NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY

C. PEREZ, respondents.|||
[G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996.]|||

FACTS:
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife
who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986.
After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to
Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.||| Nerissa became a resident alien in February 1992.
Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his
wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. When Nerissa came home a few
days before Ray II's first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. That their love for
each other was fading became apparent from their serious quarrels. Petitioner did not want to live
near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband's meager income of P5,000.00. She longed to be
with her only child but he was being kept away from her by her husband. Thus, she did not want
to leave RJ II (Ray Junior) with her husband and in-laws. She wished for her son to grow up with
his mother. On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent
Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there were enough reasons to deny Nerissa Perez custody over
Ray II even if the child is under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy's father
would be for the child's best interest and welfare.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody over the minor Ray Perez II, should be awarded to the father?
HELD:
No. When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable
law. It provides:
"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." (Emphasis supplied)
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds
its raison d'etre in the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only the most compelling
of reasons shall justify the court's awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his
mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds
have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and
best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child provides: "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
Courts invariably look into all relevant factors presented by the contending parents, such as their
material resources, social and moral situations.

Digested by:

ENRICO S. EULOGIO and NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO, petitioners, vs. PATERNO C.

BELL, SR., ROGELIA CALINGASAN-BELL, PATERNO WILLIAM BELL, JR.,
FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA BELL, PATERNO FERDINAND BELL III, and
PATERNO BENERAÑO BELL IV, respondents.
[G.R. No. 186322. July 8, 2015.]

FACTS:
Respondents, the “Bell siblings”, are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C.
Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell). In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint
for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioners
Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). The Complaint sought the annulment
of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house
and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed. The
RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount
of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum.||
RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents' property covered by the newly
reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54208 was levied on execution. Upon motion
by respondents, the trial court ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the
property was a family home. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the
writ of execution. Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market
value of the property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a
commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million.
The CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution
sale of the subject family home after finding that its present value exceeded the statutory limit. The
basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160, according to the appellate court, is its
actual value at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial
court's order was contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Whether the family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code?
HELD:
No. Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in
Article 153 of the Family Code. It has been said that the family home is a real right that is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the
Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead — the dwelling place. A
houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the
community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family
than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered. The family home
cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are
determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property
or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is
limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are
adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the
peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is
most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be
applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its
owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its
constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or
enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the
family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is
applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed
to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home,
its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum
allowed under Article 157.

Digested by: