3.

Social Legislation
International Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Secretary (from previous digest)

4. Rules of Court
Office of the Court Administrator v Garong (from previous digest)

Provincial Sheriff of Rizal v CA, et al. (DELA ROSA)

No. L-23114
December 12, 1975
Petitioner: Charles Hollmann and Provincial Sheriff
Respondent: Sandra K. Shaouy
Ponente: Makasiar, J.

Facts:
Sandra K. Shaouy was a tenant of Charles Hollmann at the latter’s house in San Juan, Rizal. Hollmann
filed a civil action against Shaouy for unlawful detained in the Justice of Peace Court. The case was
decided on the basis of a compromise agreement which states that Shaouy must pay the P350 per month
rent (for the months of May to October) to Hollmann within 6 months after signing the compromise
agreement. And that for the faithful compliance of Shaouy with the obligation subject of this compromise
agreement, she must secure a bond with Luzon Surety Co., or any reputable bonding firms within 30 days
from signing the compromise agreement. The failure of Shaouy to comply with the payment obligations
would entitle Hollman to an immediate execution on either bond or her property.

Due to the failure of Shaouy to pay the rentals (a total amount of 6,300), Hollman asked for and secured a
writ of execution from the Justice of Peace. Hollmann levied upon various personal properties of Shaouy
namely, radio phono, matrimonial bed, electric range, rattan set, lamp shade, television, refrigerator, air
conditioning unit, and tableware cabinet for sale for 23 August 1957. In order to stop the sale, Shaouy
filed with CFI on the grounds that Shaouy paid P2,500 to Hollmann and that the remaining balance
should now be P3,600. CFI issued a preliminary injunction on the condition that Shaouy files a bond in
sum of P8,000. Shaouy filed an urgent motion with the CFI seeking to reduce the bond. Motion was
denied and directed respondent to file corresponding bond before 4:00pm or else the sale will proceed.
The sale was held 24 August 1957. Properties were all sold to Hollmann for P801.

Shaouy filed a supplementary petition asking to annul the sheriff’s sale on the ground that it was
irregular, void, and illegal. Court annulled the sheriff’s sale due to the absence of the required notice of
sale and because price obtained was shocking to the conscience of the court. Petitioners, Provincial
Sheriff and Hollmann, appealed to the CA. CA affirmed and modified, stating that the Sheriff and
Hollmann are condemned to pay jointly and severally unto Shaouy the sum of P3,040. Hence, this
petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale was valid? NO

Held:
1. Rules of Court was violated —> Section 16 (b), Rule 39 of the 1940 Rules of Court
Auction sale of Shaouy’s personal properties was void. It was held 24 August 1957 and not on August 23
which was the date advertised for the sale. Provincial Sheriff should have sent new notices to the debtor
and to the public about the change of date for the auction sale. Sheriff also failed to post the notice in 3
public places in the municipality where the sale was to take place for 5-10 days as required by Section 16
(b), Rule 39 of the 1940 Rules of Court. Such omission nullifies the sale.

2. Gross inadequacy of the price paid by Hollmann is too cheap compared to the original price of the
items.
The radio phono, matrimonial bed, electric range, rattan set, lamp shade, television, refrigerator, air
conditioning unit, and tableware cabinet were all bought for only 50% or less from the original price
because (1) second hand and used, (2) Shaouy no longer has the receipt so the original price is debatable,
and (3) depreciation value of 20% a year was applied. The prices are so shocking to the conscience to the
court hence, the sale was rendered null and void. The effect of it must be to return the items to Shaouy but
as this is no longer possible, Hollmann should indemnify Shaouy the amount P4,200. As his judgment
credit against Shaouy was for P6,300 but he also realized in the garnishment the sum of P5,504, the
balance he must return to Shaouy should be P3,404. However, Sheriff must also share this responsibility
because connivance between him and Hollmann has been inferred — given that (1) slae was made on a
day different from that advertised, (2) only bidder there was Hollmann, (3) Sheriff’s sale was held at the
premises of the debtor.

WHEREFORE, petitions are denied with costs against petitioners

5. Law on Adoption
Duncan v CFI (DOMINGO)
No. L-30576 February 10, 1976 Justice Esguerra
FACTS:
Robin Duncan (a British national who had been residing in the Philippines for 17 years)
and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen (an American who was born in the Philippines) filed a
Petition for Adoption with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In the petition, they sought to
adopt a child whom they had baptized and named Colin Berry Duncan. Colin came to be with
Duncan when Colin was only three days old. Colin was entrusted to Duncan by Atty. Corazon
Velazquez, who also served as witness. It was Velasquez who gave the consent for adoption.
The CFI dismissed the petition, because it held that Velasquez’s consent is improper
because the Colin’s mother was still alive- a fact they got from Velasquez’s testimony.
Velasquez testified that Colin was entrusted to her by Colin’s mother. However, Velasquez
refused to name the mother because of lawyer-client partnership, and because the mother asked
Velasquez not to name her because that would ruin her chances to get married once more. Hence,
Duncan filed the present petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
- W/N Velasquez’s consent satisfies the consent required by law with regard to adoption
(YES)
RULING:
 - There are two statutes which state on who can adopt:
o Art 340 (Civil Code) states that the written consent of the parents, guardian, or
person in charge shall be necessary for adoption. Of course, priority is given
to the parent
o Section 3, Rule 99 (Rules of Court) states that a written consent must be
supplied by “each of its known living parents who is not an insane or
hopelessly intemperate or who has not abandoned such child.” In case the
parents are absent, the general guardian of the child must give the consent.
- In this case, while it is true that Colin’s mother is alive, she could not give the consent
because she has effectively abandoned Colin. The mother did not even inquire into Colin’s
condition or give support to Colin, from the date when she entrusted Colin to Velasquez up
to the time of the current proceedings. Given that the mother abandoned Colin, it is
Velasquez, as Colin’s guardian, who is entitled to give her consent.
- On Dura lex, sed lex- this adage is widely used, and is relied upon by the CFI. However,
the law should not be made into an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary
humane policy. In adoption cases, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less
severity and with compassion and humane understanding, because adoption is for the benefit
of unfortunate children.
o Duncan and Christensen already showed that they are suitable parties to adopt
Colin, because they already took good care of Colin even before they filed the
petition for adoption.
- Petition GRANTED, ruling of the CFI dismissing the petition is ANNULLED.

6. Local Government/Local Autonomy

San Juan v CSC (DY) GRNo. 92299
Petitioner: Reynaldo San Juan
Respondent: Civil Service Commission, DBM, and Cecilia Almajose
Ponente: Gutierrez Jr. J.

Facts:
1. The position of Provincial Budget Officer was left vacant. Petitioner, governor of Rizal, endorsed
Dalisay Santos, then municipal budget officer of Taytay, should have the PBO position.
2. Consequently, Director Abella of Region 4, recommended the appointment of the respondent as
PBO of Rizal saying that she is the most qualified nominee since she is the only CPA among
contenders.
3. DBM USec. Cabuquit signed the appointment of respondent upon recommendation of Abella.
4. Petitioner then reiterated his recommendation of Dalisay, being unaware of the appointment of
respondent.
5. DBM Regional director wrote back to petitioner saying Dalisay did not meet minimum
requirement under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget officer.
 6. Petitioner then wrote back again saying that DBM Usec. was not legally authorized to appoint
PBO; that respondent lacked the 3 year work experience requirement provided by the circular;
and that he, not the regional director, has the power to recommend nominees for PBO.
7. Respondent, through the Bureau of Legal and Legislative Affairs, issued a memorandum, saying
that the petitioner’s protest was not meritorious.
8. Petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied.
9. Petitioner filed a resolution questioning if respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge functions of
PBO upon recommendations made by the DBM USec. Petitioner claims that only he has the
privilege to recommend the nominees for PBO; he invoked Sec1. of EO. 112

Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the
Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned,
subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative
control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.

1. DBM responded that it validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since
none of the nominees submitted by petitioner were qualified.
2. On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the
appointment of the private respondent and reiterating his position regarding the matter; again
denied.

Issue: Can the DBM appoint a PBO who was not expressly nominated by the provincial governor? NO.

Held: This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of
local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Petitioner states that the phrase of EO112: “…upon recommendation of the local chief executive
concerned" must be given mandatory application pursuant to the state policy of local autonomy provided
by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision
. . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has limited power
over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and limited by
statute. Also, Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments"

Petitioner further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere
administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing
vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in
public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states: “The DBM reserves the right to fill
up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed
requirements.”
DBM appointment of respondent should be set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of
qualified nominees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to
the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new nominees who have
the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

Decision: Petition is GRANTED. Resolution of CSC is SET ASIDE. Appointment of respondent

Almajose is NULLIFIED. DBM is ordered to appoint PBO from qualified nominees presented by the
governor.

7. Constitution
Bagong Bayani v COMELEC (DY) GRNo. 147589
Petitioner: Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Ponente: Panganiban, J.

Facts: The petitioners assail the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the respondent regarding the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Moreover, the petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing that the party list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties.

Issues:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations.
3. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.

Held: The Supreme Court held in the case of the participation of political parties, under the Constitution
and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of
the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations." This is construed clearly and unambiguous further in Section 11 of
RA 7941 to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision
below: "For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.”

As to the exclusivity to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, the requisite character of these
parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and specifically section 2 of RA 7941 which expresses proportional representation by means
of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of
Filipino citizens;
1) Who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2) Who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3) Who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole.

Finally, the COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. The
OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.

Decision: The Supreme Court remanded the petition to the COMELEC, which is directed to conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. A compliance report is due within 30 days from notice thereof.
COMELEC is also directed to refrain from proclaiming any winner during the last party- election unless
it has complied and reported.

Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS (SUNGCAD)

Manila Prince Hotel (MPH) vs.Government Service Insurance System

G.R. No. 122156
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Facts
1. Dec 8, 1986 – GSIS issued proclamation No. 50 which meant the selling through public
bidding 30%-51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent (Manila Hotel Corp.)
MHC.
2. Sept 18, 1995 – Only 2 bidders participated: MPH Corp (offered to buy 51% at P41.58
per share) and Renong Berhad (offered to buy 51% at P44.00)
3. Sept 28, 1995 – Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as winning bidder/strategic
sponsor, MPH, in a letter to GSIS, matched the bid price of Renong Berhad, and sent a bid
security of P33M on Oct. 10, 1995.
4. Oct. 17, 1995 – because of GSIS ignoring the matching bid, and the chance that the sale
of the 51% of MHC may be hastened, MPH filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus to
this court.
5. Oct. 18, 1995 – SC issued a TRP enjoining respondents from perfecting the sale to the
Malaysian firm
6. On Sept 10, 1996 – Case was accepted En Banc.
Issues
1. W/N sec 10(2), Art XII is a self-executing statute?
2. W/N Manila Hotel forms part of national patrimony?
Disposition
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and
to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Rationale
1. YES. In Constitutional supremacy, “if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution… [the law or contract] is null and void and without any force and effect.” Some
constitutional provisions are non-self-executory like most provisions in Art II. A provision is
self-executory if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
term. Furthermore, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce
a constitutional mandate, the presumption is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. Even though Art XII sec 10(2) would appear as non-self-executing, the legislature
can still enact further laws to enforce the constitutional provision as long as it is in line with the
Constitution. The mere omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not self-executing. Art
XII Sec. 10(2) is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself. From the very
word of the provision, it does not require further legislations to put it in operation. If there
is no statute to enforce a right, such right enforces itself. Where there is a right there is a remedy:
Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES. Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimony to Philippine heritage.
Even though it was an American hotel when it opened in 1912, it quickly evolved to be Filipino.
It became the Japanese’s military headquarters in WWII, and was part of the 2 places where they
chose to make their last stand when the Americans returned. For 8 decades, the Manila Hotel had
so much history attach to it. National Patrimony does not only refer to natural resources in the
Philippines, but also Cultural heritage. Therefore, MH is undeniably part of our national
patrimony. Furthermore, this means that MH has become part of our national economy. Selling
51% of the equity of MHC would mean that the winning bidder of the 51% of MHC’s
stocks would have control over the hotel. So the Filipino First policy applies in this case.
Notes
Art XII Sec 10(2) - In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

Francisco v House of Representative (DOMINGO)

GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
Justice Carpio-Morales
FACTS:
On June 2, 2003, Pres. Estrada filed a complaint against Chief Justice Davide for culpable
violation of the constitution and other high crimes. Pursuant to Sec. 3(2) of the House Rules on
Impeachment, the complaint was endorsed by three members of the House of Representatives (HoR). The
House Committee on Justice ruled that while the complaint was sufficient in form, it was insufficient in
substance, thus dismissing the complaint. Four months later, another complaint was filed against Davide,
this time accompanied by a “Resolution of Impeachment” signed by at least one third of all members of
the HoR. While the Constitution holds that no impeachment complaint may be initiated against the same
officer within one year, the HoR argues that the first complaint has not been initiated since the HoR has
not acted on it as a collective body. Furthermore, the HoR holds that “initiate” means that the
impeachment complaint must be deemed sufficient in form and substance, thus, the first complaint was
not initiated yet.
ISSUES:
- W/N the validity of the second impeachment complaint is subject to judicial review (YES)
- W/N the second impeachment complaint is valid (NO)
RULING:
Issue 1: Justiciability
- The validity of the second impeachment complaint is a constitutional question which may be
- Judicial Power includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on that part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
- In cases of conflict, it is the judiciary who has the duty to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments. The Court has the moderating power to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels. If the Court declared a law to be against the Constitution, then the former
shall be void and the latter will stand.
- Requisites for Judicial Power: (1) Actual case or controversy (2) Locus Standi (3) Question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity (4) issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota.
- On Justiciability: The determination of a truly political question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits conferred upon political bodies.
ISSUE 2: Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
- Ruling on the Case: An impeachment complaint has several steps. The beginning or the initiation is the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee of Justice. The first complaint was filed, referred,
and subsequently dismissed. Hence, the filing of the first complaint initiated a impeachment proceeding.
Section 3 (5) means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee of
Justice for action.
- By giving “initiate” a different meaning, the foremost of which is that a complaint is deemed initiated if
the Committee of Justice finds it sufficient in substance, the House Impeachment Rule Secs. 16 and 17 is
unconstitutional. The second impeachment complaint is therefore BARRED.
- Note: “initiate” here must be understood in its common usage, that is, the filing of the
complaint. It is a rule in statutory construction that in the absence of any technical definition, the common
meaning of the words in a statute must prevail.

De Castro v JBC (DELA ROSA)

G.R. No. 191002
March 17, 2010
Ponente: Bersamin, J.

Facts:
- Chief Justice Puno’s compulsory retirement on May 17, 2010 will occur eight days after the presidential
election. The JBC began the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice.
- On February 8 2010, the JBC announced the names of the following nominees to the public for any
complaint or opposition to their nomination who were namely: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate
Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate
Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval.
- Although the process for filing the position of Chief Justice had begun, the JBC had not yet submitted to
the President its list so that the latter may appoint the next Chief Justice due to the controversy in this case
being unresolved. Because of these acts of the JBC, seven different petitions were filed in the Supreme
Court which prayed either for: (1) the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of
at least 3 nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice because the President has to appoint the next
CJ within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy in accordance with Section 4(1), Article 8 of the
Constitution; or (2) prevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection and nomination proceedings for
the position of Chief Justice in accordance with the prohibition provided in Section 15, Article 7.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi or legal standing. (Yes)
2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. (Yes)
3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice. (Yes)
4. Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC.
(No)

HELD/RATIO:
1. Each of the petitioners in the seven different petitions have locus standi. Each have demonstrated
adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy. The issues before us are of transcendental importance
to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. The issue is determinative of the authority of
the President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others
who may serve in the Judiciary. Nevertheless, to dispel any doubt on locus standi, it should be noted that
it is within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirements for legal standing so that it could
address and resolve the serious constitutional questions raised.

2. The controversy is ripe for judicial determination. The JBC already commenced the proceedings for the
selection of the nominees for the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that
the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide
whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President,
makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as
may be needed
3. The prohibition under Article 7, Section 15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Article 7 refers to the Executive Department while Article 8 refers to the Judiciary. Had the framers of the
Constitution intended to extend the prohibition to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they could have explicitly done so. They could have easily explicitly written that the prohibition to be
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court. Since this specification was not
done, it reveals that the prohibition against the President making appointments within 2 months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s term does not refer to the Supreme Court.

Sections 14, 15, and 16 of Article 7 are of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Sections 14 and 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department implies that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department as well. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
Furthermore, the framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because
the establishment of the JBC and the process of nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be
midnight appointments to the Judiciary.

The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show
that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period as provided by Article 8,
Section 4(1) was a true mandate for the President due to the usage of the word shall - an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear
disobedience to the Constitution.

Furthermore, there cannot be an Acting Chief Justice and the Court because the framers of the
Constitution intended the position to be permanent

4. Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be
present: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the
defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the
performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
(e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents mandatory 90-day
period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be
submitted to the President lies within their discretion. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein
should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the
Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in
performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained
delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the
President.
Thus, there is no sufficient grounds to grant the mandamus against the JBC. It is premature because the
JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the
President.

Chavez v JBC (DOCTOR)

Chavez v. JBC
GR No. 202242 - 17 July 2012
Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Facts:
The power of appointing members of the judiciary has historically been held by the legislative and
executive departments. When the two were merged during the Marcos era (after the 1973 constitution),
this power became absolute provided that the appointees were simply qualified and not disqualified to
hold such positions. The 1987 Constitutional Commission sought to form an independent governing body
that would prevent any political endeavor from staining the judicial appointments. Hence, pursuant to
Sec. 8 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC was crafted*. This provision stated that there will be
7 members (SC CJ, SoJ, Representative of Congress, representative of the IBP, a law professor, a retired
SC Justice, and a representative of the private sector). Members of the Senate and the HoR would take
turns as to which representative would be admitted into the JBC.

1994 - An 8th member was included to settle the Senate and HoR dilemma as one member from each
would sit in the JBC (each having a 1/2 vote).

2000/2001 - The JBC En Banc decided to allow both members to have one full vote each.

Petitioner assails this action by contending that the Constitution is clear in defining the composition of the
JBC. The provision aims to give each department equal footing in the JBC and that the two
representatives of Congress do not possess any right (even for the half vote) because of this violation.
Furthermore, they claim that the JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings because of its illegal and
unconstitutional composition.

Jul. 9, 2012 - The JBC filed a comment through the SolGen saying that since the Congress is bicameral,
then two representatives (from the lower and upper houses) are required to constitute said "Congress."
Literal adherence to the law would be absurd and contrary to the bicameral nature of Congress. If one
member is placed in the JBC, then the other house is deprived of its representation. Having 2 members of
Congress does not cause a political risk because they may come from different parties and this does not
necessarily put an imbalance in the council.

Issue:
W/N judicial review is warranted in this case? YES.
W/N the current practice of having 8 members of the JBC runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution? YES.

Held:
4 requirements for judicial review: a.) actual controversy, b.) locus standi of petitioner, c.) question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time, and d.) issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota (cause/motivation of suit) of the case. Locus standi is present because this is a
constitutional question and the public right of the petitioner as a taxpayer (since the JBC derives financial
support for its functions from taxes). All other requirements have been met.

The law is clear, hence verbal legis. "[A] representative of Congress" clearly refers to only 1 person. If
the framers had the intention of having more than 1 representative from Congress, they could have
indicated it. If a word or a phrase is ambiguous, then it must be understood based on the other words,
phrases, provisions of the statute. The context must always be taken in consideration to harmonize the
provisions of the law. The use of the word, "Congress," is generic and does not necessarily refer to the
bicameral nature of the legislature. No particular phrase or statement is aimed at distinguishing the
Senate and the HoR from the Congress. A former member of the Court and JBC consultant stated in his
memorandum that, "from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of
members pertained to a single individual only." Ratio legis is not needed in this case because the
language of the law is very clear. Having 7 members is also practical as to prevent any draw in voting.
The current system therefore defeats this purpose. Also, the duties of the JBC is not parallel to that of
Congress, hence the separation of the upper and lower houses is not entirely relevant to the JBC. To
maintain the equality between the 3 branches, Congress refers to the legislature and hence must produce
only one representative.

"Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer."

Although unconstitutional acts are illegal, the doctrine of operative facts provide that actions previous to
the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.

Ruling:
Petition GRANTED. Current numerical composition of the JBC is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

*Sec. 8 Art. VIII 1987 Constitution

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of
the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for
two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a
record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal (Leonen, J.)

Petitioners: Rizalito Y. David
Respondents: SET, and Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares

FACTS
1. Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by
Edgardo Militar. He turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar and named her Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry. She was adopted by FPJ
and Susan Roces. She was naturalized in the USA and worked there, but upon the death of FPJ,
she returned to the Philippines and renounced her US citizenship in accordance to the procedures
of RA 9225 (Retention or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship).
2. Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares decided to run as a Senator in the 2013 Elections. She
executed her Certificate of Candidacy, won the elections, and was declared as senator-elect on
May 2003.
3. Rizalito Y. David, a losing candidate, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo
Warranto. He contested the election of Poe for failing to, "comply with the citizenship and
residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution."
4. The Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its Decision (assailed in this case) finding Senator Poe
to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.
5. David filed for an MR. The Senate Electoral Tribunal denied the MR. David then files for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES
1. W/N Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution? YES.

HELD
1. At the heart of the controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Resolving this controversy hinges on
constitutional interpretation. The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must
necessarily begin with the text itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is the
principal source from which the Court determines Constitutional intent.
2. Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the
Constitution. What is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item.
The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit -- ut magis
valeat quam pereat -- Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to
all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.
3. In Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary, it is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision in the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one
 section is not allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.
4. Art 4, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines: 1)
Those who are citizens of the PH at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; 2) Those whose
fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3) Those born before Jan. 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect PH citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4) Those who are
naturalized in accordance with law.
5. Art 4, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution identifies who are natural-born citizens: Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3, Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
6. Grace Poe never went through the actual naturalization process; she did not have to perfect her
citizenship. She merely reacquired her PH citizenship when she returned to the PH from the
United States. Construing Article 4, sec 2 and sec 1 of the Constitution together is imperative in
accordance to the statutory construction of the Constitution, where it must be construed as a
whole while its provisions should be in harmony with each other. Her acts in accordance to RA
9225 (Retention or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship) where she made the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines as required in the provision is merely similar to the
naturalization process. However, she did not have to perfect her citizenship in any way, but only
reacquired it after having become a US naturalized citizen and returning to the country of the
Philippines.

DECISION
Petition DISMISSED. Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen qualified to hold
office as a Senator of the Philippines.