Whose Responsibility? Swedish Local Decision Makers and The Scale of Climate Change Abatement

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Whose Responsibility? Swedish Local Decision

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Whose Responsibility? Swedish Local Decision Makers and the

Scale of Climate Change Abatement
Lennart J. Lundqvist and Chris von Borgstede
Urban Affairs Review 2008; 43; 299
DOI: 10.1177/1078087407304689
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Urban Affairs Review
Volume 43 Number 3
January 2008 299-324
© 2008 Sage Publications
Whose Responsibility? 10.1177/1078087407304689
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Swedish Local Decision Makers http://online.sagepub.com
and the Scale of Climate Change
Abatement
Lennart J. Lundqvist
Göteborg University, Sweden
Chris von Borgstede
Göteborg University, Sweden
This article uses a framework combining the discourse of scalar politics with
a social dilemma perspective. The aim is to find answers to why political
interests advocate a specific scalar arrangement. Analyzing informant inter-
views with top politicians and administrators in four municipal governments
in the Gothenburg region of southwestern Sweden, we find that although all
recognize the social dilemma, the size and capacity of their local government
lead to different scalar arguments about responsibility for climate change.
Regardless of municipal size and capacity, however, actors’ recommendations
finally converge in a pattern of path dependence. Already well-entrenched
structures of intermunicipal urban cooperation are seen as the scalarly most
appropriate vehicle for addressing the social dilemma and for allocating
responsibility for climate-related regional action. This opens up for compar-
ative urban research on how new and existing transboundary urban structures
handle climate issues in terms of legitimacy and efficiency.
Keywords: climate change; social dilemma; scalar politics; response capacity;

response space; space of dependence; space of engagement; responsibility;
path dependence
Authors’ Note: Research for this article was carried out within the 2002-2006 research
program COPE: Communication, Organization, Policy Instruments and Efficiency—Research
on Ways of Achieving the Swedish Objective of “Reduced Climate Impact,” financed by grant
no. 802-21-01-F from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. We would like to thank
our fellow COPE researchers and members of the COPE Advisory Board for comments on ear-
lier drafts. Please address correspondence to Lennart J. Lundqvist, Department of Political
Science, Göteborg University, Box 711, SE-405 30 Göteborg, Sweden; e-mail: lennart.
lundqvist@pol.gu.se.
299

distribution.
300 Urban Affairs Review
Climate Change: A Social Dilemma

Solvable Through Scalar Politics?
As no other environmental challenge, climate change brings to the fore

issues of scale and scalar politics (Adger, Arnell, and Tompkins 2005).
Economic and social activities in cities and municipalities seen as necessary
to develop and sustain local welfare contribute to climate change far beyond
the local level. At the same time, the contribution of one particular local com-
munity to the general trajectory of urban or national—let alone global—
climate change is very difficult to ascertain. Climate change thus presents city
and suburban decision makers with a social dilemma. Should they use their
infinitesimal contribution as an excuse to opt for free riding, thus dumping
the costs of climate change abatement on others (Olson 1965)? Or should
they accept responsibility and try to combat climate change, even if they will
then bear the brunt of the burden, while surrounding actors at the wider urban
or regional scale benefit without contributing time and resources (see Dawes
and Messick 2000)? Or should local governments opt for solving this
dilemma by recognizing a common “space of dependence,” thus accepting
that their “space of engagement” is related to a scale surpassing their juris-
dictional territory (see Cox 1998; Brown and Purcell 2005)?
Governments on different levels have responded to the challenge of cli-
mate change through strategies ranging from individual action to efforts of
cross-boundary and/or cross-level action (Bulkeley et al. 2003; Betsill and
Bulkeley 2004). Local government actors become engaged in political
debate over the appropriate allocation of initiative and responsibility, since
climate change is not containable within existing jurisdictional boundaries.
A large body of literature discusses such predicaments in terms of “politics
of scale.” A dominant theme is that scalar politics engages “variously con-
figured networks of actors” in efforts to influence the “process of enrolling
particular actors and networks into scalar constructions [of what] consti-
tutes the urban, regional or the local” (Bulkeley 2005, 884).
In a recent overview, Brown and Purcell (2005) point to some weak
points in the analyses of “how scale and scalar politics are central to under-
standing human-environment relationships” (p. 614). However, their sug-
gestions for rectifying this weakness resorts mainly to questions of “how
scales and scalar interrelationships are socially produced” and “which polit-
ical interests advocate a particular scalar arrangement” (Brown and Purcell
2005, 614; emphasis added). To us, the crucial question is why local actors
and interests opt for specific strategies and alternatives concerning a legiti-
mate and effective spatial distribution of responsibility for action toward

distribution.
Lundqvist, Borgstede / Climate Change Abatement 301
issues not confined to any level on the jurisdictional scale (Cash et al.
2006). Our aim here is to use data from a Swedish urban region to probe
how far linking the literature on social dilemmas to that on politics of scale
will contribute to a richer and more fruitful framework for analyzing the
heart of the matter in such politics, that is, the ordering of responsibility for
governing cross-scale issues.
Analytical Framework
A major assumption underlying our analysis is that when local govern-

ments seek to secure their spaces of dependence, they will primarily follow
the logic of resource mobilization. Each will try to expand and diversify its
space of dependence through competing on a regional and even national
scale with other local governments to get new resources located within its
territory. When confronted with large infrastructure investments, however,
municipalities will also see the benefits of following the logic of efficient
resource use. By enlarging their spaces of engagement through regional
cooperation on such investments, individual local governments will
improve their future capacity to mobilize resources (Lundqvist 1998).
When local governments seek to widen their space of engagement
through cross-level or cross-scale cooperation, one would expect that ear-
lier experiences of scaling up local engagement will influence local actors’
views on desirable and legitimate scalar distributions of responsibility also
for climate change (Kousky and Schneider 2003). But as the questions
above indicate, beneficial outcomes at the municipal level are much less
certain if local governments should choose to follow a logic of sustainable
common resource use toward climate change. This issue does not imply
any given limit to the municipality’s space of dependence or any easily
delineated space of engagement. Nor is there any way of determining
whether or when a municipality will reap an appropriate benefit from
widening its engagement for a common pool resource.
This leads us to introduce also local actors’ views on the social dilemma
character of climate change as a crucial element in their construction of an
“appropriate” scalar allocation of responsibility for climate change man-
agement. What we want to find out is whether actors’ views on climate
change as a social dilemma, in combination with their construction of
spaces of dependence and engagement, lead to specific scalar preferences
that ultimately reflect objective differences in local government character-
istics. Actors enter the politics of scale with different amounts of power and

distribution.
resources to exert influence on the distribution of responsibility. Such

objective and interrelated factors as municipal size and administrative
diversity are important. With large size comes a large and diversified
municipal administration with the response capacity to deal with complex
socioeconomic and ecological problems, such as climate change and a
wider “response space,” that is, a richer economic and technological poten-
tial for solving those problems (Tompkins and Adger 2005).
Regardless of municipal size and capacity, however, the response
space of local governments toward climate change is, to a considerable
extent, constrained through past and present “interplay among scale-
dependent environmental and resource regimes” (Young 2006, 27). As a
dominant player, the national state encloses the range of alternatives for
local scalar politics through binding decisions on such climate-related
issues as infrastructure investments in airports, railroads, and highways as
well as through climate-related policy instruments such as vehicle emis-
sion standards or emission taxes. In turn, the national state is committed
to global and international climate agreements that elevate certain issues
from local to national or even international levels. Marketable emissions
rights for industries offset much of the earlier local government powers of
supervision and control. National climate policy may also prescribe local
responsibility for certain actions, thus making it difficult for local gov-
ernments to opt out of responsibility for climate change. On the other
hand, actions taken by national governments may empower local govern-
ments by, for example, affording them rights to impose taxes and make
development plans for their territories as well as by providing special cli-
mate-related economic incentives.
At issue, then, is whether actors’ views on the social dilemma character
of climate change, together with commonly shared structural frames for
local governmental action lead to similar views on the appropriate scalar
solution to climate change management (see Figure 1). Or do objective dif-
ferences in size and capacity influence local actors more, thus leading to
different constructions of spaces of dependence and engagement? Since
size implies a wider local arena “upon which more or less ‘immobilized’
actors depend for sustenance,” the question is whether this makes actors in
large cities more ready to widen their engagement, that is, the space they
“construct in order to secure . . . the continued existence of their spaces of
dependence” (Lindseth 2006, 741). The question is also whether size and
capacity influence smaller municipalities in an urban conglomeration area
to seek joint action through negotiated agreements to avoid de facto domi-
nance by the large city (Young 2006).

distribution.
Figure 1
A Framework for Analyzing “Scalar Politics” Among Local Actors
Responding to the Challenge of Climate Change
The Context of Local Local Actors’ Local Actors’ Local Actors’ Scalar
Governments’ Climate Action Views of Constructions of Preferences
Response Capacity and

Space Appropriate
• Municipal size Climate Level of
Spaces of
• Administrative capacity Change Responsibility
Dependence
= or ≠
Spaces of Dependence • Global
• International
• Profile of constraints Social Spaces of • National
and empowerments Dilemma? Engagement • Regional
imposed by other
• Local
political levels
• Major sources of
greenhouse gas
emissions
Getting the Local View
To get the local view of the scalar politics of climate change, we first
selected four local governments in the Gothenburg urban region for closer
study according to their size and administrative capacity and their main
sources of GHG emissions: the city of Gothenburg and the suburban munic-
ipalities of Stenungsund, Härryda, and Öckerö. For each of these, we sin-
gled out those policy areas and administrative branches we deemed most
important to climate change: transport and communications, infrastructure,
planning and building, and environmental management. We then carried
out semistructured, qualitative, informant interviews with four to five
elected local councillors and appointed top administrators (N = 18) in each
of the four municipalities during 2004 (see appendix). Several questions
built on an earlier survey to 750 public and private actors in the wider
Västra Götaland region (von Borgstede and Lundqvist 2006). Others
emerged from our analyses of responses from that survey. The interviews
were with one single respondent and two interviewers and averaged 60
minutes. We recorded all interviews, and we base the analysis on transcrip-
tions of these recordings. We grouped the questions as follows:

distribution.
• Climate change = common resource dilemma? Is there a conflict between

the maximization of own municipal interest and the interests on a wider
regional, national, or global scale?
• Municipal “dependence”? How serious is the climate issue for the munic-
ipality, and what is the role of “own” municipal activities affecting climate?
• Municipal “response capacity and space”: Does the municipality have
capacity and competence to effectively address the climate issue?
• Municipal “engagement” in climate-related cooperation? If so, on what
issues, on what scale, and why (or why not)?
• Ascription of responsibility? Which level(s) of government are “appropri-
ately” responsible for climate change abatement?
Admittedly, the number of interviewees is small. One should, however,

keep in mind the purpose of our study. It is to find out whether differences
and patterns in actors’ contexts feed into their reasoning about the charac-
ter and responses to climate change in ways that can be used to analyze
“scalar politics” by combining structural-institutional and rational choice
theories and thus contribute to future research. As we see it, the variety of
the local governments studied, the similarity of policy areas and branches,
the key positions of those interviewed, and our use of structured interviews
to find out how these key persons reason about scalar politics provide a fair
ground for making such a claim (Esaiasson et al. 2007).
Local Government and Climate Change:

The Swedish Context
Sweden’s national climate strategy objective of “reduced climate

impact” introduced in 2002 is quite ambitious. It stipulates a decrease in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to an average 4% lower in 2008 to 2012
than in 1990. This is contrary to the EU allowance for a Swedish increase
of 4% in the Union’s distribution of national assignments. Furthermore,
Sweden purports to achieve this reduction without compensation for the
uptake by carbon sinks and without regard for international flexible mech-
anisms (Cabinet Bill 2001/02:55).
Swedish local governments have constitutional powers to promote the
common interests of the citizens within their territories. The popularly
elected municipal councils in Sweden’s 290 municipalities are empowered
to levy income taxes on their citizens to carry out their constitutional
responsibilities. Municipal tasks of relevance to climate change concern
infrastructure development, environmental and public health protection,

distribution.
waste management, water and sewage, and rescue services. Crucially

important is the local governmental monopoly on physical planning. By
developing master plans (översiktsplan) every five years, individual munic-
ipalities seek their own developmental paths, opening up for local objec-
tives and initiatives that might not be totally in line with national objectives.
Under the 1991 Municipal Act, Sweden’s local governments enjoy wide
latitude to organize their own affairs. Except for a municipal board of direc-
tors (elected from the political majority on the municipal council) and an
election committee, local governments may tailor their political and admin-
istrative organizations to fit the needs and political will of the individual
municipality. They must, however, have identifiable administrative units for
tasks involving the use of authority toward citizens and groups, for
example, building and housing permits as well as environmental and public
health protection (Ministry of Finance 2004).
The National Climate Bill of 2002 provided for continued use of the
“green” tax shift, including increased CO2 taxes (Hammar and Jagers
2006). The bill also introduced a state support program to encourage Local
Climate Investment Programs (KLIMPs). To qualify for grants, local gov-
ernments must cooperate with target actors, engage the citizenry, and
develop methods of cooperation on climate issues across sectoral and
administrative lines. The limited sums available and the quite challenging
conditions for applications call for strong municipal capacities to succeed
in getting a KLIMP grant. Very few applications have been approved, and
the number of applications is falling (SEPA 2005).
These contextual features of climate policy make Sweden an interesting
case for analyzing local actors’ views on the character of and appropriate
response to climate change. On one hand, Swedish local governments’
strong physical planning powers hold the key to future scalar adaptation to
climate change. Given their experiences from earlier Local Agenda 21
activities (Eckerberg 2001) as well as from the KLIMP predecessor, the
1998-2004 state grants to Local Investment Plans for Sustainable
Development (LIPs), local governments are also crucial for the implemen-
tation of mitigation measures (on LIP, see Lundqvist 2004). On the other
hand, the KLIMP grants do not seem to leave much chance to municipali-
ties with thin administrative capacity to get support unless they cooperate
closely with other actors on specific projects. Market-based instruments
such as taxation of vehicles or fuels are beyond local competence. The flex-
ible mechanisms of the Kyoto agreements lift certain powers of control out
of the hands of local government. All this indicates that the Swedish
national climate strategy of reduced climate impact provides local actors

distribution.
with different and sometimes even contradictory signals concerning the

appropriate level of responsibility for climate-related action.
Local Government Characteristics

Related to Climate Change
While the national constraints and empowerments formally put local

governments on an equal footing with respect to climate-related action, one
easily recognizes that differences among local governments in response
capacity and space will come into play in scalar politics. Our four chosen
municipalities do indeed display considerable such differences (Table 1).
Gothenburg is the second largest city in Sweden and equal in size to the
Nordic capitals of Oslo and Helsinki. As a regional nexus with the largest
seaport in Scandinavia, Gothenburg is competing fiercely on a European
scale with cities such as Hamburg and even Rotterdam (Dagens Industri
2006). The city generates and experiences much GHG emission from the
transport sector. The city also harbors heavy industries in the oil, energy,
and waste management sectors. The Gothenburg city government has
a large environmental administration, charged with leading some of the
climate-related local policy planning in cooperation with the traffic and
sustainable water and waste management administrations. The city directly
owns important transport and energy producing facilities.
Stenungsund harbors the largest petrochemical industry complex in
Sweden. Several of the industries have multinational ownership. As they
gradually become partners in the global scheme of GHG emission trading,
important parts of the climate issue are brought to a scale beyond the local
administration’s reach. Harboring mostly small service sector enterprises,
Härryda is in climate change terms totally dominated by Sweden’s second
largest airport, Gothenburg Landvetter. Both Stenungsund and Härryda have
large highways running through and linking Gothenburg to Oslo and
Stockholm, respectively. These two municipalities thus find that large
chunks of the climate change problem are formally under the authority of
political and administrative units beyond the local level. Both own relatively
new district heating1 facilities. Stenungsund uses hot spill water from the
chemical industry plants, while Härryda’s facility is based on biofuel. The
small island municipality of Öckerö is exposed to mainly westerly winds
and connected to the city area by ferry. It thus creates as well as experiences
fewer emissions affecting climate than the other three municipalities. Its
environmental and infrastructure administrative units are quite small.

distribution.
Table 1
Characteristics of the Four Studied Municipalities
Administrative
Capacity Spaces of Dependence
Size Number of (major sources of CO2 emissions)2
Inhabitants municipal
Municipality (end of 2004)1 employees3 Industry Transport Energy
Gothenburg City 481,400 38,500 43% 36% 20%

Härryda 31,700 3,100 Mostly small Gothenburg District heating
enterprises and airport, R40 built on biofuel
service sector highway District
distribution.
Stenungsund 22,700 2,200 Sweden’s major E6 highway heating
center for heavy Copenhagen, using spill
petrochemical Gothenburg, water from
industry Oslo industry
Öckerö 12,100 1,100 Mostly small Commuters No district
enterprises and (ferry and heating
service sector cars) system
Sources: 1. GR (2005b); 2. municipality’s home page; 3. SKL (2004), Table 6.

307
Local Views on Climate Change: A Social Dilemma?
We specifically asked the interviewees whether they view a sustainable

climate as a common pool resource. We furthermore asked them whether they
think that measures to achieve a sustainable climate imply a conflict between
individual and collective interests. Do they see their own local climate-related
activities as involving a social dilemma warranting cooperative efforts
perhaps beyond the local scale? Practically everyone in the smaller munici-
palities acknowledged that climate change constitutes such a dilemma. The
Municipal Board chairman in Stenungsund is representative:
Of course there is a conflict. As I see it, we could have done things of extreme
importance for the climate, but then we would not have gotten the support of
our citizens. Such a strategy would hurt the climate issue. The question is
how do I get strong citizen support for positive climate measures?
With one exception, most respondents acknowledged that the dilemma

calls for including the climate issue in the municipality’s space of engagement.
The municipal board chairman of small Öckerö took a line of reasoning that
borders on free riding:
You got to think of what’s best for your municipality, and look to your eco-
nomic pain threshold. Should we pay more for being friendly to the environ-
ment? I don’t think this holds water! Our municipality does not influence that
much on a global scale.
The Öckerö chief environmental inspector seemingly turns the chair-

man’s view on its head. Referring to the global character of climate change,
she points out that when global actors such as the United States are shirking
their responsibility, this negatively affects local government’s possibilities to
engage in actions she regards as necessary: “Where then is our trustworthi-
ness when we seek to change local peoples’ climate-related behavior?”
Our analytical framework points to this social dilemma as creating a con-
flict between municipal spaces of dependence and engagement. It is clear that
both politicians and administrators struggle to find ways of reconciling these
spaces. One way seems to be to bring the issue down to the individual level.
The Härryda chief environmental inspector conceded that “private economic
gain and comfort supersedes concern for the climate,” and the Stenungsund
energy adviser argued that “when I talk about climate in general, people turn
a deaf ear. But if I show that there is money to earn from saving energy, then

distribution.
we get an effect on climate as well!” Apart from pointing to economic stim-

uli, the elected politicians in Stenungsund and Härryda saw soft instruments
such as information and communication as proper methods of bridging the
gap between individual and collective interests. The board chairman in
Stenungsund even admitted that “we may have to blunt our policy instru-
ments a bit because this is better from a global point of view.” His head of
Technical Services said that “we must talk more, even if people stick to their
interests. The solution lies in moving this issue up on a wider scale; everyone
must be engaged.” Still, the buck must stop somewhere. Said the then vice
chairperson of the Härryda Municipal Board, “To get people to understand
[this dilemma], you try information, communication, and counsel. But some-
times you have to make a decision without having reached full consensus,
and then you’ve got to stick to that decision.”
Do Gothenburg city top administrators and politicians recognize the
social dilemma character of the climate issue? Or do they equate the devel-
opmental interests of the city with the common good of the whole region and
even with that of the nation? The environmental officials see an obvious con-
flict here. The head of the Traffic and Planning Unit concedes that “one
meets this dilemma often; people do not see what’s globally important as
equally important for themselves.” The deputy head of the Environmental
Administration says that “for the city, the question is, why should we do this
when others don’t?” Both contend, however, that this is something not usu-
ally put on the table in the local decision-making process. The then traffic
office director wavered somewhat. While hoping that “views of the environ-
ment as something held in common” might permeate local decisions, he did
see “a great risk of self-interest being favored in the final round.”
While clearly acknowledging the dilemma, the city environmental coun-
cillor said that most city actors only see to what is “best for Gothenburg and
that is to have development and plenty of jobs here and now.” The head of
the City Office’s Infrastructure Group seemingly shares this view. While
hoping that increased consciousness will help everyone acknowledge
responsibility for climate as a common resource, he contends that he has
not experienced any direct reference to climate change as a social dilemma
for the city. The city’s interests come out clearly in his line of reasoning:
“We must all be rational. . . . We must not act so as to create competitive
disadvantages for industries. One cannot make fewer cars in Sweden at the
same time as car imports increase.” This implies that climate-related deci-
sions intended to benefit collective interests on a global scale might be par-
ticularly hard on the city of Gothenburg (home as it is of Volvo trucks and
Volvo passenger cars).

distribution.
Space of Dependence: Big Size Brings a Broader Base
In the smaller municipalities, actors’ views on spaces of dependence

reveal two common patterns. First, the most serious emissions emanate
from sources not clearly under the jurisdiction of local government. This
holds for Stenungsund’s possibilities to control its heavy petrochemical
industry. It also holds for local authority to control traffic emissions. Says
the chief environmental inspector in Stenungsund, “To be realistic, we must
admit that the municipality has very limited possibilities to ‘steer’ this
issue.” The Municipal Board chairman in Härryda points to its largest emit-
ter, the Gothenburg airport: “We have no influence. It’s all in the hands of
the National Aviation Board and the Environmental Courts.” On the island
municipality of Öckerö, the head of Planning and Infrastructure
Development laments that “a bridge is beyond our competence . . . [it is]
a question for the regional and even the national level.”
Respondents from the half-million population city of Gothenburg hold a
different view of response capacity and space as well as space of dependency.
Politicians and top administrators alike recognize that much of the activity
within the city aimed at sustaining—and developing—the city’s space of
dependence also generates huge amounts of GHG emissions. But there is both
capacity and space to respond. The city can steer the sectors of energy, indus-
try, and transportation “when it decides to do so,” says the deputy head of the
City Environmental Administration. He adds that size makes Gothenburg a
powerful consumer; the city’s fleet of vehicles is now composed of the most
environmentally friendly models possible. The Traffic Office director says
Gothenburg’s dominant position enables it to affect plans for large traffic cor-
ridors in the region as well as to institute specific environmental zones in the
inner city. The head of the City Office’s Infrastructure Group contended that
there “is no limit to what Gothenburg City can do in its different sectors.” He
added, “We have an environmental administration with enormously high com-
petence and with resources to participate in the overall . . . preventive plan-
ning, and they are very active.” This view is further aired by the deputy
director of the Environmental Administration: “We are the ones forcing the
[climate] issue into the planning process.” It should be noted that
Gothenburg’s KLIMP application was coordinated by the City Environmental
Administration. The resulting impressively large KLIMP grant in 2003 was
won in stiff competition, which testifies to the capacity of that administration.2
Environmental administrations in the three smaller municipalities do not
enjoy the same prominent position in strategic local planning of relevance

distribution.
to climate issues. These environmental bureaus have either been placed

under local administrations running polluting activities or have found their
law-based injunctions challenged by those local administrative units. The
chief environmental inspector in industrially dominated Stenungsund says
that “our views are sometimes met with respect, but most of the time, we
feel like sailing against the wind.” Härryda’s chief environmental inspector
says he has “pointed out that [the municipality] does not utilize our com-
petence in the strategic environmental planning.” As it happens, these two
municipalities have employed different strategies to enhance environmen-
tal capacity on such strategic issues as climate change. Härryda appointed
an environmental coordinator whose function is to provide contacts and
coordination of plans and decisions among units dealing with technical
services, housing and infrastructure, traffic and master planning, and the
environment. Both Municipal Board chairpersons in Härryda point to this as
a capacity improvement; the coordinator is a “spearhead” and is “politically
accepted” as a vehicle for bringing attention to longer term climate issues.
In fact, the Härryda solution is envied by Stenungsund’s head of Technical
Services: “Had I been in a position to choose, I would have hired someone
into the Municipal Board to become the ‘engine’ in these activities.”
Spaces of Engagement: Contextually Caused Cooperation
The answers from the smaller municipalities indicate that engagement in

specific climate cooperation projects is uncommon. Interviewees usually
pointed to internal municipal cooperation that is mandatory under planning
and environmental legislation and concerns broader environmental aspects
of infrastructure developments and municipal master plans. The environ-
mental and planning officials in small Öckerö see the municipality’s short
channels of communication as helpful in bringing broad environmental
aspects into play in joint administrative actions. The exceptions to this dearth
of specific administrative cooperation on climate issues have one thing in
common; they seem driven by opportunities to cash in on national grant
programs. Both Stenungsund and Härryda point to the state LIP grants of
1998 to 2004 as catalysts in drawing together the different local govern-
ment branches. The Härryda chief environmental inspector says that even
with the “combination of the energy adviser and the environmental coordi-
nator, as well as the demand for energy planning . . . it [the district heat-
ing system] would not have come about as easily without the LIP money.”
The Municipal Board chairman in Stenungsund viewed the LIP grant for

distribution.
district heating as a joint project feeding into further cooperation on several

climate-related issues.
As for smaller municipalities’ cooperation with local private interests, two
patterns stand out. First, projects with state support breed collaboration pro-
jects on such things as district heating. These are win-win situations and attrac-
tive for both sides. The chief environmental inspectors of Stenungsund and
Öckerö say that other public-private cooperation is very much related to such
normal handling of environmental issues as licensing and site inspections.
This relates to a striking line in the responses from the smaller municipalities.
Those actors who do recognize climate change as an issue of relevance do not
usually seem ready to expand their role beyond their jurisdictional responsi-
bility and competence except when state money is flapping in the air. As for
cooperation with national actors such as the Energy Agency and the Railroad
and Road Administrations, smaller municipalities feel stuck at the receiving
end. These national agencies define the politics of scale by setting the agenda
rather than engaging in cooperation, thereby creating frustration among local
politicians and administrators alike. “We have realized that it is meaningless
to engage in climate discussions with the Road Administration . . . about the
roads running through our municipality,” says the Stenungsund chief environ-
mental inspector. Venting his frustration on this politics of scale, the Härryda
municipal architect fired away: “We haven’t got much time for the National
Energy Agency . . . they leave no room for [our] decisions.”
Patterns of internal local environmental cooperation in Gothenburg City
are strikingly similar to those in the smaller municipalities. Projects specif-
ically addressing climate are rare. Climate issues are dealt with under such
umbrellas as environmental control, traffic, and infrastructure planning.
When specific climate cooperation projects occur, they seem driven by
stimuli from other political levels. Pointing to the NOx directive from the
EU and the subsequent environmental quality norm taking effect in Sweden
by 2006, the deputy head of the City Environmental Administration said
that this “brought different administrations to work together” following his
administration’s initiative. City respondents acknowledge the stimulus from
national KLIMP grants. These grants provided “a very visible carrot for
cooperation,” says the head of Planning and Traffic within the
Environmental Administration. The auspices of getting KLIMP grants
prompted Gothenburg’s Municipal Board to urge “sector administrations
and municipal companies to join in washing out whatever gold they had in
the pipelines,” said the head of the City Office’s Infrastructure Group.
As for cooperation with local private interests, there is a visible difference
between Gothenburg City and the smaller suburban municipalities. Such

distribution.
public-private cooperation is part of a more general feature in city politics.

Said the head of the City Office’s Infrastructure Group, “We can compliment
ourselves for having a good cooperation with business—Volvo, SKF, and
other big industries—as well as with research and higher education.” The then
traffic office director’s views on cooperation are worth quoting at length:
My years here have taught me that to work in city government is to cooper-

ate . . . To get to results, we must have information and communicate.
Results come through dialogue and cooperation . . . This is the key . . .
Nothing is decided without consensus. When we rise from the table, we are
principally in agreement. That’s what I call the “Gothenburg spirit.”
It is worth noting, however, that this Gothenburg spirit of public-private

cooperation is not always as inclusive of climate as it is of structural devel-
opment aspects. Says the city environmental councillor (who happens to
represent the Environmental Party, the Greens):
These questions [climate, environment, energy] are important. But when

push comes to shove in individual decisions that could make a difference,
then the large parties jump ship because suddenly, employment and growth
are the overarching goals.
However, the most striking difference from the smaller municipalities is that
Gothenburg respondents view the future-oriented cooperation projects with the
National Road and Railroad Administrations as principally a game of scalar
politics among equals. “It’s the city that pulls,” argued the Environmental
Administration’s deputy director, while that administration’s head of Planning
and Traffic held that “there is power on both sides to initiate” issues. The head
of the City Office’s Infrastructure Group said cooperation with national author-
ities is “simplified because of our competent administrations.”
Local Climate Responsibility Presupposes State Resources
Now, do these differences in response space and capacity as well as in

spaces of dependence and engagement carry implications for local govern-
ment decision makers’ ascription of responsibility for climate change man-
agement? We see evidence of these differences being quite influential. With
larger size and capacity comes a greater sense of problem ownership.
Gothenburg City respondents contended that the prevailing distribution of
responsibility between local and national levels should not be changed. The

distribution.
head of the City Office’s Infrastructure Group said existing jurisdictional

boundaries between the state, the local government, and the private sector
“should be respected [because] otherwise, there would be an increased state
steering of our city’s climate measures.” In fact, he added, “It is the state
that puts the brakes on developments here in Gothenburg.” The then Traffic
Office director said that “right now, the local level has a lot of responsibil-
ity, but its present role is in no way limiting or hindering [local action].”
The deputy head of the City Environmental Administration emphasized that
“it is at the local level one can take concrete measures.” The same admin-
istration’s head of Traffic and Planning argued that “there must be a wide
local responsibility, because this is about convincing people, and that is best
done when you are close [to them].” We interpret this as a recommendation
not to change the present scaling of responsibility; the city certainly has the
response space and capacity to match actors at other scales. This assertion
of the local level as the proper bearer of responsibility also seems compat-
ible with city actors’ views on climate change as a social dilemma.
Answers from the smaller municipalities provide a vivid example of how
the different scales and levels of governing intertwine and particularly affect
the local level’s possibilities to respond and engage in climate-related action.
On one hand, respondents point to traditional advantages of scaling responsi-
bility down to the local level. The Härryda municipal architect said that “as
long as local governments stay within the limits of law, it is best to let them
run the show.” The head of Planning and Infrastructure in Stenungsund said
that it is “right to place great responsibilities on the municipalities, since they
can influence so much” even within existing “narrow” regulations. The
Stenungsund Municipal Board chairman extends this line of argument by
stating that “too much say from the state level misses the unique conditions
at the local level.” Given his earlier favoring of state grants for local projects,
we interpret this as a recommendation to save at least the present scalar dis-
tribution of responsibilities also in climate change abatement activities.
On the other hand, respondents from smaller local governments see them-
selves as facing spaces of engagement dictated from above that are much too
wide for them. The Stenungsund energy adviser held that national regulations
placing climate responsibilities on local governments are meaningless as long
“as the state does not allow money to go with it.” Summing up his discussion
on local governmental capacity to deal with climate issues, the chief environ-
mental inspector of the same municipality says that the resources “are so
scarce that in practice, it is difficult for the municipality to play any role what-
soever.” The Härryda head of Infrastructure Development is worth quoting:

distribution.
Generally speaking, it’s good to have as much as possible done at the local
level. However, the big problem is that a lot of responsibility is put on local
government without allocating adequate resources; money is just too scarce.
I believe in a strategy of transferring responsibility down to the municipal
level together with supportive resources.
Respondents from the small island municipality of Öckerö offer some

differing views about the proper role of local government in climate affairs.
The environmental inspector consistently argued for a more active role for
local government in environmental affairs. At the same time, she aired
much the same view as administrative colleagues in the other small munic-
ipalities: “Generally speaking, too much responsibility is laid down on
local governments without any resources to go with it.” The island’s head
of Infrastructure and Planning said that climate “is an international issue,
and we are just at the far end of it.” As we have seen, the chairman of the
Municipal Board did not acknowledge his municipality as contributing to
any social dilemma from climate change. It is only consequential then for
him to (1) contend that “climate does not really look like a municipal issue.
. . . [It] feels like an issue to be decided at higher levels, either nationally
or in the European Union” and (2) argue for as far-reaching an institution-
alization of the subsidiarity principle as possible:
On the whole, national authorities are not highly rated by local governments. . . .
[W]henever one can defer responsibility to the local level, it’s a good thing
because we are in the midst of it.”
The responses from the smaller local governments reveal an intricate

relationship among capacity and spaces of dependence and engagement
in their “scalar strategies” (Lindseth 2006). The basic underlying premise
is to defend the local level’s present response space. And although inter-
viewees recognize the local contribution to the social dilemma of climate
change and hint at the need for an intensified and widened engagement in
this issue, they point to the constraints from the national level. They can-
not fully observe national regulations demanding more local engagement.
The response space and capacity of smaller local governments are depen-
dent on corresponding resource inputs from the state. So how could local
governments increase their space of engagement when such inputs are not
forthcoming?

distribution.
A Consensual Scalar Response: Path Dependent

Regional Cooperation
As we have seen, size and capacity go hand in hand to influence local
politicians’ and administrators’ scalar strategies for addressing climate
change. Our interviewees in the half-million population city of Gothenburg
seem assured that the city is capable of defining its own space of engagement,
thanks to a wide response space, which in turn makes the city less dependent
on other levels of government. In the smaller suburban municipalities, how-
ever, respondents put forth their dependence on national climate-related pol-
icy measures as limiting their spaces of both response and engagement.
One would assume, then, that there would be so much more reason for
smaller suburban municipalities who recognize the social dilemma charac-
ter of climate change to widen their engagement through internal and exter-
nal cooperation. However, we find a somewhat surprising pattern; there are
very few internal or external cooperation projects specifically addressing cli-
mate issues. Climate tends to be subsumed under such intra- and intermu-
nicipal cooperation that is mandated by planning and environmental
legislation. New cooperative patterns of climate cooperation are prime
examples of the interplay of different scales. They emerge mainly when
there are possibilities of getting national grants, and then, differences in
response capacity and space really come into play. As already pointed out,
the city of Gothenburg orchestrated a successful cooperative effort led by the
Environmental Administration to get a large chunk of the national KLIMP
grants. However, small municipalities stand little chance of getting such
grants. This is not only because the KLIMP program is much smaller than
the earlier LIP grants. It is also a consequence of national politics of scale.
The construction of the state KLIMP grants explicitly favors single local
government applications, thus in effect choking off intermunicipal joint
applications for cooperative regional climate change abatement measures.
Already existing institutional and normative contexts on higher jurisdic-
tional levels thus play a crucial role in determining local views on engage-
ment in cooperative schemes to manage climate change (Meadowcroft 1999).
This is underscored by the respondents’ almost unison appreciation of the
Gothenburg Region Association of Local Authorities (GR). Local decision
makers see the association as a key unit for strategic long-range discussions
and cooperation on issues that together imply a common space of depen-
dence. The GR Steering Group for Regional Planning deals with traffic,
energy, and infrastructure issues of relevance to the region’s climate through

distribution.
such special working groups as “Sustainable Regional Development 2050”

and “Future Collective Transport in the Gothenburg Region 2020” (GR
2005a). Says the Öckerö Municipal Board chairman, “It is one of the best
functioning intermunicipal associations in Sweden.” The Öckerö head of
Planning and Infrastructure Development added, “Gothenburg City can make
this out on their own, because of their size. For the smaller municipalities,
however, GR is most important.” This importance for climate of the planning
and infrastructure discussions in the GR is underscored by the Municipal
Board chairpersons in Härryda who praise the “good cooperation” and are
very “satisfied with the GR.”
When it comes to Gothenburg City’s climate-related cooperation with
external actors on a regional scale, we find that the city respondents place
as much importance on the GR as do those from the smaller municipalities.
Said the city environmental councillor, “The infrastructural cooperation
within the GR is essential.” The then Traffic Office director seconded her
by pointing to the crucial role of GR for scalar politics toward national gov-
ernment: “This overarching cooperation and responsibility for infrastruc-
ture development . . . is unique in Sweden and has become a stronghold.”
Again, size and capacity come into play. All our respondents view GR as
a valuable means for cooperation. At the same time, city officials openly state
that Gothenburg can make it without the GR, whereas suburban respondents
readily admit that their municipalities cannot. Does this mean that as the
dominant player, the city of Gothenburg can equate its own local actions and
strategies with a solution to the social dilemma of climate change by impos-
ing its own logic of resource mobilization on the suburban municipalities?
There are clear signs of self-sufficiency in the city respondents’ answers. The
city environmental councillor and top city administrators furthermore imply
that growth and development arguments weigh heavily in the final round of
decision making. Recent policy statements by the region’s unchallenged
strongman, the chairman of the City Council Board, confirm this. Contending
that “size determines growth,” he argued that the greater Gothenburg region
must seek to get at least “50% more inhabitants” to keep pace with interna-
tional competition. There is, he emphasized, “a common regional interest in
the growth and well-being of the city” (Göteborgs-Posten 2006). This to us
implies not only that the city’s scalar strategies on climate change are framed
by the city politicians’ and top administrators’ definitions of spaces of depen-
dence and engagement but also that these are imposed on the suburban gov-
ernments, which will thus have to adapt their spaces of dependence and
engagement to the tune played by the city government.

distribution.
Concluding Analysis
In this article, we use a framework combining concepts drawn from the

discourse of scalar politics with a social dilemma perspective. By linking
local actors’ views of climate change as a social dilemma to the analysis of
their scalar argumentation, our aim is to seek ways of answering why—not
just how—“political interests advocate a specific scalar arrangement”
(Brown and Purcell 2005, 614) to allocate responsibility for climate change
management. At the outset, local governments are in a formal sense equally
constrained by the constitutional and climate policies on other (national
and/or international) levels. We also assume that regardless of the size of
their local government, municipal actors apply logics of resource mobiliza-
tion and efficient resource use in their search for solutions to problems on the
local political agenda. As our empirical cases of four municipalities in the
greater Gothenburg region in southwestern Sweden show, local govern-
ments at the same time differ in response capacity and space of importance
to scalar politics. If the interplay of those factors yields specific patterns of
local views and local involvement in “scalar constructions [of what] con-
stitutes the urban, regional or the local” (Bulkeley 2005, 884) in climate
change management, our framework is a step toward understanding why
particular scalar arrangements are advocated (Young 2006).
A first, and some may say evident, result is that size and capacity are of
crucial importance, as they define in practical terms the municipality’s
response capacity and response space. However, their connections to
actors’ construction of scalar preferences seem quite intricate. The respon-
dents in the half-million population city of Gothenburg rely heavily on the
city’s size and capacity in their scalar strategies toward climate change.
They believe the city government has response capacity and response space
enough to legitimize a strong local engagement and responsibility for cli-
mate change abatement, even at the expense of national action. Although
many actors from the smaller suburban municipalities also hold this view
of local government as a suitable scalar solution for climate change, their
arguments are more defensive. They fiercely guard their present spatial
options against what they see as national scalar intrusions making them
more dependent than before. In the smallest local government with the least
response capacity and response space, this defense of the local scale against
national impositions even leads to a preference for allocating climate
responsibility to the international level. We see this as evidence that local
decision makers’ first-hand reaction to cross-scale issues, such as climate
change, is to apply the logic of resource mobilization. They will guard their

distribution.
local government’s possibilities to pursue policies that sustain and possibly

expand their space of dependence.
A second, maybe not so self-evident, result concerns the role played by
views on climate change as a social dilemma in actors’ scalar strategies.
Although all our urban and suburban respondents in one way or another
acknowledge that managing climate change could bring individual and collec-
tive interests into conflict, this seems to lead them to quite different views on
how best to pursue the common interest of sustainable climate. Again, size and
capacity come into play. Respondents from the half-million population city of
Gothenburg seemingly equate the common ecological good of the whole urban
region with sustained economic and social development of the city. In the ter-
minology used here, widening the city’s space of dependence and engagement
is a precondition for developing the response capacity and response space nec-
essary for effective management of the climate change problems in the region
as a whole. Decision makers in the smaller municipalities address the social
dilemma by emphasizing the conflict between the municipality as a collective
arena and the individual actors depending on that arena for sustenance. They
think regulatory instruments may have to be blunted and economic incentives
used more intensely to make local individuals accept climate change measures.
We see those patterns as evidence that there is, so far, no logic of sustainable
common resource use with a clear steering implication for local governments
when they engage in scalar politics over the allocation of responsibility for cli-
mate change actions. In other words, there is, so far, no evidence of scalar pol-
itics leading to wider and deeper system change (Young 2006).
Given these two findings, our third major result is quite interesting in at
least two ways. On one hand, it contributes to the scholarly debate over
whether addressing this need involves organizing new cross-scale arrange-
ments (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005) or whether drawing preexisting bodies into
a context where joint responses to new cross-boundary issues may prove more
efficient (Meadowcroft 2002), for what we find is that local governments’
response to an emergent problem such as climate change may indeed be “path
dependent” by placing responsibility on bodies whose scale has proven ade-
quate in other issue areas. Having first-hand knowledge of the regional scale
association of the GR and its activities, our sample of interviewees—top
politicians and administrators in four member municipalities—show a prefer-
ence for GR as a proper vehicle for addressing common issues related to cli-
mate change. It is important here to note the actual composition of this body.
The GR Association Board consists of chairpersons and members of the
municipal boards in all the 13 municipalities in the Gothenburg area. The GR
furthermore disposes of a budget contributed by the member municipal councils.

distribution.
Both these characteristics are based on a formula taking into account the size
and economic strength of each member municipality (GR 2006). We interpret
this preference for placing responsibility on already existing scalar arrange-
ments for intermunicipal cooperation as evidence that local government actors
fall back on the familiar logic of efficient resource use, since this has proven
its worth in earlier strategic interplays to solve common social dilemmas
through negotiated agreements. Rather than engaging in a costly search for the
new and unknown (Adger, Brown, and Tompkins 2006), they will opt for
“bridging organizations” with an intermediary role between arenas, levels, or
scales (Cash et al. 2006), where their political and economic scale of engage-
ment and dependence is already defined.
On the other hand, such scalar preferences for using preexisting bodies
hitherto directed at socioeconomic growth and development raise questions
about the possibilities of actually reaching ecologically efficient joint
responses to the cross-boundary issue of climate change. This is com-
pounded when there are lingering differences in actors’ views on what the
issue’s character of a social dilemma implies in terms of responses and
where these differences follow closely the size and capacity characteristics
of the individual local governments. This points to the question of the con-
ditions necessary for a logic of sustainable resource use to really take hold
and successfully steer activities on an urban regional scale. As some argue,
this “critically depends on the capacity to adapt [to climate change] and the
distribution of that capacity” (Adger, Arnell, and Tompkins 2005, 85).
From our findings, some issues for further research can be outlined. One
concerns whether urban and suburban actors have the capacity to recognize the
local co-benefits from scalar arrangements that address “multiple concerns
simultaneously” (Kousky and Schneider 2003, 369). To what extent does such
capacity depend on the participating local governments being reasonably equal
in spaces of dependence and engagement (Ostrom 1990)? And how dependent
is it on the dominant player being a forerunner in learning how to achieve sus-
tainable resource use (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004)? Another issue has to do with
problems of “fit” and “vertical interplay”: is the bridging organization’s space
of engagement adequate for the resource problem, and do actors at other scales
adapt their capacity affecting measures to fit that space (Young 2006)?
Notes
1. District heating systems distribute steam or hot water to multiple buildings. District
heating systems are installed in 580 urban areas in Sweden, and Sweden ranked third in
district heat deliveries in Europe in 2003. It is notable that biofuel, waste, and peat amounted

distribution.
to nearly two-thirds of district heating energy requirements in Sweden in 2004. (See further
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/District_heating.)
2. Gothenburg received the second largest grant in the 2003 round of applications and
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) allocations, SEK52 million (US$8.2 million)
amounting to 17% of total state grants allocated. Furthermore, SEPA accepted the city applica-
tion with only marginal adjustments compared to the original sum applied for (SEPA 2003).
Appendix
Interviewees
Gothenburg:
Andréasson, Kia, elected City Councillor, and Environmental Commissioner on
the City Council Board, (representing the Environmental Party, the Greens)
Johansson, Jonas, Director, City Traffic Office
Johansson, Leif, Head of Infrastructure Group at City Office
Ramnerö, Ann-Marie, Head of Planning and Traffic Bureau, City Environmental
Administration
Schöndell, Leif, Deputy Head of City Environmental Administration
Härryda:
Ferm, Christer, Municipal Architect, Head of Planning Unit within the
Infrastructure and Planning Administration
Hildén, Göran, elected Municipal Councillor, at the time Chairman of
Municipal Council Board (representing the People’s Party, the Liberals)
Nordwall, Bengt Anders, Head of Infrastructure and Planning Administration
Samuelsson, Ing-Marie, elected Municipal Councillor, at the time Vice Chairman
of Municipal Council Board (representing the Social Democratic Party)
Österlund, Thomas, Chief Environmental Inspector, Head of Environmental Bureau
Stenungsund:
Falkevi, Bo, Head of Technical Services Administration
Nilsson, Bengt, Municipal Energy Adviser
Pettersson, Bo, elected Municipal Councillor, Chairman of Municipal
Council Board (representing the Social Democratic Party)
Wilke, Lars, Chief Environmental Inspector, Head of Environmental Bureau
Öckerö:
Bryngelsson, Agneta, Building Permit Examiner, Infrastructure and Planning
Administration
(continued)

distribution.
Appendix (continued)
Hultskär, Bo, Head of Infrastructure and Planning Administration

Innala, Malin, Chief Environmental Inspector, Infrastructure and Planning
Administration
Lernhag, Arne, elected Municipal Councillor, Chairman of Municipal
Council Board (representing the Moderate-Conservative Party)
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distribution.
Lennart J. Lundqvist is a professor of environmental policy and administration in the

Department of Political Science at Göteborg University, Sweden. His The Hare and the
Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden came in 1980. He led and coor-
dinated the 2001-2005 research program COPE: Communication, Organization, Policy
Instruments and Efficiency: A Program for Research on Ways of Achieving the Swedish
Objective of “Reduced Climate Impact” at Göteborg University. His Sweden and Ecological
Governance: Straddling the Fence was published by Manchester University Press in 2004.
Chris von Borgstede is a research associate in the Department of Psychology at Göteborg

University, Sweden. Her doctoral dissertation, The Impact of Norms in Social Dilemmas, came
in 2002. From 2002 to 2005, she was deputy coordinator for the COPE Research Program at
Göteborg University.

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Keywords: climate change; social dilemma; scalar politics; response capacity;

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Climate Change: A Social Dilemma

As no other environmental challenge, climate change brings to the fore

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A major assumption underlying our analysis is that when local govern-

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resources to exert influence on the distribution of responsibility. Such

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Response Capacity and

Getting the Local View

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• Climate change = common resource dilemma? Is there a conflict between

Admittedly, the number of interviewees is small. One should, however,

Local Government and Climate Change:

Sweden’s national climate strategy objective of “reduced climate

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waste management, water and sewage, and rescue services. Crucially

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with different and sometimes even contradictory signals concerning the

Local Government Characteristics

While the national constraints and empowerments formally put local

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Gothenburg City 481,400 38,500 43% 36% 20%

Sources: 1. GR (2005b); 2. municipality’s home page; 3. SKL (2004), Table 6.

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Local Views on Climate Change: A Social Dilemma?

We specifically asked the interviewees whether they view a sustainable

With one exception, most respondents acknowledged that the dilemma

The Öckerö chief environmental inspector seemingly turns the chair-

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we get an effect on climate as well!” Apart from pointing to economic stim-

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Space of Dependence: Big Size Brings a Broader Base

In the smaller municipalities, actors’ views on spaces of dependence

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to climate issues. These environmental bureaus have either been placed

Spaces of Engagement: Contextually Caused Cooperation

The answers from the smaller municipalities indicate that engagement in

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district heating as a joint project feeding into further cooperation on several

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public-private cooperation is part of a more general feature in city politics.

My years here have taught me that to work in city government is to cooper-

It is worth noting, however, that this Gothenburg spirit of public-private

These questions [climate, environment, energy] are important. But when

Local Climate Responsibility Presupposes State Resources

Now, do these differences in response space and capacity as well as in

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head of the City Office’s Infrastructure Group said existing jurisdictional

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Respondents from the small island municipality of Öckerö offer some