Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to
MODULE 6: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND
DEPARTURE THEREFROM
LITERAL INTERPRETATION
VERBA LEGIS
1. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182249,
March 5, 2013 (Application of the rule)
FACTS:
August 30, 2001, Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as
Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080.
His appointment was included in TIDCORP’s Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA)
for August 2001, which was submitted to the CSC – Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Field Office.
September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman’s
appointment because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not
included in the DBM’s Index of Occupational Service. TIDCORP’s Executive Vice
President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De Guzman’s
appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC- NCR. According to Tambanillo,
Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORP’s charter, empowers its Board of
approve its own compensation and position classification system and qualification
standards.
CSC-NCR Director Padilla denied Tambanillo’s appeal because De Guzman’s
appointment failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 40, which requires that the position title of an appointment submitted to the
CSC must conform with the approved Position Allocation List and must be found in
the Index of Occupational Service. Since the position of Financial Management
Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational Service, de Guzman’s
appointment to this position must be invalid.
TIDCORP’s President and CEO Joel C. Valdes sent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David a Letter appealing Director Padilla’s decision to the CSC-Central
Office (CO). Valdes reiterated TIDCORP’s argument that RA 8494 authorized its
Board of Directors to determine its own organizational structure and staffing
pattern, and exempted TIDCORP from all existing laws on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards.
In its Resolution No. 30144, the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR’s decision that de
Guzman’s appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No.
40, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15. Rule III, Section 1(c) is
explicit in requiring that the position title indicated in the appointment should
conform with the Position Allocation List and found in the Index of Occupational
Service. Otherwise, the appointment shall be disapproved. In disallowing De
Guzman’s appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director Bugtong was simply
following the letter of the law.
TIDCORP moved to reconsider the CSC-CO’s decision, but this motion was denied,
prompting TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The petition
asserted that the CSC-CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Resolution No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037.
CA denied TIDCORP’s petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in Resolution
No. 30144 and Resolution No. 31037. The CA noted that filing a petition for
MODULE 6 1
certiorari was an improper recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition
for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, brushed
aside the procedural defect, ruling that the assailed resolutions should still stand
as they are consistent with law and jurisprudence.
In its present petition for review on certiorari, TIDCORP argued that the CSC’s
interpretation of RA 8494 is misplaced
Act, but it should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the
intent of Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply
with the Position Classification Act, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms.
Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavour to conform to the
principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued requirements

pursuant to the Position Classification Act despite its exemption from laws involving
DURA LEX SED LEX
position classification.

HELD:
1. OLYMPIO REVALDO v. PEOPLE OF THE
No, under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009
attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis is derived from the
FACTS:
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) and rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood
express its intent and preclude the court from construing it differently. The lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words day of June 1992, Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value
in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under
there should be no departure. existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the
damage and prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted
The phrase "to endeavour" means to "to devote serious and sustained effort" and
by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on 1997
"to make an effort to do." It is synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle
convicting petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals
and to seek. The use of "to endeavour" in the context of RA 8494 means that
ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of
despite TIDCORP’s exemption from laws involving compensation, position
the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, this
classification and qualification standards, it should still strive to conform as closely
petition for certiorari. Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure
as possible with the principles and modes provided in RA 6758. The phrase "as
conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not
closely as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP’s duty "to endeavour to conform,"
have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the police
recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from the Position Classification

MODULE 6 2
officers were not armed with a search warrant when they went to his house to
verify the report that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the
corresponding license
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without a search warrant is admissible in
court
HELD:
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber was lying
around the vicinity of petitioner’s house. The lumber was in plain view. Under the
plain view doctrine, objects falling in “plain view” of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the
lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber
in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his furniture shop.
There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber.
There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in
possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers
accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and
ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any
legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the
repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be
harsh but that is the law. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner for
violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed.
2. ARNEL SAGANA v. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, G.R.
No.161952, October 2, 2009
FACTS:
On Dec.13, 1994, Arnel Sagana filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of
Quezon City. He alleged that on November 20, 1992, Richard Francisco, with intent
to kill, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. On January 31, 1995,
process server Manuel Panlasigui attempted to personally serve the summons to
respondent, Francisco, at his address: No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City
but was unsuccessful because the occupant, who refused to give his identity, said
that the respondent is unknown at the said address. Subsequently, the trial court
attempted to serve summons to respondent’s office through registered mail on
February 9, 1995. However, despite three notices, the respondent failed to pick up
the summons.The Trial Court then dismissed the case on account of “petitioner’s
lack of interest to prosecute”, noting that the petitioner did not take any action
since the filing of the Server’s Return on 8 February 1995. In response, the
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that he exerted efforts to locate
the respondent and that respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa,
Quezon City. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on
August 4, 1995, conditioned upon the service of summons on the respondent within
10 days from receipt of the Order. Thus, on August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis
Iconar tried to serve summons at the respondent’s address but was told by Michael
Francisco, the respondent’s 19-year old brother, that the respondent no longer
lived at the said address. As such, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael
Francisco.
On November 10, 1995, the petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default, since the respondent still failed to file an Answer despite the service of
summons. The trial court granted the Motion, finding that the summons was validly
served through his brother, Michael, and allowed the petitioner to present his
evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents were
furnished to respondent at his address.
MODULE 6 3
On March 1, 1996, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco, through his counsel,
Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying that he
received the summons or that he was authorized to receive the summons on behalf
of his brother. He alleged that the substituted service did not comply with Section
8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not served at the defendant’s
residence or left with any person who was authorized to receive it on behalf of the
defendant. Michael Francisco also asserted in an Affidavit of Merit that his brother
had left their residence in March 1993, and that respondent would only call by
phone, or write his family without informing them of his address. Thereafter,
Michael Francisco submitted his respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his
Rejoinder, he attached a copy of an Affidavit prepared by the respondent, dated
December 23, 1992, where he declared himself a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita
St. The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, the same lawyer
who represented respondent’s brother before the trial court. The trial court denied
Michael Francisco’s Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, holding that:
“plaintiff had already sent numerous pleadings to defendant at his last known
address. As also pointed out by [petitioner] in his Opposition, movant has not
adduced evidence, except his affidavit of merit, to impugn the service of summons
thru him. Movant herein also admits that defendant communicates with him
through telephone. Movant, therefore, being a person of sufficient age and
discretion, would be able, more likely than not, to inform defendant of the fact that
summons was sent to him by the court.” On 20 September 1999, the trial court
rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff. On November 23, 1999, respondent
Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he received a copy of
the trial court’s Decision on November 9, 1999, and that the same was contrary to
the law, facts, and evidence, and prayed that his appeal be given due course.
On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective
briefs, a copy of which was sent to respondent by registered mail at No. 36
Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City.
The respondent attended the preliminary conference on September 3, 2002, but
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the
appellate court rendered the Decision granting the appeal and setting aside the
Decision of the trial court on the grounds that the service of summons was irregular
and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial court. The trial court’s
decision was void since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he alleged that
respondent did, in fact, reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion,
petitioner submitted the original copy of the envelope containing respondent’s
Notice of Appeal, which indicated respondent’s return address to be No. 36
Sampaguita St. Nonetheless, on January 29, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether there was valid service of summons upon the respondent.
HELD:
YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find there was proper
substituted service of summons upon the respondent. Section 8 of Rule 14 of the
old Revised Rules of Court provided:
Section 8. Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof. The personal service of
summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although unsuccessfully. The trial
court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of work,
but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the
first sheriff's return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the
case. Moreover, respondent’s claim that he moved out of their residence on March
1993 without informing his family of his whereabouts despite the regular calls and
letters is incredulous. It is even more implausible when the respondent admitted
to receiving the trial court’s decision on September 20, 19999 which was sent to
MODULE 6 4
No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City, and that his Notice of Appeal indicated
the same address. He also admitted to receiving a copy of the appellate court’s
order for a preliminary conference which was also sent to the same address. Finally,
it is unbelievable that, since respondent and his brother was assisted by the same
lawyer, none of them was able to inform respondent of the receipt of summons.
Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned
to his original home, if he actually did leave his home.
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that
he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. Under the
circumstances of this case, the respondent was duly apprised of the action against
him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner.
However, since he refused to disclose his true address because of his own
pretenses, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him. WHEREFORE,
the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The 13 August 2003 Decision of
the Court of Appeals and its 29 January 2004 Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
STATUTES MUST BE CAPABLE OF INTERPRETATION
1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC
for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached
“Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the
Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at
the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No.
6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend
that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and
inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A.
No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the
Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
MODULE 6 5
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are
declared void.
RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA
1. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
FACTS:
October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). December 3,
2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite
for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte
and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed
the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A.
No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a
new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and
would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the
provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the
area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of
802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply
with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge
the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as
an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from
territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands,
includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant
case.
July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and
to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,
2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to
file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention
as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed
at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May
10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They
averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the
proceedings in this case.
October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
MODULE 6 6
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
HELD:
Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a
full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the
land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only
be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary
legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government
unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking
into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four
times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of
a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and
the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot
operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the
perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court
should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must
be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the
statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within
the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and
that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within
the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not
accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
2. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
In line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013, approximately 280
groups and organizations manifested their desire to participate in the party-list
elections. However, 52 of these groups were subsequently disqualified by
COMELEC, including some that were duly registered and accredited as political
parties. The reasons for their exclusion were based on the contention that said
groups failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and that their nominees were indeed members of the
sectors they were seeking to represent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from
participating in the May 2013 elections.
HELD:
No, what COMELEC did was merely follow existing jurisprudence set forth by the
SC in its earlier rulings. So for purposes of setting uniform standards and
understanding of the party-list system in the Philippines, the Court provides a
lengthy account of the history and dynamics of the party-list system as embodied
in the 1987 Constitution and as envisioned by the Framers, and institutes new
guidelines to be used in resolving issues of similar nature in the future.
MODULE 6 7
 The lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: "Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides
LITERAL IMPORT MUST YIELD TO INTENT that 'Any provision of law previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act that
is inconsistent with any provision of this Act is hereby repealed.' Sec. 19 of R.A.
No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 has not been repealed; on the
other hand, the provisions of Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being inconsistent with
1. AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY v. JOSE B. R.A. No. 4180 were deemed and impliedly re-enacted.
LINGAD, G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not the lower court decided the matter correctly.
In the petition for declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose B. Lingad
HELD:
and the then Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben F. Santos being
named as respondents, appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Yes, the lower court decided the matter correctly. Even if the plain legislative
Incorporated alleged that it was duly incorporated on January 5, 1961 and that purpose so evident on the face of the statute is not to vitalize and implement what
from the start of its operation, its employees were paid on a daily and monthly the Constitution enjoins, still there is no escape from an equally authoritative
basis. principle of statutory construction that bars acceptance on what appellant would
foist upon the judiciary as an acceptable interpretation. "It is fundamental that
April 21, 1965 the aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that respondents
once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given
construed its provision "in such a way as to require the petitioner to increase the
to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, decided in 1909, it has been our
salaries of all the monthly paid employees of the petitioner to a minimum of
constant holding that the choice between conflicting theories falls on that which
P180.00 (not P152.00) which according to them is the applicable minimum wage
best accords with the letter of the law and with its purpose. The next year, in an
rate for the monthly paid employees.
equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, there was a caveat against a
Petitioner sought to justify its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin of construction that would tend 'to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator.'
respondents requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered acceptable, then
employees paid on a monthly basis in this wise: The petitioner believes that Sec.
there would be a negation of the above purpose of the amendatory act increasing
19 of R.A. No. 602 particularly that portion prohibiting the reduction of wages paid
the minimum wage law. That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster
to employees in excess of the minimum wage established in the Act only refers and
its policy. It must be rejected.
applies to employers in business prior to and at the time of enactment Act and that
the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements as envisioned in Sec 19
should not be applied prospectively to employers coming into existence subsequent
to the effective date of said Act.

MODULE 6 8
2. UNITED STATES v. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85 (1910)
FACTS:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption,
the carabao, without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal
was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant
contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not
prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal
treasure.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions
limits the prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section
33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal
slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2)
cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a
permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the
municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse,
neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large
cattle without a permit in that municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in
section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases not being provided with
a municipal slaughterhouse.
HELD:
No, The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands
against theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their
proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. If, however, the construction be
placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily be
seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of
the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove
in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such
cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them
outside of municipal slaughterhouses
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions,
that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was
enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive
other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought
to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33
of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in
section 30.
3. SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, G.R.
No. 174168, March 30, 2009
FACTS:
February 3 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the
corporation), a family corporation doing business under the name and style Guan
Yiac Hardware, submitted a letter to the corporation’s Board of Directors (Board)
statingthat Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the corporation’s
banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the total bank remittances
for the past years were less than reflected in the corporate financial statements,
accounting books and records. Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free from any
MODULE 6 9
responsibility over all corporate funds. April 5, 2003, Banaria, Banaria & Company ISSUE:
in its report, the accounting firm attributed to the Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as
unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994 to 2002. April 15, 2003, a Whether or not a third-party complaint is prohibited by the Interim Rules.
demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy. On the same date, the
HELD:
children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated
checks and other important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy No, the third-party complaint should be allowed. For while a third-party complaint
allegedly transferred residence and ceased reporting to the corporation. is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones.
Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery against the Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule
Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. July 1, 2003, the in statutory construction, that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for Accounting reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
and Damages against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
complete and true accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by whole enactment. Statutes, including rules, should be construed in the light of the
the company since 1993 and for the restitution of the said amount.The complaint object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should be
also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or preliminary injunction given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and
to restrain Sy Chim from calling a stockholders’ meeting on the ground of lack of secure the benefits intended. A statute should therefore be read with reference to
authority. its leading idea, and its general purpose and intention should be gathered from the
whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import of
September 9, 2003, the Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party
particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon some
Complaint, praying that their attached Third Party Complaint be allowed and
and as a reason for expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation
admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party complaint,
may accord with the spirit of the entire act, and so that the policy and object of
the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the
the statute as a whole may be made effectual and operative to the widest possible
corporation’s claim for misappropriating corporate funds. October 8, 2003, the trial
extent. Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint, and forthwith
construction; hence, a statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read according
directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.
to its spirit and intent.
January 16, 2004, their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan were not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a
court order, which resulted in their having been declared in default for failure to
file their answer to the third-party complaint; thus, they instead filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.61The appellate court declared that
a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules).

MODULE 6 10
 ISSUE:
CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS, CESSAT ET IPSA LEX Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.

HELD:

1. B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, G.R.
No. 93177, August 2, 1991
FACTS:
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place
on December 1 to 9, 1989.
January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted
pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to investigate the petitioners.
January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed
to the petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge
sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims
of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the
proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days
to file their objections in writing through a Motion for Summary Dismissal.
February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days
to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to
peremptory challenge was originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408
(Articles of War).
November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing
the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to
military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.
January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the
termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created there
under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases,
the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules,
we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39
became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the
issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18
of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to
peremptory challenge.

May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by
invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that
peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.

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SUPPLYING LEGISLATIVE OMISSION
1. GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M. BARBA,
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996
FACTS:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United
States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the
appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution,
containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160).
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local
Government Code, disapproved the resolution “for the reason that the authority
and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor.
Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the
appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed
petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other hand,
respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same
position.
June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a
petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of
respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.
ISSUE:
Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?
HELD:
The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor
upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor
respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding
paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner
Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward
Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and
not the provincial governor who appointed him.
CONSTRUCTION TO AVOID ABSURDITY
1. PARAS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the
petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved
to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding of recall
election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction
MODULE 6 12
which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which
states that “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election“.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections,
where the recall election is for Barangay post.
HELD:
NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic. Recall
election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of
recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a
successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping
with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election
as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. By the time
of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
the same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise
disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the
exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person
must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he
be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec.
424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are
not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18.
In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether
national or local).
CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE
1. KAREN E. SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts
of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from
him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was,
however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of
Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11
of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion
therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
MODULE 6 13
HELD: NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD
No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held
to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the
civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount
as would satisfy the judgment. Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes
futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents
fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment
of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned
law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and
oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as
the case before us. The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who
argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System
were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and,
subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit
made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos.
1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such
depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist
or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court
processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of
its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt
in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”
LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE IMPOSSIBLE
1. PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC, G.R. No. 170943, September 23,
2008
FACTS:
December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint
for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The
amount sought to be collected was the petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan
advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of
directors.
Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter
cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed service of summons
by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent
submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondent’s
employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to
petitioner’s last known address.
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication
of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex
parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation
and formal offer of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to
comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by
the clerk of court.
MODULE 6 14
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such
execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner’s
answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the court
committed grave abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper
service of summons, failure to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes
and upholding technicality over equity and justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner
with copies of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings
HELD:
No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus
Motion to Admit Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was
a finding that the Santos was in default for failure to file an answer or pleading
within the period fixed. It is illogical to notify him of the order simply on account
of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address
and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos could not
reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His
residence or whereabouts is not known and he cannot be located. In the case at
bar, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement
cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo
tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws
and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic,
common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy of the
September 11, 2003 order was still mailed to him at his last known address but it
was unclaimed.
NUMBER AND GENDER OF WORDS
1. SANTILLON v. MIRANDA, G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965
FACTS:
November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan,
his residence, leaving one son, Claro Santillon, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda.
During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta
Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following
grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal,
except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties;
(b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her
undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said
spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not
necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration
was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was
better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta
Miranda was appointed administrator of the estate.
March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a
project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro
Santillon.
April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate.
Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from
the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must
MODULE 6 15
be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other
hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of
the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro
claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

June 28, 1961, the court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which is hereby
ruled and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon,
the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the
remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is
after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the word “children” in Art. 996 can also be interpreted as “child” in
accordance with Art. 892?

HELD:

Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular.
So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower
and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of
the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that
"child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous,
because "children" will not include "child".

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow
or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where
the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to
promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

MODULE 6 16