 SECTION 1- DUE PROCESS OF LAW

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.

Facts: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions: A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law
clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that
the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES [231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as
a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent
the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado
issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed
an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein
agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision
on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and
directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the
order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the
instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with
the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by
the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing
to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation
of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the
court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending
EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme
court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can
be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos
in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr. G.R. No. 131652 & 131728,287 SCRA 245, March 9, 1998

FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a change of
venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the pendency of such petition, the offended
party executed an affidavit of desistance. The court granted the change of venue. Public respondent Judge
Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted bail.
They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish
new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to
reclusion Perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the
voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.
RULING: YES.
There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed
as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is
remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our
own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance
and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial.”

ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]

Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323,
“Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly
weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also
issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning,
using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant
to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for
the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver,
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a
checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found
the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also
explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a
bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner
and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be
disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution
No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts
mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to
petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running
in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued
to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a
warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the
case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed
in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have
thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent
any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not
have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose
of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that
petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was
himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution
No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner
Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without
prior notice and hearing. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation
of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although
the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to
all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said
order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other The respondent admits that the questioned order
was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not
necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary
in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing. The Supreme Court Said that it
is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving
petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t
scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due
to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National
Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were
members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off.
NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU. The case reached the
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with
NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were
not previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court
must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process
can be complied with by observing the following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
  While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese
General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same
occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the
written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers
to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent
students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued
enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining
order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students
Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of
the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted
and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law
School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of
filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause
of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and
hearing. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule
65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing
the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion
of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not
respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner
University. Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions,
such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
People vs Vera
Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions
for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he
is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place
Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere
in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and
this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the
power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in
pardon.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission”
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature
does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in
reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal
protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class.
Rulings:
1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no
set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and
the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province,
all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in
every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer,
while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation
in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview
of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly
situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the
salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for
the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG [86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]
Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968
and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines
to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within
the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. Hiu
Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction
and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally
to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation. While it is true that the first part
which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and
judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part
which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure. Ordinance no.
6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the
Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to
admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City
Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980

Facts: Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said
position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from
which he has retired.
He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided
therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who was convicted of a
crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides
that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4;
Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.
Issue: 1. Did petitioners have standing 2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Held: 1. No 2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted. Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review, three requisites
are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his disqualification. It was
only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely affected by the
operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality
is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the imminent elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is subject to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification. Young
blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to disqualify him
from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired
employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue
of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as
that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by
a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same
class.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in
question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible
to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been
filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually
placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries
with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence. And
although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet,
there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one
charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. A
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.

PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J. (Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
FACTS: Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of
DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation
of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art
13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to
the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
the Filipino workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.
RULING: “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition
of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make
an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions.
Himagan v People; G.R. No. 113811; 07 Oct 1994; 237 SCRA 538
FACTS: The trial court issued an order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of
Section 47, RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990) which suspends a member of the PNP with complaints for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is 6 years and one day or more from office until the case is terminated.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is a violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
RULING: NO. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned
is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged
with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him
are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does
not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Petition is DISMISSED.
GR No. 189698 Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC
FACTS: The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
BACKGROUND: Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration. The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13
of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding
a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of
candidacy“
ISSUE: Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the constitution.
HELD: The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec
13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
RULING: These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits civil service
officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. The intention to
impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political campaign
is unmistakable. The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated different from the other. The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It
is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions
clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of
the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing
authority.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order
their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No.
1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because
it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing
to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct
injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is
governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The
amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is
no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause
for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate
all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Almonte v. Vasquez
Facts:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief
accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers
from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal
Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB
had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a
concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.

May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget
Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency
Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole
plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all
EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not
to be apprehended.] In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations
written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but
was denied. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the
government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its
plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and
the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."
Issue: Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their equal
protection of laws.
Held: YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the identity of persons
who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets
will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is
the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the
national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances
of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and
that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel
records are relevant to his investigation as the designated “protectors of the people” of the Constitution.
Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all
forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn
statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure
because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known
reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had
occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory
agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand
complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right against
self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records
and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or
custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds for personal
service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the
documents by respondent Ombudsman.
Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)
Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all productions of
centrifuga sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale
to the United States and other foreign countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently
filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.
Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none
other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enacted, the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class
as the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied
upon.
SECTION 2- SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
People vs Marti
G.R. No. 81561; 18 January 1991
FACTS: On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend in Zurich, Switzerland. When asked if the
packages could be examined and inspected, appellant refused, assuring that they were simply gifts of books
cigars, and gloves. The packages were then placed in a box and was sealed with masking tape for shipment.
As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the Bureau of Customs and/or Burueau of Posts,
the proprietor of the forwarding agency opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted therefrom
and he found dried leaves inside. He brought samples to NBI, and informed them that the rest of the shipment
was still in his office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and found the shipment containing bricks of dried
marijuana leaves, some of which were packed inside the gloves and neatly stocked underneath tabacalera cigars.
Thereafter, an information was filed against the appellant in violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which
he was found guilty. Appellant assailed the decision, claiming that the evidence was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and further, that the court erred in admitting in
evidence the illegally searched and seized packages.
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights be invoked
against the State?
HELD: No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State in the absence of governmental interference. This constitutional right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government; and the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals. In the present case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made
search/inspection of the packages and the contraband came into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The NBI agents made no search
and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the alleged act of the private individual in violation of a constitutional
right cannot be invoked against the State.
NB: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it
is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor
of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Reference:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

Stonehill vs Diokno
20 SCRA 383
Facts: Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds
or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is
described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution
and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations,
and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.
Held: No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

MAXIMO SOLIVEN v. RAMON MAKASIAR (D) G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988
FACTS:
 Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The
President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from
suit.
 President Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran
 Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
HELD:
 Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings.
 The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also
demands undivided attention.
 But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as
a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
 Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE [203 SCRA 140; G.R. No. 81756; 21 Oct 1991]

Facts: Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an "application for search
warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal,
then the presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for
violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972. Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe
that Mr. Tama Silva has the possession and control of marijuana dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant
authorizes Sgt. Villamor to make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva at the residence
of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and containers to look for said illegal
drugs. In the course of the search, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of
P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on the sole
basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by searching
questions and answers.
Issue: Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their authority in seizing the
money of Antonieta Silva.
Held: Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of
searching questions and answers. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable by mere yes or no.
Such questions are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The questions were already
mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty
of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her money.
The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of
Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc.
Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void. Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court Examination of the complainant,
record -the judge before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements together with their affidavits.

Esteban Morano V. Hon. Martiniano Vivo, 102 Scra 562 (1967)

Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November 1961 to visit
her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai
both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun,
her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into
the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos.
On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on
September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun
obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962,
the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or
before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and
will cause the confiscation of their bond.
Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant. Under
Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to
the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country; second, she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter
undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act..

Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding
of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an order of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of
investigation or prosecution. It is also held that the requirement of probable cause is not applicable in deportation
proceedings, which are not criminal in nature. The order of deportation is purely administrative, its purpose being
not punishment but the return to his country of the alien who has violated the conditions for the admission to
the local state.

Harvey vs Defensor- Santiago (1988)

[162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 June 1988] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights| Deportation|

FACTS: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72, Dutch Citizen Adrian Van Den Elshout, 58,
and 19 other foreigners residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna were apprehended at their residences. The ―Operation
Report of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation (CID) read that Harvey, Sherman and Van Den
Elshout, et. al. were suspected pedophiles.
Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside
his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been
under his care and living with him.
Seized during their apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown
in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child
prostitutes were also found.
The petitioners were apprehended after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID.
Deportation proceedings were then instituted against and warrants of arrest were issued for violation of the
Immigration Act.
ISSUE: Whether deportation proceedings and warrants of arrest issued are valid.
HELD: Yes. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3
months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The
articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant after a determination
of the existence of a ground for deportation against them.
The state has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper
for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under
the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence
in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly
so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.

ALVAREZ V. CFI G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain
Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging
usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based
on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued
the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized
different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts,
etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW.
Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question
be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that
they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the
latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of
the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in
whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for
the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom
he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that
there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be
based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest
sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to
perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person
taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could
be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was
made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers
are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or
complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any
other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of
the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing
magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is
sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient
facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having
a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based
only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

MATA V. BAYONA G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information
against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal
tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or
from the government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered
that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to
which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”.
The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion
to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating
that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo
T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made
a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when
these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order
having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that
the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as
evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?
HELD:YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by
the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO [234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994]

Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession
and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which
authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s, an
entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s
and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe
the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the
methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

UMIL VS. RAMOS [187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991]

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member)
who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital
was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31
January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22)
years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name
of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]

Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused).
Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. Sucro was
monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt.
Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante.
From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing
in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground.
Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19
sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.

(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v.
Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required
from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and
seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones
conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992]
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with ultraviolet
powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused,
met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for
P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently
organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM
agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no
authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court,
considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.

Held: The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that the
suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a buyer,
since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated accused’ right against
unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly
made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency
and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had
already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then
they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further
notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited
drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant: CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer,
testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and
no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and
thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:

One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:

Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored plastic
labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight
of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having
a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house
of Rodrigueza’s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that
became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic
bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the
existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause
of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted.

Go Vs. Court of Appeals

206 SCRA 138
G.R. No. 101837
February 11, 1992

Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another
vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness
of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police, who
subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the
police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought
against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary
investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant
lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his
petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.

Issue:

Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.

Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest
as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted “continuing
crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest
under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus
they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources.
Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor
any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor,
preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a
substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the
same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation,
trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered
released upon posting a bail bond.
GO VS. CA

FACTS: Petitioner was the primary suspect of killing of Maguan when he was seen by a security officer near the
place where his and the victim’s car almost collided at the corner of a street, after which he went of out of his car
and shot Maguan, which caused his death later on, then went back to his car and left the scene. He was then
arrested days after the crime happened.

ISSUE: WON a lawful warratless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go.

HELD:
We do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms
of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were
not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could
the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in
fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information
upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting
— one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate
number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section
5 of Rule 113.

People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Mengote y. TejasG.R. No. 8759, June 22, 1992
Facts:
a telephone call was by Western Police district that here were three suspicious-looking persons at the
corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of plainclothesmen was
dispatch to the place. They saw two men “looking from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but
were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One
of them, who turned out to be the accused was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is violated
Ruling:
The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be arrested
1 After he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In
the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was apparently
no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote
in their presence.
Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent requirements have not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
– ACQUITTED

MALACAT vs. CA

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched by a group of
policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda with his eyes
moving fast together with other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the group of men, they
scattered in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a
search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner
contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and the seizure of the hand grenade
from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence
since it was admissible because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly
effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to
those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless
arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful
arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may
search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such
a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

Facts: The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the accused was on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip,
they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer
pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos
of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue: Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

Ruling: The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified
unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed. A
vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because
these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. In the
present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days
within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the
information they have received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine on his own authority that a search warrant
was not necessary. The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law enforcement
agents.- ACQUITTED

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

Facts:

Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was
received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus
and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the
inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and
when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing
tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus
accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon
inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.
Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed
by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the
offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with
him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
Facts:
Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm
reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged
buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was
more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged of possession of prohibited
drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense . . . “
Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy
bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of
drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the
buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and
the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.

PAPA VS. MAGO

Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the goods was intercepted
by the BOC, questioned the validity of the search conducted by them since it was made without any search
warrant and whether the BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.
Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?

Held:
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant
case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to
enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and
also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house
may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our
considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and
adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should
suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any
manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should
find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully
brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.
******
FACTS:

- Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would
be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, Upon orders
of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs,
Petitioner Alagao conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at
about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks
and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of
goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal
Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Remedios
Mago, herein respondent, said that she owns the goods seized.
- That she purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga;
- that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at
1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila;
- that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a
competent court;
- that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not
opened and the goods contained therein be not examined;
- that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because
the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs;
- that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure
under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another
person without knowledge that they were imported illegally.

ISSUE:
WON the seizure of the imported goods is validly done by herein petitioners
WON an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant

HELD:
1. YES. The seizure is valid.
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have been
released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings
for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods,
for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession
or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized
the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction
over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular
courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question
after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so,
it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of the said warrant was only an attempt to divest
the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge
did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and
so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967releasing
said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could not seize
the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained.

The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other
movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and
tariff laws.

He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other containers wherever found when he had
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid.

It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect
the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand the
assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said
assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search
and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given
authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo.
2. YES. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the
instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any
person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning
the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said:
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon a warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . .
." It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
An automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity production
and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted
individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a
capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for a successful commission of a crime a disguising means
of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their
police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and
broader than their use in so-called "bootlegging" or "rum running," which is itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on
highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards
against search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate
the commission of a crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape,
burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory,
confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether the search of and seizure from an automobile
upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be
determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is mad
Therefore, the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in
accordance with law and by that seizure, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws.

PEOPLE V MUSA

FACTS: On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2 wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt. Amado Ani in a
buy-bust operation in Zamboanga City. The said buy-bust operation was planned since a civilian informer told
that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day prior to the
said buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to Musa, Musa entered
his house to get the wrappings. Upon his return and with the inspection of the wrappings, Musa was arrested,
but the marked money used as payment cannot be found with him, prompting the NARCOM agents to go inside
his house. There, they could not find the marked money, but they found more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic
bag inside the kitchen. The leaves were confirmed as marijuana by the forensic chemist of the PC crime
laboratory, who later on served as a witness, along with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-bust
operation and Sgt. Ani. The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14 December 1989 wherein
he and his wife, Ahara Musa, served as witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes,
got inside their house since the door was open, and upon entering, declared that they were NARCOM agents and
searched the house, despite demands of the couple for a search warrant. The agents found a red bag whose
contents were unknown to the Musas.
Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court. On appeal, Musa contests that his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He also questioned the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the
admissibility of the seized plastic bag as evidence since it violates his constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.

ISSUES:
1. WON Musa is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
2. WON the seized plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence.

HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes. The testimony given by T/Sgt. Belarga only strengthened the testimony of Sgt. Ani since it was the
testimony of the latter that served as direct evidence, being enough to prove the consummation of the sale of
the prohibited drug, and that their testimonies were not conflicting as well.
2. No. Although the warrantless search done falls under Sec. 12 of Rule 126 and that the search may include
premises or surroundings under the accused’s immediate control, it does not fall under the “Plain View” doctrine.
The agents found the plastic bag inside the kitchen, and upon asking about the contents of the bag, the accused
did not answer, making the agents open the bag and find marijuana leaves. Even if an object is observed in "plain
view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the
object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.

VALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA

FACTS: Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere,
as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents
to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because they were subjected to searches and seizures without
the benefit of a warrant. The petitioners averred that there’s a recent incident happened, where a certain
Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and
for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
ISSUE: WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against illegal search and
seizures.
HELD: NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of
each case.
In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units,"
not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between
the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against
a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner, that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court
to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure.
Hence, petition dismissed.

RULE 113 - ARREST

Section 1. Definition of arrest. – Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense.

Sec. 2. Arrest; how made. – An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission
to the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.

Sec. 3. Duty of arresting officer. – It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused
and deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.

Sec. 4. Execution of warrant. – The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution
shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the
expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who
issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reason therefore.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.

Sec. 6. Time of making arrest. – An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.

Sec. 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant.

– When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of
the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before
the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The
officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person
arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.

Sec. 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. – When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall
inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged
in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees, or forcibly
resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil
the arrest.

Sec. 9. Method of arrest by private person. – When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to
be arrested of the intention to arrest him and the case of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists
before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information
will imperil the arrest.

Sec. 10. Officer may summon assistance. – An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons
as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist
him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself.

Sec. 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. – An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue
of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the
person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his
authority and purpose.

Sec. 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. – Whenever an officer has entered the building or
enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate
himself.

Sec. 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. – If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may
immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines.

Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. – Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the
request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with
such person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable
regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right.

RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Section 1. Search warrant defined. – A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court.

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. – An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending.

Sec. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in
the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with
the affidavits submitted.

Sec. 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. – If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which
must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.

Sec. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a
house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant to liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. – No search of a house,
room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.

Sec. 9. Time of making search. – The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit
asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may
be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.

Sec. 10. Validity of search warrant. – A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it
shall be void.

Sec. 11. Receipt for the property seized. – The officer seizing the property under the warrant must give a detailed
receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made,
or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.

Sec. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. – (a) The officer
must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory
thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been
made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no
return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been
complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants
who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.

Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. – A motion to quash a search
warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where
the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved
by the court that issued search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case
is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

SECTION 3- PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

RAMIREZ V CA G.R. No. 93833

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in
a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation
was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not
be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded
as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
“meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative
body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
“conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to
the Bill.

ZULUETA VS. CA

Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent. Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held: (1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this
has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

NAVARRO VS COURT OF APPEALS 313 SCRA 153

Facts: Reporters Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan and one Mario Ilagan went to the police station to report an
incident in Entertainment City where they were threatened by one Dante Liquin and the security guard. At the
station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then
having drinks outside the headquarters. The accused was challenged by Lingan to a fisticuffs and the former
thereafter hit the victim with the handle of his gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow on Lingan’s
head. Lingan died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic
exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight.

Issue: Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.

Held: The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted sufficient
provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and must immediately precede the act; and
in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly
proportionate in gravity.
The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The
exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no
intent to kill the latter.

Ople vs Torres

FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that:
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
HELD: The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said order. The
broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right to
privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services.
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.

SECTION 4- FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

Facts: In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges against
Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated
the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the
motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits
upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to
the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace
in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio: Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform made
by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when
he wrote, “that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the
people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine
Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion should be the constant source of liberty
and democracy.” It also said “the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of
public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct.
It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of
any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement
of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty,
to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result of this.
Privilged communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the
“unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of malice.
This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty in the matter.
Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it
was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or
in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus
of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice
as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered
libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government
official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity
or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present
a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits
made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution.
Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true
by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal
from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These
respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them
of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of
their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of
the justice of the peace was proper.

PEOPLE VS ALARCON

AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]

Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the
intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a
"docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy
(University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not
approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of
his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.
petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his
family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears
substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that
the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. The projected motion picture was as yet
uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge
knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger"
of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus
relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. At all relevant times, during which the momentous
events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:"
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech
and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.

Borjal Vs CA

Facts : During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the
House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference
on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and
government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More
importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land
transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was
estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as
government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants. 2 On 28
February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected
Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of
the conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on
different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer
of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the
conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the
dates they were published Issue :

Issue : Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel

Held : A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely
privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An
example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report
without any comments or remarks To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based
on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably
be inferred from the facts There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.
A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily
bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The
nature and functions of his position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the
FNCLT in order to generate interest in the conference, and the management and coordination of the various
activities of the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence. These are matters
about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the
conference itself. Generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a
communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff,
private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct

Reyes vs Bagatsing

FACTS: Retired Justice Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought to permit a rally permit from Luneta
Park to front gate of the US Embassy in Manila. Mayor Bagatsing denied the petition. He issued City Ordinance
No. 7295 to prohibit rallying 500 meter radius around the Embassy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor violated the petitioners' constitutional right.

RULING: Yes, the mayor's ordinance which prohibit the petitioners to rally violates their constitutional right to
free speech and peaceable assembly. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets,
there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group.

REYESvsBAGATSING125SCRA553

FACTS: This was a petition for mandamus with writ of preliminary injunction to review the decision of the City of
Mayor of Manila Ramon Bagatsing, denying the application for permit to hold a rally from Luneta to the gates of
the United States Embassy.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of mayor Bagatsing as to denying the application for permit to hold rally was in
accordance to the Veinna Convention?

HELD: NO.The Constitution adopts the generally accepted principle of International law as part of the law of the
land.Veinna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law.It should be a
part of the law of the land.That being a case,If there were clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage
or distribution of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial
of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy.
Petition is GRANTED. The court found that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a
legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech
and peaceble assembly.

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila,
Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police
District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials
believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and
members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"
magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western
Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s
magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary
restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This
was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.
Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic
literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers
of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were
used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any
constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the
ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the
aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown
the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed
of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance
of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear
and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a
case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;

SWS vs Comelec

Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features news- worthy items of information including election surveys Petitioners brought this action for
prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states
that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local
levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last
day of the elections on May 14,2001

Issue : WON §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression,
and the press.

HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of §5.4? The United States
Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is
sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and
press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for
distinguishing content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the
review of such laws." is noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases First.
Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted
governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the
publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the
integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of
opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair
theorists, and other opinion takers Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the
suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to
meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the
creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained
at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing
unlawful acts, rather than speechbecause of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils To
summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.

ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - public meeting at Plaza Miranda - (1) A statute requiring persons using the public streets
for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute
is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in them issuance of licenses, to a
consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse license. (2) In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate
the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting
to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested
is
a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not discretion to transcend it or to confer upon
any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant.
Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)
Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to
hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the
respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and
high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption
of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any
act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the
Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City
of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or
public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the
streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit
the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly
granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of
free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982.
Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and
Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein
stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same
day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by
their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they
should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that
they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity
thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents
and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the
charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this
petition.

Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was
an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.

Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they
speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present
danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is
accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be
aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises,
permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily
or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to
avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be
violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, Et. Al.

petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CSC and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OFEDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions are among several petitions filed with this Court arising from themuch-publicized
public school teachers' mass actions of September/October 1990.
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who weresimultaneously charged,
preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 bythen Secretary Isidro D. Cariño of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).The decision was anchored on the reports that the above-
named teachers participated in the massaction/illegal strike in Sept. 19-21, 1990 and subsequently defied the
return-to-work order datedSeptember 17, 1990 issued by the Department.The decision of dismissal by Secretary
Cariño was affirmed by the CSC, and later by the CA.Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously
erred in affirming the CSC resolutionsfinding them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
when their only"offense" was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition
thegovernment for redress of their grievances.Moreover petitioners insist that the mass actions of
September/October 1990 were not "strikes"as there was no actual disruption of classes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners was invalid as it is against the rightof the said teachers to
peaceably assemble
HELD:
NO. As early as December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of ManilaPublic School
Teachers Association v. Laguio Jr., and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon.Isidro Cariño that the mass actions
of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila publicschool teachers "amounted to a strike in every sense
of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it
was said teachers'sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons to protest and pressurethe
Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the unjustor prejudicial
implementation of the salary standardization law, the non-payment or delay inpayment of various fringe benefits
and allowances, and the imposition of additional teachingloads and longer teaching hours."In Rolando Gan v
.Civil Service Commission
, we denied the claim that the teachers were therebydenied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances

PBM Employees vs PBM

Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed
of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they
decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the
pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the
first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and
No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence
of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present
in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels
for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their
freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, theemployees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival,
utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic
human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of
its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of
their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted
as they believed they were by thepeace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which
the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to
individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the
demonstration against policeofficers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining
and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a potent
means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom
of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised
by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose
of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA [488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed. 26
petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently
dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No.
880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim
that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked
them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their
members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was
scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers
blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly
dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others
only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies
under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence
or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom
of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression
is sought.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the
right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the
CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P.
No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot
put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right,
the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing
evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a
permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly
wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it
contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling
effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public
inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral
regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the
Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place
and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all
rallies.

Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of
petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of
public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers
to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable”
and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent
of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech
is not relevant to the regulation.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down
as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify
abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and
void.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate
compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one
suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality
of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to
peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied
with Section 15 of the law.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION
THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end,
the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and
equal protection of the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to
the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall
be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of
this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers
and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and
regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park,
plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of
the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person or
persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in
the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period
as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of
such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended
activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be
used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal
mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the
date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by
the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial
or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his
permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the
appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal
shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing.
Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to
the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable
length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the
participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue
interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a
public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be
conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the
following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful
activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly
may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the
rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with
the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent
under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred
(100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their
assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their
responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom
of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform
with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their
uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped
with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public
assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.
However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the
attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at
the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of
the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public
assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate,
the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the
public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith
disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he
violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed
by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a
group for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permit where
a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured
that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such
purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished
or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the
mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the
public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public
assembly or on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle,
its horns and loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the
immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years
without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to
thirty days.
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity
of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions
which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings
may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks
within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity
or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

SECTION 5

Aglipay vs Ruiz
Facts of the Case: The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in
the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the
petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member
of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued
already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to
be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

Held: No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage
stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving
the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not
intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing of the
stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great opportunity to give
publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating the design made for
the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the
location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore
the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects
will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San
Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his
successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast
day. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio
Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church
funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the
replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso
as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The
priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2)
Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased
in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship
of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody
so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers
and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of
the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation
of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves
the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions
regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957

Facts:
· American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898
· City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
· American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect
· City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances for
operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and
license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953
· To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license fees
under protest
· American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and
3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
· City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in
question
· Trial Court dismissed the complaint
· American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles

Ruling: NO
· Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any of the
business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayor’s permit and license from the City
Treasurer. American Bible Society’s business is not among those enumerated
· However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation not
mentioned, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00
· Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said
business, trade or occupation.
· 2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to
tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
b. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers
and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal tax.
Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For
purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1)
luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate
license shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same
establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or
highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be
provided by ordinance
· The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that a
retail dealer has to pay per annum
· As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms
provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly
struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the
activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the
pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of
this flat license tax.
· Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly
as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in
this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse
· Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code,Corporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .:
Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal,
or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the
tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed
· The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than
the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit
· Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible Society’s free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from,
sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996]

Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and
on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board
of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128.
The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an
attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the
Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former
Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the
respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free
speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also
filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV
Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No.
19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of
the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is
found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is notconstitutionally protected as a form of religious
exercise and expression.

Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas
and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with
its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board
may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such
criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor
any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war
and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of
religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom
may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever
of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing
of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at
bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly,
unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech
and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such
vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or
expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors."
A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu

GR 95770, 29 December 1995; En Banc Resolution, Kapunan [J]
FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same
issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be
expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in
the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the
Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities
in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by
Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 ,
and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational
Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry
against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection
against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v.
Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system
of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any
religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag
ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt
school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or
non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it
involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger
to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
“external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show
their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage
in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Estrada vs. Escritor,

492 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Facts:
Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested an investigation of
respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a child with the latter while she was still
married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the
judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones
her act.
Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral conduct
for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and Watch Tower Society and her
conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious beliefs. She further alleged that they
executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in accordance with her religion which allows members of
Jehovah’s Witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration
makes the union moral and binding within the congregation throughout the world except in countries where
divorce is allowed.

Issue:
Is Escritor guilty of gross immorality for having an illicit relationship?
Does her religious belief justify such act?

Ruling:
Yes the act was grossly immoral. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government employees engaged
in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she may be held administratively
liable. In these cases, there was not one dissent to the majority's ruling that their conduct was immoral. The
respondents themselves did not foist the defense that their conduct was not immoral, but instead sought to
prove that they did not commit the alleged act or have abated from committing the act.
No, Escritor is not guilty of gross immorality and she cannot be penalized for her freedom of religion justifies her
conjugal arraignment. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early
case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education is instructive on the matter, viz:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the
scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel.

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom, including religious freedom, may
be enjoyed.