC flagged MVs
from rocket/missile and Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device (WBIED) could resurge in the SRS
without notice. It is UNLIKELY that the Houthis would deliberately target neutral shipping, not directly
linked to the SLC; however, the risk of unintended damage to neutral shipping would exist, due to
misidentification, as seen with MV INCE INEBOLU in May 18.

33. There remain no reported incidents of naval mines in the shipping lanes of the SRS or BAM.
Although the Houthi’s have ALMOST CERTAINLY deployed naval mines in Yemeni coastal waters,
analysis of the mines indicates that they are LIKELY of low quality and are HIGHLY UNLIKELY to drift
into international shipping lanes. Subsequently, the mine threat within the established Maritime
Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) continues to be LOW.

34. The continuing conflict and hostilities in Yemen offer considerable freedom of movement to
International Terrorist Organizations (ITOs) and other non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Daesh. However, there has been no attack by these groups in the
maritime environment since May 17 (MV MUSKIE); the threat from ITOs is LOW.

Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa)

35. MSCHOA is still analyzing any possible impact on BMP5 compliance and changes in
behaviour, within the vessel registration area (VRA), caused by the reduction of the High Risk Area
(HRA) following the agreement of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). Initial analysis indicates that
there have been no significant changes in vessel registration figures and the implementation of BMP5.
However further data collection and anlysis is required, over a longer time period, to more accurately
assess and identify any change in behaviour. This will be a topic of discussion at the next SHADE
Conference in November, when more than six months of data will be available.

a. The reduction of the HRA has had no noticable impact on vessel registration. Although
registrations within the vessel registration area (VRA) is around 70% within the HRA
registrations are higher, the GOA represents the highest level with 86% of vessels transiting
being registered. EU NAVFOR Somalia and CMF highly reccomend that the shipping
community continues to register when operating within the VRA.
b. As shown in Figure 3, with the last three ‘bars’ representing data collected since the
reduction in the HRA, there has been no signifcant change to the number of vessels
employing PASTs onboard.

8 of 13
 Figure 2: Average Number of Registrations, July 2019

Figure 3: Monthly Analysis of use of PASTs since Dec 2018

Summary of CMF Activity

36. CMF through Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 conducted multiple counter piracy operations
involving naval forces, maritime air assets and maritime agencies. Presenting a strong deterrence to

9 of 13
potential Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) and reinforcing confidence within the maritime community
through increased naval presence. CMF and EU NAVFOR Somalia will continue to coordinate
operational activity to maximize the naval presence within the region and reinforce information sharing
throughout the maritime community. During the reporting period, CMF has conducted several Surge
Operations (SO) in the vicinity of the GOA and HOA, in particular CTF 151 conducted:

a. SO Al Saraiat from 26 to 28 May 19,

b. SO Blue Crab from 17 to 18 Jul 19,

37. The strategic counter piracy strategy, agreed by CMF and EU NAVFOR, is:

a. Continue naval presence operations by CMF and EU NAVFOR assets to deter and
deny PAG’s operations against the shipping community;

b. Increase intelligence gathering and sharing of information on PAG camps;

c. Expand Key Leadership Engagements (KLEs) with regional and other international
navies, coastguards and maritime agencies to garner support for counter piracy efforts;

d. Continue to engage the international shipping community and provide timely piracy
updates;

e. Increase awareness on social media of the counter piracy efforts made by CMF and
EU NAVFOR.

38. While CTF 151 has achieved success in countering piracy in the GOA and HOA, the other
CMF CTFs have also had notable accomplishments in the Indian Ocean (CTF 150) and Arabian Gulf
(CTF 152).

a. Since the start of 2019, CTF 150 has seized 45,917 kilograms of hashish, 1,947
kilograms of heroin and 56 kilograms of meth, with a combined street value of US$ 43,891,060.
In addition, CTF 150 continues to engage with regional partners and international agencies to
address other illicit activity such as charcoal smuggling.

b. CTF 152, under the command of the Kuwaiti Coastguard, has significantly enhanced
regional cooperation for maritime security in the Arabian Gulf (in particular participation by
regional Coastguards). It has instigated a number of cooperative and capacity building training
courses and joint patrols to encourage the sharing of best practice amongst regional partners
and agencies.

39. These operational successes, across all the CTFs, directly contributed to the deterrence of
illicit activities in the maritime throughout the Area of Operations (AOO).

10 of 13
40. Additionally, the Commanders of the CTFs have continued to build relations and develop
capability by engaging with numerous countries in the region. This has led to increased information
sharing, closer alliances, and further improved our ability to suppress piracy and combat illegal
activity, whilst enabling the legitimate use of the seas in the region.

Summary of EU NAVFOR Activity

41. To fulfil one of its primary tasks, the protection of World Food Program (WFP) vessels and
other vulnerable shipping, EU NAVFOR Somalia deployed an Autonomous Vessel Protection
Detachment (AVPD) from Montenegro aboard MV Juist providing protection for seven voyages
delivering food and non-food support to Somalia. Between 21 and 24 Aug 19, Lithuania will take over
the staffing of the AVPD.

42. With the sixth revision of the OPLAN for Operation ATALANTA, EU NAVFOR Somalia is
executing its Concept for Cooperation (COCOA). This concept allows nations to contribute to the
Operation for a short time or for a specific activity, instead of allocating a ship for a full rotation. In
June and July EUNAVFOR Somalia invited the Korean Navy to join EU NAVFOR Somalia’s flagship
for counter piracy activity south of the IRTC. This example of “enhanced coordination“ provides EU
NAVFOR Somalia with greater force flow for short periods, takes the opportunity to share best practice
and is a practical example of the new COCOA.

43. In July and August, EU NAVFOR Somalia participated in two operations with CMF in the Horn
of Africa. These operations demonstrated the resolve of CMF and EU NAVFOR Somalia to continue
to conduct operations to deter piracy whilst also providing a practical ‘show of force’ to reinforce the
message.

Conclusion

44. The last piracy incident, on 21 Apr, emphasised that piracy has not been eradicated and
underlined the importance of the diligent and effective implementation of BMP5. The southwest
monsoon will soon end, providing more permissive conditions for small boat operations and a resultant
increase in maritime activity in the region. The continued presence of international naval forces, such
as CMF and EU NAVFOR Somalia, combined with BMP5 measures continue to constitute the most
effective forms of deterrence and defence against piracy in the region.

45. The ongoing conflict in Yemen continues to pose a latent threat to shipping in the BAM and
SRS. Should the Stockholm agreement collapse, attacks in the maritime targeting SLC warships and
flagged MVs could LIKELY resume without notice, bringing an inherent risk of unintended damage to
neutral shipping due to misidentification.

11 of 13
46. The 45th Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) Conference2, hosted by CMF, will
take place on 19 and 20 November 2019 at the British Club, Manama, Bahrain. This forum will allow
maritime industry along with CMF, EU NAVFOR Somalia, independent deployers and national
representatives to discuss maritime security and relevant threats to the free flow of commerce in the
region. Cooperation between military and maritime industry stakeholders remains pivotal to the future
success of Counter Piracy and the wider Maritime Security effort in the region.

Annex:

A. Glossary of Terms.

2Those wishing to attend the 45th SHADE conference are requested to register via the website SHADE.MSCHOA.ORG.
This website will be used to coordinate the conference and provide updates to attendees, it also contains minutes and
presentations from previous conferences. To access the SHADE website, please request an account from
CJ3WEBADMINISTRATOR@MSCHOA.ORG.

12 of 13
 Annex A to
IRTA
Dated 1 Sep 19
Glossary of Terms

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

AOO Area of Operation
AQAP Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula
AVPD Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment (military detachment)
BAM Bab-al-Mandeb strait
BMP5 Best Management Practice (Version 5)
IMO and industry sponsored suggested planning and operational practices for
ship operators and Masters of ships transiting the Indian Ocean
CMF Combined Maritime Force: 33 nation multi-national maritime force operating in
Indian Ocean and Red Sea
CTF Combined Task Force
EU NAVFOR European Union Naval Forces
Counter Piracy Mission, Op ATALANTA
HRA High Risk Area
Industry defined area where it is considered there is a higher risk of piracy and
within which self-protective measures are most likely to be required
GOA Gulf of Aden
IRTA Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
IRTB Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
IRTC Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
MSCHOA Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa)
The maritime industry control centre for the EU's Op ATALANTA.
MSTC Maritime Security Transit Corridor
PAG Piracy Action Groups
Individual group of pirates formed to capture a vessel at sea
PAST Private Armed Security Team
POB Persons on board
SLC Saudi Led Coalition
SRS Southern Red Sea
UKMTO United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
WBIED Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device

13 of 13