G.R. No.

L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-

appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees,
oppositors- appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among
the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto
and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.

The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion
Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27,
1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of
the estate as follows:

(Spanish lels)

The testamentary dispositions are as follows:

(Spanish)

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is
to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the
other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third
(1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in
favor of Wanda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution
in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda)
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first
heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the
Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who
is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the
testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates
the testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of
partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.

1. The widow's legitime.

The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They admit
that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only
survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no
burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)

It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that
the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her
favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en
pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any
additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention
for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
 2. The substitutions.

It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of
substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil
Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal
classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two."
(111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)

The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs
instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.

The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:

ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir
and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.

It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto,
con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.

The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question the
sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct
over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have
ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.

The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's usufruct over
two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.

They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or stated
differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for
vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the
Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.

As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void
for the following reasons:

(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally
instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not
go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."

What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:

Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission.

The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view,
there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the
first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the
substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus
clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
 From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir.
These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp.
193-194.)

(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts.
865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual
agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)

3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it
violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)

The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not
only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the
Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary
succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of
land.

This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right,
does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V.
Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-56249 May 29, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED REV. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS,
RAMONA B. VDA. DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF THE LATE RODULFO B.
ARANAS, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to declare the orders of respondent Judge dated July 16, 1980 and
September 23, 1980 as an exercise of a gross abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, by ruling that
the properties under Group C of the testate estate of the late Fr.Teodoro Aranas are subject to remunerative
legacies.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19, 1953. He had executed on
June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will
and Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:

A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr. Aranas from his brother Aniceto
Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from his parents.

B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr. Aranas from his brother Carmelo
Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from his parents.

C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and
serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after
deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic
Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul. Said pertinent provision 1 reads as follows:

Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be converged and
placed under a "special administrator." The special administrator of these lands, for his office,
should receive one half of all the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for the
administration, and the other half of the produce should be received by the Roman Catholic
Church and should be spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful
and serviceable nephew, should be the first special administrator of said properties, without
bond, until his death or until he should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of the
sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office of special administrator, and none
other than they. Their father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among
them shall hold the said office, but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said
sons will have power to select the one among them ourselves. The special administration is
perpetual.

The lower court in its Order   dated November 17, 1977 ruled, upon petitioners' (in Sp. Proc. No. 303) "Motion for
2

the Declaration of Heirs and Partition; and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente Aranas) and/or for his
Permission to Resign, and appointment of His Successor" that the "perpetual inalienability and administration of
the portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas, administered by Vicente Aranas, is nun and void
after twenty years from January 19, 1954 ... " and declared in the same order the heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro
Aranas. It also declared that "the removal of Vicente Aranas will, therefore, not serve the ends of justice and for
the best interest of all the heirs, particularly with respect to the portion of the estate taken by the heirs of Aniceto
Aranas, represented by the petitioners herein and the rest of the heirs of Carmelo, represented by the
intervenors, coheirs of Administrator Vicente Aranas."  3

However, the abovesaid Order was subsequently set aside upon the "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to
Declare Testate and Intestate Heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas," filed by the administrator Vicente Aranas on
the allegation that said order was violative of due process and without legal and factual basis because only the
issue for the removal of the administrator was heard and not the matter of the declaration of heirs. Thus, the
lower court declared in its Order,   dated July 16, 1980 that the Order dated November 17, 1977 is "set aside and
4

in the interest of justice, reopened in order that other heirs, successors-in-interest of Felino Aranas,    could
5

likewise assert their claims, as in the case of the heirs of Aniceto Aranas and Carmelo Aranas."  6

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the lower court in its order dated September 23, 1980,
petitioners now come before Us by certiorari raising the issue that the lower court erred in setting aside its order
dated November 17, 1977 and in not applying the provisions on Usufruct of the New Civil Code with respect to
the properties referred to as Group "C" in the Last Will and Testament.

The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of properties (Group "C") is subject to the
following:

1. Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of 1/2 of the estate after
deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas, during his lifetime and shall
continue an administrator of the estate, and, who, upon his death or refusal to continue such
usufruct, may be succeeded by any of the brothers of the administrator as selected by their
father, Carmelo Aranas, if still alive or one selected by his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead; Pursuant
to the Will. (Article 562, 563, 564 and 603 of the New Civil Code).

2. Legacy in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, particularly the Archbishop diocese of
Cagayan de Oro City Represented by the Reverend Archbishop Patrick H. Cronin over one-half
of the proceeds of the properties under Group "C." (Article 603, New Civil Code) and to last for a
period of Fifty years from the effective date of the legacy, Article 605, New Civil Code). (Annex
"L-14," p. 87, Rollo)

Assailing the aforementioned ruling, petitioners rely heavily on the doctrine laid down in Art. 870 of the New Civil
Code to wit:

Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more
than twenty years are void.

A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament shows that it was the sincere
intention and desire of the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by
allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or
refusal to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas
among his sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one among themselves.
Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits
which result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits
of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore
it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente
Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the
naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas
prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct.
To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the
dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said
testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden. The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or until
the refusal to act as such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be
properly disposed of, subject to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a
fideicommissary substitution, said Article says:

A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted
with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir
and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.

It is contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent court dated November 17, 1977 was already
final and not subject to correction as what was set aside and to be reheard was only regarding the determination
of additional heirs. Such contention is not worthy of credence. Respondents in their Memorandum allege and it is
not disputed by petitioners that the order of November 17, 1977 has not yet become final because it was
received only on January 12, 1978 by the counsel for respondent Vicente Aranas and the Motion for
Reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs dated January 17, 1978 was filed by the said
respondent within the reglementary period. Besides the validity or invalidity of the usufructuary dispositions
would affect the determination of heirs.

As to petitioners' allegation that the order of July 16, 1980 is without basis, the record shows that during the
hearing of the urgent motion for reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs, it was proven
conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B. Aranas that he was instituted as a remunerative legatee per
mandate of the Last Will and Testament by way of usufructuary. Likewise the right of the Roman Catholic
Church as the other usufructuary legatee for the duration of the statutory lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50
years from the date of the effectivity of said legacy, was also established. 
7

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-13876             February 28, 1962

CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.

Felix V. Vergara for defendant-appellant.

B. Martinez for plaintiffs-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo against Manuel
Singson in connection with a residential lot located a Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of
approximately 193 square meters, and the improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their
complaint alleged that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino
owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson, the original
owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in
special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendant
refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action.

Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and not owner of one-half
pro-indiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.

After trial upon the issue thus posed, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

1. Declaring that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with the defendant of the house and lot described
in the complaint to the extent of each of an undivided 1/2 portion thereof; .

2. Ordering the aforesaid co-owners to execute an agreement of partition of the said property within 30
days from receipt of this judgment unless it be shown that the division thereof may render it
unserviceable, in which case the provisions of Art. 498 of the New Civil Code may be applied; . 1äwphï1.ñët

3. That in the event the said parties shall fail to do so, this Court will appoint the corresponding
commissioners to make the partition in accordance with law; and .

4. Without special pronouncement as to costs." .

From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.

It is admitted that Dña. Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in
question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted to probate in
Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G.R. No.
3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel
and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed
Florentino.

Clause IX of her last will reads as follows: .

(Spanish)

The issue to be decided is whether the testamentary disposition above-quoted provided for what is
called sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria. This issue is, we believe, controlled by the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code in force in the Philippines prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code, in view of the
fact that the testatrix died on January 13, 1948. They are the following: .
 Art. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case
such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish or should be unable to accept the
inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it is to apply, shall include the three
mentioned in the next preceeding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided:

Art. 781. Fidei-commissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is charged to preserve and transmit
to a third person the whole or part of the inheritance shall be valid and effective, provided they do not go
beyond the second degree, or that they are made in favor of persons living at the time of the death of the
testator." .

Art. 785. The following shall be inoperative: .

1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving them this name or by imposing upon the
fiduciary the absolute obligation of delivering the property to a second heir." ....

In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the testator may not only designate the heirs who will
succeed him upon his death, but also provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs do not accept or are in
no position to accept the inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him.

The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person with the obligation, on the part of the latter,
to deliver the same to another person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a particular event (6 Manresa,
p. 1112).

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a substitution of the heir
named therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino — whether this occurs before or
after that of the testatrix — the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal
parts to the testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them
die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary
result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided
half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than
usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not
in the latter. As Manresa says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the property bequeathed by will,
but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it is
obvious that the nude ownership over the property, upon the death of the testatrix, passed to and was acquired
by another person, and the person cannot be other than the fideicomisario (6 Manresa p. 145).

It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the
first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or
upon the happening of a particular event. For this reason, Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a
fideicommissary substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly ("de una manera expresa") either
by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation ("obligacion terminante") to
deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir. In this connection Manresa says: .

(Spanish)

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided for
therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that
appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon
appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix — her share shall belong to the
brothers of the testatrix.

In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson,
established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to
be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.

(PCIB VS ESCOLIN IS IN THE SCREEN SHOTS OF THE PC