1. O’Lao vs.

Co Cho Chit, 220 SCRA 656 (FCD)

Emilia O’Laco vs. Valentin Co Cho

G.R. No. 58010, March 31, 1993
Bellosillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is well-settled that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a

condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Hence,
the defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, for lack of cause of action.

FACTS:

The parcel of land subject of this case is being claimed by petitioner Emilia O’Laco on
the one hand and respondent O Lay Kia on the other hand, who were half-sisters. Both
the deed of sale and the title were in the name of petitioner.

The subject property was consequently sold by petitioner to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, prompting respondent to file a case to recover the purchase price
of the land before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Respondent contended that she
was the real vendee of the property and that the legal title was merely placed in
petitioner’s name.

On the other hand, petitioner asserted that she bought the subject property with her own
money and that she merely left the Deed of Sale and title with respondent for
safekeeping. She further alleged that the complaint failed to allege that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were exerted considering that the suit was between members of
the same family.

ISSUE:

Whether compromise is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of

the same family?

RULING:

YES. Admittedly, the present action is between members of the same family since
petitioner Emilia O'Laco and respondent O Lay Kia are half-sisters. Consequently, there
should be an averment in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, pursuant to Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, 6 or a motion to
dismiss could have been filed under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court.
For, it is well-settled that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is
a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family.
Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, for lack of cause of action.

But, plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint to correct the defect if the
amendment does not actually confer jurisdiction on the court in which the action
is filed, i.e., if the cause of action was originally within that court's jurisdiction. In such
case, the amendment is only to cure the perceived defect in the complaint, thus may be
allowed.

In the case before Us, while respondent-spouses did not formally amend their
complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to introduce evidence purporting to show that
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made, that is, respondent O Lay Kia
importuned Emilia O'Laco and pressed her for the transfer of the title of the Oroquieta
property in the name of spouses O Lay Kia and Valentin Co Cho Chit, just before
Emilia's marriage to Hugo Luna. But, instead of transferring the title as requested,
Emilia sold the property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. This testimony
was not objected to by petitioner-spouses. Hence, the complaint was deemed
accordingly amended to conform to the evidence, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court which reads —

"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. —

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as, if they had been raised in
the pleadings . . ."

Indeed, if the defendant permits evidence to be introduced without objection and which
supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint, then the evidence is
deemed to have the effect of curing the defects of the complaint. The insufficiency of
the allegations in the complaint is deemed ipso facto rectified.
2. Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57

Florante Manacop vs. Court of Appeals and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 104875, November 13, 1992
Melo, J.

DOCTRINE:

While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does
not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth,
are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

FACTS:

In 1972, petitioner Florante Manacop and his wife purchased a residential lot located in
Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between Manacop Corporation owned by the petitioner and FF Cruz
& Co. The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer
for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for
the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in
Quezon City owned by the petitioner. The petitioner contends that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is
therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner’s family home shall be exempt from the preliminary attachment?

RULING:

No, While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does
not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth,
are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Mondequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither
does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have
retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code (Mondequillo
vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner's debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987,
it preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from
attachment.

Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in 1987 or prior to the effectivity on
August 3, 1988 of the Family Code. This fact alone will militate heavily against the
so-called exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied under paragraph 2, Article
155 of the Family Code cited in Modequillo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

3. Patricio vs. Dario III, 507 SCRA 438 (2006)

DOCTRINE:

Dario IV (a grandson) cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him.

FACTS:

In 1097, Marcelino Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla
Patricio and their two sons. Private respondent is Marcelino Dario III, son of the
decedent.

The deceased left several real properties. The parties extrajudicially settled the estate.
Thereafter, a partition of the subject property was instituted.

The trial court partitioned the property into:

1. Perla (petitioner) - 4/6

2. Marcelino (other son) - ⅙
3. Marcelio (private respondent) III - ⅙

The Court of Appeal held that the family home should continue despite the death of one
or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not
partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The
appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of
spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family
home.

Private respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date of
death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property
continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still resides
in the premises.

Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III
were already of age at the time of the death of their father, hence there is no more minor
beneficiary to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said
home.
RULING:

Yes, partition is proper.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

If there is no more beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home will
be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If there are
beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will continue for ten years, unless
at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the
family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and
wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily
include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a
family home.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand

support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting
him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s
parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his
immediate family.

Notes: The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. The family home is deemed
constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family
home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law
4. Eugelio vs. Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103 (2015)

DOCTRINE:

To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to 300,000 in urban areas and 200,000 in rural areas, unless those
maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not
match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of
exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a
family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any
of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

FACTS:

In 1995, the respondent Bell Siblings filed a complaint for annulment of reconveyance,
quieting of title and damages against petitioners Eulogio. The RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents and declared that the house and lot in question is free from any and all
encumbrances by virtue of said equitable mortgage. The RTC ordered the RD of
Batangas City to cancel the TCT in the name of petitioner Eulogio and reconstitute as
family home of herein respondents Bell. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
A writ of execution was issued and the newly reconstituted title was levied on execution.
The said writ was lifted on motion of the respondents on the ground that the same was
a family home. Petitioner Eulogio filed an MR considering that the current market value
of the family home exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000.00 under Art. 160 of the
Family Code and that the same was located in a commercial area.

The RTC ordered the determination of the present value of the family home and
appointed board of appraisers to conduct a study on the prevailing market value.
Respondents filed an MR arguing that the petitioners bid to determine the present value
was a ploy to relitigate an issue that had long been settled with finality. The RTC denied
the said motion and proceeded with the canvass. They filed a Certiorari and Injunction
before the CA. Meanwhile, the RTC dispensed with the valuation report and directed
the issuance of the writ of execution. Respondents filed a TRO which the CA granted
and enjoined the execution sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the family home of respondents may be subject of execution?

RULING:

No.

Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in
Article 153 of the Family Code.

It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the
protection or the preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A houseless,
homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the
community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a
family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered.
The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.

The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however,
are determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind
of property of the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot
exceed the statutory limit.

To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to 300,000 in urban areas and 200,000 in rural areas, unless those
maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not
match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of
exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a
family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any
of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons

constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value
of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the
statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in
its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of
a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations
under Articles 155 and 160.

Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home with
immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims
of their credit
5. Modequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766 (FCD)

DOCTRINE:

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside,
and the land on which it is situated.

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors
should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to
the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

FACTS:

The CA rendered judgement in a civil case entitled Salinas vs. Modequillo et al

rendering a judgment in faovr of petitioners and directing therein respondents to jointly
and severally pay its liabilities. When the judgment became final, a writ of execution was
issued to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur. The sheriff then levied on a
parcel of residential land registered in the name of now herein petitioner Modequillo.
The latter filed a motion to quash the levy of execution alleging therein that the
residential land is where the family home is built in 1969 and that such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment, provided in Articles 152 and 153 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE:

Whether final judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of
execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code?

RULING:
No. Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the
same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus,
the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before
extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family
home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed
constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987
(1988 being a leap year).
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter
shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It
does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such
that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of
the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Thus, the contention of the petitioner is not well-taken. His home is not considered as a
family home since Art 162 is not applicable in the present case. Likewise, Art 152 and
153 cannot be given retroactive effect. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.
6. Benitez-Badua vs. CA, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994

DOCTRINE: Thus, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving:

(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence.
FACTS: The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned
various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 followed by Vicente in 1989.
He died intestate.

Private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's

sister and nephew, respectively) instituted an action before the RTC to pray for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent
Aguilar. They alleged, that the decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives either
any ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted.

Also, despite claims or representation to the contrary, they can well and truly establish,
given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who
pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were
without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa
Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not
related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir.

Petitioner opposed the petition and alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased
Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. Petitioner submitted
documentary evidence, among others:

(1) her Certificate of Live Birth;

(2) Baptismal Certificate;
(3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late
Vicente naming her as his daughter; and
(4) School Records.
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their
legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru
testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage
and that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr.
Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals,
reversed the said decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the legitimate child and thus the surviving heir of the
spouses Benitez.

RULING:No. A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will
show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of
his wife. Thus, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;

(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;

(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence.

Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of
his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then,
the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
bench for it is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that
petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Factual finding of the appellate court
that petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian is meritorious. There was strong and convincing
evidence that Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered
a child.
7. Macadangdang vs. CA, 100 SCRA 73

DOCTRINE: The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of

legitimacy, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as
could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child.

FACTS: Private Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is married with Crispin Anahaw. She
allegedly had sexual intercourse with petitioner Macadangdang. She also alleges that
due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967.

On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave
birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites.

The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent filed a complaint for
recognition and support against petitioner with the CFI of Davao. Macadangdang filed
his answer opposing plaintiff's claim and prayingfor its dismissal.

The lower court dismissed the complaint. Mejias appealed before the CA, wherein the
latter reversed the lower court’s decision and thus declared minor Rolando to be an
illegitimate son of Macadangdang.

ISSUE: Whether the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the
spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw (husband).

RULING: Yes. Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband. The baby boy
subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after
March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent and
petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their separation (if there really was a
separation). It must be noted that as of March 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw
had already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date. The
birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the
celebration ofthe said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged
separation between aforenamed spouses.The fact that the child was born a mere
seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact between petitioner and respondent is
another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from indications, he came
out as a normal full-term baby.The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of
respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of
proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first
120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually
quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence
— the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120
days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of
access may be caused by any of these:

1. Impotence of the husband;

2. Living separately in such a way that access wasimpossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the
husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved,unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to
the contrary; wheresexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be
taken to be the father of the child. To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore,
there must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the
period of conception. The law expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a
circumstance which makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the presumption
of legitimacy; but it may beproved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical
impossibility ofaccess.The separation between the spouses must be such as to make
sexual access impossible. This may take place when they reside in different countries
or provinces, and they have never been together during the period of conception. Or,
the husband may be in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that
sexual union took place through corrupt violation of or allowed by prison regulations.The
presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains,notwithstanding the
husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart,unless the contrary is shown and
this includes children born after theseparation

.With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part
of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it
is still possible that the child is that of the husband. Ithas, therefore, been held that the
admission of the wife's testimony on thepoint would be unseemly and scandalous, not
only because it revealsimmoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it
may have onthe child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief
suffererthereby. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to hiswife.
He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which theinfidelity of his
wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal thatinfidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral or economic interest involved.Thus the mother has no right to disavow
a child because maternity is neveruncertain; she can only contest the Identity of the
child.
8. Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and TEODORA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997
Regalado, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or
the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not
be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact.
As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of
the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the
property of some other member of the family.

FACTS:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew of the
deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father
Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any
ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and
herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they
seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself,
allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latter’s name.

Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone
witness, with documentary evidences offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father
and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of
the exhibits.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground
that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
Guerrero.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an heir,
may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the documentary evidence presented by petitioners are
sufficiently corroborated the declaration of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero of their
filiation.
3. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in
question by right of representation.

RULING:
1. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners.

There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on

sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. It is only
in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside
of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount to an insult to his memory.

2. Yes. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship

between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to
the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946,
categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception
to the hearsay rule.
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the
declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the
common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be
some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that
there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the
relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the
declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his
declarations to the property of some other member of the family.

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance
where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners
are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her
niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the
reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More
importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to
refute that declaration made by the decedent.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole
basis of the decedent’s declaration and without need for further proof thereof,
that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held
in one case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant’s own
relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the
admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is
offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence
unnecessary.

3. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which
the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:

“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the

deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if
they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they
shall inherit in equal portions.”
 “Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants,
and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,
should there be any, under Article 1001.”

“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.”

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half
shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his
total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private
respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of
the property covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
9. Mariategui vs. CA, 205 SCRA 337

DOCTRINE:

Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages.

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when
he was still unmarried .

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163
of the Muntinglupa Estate.

Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina)
filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with
Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and
that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third
marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition
of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition
dated December 2, 1967

The defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was
one for recognition of natural children.

the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of
Lupo Mariategui, including appellants children of the third marriage as entitled to equal
shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition,
were able to prove their successional rights over said estate.
RULING:

Yes.

Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's
birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence
which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In
the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as
their brother Jacinto.

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents
are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the
filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is
properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156
SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
10. Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, 594 SCRA 648 (2009)

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, et al. v. RONALD PAUL S. GARCIA, in his capacity
as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City

594 SCRA 648, (2009)

DOCTRINE:

Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must
be signed by putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172. It is
therefore implied.

Special circumstances to the case:

Died 2 months prior to child’s birth

Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented

Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who stand to be

affected by their hereditary rights

The Court then adopted the ff. rules:

1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent

2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence

FACTS:

Jenie dela Cruz and Dominique Aquino lived together as husband and wife. Two
months after Dominique‘s death, Jenie gave birth to a child. Jenie applied for
registration of the child‘s birth, using Dominique‘s surname Aquino, with the Office of the
City Civil Registrar. She attached to the Affidavits a document entitled
―”AUTOBIOGRAPHY” – a handwritten document by Dominique which states that he
and Jenie ―”fell in love with each other, then we became good couples. And as of now
she is pregnant and for that we live together in our house now.”

The City Civil Registrar denied Jenie‘s application, holding that the child cannot use the
surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately
died prior to his birth. Jenie filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, which
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the autobiography was unsigned and it does
not contain any express recognition of paternity.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity

RULING:

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the
private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child‘s paternity must be signed by
the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related
provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his
signature.

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must
affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code.
Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such
requirement; it did not ―unduly expand‖ the import of Article 176 as claimed by
petitioners.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique‘s
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the
law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child‘s birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to
the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie‘s testimony is
corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique‘s father Domingo Aquino
and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be
affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominique‘s paternity of the child give life to his statements in
his Autobiography that ―”JENIE DELA CRUZ is ―MY WIFE” as ―”WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER “and ―”NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER.”

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique‘s
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other
relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living
together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents‘ house in
Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child
– they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique‘s.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the ―”paramount consideration”
in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic.
11. Ong vs. CA, 272 SCRA 725

Ong vs. CA
G.R. No. 95386 May 29, 1997
Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE:

The phrase "any evidence or proof" in the last paragraph of Art. 283 operates as a
blanket provision covering all cases in the preceding ones, so that evidence, even
though insufficient to constitute proof under the other paragraphs, may nonetheless be
enough to qualify the case under par. 4.

FACTS:

Manuel Ong, representing himself as Alfredo Go, was introduced to Saturnina Caballes.
In no time, the two had a relationship. Saturnina testified that she and Manuel Ong lived
together for four months. On June 28, 1955, Alfredo Ong, Jr. was born in Talamban. He
was registered in the Local Civil Registry as Alfredo Go, Jr. On August 17, 1956, Robert
Ong was born.

Thereafter, the financial support from Manuel Ong started to dwindle, until seven
months later when Manuel Ong stopped seeing her. This prompted Saturnina to look for
him. She discovered his identity as Manuel Ong. Saturnina asked Manuel Ong for
financial support of their children, but he refused her request.

Alfredo filed a complaint for recognition and support against Manuel Ong. The complaint
was amended to include Robert as co-plaintiff.

The CA declared private respondents the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong pursuant
to Art. 283, pars. 2, 3 and 4.

Petitioner contends that Manuel Ong's acts of recognition were intermittent and isolated
and not continuous. Petitioner also contends that the refusal of Manuel Ong to
recognize and give support to private respondents is proof that he never recognized
them as his children.

With regard to the application of par. 3 of Art. 283, petitioner points out that the CA
simply referred to its main decision and that of the trial court in holding that there was
cohabitation when the fact is that neither in the appellate court's decision nor in that of
the trial court was it found that there was cohabitation. On the contrary, the trial court
held that there was no cohabitation because Manuel Ong and Saturnina Caballes did
not openly live together as husband and wife, for a period of time, under the same roof,
but did so clandestinely.
ISSUE:

Whether Ong is obliged to recognize Alfredo Jr. and Robert as his natural children?

RULING:

YES. We agree that this case does not fall under pars. 2 and 3 of Art. 283 of the Civil
Code. As petitioner well states, the four times during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo
and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. The father's conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Here there are no acts shown of Manuel Ong
treating Alfredo Ong, Jr. as his son except on the four occasions during which they met.
In the case of Robert Caballes, there is no proof at all that Manuel Ong treated him as
his son.

Nor can it be said that there was proof of cohabitation in this case. While Saturnina
Caballes testified that she and Manuel Ong lived together for four months as husband
and wife in order to justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and
public so as to constitute cohabitation. While the parties are not required to hold
themselves out as husband and wife, neither must they act clandestinely or secretly,
otherwise they will be considered to have merely engaged in illicit sexual intercourse.

Nonetheless, we hold that the evidence in this case sufficiently makes this case fall
under the last paragraph of Art. 283, i.e., any other evidence showing that Manuel Ong
was the father of private respondents. In Ilano v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that
the phrase "any evidence or proof" in the last paragraph of Art. 283 operates as a
blanket provision covering all cases in the preceding ones, so that evidence,
even though insufficient to constitute proof under the other paragraphs, may
nonetheless be enough to qualify the case under par. 4.

In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with
Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957) which, had it been openly done, would
have constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof that private respondents were
conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of Ong's
paternity. This relationship was further established through the testimony of Constancia
Lim.

The evidence for private respondents is not negated by the admission of Saturnina
Caballes that she had relation with another man before, because the relationship
terminated at least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before the
birth of the second child Robert Caballes.
12. Perla vs. Baring, 685 SCRA 101 (2012)

ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012
Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father
to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection
and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a
nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire
to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally,
but continuously.

FACTS:

Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively
respondents), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio.

They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law
spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November
11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and
failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered
to support Randy.

Mirasol presented Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating
her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied
the information in the said certificates.

Randy claimed that he knew Antonio to be the husband of her mother and as his father.
He recounted having met him for the first time in 1994 in the house of his Aunt Lelita,
Antonio’s sister, where he was vacationing. During their encounter, Randy called
Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged him. When Randy asked
him for support, Antonio promised that he would support him. Randy further testified that
during his one-week stay in his Aunt Lelita’s place, the latter treated him as member of
the family.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was
affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents were able to establish the filiation of Randy to Antonio?

RUING:

No. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family
Code which provide as follows:

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

xxxx

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the
father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to
Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.60 It is settled that "a certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate."61 We also cannot lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied
certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any
participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature
thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied
certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth
certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation. Most
important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the
witness stand.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their
first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio
hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a
relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be
considered as indications of Randy’s open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of
the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity.1âwphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously."62 Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and
promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he father’s conduct towards his son must be
spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist."63 Here, except for that singular
occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his
son.64 Neither can Antonio’s paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated
Randy. To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have been done due to charity or some
other reasons.
13. Lucas vs. Lucas, 650 SCRA 667 (2011)

Doctrine: To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding
of the test.

Facts: Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas in Manila.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that
the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that
Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by
Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not
yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in
favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a
traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

Issue: WHETHER DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE

PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION

Ruling: Yes.

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of
right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding
of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search,"
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable
cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained —

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be
made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested
and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for
blood testing.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for
DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order
remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether
there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of
evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the
court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
14. Alanis vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 216425, Nov. 11, 2020

DOCTRINE: Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together with the State's declared
policy to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, a
legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a last name.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC to change his name. He alleged that
he was born to Mario Alanis y Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al-Raschid, and
that the name on his birth certificate was "Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III." However, he
wished to remove his father's surname "Alanis III," and instead use his mother's maiden
name "Ballaho," as it was what he has been using since childhood and indicated in his
school records. He likewise wished to change his first name from "Anacleto" to
"Abdulhamid" for the same reasons.

During trial, petitioner testified that his parents separated when he was five years old.
His father was based in Maguindanao while his mother was based in Basilan. His
mother testified that she single handedly raised him and his siblings.

As summarized by the RTC, petitioner presented various in evidence to support his

claim such as id’s, yearbook, diploma, etc.

RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the legitimate children have the right to use their mothers' surnames
as their surnames and whether petitioner in this case has the right to change the first
name.

RULING: The legitimate have the right to use their mother’s surnames as their surname
instead of their father’s. Petition also has been granted to change the first name.

Article 364 of the Civil Code provides that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The RTC’s application of Article 364 is
incorrect. Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the
surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean "exclusively."

Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate children cannot use their
mothers' surnames. Contrary to the State policy, the trial court treated the surnames of
petitioner's mother and father unequally.

The fundamental equality of women and men before the law shall be ensured by the
State. This is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, a statute, and an
international convention to which the Philippines is a party.

Petition to change name was filed to avoid confusion. Petitioner has been using the
name Abdulhamid Ballaho in all his records and transactions. He is also known to and
called by his family and friends by such name. He has never used the name Anacleto
Ballaho Alanis III even once in his life. To have the petitioner suddenly use the name
Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III would cause undue embarrassment to the petitioner since he
has never been known by such name.

The purpose of the law in allowing change of name as contemplated by the provisions
of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his
personality and to provide his best interest.

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue
of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the
court. Here, respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper and
reasonable reason.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 26, 2014 Decision and December
15, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 02619-MIN, as well as
the April 9, 2008 and June 2, 2008 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch 12 in Special Proceeding No. 5528, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
15. Mendoza vs. CA, 201 SCRA 675

DOCTRINE:

Article 172 stated, that in the event of the foregoing evidence the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws”. In this
particular case, Rules of Court 130, Section 39 gives light on the matter further:

Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.

FACTS:

The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.
Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on
August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro
Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza
recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the
rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.

Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that
her father was Casimiro. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but
she used to visit him at his house. When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro
bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood.
Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband.
In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later
he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14,
1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the
Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years later,
Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro
ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita.

Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous
possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or
of his family. On appeal, however, the respondent court disagreed and found that
appellant has sufficiently proven her continuous possession of such status.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of

an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza?

2. Whether or not Teopista can be considered as illegitimate child?

RULING:

1. NO.

Under both Article 283 of the Civil code and Article 172 of the Family code, court
agreed with the trial court, but, although Teopista has failed to show that she was
in an open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, she nevertheless established it by another method;

2. YES.

Article 172 stated, that in the event of the foregoing evidence the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws”. In this particular case, Rules of Court 130, Section 39 gives light
on the matter further:

Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration

of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.

However, there are following requisites that have to be complied before the act of
declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:

1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

2. The pedigree must be in issue.

3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar.

The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely,
the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both
dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of
Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the
complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the
complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and
Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been
established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was
mentioned as one of his heirs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered

DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late
Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
16. Grande vs. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698 (2014) (FCD)

Grace Grande vs. Patricio Antonio

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Velasco, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

FACTS:

Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio lived together as husband
and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of
this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, who were
not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births.

The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United
States with her two children. That prompted respondent to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before RTC Cagayan.

Accordingly, RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, giving him the full or sole
custody of the children. On appeal, CA modified the RTC decision, the sole custody was
then given to petitioner, ratiocinating that notwithstanding the father’s recognition of his
children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent
the most compelling of reasons. The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal
consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the
minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child"
clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the
CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." The same was
denied, hence the case was elevated to the SC. Petitioner argued that Article 176 of the
Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in
permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
ISSUE:

Whether there is a legal basis for the CA to order the change of the surname of the
children to that of respondent?

RULING:

THERE IS NONE. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in
the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname
of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and
operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children
are to be measured is their best interest. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s
surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible
situation considering his circumstances.

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s
surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255, which states:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

xxxxxx

7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall
use the surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF
[Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].

7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall
use the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.

7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she
has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate
instrument duly notarized.

Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a

legislative act. To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of
no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be
known.

As to custody, parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the
mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is
given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the
dispositive portion of which shall read:
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case
No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:

a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by
virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;

b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights at least twice a week, and may only take
the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:

c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the
rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and

d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,

Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.

Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and
VOID.

SO ORDERED.
17. Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, 594 SCRA 648 (2009)

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as
City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
Carpio Morales, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing
the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein
an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence

submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant

and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to
have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.

FACTS:

In 2005, petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz and Christian Dominique Aquino lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, Jenie, who continued
to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her minor child Christian Dela Cruz
"Aquino"

Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino,
with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in
his own handwriting.

The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City denied the said application. It held that the child
cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child.

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name before
the RTC.
The trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the
Autobiography was unsigned.

Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father can be considered
as a recognition of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument", which entitles the said
minor to use his father’s surname?

RULING:

No, In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the
law

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child
to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an
admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in
any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the
private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by
the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related
provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his
signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must
affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code.
Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such
requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by
petitioners.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the
law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to
the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie’s testimony is
corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino
and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be
affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in
his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER."

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other
relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living
together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents’ house in
Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child
– they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence

submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant

and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to
have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in
resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic.
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x." Too, "(t)he
State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development."

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is
to petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now
deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

18. Republic vs. Bobiles, 205 SCRA 356

DOCTRINE:

It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading
up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the
adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming
to it as a result of the adoption.

FACTS:

In 1988, Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, who was then 6 months
old. Jason has been living with her family in Legaspi since he was 4 months old. The
RTC issued an order setting the hearing. The order was duly published yet nobody
appeared to oppose the petition.

RTC disposed the case in the effect that Jason be: to all intents and purposes, the child
of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed
to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.

The OSG contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was
filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185
of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses.

The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on
February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either
of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision
and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No.
209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for
adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent was attached to the petition and
expressly made an integral part thereof. Thisshows that he himself actually joined his
wife in adopting the child

ISSUE:

Whether the affidavit of consent of Dioscoro, is sufficient, despite him not being named
as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife

RULING:
The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a
substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the
proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of
the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings
where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental
care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow
childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally
a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of the la
19. Lahom vs. Sibulo, 406 SCRA 135 (FCD)
DOCTRINE
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right
to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out
to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have
to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will
and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of
his estate.
FACTS

Petitioner, and her husband, who later died, are the adoptive parents of herein
respondent. At the age of two, respondent was under the care of herein petitioners and
he enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated him as their own
child. As such, in 1971 the couple decided to file a petition for adoption which was
granted on May 5, 1972. The Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name of herein
respondent from Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. However, in December
1999, Lahom filed a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the RTC and
averred that despite the pleadings of the Lahom spouses, respondent refused to
change his surname and even continued using his surname Sibulo in his records with
the PRC, and in all his dealings in connection with the practice of his profession.
However, on March 22, 1998, RA 8552 or Domestic Adoption Act went into effect and
the new statute deleted ther right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. With this,
Sibulo moved for the dismissal of the petition for lack of cause of action. The RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground that since the effectivity of RA 8552, indeed,
petitioner lacks cause of action.

Hence, this present petition. Lahom argued that RA 8552 should not adversely affect
her right to annul the adoption decree considering that she has vested right under the
Civil and Family Codes, the laws then in force.

ISSUE
Whether or not the decree of adoption may still be rescinded by Lahom?

RULING
No.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action
to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the
Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.27
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it
has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right
to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out
to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have
to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will
and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of
his estate.
20. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009)

DOCTRINE:

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

FACTS:

Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two minor
children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia
Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo registered the
children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were
named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the
children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On 27 December
2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen.

Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552
to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old
and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her
husband, Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption.
The trial court dismissed the petitions on the ground that since Monina had remarried,
she should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. Monina appealed
contending that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the
court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case
since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt?

RULING:

No. The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

a. Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee,
or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
a. Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she
has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
a. a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
b. one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or
c. one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
 a. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
b. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
c. if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
21. Santos vs. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344

DOCTRINE: Consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned,
consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

FACTS: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old,
was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila.

It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could
not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors
have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been
continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody.

The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa,
who was appointed by the Court. Said guardian ad litem forthwith gave his written
consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen years of age, likewise
gave her written consent thereto

After due publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the
adoption.Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate.

Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former,
stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the
estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition
to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the
adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of
their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.

Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of
Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by
Aranzanso.

Court of First Instance ruled that the validity of the adoption in question could not be
assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings.

However, the Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a

collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the
consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab
initio.
ISSUE: Whether failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional
defect rendering the adoption void ab initio.

RULING: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was
abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.”

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends
upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by
the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA
erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that
the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them.

Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the order of
the probate court a quo sustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed.
Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as Consuelo and
Pacita Pasion are declared without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
dissolved, except insofar as it enjoins the intervention or allowance of withdrawals of
properly from the estate by Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo and
Pacita Pasion, in the concept of heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No
costs. So ordered.
22. Cang vs. CA, 296 SCRA 128

HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. CLAVANO

G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
Romero, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to
the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. The written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith.

However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure
of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.

FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married and begot three
children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977,
and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.

Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Cebu, upon learning of her husband’s extramarital affairs Wilma
Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos, which the trial court approved. Petitioner sought a
divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada which issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three
minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and
places to petitioner.

Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang children
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent
alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children and
that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business,
leaving the children would be a problem.

Petitioner contest the adoption, alleging that, although were financially capable of
supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could
not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved
children.

The petition was granted by the lower court which the Court of Appeals affirmed stating
Article 188 of the Family Code which requires the written consent of the natural parents
of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who
has abandoned the child is not necessary.

Herbert elevated the case to the Court on the ground that he didn’t abandon his
children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has abandoned his children and the latter be legally adopted
without his written consent.

RULING:
No, petitioner has not abandoned his children and the latter cannot be legally adopted
without his written consent.

The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree
of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if
the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written
consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption
alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to
the petition for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking.
Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for
adoption by the natural father. The allegations of abandonment in the petition for
adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower
court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the
circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the
requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor children.

However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure
of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of
whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."

In this case, however, petitioner did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While petitioner was physically absent, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The
Court find pieces of documentary evidence that petitioner maintained regular
communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send
them packages catered to their whims.
23. DSWD vs. Belen, 275 SCRA 440

DOCTRINE:

Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:

No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or
the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as
the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on
the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall
intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should
be denied.

FACTS:

The spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are
naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the
minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.

Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were
highly qualified to adopt the child as their own. He based his decree primarily on the
"findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand
and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional
attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor." On these
considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody.
Said DSWD findings and recommendations, as respondent judge asserted in his
judgment, are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña.

However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel
clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the
department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding
said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the
adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no
directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to
coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's
adoption.
As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present administrative
complaint against respondent judge charging him with violating Article 33 of Presidential
Decree No. 603 which requires, inter alia, that petitions for adoption shall be granted
only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the
natural parents and the adoptive parents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an error on the part of the Judge as there was a failure on his
part to notify the DSWD onset of the adoption proceeding as to the case study.

RULING:

Yes.

Indeed, Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms
that:

No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or
the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as
the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on
the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall
intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should
be denied.

The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident.
Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken
was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding
No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted
by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that
possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation.
Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary
for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption
proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination
was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of
the law.

By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in

jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration.
Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be
accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case.

respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively
to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and
submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act.

ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M.
Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby
CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12
of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of
the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for
violating Circular No. 12.

SO ORDERED.
24. Bartolome vs. SSS, 740 SCRA 78 (FCD)

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR

MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

Velasco, Jr.

DOCTRINE:

Insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on

rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated.

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,

Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program
(ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of
his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s
biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death
benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer
considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio
Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.

RULING:
 Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death
is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority
should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking
into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there
are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is

concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike

the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee,
who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While
the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at
least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption
vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which,
the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.