POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
KA-POLI NOTES
This reviewer is made out of love and fear for the law. Please
do not hesitate to share this material because sharing is caring
and karma always has its ways. #NoToCrabs
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5.
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
What are the Rules of Apportionment of Legislative Districts?
Under the Constitution,
(1.) Legislative districts shall be made in accordance with the
number of the respective inhabitants and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio (Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)).
(2.) Each city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall
have at least 1 representative (Art. VI, Sec. 5(3)).
(3.) Each province, irrespective of the number of inhabitants,
is entitled to at least 1 representative (Art. VI, Sec. 5(3)).
(4.) Each legislative district shall compose, as far as
practicable, of contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory (Art. VI, Sec. 5(3)).
(5.) Reapportionment of legislative districts by Congress
within 3 years following the return of every census (Art.
VI, Sec. 5(4)).
What is Gerrymandering?
It is the formation of one legislative district out of separate
territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.
It is not allowed.
What is the Party-List System?
The Party-List System is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the HoR
from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations,
or coalitions thereof, registered with the COMELEC.
The party-list is “not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation.” The framers of the 1987 Constitution did not
intend to leave out “non-sectoral parties” in the party-list
system and exclusively limit it into sectoral groups. The
framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but
not the entirety of the party-list system.
What is its purpose?
The purpose of the Party-List System is to enable certain
Filipino citizens, especially those belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, to
be elected to the HoR.
What are the Parameters in the Election Party-Lists?
(1.) The 20% allocation – 20% of the total membership of the
House of Representatives is the maximum number of
seats allocated for party-list representatives
(2.) The 2% threshold – A guaranteed seat for a party-list
organization garnering 2% of the total votes cast. The
guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of
seat allocation to parties that receive at least two percent
of the party-list votes
(3.) Proportional representation – the additional seats, that
is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed
seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations
including those that received less than 2% of the total
votes
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
(4.) The 3-seat cap – Each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of 3 seats.
What are the New Parameters (Guidelines for Screening Party-
List Applicants) for Party-List Elections as set by the Atong
Paglaum Case?
(1.) Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system:
(a.) National parties or organizations;
(b.) Regional parties or organizations; and
(c.) Sectoral parties or organizations.
(2.) National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector.
(3.) Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections.
A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
(4.) Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers.
The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
Note: the enumeration of sectoral groups which
“lack well-defined constituencies” is not exhaustive.
The crucial element is whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
(5.) A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "well-defined political
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent.
(6.) The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or
that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must:
(a.) Belong to their respective sectors, or
(b.) Must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
(7.) National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified. |
Tobias vs. Abalos
G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994
Facts:
➔ Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged
to only one legislative district.
➔ Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the
bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President
Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
➔ The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they
approved of the conversion of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided
under R.A. No. 7675.
➔ The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population.
➔ Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted
“no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was
deemed ratified and in effect.
➔ Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that
R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional.
➔ Thus, the petitioners argued that the division of San Juan
and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an
increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec.
5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners
contend that said division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements. And
finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4).
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Issue: W/N RA 7675 violates the present limit on the number
of representatives as set forth in the Constitution.
Held: No. A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5 (1), shows that the present limit of 250 members is
not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, "unless otherwise provided by law."
The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself
so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
In the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do
not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed
Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. As to
the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof.
Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which
pertains to itself.
Doctrine: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be
made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The
inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself
so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Mariano Jr. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577. March 7, 1995
Facts:
➔ Two petitions assail certain provisions of RA 7854 as
unconstitutional.
➔ R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati.
➔ This was on the grounds:
 That RA 7854 increased the legislative district of
Makati only by special law (the Charterin violation
of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress
within three (3) years following the return of every
census;
 The increase in legislative district, was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
 The addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the constitution.
Issue: W/N RA 7854 is unconstitutional.
Held: No. These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case
of Tobias v. Abalos.
In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city.
The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an
increase in Makati's legislative district.
Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city
or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that
a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000).
In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
Doctrine: The Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment law. To hold that reapportionment
can only be made through a general apportionment law, with
a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress
will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Montejo vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 118702. March 16, 1995
Facts:
➔ Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First
District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1
of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting
certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representation.
➔ To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the
Second District of the province.
➔ Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second
District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in
his district. We gave due course to the petition
considering that, at bottom, it involves the validity of the
unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of
the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment.
➔ The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and
Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts.
➔ The first district covers Tacloban City and the
municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San
Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
➔ The second district is composed of the municipalities of
Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag,
Jaro, Julita, La Paz, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana,
Tabontabon, and Tunga.
➔ The third district is composed of the municipalities of
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba,
Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and
Villaba.
➔ Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made its
sub-province by virtue of . On January 1, 1992, the Local
Government Code took effect, pursuant to its Section
462, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular
province.
➔ The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.
As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8)
municipalities of the Third District composed the new
province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval.
➔ A further consequence was to reduce the Third District
to five (5) municipalities.
➔ The composition of the First District which includes the
municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth
District were not disturbed.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
➔ Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration
calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among
others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and
voters between the First and Second Districts. To
diminish the difference, he proposed that the
municipality of Tolosa with 7,700 registered voters be
transferred from the First to the Second District.
➔ In this petition, petitioner insists that Section 1
of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality
of representation ordained in the Constitution.
Citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 8 he argues that respondent
COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as
much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's." The
Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the
views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however,
opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736;
and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in
accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed
its own Comment alleging that it acted within the
parameters of the Constitution.
Issue: W/N COMELEC has the constitutional power to transfer
municipality from one legislative district to another, such as
the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District
to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
Held: None. We find Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and
administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and
white in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the
COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it
itself exercised the power.
Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to
make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein
made." The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments" was
again clarified in the debates of the Commission, viz: The
authority conferred would be on minor corrections or
amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have
forgotten an intervening municipality in the
enumeration, which ought to be included in one district. That
we shall consider a minor amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor
adjustment. Can it be possible that one municipality in a
district be transferred to another district and call it a minor
adjustment?
"MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done. Mr. Presiding
Officer. Minor, meaning, that there should be no change in
the allocations per district. However, it may happen that we
have forgotten a municipality in between, which is still in the
territory of one assigned district, or there may be an error in
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
the correct name of a particular municipality because of
changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the
Regular Batasang Pambansa.
Xxxxxx
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor
adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another
district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent
COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created.”
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of
its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative
districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section
5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives
Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3)
years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
In Macias v. COMELEC , we ruled that the validity of a
legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But while
this Court can strike down an unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment
as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent
COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
Therefore, we also deny the Petition praying for the transfer
of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the province of Leyte.
Doctrine: Reapportionment of legislative districts lies within
the jurisdiction of the Congress and thus, COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to transfer one legislative district to another.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
Aquino vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010
Facts:
➔ Petioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and
Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No.
9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition
of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a
New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that
the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained
from making any issuances and from taking any steps
relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
➔ Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No.
4264, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.
➔ The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration
by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
➔ Petitioners rely on Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.
➔ Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning
legislative districts independently from the creation of a
province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000
population threshold, in the same manner that the
Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Issue: W/N a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
Held: No. There is no specific provision in
the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second
sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population
of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a
population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no
other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires
a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled
to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative
districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by
this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.
In Mariano, the issue presented was the converted the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. The
petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an
additional district would violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, because the resulting districts would be
supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering
that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and
the validity of the newly created district, explaining the
operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. "
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000
minimum population requirements for cities only to
its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the
creation of an additional district within acity, should not be
applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if
an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order
to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely
an alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population
requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be
gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission
which, simply put, the population figure was used to
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
determine how many districts a province, city, or
Metropolitan Manila should have.
Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose,
population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an
absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to
the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise
district within the province to which, through the use of the
population benchmark, so many districts have been
apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though
it was among, several determinants.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the
reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of
Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting
additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several
other factors in the composition of the additional district.
Doctrine: 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while
a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a
population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000
Facts:
➔ Petitions for certiorari were filed assailing two (2)
Comelec Resolutions ordering the proclamation of
thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to
complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House
of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
➔ Comelec, together with the respondent parties, averred
that the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in the House under the Constitution was
mandatory and that the two percent vote requirement
in RA 7941 was unconstitutional, because its strict
application would make it mathematically impossible to
fill up the house party-list complement.
Issue: W/N the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation is
mandatory for party-list representatives stated in Section 5(2),
Art VI of the Constitution.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Held: The 20% allocation is a mere ceiling.
The Constitution simply states that "the party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-
list."
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message
that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the
percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a
policy to promote "proportional representation" in the
election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list
seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can
have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of
the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be
shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress.
THE TWO PERCENT THRESHOLD
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent
threshold may result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice
it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust
or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in granting additional seats which violated the two
percent threshold and proportional representation
requirements of RA 7941.
• The Supreme Court held that Section 5 (2), Art. VI of
the Constitution stating that "[t]he party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list" is not mandatory; that this
percentage is a ceiling the mechanics by which it is to be
filled up has been left to Congress;
• that in the exercise of its prerogative, Congress
enacted RA 7941 by which it prescribed that a party,
organization or coalition participating in the party-list
election must obtain at least two percent of the total
votes cast for the system to qualify for a seat in the
House of Representatives but that no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats
therein;
• that Congress has the prerogative to determine whether
to adjust or change this percentage requirement;
• Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according
to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
• and In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.
Doctrine: The 20% allocation in the House for Party-List
Lawmakers is a mere ceiling and is not mandatory.
BANAT vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179271. April 21, 2009
Facts:
➔ For the 14 May 2007 elections, BANAT filed a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution before the COMELEC,
because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to implement
the Veterans ruling in allocating party-list seats.”
➔ COMELEC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60,
which declared 13 parties winners of a guaranteed seat
in accordance with Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7941 (Party-List System Act).
➔ Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared
the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties.
➔ These additional seats were promulgated in accordance
with the Panganiban Formula. (*Note: this case
abandons this jurisprudence as to the computation of
the additional seats.)
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
➔ Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-88 denied the petition of BANAT for
being moot and academic.
➔ BANAT filed a petition certiorari and mandamus
assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
➔ Essentially, this case settles the manner as to how Party-
List Guaranteed and Additional Seats are computed.
Issue: How shall the party-list representative seats be
allocated?
Held:
THE FOUR INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS OF THE PARTY-LIST
(As stated in Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC):
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent
of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Number of seats
available to legislative Number of seats
districts available to party-list
x .20 =
representatives
.80
th
Since the 14 Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives. [(220 / .80) x .20 = 55]
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent (2%) of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a
seat in the House of Representatives.
The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Number of votes garnered
by each party Percentage of votes
= garnered by each party
Total number of votes case
for all party-list candidates
Those who received at least 2% from the total number of votes
cast for party-list candidates, are the qualified party-list
candidates, or the two-percenters, and are the party-list
candidates that are “entitled to one seat each”, or the
guaranteed seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in
a first round of seat allocation, and the guaranteed seats are
subtracted from the total number of available seats.
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two
additional seats;
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in
proportion to their total number of votes”. (Note: in
computing for such additional seats, the 2% threshold to
determine if a party is qualified is struck down in this case.)
COMPUTATION FOR THE ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL
SEATS (Panganiban Formula was Expressly Abandoned)
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats,
the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
[For Reference] R.A. No. 7941, Sec. 11 (b). The
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number
of available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives. In declaring the two percent
threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the two-percenters.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose
there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two
percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for
the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in
relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941.
PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS
FOR PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES UNDER RA 7941, SEC. 11:
(1.) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(2.) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
(3.) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until
all the additional seats are allocated.
(4.) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats"
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System
less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.
There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.
First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, which is the difference between the maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the guaranteed
seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product
of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available
seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Doctrine: Yung buong ruling doctrine putangina
maghanap ka nalang ng asawang mayaman mas madali
pa.
Ang Bagong Bayani—OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001
Note: This ruling has been reversed. In the later case of Atong
Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC, it was held that National or
Regional Parties no longer need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector. In the same case, new guidelines in
the party-list system were provided.
Facts:
➔ With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec
received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
➔ Thereafter, the registered parties and organizations filed
their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and
political parties and organizations whose registrations
were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration,
together with Manifestations of their intent to participate
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties
filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
➔ The Comelec gave due course or approved the
Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
➔ Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna
both filed Petitions before this Court assailing
Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Issues:
(1.) W/N political parties may participate in the party-list
elections;
(2.) W/N the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized
and underrepresented' sectors and organizations
Held: Political Parties may Participate, but must comply with
the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
be elected to the House of Representatives."
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission,
Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-
list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a
chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. He
explained: "In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they
were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So,
they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts."
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections
does not mean, however, that any political party — or any
organization or group for that matter — may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
RA 7941, Sec. 2 mandates a state policy of promoting
proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style
party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House
of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
(1.) Who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties; and
(2.) Who lack well-defined constituencies; but
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
(3.) Who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.
*** Old Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants***
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must
show — through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by
laws, history, platform of government and track record — that
it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected
to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they
are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent
the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.
Third, the religious sector may not be represented in the
party-list system.
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds
for disqualification as follows:
It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
It is a foreign party or organization;
It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or
a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the
party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent
of the government.
10
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements
of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA
7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed
to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties."
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined
political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Doctrine: Political Parties may Participate, but must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
be elected to the House of Representatives."
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013
Facts:
➔ These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-
list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections.
➔ Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the
COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The
COMELEC disqualified some groups and organizations
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
based on these guidelines.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
➔ The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these
two criteria: (1) allnational, regional, and sectoral groups
or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent.
Issue: W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Held: We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts
in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions
applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the
party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision. (Refer to Doctrine for new
guidelines)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that
there shall be "a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different
groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional
parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties
or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-
oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral
party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political
party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides provides the grounds for
the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or
organizations after due notice and hearing, and none of these
8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
11
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration
in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing
provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of
the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer
only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature,
economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of
the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must
have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as
sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the
youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will
allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win
seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to
likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
Doctrine:
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different
groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional
parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional
parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the party-list system to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy
declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific
implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented"
should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar
sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the
sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
record of advocacy for the sector represented.
New Guidelines in the Party-List System:
1. Three different groups may participate in the
party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list
elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral
wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector
they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who
lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or
must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-
fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that
12
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified. |
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190582. April 8, 2010
Facts:
➔ In 2003, COMELEC refused to accredit Ang Ladlad as a
party-list organization under the Party List System Act on
the ground that it had no substantial membership base.
➔ 6 years later, COMELEC refused Ang Ladlad once again,
however, now, on moral grounds. Bullshit right? Wait, it
gets better.
➔ Ang Ladlad argued that their community is a
marginalized and underrepresented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and identity. They are obvious victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence.
➔ Further, COMELEC reiterated that the LGBT tolerates
immorality, which offends religious beliefs.
➔ The COMELEC further pointed out that:
 Ang Ladlad advocates sexual immorality (male to
male sex, and female to female sex);
 Ang Ladlad collides with Article 695 of the Civil
Code, which defines “nuisance”, connecting it to
ang Ladlad as it “shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality”;
 Ang Ladlad collides with Article 1306 of the Civil
Code for being “against morals and good
customs”; and
 Ang Ladlad has been turned down by COMELEC
because the RPC penalizes “immoral doctrines,
obscene publications, exhibitions, and indecent
shows.”
➔ Now, let’s move on to the COMELEC Chairman’s
tiebreaking opinion (nag 3-3 kasi sa COMELEC en banc if
papayagan si Ang Ladlad). Here, he stated that:
 Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral
party in the party-list system. Even assuming that
it has properly proven its under-representation
and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad's
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit
the nation as a whole.
 The party-list system is not a tool to advocate
tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood
persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of
marginalized individuals whose interests are also
the nation's — only that their interests have not
been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until the
time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that
having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
identities is beneficial to the nation, its application
for accreditation under the party-list system will
remain just that.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
 Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance,
and acceptance of LGBT's is elevated, there can be
no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still
males and females, and they will remain either
male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights
that applies to all citizens alike. There is no
question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian
or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any
attempt to any particular religious group's moral
rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as
moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals. They are possibly
religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines
cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim
and Christian upbringing, such that some moral
precepts espoused by said religions have sipped
[sic] into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms.
Issue: W/N the disqualification of Ang Ladlad was valid.
Held: No.
In this case, COMELEC denied the application on the ground
that the ideals of Ang Ladlad is neither enumerated in the
Constitution, RA 7941, nor it is associated with or related to
any of the sectors in enumeration. Further, it argues that Ang
Ladlad made untruthful statements when it said that it had
“nationwide existence” through its members and affiliate
organizations.
However, Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never
claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it
had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and
4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.
Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT
umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines."
Thus, it was sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of
non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent
ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register
as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under
RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad's morality,
or lack thereof.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Clearly, "governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality."
13
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the
Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. There must be
an articulable and discernible secular purpose and
justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses.
This Court is not blind to the fact that, through the years,
homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves,
have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult
to imagine the reasons behind this censure — religious
beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family,
and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we
recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally
accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.
This Court does not suggest that the state is wholly without
authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality,
and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government
will and should continue to restrict behavior considered
detrimental to society. Nonetheless, this Court cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal
reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is
robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of
morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.
Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable
conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals
themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates
our equal protection clause.
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine
population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to
disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent,
the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law
exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior.
Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as
the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here —
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority — is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational
basis review under the equal protection clause.
The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim
that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no Palparan vs. HRET
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike G.R. No. 189506. February 11, 2010
for a disfavored group.
Facts:
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay,
➔ Jovito S. Palparan is the first nominee of the Bantay
bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections.
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
➔ Shortly after the elections, respondents filed with HRET
other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this
a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its
case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
nominee Palparan, alleging that the latter was ineligible
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
to sit in the House because he did not belong to the
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
marginalized sector he alleges to represent (victims of
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
communist rebels, civilian armed forces geographical
units, former rebels, and security guards) as he
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
committed gross human rights violations against
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is
organizations.
in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
➔ Palparan countered that HRET does not have any
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party
list, and not him, that was elected. He claimed that he
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and
was just Bantay’s nominee.
moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are
free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and
Issue: W/N it is the party-lists representative who is
every moral discernment has access to the public square
considered members of the House of Representatives, and not
where people deliberate the order of their life together.
the party itself.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped
by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal
Held: Yes. Clearly, the members of the House of
access to the public square. In this representative democracy,
Representatives are of two kinds:
the state is prohibited from determining which convictions
(1.) Members who shall be elected from legislative distrits;
and moral judgments may be proposed for public
and
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the
(2.) Those who shall be elected through the party-list system
people deliberate and decide.
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic
governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
This means that, from the Constitution's point of view, it is the
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority.
their parties or organizations.
This position gains even more force if one considers that
These representatives are elected, however, through that
homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows
that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality and peculiar party list system that the Constitution authorized and
that Congress by law established where the voters cast their
the activity of forming a political association that supports
votes for the organizations or parties to which such party list
LGBT individuals are protected as well.
representatives belong. Once elected, both the district
representatives and the party-list representatives are treated
Doctrine: The COMELEC cannot disregard an application for
in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights,
Party List on the mere ground of personal moral and religious
salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making
belief. Laws of general application should apply with equal
of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-
sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not tolerated—not by our own laws nor by any
The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees
international laws to which we adhere. moral disapproval,
as "members of the House of Representatives." As this Court
without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
also held in Bantay Republic Act v. Commission on Elections,
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected
party-list system.
member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote
cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in
the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate
cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

14

POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5

KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the
qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list
nominees. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee
must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent."
Primarily, the authority to determine the qualifications of a
party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that
nominated him. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring
nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them
after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates
them.
However, where an allegation is made that the party or
organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee
to become its party-list representative in the lower House and
enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the
resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Thus, it is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nominee — the need for him or
her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-
list organization — in the context of the facts that characterize
petitioner’s relation to his party, the marginalized and
underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
Doctrine: The members of the House of Representatives are
of two kinds:
(1.) Members who shall be elected from legislative distrits;
and
(2.) Those who shall be elected through the party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
This means that, from the Constitution's point of view, it is the
party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not
their parties or organizations.
Phil. Guardians Brotherhood vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010
Facts:
➔ For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en
banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-
list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected
was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of
the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the
2007 elections.
➔ PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but
likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad
cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act.
➔ The COMELEC denied PGBI's motion/opposition for lack
of merit.
15
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
Issue: W/N COMELEC’s delisting of PGBI justifiable.
Held: No. First, the law is clear — the COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it:
(1.) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections;
or
(2.) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.
Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative
intent of Section 6 (8) of RA 7941, as PGBI's cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. Minero therefore
simply cannot stand.
What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization
that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by
default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is
a confused interpretation of the law, given the law's clear and
categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two
scenarios differently.
What we say here should of course take into account our
ruling in BANAT vs. COMELEC. In that case, we ruled that in
computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number
of available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment
of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two
(2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in
light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations
garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify
for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
A percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in This, we declare, is how Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 should be
Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to understood and applied. We do so under our authority to
apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify state what the law is, and as an exception to the application
for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency of the principle of stare decisis.
in which it registered.
Bantay Republic Act vs. COMELEC
To reiterate: G.R. No. 177271. May 4, 2007
(1.) Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or Facts:
combined to support delisting; and
➔ COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804, prescribing rules
(2.) The disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list
and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of
votes in two preceding elections should now be
intent to participate and submission of names of
understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure
nominees under the party-list system of representation
to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections
in connection with the 2007 election. Here, they stated
for the constituency in which it has registered.
that the Commission will not disclose the names of the
party list and its representatives.
This, we declare, is how Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 should be
➔ Subsequently, petitioners filed an urgent petition to
understood and applied. We do so under our authority to
disqualify certain members of certain party-list
state what the law is, and as an exception to the application
organizations. However, both petitioners did not have
of the principle of stare decisis.
the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified;
thus, they asked COMELEC for a copy of this even despite
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial the notice the Commission has posted and sent them.
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
➔ The petitioners averred that the COMELEC is duty-bound
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision
to disclose the list even despite the Resolution, further
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
alleging that such list must be rendered invalid.
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been
Issue: W/N the non-disclosure of the names of the party lists
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
and its representatives under the Party List Act, and later the
closed to further argument.
assailed COMELEC resolution valid.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing

Held: No. Petitioners BA-RA 7941's and UP-LR's posture that
that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine
granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously
of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.
determining the qualifications of their nominees is without
basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that
We are aware that PGBI's situation — a party list group or
the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined
organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization.
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding
election — is something that is not covered by Section 6 (8)
And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa
of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended
Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a
gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address.
petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed
with COMELEC "not later than ninety (90) days before the
This court cannot and does not address matters over which
election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the
full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the
submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the
legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of
election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives
powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should
shall be chosen.
bring this concern to the legislature's notice.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal
Doctrine: to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list
(1.) Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or commanding the publication and the posting in polling places
combined to support delisting; and of a certified list of party-list system participating groups,
(2.) The disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list nonetheless tells COMELEC not to show or include the names
votes in two preceding elections should now be of the party-list nominees in said certified list.
understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure
to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered.

16

POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5

KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. —
The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have
applied or who have manifested their desire to participate
under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all
precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The
names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties
in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for
every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to
respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of
Rights in a constitutional regime. Without a government's
acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in
order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the
rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a
sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any
attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information
and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every
citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right
to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are
ordinarily unavailing.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to
information and its companion right of access to official
records are not absolute.
The policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of
preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such
as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those
affecting national security.
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded
precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from
Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives,
or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of
an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts
to determine, on a case-to-case basis, whether or not at issue
is of interest or importance to the public.
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec
to deny the requested disclosure.
The prohibition imposed by COMELEC under said Section 7 is
limited in scope and duration. It extends only to the certified
list which the same provision requires to be posted in the
polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the
prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something
that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in
R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or
even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified
List" the names of the party-list nominees.
The people have the right to elect their representatives on the
basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to
be informed about matters that have a bearing on their
choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind
voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of
COMELEC.
The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, has
consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way
the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.
Doctrine: The COMELEC cannot withhold the list of nominees.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he
names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for COMELEC to
deny the requested disclosure. The prohibition imposed by
COMELEC limited in scope and duration extends only to the
certified list which the same provision requires to be posted
in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage
of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law
something that is not intended.
COMELEC obviously misread the limited non-disclosure
aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure
before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given
by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension
on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is

involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands
of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "The

names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the

17

POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE VI, SECTION 5

KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva