TOPIC OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER:

IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.

GRN 47517, June 27, 1941
FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of dividends which have been
declared and made payable on shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was
being withheld by the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of
said shares to the exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of defense that the
withholding of plaintiff’s right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain
demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one
Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner, Idonah
Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins and H. Engelhard
be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they
assert thereon. Summons by publication were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah
Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a
crosscomplaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent
Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole
legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question with all
the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.

Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no jurisdiction of the
subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York is res
judicata. Petitioner’s demurrer was overruled, thus this petition.

ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of New York and
which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the respondent, Eugene
Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief
sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be
sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case,
the amended complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication
of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the granting
of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI-
Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner’s crosscomplaint.
Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York and
asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue
execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction
of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.

The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment “annulling the
final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioner’s favor by the courts of
the State of New York, which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject
matter of civil case” and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of
the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in
her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the
rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The
test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether
its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be
reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates
and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.

Petition denied.

IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.

GRN 47517, June 27, 1941
FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of dividends which have been
declared and made payable on shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was
being withheld by the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of
said shares to the exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of defense that the
withholding of plaintiff’s right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain
demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one
Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner, Idonah
Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins and H. Engelhard
be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they
assert thereon. Summons by publication were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah
Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a
crosscomplaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent
Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole
legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question with all
the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.

Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no jurisdiction of the
subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York is res
judicata. Petitioner’s demurrer was overruled, thus this petition.

ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of New York and
which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the respondent, Eugene
Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief
sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be
sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case,
the amended complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication
of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the granting
of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI-
Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner’s crosscomplaint.
Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York and
asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue
execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction
of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment “annulling the
final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioner’s favor by the courts of
the State of New York, which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject
matter of civil case” and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of
the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in
her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the
rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The
test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether
its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be
reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates
and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.

Petition denied.

TOPIC OVER THE PERSON OF DEFENDANT:

G.R. No. L-18164 January 23, 1967

WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE vs. HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER

Facts: Paul Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, filed with the CFI of Rizal a
complaint against herein plaintiff Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial
subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his
alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissu ed original capital stock of said corporation and the
increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages.
As a response, Gemperle filed an action against Schenker on the allegation that the latter had
caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant
and immaterial to said case aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and
credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his" honesty, integrity and reputation" and of
bringing him into public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman.

The action was denied by the court as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, an
instant appeal.

Issue: Whether or not, the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Schenker?

Held: The SC ruled on the affirmative. It was not disputed that Schenker, a citizen of Switzerland
has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although the summons address to
him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in the Philippines. Gemperle maintained
that due to the voluntary appearance of Mr. Schenker, the same is considered a submission to the
court’s jurisdiction. The SC hold that lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant,
through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer
that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case. In other
words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that
she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of
the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.
ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARIA HEDY VELAYO, respondents.

FACTS:

Spouses Raymond and Maria Hedy Velayo filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against
Velayo-Fong. In the complaint, Spouses Velayo alleged that Velayo-Fong was a resident of Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA. Since Velayo-Fong was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, Spouses Velayo-
Fong prayed for a writ to attach Velayo-Fong’s properties found in the Philippines.

However, before the application for the writ can be acted upon by the RTC, Spouses Velayo filed an
Urgent Motion praying that the summons be served to Velayo-Fong at her Two Condominium Suites. One
at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City and another, at Burgos Street, T. Towers Condominium, Makati.
Subsequently, the RTC granted the said motion.

Then, the Process Server indicated on his Officers Return that after several failed attempts to serve the
copy of summons and complaints issued at the given addresses of Velayo-Fong, finally, the Process
Server was able to serve personally the summons together with the copy of the complaint upon Velayo-
Fong, not at her two addresses but at the lobby of a hotel, right in the presence of a lobby counter
personnel but Velayo-Fong refused to sign in receipt thereof.

Later, the RTC in its Order declared Velayo-Fong in default for failure to file an answer. Velayo-Fong,
upon knowing the order of the RTC, filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default claiming that she was
prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against respondents’ complaint
because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officer’s Return, no summons was served
upon her; that she has valid and meritorious defenses to refute respondents’ material allegations.

The RTC denied the Motion and CA affirmed RTCs order.

Now, Velayo-Fong questioned the propriety and validity of the service of summons made upon her as she
did not remember having been served with summons but remembers that a man hurled some papers at
her while she was entering the elevator and, not knowing what the papers were all about, she threw back
the papers to the man before the elevator closed; that she has a valid and meritorious defense to refute
the material allegations of respondents’ complaint.

She also argued that the summons should have been served through extraterritorial service since she is
a non-resident.

ISSUES:

How may service of summons be effected on a non-resident?

RULING:

Under Sec. 17, Rule 14, when the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served extraterritorially. This kind of service of summons applies only where the action
is in rem because in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

Where the action is in personam and when the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done,
however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.

In the present case, Spouses Velayo’s cause of action and their prayer that actual and moral damages,
plus attorney’s fees, be awarded in their favor affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Any judgment
therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Thus, it is an actionin personam. As such,
personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.

NOTES:

The party seeking to have the order of default lifted must first show that her failure to file an answer or
any other responsive pleading was due to fraud accident, mistake, or excusable neglect and then she
must show that she has a valid and meritorious defense.

Macasaet etal vs Co
G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013

Facts: On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in
Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its
Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus
R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages
because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite.
The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 0097907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due course
issued summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business address at
Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A.
Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila. In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina
proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his
efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then
out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at
serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort
to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s return dated September 22,
2005.

Issue: Whether or not jurisdiction over the petitioners have been acquired.

Held: Yes. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or
quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires
jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is
not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of
due process.

The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on the one hand, and an
action in rem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen, thusly:

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in
rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by
these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or
the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose,
through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.
Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a
pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment
against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has
been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such
action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled
that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights
and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in
personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the
property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual
is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability
of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the
particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section
15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because
they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not
essential. In the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant, and
such extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for
the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be
informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the
defendant in an action in personam does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot
try the case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.

As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court
by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.

The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in personam cannot
be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in
the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity
to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not
acquired in a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper
service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with
the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due
process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may
have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to him
the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also waive the process. In other words,
compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it
is of jurisdiction.

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself
whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule
on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the realization of the two fundamental
objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the
summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the
defendant is made through his substitute.

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners
in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the
afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were “always out and
not available” and the other petitioners were “always roving outside and gathering news.” After Medina
learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any
of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that
further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully
warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal
service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted
service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what
was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on
personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already
justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126477. September 11, 1998]

FRENCH OIL MILL MACHINERY CO., INC., petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], CEBU
CITY, BR. 11, and LUDO & LUYM OLEOCHEMICAL CO.), respondents.

RESOLUTION

MARTINEZ, J.:

Private respondent filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against petitioner foreign
corporation and the latters alleged Philippine agent Trans-World Trading Company. The complaint states
in part that:

1.2 Defendant French Oil Mill Machinery (FOMMCO) is a corporation with principal office at, Piqua, Ohio,
United States of America, engaged in business in the Philippines through its agent Trans-World Trading
Company. FOMMCO may be served with summons and other court processes through its agent, Trans-
World Trading Company.

1.3 Defendant Trans-World Trading Company (Trans-World) is the agent of FOMMCO in the Philippines,
with office at Don Pablo Building, 144 Amorsolo St., Makati, Metro Manila, where it may be served with
summons and other court processes.[1]

Summons was served on Trans-World which moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that it is not
petitioners agent. Petitioner itself filed a special appearance with motion to dismiss contending that the
court had no jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. It argued that (a) it is not
doing business in the Philippines and (b) Trans-World is not its agent, therefore the procedure in Sections
14[2] and 17[3], Rule 14 should have been observed. The court a quo initially dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over petitioner[4] but on private respondents motion for reconsideration, said court
reversed the order of dismissal and ruled that summons was properly served on petitioner whom it found
doing business in the Philippines with Trans-World as its agent. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals (CA) via petition for certiorari and prohibition but to no avail. Not satisfied, petitioner filed this
petition under Rule 45 which was initially dismissed for being filed late[5] but on petitioners motion for
reconsideration was reinstated by the Court.[6]

Petitioner contends that it is not doing business in the Philippines and that Trans-World is not its agent,
and thus, the summons served on the latter has no effect on the former. The contention is not
meritorious.

It is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant foreign corporation is doing business.
For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of doing business must first be "established by appropriate
allegations in the complaint"[7] and the court in determining such fact need not go beyond the allegations
therein.[8] In this case, the allegations that petitioner entered into a contract with private respondent to
supply and install various machineries and equipments for the use of the latter's oil mill factory [9] and that
the first shipment of machineries from petitioner was received by private respondent [10] are sufficient
allegations that petitioner is doing business for purposes of Section 14, Rule 14. In any case, the
determination that a foreign corporation is doing business is merely tentative and only to enable the local
court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the foreign corporation through service of summons. It
does not foreclose a subsequent finding to the contrary depending on the evidence.[11]

Having determined the issue of doing business, the Court will now inquire on whether petitioner was
validly served with summons. Under the Rules of Court, if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines, summons may be served on (a) its resident agent designated in accordance
with law; (b) if there is no resident agent, the government official designated by law to that effect, or (c)
any of its officer or agent within the Philippines.[12] Private respondent alleged in its complaint that Trans-
World is petitioners agent, so that the service was made on the latter. Such general allegation is
insufficient to show the agency relationship between petitioner and Trans-World. However, although there
is no requirement to first substantiate the allegation of agency yet it is necessary that there must be
specific allegations in the complaint that establishes the connection between the principal foreign
corporation and its alleged agent with respect to the transaction in question. Nowhere in the case of
Signetics Corporation v. CA,[13] cited by both parties, did the court say that if the complaint alleges that
defendant has an agent in the Philippines, summons can validly be served thereto even without prior
evidence of the truth of such factual allegation. It is only in the headnote of the reporter [14] where the
quoted statement appears. Certainly a portion of the decision was paraphrase to convey that statement
which is never meant nor mentioned in the ponencia and thus, was a misinterpretation of the scope of the
decision. The headnote or syllabi is not the work of the court, nor does it state its decision. It is simply the
work of the reporter, who gives his understanding of the decision, and is prepared for the convenience of
the profession in the examination of the reports.[15] A headnote is not a part of the courts decision.

For purposes of the rules on summons, the determination of principal-agent relationship from the
allegations in the complaint is only preliminary and is not even conclusive as to liability. Nothing bars the
court from later making a different finding after the parties had substantiated their respective allegations
with respect to agency should the same be disputed. As found by both courts below, petitioner treated
Trans-World as its Philippine agent in the assailed transaction.[16] Such factual assessment is binding on
this Court[17] and will not be disturbed as no exceptional circumstances [18] nor cogent reasons[19] were
shown to justify its reversal. For it is well-settled that factual findings of the trial court are respected on
appeal when it is supported by substantial evidence on record[20] and carry more weight when affirmed by
the appellate court,[21] absent any proof that significant facts or circumstances were overlooked or
disregarded which would have varied the outcome of the case.[22]

Finally, petitioner fears that it could no longer contest the jurisdiction of the court once it files an answer
instead of a motion to dismiss, as the filing of the former amounts to voluntary appearance. [23] Suffice it to
say that the filing of an answer per se should not be automatically treated as voluntary appearance by the
defendant for purposes of summons. It should be noted that when the appearance of defendant is
precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it cannot be considered as appearance
in court.[24] The foregoing, however, need not be further discussed in this case as petitioner did not file
any answer.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., (Chairman) on official leave

TOPIC OVER THE RES