SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

College of Law

Persons and Family Relations

CASE DIGESTS

Submitted by:
Class 1H
First Semester A.Y. 2023-2024

Submitted to:
Prof. Joseph Ferdinand M. Dechavez
 MODULE 6:
The Family and Family Home
(Articles 149-162, Family Code)
Contributor: ARAGON, PAULUS MAXIMILIAN D.
Martinez v. Martinez, G.R. No. 162084, June 28, 2005

FACTS:
The Martinez couples owned the land and the house that were built on it. In his last will and testament,
Daniel Sr. instructed that the property be divided into three lots. He subsequently left the three lots—Rodolfo,
Manolo, and Daniel, Jr.—to each of his sons. The estate's administrator was chosen to be Manolo. Rodolfo
discovered a deed of sale that was allegedly signed by his father, according to which the latter sold the property
to Manolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo complained against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila for
the cancellation of the TCT and the annulment of the sale agreement. Rodolfo received a letter from Manolo and
Lucila Martinez ordering him to leave the property. Rodolfo refused to comply and disregarded the letter. The
Martinez spouses took this as cause to accuse Rodolfo of wrongfully detaining. They asserted that they were the
property's proprietors. The Martinez spouses claimed that they had made and/or exercised sincere efforts to reach
a solution, but that these efforts had been ineffective. The parties' fundamental differences prevented them from
coming to an agreeable agreement during the preliminary conference.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case passed
through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made
RULING:
Yes. The Code Commission said that it is difficult to think of a sadder or more tragic scene than litigation
involving family members. It is imperative that every effort be made to reach a compromise before allowing
litigation to sow the seeds of animosity and fervor inside the family. It is also well-known that a lawsuit involving
close family members tends to produce more resentment than one involving strangers.Therefore, it would be
premature to file a complaint against a family member if the complaining party did not first comply with Article
151 of the Family Code.
Contributor: ARGAÑOZA, KRISTER KEITH
Gayon v. Gayon, G.R. No. L-28394, November 26, 1970

FACTS:
Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging
substantially that said spouses executed a deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera a parcel of unregistered land
subject to redemption within five (5) years. It is also alleged that said right of redemption had not been exercised
by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period.
Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale, sold the land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon.
Plaintiff had introduced improvements on the land and paid the taxes therein. Plaintiff now prays that an order be
issued in his favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the property.
Mrs. Gayon alleged that the deed of sale between them and Pedro Gelera is fictitious because the signature
thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff
"did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint. The case was dismissed
on the ground that Silvestre Gayon, as seen in the deed of sale, is the absolute owner of the land and since he is
already dead, his wife, Mrs. Gayon, has nothing to do with the land. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pedro Gayon’s failure to seek a compromise bars the present action
RULING:
NO. Plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our
Civil Code provides: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed
or maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should,
however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be
excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and
plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
Contributor: BARROZO, MARVIN
Manacop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97898, August 11, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife purchased a residential property in 1972. In 1986, a complaint
was filed by E & L Mercantile, Inc. against Manacop for an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of answering,
a compromise agreement was reached, requiring payment of P2,000,000.00. Despite a court-approved agreement
and subsequent execution, Manacop failed to pay, leading to the seizure of personal properties. Manacop claimed
the judgment was not yet executory, citing the agreement's conditions. The court, however, denied this, stating
the debt remained unpaid despite substantial collections. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision, emphasizing
the absence of evidence that Manacop's residence was duly constituted as a family home, exempt from execution.
The Court of Appeals rejected a motion for reconsideration, referencing a precedent that family residences
existing before the Family Code's effectivity are considered family homes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the enforcement of a final and executory decision, as well as the execution of a writ, can
proceed on a family home established under the provisions of the Family Code, despite these legal actions
occurring before the Family Code came into effect, is a matter of consideration.
RULING:
The Court held in the affirmative. The Supreme Court ruled that, with the enactment of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988, the property in question became the petitioner's family home through the simplified process
outlined in Article 153 of the code. However, the Modequillo v. Breva case explicitly clarified that this provision
of the Family Code does not apply retroactively. Consequently, before August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated
by the Civil Code needed to be followed to establish a family home. As there is no evidence that the property
underwent judicial or extrajudicial constitution as a family home, the petitioner cannot benefit from the protective
provisions of the law.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article
153 of the Family Code. It was deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication.
Contributor: BEDANA, VIOLETARE KLINE ALESSA T.
Taneo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999
FACTS:
In the case at bar is the recovery of property deemed in favor of the private respondent. Wherein, two
properties of the petitioner were levied for the satisfaction of the judgement amounting to P5,000. The first
property is a parcel of land located in Bario Igpit, Municipal of Opol in Misamis Oriental with 5 hectares and the
second property is the family home also in the same location. To prevent the properties from being levied, the
petitioners then filed a case to declare the deed of conveyance null and void and quiet title over the land with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In the content of their complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the
children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valacera both of which have passed away. Petitioners further said
that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the lands. However, on February 9, 1968, the
Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose Yasay have issued a Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance favoring the respondents over
the subject properties, which include the petitioners’ family home as petitioners said that this was extrajudicially
constituted in accordance with the law. Due to the illegal deed of conveyance, the respondent was able to obtain
Tax Declaration over the land which gives confusion to the title and ownership of the properties.
In the decision of RTC on March 27, 1989, the complaint was dismissed. Whilst on the appeal, CA have
affirmed RTC’s decision in toto.
ISSUE:
WON the Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance was valid including the petitioners’ family home?
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. Citing Article 153 of the Family Code states that Family Home is deemed
constituted once the house and lot is made as a residence of a family, as a family. Such property cannot be seized
by creditors in the exception for special cases. However, in the case at bar, the application law is the Civil Code
where it states that registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Thus, make it clear that some
family homes are exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
On March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo established the house in question which was erected on the land of
Plutarco Vacalares as their family home. The family home was then registered on January 24, 1966 but the money
judgement against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 196. Meaning, that at the time of the debt was
rendered, the said family home was not yet registered or even constituted. The allegations of the petitioners did
not suffice as their father in not exempted for the liability citing the Article 243 par. 2.
The decision is denied due to lack of merit.
Contributor: BEN, CELINA M.
Modequillo v Breva, G. R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
1. Jose Modequillo owned a parcel of residential land in Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur. There, his family
home was built since 1969.
2. On March 16, 1976, he and one other were involved in a vehicular accident. The Court of Appeals rendered
its decision on said case on January 29, 1988, whereby Jose and his companion were ordered to jointly
pay the victims of said accident for damages.
3. To satisfy the judgment, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court; Jose’s residential land in
Poblacion Malalag, and a parcel of agricultural land registered upon his name was levied upon.
4. Jose now opposes this levy on grounds that his residential house was exempt from such execution, forced
sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities listed in Article
155 of the same code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Modequillo’s family home may be levied upon for the satisfaction of damages owed.
RULING:
YES. Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is a dwelling where a family
resides and it is deemed as such from the time it is occupied as a family residence. In relation, Article 155 of the
Family Code states that the family home will be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except on
instances listed in said provision. The exemption provided is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family homes and lasts so long as any of the family’s beneficiaries actually resides there.
In the case at bar, Jose contends that his residential home should be considered as a family home from the
time it was occupied by him and his family in 1969. However, while Article 162 of the Family Code provides
that the provisions of its chapter shall also govern family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable it
does not mean that Article 152 and 153 have retroactive effect. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes.
Jose and his family occupied their family home on March 16, 1976, and the decision that caused the
levying of said home was rendered on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. Thus, they do not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
Petition dismissed.
Contributor: BERNARDEZ, JASPER CLARENCE A.

Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006

FACTS:
Marcelino Dario died intestate, survived by his wife Perla Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc
Dario and Marcelino G. Dario III. The disputed property was the family home in Cubao, Quezon City. After an
extrajudicial settlement, Marcelino Marc Sought to Partition the Property. The RTC ordered Partition, but the
Court of Appeals later Reversed, stating that the family home should continue as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, citing Art. 154 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the minor grandson can be considered a beneficiary under Art. 154 of the Family Code?
RULING:
NO.
Article 154 of the Family Code provides three requisites for a minor to be a beneficiary: (a) the specified
relationship, (b)
Residence in the family home, and (c) dependence on the head of the family for legal support.
In the case at bar, the grandson meets the first two requisites but fails the third as he is dependent on
support from his father, not his paternal grandmother.
Therefore, The minor grandson cannot be considered a beneficiary under Art. 154.
Contributor: BIBAR, DANE ANTHONY C.

Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015

FACTS:
Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno Beneraño
IV (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-
Bell (Spouses Bell). Sometime later, the Bell siblings filed a Complaint for Annulment of documents,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioners Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the
Eulogios) at RTC Batangas City. The Complaint was sought for the annulment of the contract of sale which was
executed by Spouses Bell over their 329 square meters residential house and cancellation of the title obtained by
petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The respondents’ prayers were granted by the RTC, however, they declared that Spouses Bell is liable to
petitioners in the amount of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum. Both petitioners and respondents appealed
to the CA but the RTC’s decision was affirmed in toto. Subsequently, Spouses Bell brought the case to the Court
to question their liability to petitioners, but the Court dismissed the said Petition for failure to show any reversible
error committed by the lower court.
In 2004, the RTC issued a writ of execution for the subject property. Still, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration invoking Art. 160 of the Family Code and stated that the current market value of the property
exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial area, and that Spouses
Bell had sold it to them for P1 million.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents’ family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
RULING:
No. The family home may not be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code. To warrant the
execution sale of the respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1)
there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property
introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased
actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157. During the execution proceedings, none of those
facts that were alleged was proven by petitioners.
The Court also held that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of
the homestead which is also the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy,
industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall
a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered. Thus, the family home
cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
Contributor: BIGORNIA, ANGELO MARI A.

Favis v. Favis G.R. No. 18592 January 15, 2014

FACTS:
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he had seven
children. Capitolina died in March 1994, after some time Dr. Favis married a woman named Juana Gonzales
(Juanna) who was the common-law wife of Dr. Favis at that time. Dr. Favis and Juanna had one child, Mariano
G. Favis (Mariano), Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children.
Mariano then got married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), they had four children.
Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior to his death, he allegedly executed
a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the
said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for
annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC
against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued
with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation.
The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners’ nullification case. The CA motu proprio
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely and seriously erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exert earnest
efforts towards a compromise.
Whether Art. 151 of the Family Code is enough to dismiss the nullification of the deed of donation
executed by Dr. Favis in favor of his grandchildren with Juana?

RULING:
YES. CA committed an error in dismissing the complaint. A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at
a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect
in the statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners
was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the
petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention
having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition preced ent was filed in the trial court; neither was such
failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable
to the respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to
petitioners’ complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a
compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the
dismissal of petitioners complaint.
The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to rely
only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's
factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it
reversed.
 MODULE 7:
Paternity and Filiation
(Articles 163-182, Family Code)
Contributor: BOLIVAR, URIEL G.

De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, GI.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus were married on August 23, 1964. During their marriage petitioners
Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie Christine de Jesus was born.
In a notarized document, Juan Dizon acknowledges the petitioners as his illegitimate children by Carolina
de Jesus. On March 12, 1992, Juan Dizon died leaving behind considerable assets of shares of stocks in different
corporations and real properties. It was because of the notarized document that the petitioners filed a complaint
in the Regional Trial Court Branch 88 of Quezon City for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the estate
of Juan Dizon.
The respondents in this case are the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan Dizon including the
corporations which Juan Dizon is a stockholder. The respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case arguing that
the complaint nevertheless call to alter the status of the petitioners from being legitimate children of spouses
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to be illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and the deceased Juan
Dizon.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioners are illegitimate children of deceased Juan Dizon
and are entitled to inherit assets which he left behind.
RULING:
The supreme court denied the petition.
On its decision, the supreme court cited Articles 175, 172 and 166 of the Family Code. Articles 175 and
172 discussed the filiation of illegitimate children. Article 175 discussed the filiation establishment of illegitimate
children in the same way as to legitimate children provided in Article 172. The article provides that legitimate
children is established through a.) the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgement or b.) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
Upon scrutiny of the record, it shows that the petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents,
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus. The live birth record also shows that the petitioner’s father is also Danilo
de Jesus. The supreme court also noted that there is no other stronger presumption of the law than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate children unless there is a proof that there is a physical impossibility
of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child such as physical incapacity of the husband to have a sexual intercourse with his wife, the husband and
the wife were separated where sexual intercourse is impossible and serious illness of the husband which absolutely
prevented sexual intercourse. This provision is set in Article 166 of the Family Code. The supreme court also
noted that upon the expiration of the periods in Article 170 and Article 171 of the same code, an action to impugn
the legitimacy of the child would not be legally feasible and the status will be fixed and unassailable. The high
court also added that our law establishes the legitimacy of children conceived during the marriage of the parents
and it is only the father of the child that can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
Contributor: BRAGA, ANGELICA JOIE N.
Social Security System v Aguas. G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006

FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December 8, 1996.
Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996.
Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on
October 29, 1991.
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned
the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been
dependent for support. Additionally, Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but the latter had several children
with a certain Romeo dela Peña. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original
birth certificate of one Jefren H. dela Peña, showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna
Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña. According to Leticia, Janet was also not the real child of Pablo and
Rosanna; she was just taken in by the spouses because for a long time they could not have children; however,
there were no legal papers on Janet’s adoption.
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September 1997.
It also conducted an investigation to verify Leticia’s allegations.
In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by
her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father.
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that she had
contracted marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the
SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there was more compelling evidence
that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child.
ISSUE:
Whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
RULING:
No. The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently established
her right to a monthly pension. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears
the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that
she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4,
1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn
was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however,
can not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. The Court cannot give Janet’s birth
certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. There
was no confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the certificate.
Furthermore, under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are
considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot
consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the
legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any
proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already
living separately.
Contributor: BRIONES, STEFFI L.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989 and lived with Ma. Theresa’s parents in
Fairview, Quezon City. On December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to their son, Jose Gerardo.
On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy, alleging that on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, that this marriage
was never annulled, that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Ma. Theresa did
not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old, but averred that the marriage was a sham and that she
never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married
Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous, hence declaring Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights. Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the trial court’s decision, arguing that there was
nothing in the law granting him visitation rights, and that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from
Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s
surname. Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of ‘Concepcion’ as
Jose Gerardo’s surname.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Gerardo can impugn the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo by invoking Article 166 (1)(b) of the
Family Code
2. Whether or not Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Ma. Theresa
3. Whether or not Jose Gerardo’s surname should remain to be Concepcion
4. Whether or not Gerardo is entitled to visitation rights to Jose Gerardo

RULING:
(1) NO. The Court ruled that he cannot invoke Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, as he has no standing
to do so. Upon declaration of his marriage to Ma. Theresa as void from the very beginning, he never became her
husband and has never acquired the right to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. Only Mario Gopiao, as her
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs, may question this. Further, to invoke said Article, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary. The presumption of legitimacy is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses
must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. In the present case, Mario and Ma. Theresa living 4 km
apart in Quezon City does not disprove personal access between them, hence not physically impossible for them
to engage in marital act.
(2) YES. The Court ruled that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of
the Family Code was clear in saying that “A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate.” Article 167 of the Family Code also provides “The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.”
(3) NO. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario
and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A person’s surname
or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo
cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
(4) NO. In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the
natural right of both parent and child to each other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship
between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Contributor: CAGURANGAN, DIANA MARIE
Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007
FACTS:
A complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong before the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City. Jinky was already married to a foreign national named Hasegawa Katsuo,
who was residing abroad and only visited the country once a year when she and Rogelio got acquainted. They
cohabited and lived together, which produced a daughter named Joanne. However, Rogelio abandoned them,
stopped supporting the minor, and falsely alleged that he was not the father of the child. The RTC ruled that
Joanne was the illegitimate child of Rogelio, given Joanne’s subsisting marriage, and ordered Rogelio to pay
support in favor of Joanne until she reached the age of majority. Rogelio filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
but died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. Subsequently, the CA
ordered the case to be remanded to the RTC for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements
for DNA analysis to determine the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for DNA analysis
despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.
RULING:
NO. The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an
appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing. And even the death of Rogelio
cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of
the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to (People v. Umaniyo,
citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 424 SCRA 277). Hence, the petition was dismissed, upholding the
Court of Appeals’ ruling.
Contributor: CANON, JAZMINE B.
Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
FACTS:
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties
especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989.
He died intestate. The appeal was disagreed by the petitioner Badua on the CA’s decision because she contends
that she is the sole heir of Benitez since she may not be affiliated by blood with the deceased but rather legally
adopted. This was filed in the Supreme Court because upon the death of the spouses, the property was favored to
the Respondents.
Petitioner contends that she has sufficient evidence such as the following: 1.) Certificate of Birth; 2.)
Baptismal Certificate; 3.) ITR and information sheet membership with GSIS named under the petitioner; 4.)
School Records proving that the deceased/s supported her for education as recorded that they were her parents
The Respondent, however, contends that the deceased wife was brought at the OB-GYNE for treatment
since it cannot conceive a child and is physically incapable to do so. There was also a compliance with proper
procedures of the Extra- Judicial Settlement of Estate through the Statute of frauds by notarizing the document
that the Sister of the husband Benitez and the nephew are absolutely their legal heirs
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a legitimate child?
RULING:
NO. Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article
166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child. As regards the Birth Certificate which lists
Marissa as the child of Isabel and Vicente, the court said that it is highly questionable and suspicious. Under
Article 410 of the New Civil Code, it states that, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the f acts therein stated."
The totality of contrary evidence presented by the sister and nephew of Vicente show that Isabel did not become
pregnant as testified to by the witnesses. Also the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Isabel Chipongian executed by Vicente himself and by Isabel’s brother, stated that they are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of Marissa where it appeared that Vicente was Marissa’s father.
Therefore, Marissa’s petition before the Supreme Court was dismissed.
Contributor: CARDINEZ, HANNA CRISTELLE R.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
FACTS:
Plaintiff Karen Santos claims to be the only child of the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo, filed a
complaint for annulment of the document 'Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman' and recovery of possession against
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, who are the brothers of her father Rufino. After learning that the brothers
executed the document, and adjudicating themselves that they are the sole heirs of Rufino and Caridad Geronimo
to the said one-half piece of land.
The defendants denied Karen's allegation, and they said that Karen was an adopted child, and that they
claimed that her birth certificate has questionable alterations. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent Karen
Santos. The trial court ruled that the filiation has already been established, and the continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the respondent Karen Santos' filiation is duly recognized by the law?
RULING:
NO.
In the basis wherein both courts declared a quo, that the respondent was a legitimate child and the sole
heir of the deceased spouses Geronimo, based on the misinterpretation of the presented facts.
It was indeed that Karen Santos is the legitimate child of the spouses Geronimo, given the fact that she
enjoyed the privilege of bearing the surname 'Geronimo' next to her name, and all of the continuous possessions
of the status of a legitimate child. However, the appellate court ruled that the irregularities presented in her birth
certificate, consisting of the entries of the date of birth, and the name of the informant which made the document
questionable, were further confirmed by an NSO representative. Even the respondent didn't even bother herself
to explain the irregularities in her birth certificate.
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents, is not a
valid adoption and it does not grant the child the status of an adopted child and the child's legal rights. Moreover,
it is already fixed that the record of birth is just a prima facie evidence of the facts. It is not even a conclusive
evidence of truthfulness out of the statements made by the interested parties.
Contributor: CASAUAY, WILBERT RYAN F.
Salas v. Matusalem, G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent (Matusalem) claimed that petitioner (Salas) is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who
was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24
years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her,
petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent
further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and t heir
child. Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well
as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son, Christian Paulo, is the
illegitimate child of the petitioner
RULING:
NO. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children. Hence, pursuant to Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of
illegitimate children may be established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. And in the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
In this case, none of the required evidences in establishing filiation were present. The certificate of live
birth is not a competent evidence of paternity because there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by
the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Moreover, Baptismal
Certificates can only serve as evidence of administration of the sacraments and not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
As to the rest of documentary evidence, which consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and
photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit as well as the testimonies of the
respondent and Murillo, are likewise incompetent to prove Salas as the father of Christian Paulo.
Contributor: CASIO, CHRISTIAN JOSHUA G.
Babiera v. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
FACTS:
• Petitioner Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the
birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and
contained false entries.
• Respondent Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed thereinher
certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
• The petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of Hermogena and
Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family
Code; and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the Family
Code.The trial court ruled in favour of Presentacion.
ISSUE:
WON Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171
RULING:
NO. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to instances which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife’s child.
The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista’s
filiations to Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
The reason why Presentacion took interest on Teofista’s status is to protect the former’s successional
rights.Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista’s Birth Certificate, it does not
impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was allegedly
declared void ab initio.
Contributor: CESISTA, FRENCES ROSE L.
Agustin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005

FACTS:
Arnel and Fe entered into an intimate relationship. When Fe got pregnant, Arnel insisted to abort the
conceived child, nevertheless Fe continued to bear the child and eventually gave birth to Martin. Martin’s birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. The prenatal and hospital expenses were shouldered by
Arnel but he refused to the repeated requests of Fe for Martin’s support despite Arnel’s adequate financial capacity
and even suggested having the child committed for adoption. He subsequently denied Martin as his son. Fe and
Martin then filed for support and support pendente lite from Arnel.
Arnel, Fe, and Martin were ordered to undergo DNA paternity testing for the identification of the child’s
filiation. Arnel contended that the said order violates his constitutional right against self -incrimination and right
to privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating Arnel’s
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. [YES]
RULING:
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. It was when new kinds of scientific techniques, including
DNA typing, were introduced.
In the Philippines, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Applying Daubert to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing
and utilizing STR analysis is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of
human genetics and molecular biology.
The Court upholds the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results
thereof as evidence. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Contributor: CHING, RAMONA JAZMINE R.
Angeles v. Angeles, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005

FACTS:
This case involves a legal battle between two parties regarding the administration of an intestate estate,
with the petitioner contesting the legitimacy of the respondent's claim as the legitimate child of the deceased.
Respondent Aleli "Corazon" Angeles-Maglaya filed a petition seeking administration of Francisco
Angeles' estate. She claimed to be the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado and requested
appointment as the estate's administrator.
On the contrary, the petitioner, Belen Sagad Angeles claiming to be Francisco's legal spouse, and sought
her appointment as the estate's administrator instead.
The petitioner Belen argued that her marriage to Francisco was legitimate, supported by their marriage
contract and subsequent religious rites. She also disputed the legitimacy of the respondent, questioning the
authenticity of documents proving her filiation with Francisco.
In response, the respondent provided evidence, including witnesses and documents like her birth
certificate, wedding pictures, marriage contract, and educational and employment records. She asserted her
legitimacy as Francisco's child, emphasizing her continuous possession of this status throughout her life.
As the trial proceeded, the petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss," asserting that the respondent failed to
establish her filiation with Francisco, hence lacking a legal basis for the petition for administration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva
Mercado precluding her to become the administrator of the deceased Francisco Angeles’s Estate?
RULING:
No. The supreme court did not agree with the Court of Appeal’s decision regarding the respondent's
legitimacy. Legitimacy is established through a valid and legal marriage between the parents. Without this lawful
union, there is no legitimate connection between parents and child, as emphasized in Article 164 of the Family
Code, stating that children born during the marriage are considered legitimate.
The Court of Appeals' decision relied on the presumption of legitimacy, claiming that since the petitioner
didn't present contradictory evidence, the presumption regarding the respondent's legitimacy remains
unchallenged.
However, it's crucial to understand that this presumption of legitimacy can only apply if the child is born
within a legal marriage. It's not automatic and requires convincing evidence that the child's parents were lawfully
married and the child was conceived or born during that marriage. Without this proof, the presumption of
legitimacy does not stand.
In essence, while legal presumptions can serve as initial evidence, the presumption of legitimacy can only
hold if there's substantial proof of the parents' legal marriage and the child's birth during that union. Otherwise,
the presumption doesn't apply.
HENCE, Regarding the appointment of an administrator for the deceased's estate, the law favors the
surviving spouse over other relatives. When the law refers to the "next of kin," it means those entitled to the
decedent's property as heirs. Consequently, in deciding the appointment of an administrator, the court needs to
determine the issue of filiation. Handling this issue separately would only lead to more legal actions. Therefore,
the trial court acted appropriately in examining the claimed relationship between the respondent and the late
Francisco Angeles.
Contributor: CO, KATE VIATRIZE B.
Ilano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994

FACTS:
In May 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, who is the niece of Leoncia, resided with Leoncia and the petitioner.
On December 30, 1963, when Leoncia began experiencing labor pains, Ruth accompanied her aunt. The petitioner
arrived later in the afternoon, after five o'clock. When the nurse inquired about the child, Leoncia was still
unconscious, so the nurse sought information from Artemio Ilano (the petitioner). Since it was already past seven
o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning to obtain the petitioner's signature.
However, the petitioner instructed them to give the birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he would be
leaving early the next morning.
During the period when the petitioner and Leoncia were living together as a couple, the petitioner
displayed concern for Merciditas as her father. When Merciditas was in Grade I at St. Joseph Parochial School,
the petitioner signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Furthermore, when
the petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he presented Leoncia with a picture of himself
with a dedication that read, "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong."
Upon evaluating the contradictory testimonies and evidence presented by both parties, the trial court was
not entirely convinced that the petitioner is the father of Merciditas. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision and declared the respondent as the duly acknowledged and recognized
illegitimate child of the defendant.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in declaring respondent as the duly acknowledge and recognized illegitimate child of
defendant?
RULING:
NO. It is not sufficient for the birth certificate to constitute a voluntary recognition by the father. Even if
the father signs under the caption "parent" on the report card, it is considered an equivocal act and does not meet
the requirements. Merciditas has never been to the petitioner's family home in Imus, Cavite, introduced to his
family, or treated as his child in public. However, the private respondent's evidence establishing her filiation with
the petitioner and his paternity is overwhelmingly strong, while the testimony of Melencio is highly improbable
and flawed, and the petitioner's denials are weak. It was an error for the trial court to not consider this evidence
as sufficient to establish that the plaintiff had continuous possession of the status of a child, especially considering
the denial of paternity by the appellee and the lack of clear and sufficient evidence of support given to the
plaintiff's mother.
The last paragraph of Article 283 provides a broad provision that covers all the other cases mentioned in
the preceding paragraphs. It states that "any other evidence or proof" of the defendant being the father is sufficient,
rendering the other paragraphs of this article unnecessary. Even if the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not enough to meet the requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough
under the last paragraph. This paragraph allows for hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of
Court, regarding illegitimate filiation. Therefore, as a necessary result of finding that the private respondent is the
illegitimate child of the petitioner, she is entitled to support.
Contributor: COLLANTES, IAN MIGUEL P.
Herrera y. Alba. G.R.No 148220. June 15. 2005

FACTS:
On May 14, 1998, respondent Rosendo Alba was represented by his Mother Armi Alba , filed before the
trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner , Rosendo Herrera. On
August 7, 1998 Rosendo Herrera filed a counter claim where he denied that he is the biological father of Rosendo
Alba. He also denied physical contact with Armi Alba.
Rosendo Alba filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D., an Associate Professor
at De La Salle University teaching Cell Biology, who described DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test
had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Rosendo Herrera opposed the DNA paternity testing and contended that is has not gained acceptability.
He further argued that the DNA paternity testing violates his right against self -incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation
RULING:
Yes. The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation
of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his
or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern
science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules,
and jurisprudence.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person's entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human
cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person's DNA profile
can determine his identity.
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self -incrimination. This
privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress. The Supreme Court has
ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be
material.
Contributor: COLORGE, JOHN DAVE C.
People v. Malapo, G.R. No. 123115, August 25, 1998

FACTS:
Amalia Trinidad is a retardate and a former ward of the Elsie Gaches Village institution. She was under
the care of her aunt, Nenita No.
First week of September 1991, Amalia was left alone in their house at Salvacion, Iriga City. Nenita went
home and saw the accused, Nixon Malapo, in her yard and in a hurry. Nenita went inside the house and saw
Amalia crying but wouldn’t say anything.
On May 18, 1992, Amalia told Nenita’s cousin, Bernardita Marquinez, that she was raped by Nixon
Malapo, their neighbor and a married man. Amalia recounted that at around 9:30 in the morning in September
1991, while she was cooking, Malapo entered the house and upon seeing him she tried to run away. Malapo
caught her and caused her to fall on the floor, covered her mouth, and forcibly removed her pants and
undergarment. Malapo then proceeded to rape her. Amalia tried to punch him and remove his hand, but Malapo
was too strong. Afterwards, Malapo threatened her that he would kill her if she reported the incident to anyone.
This resulted in Amalia getting pregnant.
On the same day of May 18, 1992, Amalia gave birth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nixon Malapo is the father of the baby delivered by Amalia Trinidad on May 18, 1992.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 166 (1) of the Family code, the legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
grounds of physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120
days of 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the child. In the case at bar, the court inferred that the
conception took place within 120 days in September 1991, which is also within the 300 days immediately
preceding the birth of the child. The testimonies of Amalia and the witnesses proved that Malapo committed the
crime around the same days when the conception of the baby took place. In order to overcome the presumption
that his crime resulted in the conception of the baby, Malapo can provide proof that it was physically impossible
for him to have sexual intercourse with Amalia due to his physical incapacity or serious illness, which absolutely
prevented sexual intercourse. Malapo failed to present these. Thus, the court ruled that Malapo is the father of the
child.
Contributor: COROTAN, VINCE ELYZON D.
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24. 1991

FACTS:
On August 12, 1981, a complaint was filed by the private respondent, Teopista Toring Tufiacao, alleging
that she was born August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza,
married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by
treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child; but was later
denied by Casimiro Mendoza who was then already 91 years old. Teopista then testified that it was her mother
who told her that her father was Casimiro to which she often referred as “Papa Miroy” and used to visit him at
his house. She married Valentin Tufiacao, in which Casimiro bought a passenger truck for his livelihood and
when it was sold, the proceeds of the sale were given to her and her husband. Subsequently, Casimiro allowed
the son of Teopista, Lolito, to build a house in his lot and gave Teopista money to purchase her own lot from her
brother, Vicente Toring. Casimiro also opened a joint savings account with Teopista as a co-depositor in a bank.
Lolito, considered Casimiro as his grandfather because Teopista said so and that he would often give him money
when they met as well as allowed him to build a house in his lot. Two witnesses named Gaudencio Mendoza and
Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro, testified that Teopista was the child of Casimiro. Gaudencio was a co-
worker of Brigida Toring and said that she became pregnant in 1930 and gave birth to Teopista; while Isaac
testified that his father and grandmother told him that Casimiro was the father of Teopista, and both witnesses
delivered money to Brigida from Casimiro. Teopista’s brother Vicente, countered her claim regarding her status
as an illegitimate child.
ISSUE:
Whether Teopista Toring Tufiacao is to be considered as an illegitimate child of the late Casimiro
Mendoza.
RULING:
YES, The Court ruled in the affirmative, Teopista Toring Tufiacao is an illegitimate child of the late
Casimiro Mendoza. Although the jurisprudential requirements under the Civil Code and the Family Code
pertaining the “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," were not met by Teopista;
an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is
her father," according to the Family Code. Under the Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, or the “Act or
declarations about pedigree”, the following are requisites that must be complied before such may be admitted in
evidence namely: 1) The declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2) The pedigree must be in issue; 3) The declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue; 4) The declaration must be made before the controversy
arose, and 5) The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown
by evidence other than such declaration. All the requisites are present in the case. The persons who made the
declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations
referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved. The
declarations were made before Teopista filed the complaint or the controversy arose between her and Casimiro.
Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro is evident him being mentioned as one of the heirs
of the estate of his father. The acts of Casimiro such as the financial doles to Brigida and Teopista as well as
monetary gifts and various proprietary benefits given to Teopista, and her family made the Court to reasonably
conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and therefore entitled to all the rights
appurtenant to such status.
Contributor: CRUZ, RAZIEL EUNICE Q.
Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10)
years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965
up to the time of William's untimely demise. They lived together in the company of Corazon's two (2) children,
Enrique and Bernadette from her subsisting marriage, wherein both are surnamed Yulo. Corazon gave birth to
William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William
Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital
expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
During the occasion of William Liyao's last birthday, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his
son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter's
direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs.
However, after William Liyao's death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his
tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills
ISSUE:
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?
RULING:
NO. Because only the husband or his heirs in exceptional circumstances, can challenge the legitimacy of
a child; and it is already beyond the prescribed period to challenge the child’s legitimacy.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate (art 164). The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. It was physically impossible for Corazon Garcia to have sexual relations
with Ramon Yulo because they had been living separately for ten (10) years when petitioner was conceived and
born.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases,
his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule, and he should
be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of
the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour. On the other hand,
if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption.
It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to
maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. there is
no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.
Contributor: CURAMENG, SHAIRENE D.
Verceles v. Posada, G.R. No. 159785, April 27, 2007
FACTS:
Maria Clarissa Posada met Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of barrio Pandan, Catanduanes. He then offered
Clarissa a job. Clarissa thus, accepted petitioner's offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor's office
starting.
On orders of Teofisto, she went to follow up funds for barangay projects. The same day, she went to a
hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. He led her upstairs
because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor.
However, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife, he claimed he could appoint her as a municipal
development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances, but she kept the incident to herself. When she missed
her menstruation, she wrote him she was pregnant. She then gave birth to Verna Aiza Posada.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite. In his Memorandum,
petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity and filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has not been duly established or
proved in the proceedings; that the award for damages and attorney's fees has no basis; and that the issue of
filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a collateral action. Petitioner argues he never signed the birth
certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as father. He further contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not
admissions of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant Verceles was the father of the child.
RULING:
YES; Recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing is a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
The letters of petitioner are declarations that he sired Verna Aiza. We also note that in his Memorandum,
petitioner admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them, and his giving her money
during her pregnancy.
Articles 172 and 175 of the FC are applied in this case.
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza's filiation under
Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters,
pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner's
illegitimate child.
Petitioner is liable to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth.
Contributor: DABBAY, JENINA MAE H.
Ara v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017

FACTS:
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners) as well as Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and Henry A. Rossi
(respondents) all asserted their lineage as children of the late Josefa A. Ara, who passed away on November 18,
2002. The petitioners claim that Fely S. Pizarro was born to Josefa and her then husband, Vicente Salgado, who
died during World War II. Josefa was said to have met and lived with an American soldier named Darwin Gray
towards the end of the war, from which Romeo F. Ara was born. Subsequently, Josefa had a relationship with
Alfredo Garcia, resulting in the birth of sons Ramon Garcia and William A. Garcia. After Alfredo's passing,
Josefa reportedly encountered an Italian missionary named Frank Rossi, who was purportedly the father of Henry
Rossi.
Pizarro disputes these claims, stating that she believes herself to be Josefa's only child. Additionally, petitioner
Garcia's records show him as the son of Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, evidenced by a Certificate of Live
Birth dated July 19, 1950. Likewise, petitioner Ara's records indicate him as the son of Jose Ara and Maria Flores,
as per his Certificate of Live Birth.
The petitioners, along with Ramon and respondent Rossi, verbally sought the division of Josefa's properties,
which were in the possession of respondent Pizarro. They filed a Complaint for judicial partition of Josefa's
properties before the Regional Trial Court. In response, Pizarro stated in her Answer that, to her knowledge, she
was Josefa's only legitimate child, and she denied the familial relationship with any of the plaintiffs due to lack
of information. Moreover, Pizarro claimed that there were other properties of Josefa in possession of the
petitioners, not included in the properties being partitioned by the trial court in Special Civil Action No. 337-03,
detailed in her counterclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can establish their filiation to Josefa via their continuous and open
assumption of the status as illegitimate children, as stipulated in the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code.
RULING:
NEGATIVE. To establish filiation successfully, it's crucial to make the claim within the specified
timeframe and provide evidence as required by the Family Code. If someone seeks to establish their connection
as an illegitimate child after a putative parent's passing, they can do so through a birth record in the civil register,
a conclusive court judgment, or an acknowledgment of legitimate filiation. While the petitioners presented
baptismal certificates, a marriage certificate listing Josefa as their mother, group photos, and a relative's testimony,
none of these meet the criteria outlined in Article 172 first paragraph as evidence.
Contributor: DAVID, ERIKA ELAINE J.
Ende V. Roman Catholic Prelate of the Pelature Nullius of Cotabato, G.R. No. 191867, December 6, 2021
FACTS:
The spouses Butas Ende (Butas) and Damagi Arog (Damagi; collectively, Spouses Ende), both Manobo
natives were both registered owners of a lot with an area of 223,877 square meters (sqm) located in Sudapi,
Kidapawan Cotabato. However, portions of the subject property are presently occupied by respondents Roman
Catholic (11,356 sqm), Welhilmina (112, 023 sqm); Eliza and Juanito Diaz (26,457 sqm) and Jessie and Corazon
Flores (12,500 sqm).
Claiming to be the surviving heirs of the spouses Ende, Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar filed a complaint
and recovery of possession with damages and attorney’s fees, claiming that taking advantage of the ignorance
and illiteracy of the spouses Ende, the respondents took possession of portions of the subject property through
deceitful machinations. Respondents argued that the acquired ownership over their respective portions of the
subject property from Damagi or from third persons who in turn, acquired the same from Damagi. Respondents
also invoked acquisitive prescription claimin that their possession of the respective portions of the subject
property spanned at least 30 years to at most 50 years already.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners Amlayon and Quezon are the legal heirs of the spouses Ende.
RULING:
Yes. The court holds these testimonial evidence sufficient to establish petitioners' status as heirs of the
Ende couple. Petitioners claim that they are the legitimate children of the spouses Ende. However, petitioners'
records of birth were not recorded in the Civil Register or their legitimate filiation embodied in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument signed by the spouses Ende. Instead, petitioners offered testimonies of their
relatives, namely, Elena R. Birang (Elena), Laureana Bayawan (Laureana), Cristina Birang Carbonel (Cristina),
and Marino Icdang (Marino) to prove that they are legitimate children of the spouses Ende.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in
conformity with the provisions of this Code and Support; and to be entitled to the legitimate and other successional
rights granted to them by the Civil Code.
Under the Spanish Civil Code, all the estate of the married couple is considered as conjugal partnership
property unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband of the wife. Even if the
title of the property shows that it was in the name either the husband or wife only, the same is presumed part of
the conjugal partnership in the absence of evidence that the acquisition was made with the money belonging
exclusively to one of the spouses.
Patently, the subject property was registered solely in the name of Butas. However, in the absence of
evidence that it was an exclusive property of Butas, the presumption exists that the same was acquired during his
marriage to Damagi and therefore, part of the conjugal partnership. Amlayon, Matias, and Quezon. Since Matias
died without any case descendants who can inherit by right of representation, or surviving spouse, his share
redounded to his brothers Amlayon and Quezon, who survived him, with each inheriting the estate of their fathers
Butas in equal shares or equivalent to 5.5 hectares and 95.1925 square meters.
Contributor: HASNE, RAMI ABDUL N. S. B.
Ordona v. Local Registrar of Pasig City, G.R. No. 215370. November 9, 2021
FACTS;
Petitioner Richelle Ordona and her husband Ariel Libut were separated -in-fact. Richelle then met Allan
Fulgueras. She and Allan engaged in an intimate relationship where she got pregnant and gave birth to a son. In
the Certificate of Live Birth, the child was given the name "Alrich Paul Ordona Fulgueras" with Allan as the
purported father. She later on filed a petition seeking the change of last name of Alrich Paul from Fulgueras to
Ordona and the deletion of entries in the paternal information. She alleged that it was not Allan who signed the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity attached to the Certificate of Live Birth considering that
Allan was not in the Philippines when she gave birth to Alrich Paul.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Richelle can impugn the child's legitimacy?
RULING:
No. Article 164 of the Family Code provides that "children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parties are legitimate." Here, Richelle admitted to being in a valid and subsisting marriage with Ariel when she
conceived and gave birth to Alrich Paul. Thus, Alrich Paul is presumed to be a legitimate child of Richelle and
Ariel. However, Richelle, declared against her child's legitimacy when she alleged that Alrich Paul was the child
of Allan. The collateral attack of Alrich Paul's filiation cannot be allowed .
It must be emphasized that the direct action to impugn the legitimacy of a child must be brought by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law. Richelle, is barred from impugning Aldrin Paul’s presumed
legitimacy considering the prohibition under Article 167 of the Family Code which provides that the child shall
be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The child who was conceived or born during a valid and existing marriage has also no
right to impugn his own legitimacy under the Family Code. He cannot choose his own filiation.
It is only the father, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, who may impugn the child's legitimacy on
grounds provided under Article 166 of the Family Code within the periods provided under Article 170 in relation
to Article 171 of the Family Code.
In this case, the presumption that Alrich Paul is legitimate stands in the absence of a direct action timely
filed by the proper party. The hands of the Court are tied as it may only entertain the impugnation of a child's
presumed legitimacy in a direct action filed by the proper party and within the prescribed period under the law.
However, with the current state of the laws, an illegitimate child's true filiation may never be recognized
by law because the husband, who is already living separately from the wife, may have no interest in filing the
appropriate action even if he knows that his wife gave birth to a child with another man.
Contributor: JOVE, HILDA F.
Torrefranca v City Civil Registry of Tagum City, G.R. No. 253540, January 25, 2021
FACTS;
The petitioner, Sandra Mae G. Torrefranca, argues that her daughter, Therese May Fernandez, should use
her surname instead of the father’s surname. Records show that Therese May’s birth certificate was registered on
July 21, 2015. The trial court dismissed the petitioner’s petition. The petitioner essentially maintains that the trial
court erred in dismissing her petition claiming that pursuant to Art 176 of the Family Code the use of the mother’s
surname by an illegitimate child such as her daughter is mandatory, especially in the absence of an Affidavit to
Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) as required by Rule 8.2. of AO 1, s. 2016. She insists that her daughter’s
use of the surname of the father, Terrence Edward Matias “Fernandez” has no basis in law and should therefore
be changed to her surname “Torrefranca.” The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it dismissed the case that the petitioner’s daughter should use the
petitioner’s surname instead of the father’s surname in the absence of ASUF?
RULING:
NO. The Court finds no compelling reason to reverse the trial court's dispositions in this case.
Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255 decrees: Illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is mad e by the
father. Meanwhile, Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1), Series of 2016 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General,
implementing the provisions of RA 9255 ordains: Illegitimate child acknowledged by the father shall use the
surname of the mother if no AUSF is executed. Petitioner may not rely on the absence of an AUSF to compel
her daughter's use of her surname. For an AUSF was not yet required at the time Theresse May's birth
certificate was registered. To be sure, the above-cited rules were promulgated only in 2016, while records show
that Theresse May's birth certificate was registered on July 21, 2015.The governing rule when Theresse May's
birth was registered was still AO 1, Series of 2004, thus: The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the
father if a public document is executed , either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
document. Verily, AO 1, s. 2004 only requires an AUSF when the child's birth had previously been registered
using the mother's surname. For original registrations as in the case of Theresse May, a public document executed
by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document, would suffice. Here,
petitioner does not deny as she herself asserts that Theresse May's father Terrence Edward Matias Fernandez
executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity which was annotated on the dorsal portion of
Theresse May's birth certificate. Section 5 of Act No. 3753 specifically provides that in case of an illegitimate
child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother
if the father refuses. Here, Theresse May's birth certificate was jointly registered by her parents before their
relationship turned sour. Indeed, the signature of petitioner herself is apparent on Theresse May's birth certificate,
indicating her consent, acknowledgment and verification of its contents, including the use of "Fernandez" as her
daughter's surname. In sum, the requirements for Theresse May's use of her father's surname were fulfilled when
her birth was registered. Sandra Mae, too, consented to registering Theresse May's birth under the surname
"Fernandez." There is no apparent error, therefore, in Theresse May's birth certificate which requires correction.

The Petition is denied for utter lack of merit.

Contributor: LEGASPI, ANGELICA T.
Alanis v. Court of Appeal, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020
FACTS;
Before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12, Alanis III submitted a petition seeking to
alter his name. He asserted that he was born to Mario Alanis y Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al-
Raschid, with his birth certificate indicating the name “Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III.” However, he aimed to
change his father’s surname “Alanis III” with his mother’s maiden name “Ballaho,” which he had been using
since childhood and had reflected in his school records. Additionally, he sought to change his first name from
“Anacleto” to “Abdulhamid” for the same reasons. Alanis III testified during the trial that his parents separated
when he was five years old, and his mother testified that she raised him and his siblings on her own.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court rejected the petition, stating that the petitioner failed to provide
sufficient evidence supporting any valid grounds for a name change. The court emphasized that simply using a
different name and being recognized by it does not constitute a legitimate reason for a name change. Furthermore,
it held that permitting him to discard his last name would violate the Family Code and Civil Code, which stipulate
that legitimate children should primarily adopt their father's surnames. The court argued that disregarding the
surname of his natural and legitimate father was not permissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not legitimate children are entitled to adopt their mother’s surname as their own.
RULING:
YES. The commitment to fundamental gender equality under the law extends to courts and all government
entities. When a law's language allows an interpretation promoting gender equality, that interpretation is
considered correct. The Regional Trial Court erred significantly by claiming that legitimate children cannot adopt
their mothers' surnames, contrary to State policy. This unequal treatment of the petitioner's parents' surnames goes
against the imperative of gender equality.
The court's misinterpretation of Article 364 of the Civil Code is evident. While the provision states that
legitimate children should "principally" use the father's surname, this doesn't imply exclusivity. It allows for the
integration of the State policy, emphasizing gender equality, into Article 364. There's no apparent justification
for neglecting this consideration.
MODULE 8:
Adoption
Contributor: LUCEÑO, GELINA MAE
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorado B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Atroga Garcia,
daughter of his deceased wife Gemma Astroga Garcia. Honorado insists that he is now a widower and is qualified
to be the adopting parent of Stephanie. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia,"
her mother's surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
The trial court granted his petition of holding the care and custody of Stephanie since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No.
603.
On April 20, 2001 petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/ or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name, which was then
denied.The decline of petitioner's application for reconsideration ruled that there is no legislation or jurisprudence
that allows an adopted child to use his original mother's surname as his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie
should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural mother because under
Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion
and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should
be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law
Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother."
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters." But, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right
and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother
Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie
should be allowed to use her mother's surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
Contributor: NARCISO, RODOLFO JOSELITO L.
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. G.R. Nos. 168992-93,
May 21, 2009

FACTS:
In 1974, the petitioner married Primo Lim. They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner
and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children's parents. The children were named
Michelle and Michael. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario,
an American. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under R.A.
8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the RTC. Michelle and Michael were already adults.
The trial court denied the petition, stating that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioner, who has remarried, singly adopt?
RULING:
NO. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to
affirm the trial court's decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally
separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is
the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
 MODULE 9:
Support
(Articles 194-208, Family Code)
Contributor: RAMOS, CEDRIQ JOSHUA S.
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS:
• On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, on behalf of her then minor children Rica
and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite
with the RTC Makati.
• In the petition, it was alleged that on Feb. 16, 1975, petitioner Belen Mangonon and respondent Federico
Delgado were civilly married by then City Court judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legazpi City City, Albay.
• At the time of the marriage, Mangonon was only 21 years old while Delgado was only 19 years old, and
the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per article 85 of the New Civil Code. The
marriage was then annulled on Aug. 11, 1975, by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
• On March 25, 1976, or within 7 months after the annulment of their Mangonon gave birth to twins Rica
and Rina.
• According to Mangonon, she had raised her twin daughters with the assistance of her second husband
Danny Mangonon as Delgado had totally abandoned them.
• At the time of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the USA where Mangonon together
with her daughters and husband had moved to and finally settled in.
• Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts, while Rina was accepted by the Long Island
University and Western New England College. However, they were financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education because of the following:
o Average Annual Cost for College Education in the US is about 22,000$/year.
o Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each amounting to $3000 per year.
o Mangonon’s monthly income from her 2 jobs amount to $1200 after taxes.
o Neither can Mangonon’s present husband be compelled to share in the general support and college
education of Rica and Rina as he has his own son and daughter to attend to.
o Rica and Rina’s petitions for federal student aid have been rejected by the US Department of
Education
• Mangonon likewise averred that demands were made upon Federico and Federico’s father, Francisco, for
general support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. However, these
demands remained unheeded.
• Mangonon alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate daughters with Federico since the twin sisters
were born within 7 months from the date of the annulment of her marriage.
• However, Federico failed to sign the birth certificates of Rica and Rina, it was imperative that their status
as legitimate children of Federico be judicially declared pursuant to Article 173 of the Family Code.
• Mangonon argued that under the provisions of Article 174 and 195(b) in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2)
and 199(c), Rica and Rina are entitled to general and educational support as legitimate children and
grandchildren. Furthermore, Mangonon alleged that under the provisions, in case of default on the part of
the parents, the obligation to provide support falls upon the grandparents.
• Mangonon also claimed that she was constrained to seek support pendente lite from Francisco who are
millionaires with extensive assets both in the Philippines and abroad.
• Respondent Francisco stated that as the birth certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of
Respondent Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be first established as “there is no basis to claim
support until a final and executory judicial declaration has been made as to the civil status of the children.”
• Respondent Francisco Delgado also averred that the order of liability for support under Article 199 of the
Family Code is not concurrent such that the obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the
recipient.
• In this case, respondent Francisco maintained that responsibility should rest on the shoulder of Mangonon
and her second husband, with the latter having voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a
natural father.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether respondent Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.
(2) Whether Francisco can avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

RULING:
(1) Yes, respondent Francisco has the obligation to provide for Rica and Rina in default of the father.
Pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
A. The spouse;
B. The descendants in the nearest degree;
C. The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
D. The brothers and sisters.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and
Rina, petitioner Mangonon and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college
education. In view, however, of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by
respondent Francisco as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina.
(2) No, Francisco cannot avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.
Article 204 of the Family Code provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill
the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. With
the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties
hadcertainly been affected.
Contributor: SANTOS, CHRISTINE MAE M.
Dadivas de Villanueva vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil 93 (1929)

FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva (Aurelia) and defendant Rafael Villanueva (Rafael) was married
on July 16, 1905, in the City of Manila. Their marriage begot them three children, namely, Antoni, 18 years-old,
Guillermo, 10 years-old, and Sergio, 9 years-old.
On May 27, 1927, Aurelia instituted this case against Rafael, wherein she intends to obtain separate
maintenance and custody of their two minor children, Guillermo and Sergio. Aurelia sited Rafael’s alleged
infidelity and cruelty as the ground for the separate maintenance. She claims that during the period of about ten
years, Rafael was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with four different women, and that even after she began
the court action, he still has had illicit relations with other women. According to Aurelia, the only thing that kept
her from from protesting Rafael’s irregular conduct before was to keep the family intact, with the hope of
retrieving him from his erring course. Eventually, a final separation occurred on April 20, 1927, about a month
before the present case was begun, wherein she withdrew from the family home and established a separate abode
for herself and two younger children, Guillermo and Sergio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife, Aurelia, is entitled to maintain a separate home and to require separate
maintenance (support) from her husband.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that yes, she is entitled to both the maintenance of her separate home and support
from her husband.
The Court explained that the law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations
with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.
Additionally, it is not necessary that the husband should bring his concubine to the marital home because perverse
and illicit relations with women outside the marital establishment are enough.
With regards to support, it was ruled that a husband cannot, by his own wrongful act, relieve himself from
the duty to support his wife imposed by law, and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct,
drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, just like in this case, he cannot take advantage of her departure to
abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder. The Court, thus, held that
the sum of P500 per month shall be given by Rafael to Aurelia, as a means of support, beginning April 1, 1928,
until judgement shall be promulgated in this case, and from that date onwards.
Contributor: SOTERO, CLARK P.
Quintana v Lerma, 24 Phil 285 (1913)

FACTS:
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals from the judgment of the lower court
granting his wife, the plaintiff-appellee Maria Quintana, a sum of money allegedly due her based on a contract
they made for support.
As shown in the evidence, the two were married in 1901 and entered, in February 1905, into a written
agreement of separation, renouncing certain rights as against each other, dividing the conjugal property between
them and the defendant undertaking the duty to provide plaintiff P20-worth of monthly support and maintenance
to be given within the first three days of each month.
In his original answer to the action, Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her right to support by
committing adultery. However, this special defense was stricken out by the court on the ground that under Art.
152 of the Civil Code, adultery is not a recognized ground upon which obligation to support ceases.
The lower court refused to recognize the same defense when the defendant reentered it in his amended
complaint.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the written agreement made by parties is void
2. W/N adultery may be permitted as a special defense against action for support
RULING:
(1) YES. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code provides that “in default of express
declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only
take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50.” However, the wife has a right
of action against the defendant under the Code.
(2) YES. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the defendant may also set
up adultery as a special defense, which if properly proved and sustained will defeat the wife’s action.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded for new trial with instructions to permit the interposition of the special
defense of adultery and such amendments of the complaint and answer as may be necessary to carry the judgment
into effect.
Contributor: CRUZ, RAZIEL EUNICE Q.
Francisco vs. Znadueta, 61 Phil 752 (1935)

FACTS:
The respondent, Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, aged two years, through his natural mother and guardian
ad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against the herein petitioner in the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila.
In that case it is alleged that the therein plaintiff is the acknowledged son of Luis Francisco and as such is
entitled to support. The petitioner, as defendant in that case, answered by a general denial of each and every
material allegation contained in the complaint and as a special defense alleged that he never acknowledged and
could not have acknowledged that he never acknowledged and could not have acknowledged the plaintiff as his
son; that he was not present at the baptism of the plaintiff and that he was married at the time it is alleged that the
plaintiff was born.
Notwithstanding this denial of paternity the respondent judge, Honorable Francisco Zandueta, denied that
motion, hence the institution of this special proceeding.
ISSUE:
WoN Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his status as petitioner’s son
RULING:
NO. in the present case the action for support is brought by a minor, through his guardian ad litem, who
alleges that he is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as such son.
His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in
issue.
Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other: (1) Husband and wife,
(2) legitimate ascendants and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate
descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of natural children and
(5) brothers and sisters. In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action
for support, the civil status of marriage or that of relationship.
The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived,
being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been
made as to the existence of the cause. It is also evident that there is a substantial difference between the capacity
of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession of the status
of a son and his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in
possession of such a status.
The Civil Code grants the right of support to a son. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the
respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any other
amount as monthly support, pendente lite. Hence, to pay the plaintiff in that case the sum of P30 monthly, as
support, pendente lite, is hereby declared null and void, without costs.
Contributor: DAVID, ERIKA ELAINE J.
Ramirez vs. Redfern, 49 Phil 849 (1926)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs are Jose V. Ramirez and his wife, Eloisa de Marcaida. The defendant is J. R. Redfern. Jose
V. Ramirez and J. R. Redfern are brothers-in-law.
Sometime in 1908, Redfern took hs wife and three minor children to Englad and left them there. He
returned to the Philippines the following year. From 1910 up to 1922, Mr. Redfern provided his wife funds for
her expenses, ranging from 20 to 30 pounds per month. Redferd then furnished his wife P300 per month for the
support of herself and one child. The two grown sons are employed and are earning on their own.
The action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendant the sums of $600, £185, and P875
for alleged advances to the defendant’s wife for her support and maintenance. The judgment of the trial court
absolves the defendant from the demands of the plaintiffs with costs against the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs can demand support from the defendants relying on Article 216 of the Family
Code.
RULING:
No. For one to recover under the provisions of Art 216 of the Family Code, it must be alleged and proved,
first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to do so; second,
that the support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. The negative
qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it.
In the case at bar, there is a failure of proof as to the first essential, and possibly the second essential, of
the law.
Mr. Redfern's reason for reducing the allowance, he says, was his precarious financial situation in 1921
and 1922. Before one can tender succor to the wife of another with an expectation or recouping himself for the
loan, the husband should be given an opportunity to render the needful assistance. Also, it is clear that there is
evidence in the record which corroborates the finding of the trial judge that the defendant was amply providing
for his wife and children in London.
Contributor: NARCISO, RODOLFO JOSELITO L.
Lim-Lua v. Lua, G.R. No. 175279-80 June 5, 2013

FACTS:
In 2003, petitioner Susan filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent
Danilo. In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of
₱500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies. This petition was granted. Since the instant complaint was filed on September 3, 2003, the amount of
₱250,000.00 should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such d ate until the hearing of the support
pendente lite. ₱250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven months that lapsed from September 2003 to March
2004 would be tantamount to a total of ₱1,750,000.00.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the lower court’s decision, ordering him to pay to pay
private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of ₱115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and every
month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof and to pay the private respondent the amount of ₱115,000.00
a month multiplied by the number of months starting from September 2003 until March 2005.
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred
by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel
expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the
benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well.
ISSUE:
WON certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the CA decision.
RULING:
IN PART. Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited
against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the
trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and
also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his
children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of
items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount supposedly
given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the deductions
should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed
ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while
correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the
executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair consequences to
petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate courts.
Contributor: CASIO, CHRISTIAN JOSHUA G.
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS:
• Petitioner Norma Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was 16 years of age. Their marriage
bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
• According to Norma, Van Wilsem made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount
of 250 Guildene, which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less. However, since the arrival of petitioner
and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to their son. Van Wilsem then came to the
Philippines and remarried in Cebu and since then have been residing thereat.
• Norma invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support
his minor child with petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON respondent, a foreign national, have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law?
RULING:
YES. Article 195 of the Family Code and R.A. No. 9262 can both be held against the alien.
In this case, which the respondent has different nationality, it provides that the Family Code of the
Philippines and R.A. No. 9262 only subjects the citizens of the Philippines, same goes to other foreign countries
who are bound by their own laws. But in the application of International Law, an exemption of obligation shall
be proven by the obligor that such obligation is contrary to their laws. In which, the respondent shall plead and
prove that he is not obliged according to his national law to impose upon the parents to support their child.
In this case, since the respondent was not able to prove his national law in his favor, the Doctrine of
Processual Presumption shall govern, where the failure of respondent to prove his national law, it is then presumed
that the respondent’s national law is the same as our internal or domestic law.
Hence, in respect to the national law of the petitioner, which shall also govern the respondent, Article 195
of Family Code and R.A. No. 9262 shall be held against the respondent.
Contributor: BRAGA, ANGELICA JOIE N.
Ruiz v. AAA, G.R. No. 231619, November 15, 2021

FACTS:
AAA applied for a protection order against her husband, Wilfredo Ruiz (Wilfredo), alleging physical,
emotional, and economic abuse committed against her during their marriage. On September 10, 2008, the
Regional Trial Court granted AAA a Permanent Protection Order. On July 16, 2013, AAA filed a Motion for
Execution on Support (Motion for Execution), alleging that Wilfredo still has not complied with the portion of
the Permanent Protection Order pertaining to support despite the Decision being final and executory.
Wilfredo opposed this, arguing that the Permanent Protection Order has already been revoked by operation
of law. He claimed that AAA no longer needed protection as she was already cohabiting with another man. He
also notes that their marriage has since been declared void ab initio, terminating his legal obligation to support
respondent. As for CCC, petitioner insists that the trial court has given the child's care and custody to the maternal
grandmother.
Petitioner also argues that ever since the Permanent Protection Order was issued, he has inflicted no
violence on the respondent. He also raises that respondent has since had many relationships with other men,
graduated from law school, and took the Bar Examinations, all showing that she was no longer a victim of physical
and economic violence. He also notes that respondent is also now charged with adultery, putting her out of the
State's protection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a supervening event that falls as an exception to the rule on immutability of
judgments such that petitioner Wilfredo A. Ruiz should no longer be liable to provide support to respondent AAA.
RULING:
No. Under Section 8(g) of Republic Act No. 9262, a respondent may be directed to provide support if the
woman and/or her child is entitled to legal support. What legal support means and who are obliged to provide it
are stated in Articles 194 and 195 of the Family Code. After the final judgment nullifying the marriage, "the
obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases." Petitioner and respondent's marriage having been
declared void, they are no longer obliged to give spousal support to each other. Nonetheless, the rest of the reliefs
granted under the Permanent Protection Order in favor of the respondent shall remain in full force and effect.
Unlike in an ordinary case for spousal support, the grant of support under a permanent protection order also serves
to protect the offended party from harm and violence and help them recover and regain control over their life.
This added layer differentiates it from ordinary legal support between spouses and other dependents provided
under the Family Code, which is solely meant to provide subsistence. This Court notes that most of the reliefs
granted under the Permanent Protection Order does not depend on whether a marriage between petitioner and
respondent subsists. Respondent may still be entitled to the other reliefs even if she is no longer petitioner's wife,
because the determining factor in the grant of the relief is whether the offended party was subjected to physical,
sexual, psychological, or economic abuse. Thus, under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 9262, even if the charge
against a respondent has been dismissed, a permanent protection order shall still be granted "as long as there is
no clear showing that the act from which the order might arise did not exist." It cannot be assumed that respondent
is already living in and free from the infliction of harm against her. Furthermore, the grant of support in the
Permanent Protection Order pertains to respondent and her children with petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s obligation
to provide support to his minor child CCC and even their other child [BBB], if still studying and unemployed,
and does not cease even if care and custody are no longer with respondent.
 MODULE 10:
Parental Authority
(Articles 209-233, Family Code)
Contributor: BERNARDEZ, JASPER CLARENCE A.
Santos vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995

FACTS:
Lieutenant Leouel Santos, Sr. and Julia Bedia, married in 1986, had a son, Leouel Santos Jr. Julia left for
the United States in 1988, leaving the child with her parents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. In 1990, Santos Sr.
allegedly abducted the child and took him to Negros Oriental. The grandparents filed for custody, which was
granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Santos Sr. appealed, arguing that the CA erred in
awarding custody to the grandparents.
ISSUE:
Whether Leouel Santos, Sr. should be awarded custody of Leouel Santos Jr.
RULING:
YES.
According to Art. 214 of the Family Code, “In case of death or unsuitability of the parent, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by
the court, taking int account the same consideration mentioned n the preceding article, shall exercise authority.”
in addition, Parental Authority is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection
of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter’s needs.
In this case, the appellate court’s considerations about the grandparents’ capacity are insufficient to defeat
Santos Sr.’s parental authority, as he has not been proven unsuitable. Parental authority is a mass of rights granted
by law for the child’s preservation, development, education, and well-being.
Therefore, Leouel Santos Sr. should be awarded the custody of Leouel Santos Jr.
Contributor: CAGURANGAN, DIANA MARIE
Sagala-Eslao vs. CA, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997

FACTS:
Maria Paz entrusted the custody of her youngest child, Angelica, to her grieving mother-in-law, Teresita
Sagala-Eslao, after the death of her husband, Reynaldo Eslao. Several years later, Maria Paz married Dr. James
Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American, and migrated to the US to be with him. Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye returned
to the Philippines to reunite with her children hoping to bring them to the US. She told Teresita that her present
husband was willing to adopt her children and that she wanted to take custod y of Angelica. Teresita objected and
said Maria abandoned Angelica when she was just ten days old. Maria filed a petition to recover the custody of
her minor daughter from Teresita. The trial court found the petition meritorious and granted the same, which the
Court of Appeals fully affirmed. Hence, the petitioner seeks the reversal of the CA's decision, contending it erred
in its ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given custody of the child, Angelica Eslao.
RULING:
NO. When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to
the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental
authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which
do not appear in the case at bar. Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that “the right
of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the estate of
decisions of the courts but derives from the nature of the parent relationship.”
Contributor: CHING, RAMONA JAZMINE R.
Vancil vs. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner BONIFACIA P. VANCIL is a US citizen living in Colorado. She filed for guardianship over
the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent, children of her now deceased son, Redeer.
She was appointed as their guardian but the children's mother, Valerie Belmes (Respondent), opposed this
decision as the common-law wife of Redeer.
The Court of Appeals later ruled that, according to Philippine laws, the mother is the natural guardian of
her children, giving her preference over the grandmother. The case was brought to the Supreme Court.
The daughter Valerie turned 18, hence the only issue here is the minor child, Vincent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of her minor child Vincent.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the child's natural mother, respondent Helen Belmes,
has the primary right as the guardian. This aligns with the Family Code, recognizing the natural and legal right of
parents to their children's custody.
Petitioner, the child's grandmother, can only become the guardian through substitute parental authority
according to the Family Code. This applies only if the parent is absent, deceased, or unsuitable. However, the
grandmother failed to provide convincing proof of the mother's unsuitability. Moreover, the grandmother's foreign
citizenship and residency present practical challenges in fulfilling the duties of a guardian in the Philippines.
Even if the mother were unsuitable, the grandmother doesn't qualify as a substitute guardian due to her
foreign citizenship and practical limitations. Additionally, her absence from the Philippines since 1987 and other
personal issues further hinder her suitability.
Courts should not appoint guardians who are not within their jurisdiction, as it becomes challenging to
safeguard the wards' interests.
The decision is affirmed, modifying it only to remove Valerie, who is now of legal age, from the
guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
Contributor: BARROZO, MARVIN
Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding met in 1976, began a common-law
relationship in 1984, and formally got married in 1987. They had two children. The marriage deteriorated, leading
to their separation in 1990. Teresita left for California, citing financial disagreements, while Reynaldo contends
she was a spendthrift. Reynaldo brought their children to the Philippines but had to return to Pittsburgh for work,
leaving the kids with his sister. Teresita, fearing arrest due to a bigamy case filed by Reynaldo, delayed her return
to the Philippines. She filed a habeas corpus petition on December 8, 1992, seeking custody of the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
RULING:
The Court held in the negative. In matters concerning the care, custody, education, and property of
children, the primary consideration is the welfare of the children. Even a child under the age of 7 may be separated
from the mother if compelling reasons exist. While there is a strong presumption in favor of the mother as the
best custodian for a child under seven, this presumption is not absolute.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals made a mistake in applying Article 363 and Article
213 of the Code. Instead of carefully examining the records to ascertain the children's preferences and assessing
the fitness of each parent, the court relied on statutory presumptions and general principles applicable to typical
situations. The seven-year age limit was treated mechanically as a rigid cutoff rather than being considered as a
guideline founded on a strong presumption.
In this case, both children were over 7 at the time of the judgment, and the child's preference for residence
should be taken into account. Records indicate that Rosalind chose to stay with her father/aunt due to emotional
shock caused by her mother's infidelity. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that Reynaldo is unfit; in
fact, he has been making sincere efforts to provide the children with the care and attention their mother cannot
offer. Conversely, the mother's conviction for bigamy and her illicit relationship have resulted in emotional
disturbances and conflicts, particularly with the daughter.
Contributor: COLLANTES, IAN MIGUEL P.
Luna vs. IAC, G.R. No. L 68374, June 18, 1985

FACTS:
Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is
married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her correspondent Sixto
Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is
the subject of this child custody case.
Two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her
to the petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection
and brought her up as their very own.
A few months before September, 1980, her "Mama" and "Papa" decided to take Shirley abroad and show
her Disneyland and other places of interest in America. Shirley looked forward to this trip and was excited about
it. However, when the petitioners asked for the respondents' written consent to the child's application for a U.S.
visa, the respondents refused to give it, to the petitioners' surprise and chagrin Shirley was utterly disappointed.
As a result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the private respondents, upon the
latter's request.
When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents had transferred
Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did
the said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the private respondents to produce the person
of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody.
ISSUE:
Should procedural rules in child custody cases prevail over and above the desire and preference of the
child?
RULING:
NO. The child’s manifestation that she will kill herself or run away home if she should be forced to live
with private respondent is a supervening event that would justify cancellation of the execution of the final decision
rendered by the CA.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and
property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can
override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children.
In this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can
exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to
that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral, and intellectual
development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide
her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling. and moral and material security.
Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and
cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley
has grown more embittered cautious and dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the
private respondents to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would indeed be
traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child.
Contributor: BIBAR, DANE ANTHONY C.
Pablo-Gulaberto vs. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005

FACTS:
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Gualberto filed, in the RTC of Paranaque for the declaration for nullity of their
marriage against Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto as well as the custody of their child, Rafaello Gualberto, whom the
former allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school. The RTC granted the petition and
the custody of the child to Crisanto after Joycelyn failed to appear in the court proceedings as well as the evidence
that she was having an extramarital lesbian relations with one Noreen Cuidadano in Cebu City. Jocelyn challenged
this decision, which was reversed and she was granted custody on the basis that, according to Article 213 of the
Family Code, a minor child shall not be separated from his mother unless a court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. Crisanto challenged the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeal, the CA reversed the decision
based on procedural matters and returned the custody of the child to Crisanto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the custody of Rafaello Gualberto should be awarded to Crisanto Gualberto.
RULING:
No. In cases concerning minor children below the age of 7, Article 213 of the Family Code takes priority
as it is in the best interests of a young child to be cared for by his mother unless 'compelling' reasons are presented
for a court to order otherwise. As no such reasons were presented or proved, custody was awarded to the mother.
In this case, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive
Joycelyn of custody. The mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody,
but sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact
that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her
minor child. It was held that in order to deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted her from exercising proper
parental care. It was, therefore, not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian, but he had
to also demonstrate that she had carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence
of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. However, there was
no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and
psychological development suffered as a result.
Contributor: HASNE, RAMI ABDUL N. S. B.
Briones vs. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
FACTS:
According to petitioner Joey Briones, respondent Loreta P. Miguel is the mother of minor Michael Kevin
Pineda, whom he claims is his illegitimate son. Michael was born in Japan as evidenced by his Birth Certificate.
Loreta is married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
Joey alleges that he arranged for Michael to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him
and send him to school. One day, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel went to the house of
Joey to visit Michael and requested that they be allowed to bring him for recreation at the SM Department store.
They promised Joey that they would bring Michael back in the afternoon, to which he agreed. However, Maricel
and Francisca did not bring Michael back as promised. Hence, Joey filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
against Maricel and Francisca, to obtain custody of Michael as his biological father and as he has demonstrated
his capability to support and educate him. He added Loreta to his amended petition making her one of the
respondents.
Loreta responded by denying the allegation that Maricel and Francisca were the ones who took the child
from Joey. She averred that she was the one who took Michael from Joey when she returned to the Philippines
and that he readily agreed and consented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joey should have custody of the child?
RULING:
The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that
only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of Joey and Loreta.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that “illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. Ordering him to give support
to, but not the custody of the child.
There is thus no question that Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the
minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived
of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it “except in the cases authorized by law
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the
most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else such neglect or abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and
affliction with a communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor. There is no showing
at all that Loreta is unfit to take charge ofMichael. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
Contributor: BEN, CELINA M.
St. Mary’s Academy v. William Carpitanos, GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
1. February 1995, St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. The
enrollment campaign included visitations of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.
Their student, Sherwin Carpintanos, was part of the campaign.
2. Sherwin along with other high school students were riding a jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva. The jeep
was driven by James Daniel II, 15 years old, another student of St. Mary’s. Allegedly the minor was
driving in a reckless manner, resulting in the jeep to overturn. The accident killed Sherwin.
3. St. Mary’s Academy was then held liable for the resulting damages, as per decision rendered by the trial
court, and then, later, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Decision was rendered on the basis of Articles
218 and 217 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not St Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of their student, Sherwin
Carpitanos.
RULING:
NO, they are not liable. Article 218 of the Family Code provides, among other things, that schools, its
administrators and teachers have special parental authority over a minor child under their supervision, instruction
or custody. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside school premises.
On the other hand, Article 219 states that those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the minor under their supervision, instruction, or
custody. However, for this to be applicable, the act or omission considered as negligent must be the proximate
cause of the injury; the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
In the case at bar, the Carpitanos failed to show that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause
of the death of their son.
In their comment to the petition, respondents admitted that the cause of the accident was the detachment
of the steering wheel of the jeep. Hence, cause of the accident was not the recklessness of the driver but the
mechanical defect of Vivencio’s jeep. Further, there was no evidence that the school allowed James Daniel II to
drive the jeep. It was Ched Villanueva, Vivencio’s grandson, who had possession and control of the jeep, and had
allowed James Daniel II to drive it.
Given the foregoing, negligence of the school was only a remote cause of the accident. The accident
occurred because of the detached wheel guide of the jeep. It has been held before that the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused by the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.
It is the registered owner of the vehicle who should be held liable for the damages due to the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos, not the school.
Court of Appeals decision reversed and set aside; St. Mary’s Academy excluded in the determination of
liability of the defendants.
Contributor: BRIONES, STEFFI L.
Masbate vs. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, 30 July 2018
FACTS:
Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with
Renalyn's parents without the benefit of marriage. Three (3) years later, or in April 2015, the relationship ended.
Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James.
On November 7, 2015, Renalyn's parents took Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked
to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
executed by Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them. Consequently,
Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody.
On December 4, 2015, the RTC ruled that the custody of three (3)-year-old Queenie rightfully belongs to
Renalyn, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, which states that "[n]o child under seven
[(7)] years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x." Ricky James moved for reconsideration but was
denied, as Queenie was born out of wedlock and shall hence be under parental authority of her mother pursuant
to Article 176 of the Family Code. In addition, the RTC faulted Ricky James for failing to present credible
evidence in court to demonstrate that Renalyn is unfit to take custody of their daughter.
On January 12, 2017, the CA ordered:
• Affirmation of the RTC Orders granting custody to Renalyn "pending the outcome of the case," stating
that only Queenie's mother, Renalyn, has parental authority over her as she is an illegitimate child.
• Declaration that the RTC must thresh out Renalyn's capacity to raise her daughter, which shall determine
whether or not the tender-age presumption must be upheld, or whether Queenie's well-being is better
served with her remaining in the custody of her maternal grandparents in the exercise of their substitute
parental authority or with Ricky James, who was Queenie's actual custodian before the controversy.
• Granting Ricky James visitation rights of two (2) days a week, with provision for additional visitation
days that may be permitted by Renalyn.
• Granting Ricky James "limited and temporary custody" that will allow him to take Queenie out once a
month, or on the first Saturday of each month, for a period not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours, but
which shall not reduce his visitation days fixed at two (2) days per week.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination of who should exercise
custody over Queenie.
RULING:
YES. As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code states that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are
entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition
of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their
company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to
exercise such authority and care. According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons"
to prove the mother’s unfitness and wrest away custody from a mother over her child although under seven (7) years of age:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity
or affliction with a communicable disease.
Also, despite it being worded as solely applicable to legitimate children, Article 213 was also held to be applicable
to illegitimate children, as the said provision does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children. Further,
given the conflict between the provisions of Articles 214 and 216 which provide for substitute parental authority in case of
the absence of the mother, it would either be the surviving grandparent (Art. 214) or the child’s actual custodian (Art. 216).
However, given Art. 176, the father of an illegitimate child would be effectively disqualified from exercising substitute
parental authority under Article 216 even if he were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is allowed
to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. The Court ruled that while these are the provisions, they cannot adopt
a rigid view, as the legal right of a person should not be given more priority over the best interest of the child. In the present
case, Ricky James holds that the CA erred in giving temporary custody, as Ricky James seems to be very much willing to
take responsibility for his daughter, hence deserving to prove that he is entitled to regain custody of his daughter.
Contributor: DABBAY, JENINA MAE H.

Caram v. Atty. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014

FACTS:
• Petitioner Christina was engaged in a romantic relationship with Marcelino and eventually conceived his
child without being married. After becoming pregnant, Christina deceived Marcelino into believing she
had undergone an abortion when, in reality, she carried the pregnancy to term. During this period, her
intention was to arrange the adoption of the child through the Sun and Moon Home for Children in
Parañaque City.
• On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center in
Marikina City. The expenses incurred for the hospital and medical care were covered by Sun and Moon.
• On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian through a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
• On November 27, 2009, the DSWD issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for
Adoption." By February of 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with Spouses Medina, and a supervised trial
custody began.
• However, on May 5, 2010, Christina, having reconsidered the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD
requesting a halt to Baby Julian's adoption proceedings, expressing her desire to reunite her family.
• On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, represented by respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD
Assistant Secretary Cabrera, stating that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption
had become final on November 13, 2009, three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment, which terminated her parental authority and effectively placed Baby Julian under the care
of the State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for a Writ of Amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and
custody of a minor child.
RULING:
NEGATIVE. Christina's direct accusations against the respondents, alleging that they forcefully
separated her from her child and facilitated the child's adoption without fulfilling the necessary legal requirements,
clearly signify her aim to assert parental authority and contest custody rather than simply seeking a lost child. The
filings demonstrate that the crux of the matter involves child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a
child who has been legally designated as a ward of the State. Given these circumstances, where the child's legal
status is that of a ward of the State, the Amparo rule isn't applicable.
Furthermore, the petition for a writ of Amparo serves as a recourse for individuals whose right to life,
liberty, and security faces violation or imminent threat due to an unlawful act or omission by a public official,
employee, private entity, or individual. This writ typically addresses extralegal killings, enforced disappearances,
or related threats. In this instance, the claim of "enforced disappearance" doesn't hold as the DSWD officers never
concealed the child's whereabouts.
Contributor: CASAUAY, WILBERT RYAN F.
Reyes v. Elquiero, G.R. No. 210487, September 2, 2020

FACTS:
Petitioner Melysinda D. Reyes (Melysinda) is the biological aunt of the minor child Irish Elquiero (Irish).
Irish is the biological daughter of Melysinda’s brother and the legally adopted daughter of Rex R. Elquiero (Rex)
who, in turn, is the son of respondent Maria Salome R. Elquiero (Salome). Upon the death of Rex in 2009,
Melysinda and Salome both claimed custody of Irish.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Salome is entitled to seek custody of Irish
RULING:
NO. The order of preference laid down by Article 216 is mandatory, unless special circumstances require
otherwise. In the case at bar, in default of Irish’s biological parents and her deceased adoptive father, the parties
claiming custody are the mother of her adoptive father and her biological aunt who is also her actual custodian.
The legal relationship created by adoption extends only to the adopter and the adoptee. For this reason,
the Court, in Teotico v. Del Val Chan, ruled that the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the
adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption.
Hence, Salome cannot claim custody of Irish because the law only recognizes a familial relation insofar
as Rex and Irish are concerned. The relation does not extend to any of Rex’s relatives, Salome and her daughters
included. On the other hand, Melysinda, as Irish’s actual and current custodian, is explicitly enumerated as one
of the persons eligible to exercise substitute parental authority under the Family Code.
Contributor: CO, KATE VIATRIZE B.
In the matter of the Petition for Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Corpus in favor of Alicia Jasper S.
Lucena, G.R. No. 252120, September 15, 2020
FACTS:
Petitioners are the parents of Alicia Jasper S. Lucena (AJ), born on July 24, 2001. AJ joined the Far Eastern
University (FEU) in 2018 as a Grade 11 student and became a member of Anakbayan, a youth organization
advocating national democracy. AJ informed her parents on February 2, 2019, that she had joined Anakbayan.
AJ left the family home without explanation the next day and returned three days later. On March 10,
2019, AJ left again and returned more than two months later, having been in the custody of Anakbayan leaders
and engaging in recruiting activities. AJ left the family home for the third time on July 10, 2019, and did not
return. She dropped out of FEU.
The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs conducted a hearing regarding reports of
Anakbayan recruiting students. Petitioner Relissa testified about her experience with AJ. On August 14, 2019,
representatives of various party-lists held a press conference with AJ, where she stated that she joined Anakbayan
voluntarily.
Petitioners filed a petition seeking the issuance of writs of amparo and habeas corpus to regain custody of
AJ. The petition argues that AJ's decision to stay with Anakbayan was influenced by radicalization and
indoctrination she experienced as a minor, hindering her ability to give valid and informed consent.
The Court issued a resolution requiring respondents to show cause why the writs should not be issued.
The petition seeks various reliefs, including a writ of amparo, temporary protection order, writ of habeas corpus,
and placing AJ under the custody of the petitioners. AJ's age of majority is acknowledged, but the petition argues
that her consent was not freely given due to radicalization and indoctrination at a young age.

ISSUE:
1. WON Spouses Lucena’s plea for the issuance of writ of amparo proper?
2. WON Spouses Lucena’s plea for the issuance of habeas corpus proper?

RULING:
(1) NO. The remedy of amparo, in its present formulation, is confined merely to instances of "extralegal
killings" or "enforced disappearances" and to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, the elements
constituting "enforced disappearance," are enumerated as follows: (a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction
or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) That it be followed by the State or political organization's
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo
petition; and (d) That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time. Here, there is not much issue that AJ's situation does not qualify. AJ wasn’t
missing. Her whereabouts are determinable. She is staying with the Anakbayan and are not agents acting on behalf
of the State. With these facts Spouses Lucena's invocation of the remedy of amparo cannot pass.
(2) NO. The Rules of Court envisions the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy applicable to cases of illegal
confinement where a person is deprived of his or her liberty. In this case, Spouses Lucena failed to make out a
case that AJ is being detained by the Anakbayan against her free will. To start, there was never any accusation
that the Anakbayan employed violence, force or threat against AJ that would have influenced her to stay.
It also cannot be said that Spouses Lucena were being excluded from their rightful custody over the person
of AJ. As it was established, AJ has already reached the age of majority thus, legally emancipated. This meant
the termination of the Spouses Lucena's parental authority which includes their custodial rights over the person
and property of AJ. AJ at least in the eyes of the State has earned the right to make independent choices with
respect to the places where she wants to stay, as well as to the persons whose company she wants to keep. Such
choices, so long as they do not violate any law or any other persons' rights, have to be respected and let alone,
lest the Court trample upon AJ's personal liberty the very freedom supposed to be protected by the writs of amparo
and habeas corpus.
 MODULE 11:
I. Emancipation and Age of Majority and
Summary Proceedings
(Articles 234-257, Family Code)
II. Cancellation or
Correction of Entries
Contributor: SOTERO, CLARK P.
Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a
reversal of the Decision of the Regional Trial which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth
certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to
"male." Respondent alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate
of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. The OSG argued that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH
does not make her a male.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition on the ground of her medical condition.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court denied the petition.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. Under Article 412 of the Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. Under Rep. Act
No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations, which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine the respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in
the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Contributor: BIGORNIA, ANGELO MARI A.
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically
male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery.
From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name
in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.
RULING:
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name
on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no
entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of the
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining
to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts.
 MODULE 12:
I. Surnames
(Articles 364-380, New Civil Code)
II. Funerals
(Articles 305-310, New Civil Code)
III. Absence
(Articles 381-396, New Civil Code)
Contributor: CESISTA, FRENCES ROSE L.
Alanis Hi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020

FACTS:
Alanis III was born to Mario Alanis y Cimafranca (father) and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al-Raschid
(mother), and that the name on his birth certificate was “Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III.” His parents separated when
he was five and that he and his siblings were raised single-handedly by his mother Jarmila.
He then wished to remove his father’s surname “Alanis III” to instead use his mother’s maiden name
“Ballaho” being the surname that he has used since childhood and indicated in his school records. He also wished
to change his first name from “Anacleto” to “Abdulhamid” for the same reasons.
Petition was denied after Alanis III failed to prove any of the grounds to warrant a change of name. The
mere fact that he has been using a different name and has become known by it is not a valid ground for change of
name and that to allow him to drop his last name was to disregard the surname of his natural and legitimate father,
in violation of the Family Code and Civil Code, which provide that legitimate children shall principally use their
fathers’ surnames.
ISSUE:
Whether legitimate children have the right to use their mother’s surname as their surname. [YES]
RULING:
The fundamental equality of women and men before the law must be ensured by the State and its agencies,
including the Court, which principle is guaranteed by the Constitution, the Women in Development and Nation
Building Act, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to which
the Philippines is a party..
Accordingly, where the text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more equally,
that is the correct interpretation. Indeed, the provision of Article 364 of the Civil Code states that legitimate
children shall “principally” use the surname of the father, but “principally” does not mean “exclusively.” This
gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women
and men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it.