CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC, GR No.
195649, 2013-04-16
Facts: Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.[4
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship
To further bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record[11] dated 03 December 2009
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009
and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in
the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the
available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent... travel records:
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed
with Arnado's claim that he is a Filipino citizen.[18]
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
Arnado's continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had
no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.
Issues: On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others,
Ruling: However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open
to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive
acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.[3
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and
out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted... by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,[35] it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required... for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
Valles vs COMELEC
CITIZENSHIP: Jus Sanguinis - a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth
FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and
came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then
participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In
the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were
the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916,
also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to
be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan.
5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the
same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of
jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
FRIVALDO- petitioner Vs COMELEC & RAUL LEE
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22
January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who
was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo‘s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983.
Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded
the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to
protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was ―merely
forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the
Martial Law Dictator‘s agents abroad.‖ He also argued that the challenge to his title
should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omhibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo’s repatriation is valid.
Held: YES
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the
decision on Frivaldo‘s citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its
counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner.
The Solicitor‘s stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with
COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC
itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19
November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a ―natural-born‖ citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per
the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the
United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk
than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to
abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his
American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done
so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts.
Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was
elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibilityQualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer‘s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his
title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor
of Sorsogon.
CICERON P. ALTAREJOS vs. COMELEC, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to
ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern
our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza filed to the COMELEC a
petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that he was not a permanent resident of
or immigrant to a foreign country.
Petitioner object that he did not commit false representation in his application
for candidacy as mayor because he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by
the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda
within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did
not file one within the required period. Petitioner, however, filed a Reply
Memorandum subsequently.
Atty. Zaragoza, Jr hearing officer of this case recommended that petitioner
Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as
Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was
delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the
inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on
Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have
long been transmitted to said offices.
ISSUE: When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office
apply?
RULING:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the citizenship
qualification must be construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected
official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year’s residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty-three years of age on election day).
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the
repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application. In said
case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which
took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No.
725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of
Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court,
thus:
xxx
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions
existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number
of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be
given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the
law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted
to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As
earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing
that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from
giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of
some constitutional guaranty.
Tecson vs COMELEC
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage
to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the
year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code
Republic vs. Sagun
FACTS: Respondent is the legitimate child of father, aChinese national, and mother, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio Cityand did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. At the age of 33, she
executed an Oath of Allegianceto the Republic of the Philippines. The document was
notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City. In 2005, she applied for a Philippine passport but was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that
she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship is authorized by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; and
2.) Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
RULING:
1.) Yes. But it should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural
rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts. Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek
the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly
she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.

2.) No. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply
with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine
citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election.All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippinecitizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s
petition before the trial court must be denied.