Professional Documents
Culture Documents
HELD: ISSUE:
Yes, former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of Whether or not RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant to the
the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo. It is well-entrenched that where the words Position Classification Act despite its exemption from laws involving position classification.
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a HELD:
statute there should be no departure. It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the No, under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
civil and political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration. plain-meaning rule or verba legis is derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention) and rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
b. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. legislature in a statute correctly express its intent and preclude the court from construing it
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, (G) differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013 advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.
Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
FACTS: The phrase "to endeavour" means to "to devote serious and sustained effort" and "to make an
August 30, 2001, Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Financial effort to do." It is synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek. The use of "to
Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled corporation endeavour" in the context of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORP’s exemption from laws
(GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was included in involving compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it should still strive to
TIDCORP’s Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was submitted to the conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in RA 6758. The phrase
CSC – Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office. "as closely as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP’s duty "to endeavour to conform," recognizes
September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman’s appointment that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from the Position Classification Act, but it should still
because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in the DBM’s Index try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent of Congress been to require
of Occupational Service. TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with the Position Classification Act, it would have
TIDCORP’s Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavour to
Guzman’s appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC- NCR. According to Tambanillo, conform to the principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.
Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORP’s charter, empowers its Board of Directors to
create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve its own compensation 2. Dura lex sed lex
and position classification system and qualification standards. a. OLYMPIO REVALDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, (A w/ Mod)
CSC-NCR Director Padilla denied Tambanillo’s appeal because De Guzman’s appointment G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009
failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, which requires
that the position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved FACTS:
Position Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. Since the Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in
position of Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code.
Service, de Guzman’s appointment to this position must be invalid. June 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Maasin, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, the
accused, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any February 16, 1996, the trial court issued an Order finding that the summons was validly served
legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government to respondent through his brother, Michael. It thus declared respondent in default and allowed
authorities. petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court
Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the PNP in Maasin, Southern Leyte, documents were furnished to respondent.
testified that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro March 1, 1996, Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a
Rojas, SPO3 Melquiades Talisic and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit to the house of petitioner to verify the Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the summons or that he was authorized to
report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the necessary documents. receive summons on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the substituted service did not comply
They were not armed with a search warrant on that day.They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
different varieties lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner. October 4, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying Michael Francisco’s Manifestation
September 5, 1997, the RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the offense and Motion for lack of merit. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and hereby orders
charged and sentencing him. defendant to pay plaintiff.
August 23 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Court of November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that
Appeals ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the he received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on 9 November 1999; that the same was contrary
lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. to the law, facts, and evidence, and praying that his appeal be given due course.
August 13, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed Decision granting the
ISSUE: appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court. The appellate court held that the service of
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was legal. summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial court. Since
it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, the trial court’s decision was
HELD: void.
Yes, even without a search warrant, the personnel of the PNP can seize the forest products cut,
gathered or taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 of the Forestry Code. ISSUE:
Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police Whether or not there was a valid service of summons upon the respondent.
officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and
ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents HELD:
therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Yes, there was a valid service of summons upon the respondent. The purpose of summons is
Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that
crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim
On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we deem it necessary to discuss the matter. against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that respondent was duly apprised of
Violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft with the penalties the action against him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner.
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code However, since respondent refused to disclose his true address, it was impossible to personally
serve summons upon him. Considering that respondent could not have received summons because
b. ARNEL SAGANA v. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, (G) of his own pretenses, and has failed to provide an explanation of his purported "new" residence,
G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009 he must now bear the consequences.
It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law with its spirit. Thus, it is not altogether
FACTS: surprising that two competing values are usually discernable in every controversy – the principle
December 13, 1994, petitioner Arnel Sagana filed a Complaint for Damages before the of dura lex sed lex versus the notion that technicalities should yield to broader interests of justice.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and raffled to Branch 99. Petitioner alleged that on 20 In our rules of procedure, for instance, judges often struggle to find a balance between due
November 1992, respondent Richard A. Francisco, with intent to kill and without justifiable process considerations and a liberal construction to secure a just disposition of every action.
reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. As a result, petitioner incurred medical
expenses and suffered wounded feelings, and was compelled to engage the services of a lawyer, B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
due to respondent’s refusal to pay said expenses. Petitioner thus demanded payment 1. Statutes must be capable of interpretation
of P300,000.00 as actual damages, P150,000.00 as moral damages,P50,000.00, exemplary a. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, (G)
damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
January 31, 1995, process server Manuel S. Panlasigui attempted to serve summons at
respondent’s address at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was unsuccessful. In his FACTS:
Server’s Return, Panlasigui stated that he tried to personally serve the summons to respondent at December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
his given address. However, the occupant of that house told him that respondent is unknown at Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits
said address. Panlasigui also declared that diligent efforts were exerted to serve the summons but of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative.
these proved to be futile. Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order
respondent’s office through registered mail. However, despite three notices, respondent failed to directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
pick up the summons. Initiative on the 1987 Constitution including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment,
August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar again tried to serve the summons at the address and the signature form, and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general
of the respondent but no avail. According to Iconar’s handwritten notation on the summons, he circulation at his own expense and setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00
was informed by Michael Francisco, respondent’s brother, that respondent no longer lived at said a.m.
address. However, he left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco. December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that it
November 10, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
despite service of summons, respondent still failed to file an Answer. December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three
systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical
left to some future law. grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for
a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Petition, and private respondents uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation
January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They argue therein (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat
that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to propose had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to
amendments to the constitution. comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
ISSUE: Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of
amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the
such initiative. instant case.
July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
HELD: Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that
No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not of this case.
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20,
therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to
which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the the proceedings in this case.
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in
ordinances, or resolutions." this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010..
Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution
and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 restates the ISSUE:
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among
other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended HELD:
or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which,
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-
for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A.
is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00
for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
2. Ratio legis est anima possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
a. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, (D) elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011 existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable
of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
FACTS: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
(LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the
not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
b. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013 sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
FACTS: "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political 3. Literal import must yield to intent
party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections a. AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY v. JOSE B. LINGAD, (D)
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC,
on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in FACTS:
the printing of the official. In the petition for declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose B. Lingad and the then
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben F. Santos being named as respondents,
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated alleged that it was duly
of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. incorporated on January 5, 1961 and that from the start of its operation, its employees were paid
No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). on a daily and monthly basis.
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the April 21, 1965 the aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that respondents construed its
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for provision "in such a way as to require the petitioner to increase the salaries of all the monthly paid
the elections. employees of the petitioner to a minimum of P180.00 (not P152.00) which according to them is
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary the applicable minimum wage rate for the monthly paid employees.
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. Petitioner sought to justify its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin of respondents
requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for employees paid on a monthly basis
ISSUE: in this wise: The petitioner believes that Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 particularly that portion
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to employees in excess of the minimum wage established
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections. in the Act only refers and applies to employers in business prior to and at the time of enactment
Act and that the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements as envisioned in Sec 19
HELD: should not be applied prospectively to employers coming into existence subsequent to the
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions effective date of said Act.
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court The lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: "Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides that 'Any
adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings provision of law previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act that is inconsistent with any
in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the provision of this Act is hereby repealed.' Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A.
COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register No. 4180 has not been repealed; on the other hand, the provisions of Section 19 of R.A. No. 602
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 were deemed and impliedly re-enacted.
prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first ISSUE:
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of Whether or not the lower court decided the matter correctly.
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, HELD:
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision Yes, the lower court decided the matter correctly. Even if the plain legislative purpose so
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two evident on the face of the statute is not to vitalize and implement what the Constitution enjoins,
obvious reasons. still there is no escape from an equally authoritative principle of statutory construction that bars
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be acceptance on what appellant would foist upon the judiciary as an acceptable interpretation. "It is
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be
is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." given to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, decided in 1909, it has been our constant
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the holding that the choice between conflicting theories falls on that which best accords with the
first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party- letter of the law and with its purpose. The next year, in an equally leading decision, United
list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after States v. Toribio, there was a caveat against a construction that would tend 'to defeat the purpose
and object of the legislator.'
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered acceptable, then there would be a April 5, 2003, Banaria, Banaria & Company in its report, the accounting firm attributed to the
negation of the above purpose of the amendatory act increasing the minimum wage law. That Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994 to 2002.
would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster its policy. It must be rejected. April 15, 2003, a demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy. On the same date,
the children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and
b. UNITED STATES v. TORIBIO, (A) other important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred residence and
15 Phil. 85 (1910) ceased reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint for
robbery against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.
FACTS: July 1, 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao, Accounting and Damages against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete
without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in and true accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company since 1993
violation of the provisions of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and and for the restitution of the said amount.The complaint also prayed for a temporary restraining
slaughter of large cattle. order (TRO) and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling a stockholders’
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was meeting on the ground of lack of authority.
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under September 9, 2003, the Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party
such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of Complaint, praying that their attached Third Party Complaint be allowed and admitted against Sy
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation’s claim for misappropriating corporate
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter funds.
of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured October 8, 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint,
from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal and forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.
slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that January 16, 2004, their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were
the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order, which resulted in their
prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in having been declared in default for failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint; thus,
that municipality. they instead filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
ISSUE: Tan.61The appellate court declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim
Whether or not the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in section 30 Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim
and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases not being provided with a municipal Rules).
slaughterhouse.
ISSUE:
HELD: Whether or not a third-party complaint is prohibited by the Interim Rules.
No, The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft
and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, HELD:
or stolen. If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the No, the third-party complaint should be allowed. For while a third-party complaint is not
appellant, it will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this
record of the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that
large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of
naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
slaughterhouses intent of the whole enactment. Statutes, including rules, should be construed in the light of the
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should be given such
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended. A
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be statute should therefore be read with reference to its leading idea, and its general purpose and
rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the intention should be gathered from the whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that the literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon
sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered some and as a reason for expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation may
for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30. accord with the spirit of the entire act, and so that the policy and object of the statute as a whole
may be made effectual and operative to the widest possible extent. Otherwise stated, the spirit,
c. SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, (G) rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in the rules in this
G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009 case, must be read according to its spirit and intent
ISSUE: HELD:
Whether or not, the SEC has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint. Yes, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke,
withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to
HELD: restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. In the case of Austin-Hardware, Inc. vs.
Yes, The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. SEC was acting pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the Court of Appeals,[7] it was held that the power to license carries with it the authority to provide
Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code, to wit: reasonable terms and conditions under which the licensed business shall be conducted. As the
13. Violation Solicitor General puts it:
If there shall be violation of this Rule by pursuing a purchase of equity shares of a public "If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license, which is a broader
company at threshold amounts without the required tender offer, the Commission, upon power, it stands to reason that he can also exercise a lesser power that is reasonably incidental to
complaint, may nullify the said acquisition and direct the holding of a tender offer. This shall be his express power, i. e. to restrict a license through the imposition of certain conditions, especially
without prejudice to the imposition of other sanctions under the Code. so that there is no positive prohibition to the exercise of such prerogative by the City Mayor, nor
The foregoing rule emanates from the SECs power and authority to regulate, investigate or is there any particular official or body vested with such authority"
supervise the activities of persons to ensure compliance with the Securities Regulation Code, However, Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and
more specifically the provision on mandatory tender offer under Section 19 thereof. the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually
Another provision of the statute, which provides the basis of Rule 19(13) of the Amended granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code, is Section 5.1(n), viz: regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise,
[T]he Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions: to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other
xxx hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her
profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to
engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage
in the practice of optometry as a corporate
body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice
optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of
optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency
specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
The regulatory power to issue licenses or permits extends only up to the regulation of a
business and not in the regulation of a profession. Therefore, the acts of the mayor are ultra vires
and cannot be given effect.
FACTS:
Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) was organized to provide domestic
water services in Brgy. Twang, La Trinidad, Benguet. Respondent La Trinidad Water District
(LTWD) is a government owned and controlled corporation, a local water utility created under PD
No. 198, authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purpose within
municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
October 9, 2000, TMPC filed with National Water Resources Board an application for
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Brgy.
Tawang LTWD claimed that under Sec. 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
August 15, 2002, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional under Sec. 2, Art. XII.
October 1, 2004, upon appeal of LTWD to the RTC, the latter cancelled TMPC’s CPC and
held that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid; that the ultimate purpose of the Constitution is for the
State, through its authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and maintain
ultimate control and supervision over the operation of public utilities. What is repugnant to the
Constitution is a grant of franchise exclusive in character so as to preclude the State itself from
granting a franchise to any other person or entity than the present grantee when public interest so
requires.
November 6, 2004, RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by TMPC.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC erred in holding that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo,
prohibetur et per obliquum – Those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
Under Sec. 2 and 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, The President, Congress, and Court
cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of
Directors (BOD) of a water district and Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create
franchises that are exclusive in character. Sec. 47 of PD no. 198 is in conflict with the above-
mentioned provision of the Constitution. And the rule is that in case of conflict between the
Constitution and a statute, the former prevails, because the constitution is the basic law to which
all other laws must conform to.