I. NATURE OF PROVISIONAL Philippine Commercial International Bank v.

REMEDIES Alejandro, G.R. No. 175587, 21 September

• 2007.
Calderon v. Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, 9 January
2013.
• A writ of attachment may be issued under
GMA Network Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No.
181789, 3 February 2016.
• by actual or constructive seizure of the property.
Reyes v. Lim, G.R. No. 134241, 11 August
2003.
II.
UNDER THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
A. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (RULE 57,
SEC. 1-20)
•
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 93262, 29
December 1991.
DOCTRINE:
as
Preliminary attachment is defined as the
provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or
other proper party may,
at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter, have the
property of the adverse party taken into the
custody of the court as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered. It is a remedy which is
purely statutory in respect of which the law
requires a strict construction of the
provisions granting it. Withal no principle,
statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits
its issuance by any court before acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.
DOCTRINE:
Section 1, paragraph (f), Rule 57 – if the
defendant is a resident temporarily out of the
Philippines, to acquire jurisdiction over the action
FACTS:
Petitioner PCIB filed a complaint with issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Respondent, when the latter failed to pay his
obligation concerning the insufficiency of his
deposits resulting from the fluctuations in the
foreign exchange rates. Respondent is a
resident of Hongkong.
Both RTC and CA ordered the quashing of the
writ. Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of
attachment because respondent is a resident of
the Philippines and that his act of withdrawing
his deposits with petitioner was without intent to
defraud, can no longer be passed upon by
this Court. The order has become final.
Later, respondent filed a claim for damages in
the amount of P25 Million on the attachment
bond on account of the wrongful garnishment of
his deposits. He presented evidence showing
that his P150,000.00 RCBC check payable to his
counsel as attorney's fees, was dishonored by
reason of the garnishment of his deposits.
ISSUE:
whether petitioner bank is liable for damages for
the improper issuance of the writ of attachment
against respondent. – YES.

"AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION” RULING:

- refers to the date of the filing of the
complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the
date that marks "the
commencement of the action;" and the reference
plainly is to a time before
summons is served on the defendant, or even
before summons issues.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention that
respondent can be considered a resident who is
temporarily out of the Philippines upon whom
service of summons may be effected by
publication, and therefore qualifies as among
those against whom a writ of attachment may be
issued under Section 1, paragraph (f), Rule 57.

• The purposes of preliminary attachment are:

Mangila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125027, (1) to seize the property of the debtor in advance
12 August 2002. of final judgment and to hold it for purposes of
• satisfying said judgment, as in the grounds
stated in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 1, Rule
57 of the Rules of Court; or
(2) to acquire jurisdiction over the action by
actual or constructive seizure of the property in
those instances where personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant cannot be
effected, as in paragraph (f) of the same
provision.
In actions in personam, such as the instant case
for collection of sum of money, summons must
be served by personal or substituted service,
otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction
over the defendant. In case the defendant does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines
(and hence personal and substituted service
cannot be effected) the remedy of the plaintiff in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try
the case is to convert the action into a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching
the property of the defendant. Thus, in order to
acquire jurisdiction in actions in personam where
defendant resides out of and is not found in the
Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for
the court to convert the action into a proceeding
in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the
defendant's property. The service of summons in
this case (which may be by publication coupled
with the sending by registered mail of the copy
of the summons and the court order to the last
known address of the defendant), is no longer
for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction but for
compliance with the requirements of due
process.
However, where the defendant is a resident who
is temporarily out of the Philippines, attachment
of his/her property in an action in personam, is
not always necessary in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.
Thus, in actions in personam against residents
temporarily out of the Philippines, the court need
not always attach the defendant's property in
order to have authority to try the case. Where
the plaintiff seeks to attach the defendant's
property and to resort to the concomitant service
of summons by publication, the same must be
with prior leave, precisely because, if the sole
purpose of the attachment is for the court to
acquire jurisdiction, the latter must determine
whether from the allegations in the complaint,
substituted service (to persons of suitable
discretion at the defendant's residence or to a
competent person in charge of his office or
regular place of business) will suffice, or whether
there is a need to attach the property of the
defendant and resort to service of summons by
publication in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case and to comply with the
requirements of due process.
In the instant case, the writ was issued by the
trial court mainly on the representation of
petitioner that respondent is not a resident of the
Philippines. Obviously, the trial court's issuance
of the writ was for the sole purpose of acquiring
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Had the
allegations in the complaint disclosed that
respondent has a residence in Quezon City and
an office in Makati City, the trial court, if only for
the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction, could have
served summons by substituted service on the
said addresses, instead of attaching the property
of the defendant. The rules on the application of
a writ of attachment must be strictly construed in
favor of the defendant. For attachment is harsh,
extraordinary, and summary in nature; it is a
rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to
humiliation and annoyance. It should be resorted
to only when necessary and as a last remedy.
It is clear from the foregoing that even on the
allegation that respondent is a resident
temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner is
still not entitled to a writ of attachment because
the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over the
case by substituted service instead of attaching
the property of the defendant. The
misrepresentation of petitioner that respondent
does not reside in the Philippines and its
omission of his local addresses was thus a
deliberate move to ensure that the application
for the writ will be granted.
Northern Islands, Co., Inc. v. Spouses Garcia,
G.R. No. 203240, 18 March 2015.
•
UEM Mara Philippines Corporation v. Ng Wee,
G.R. No. 206563, 14 October
2020.
•
Lim v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, 3 July 2013.
•
Republic v. Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., G.R.
No. 184666, 20 July 2016.
•
Security Bank Corporation v. Great Wall
Commercial Press Company, Inc.,
G.R. No. 219345, 30 January 2015.
•
Mt. Banahaw Wood Industries Inc. v. Naga
Dynasty Allied Marketing
Corporation, G.R. No. 211179, 11 September
2019.
• the same articles whenever required by the court
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195295, 5
October 2016.
• presence and
Watercraft Venture Corporation v. Wolfe, G.R.
No. 181721, 9 September 2015.
Cunanan v. Flores, A.M. No. P-99-1351, 24
November 1999.
DOCTRINE:
SHERIFF; HAS DUTY TO TAKE AND SAFELY
KEEP ATTACHED PROPERTY IN HIS
CAPACITY.
FACTS:
Francisco Ong, attachment debtor, complains
against Arturo C. Flores, Deputy Sheriff for
nonfeasance for failure to discharge his
obligation. Flores attached two motor vehicles
and other personal properties of Francisco Ong.
The properties were stored at the courtyard.
However, the properties would have to be
removed from the court premises to pave the
way for the demolition of the building.
When the writ was dissolved, Flores attempted
to return some of the seized properties to
Cunanan, however he refused, stating that he
would only accept them if given to him ALL the
properties. Finally, the ALL the properties were
turned over to Cunanan, he noticed extensive
damage, and the substitution of a majority of the
pieces of equipment with inferior.
Thus, Cunanan filed an administrative case
against Flores. The judge and OCA
recommended his dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether Flores shall be dismissed from his
position.
RULING:
Yes.
Under the Rules of Court (now Rule 57, Sec. 7
[b]), personal property seized under a writ of
attachment, capable of manual delivery, must be
taken and safely kept by the Deputy Sheriff in
his capacity, after issuing the corresponding
receipt therefor. Thus, the respondent's act of
leaving the seized articles in the possession and
control of the plaintiff (the prevailing party in the
case below) did not comply with the Rules.
Neither did it comply with the plainly worded
Order of the Regional Trial Court. The condition
imposed on the plaintiff that he would produce
was no compliance either, because it did not
show that subject property was in respondent's
possession. Respondent's
performance fell short of his bounden duty to
take and safely keep the attached property "in
his capacity."
Respondent's stance that the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City did not have any storage
facility to house subject properties is no
justification. As aptly ruled by the Investigating
Judge, the respondent could have sought prior
authority from the trial court
which issued the writ.
Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan, G.R. No.
203530, 13 April 2015.
DOCTRINE:
Section 5 requires the deposit of money as the
word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly
associated with a sum of money.
FACTS:
Respondent Krishnan presented her Time
Deposit Certificates (more than 28M) to
Petitioner Bank as they have become due.
However, the Petitioner refused to honor them.
Krishnan then applied for a Preliminary Writ of
Attachment. By virtue of the writ, petitioner
bank's accounts in BPI in the amount of
P28,597,472.70 and its account amounting to
P49,000,000.00 in the Central Bank were
garnished.
Petitioner bank filed a motion to admit bank
property in lieu of counterbond.
RTC: issued order (reinstating, because it was
earlier quashed) the Writ of Attachment for
failure of petitioners to file the required
counterbond.
CA: affirmed.
petitioners contend that it has the option to
deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a
counter-bond, to secure any contingent lien on
its property in the event respondent wins the
case. They argue that Section 2 of Rule 57 only
mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only
be confined or construed to refer to cash.

ISSUE:
whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's
decision which denied petitioners' motion
praying that bank property be deposited in lieu of
cash or a counter-bond. – NO.
RULING:
Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment
may be issued either ex parte or upon motion
with notice and hearing by the court xxx, unless
such party makes deposit or gives a bond as
hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that
fixed in the order, which may be the amount
sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the
value of the property xxx."
Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that
"[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without
delay and with all reasonable diligence attach,
xxx, only so much of the property in the
Philippines of the party against whom the writ is
issued, not exempt from execution, as may be
sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand,
unless the former makes a deposit with the court
from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-
bond executed to the applicant, in an
amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in
the order of attachment or to the value of the
property to be attached, exclusive of costs."
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once
the writ of attachment has been issued, the only
remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is
through a cash deposit or the filing of the
counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that
petitioner's argument that it has the option to
deposit real property instead of depositing cash
or filing a counter-bond to discharge the
attachment or stay the implementation thereof is
unmeritorious
K.O. Glass Construction Co., Inc. v. Valenzuela,
G.R. No. L-48756, 22 September 1982.
DOCTRINE:
Failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites
prescribed for issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment is fatal.
FACTS:
Pinzon filed an action to recover from K.O. Glass
the sum of Php. 37,190.00 alleged to be rentals
of his truck. He asked for the attachment against
the property of K.O. Glass consisting of
collectibles and payables with the Philippine
Geothermal, Inc., on the grounds that the
defendant is a foreigner; that he has sufficient
cause of action against the said defendant; and
that there is no sufficient security for his claim
against the defendant in the event a judgment is
rendered in his favor.
The writ was granted.
The defendants opposed through motion to
discharge and or dissolve the writ of preliminary
attachment upon the ground that the affidavit
filed in support of the motion for preliminary
attachment was not sufficient or wanting in law
for the reason that:
(1) the affidavit did not state that the amount of
plaintiff's claim as required by Sec. 3, Rule 57 of
the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) the affidavit did not state that there is no
other sufficient security for the claim sought to
be recovered by the action as also required by
said Sec. 3; and
(3) the affidavit did not specify any of the
grounds enumerated in Sec. 1 of Rule 57
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of writ by the Respondent
Judge constitute grave abuse of his discretion. –
YES.
RULING:
The respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
attachment and in not ordering the release of the
money for the following reasons:
(1) there was no ground for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment.
Section 1, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which enumerates the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Pinzon did not allege that the defendant Kenneth
O. Glass "is a foreigner (who) may, at any time,
depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud
his creditors including the plaintiff." He merely
stated that the defendant Kenneth O. Glass is a
foreigner.
There being no showing, much less an
allegation, that the defendants are about to
depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud
their creditor, or that they are non-resident
aliens, the attachment of their properties is not
justified.
 (2) the affidavit submitted by Pinzon does
not comply with the Rules.
Under the Rules, an affidavit for attachment
must state that
(a) sufficient cause of action exists,
(b) the case is one of those mentioned in
Section 1 (a) of Rule 57;
(c) there is no other sufficient security for
the claim sought to be enforced by the
action, and
(d) the amount due to the applicant for
attachment or the value of the property the
possession of which he is entitled to
recover, is as much as the sum for which the
order is granted above all legal
counterclaims.
While Pinzon may have stated in his affidavit
that a sufficient cause of action exists against
the defendant Kenneth O. Glass, he did not
state therein that "the case is one of those
mentioned in Section 1 hereof; that there is no
other sufficient security for the claim sought to
be enforced by the action; and that the amount
due to the applicant is as much as the sum for
which the order granted above all legal
counterclaims." It has been held that the failure
to allege in the affidavit the requisites prescribed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment, renders the writ of preliminary
attachment issued against the property of the
defendant fatally defective, and the judge issuing
it is deemed to have acted in excess of his
jurisdiction.
(3) it appears that the petitioner has filed a
counter-bond in the amount of
P37,190.00 to answer for any judgment
that may be rendered against the
defendant.
Upon receipt of the counter-bond the respondent
Judge should have discharged the attachment
pursuant to Section 12, Rule 57.
The filing of the counter-bond will serve the
purpose of preserving the defendant's property
and at the same time give the plaintiff security
for any judgment that may be obtained against
the defendant.
Republic v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167741, 12 July
2007.
DOCTRINE:
State is exempt to pay attachment bond
because it is assumed to be always solvent.
FACTS:
Republic filed a petition for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties through a writ of
preliminary attachment against Maj. Gen. Carlos
F. Garcia and his family with the
Sandiganbayan. The Republic maintained that,
as a sovereign political entity, it was exempt
from filing the required attachment bond.
The Sandiganbayan: ordered Republic of a P1
million attachment bond.
The Republic posted the required attachment
bond to avoid any delay in the issuance of the
writ as well as to promptly protect and secure its
claim. Later it filed for a motion for partial
reconsideration to exempt from the attachment
bond.
ISSUE:
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of
discretion when it rejected the Republic's claim
of exemption from the filing of an attachment
bond? - YES
RULING:
GR: Under SEC. 3&4 of Rule 57, before a writ of
attachment may issue, a bond must first be filed
to answer for all costs which may be adjudged to
the adverse party and for the damages he may
sustain by reason of the attachment.
XPN: this rule does not cover the State.
In Tolentino, this Court declared that the State
as represented by the government is exempt
from filing an attachment bond on the theory that
it is always solvent.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
is conditioned on the filing of a bond unless the
applicant is the State. Where the State is the
applicant, the filing of the attachment bond is
excused.
The attachment bond is contingent on and
answerable for all costs which may be adjudged
to the adverse party and all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the attachment should
the court finally rule that the applicant is not
entitled to the writ of attachment. Thus, it is a
security for the payment of the costs and
damages to which the adverse party may be
entitled in case there is a subsequent finding
that the applicant is not entitled to the writ. The
Republic of the Philippines need not give this
security as it is presumed to be always solvent
and able to meet its obligations.
China Banking Corp. v. Asian Construction, G.R.
No. 158271, 8 April 2008.
DOCTRINE:
Perishable items are not those items that are
depreciable per se.
FACTS:
China Bank granted ACDC a credit line
amounting to Php 90,000,000.00. However,
ACDC failed to comply with its obligations
resulting to China Bank to filing a complaint for
recovery of sum of money and damages
with preliminary attachment against ACDC.
RTC granted the writ.
In the Sherrif's Report, the list included:
Vans, dump trucks, cement mixers, cargo trucks,
utility vehicles, machinery, equipment and office
machines and fixtures.
Bank C now prays for the selling of the
properties arguing that they are perishable items
– that they might depreciate.
ISSUE:
Does the vehicles, office machines and fixtures
are "perishable property" under Section 11,
Rules 57 of the Rules of Court?
NO.
RULING:
According to the CA, as affirmed by the SC,
"selling the attached properties prior to
final judgment of the appealed case is premature
and contrary to the intent and purpose
of preliminary attachment for the following
reasons:
first,  the attached properties subject of the
motion are not perishable in nature; and  buses (units). However, all the postdated checks
second, while the sale of the attached properties
may serve the interest of China Bank, it will not
be so for ACDC. The CA recognized China
Bank’s apprehension that by the time a final
judgment is rendered, the attached properties
would be worthless.  air sought to recover, RCJ Lines claimed that it
The CA also acknowledged that since ACDC is
a corporation engaged in a construction
business, the preservation of the properties is of
paramount importance; and that in the event
that the decision of the lower court is reversed
and a final judgment rendered in favor ACDC,
great prejudice will result if the
attached properties were already sold.
What is considered perishable?
In Mossler Acceptance Co. v.  Denmar, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana held that while
there might be a depreciation in the value of a
car during storage, depending largely on
existing economic conditions, there would be no
material deterioration of the car itself or any of its
appurtenances if the car was properly cared for,
and therefore it could not be said
that automobiles were of a perishable
nature within the intendment of the statute,
which could only be invoked when the
property attached and seized was of a
perishable nature..
In McCreery v. Berney  National Bank, the
Supreme Court of Alabama stated that the term
"perishable" property, xxx meant only such
property as contained in itself the elements
of speedy decay, such as fruits, fish,
fresh meats, etc.
Phil-Air Conditioning Center v. RCJ Lines, G.R.
No. 193821, 23 November 2015.
DOCTRINE:
Sec. 4: the party applying for the order must . . .
give a bond executed to the adverse party in the
amount fixed by the court in its order granting
the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the
latter will pay all the costs that may be adjudged
to the adverse party and all damages that he
may sustain by reason of the attachment
FACTS:
petitioner Phil-Air sold to respondent RCJ Lines
four Carrier Paris 240 air conditioning units for
issued by RCJ Lines were dishonored.
Thus, Phil-Air filed the complaint for sum of
money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. From the amount Phil-
was also entitled to be reimbursed for costs and
damages occasioned by the enforcement of the
writ of attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether Phil-Air should reimburse RCJ Lines for
the counter-bond premium and its alleged
unrealized profits – NO.
RULING:
Phil-Air is not directly liable for the counter-bond
premium and RCJ Lines' alleged
unrealized profits.
Granting that RCJ Lines suffered losses, the
judgment award should have been first executed
on the attachment bond. Only if the attachment
bond is insufficient to cover the judgment award
can Phil-Air be held liable.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional
remedy issued by the court where an action is
pending to be levied upon the property or
properties of the defendant. The property is held
by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
whatever judgment that might be secured by the
attaching party against the defendant.
The grant of the writ is conditioned not only on
the finding of the court that there exists a valid
ground for its issuance. The Rules also require
the applicant to post a bond.
Section 4 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules) provides that "the party
applying for the order must . . . give a bond
executed to the adverse party in the amount
fixed by the court in its order granting the
issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter
will pay all the costs
that may be adjudged to the adverse party and
all damages that he may sustain by reason of
the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge
that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
The enforcement of the writ notwithstanding, the
party whose property is attached is afforded
relief to have the attachment lifted.
There are various modes of discharging an
attachment under Rule 57, viz.:
(1) by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond
under Section 12;
(2) by proving that the attachment bond was
improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or
that the bond is insufficient under Section 13;
(3) by showing that the attachment is excessive
under Section 13; and
(4) by claiming that the property is exempt from
execution under Section 2.
RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by posting a
counter-bond. Under the first mode, the court will
order the discharge of the attachment after
(1) the movant makes a cash deposit or posts a
counter bond and
(2) the court hears the motion to discharge the
attachment with due notice to the adverse party.
The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond
must be equal to that fixed by the court in the
order of attachment, exclusive of costs. The
cash deposit or counter-bond shall secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching
party may recover in the action.
The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the
attachment applies when there has already been
a seizure of property by the sheriff and all that is
entailed is the presentation of a motion to the
proper court, seeking approval of a cash or
surety bond in an amount equivalent to the value
of the property seized and the lifting of the
attachment on the basis thereof. The counter-
bond stands in place of the property so released.
Sec 12 and Sec 13 discussed.
Section 12 Section 13
the discharge takes discharge on the
effect upon posting of ground that the writ
a counter-bond or was improperly or
depositing cash, and irregularly issued or
after hearing to enforced, or that the
determine the attachment bond is
sufficiency of the insufficient, or that
cash deposit or the attachment is
counter-bond. excessive.
The discharge must
be made only after
hearing.
These differences notwithstanding, the
discharge of the preliminary attachment either
through Section 12 or Section 13 has no effect
on and does not discharge the attachment bond.
The dissolution of the preliminary attachment
does not result in the dissolution of the
attachment bond.
In the present case, the RTC lifted the
preliminary attachment after it heard RCJ Lines'
urgent motion to discharge attachment and the
latter posted a counter-bond. The RTC found
that there was no fraud and Phil-Air had no
sufficient cause of action for the issuance of the
writ of the attachment. As a consequence, it
ordered Phil-Air to refund the premium payment
for the counter-bond and the losses suffered by
RCJ Lines resulting from the enforcement of the
writ. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 84526, 28 January 1991.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Florido v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation,
G.R. No. 146400, 25 October 2005.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Respondent Shemberg Marketing Corporation
filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
with a plea for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Solomon Nacua,
Jr.
The sheriff prepared a notice of levy on
attachment over five marine vessels owned by
Nacua. The sheriff served the summons to
Nacua’s attorney-in-fact, since Nacua was out of
the country. The sheriff levied the vessels.
Petitioner Florido (brother of Nacua’s attorney-
in-fact) filed a "Third Party Claim", claiming that
Nacua was indebted to him and that, to secure
payment, Nacua had, through his attorney-in-
fact (petitioner's brother Florido Jr.), executed in
petitioner's favor a contract of pledge over his
vessels.
ISSUE:
whether the petitioner had the personality to
challenge the attachment writ and bond. - NO
RULING:
Section 14, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure categorically provides specific
remedies to one claiming a right to property
attached in a suit in which the claimant is not a
party.
Here, instead of submitting an affidavit of his title
stating his right to the vessels, petitioner elected
to pursue his claim in the respondent's action
against Nacua. The veracity of his claim should
therefore be threshed out there.
Petitioner all but trivializes the fact that his
motion and subsequent special civil action for
certiorari were filed in disregard of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. He attempts
to justify this with the conjectural and self-
serving statement that "the filing of an Affidavit
of Claim, or a separate action cannot promptly
relieve the petitioner of the harsh consequences
of the unlawful levy on attachment. In actuality,
thus, no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law available to
petitioner other than the above-named special
action (sic )."
The emergence of third-party claims to protest
the attachment of property is hardly new.
A stranger to an action where property in which
he claims to have a right is attached must resort
to the remedies available under the Rules of
Court. The only exception to this rule is when the
sheriff mistakenly levies on properties in which
the defendant has no interest. In such an event,
a summary hearing is held upon application to
determine if he has taken hold of property not
belonging to the judgment debtor.
In this case, however, Solomon Nacua, Jr.'s
ownership of the vessels attached was never
disputed. Petitioner must therefore follow the
prescribed procedure for vindicating his claim on
the vessels rather than attempt to erroneously
short-circuit the rules.
Yu v. Miranda, G.R. No. 225752, 27 March
2019.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
David Miranda v. Miranda Morning Sta is an
action for Sum of Money with Prayer for
Issuance of Preliminary attachment.
David Miranda supplied and financed the
backfilling of Morning Star for the latter’s housing
project. However, Morning Star defaulted in its
obligation to pay.
RTC granted the attachment of Morning Star’s
properties.
The petitioners Yu filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene, claiming that they have legal interest
in the properties subject of the preliminary
attachment. The petitioners Yu claimed that
while the subject properties were registered in
the name of respondent Morning Star,
the latter is a mere nominal owner of the subject
properties since they were the real owners; and
that they had transferred the titles covering the
subject properties to respondent Morning Star
only to facilitate the latter's loan with HDMF
under the GLAD program.
The case has become decided in favor of
Miranda.
Later, RTC denied the petitioners Yu's Motion
for Leave to Intervene, stating that they are not
the registered owners of the properties, and that
their rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners Yu may still be allowed
to intervene. - NO
RULING:
First, the main case has already attained its
finality. The case where the petitioners Yu seek
to
intervene in has already ceased.
Second, Petitioners Yu are not indispensable
parties since the only involvement of the
petitioners Yu in the civil case is their claim over
the subject properties registered in the name of
respondent Morning Star, which were subjected
to preliminary attachment to secure the
judgment debt. It is only incidental to the cause
of action subject civil case, i.e. , recovery of sum
of money based on an obligation to pay. The
civil case is centered on the recovery of sum of
money pursued by respondent Miranda against
respondents Morning Star, et. al on the basis of
the latter's obligation to pay the former for the
supply and financing of the backfilling materials
provided by respondent Miranda for the
respondents' housing project. The petitioners Yu
have no participation whatsoever in the
transaction entered into by the respondents
Morning Star, Timmy, and Lilibeth with
respondent Miranda.
At most, the petitioners Yu may only be
considered necessary parties, but who ought to
be joined as a party if complete relief is to be
accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the
claim subject of the action.
Under Rule 57, Section 14 of the Rules of Court,
if the property attached is claimed by any third
person, and such person makes an affidavit of
his title thereto, or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title,
and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while
the latter has possession of the attached
property, and a copy thereof upon the
attaching party, the sheriff shall not be bound to
keep the property under attachment, unless the
attaching party or his agent, on demand of the
sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to
indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not
less than the value of the property levied upon.
Here, no such affidavit was filed by the
petitioners Yu. Moreover, jurisprudence has held
that a writ of preliminary attachment is only a
provisional remedy issued upon order of the
court where an action is pending; it is an
ancillary remedy. Attachment is only adjunct to
the main suit. Therefore, it can have no
independent existence apart from a suit on a
claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. In
other words, an attachment or garnishment is
generally ancillary to, and dependent on, a
principal proceeding, either at law or in equity,
which has for its purpose a determination of the
justice of a creditor's demand. Any relief against
such attachment could be disposed of only in
that case.
Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124642, 23
February 2004.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
the (PBMCI) obtained a loan from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this
loan, The PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-
President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory
note and a continuing guaranty binding
themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the
ABC.
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment
against the PBMCI. Alfredo Ching was
impleaded as co-defendants.
The properties of Alfredo Ching were levied.
Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband
Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the
levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that
the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the
sheriff were acquired by her and her husband
during their marriage out of conjugal funds
after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was
established. Furthermore, the indebtedness
covered by the continuing
guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract
executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the
account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. She, likewise,
alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she
was a third-party claimant entitled to file a
motion for the release of the properties. She
attached
therewith a copy of her marriage contract with
Alfredo Ching.
ISSUE:
whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file
the motion to quash the levy on attachment on
the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp
Investment Philippines - Yes.
RULING:
I n Ong v. Tating , the sheriff may attach only
those properties of the defendant against whom
a writ of attachment has been issued by the
court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on
attachment and seizes the property of a third
person in which the said defendant holds no
right or interest, the superior authority of the
court which has authorized the execution may
be
invoked by the aggrieved third person in the
same case. Upon application of the third person,
the court shall order a summary hearing for the
purpose of determining whether the sheriff has
acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his
duties in the execution of the writ of attachment,
more specifically if he has indeed levied on
attachment and taken hold of property not
belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may
then order the sheriff to release the property
from the erroneous levy and to return the same
to the third person. In resolving the motion of the
third party, the court does not and cannot pass
upon the question of the title to the property with
any character of finality. It can treat the matter
only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the
sheriff has acted correctly or not. If the
claimant's proof does not persuade the court of
the validity of the title, or right of possession
thereto, the claim will be denied by
the court. The aggrieved third party may also
avail himself of the remedy of "terceria" by
executing an affidavit of his title or right of
possession over the property levied on
attachment and serving the same to the office
making the levy and the adverse party. Such
party may also file an action to nullify the levy
with damages resulting from the unlawful levy
and seizure, which should be a totally separate
and distinct action from the former case. The
abovementioned remedies are cumulative and
any one of them may be resorted to by one third
party claimant without availing of the other
remedies.
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion
to set aside the levy on attachment of the
100,000 shares of stocks in the name of
petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares
of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not
liable for the account of her husband under his
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right
to file the motion for said relief.
Booklight, Inc. v. Tiu, G.R. No. 213650, 17 June
2019.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Rudy O. Tiu (respondent) filed a case for
Collection of Sum of Money, Damages,
Attorney's Fees, Litigation Expenses and
Attachment against Booklight, Inc. (petitioner) for
the unpaid rentals.
Respondent's application for the issuance of a
writ of attachment was granted by the RTC.
Thus, petitioner's personal properties in the
bookstore were attached and its funds in Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation were
garnished.
RTC: rule in favor of the Respondent.
CA: affirmed with modification, deleting some
particulars.
Petitioner avers that the CA neglected to rule on
its claim for refund of the advanced rental and
deposit it allegedly paid to respondent
amounting to a total of One Hundred Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Forty Pesos
(P109,440.00). 16 Petitioner also argues that the
electric bills should likewise be deleted for the
same reason used by the CA in ruling for the
deletion of the unpaid
security fees.
ISSUE:
Whether the refund may be claimed by the
Petitioner. – NO.
RULING:
the satisfaction of judgment
out of property attached is not mandatory to
warrant this Court to
unconditionally order the satisfaction of the
judgment against petitioner out
of the attached properties.
Sec. 15, Rule 57 - the sheriff may cause the
judgment to be satisfied out of the property
attached, if it be sufficient for that purpose.
The use of the word may clearly makes the
procedure directory, in which case, the sheriff
may disregard the properties attached and
proceed against other properties of the judgment
debtor, if necessary.
The proper procedure, therefore, is for the
prevailing party, respondent in this case, to
move for the execution of the judgment upon
finality before the RTC, wherein the proper
satisfaction thereof should be addressed.
Sarmiento v. Victoria, A.M. No. P-00-1432, 19
October 2000.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Respondent sheriff Romulo C. Victoria is
charged with Grave Abuse of Authority and
Gross Misconduct when Sarmiento's levied
personal properties were deposited to the
warehouse of Singson (plaintiff to the complaint
in the writ).
In his Answer, respondent sheriff admitted that
the attached properties were deposited in
complainant's warehouse but this was done in
the exercise of his best judgment because it had
taken him the whole day to attach Sarmiento's
properties. He did not have time to look for a
private bonded warehouse. Knowing that the
court had no space to store the attached
properties, he asked Sarmiento's daughter,
Beverly, if he could deposit the seized properties
in the warehouse of Singson.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent ignored the mandatory
provision of Section 7, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rule
of Civil Procedure.
RULING:
Yes.
Clearly, the law commands the sheriff to take
possession and control of the attached
properties. It does not give him any discretion on
whether to keep it in his custody or to surrender
it to the creditors.
The consent given by complainant's daughter is
of no moment, because it did not establish that
the properties were in respondent sheriff's
substantial presence and possession.
Respondent fell short of his obligation to take
and safely keep the attached properties in his
custody'.
“We believe that . . . to constitute a valid levy of
an attachment, the officer levying it must take
actual possession of the property attached as far
as . . . practicable (under the circumstances). He
must put himself in (a) position to, and must
assert and, in fact, enforce a dominion over the
property adverse to and exclusive of the
attachment debtor, and such property must be in
his substantial presence and possession.”
Indeed, respondent sheriff was remiss in his
duties when he deposited the attached
properties in the warehouse of Singson, a party
in the civil case below.
Albay Electric Cooperative v. Security Pacific,
G.R. No. 174189, 5 October 2007.
DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
ALECO filed a complaint for a sum of money
and breach of contract with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against Roberto D.
Tuazon and/or R.D. Tuazon Construction. The
contract Tuazon allegedly breached despite his
receipt of a cash advance payment related to
the construction of a power station project.
Tuazon sought the dissolution of the writ by filing
a counter-bond to be issued by SPAC
(respondent.
ALECO opposed the dissolution alleging that
SPAC is financially incapable to undertake the
counterbond.
RTC: ruled in favor of Aleco. Tuazon is ordered
to pay ALECO the amount of P9,000,000.00, as
actual and compensatory damages.
ALECO managed to get P2,000,000.00 from
[SPAC's] funds with the PCIB, Quezon Ave.
Branch and remittances due petitioners from
Toyota Cubao, Inc., including that garnished
from the Bureau of Treasury.
ISSUE:
Whether there is GADALEJ in executing the writ
in favor of ALECO – yes.
RULING:
a recovery against the surety's counter-bond
may be allowed present the element of finality of
the judgment, and provided that the statutory
requirements on demand, notice and hearing are
complied with as provided in Section 17, Rule
57.
As determined by the appellate court, however,
the trial court, in grave abuse of discretion,
proceeded to issue the desired order of
execution against the counter-bond — and then
effectively reiterated it — notwithstanding the
absence of demand and the corresponding
notice and hearing in Civil Case.
respondent SPAC was not furnished with a copy
of ALECO's motion for reconsideration of the
Orde. It was imperative that [SPAC] be furnished
with a copy of the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration because in the event that
ALECO's motion for reconsideration is granted,
the subject counter-bond will eventually be the
subject for execution for the satisfaction of the
judgment. Consequently in view of the lack of
notice, it was impossible for [SPAC] to know that
ALECO was instituting an action against the
counter-bond to answer for TUAZON's liability
under the judgment. Thus, following the settled
rule, a writ of execution for recovery on the
counter-bond issued against the surety who was
not given notice and an opportunity to be heard
is invalid.
Thus, the trial court in granting the writ and
supplemental writ of execution against
SPAC was issued in grave abuse of discretion
because the decision against Tuazon was not
yet final when that court granted the motion for
execution against the counter-bond. This
disposition, it should be stressed, should be
taken in the above light, and not as exempting
SPAC, as surety, or its counter-bond, from the
liability of the principal debtor.
Section 18. Disposition of money deposited. —
Where the party against whom attachment had
been issued has deposited money instead of
giving counter-bond, it shall be applied under the
direction of the court to the satisfaction of any
judgment rendered in favor of the attaching
party, and after satisfying the judgment the
balance shall be refunded to the depositor or his
assignee. If the judgment is in favor of the party
against whom attachment was issued, the whole
sum deposited must be refunded to him or his
assignee. (18a)
Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. v. Visayan Surety
& Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 212025, 1
July 2015
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Win Multi-Rich filed a complaint for sum of
money and damages against petitioner Excellent
Quality, arising from the failure to pay the
construction of factory building. It also prayed
for the issuance of a writ of attachment.
Win Multi-Rich secured bond from two sureties:
First, from respondent Visayan Surety for the
filing of the writ. RTC granted the writ.
This was countered by the petitioner by issuing
Equitable PCI Bank Check - to prevent the
enforcement of the writ of preliminary
attachment on its equipment and machinery,
petitioner k. RTC denied the Petitioner’s Motion.
Thus, the RTC issued another order directing
the deposit of the garnished funds of petitioner
to the cashier of the Clerk of Court then to Win
Multi-Rich.
Second, from Far Eastern Surety and Insurance
Co., Inc. (FESICO) for the amount of
P9,000,000.00, to secure the withdrawal of the
cash deposited by petitioner. Thus, Win Multi-
Rich was able to receive the funds of petitioner
even before the trial began.
The RTC’s orders were annulled by CA
however, the CA decision failed to state an order
to return the garnished amount which was taken
from its bank account and given to Win
Multi-Rich.
Petitioner contends that Visayan Surety and
FESICO could be held liable because the Court,
in G.R. No. 175048, ruled that it cannot allow
Win Multi-Rich to retain the garnished amount
turned over by the RTC.
Visayan Surety asserted in its Comment that no
application for damages was filed before the
Court in G.R. No. 175048.
FESICO asserted its Comment that petitioner
failed to comply with Section 20, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court because the hearing on the
motion for execution was conducted after the
decision in G.R. No. 175048 had already
become final and executory. It also stated that
petitioner failed to implead the surety
respondents as parties
ISSUE:
Whether Visayan and FISECO are liable to Win
Multi-Rich for the return of the bond. – Only
FISECO shall be liable.
RULING:
I There was an application for damages; but
there was no notice given to Visayan Surety.
The attachment bond was issued by Visayan
Surety in order for Win Multi-Rich to secure the
issuance of the writ of attachment. Hence, any
application for damages arising from the
improper, irregular or excessive attachment shall
be governed by Section 20, Rule 57.
Requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 are as
follows:
1. The application for damages must be filed in
the same case where the bond was issued;
2. Such application for damages must be filed
before the entry of judgment; and
3. After hearing with notice to the surety.
The first and second requisites relate to the
application for damages against the bond. An
application for damages must be filed in the
same case where the bond was issued, either
(a) before the trial or
(b) before the appeal is perfected or
(c) before the judgment becomes executory.
The usual procedure is to file an application for
damages with due notice to the other party and
his sureties. The other method would be to
incorporate the application in the answer with
compulsory counterclaim. The purpose of
requiring the application for damages to be filed
in the same proceeding is to avoid the
multiplicity of suit and forum shopping. It is also
required to file the application against the bond
before the finality of the decision to prevent the
alteration of the immutable judgment.
HERE, the petitioner sufficiently incorporated an
application for damages against the wrongful
attachment in its answer with compulsory
counterclaim filed before the RTC. Petitioner
alleged that the issuance of the improper writ of
attachment caused it actual damages in the
amount of at least P3,000,000.00. It added that
the Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 160149 it
issued to the RTC Clerk of Court, to lift the
improper writ of attachment, should be returned
to it. Evidently, these allegations constitute
petitioner's application for damages arising from
the wrongful attachment, and the said
application was timely filed as it was filed before
the finality of judgment.
The next requisite, however, was not satisfied by
the petition.
Section 20, Rule 57 specifically requires that the
application for damages against the wrongful
attachment, whether filed before the trial court or
appellate court, must be with due notice to the
attaching party and his surety or sureties. Such
damages may be awarded only after proper
hearing and shall be included in the judgment on
the main case. Due notice to the adverse party
and its surety setting forth the facts supporting
the applicant's right to damages and the amount
thereof under the bond is indispensable. The
surety should be given an opportunity to be
heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the
damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of
the writ. In the absence of due notice to the
surety, therefore, no judgment for damages may
be entered and executed against it.
HERE, petitioner's answer with compulsory
counterclaim, which contained the application for
damages, was not served on Visayan Surety.
Also, a perusal of the records revealed that
Visayan Surety was not furnished any copies of
the pleadings, motions, processes, and
judgments concerned with the application for
damages against the surety bond. Visayan
Surety was only notified of the application when
the motion for execution was filed by petitioner
after the judgment in G.R. No. 175048 had
become final and executory.
Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the
requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 because
Visayan Surety was not given due notice on the
application for damages before the finality of
judgment. The subsequent motion for execution,
which sought to implicate Visayan Surety,
cannot alter the immutable judgment anymore.
II. FESICO's bond is not covered by Section
20, Rule 57.
The surety bond of FESICO is not covered by
any of the provisions in Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court because, in the first place, Win Multi-Rich
should not have filed its motion to release the
cash deposit of petitioner and the RTC should
not have granted the same. The release of the
cash deposit to the attaching party is anathema
to the basic tenets of a preliminary attachment.
The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment
is to secure a contingent lien on defendant's
property until plaintiff can, by appropriate
proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such
property applied to its satisfaction, or to make
some provision for unsecured debts in cases
where the means of satisfaction thereof are
liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or
improperly disposed of or concealed, or
otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.
The garnished funds or attached properties
could only be released to the attaching party
after a judgment in his favor is obtained. Under
no circumstance, whatsoever, can the garnished
funds or attached properties, under the custody
of the sheriff or the clerk of court, be released to
the attaching party before the promulgation of
judgment.
Cash deposits and counterbonds posted by the
defendant to lift the writ of attachment is a
security for the payment of any judgment that
the attaching party may obtain; they are, thus,
mere replacements of the property previously
attached. Accordingly, the P8,634,448.20 cash
deposit of petitioner, as replacement of the
properties to be attached, should never
have been released to Win Multi-Rich.
Sec. 20 v. Sec 17
The nature of the surety bond of FESICO is to
enable Win Multi-Rich to withdraw the cash
deposit and. Corollarily, the surety bond of
FESICO substituted the cash deposit of
petitioner as a security for the judgment. Thus,
to claim damages from the surety bond of
FESICO, Section 17, Rule 57, there must be:
(1) demand made upon the surety; and
(2) notice and summary hearing on the same
action.
SEC 20 SEC 17
requires notice and allows a party to
hearing before the claim damages on
finality of the the surety bond after
judgment in an the judgment has
application for become executory.
damages
in relation to Section in relation to Section
4, the surety bond 12, the cash deposit
shall answer for all or the counter-bond
the costs which may shall secure the
be adjudged to the payment of any
adverse party and all judgment that the
damages which he attaching party may
may sustain by recover in the action.
reason of the Stated differently, the
attachment. In other damages sought to
words, the damages be charged against
sought to be enforced the surety bond are
against the surety liquidated.
bond are
unliquidated. The final judgment
had already
 Necessarily, a notice determined the has acquired jurisdiction over the surety, and the
and hearing before amount to be provisions of Sections 12 and 17 of Rule 57
the finality of awarded to the became operational. Thus, the Court holds that
judgment must be winning litigant on the FESICO is solidarily liable under its surety bond
undertaken to main action. Thus, with its principal Win Multi-Rich.
properly determine there is nothing left to
the amount of do but to execute the
damages that was judgment against the
suffered by the losing party, or in
defendant due to the case of insufficiency,
improper attachment. against its sureties.
These damages to be
imposed against the
attaching party and
his sureties are
different from the
principal case, and
must be included in
the judgment.

Here, a demand against FESICO had been

made, and that it was given due notice and an
opportunity to be heard on its defense.
First , petitioner filed a motion for execution, a
copy of which was furnished to FESICO;
second, petitioner filed a manifestation that
FESICO was duly served with the said motion
and notified of the hearing;
third , hearing on the motion for execution, the
counsels for petitioner, Win Multi-Rich and
FESICO were all present;
fourth , in an Order FESICO was given fifteen
(15) days to submit its comment or opposition to
the motion for execution; 70 and
lastly, FESICO filed its comment on the motion.
Based on the foregoing, the requirements under
Section 17, Rule 57 have been more than
satisfied.
Indeed, FESICO cannot escape liability on its
surety bond issued in favor of petitioner. The
purpose of FESICO's bond was to secure the
withdrawal of the cash deposit and to answer
any damages that would be inflicted against
petitioner in the course of the proceedings. Also,
the undertaking signed by FESICO stated that
the duration of the effectivity of the bond shall be
from its approval by the court until the action is
fully decided, resolved or terminated.
FESICO cannot simply escape liability by
invoking that it was not a party in G.R. No.
175048. From the moment that FESICO issued
Surety Bond No. 10198 to Win Multi-Rich and
the same was posted before the RTC, the court
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (RULE 58, SEC.
1-9)
Riano Notes:
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of an action, prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party, court, agency or person
to perform or refrain from performing a
particular.
 Prohibitory – if it is availed of to require
one to refrain from a particular act
 Mandatory – if it requires the
performance of a particular act or acts.
Requires main action.
Merely temporary, subject to final disposition
of the principal action. its purpose is to preserve
status quo. Otherwise, if no preliminary
injunction I issued, the defendant may, before
final judgment, do act which the plaintiff is
seeking the court to restrain.
Preliminary injunction as an equitable remedy
Purpose: to prevent threatened or continuous
irreparable injury to parties before their claims
can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated and
during the pendency of an action.
Status quo – the last actual, peaceful and
uncontested status that precedes the actual
controversy, that which is existing at the time of
the filing of the case.
Unlike TRO or PI, a status quo is more in the main case.
nature of cease and decease order, since it Solely based on initial Established with
neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in and incomplete absolute certainty to
the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive evidence be a basis for a final
relief. and permanent
Ex: a status quo order to reinstate a person to injunction.
his former position as school director and Not a final resolution A judgment for a
curriculum administrator and to direct the or decision disposing permanent injunction
undoing of an act already consummated, is of the case. Maybe suit should be
improper. The order is the province od challenged by assailed by a timely
prohibitory or mandatory injuncitive relief and not certiorari appeal
of a status quo order.
Examples of acts subject to the main action for
Grant of a WPI is not a judgment on merits. injunction:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
Issuance of the writ as subject to judicial residence:
discretion (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
Because the assessment and evaluation of family relations of another;
evidence towards that end involve findings of (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated
fact left to the trial court for its conclusive from his friends;
determination. (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of
his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
Preliminary injunction v. Main Action for birth, physical defect, or other personal
Injunction condition. (Art. 26 of CCP)
Preliminary Main Action for
injunction Injunction Preliminary prohibition injunction v. Petition
Not a principal action Principal action and a for Prohibition
and can only exist as cause of an action in Preliminary Petition for
an incident to a itself. prohibition injunction Prohibition
principal action Not an independent independent action
Does not seek Seeks a judgment action
permanent injunction making the injunction Generally directed Against tribunal,
permanent against the party corporation, board,
Order granted at any Granted after the trial litigant officer or person
stage of an action or of the action if it exercising quasi-
proceeding prior to appears that the judicial or ministerial
the judgment or final applicant is entitled to function
order have the act or acts Applies even if there Presence of
complained of is no issue of GADALEJ
permanently jurisdiction,
enjoined. GADALEJ
The injunction is
permanent and forms
part of the judgment
on the merits and it
can only be properly RULE 58
ordered on a final Preliminary Injunction
judgment. (Zuneca v. Section 1. Preliminary injunction
Natrapharm) defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is
The hearing on the an order granted at any stage of an action or
application for proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
issuance of a writ of requiring a party or a court, agency or a
preliminary injunction person to refrain from a particular act or acts.
is separate and It may also require the performance of a
distinct from the trial
particular act or acts, in which case it shall be
on the merits of the
known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
(1a)
Section 2. Who may grant preliminary
injunction. —
 by the court where the action or
proceeding is pending.
 in the Court of Appeals or
 in the Supreme Court
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of
preliminary injunction. —
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the
relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the
act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or
acts either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance
or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a
person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual. (3a)
Section 4. Verified application and bond for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. — A preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or
proceeding is verified, and shows
facts entitling the applicant to the relief
demanded; and
(b) a bond executed to the party or
person enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the
applicant will pay to such party or
person all damages which he may
sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant
was not entitled thereto.
XPN: Unless exempted by the
court the applicant files with
the court where the action or
proceeding is pending,
(c) When an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or a temporary
restraining order is included in a
complaint or any initiatory pleading,
the case, if filed in a multiple-sala
court, shall be raffled only after notice
to and in the presence of the adverse
party or the person to be enjoined. In
any event, such notice shall be
preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint
or initiatory pleading and the
applicant's affidavit and bond, upon
the adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could
not be served personally or by
substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the adverse party is a
resident of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom or is a nonresident
thereof, the requirement of prior or
contemporaneous service of
summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary
restraining order shall thereafter be
acted upon only after all parties are
heard in a summary hearing which
shall be conducted within twenty-four
(24) hours after the sheriff's return of
service and/or the records are
received by the branch selected by
raffle and to which the records shall be
transmitted immediately.
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted
without notice; exception. —
GR: No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined.
XPN: may issue a temporary restraining order
to be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein
provided.
If it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice, the court to which the application for
preliminary injunction was made.
*Irreparable Injury – if it is of such
constant and frequent recurrence that
no fair or reasonable redress can be
had therefore in court or law or where
there is no standard by which their
amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy.
Within the said twenty-day period, the court
must order said party or person to show
cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, determine
within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order.
(Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
NOTE: the executive judge of a multiple-sala
court or the presiding judge of a single sala
court may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order effective for only seventy-two
(72) hours from issuance but he shall
immediately comply with the provisions of the
next preceding section as to service of
summons and the documents to be served
therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid
seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before
whom the case is pending shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the
temporary restraining order shall be extended
until the application for preliminary injunction
can be heard. In no case shall the total period
of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary
injunction is denied or not resolved within the
said period, the temporary restraining order is
deemed, automatically vacated. The effectivity
of a temporary restraining order is not
extendible without need of any judicial
declaration to that effect and no court shall
have authority to extend or renew the same
on the same ground for which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or
a member thereof, the temporary restraining
order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from
service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined. A restraining, order issued by the
Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be
effective until further orders. (5a)
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for
motion of dissolution of, injunction or
restraining order. —
 upon a showing of its insufficiency.
 other grounds upon affidavits of the
party or person enjoined, which may
be opposed by the applicant also by
affidavits.
 It appears after hearing that although
the applicant is entitled to the
injunction or restraining order, the
issuance or continuance thereof, as
the case may be, would cause
irreparable damage to the party or
person enjoined while the applicant
can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer, and the
former files a bond in an amount fixed
by the court conditioned that he will
pay all damages which the applicant
may suffer by the denial or the
dissolution of the injunction or
restraining order.
If it appears that the extent of the
preliminary injunction or restraining order
granted is too great, it may be modified.
Section 7. Service of copies of bonds; effect
of disapproval of same. — The party filing a
bond in accordance with the provisions of this
Rule shall forthwith serve a copy of such
bond on the other party, who may except to
the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or
sureties thereon.
If the applicant's bond is found to be
insufficient in amount, or if the surety or
sureties thereon fail to justify, and a bond
sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties
approved after justification is not filed forthwith
the injunction shall be dissolved.
If the bond of the adverse party is found to be
insufficient in amount, or the surety or sureties
thereon fail to justify a bond sufficient in
amount with sufficient sureties approved after
justification is not filed forthwith, the injunction
shall be granted or restored, as the case
may be. (8a)

Section 8. Judgment to include damages
against party and sureties. — At the trial, the
amount of damages to be awarded to either
party, upon the bond of the adverse party,
shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded
under the same procedure prescribed in
section 20 of Rule 57. (9a)
Section 9. When final injunction granted. — If
after the trial of the action it appears that the
applicant is entitled to have the act or acts
complained of permanently enjoined the court
shall grant a final injunction perpetually
restraining the party or person enjoined from
the commission or continuance of the act or
acts of confirming the preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Evy Construction v. Valiant Roll Forming Sales
Corporation, G.R. No. 207938,
11 October 2017.
DOCTRINE:
In every application for provisional injunctive
relief, the applicant must establish:
 the actual and existing right sought to be
protected;
 the urgency of a writ's issuance to
prevent grave and irreparable injury.
FACTS:
When Evy construction purchased a land from
Linda N. Ang and Senen T. Uyan, its Deed of
Sale has annotation of a notice of adverse claim
of Ang.
When Evy Construction registered the Deed of
Absolute Sale with the RD, it contained the
annotation of the prior notice of levy on
attachment and a notice of levy on preliminary
attachment.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Valiant Roll
Forming Sales Corporation (Valiant).
A Writ of Execution and a Notice of Levy were
issued against the property
Evy Construction filed a Notice of Third-Party
Claim. The property was later awarded to
Valiant.
Evy Construction filed with the Regional Trial
Court its Complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal
of Cloud, Annulment of Execution Sale and
Certificate of Sale, and Damages, with
application for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary
injunction.
It prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Register of Deeds from
compelling it to surrender its copy of TCT and
from annotating any further
transactions relating to Civil Case
Evy Construction claimed that it would suffer
great and irreparable injury if the Register of
Deeds were restrained from compelling it to
surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT. It
claimed that potential investors interested in
developing the property "[would] back out of
their investment plans if there [was a] cloud of
doubt hovering over the title on the property."
RTC: denied.
ISSUE:
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner Evy Construction
and Development Corporation's application for
injunctive relief. - NO
RULING:
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion,
denied petitioner's application for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction on the ground that
petitioner would still have sufficient relief in its
prayer for damages in its Complaint.
Injunction is defined as "a judicial writ, process
or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do
or refrain from doing a certain act." It may be file
as a main action before the trial court or as a
provisional remedy in the main action
petitioner claims that they were denied due
process when "no valid hearing for the
application for preliminary injunction was ever
set" by the trial court and it "was NOT even
allowed to present its summary arguments
A temporary restraining order may be issued ex
parte "to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction[,] which cannot be issued ex parte. "
Otherwise stated, a trial court may issue a
temporary restraining order even without a prior
hearing for a limited period of 72 hours "if the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury."
In this instance, a summary hearing, separate
from the application of the preliminary injunction,
is required only to determine if a 72-hour
temporary restraining order should be extended.
A trial court may also issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order for 20 days "[i]f it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verifie
application that great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant before the matter can be
heard on notice." The trial court has 20 days
from its issuance to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the
application for preliminary injunction during this
period, the temporary restraining order is
deemed to have expired.
Notably, the Rules do not require that a hearing
on the application for preliminary injunction be
conducted during this period.
While Rule 58, Section 4 (d) 43 requires that the
trial court conduct a summary hearing in every
application for temporary restraining order
regardless of a grant or denial, Rule 58, Section
5 requires a hearing only if an application for
preliminary injunction is granted . Thus, Section
5 states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined." Inversely
stated, an application for preliminary injunction
may be denied even without the conduct of a
hearing separate from that of the summary
hearing of an
application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
In this case, the hearing was denominated as a
"hearing on the application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction."
Petitioner's counsel was allowed to present its
arguments and its witness 46 but conceded that
the issues before the trial court were legal in
nature. Thus, the trial court resolved that there
was no need to present the witness, which
petitioner's counsel accepted without objection.
Petitioner cannot insist on a separate hearing for
the application for preliminary injunction,
considering that it accepted that its application
would be submitted for decision without the
presentation of its witness. The trial court did not
find any need to conduct a further hearing on the
application for preliminary injunction since
petitioner was unable to substantiate its
entitlement to a temporary restraining order. In
any case, even if a separate
hearing was granted, petitioner would have
presented the same arguments and evidence in
the hearing. Thus, there can be no denial of due
process if the party alleging it has already been
granted an opportunity to be heard.
IIA.
In order to be granted the writ, it must be
established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring
performance of an act or acts, either for
a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or
non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person
is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
considered an "extraordinary event," being a
"strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy."
Thus, the power to issue the writ "should be
exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with
great caution and deliberation."
An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants
with "actual and existing substantial rights" or
rights in esse. Further, the applicant must show
"that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage."
Thus, the writ will not issue to applicants whose
rights are merely contingent or to compel or
restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause of
action.
In this case, petitioner alleges that as the
registered owner of the property covered by TCT
No. 168590, "[i]t has the undeniable right to the
full use and possession [of it]."
At the time of the sale between petitioner Evy
Construction, Uyan, and Ang, TCT No. 134890
in Uyan's and Ang's names did not contain any
liens or encumbrances, except for a notice of
adverse claim by Ang dated January 21, 1999.
However, petitioner admitted that while the Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4,
2007, the property was only registered in its
name on November 20, 2007. 58 The
encumbrances in respondent's favor
were annotated on September 18, 2007,
October 2, 2007, and November 8,
2007, 59 or when the property was still
registered under Uyan's and Ang's
names.
The sale between petitioner Evy Construction,
Uyan, and Ang was not
annotated on TCT No. 134890 at the time of its
sale. A sale of property that
is not registered under the Torrens system is
binding only between the buyer
and the seller and does not affect innocent third
persons. 61 The Regional
Trial Court could not have been faulted for
ordering the annotation of the
notice of levy on attachment on TCT No. 134890
considering that when the
September 18, 2007 Order was issued, the
property was still in Uyan's and
Ang's names.
Thus, no injunctive writ could be issued pending
a final determination
of petitioner's actual and existing right over the
property. The grant of an
injunctive writ could operate as a prejudgment of
the main case.
IIB.
Even assuming that there is already a final
determination of petitioner's right over the
property, petitioner still failed to prove the urgent
and paramount necessity to enjoin the Register
of Deeds from making further annotations on
TCT No. 168590.
For this reason, the loss of goodwill and
business
reputation, being unquantifiable, would be
considered as grave and irreparable damage.
Petitioner alleges that the execution sale and the
prior annotations on its title caused "crucial
investors and buyers" 77 to withdraw,
"notwithstanding the considerable costs and
expenses [it] already incurred."
This is the grave and irreparable damage it
sought to be protected from.
However, the feared "damage" was caused by
the execution sale and the annotations already
made on the title. It even admits that the
annotations were "impairing the progress of [its]
housing development." In other words, petitioner
failed to establish the urgent and paramount
necessity of preventing further annotations on
the title.
Thus, what petitioner actually seeks is the
removal of the annotations on its title, which is
precisely what it asked for in its Complaint for
Quieting of Title/Removal of Cloud, Annulment
of Execution Sale and Certificate of Sale, and
Damages before the trial court. Injunctive relief
would have no practical effect considering that
the purported damage it seeks to be protected
from has already been done. Therefore, its
proper remedy is not the issuance of an
injunctive writ but to thresh out the merits of its
Complaint before the trial court.
Municipality of Famy v. Municipality of
Siniloan, G.R. No. 203806, 10 February
2020.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Heir of Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182371,
4 September 2013.
DOCTRINE:
An Order granting a preliminary injunction,
whether mandatory or prohibitory, does not
automatically entitle the applicant-movant to an
immediate enforcement. Posting of a bond is a
condition sine qua non for the issuance of a
corresponding writ.
Here, the WPI is issued with GADALEJ since it
was issued without a bond and the right was not
clearly established.
FACTS:
the spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap
Matualaga file against John Z. Sycip (being
represented by the heirs), for the declaration of
nullity of documents and recovery of possession
of real property with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI) and
damages.
The trial court declared Melencio Yu as the
registered and absolute owner of the land. Until
it was elevated to the SC and became final and
executory.
While the case was pending, squatters entered
the subject lot. Consequently, when a writ of
execution and an order of demolition were
issued by the trial court, a group of squatters
known as Yard Urban Homeowners Association,
Inc. (YUHAI) filed a complaint for injunction with
damages and prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) or temporary restraining order
(TRO).
Later, Notice to Vacate was issued and
addressed to the heirs of John Z. Sycip,
members of YUHAI and all adverse claimants
and actual occupants of the disputed lot. The
respondents informed the Sheriff of the
pendency of their complaint, but refused. As
their demands went unheeded, private
respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title,
specific performance, reconveyance and
damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO,
WPI and WPMI.
RTC: denied, and ordered implementation of the
Special Order of Demolition.
YUHAI file a petition for certiorari before the CA
to annul the Special Order of Demolition.
CA: initially issued TRO. But revoked the TRO.
Thus, demolition is manifested to resume. It was
opposed by the private respondents, thus, filing
certiorati with TRO before CA.
CA: issued TRO by Respondent Judge
Rosemarie D. Anacan-Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of TRO is tainted with
GADALEJ. – YES.
RULING:
Petitioners correctly argued that respondent
Anacan-Dizon hastily issued and released for
service the Order and the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction simultaneously on the
same day without first waiting for private
respondents to post the required bond in the
amount of Php300,000.00 as mandated by the
Order. Private respondents candidly admitted in
paragraph 36, page 16 of their Comment that it
was only on April 14, 2008 that they posted the
required bond. This is obviously contrary to the
provision of the Rules of Court ("Rules"), Section
4, Rule 58 of which states in no uncertain terms,
“Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction shall be issued”
An Order granting a preliminary injunction,
whether mandatory or prohibitory, does not
automatically entitle the applicant-movant to an
immediate enforcement. Posting of a bond is a
condition sine qua non for the issuance of a
corresponding writ. In fact, under the Rules, the
party filing a bond is mandated to serve a copy
thereof to the other party, who may oppose the
sufficiency of the bond or the qualifications of its
surety or sureties. This is clearly expressed in
Section 7, Rule 58.
Yet more than the undue haste by which the writ
was issued, the Court believes and so holds that
respondent CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it granted private respondents'
prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction.
To justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, it must be shown that: (1)
the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) such
right has been violated and the invasion by the
other party is material and substantial; and (3)
there is an urgent and permanent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction
will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a
right which is merely contingent and may never
arise since, to be protected by injunction, the
alleged right must be clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law.

Thus, a preliminary mandatory injunction should
only be granted "in cases of extreme urgency;
where the right is very clear; where
considerations of relative inconvenience bear
strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a
willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right
against his protest and remonstrance, the injury
being a continuing one; and where the effect of
the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish
and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a
new relation."
In this case, there is doubt on private
respondents' entitlement to a preliminary
mandatory injunction since the evidence
presented before the respondent CA in support
thereof appears to be weak and inconclusive,
and the alleged right sought to be protected
is vehemently disputed. The documentary
evidence presented by private respondents does
not suffice to prove their ownership and
possession of the contested lot. Notably, both
the Quitclaim Deed allegedly executed by the
spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga
in favor of Alfonso Aguinaldo Non and the
Transfer of Free Patent Rights allegedly
executed by Melencio Yu in favor of Concepcion
Non Andres were among those documents
already declared null and void by the trial court
on the grounds that: (a) the spouses never
received any consideration for said
conveyances; (b) the documents were falsified;
(c) the instruments were not approved by the
Provincial Governor or his duly-authorized
representative pursuant to Sections 145 and 146
of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu; (d) all
transactions were restricted by the law
governing free patent; and (e) Lot No. 2, Psu-
135740-Amd is a paraphernal property of
Talinanap Matualaga and was sold without her
consent.
SM Investments Corporation v. Mac
Graphics, G.R. Nos. 224337-38, 25 June
2018.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
217126-27, 10 November 2015.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Ombudsman filed a case against Binay Jr. for
malversation of funds in relation to the Makati
building under construction.
While pending, he was subjected to preventive
suspension.
Binay Jr., thus filed with the CA the TRO against
his preventive suspension. Binay alleged
condonation doctrine that because he was re-
elected, he was effectively condoned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining
the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman;
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the
WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension
order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine
RULING:
I Yes.
The power of a court to issue these provisional
injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent
power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and
other means necessary to carry its acquired
jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135
of the Rules of Court.
the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the
principle by which the courts deal with diverse
matters over which they are thought to have
intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making]
and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the
invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a
court must show that the powers are reasonably
necessary to achieve the specific purpose for
which the exercise is sought.
Inherent powers enable the judiciary to
accomplish its constitutionally mandated
functions."
the Court rules that when Congress passed the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so
doing, took away from the courts their power to
issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-
making authority. Clearly, these issuances,
which are, by
nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs
created under the provisions of the Rules of
Court, are matters of procedure which belong
exclusively within the province of this Court.
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create,
define, and regulate a right but merely
prescribed the means of implementing an
existing right since it only provided for temporary
reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse
which is threatened to be
violated during the course of a pending litigation.
These issuances were merely ancillary to the
exercise of the CA's certiora jurisdiction
conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of
BP 129, as
amended, and which it had already acquired
over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
II Yes
The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the
condonation doctrine.
Spouses Espiritu v. Spouses Sazon, G.R. No.
204965, 2 March 2016.
City of Iloilo v. Honrado, G.R. No. 160399, 9
December 2015.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
JPV Motor Vehicle Emission Testing and Car
Care Center (JPV) was granted authority to of
emission testing in Iloilo City pursuant to DOTC
resolution of privatizing emission testing.
Later JPV filed a TRO against the petitioner City
of Iloilo to prevent them from acting on acting
applications of other emission testing center.
the petitioner contested the injunctive relief
being sought by JPV, insisting that such relief, if
issued, would result into a monopoly on the part
of JPV in the operation of a PETC; that the writ
of injunction would prevent the exercise by the
City Mayor of his discretionary power to issue or
not to issue business permits; and that JPV did
not establish the existence of its right in esse to
be protected by the writ of injunction.
RTC issued TRO.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC contravene the guidelines in Sec3
of Rule 57 when it granted JPV's
application for the writ of preliminary injunction?
- YEs
RULING:
Reflecting the avowed roles of the remedy,
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court set the
guidelines for when the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is justified, namely:
(a) when the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually; or
(b) when the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) when a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
As upheld in other jurisprudence, The prevailing
rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction which would in effect
dispose of the main case without trial. if the
lower court issued the desired writ to enjoin the
sale of the properties premised on the
aforementioned justification of the petitioners,
the issuance of the
writ would be a virtual acceptance of their claim
that the foreclosure sale is null and void. (See
Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Court of
Appeals, supra ). There would in effect be a
prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of
the rule on the burden of proof since it would
assume the proposition which the petitioners
are inceptively bound to prove.
Here, Such granting of JPV's application already
amounted to the virtual acceptance of JPV's
alleged entitlement to preventing the petitioner
from considering and passing upon the
applications of other parties like Grahar to
operate their own PETC in Iloilo City based on
JPV's still controversial capability to serve all the
registered motor vehicles in Iloilo City pursuant
to Department Order No. 2002-31. The granting
amounted to the prejudgment of the merits of the
case, something the RTC could not validly do. It
apparently forgot that the function of the writ of
preliminary injunction was not to determine the
merits of the case, or to decide controverted
facts,
because an interlocutory injunction was but a
preliminary and preparatory order that still
looked to a future final hearing, and, although
contemplating what the result of that hearing
would be, it should not settle what the result
should be.
Thus, the RTC did not exercise its broad
discretion soundly because it blatantly violated
the right to be heard of the petitioner, whose
right to substantiate its defense of the power to
regulate businesses within its territorial
jurisdiction should be fully recognized.
Bogabong v. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-
18-2537, 14 August 2019.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, G.R. No. 214073,
4 October 2017.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
BMC Chief instructed the gate closure of the
hospital compound. The relocation of this gate
was implemented for security reasons and to
make way for "[m]assive development within the
Complex."
The gate closure drew a lot of criticism from the
community, which led Atty. Botor to write to the
Mayor, asking for the reopening or dismantling
of the gate for being a public nuisance.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City
passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Bongat to
dismantle the gate. However, instead of
dismantling it, Mayor Bongat filed a Verified
Petition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against BMC.
RTC denied, but CA granted the writ reasoning
that "the general public had been using the road
since time immemorial. It reiterated that the writ
is against the relocation of the service road and
gate closure
ISSUE:
whether the Court of Appeals erred in directing
the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction on the closure of Road Lot
No. 3.
RULING:
of preliminary injunction may be issued:
Section 3.
Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.
— A preliminary injunction may be granted when
it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for
a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or
non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person
is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or
 proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
Jurisprudence has likewise established that the
following requisites must be proven first before a
writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory
or prohibitory, may be issued:
(1)The applicant must have a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right
in ess
(2)There is a material and substantial invasion of
such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to
prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate
remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.
In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for
the writ need not substantiate his or her claim
with complete and conclusive evidence since
only prima facie evidence or a sampling is
required "to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending
the decision of
the case on the merits."
Here, To prove its clear legal right over the
remedy being sought, Naga City presented
before the trial court the 1970s Revised
Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its
Identification Map which both identified Road Lot
No. 3 as being in the name of the Province of
Camarines Sur. Witnesses'
testimonies were also presented to corroborate
Naga City's claims of the public nature of Road
Lot No. 3. Respondents claimed that as
members of the general public, they had every
right to use Road Lot No. 3, a public road.
On the other hand, BMC presented TCT No.
13693, which covered a total land area of
53,890m2 within Barrio Concepcion, Naga City
with the Ministry of Health, now Department of
Health, as the registered owner. It is not
disputed that Road Lot No. 3 is part of the
property covered by TCT No. 13693. BMC
likewise presented a certification from the City
Engineer of Naga City.
Respondents failed to establish prima facie proof
of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No. 3.
Whatever right they sought to establish by
proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was
rebutted by the Department of Health's
certificate of title and the City Engineer's
categorical statement that "the road from
Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit
gate of [BMC] was not included in the list" of city
roads under Naga City's control.
Instead of merely relying on a tax map and
claims of customary use, Naga City or
respondents should have presented a clear legal
right to
support their claim over Road Lot No. 3.
Absent a particular law or statute establishing
Naga City's ownership or control over Road Lot
No. 3, the Department of Health's title over the
BMC compound must prevail over the
unsubstantiated claims of Naga City and
respondents. Department of Health's ownership
over Road Lot No. 3, with the concomitant right
to use and enjoy this property, must be
respected.
Respondents likewise cannot rely on the
supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by
the public to support their claimed right of
unfettered access to the road because
customary use is not one (1) of the sources of
legal obligation; hence, it does not ripen into a
right.
II.
Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only
upon prior notice to the party sought to be
enjoined and upon their due hearing. Rule 58,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court
determination of the propriety of the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction," giving the
applicant an opportunity to prove that great or
irreparable injury will result if no writ is issued
and allowing the opposing party to comment on
the application.
On the other hand, a temporary restraining order
that is heard only with the evidence presented
by its applicant is ex parte, but it is issued to
preserve the status quo until the hearing for
preliminary injunction can be conducted.
difference between preliminary injunction and a
restraining order as follows:
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to perform to refrain
from performing a particular act or acts. As an
extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to
preserve or maintain the status quo of things
and is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can
be heard. A preliminary injunction persists until it
is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.
The basic purpose of restraining order, on the
other hand, is to preserve the status quo until
the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction. Under the former §5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by §5, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may
issue a temporary restraining order with a limited
life of twenty days from date of issue. If before
the expiration of the 20-day period the
application for preliminary injunction is denied,
the temporary order would thereby be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by
the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary
restraining order would automatically expire on
the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no
judicial declaration to that effect being
necessary. In the instant case, no such
preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the
TRO earlier issued automatically expired under
the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.
Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Hontanosas, G.R. No. 157163, 25 June
2014.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Philippine Investment Two (SPV-AMC) v.
Mendoza, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2538, 21
November 2018.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Heirs of Nuesa filed a Complaint for Quieting of
a Title against Samonte, PI Two, DBP and
Sheriff, when the subject property allegedly
owned by their father was being subjected by a
Writ of possession by the Sheriff in favor of PI
Two. They alleged that their father executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale of the Subject Property in
favor of his common-law spouse, Samonte.
Samonte
then used the Subject Property as collateral for
the loan she obtained from
the DBP, which foreclosed the mortgage
constituted. They claimed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale between their father and Samonte
was null and void for lack of consideration and
for being prohibited by law. They availed the
remedy of terceria. Later, respondent Judge
Mendoza issued an Order, directing the
issuance of a 72-hour TRO, upon the posting of
a bond of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) by the Heirs of Nuesa.
respondent Judge Mendoza issued an Order
extending the validity of the TRO until October
12, 2017 after one of the Heirs of Nuesa,
testified on the contents of his judicial affidavit.
PI TWO filed an Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam
Manifestation raising its objections to respondent
Judge Mendoza's Orders issuing the TRO and
extending its validity. PI TWO averred that the
lower court did not have jurisdiction over PI
TWO because PI TWO never received the
summons for the Quieting of Title Case.
When the gross ignorance case was referred to
OCA, the Respondent Judge Mendoza averred
that he immediately issued the 72-hour TRO
because he honestly believed that there
appeared an extreme urgency and that the Heirs
of Nuesa would suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury since they were the present
possessors of the property
subject of the writ of possession
ISSUE:
Whether the judge is guilty of gross ignorance. –
Yes.
RULING:
Relevant provisions - Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
58 of the Rules of Court on preliminary
injunction,
A temporary restraining order may be issued ex
parte "to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction[,]
which cannot be issued ex parte. "
Otherwise stated, a trial court may issue a
temporary restraining order even without a prior
hearing for a limited period of 72 hours "if the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
wi
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury ."
In this instance, a summary hearing, separate
from the application of the preliminary injunction,
is required only to determine if a 72-hour TRO
should be extended.
A trial court may also issue ex parte a TRO for
20 days "[i]f it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great
or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice."
The trial court has twenty (20) days from its
issuance to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the
application for preliminary injunction during this
period, the
temporary restraining order is deemed to have
expired.
In this case, the OCA correctly observed that
respondent Judge Mendoza's failure to serve the
summons on PI TWO after the issuance of the
assailed 72-hour TRO cannot be cured by his
claim that it was received by the sheriff, the
person enjoined from implementing the writ of
possession.
The previous summons received by the sheriff
was also no longer valid considering that the
complaint was amended and admitted by virtue
of
respondent Judge Mendoza's Order dated
September 18, 2017. Section 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules, as bolstered by Administrative Circular
No. 20-95, is explicit that the adverse party
should be immediately served with the summons
and a copy of the complaint.
Furthermore, the supposed extreme urgency of
the issuance of the 72-hour TRO was belied by
respondent Judge Mendoza's setting of
summary
hearing for the extension of the same, five (5)
days after the issuance thereof. Section 5, Rule
58 clearly states that such summary hearing
must
be conducted within the 72-hour period. Instead,
respondent Judge Mendoza set the hearing on
September 25, 2017, two (2) days beyond the
effectivity of the 72-hour TRO.
To make matters worse, respondent Judge
Mendoza extended the 72-hour TRO, which had
already expired, into a full 20-day TRO. An
already expired TRO can no longer be extended.
The TRO was issued on September 20, 2017.
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules clearly provides
that "[i]n no case shall the total period of
effectivity of the [TRO] exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours
provided." The effectivity of the 72-hour TRO
issued by respondent Judge Mendoza on
September 20, 2017 therefore could only be
extended until October 10, 2017, twenty (20)
days after its issuance. Thus, respondent Judge
erroneously extended the effectivity of the 72-
hour TRO until October 12, 2017, two (2) days
beyond the period of effectivity of a TRO
explicitly provided by the Rules.
In this case, respondent Judge Mendoza's
failure to apply the settled laws and
jurisprudence on the issuance of TROs
constitutes gross ignorance
of the law which merits administrative sanction.
Spouses Lago v. Abul, A.M. No. RTJ-
10-2255, 17 January 2011.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Philippine Ports Authority v. Nasipit, G.R. No.
174136, 23 December 2008.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
NIASSI was awarded of the stevedoring services
in Nasipit port. It was granted hold-over permits
with this regard. However, the 1-yr contract was
never executed.
Later, PPA (Philippine Port Authority) took over
the services. However, this
composite group continued to utilize NIASSI's
manpower and equipment.
NIASSI (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre And
Stevedoring Services, INC) filed a petition for
injunction with prayer of WPI and/or TRO
against PPA. It later amended its petition to
mandamus with prayer for the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.
The amended petition sought to compel PPA to
execute or cause the final execution of the cargo
handling contract with NIASSI.
RTC initially granted the writ taking into
consideration that NIASSI had already relased
substantial capital. However, it later dissolved
giving credence to PPA, that the State has the
power to revoke the temporary permits issued to
arrastre and stevedoring operators whenever
there is a need to promote the public interest
and the welfare of the stevedoring industry –
police power.
ISSUE:
RULING:
the RTC failed to observe the procedural
requirements when it dissolved the preliminary
mandatory injunction without the benefit of a
hearing. Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court.
A hearing is indispensable before an injunction
or restraining order may be dissolved. It is during
the hearing that a determination may be made
whether or not the continuance of an injunction
would cause irreparable damage to the party or
person enjoined.
Here, the respondent judge did not require the
filing of respondent's affidavit nor allow petitioner
to submit a counter affidavit opposing the
dissolution of the writ in question. Likewise, no
hearing was conducted to enable the respondent
judge to determine whether the continuance of
the writ of injunction may cause irreparable
damage to the respondent. And while it may
conceded that the court a quo set the hearing on
respondent's motion for reconsideration on 01
April 2005, the same was reset to 06 April 2005
for the purpose of receiving evidence on the new
allegations that respondent failed to present at
the hearing on the application for injunction. We
have gone over the minutes of the proceedings
held before the court a quo but there is nothing
in the records to show that a hearing was ever
conducted on 06 April 2005 or at anytime
thereafter to determine the grounds for
nullification of the order granting the writ
application and the propriety of dissolving the
writ previously issued by the court a quo.
Such fatal omission notwithstanding, the
respondent judge gratuitously issued the
resolution granting the motion for
reconsideration that resulted in the dissolution of
the mandatory injunction.
Needless to state. The respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he dissolved the
subject Writ without conducting a hearing to
assess the prevailing circumstances and without
requiring the respondents to file a counter-bond
as required in Section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Thus, It would be in the interest of justice to
reinstate the preliminary mandatory injunction
the RTC has earlier issued in favor of NIASSI.
The
stevedoring company has proven that it stands
to suffer irreparable injury with PPA's continued
use of its facilities and takeover of the port. Even
though PPA is a governmental arm, it does not
stand above the law in the guise of protecting
the public interest. It should also be noted that
an arrastre contract is not an ordinary
agreement involving merely parties therein, as it
affects the public in general.
In all contracts, the law must protect all parties in
securing fair play and equity to prevail.
Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon,
G.R. No. 142896, 12 September 2007.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

Spouses Yap v. International Exchange Bank,
G.R. No. 175145, 28 March 2008.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Spouses Yap filed a WPI against ibank and
Sheriff Flora to stop them from selling the
property allegedly owned by them. Such
property was sold by Mr. Go, whose properties
are being possessed.
RTC granted the writ. CA and SC ruled that
there is no GADALEJ in issuing the writ.
Aggrieved, ibank and Sheriff Flora filed with the
RTC an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to
Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction)
which seeks for the dismissal of the case be
resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction previously issued be dissolved.
RTC recalled and
dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
ISSUE:
May the trial court recall and dissolve the
preliminary injunction it issued despite the
rulings of the Court of Appeals and by this Court
that its issuance was not tainted with grave
abuse of discretion? - YES
RULING:
The issuance of a preliminary injunction is
different from its dissolution. Its issuance is
governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its
dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As long as
the party seeking the dissolution of the
preliminary injunction can prove the presence of
any of the grounds for its dissolution, same may
be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court
previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Under Sec. 6, a preliminary injunction may be
dissolved if it appears after hearing that although
the applicant is entitled to the injunction or
restraining order, the issuance or continuance
thereof, as the case may be, would cause
irreparable damage to the party or person
enjoined while the applicant can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may
suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount
fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all
damages which the applicant may suffer by the
denial or the dissolution of the injunction or
restraining order. Two conditions must concur:
first, the court in the exercise of its discretion,
find
that the continuance of the injunction would
cause great damage to the defendant, while the
plaintiff can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer; second, the
defendant files a counter-bond. The Order of the
trial court dated 29 April 2006 is based on this
ground.
In the case at bar, the trial court, after hearing,
found that respondents duly showed that they
would suffer great and irreparable injury if the
injunction shall continue to exist. As to the
second condition, the trial court likewise found
that respondents were willing to post a counter-
bond which could cover the damages that
petitioners may suffer in case the judgment turns
out to be adverse to them. The Order of the trial
court to recall and dissolve the preliminary
injunction is subject to the filing and approval of
the counter-bond that it ordered. Failure to post
the required counter-bond will necessarily lead
to the non-dissolution of the preliminary
injunction. The Order of Dissolution cannot be
implemented until and unless the required
counter-bond has been posted.
The well-known rule is that the matter of
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the
trial court, and its action shall not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or,
otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion. By the
same token, the court that issued such a
preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ
as the circumstances may warrant.
In the case on hand, the trial court issued the
order of dissolution on a ground provided for by
the Rules of Court. The same being in
accordance with the rules, we find no reason to
disturb the same.
Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. v.
Atlocom Wireless System, Inc., G.R. No.
205875, 30 June 2015.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
• injunction.
Ama Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents’
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342, 19
July 2017.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Ama Land Inc (AMALI) filed a WPI
ISSUE:
whether WWRAI is entitled to a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction pending determination of the original
petition for the declaration of temporary and
permanent easements of right of way over a
portion of Fordham Street.
RULING:
to be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner
must show that: (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right
is directly threatened by the act sought to be
enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious and irreparable damage.
The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests
on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, since the assessment
and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involves findings of fact left to the conclusive
determination by such court; and the exercise of
judicial discretion by such court will not be
interfered with, except upon a finding of grave
abuse of discretion.
In the issuance of the injunctive writ, grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal aversion
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
Guided by the foregoing principles, the CA erred
in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing its October 28, 2010 and
February 23, 2011 Orders, denying WWRAI's
application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary
However, WWRAI was unable to convincingly
demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected by the injunctive writ. The
apprehensions of its members are, as correctly
ruled by the RTC, speculative and insufficient to
substantiate the element of serious and
irreparable damage.
the denial of WWRAI's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the construction of
the AMA Tower does not necessarily translate to
AMALI's entitlement to a temporary easement of
right of way over a portion of Fordham Street
belonging to WWRAI for use as an access road
and staging area of its AMA Tower project
before the resolution of its petition for declaration
of easement of right of way (original petition) by
the
RTC. Stated differently, WWRAI cannot be
compelled at this stage of the proceedings to
grant AMALI a temporary legal easement of right
of way over a portion of Fordham Street.
First of all, the CA Decision categorically found
that WWRAI is the owner of the subject
Fordham Street as this was expressly admitted
by
AMALI and pursuant to the RTC's pre-trial order.
Thus, inasmuch as AMALI
prays for the grant of both temporary and
permanent easements of right of way over a
portion of Fordham Street against WWRAI in the
original petition, WWRAI should be deemed to
be the owner of the servient estate. Simply
stated, WWRAI, and not its members, is the real
party in interest in this case.
To be sure, even AMALI itself filed the original
petition against WWRAI and not against the
latter's members.
Secondly, the question of whether or not AMALI,
as owner of the dominant estate, may validly
claim against WWRAI a compulsory permanent
right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code, will depend on a finding that AMALI
has established the existence of the following
requisites, namely: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables; (2) it is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (3) after the
proper indemnity has been paid; (4) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor of the dominant
estate's own acts; and (5) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.
A sixth requisite is that the right of way must be
absolutely necessary for the normal enjoyment
of the dominant estate by its owner.
There must be a real, not fictitious or artificial
necessity for the right of way, and the right
cannot be claimed merely for the convenience of
the owner of the enclosed estate.
The burden of proving the existence of the
foregoing requisites lies on AMALI, being the
owner of the dominant estate.
This issue has been correctly recognized by the
CA as still pending determination by the
Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City
Philippine Associated Smelting and
Refining Corporation v. Lim, G.R, No.
172948, 5 October 2016.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Zuneca Pharmaceutical v. Natrapharm, Inc.,
G.R. No. 197802, 11 November
2015.
DOCTRINE:
The injunction is permanent and forms part of
the judgment on the merits and it can only be
properly ordered on a final judgment.
FACTS:
Natrapharm sells a medicine bearing the generic
name "CITICOLINE," which is indicated for heart
and stroke patients. The said medicine is
marketed under its registered trademark
"ZYNAPSE," which
respondent obtained from the Intellectual
Property Office on Sep. 24, 2007.
While, Petitioner Zuneca have been selling since
2003 or even as early as 2001, a medicine
imported from Lahore, Pakistan bearing the
generic name "CARBAMAZEPINE," an anti-
convulsant indicated for epilepsy, under the
brand name "ZYNAPS," which trademark is
however not registered with the IPO.
Respondents wrote a Cease and Desist Order.
But Petitoners unheeded.
respondent filed a complaint against petitioners
for trademark infringement, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
RTC denied respondent's application for a TRO,
ruling that even if respondent
was able to first register its mark "ZYNAPSE"
with the IPO in 2007, it is
nevertheless defeated by the prior actual use by
petitioners of "ZYNAPS" in
2003.
CA upheld the allegations of respondents that it
is entitled to injunctive relief on the
basis of its IPO registration and permanently
enjoined petitioners from the
commercial use of "ZYNAPS."
ISSUE:
Whether the CA may order a permanent
injunction in deciding a petition for certiorari
against the denial of an application for a
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC?
RULING:
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both
preliminary and permanent injunction. Section 1,
Rule 58 provides for the definition of preliminary
injunction – “an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency
or a person to refrain from a particular act or
acts.”
On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Rule permanent injunction, the proper remedy is an
defines a permanent injunction in this wise: appeal from the decision in the main case.
SEC. 9.
When final injunction granted. — If after the trial

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based

solely on initial and incomplete evidence.
The evidence submitted during the hearing on
an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction is
not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is
needed to give the trial court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction
pending the decision of the case on the merits.
As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a
court when issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction are interlocutory in nature and made
even before the trial on the merits is commenced
or terminated.

By contrast a permanent injunction, based on

Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, forms
part of the judgment on the merits and it can
only be properly ordered only on final judgment.
A permanent injunction may thus be granted
after a trial or hearing on the merits of the case
and a decree granting or refusing an injunction
should not be entered until after a hearing on the
merits where a verified answer containing
denials is filed or where no answer is required,
or a rule to show cause is equivalent to an
answer.

As such a preliminary injunction, like any

preliminary writ and any interlocutory order,
cannot survive the main case of which it is an
incident; because an ancillary writ of preliminary
injunction loses its force and effect after the
decision in the main petition.

Here, this Court is being asked to determine

whether the CA erred by issuing a permanent
injunction in a case which questioned the
propriety of the denial of an ancillary writ. But
with the RTC's December 2, 2011 Decision on
the case for "Injunction, Trademark
Infringement, Damages and Destruction," the
issues raised in the instant petition have been
rendered moot and academic. We note that the
case brought to the CA on a petition for certiorari
merely involved the RTC's denial of
respondent's application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, a mere ancillary writ. Since a decision
on the merits has already been rendered and
which includes in its disposition a