16.

CSC vs DACOYCOY
G.R. No. 135805
April 29, 1999

FACTS:
Pedro Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts
and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President,
Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a
complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. The
Civil Service commission dismissed the case on habitual drunkenness and misconduct for want
of substantial evidence. He was still however dismissed for he was found guilty of nepotism on
two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and
utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as
the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. Dacoycoy invoked
the power of the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission ruling
that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not
guilty of nepotism. It stated that “the person who recommends or appoints who should be
sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act.” Of course, the Civil Service Commission
did not take it sitting down. It duly filed an appeal via certiorari, hence the case.

ISSUE:
Is Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism?

RULING:
YES. As per Sec. 59 of EO 292 “Nepotism. –
(1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any
branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made
in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau
or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
“As used in this Section, the word “relative” and members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.” Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty
of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending
authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee. He may not have been the one who appointed or recommended his two sons but
he was the one who recommended the appointment of the person who appointed his two sons.
The law was circumvented. “Also, it was Dacoycoy who certified that “funds are available for
the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy” and even rated his performance as “very
satisfactory”. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father
was “his next higher supervisor”. The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious.
Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the
school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level
employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of
respondent’s two sons and placed them under respondent’s immediate supervision serving as
driver and utility worker of the school. To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent
Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two
sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
17-18. HON. R. GLORIA VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 131012
April 21, 1999

FACTS:
Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City
in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned
as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the
vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation
of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite
reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same
attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.

RULING:
1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed
against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and
not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts
where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the
reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an
expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is
more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job,
being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the
reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the
part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature
of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil
service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but
also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of
Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19
SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the
employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his
removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly
terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the
provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria
vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his
security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.
19. ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO v. HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE
G. R. No. 133132
January 25, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners were appointed Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM, created under RA 6975
entitled "An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department
Of The Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes."
They assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551), otherwise known
as the "Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998," by virtue of which
petitioners herein, were separated from office.
Section 8 of the said act provides that, “Upon the effectivity of this Act, the terms of
office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired which shall constitute a bar to their
reappointment or an extension of their terms in the Commission except for current
Commissioners who have served less than two (2) years of their terms of office who may be
appointed by the President for a maximum term of two (2) years.”
Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates
their security of tenure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by
Congress.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. As such, they cannot be removed or suspended
from office, except for cause provided by law. The phrase "except for cause provided by law"
refers to "reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for
removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise
of discretion may deem sufficient."
The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is
acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officers
right to continue in the position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons,
such as the lack of funds or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be
valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.
An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and
permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with
another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. In order to determine whether
there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by
the new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM.’
No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress,
RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners
herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees
from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally
infirm.
20. BUKLOD NG KAWANI NG EEIB v ES
July 10, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioners seek that EO 191 (deactivation of EEIB) and EO 223 (all EEIB personnel are
separated from office) unconstitutional.
 1987 - Cory issued EO 127 creating the EEIB which gives it the following tasks:
o Receive, gather and evaluate intelligence reports and information and evidence on the
nature, modes and extent of illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, and dollar-salting,
investigate the same and aid in the prosecution of cases;
o Coordinate with external agencies in monitoring the financial and economic activities
of persons or entities, whether domestic or foreign, which may adversely affect
national financial interest with the goal of regulating, controlling or preventing said
activities;
o Provide all intelligence units of operating Bureaus or Offices under the Ministry with
the general framework and guidelines in the conduct of intelligence and investigating
works;
o Supervise, monitor and coordinate all the intelligence and investigation operations of
the operating Bureaus and Offices under the Ministry;
o Investigate, hear and file, upon clearance by the Minister, anti-graft and corruption
cases against personnel of the Ministry and its constituents units;
o Perform such other appropriate functions as may be assigned by the Minister or his
deputies.
 1989 – cory issued Memorandum order 225 declaring that all smuggling cases outside the
sol jurisdiction of the BOC fall within EEIB;
 2000 – Erap issued EO191 with the reason that most of the EEIB’s functions are done by
other bureaus and agencies. He transferred the functions of EEIB to BOC and NBI
 Erap also issued EO196 which is the presidential anti-smuggling task force ADUANA
 EO223 was issued
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the president can reorganize the executive department
2. Whether or not the reorganization was valid

RULING:
 (1) Yes. It is argued that the power to create and abolish government offices lies in the
constitution, the legislature and the authority of law. However, multiple laws allow the
president to reorganize the executive department.
o Firstly, reorganization was defined by EO 292 sec 31 (admin code of 1987) which
is the power of the president to reduce, consolidate and abolish offices in the
executive department
o RA 7695 sec 48 (GAA 1993) – heads of bureaus can identify offices that can be
scaled down, phased out or abolished
o Same, sec 62 – Offices can be abolished only by law or by the president
o PD 1772 [order by marcos that was not repealed(considered active)] – allows the
president to reorganize national government
o RA 8745sec 77 (GAA 1999) (this is the most important)– used by respondent
states that Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the
Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any department
or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and
funded from appropriations provided by this Act.
 (2)Yes: petitioners say the reorganization was done in bad faith because it was only done
to make way for task force aduana. This is not the accurate.
o RA 6656 gives the evidences for bad faith in removal from civil service
 there was increase in positions in an office
 a similar office was created
 replacements by less qualified candidates were made
 same functions as the abolished office was given to a new office
 violated orders of suspension
 o Task force Aduana was created for effieciency
 It hired no new employees since it employs only intelligence member s of
the AFP and intelligence officers of other bureaus.
 Budget for Aduana is significantly lower (50M) as opposed to EIIB
(200M)
 It has more powers specifically that of search, seizure and arrest as well as
investigation of ill-gotten wealth
Wherefore the petition is denied EO 191 and 223 are VALID.
21. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R. No. 160261, 10 NOVEMBER
2003

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June
2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed
by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted
to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in
the Constitution.
 2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

RULING:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the
first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do
away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.
22. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 193459 ;
February 15, 2011

FACTS:
On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. (Baraquel group)
filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner based on betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution. On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., et al.
filed the second complaint based on the same offense. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during
its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to
public respondent. On September 13, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from
proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining
order. The petitioner invoked the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The public respondent contended
that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent.
Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it
had not gone beyond the determination of of form and substance of the two complaints. Hence,
certiorari is unavailing. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc
RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment
proceedings against petitioner. Section 3(1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. 3(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication.
(2) Whether or not the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule.

RULING:
(First issue) The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot
thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable
officer within a period of one year.
(Second issue) Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.” However, the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied
with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the
House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Petition is DISMISSED.
23. REPUBLIC v. SERENO
G.R. No. 237428

Facts:
The petition challenges respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice. The
Republic avers that respondent unlawfully holds her office because in failing to regularly declare
her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as
an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the Court, she cannot be said to possess the
requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the Judiciary. The
Republic thus prays that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared void. Respondent
counters that, as an impeachable officer, she may only be removed through impeachment by the
Senate sitting as an impeachment court.

ISSUE NO. 1
Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against
whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of
Representatives.

RULING:
Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court
shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.
Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action
for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court
in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. While the hierarchy of
courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition.In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for
quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of
whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office is a matter
of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow
an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.
Quo warranto v. Impeachment
While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official,
the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political
in nature, while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the
courts.
Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the
sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public
officer by determining the public officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for
quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or
appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules.
Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and impeachment may
proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2)
grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
Impeachment proceeding v. impeachment case
As correctly cited by Respondent, “Impeachment proceeding" is different from the
"impeachment case". The former refers to the filing of the complaint before the Committee on
Justice while the latter refers to the proceedings before the Senate. The difference bolsters the
conclusion that there can be no forum shopping. Indeed, the "impeachment proceeding" before
the House Committee on Justice is not the "impeachment case" proper. The impeachment case is
yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the
moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the respondent.
Impeachment is not an exclusive
remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed
from office
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice- President, both
of whom are impeachable officers. Following respondent's theory that an impeachable officer
can be removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice President against
whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the dismissal of the protest on the
ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal from office through a mode other than by
impeachment. To sustain respondent's position is to render election protests under the PET Rules
nugatory. The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities
in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as reflected in their votes must be
determined and respected. The Court could not, therefore, have unwittingly curtailed its own
judicial power by prohibiting quo warranto proceedings against impeachable officers. Further,
the PET Rules provide that a petition for quo warranto, contesting the election of the President or
Vice-President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may
be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten (10) days
after the proclamation of the winner. 161 Despite disloyalty to the Republic being a crime
against public order162 defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus may likewise be
treated as "other high crimes,"163 constituting an impeachable offense, quo warranto as a
remedy to remove the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless made expressly
available.
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose
a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision reads: Section 2. The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)
It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain,
it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 165 The provision uses the permissive term
"may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect. 166 We have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or
faculty which he has the option to exercise. 167 An option to remove by impeachment admits of
an alternative mode of effecting the removal.
To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are
outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding.
The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of
impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of
an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been
determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification,
when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer
commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue
discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such
would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key
positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from
office through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of the
Constitution.
We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. Thus, the people have the
right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public· office. To construe Section 2, Article
XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy
to correct a "public wrong" arising from defective or void appointments. Equity will not suffer a
wrong to be without remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a
remedy.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obliviate confusion in the future as to
when quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in
keeping with the Court's function of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution,
the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official's qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that
the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if
it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot
be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes
an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

ISSUE NO. 2
Whether the one-year limitation is equally applicable when the petitioner is not a
mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking relief
for a public wrong and suing for public interest.

RULING:
No. Prescription does not lie against the State.
Reference must necessarily be had to Section 2, Rule 66 which makes it compulsory for
the Solicitor General to commence a quo warranto action:
SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. - The Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof must commence such action. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, when the Solicitor General himself commences the quo warranto action
either (1) upon the President's directive, (2) upon complaint or (3) when the Solicitor General has
good reason to believe that there is proof that (a) a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises· a public office, position or franchise; (b) a public officer does or suffers an
act which is a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or ( c) an association acts as a corporation
without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act, he does so in the
discharge of his task and mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the
government are upheld. In these three instances, the Solicitor General is mandated under the
Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition.
Indeed, when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to
assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription.208 Indubitably,
the basic principle that "prescription does not lie against the State" which finds textual basis
under Article 1108 (4)209 of the Civil Code, applies in this case.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of
an action for quo warranto. People v. City Whittier,210 explains that the remedy of quo warranto
is intended to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted. Indeed, on point
is People v. Bailey,211 when it ruled that because quo warranto serves to end a continuous
usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just
court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in
the Judiciary.
ISSUE NO. 3
Whether or not the failure to comply with the SALN requirement reflects on a
person’s integrity

RULING:
Yes. To recapitulate, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution requires that a member of the
Judiciary must be of proven integrity. To be of proven integrity means that the applicant must
have established a steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles. The necessity of having
integrity among the members of the judiciary is clearly discussed in the Commentary on the
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
Integrity is the attribute of rectitude and righteousness. The components of integrity are
honesty and judicial morality. A judge should always, not only in the discharge of official duties,
act honourably and in a manner befitting the judicial office; be free from fraud, deceit and
falsehood; and be good and virtuous in behaviour and in character. There are no degrees of
integrity as so defined. Integrity is absolute. In the judiciary, integrity is more than a virtue; it is a
necessity.
Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character
and is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards
the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public
official who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of
proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her disqualified from holding public office.
 The requirement to file a SALN is not a trivial or a formal requirement. Neither is it
something over which public officials can exercise discretion. It is mandated by Our Constitution
and laws. It is meant to forge transparency and accountability in the government and as a
measure meant to curb corruption.
Members of the Judiciary are bound by the qualifications of honesty, probity,
competence, and integrity. In ascertaining whether a candidate possesses such qualifications, the
JBC in the exercise of its Constitutional mandate, set certain requirements which should be
complied with by the candidates to be able to qualify. These requirements are announced and
published to notify not only the applicants but the public as well. Changes to such set of
requirements, as agreed upon by the JBC En Banc through a proper deliberation, such as in this
case when the JBC decided to allow substantial compliance with the SALN submission
requirement, should also be announced and published for the same purpose of apprising the
candidates and the public of such changes. At any rate, if a candidate is appointed despite being
unable to comply with the requirements of the JBC and despite the lack of the aforementioned
qualifications at the time of application, the appointment may be the subject of a quo warranto
provided it is filed within one year from the appointment or discovery of the defect.Only the
Solicitor General may institute the quo warranto petition.
The willful non-filing of a SALN is an indication of dishonesty, lack of probity and lack
of integrity. Moreso if the non-filing is repeated in complete disregard of the mandatory
requirements of the Constitution and the law.
Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be retained after more
than ten years by the receiving office or custodian or repository unless these are the subject of
investigation pursuant to the law.
Thus, to be in keeping with the spirit of the law requiring public officers to file SALNs -
to manifest transparency and accountability in public office - if public officers cannot produce
their SALNs from their personal files, they must obtain a certification from the office where they
filed and/or the custodian or repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In the event that said
offices certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located, said offices must certify
the valid and legal reason of their non availability, such as by reason of destruction by natural
calamity due to fire or earthquake, or by reason of the allowed destruction after ten years under
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713.
 In this case, it was found that respondent is ineligible to hold the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court position for lack of integrity on account of her failure to file a substantial number
of SALNs and also, her failure to submit the required SALNs to the JBC during her application
for the position. Again, one of the Constitutional duties of a public officer is to submit a
declaration under oath of his or her assets, liabilities, and net worth upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law. 335 When the Constitution and the law exact
obedience, public officers must comply and not offer excuses. When a public officer is unable or
unwilling to comply, he or she must not assume office in the first place, or if already holding
one, he or she must vacate that public office because it is the correct and honorable thing to do.
A public officer who ignores, trivializes or disrespects Constitutional and legal provisions, as
well as the canons of ethical standards, forfeits his or her right to hold and continue in that office.
24. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G. R. No. 162215
July 30, 2007

FACTS:
One of the qualification standards for Director II positions under the Office of the
Ombudsman is Third Level (Career Executive Service, CES) eligibility. However, in the
Supreme Court decision Inok vs. Civil Service Commission, CES eligibility is only required in
the Executive Branch. Ombudsman Marcelo then wrote to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
requesting the approval of the amendment of qualification standard for Director II, from Third
Level Eligibility to Second Level Eligibility.
The CSC issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 disapproving the request:
1. Nowhere does Inok exempt the Office of the Ombudsman or other constitutional agencies
from the coverage of the Civil Service Law and Rules. On the contrary, Inok declares that
these bodies are covered by the civil service system.
2. To set aside the authority of the Commission to require third level eligibilities to said
offices would be to nullify and strike down the very core of the civil service, that is, the
promotion of merit and fitness principle
The Office of the Ombudsman, claiming that its constitutional and statutory powers were
unduly curtailed, now seeks to set aside and nullify the CSC Opinion via this petition for
certiorari:
1. Its specific, exclusive and discretionary constitutional and statutory power as an
independent constitutional body to administer and supervise its own officials and
 personnel, including the authority to administer competitive examinations and prescribe
reasonable qualification standards for its own officials, cannot be curtailed by the general
power of the CSC to administer the civil service system
2. Any unwarranted and unreasonable restriction on its discretionary authority, such as what
the CSC did when it issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004, is constitutionally and legally
infirm.

ISSUE;
Whether CES eligibility is required for the subordinates of the Office of the Ombudsman
RULING:
CES eligibility not required. CSC is ordered to approve the amendment of qualification.
Under EO 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), the CES covers presidential appointees
only. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is the appointing authority for all officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except the Deputy Ombudsmen. Thus, a person
occupying the position of Director II in the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the
Ombudsman, not by the President. As such, he is neither embraced in the CES nor does he
need to possess CES eligibility.
To require CES eligibility for the positions of Director II in the Office of the Ombudsman will
lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences:
1. vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the
Constitution
2. including in the CES a position not held by a presidential appointee, contrary to the
Administrative Code.
Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent body. The appointing
power of the Ombudsman is a guaranty of its independence; it necessarily includes the power
of setting, prescribing and administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the
Office (RA 6770, Ombudsman Act of 1989). To further ensure its independence, the
Ombudsman has been vested with the power of administrative control and supervision of the
Office. This includes the authority to organize such directorates for administration and allied
services as may be necessary. Necessarily, it also includes the authority to determine and
establish the qualifications, duties, functions and responsibilities of the various directorates.
Qualification standards are used as guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in
determining training needs and as aid in the inspection and audit of the personnel work
programs. They are intimately connected to the power to appoint as well as to the power of
administrative supervision. Thus, as a corollary to the Ombudsman’s appointing and
supervisory powers, he possesses the authority to establish reasonable qualification
standards for the personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Administrative Code vests the establishment, administration and maintenance of
qualification standards in the department or agency, with the assistance and approval of the
Civil Service Commission and in consultation with the Wage and Position Classification Office.
The role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department or agency with respect to these
qualification standards and approving them. The CSC cannot substitute its own standards for
those of the department or agency, especially in a case like this in which an independent
constitutional body is involved.
25. EMILIO GONZALES v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 196231
February 26, 2014

These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to
the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the
protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong – the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232
Primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to
dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

FACTS:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and
physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector
(P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M.Kalaw, before
the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently
a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a
finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any
evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the
Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the
complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the
recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and
his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to
Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review
and action when P/S Insp.Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of
August 23, 2010 in desperate attempt to have him reinstated in the police service. In the
aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong
Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando?
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the
creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.
The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation
of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.
The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence
the petition.
G.R. No. 196232:
Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo
Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money
Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia’s
urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of
bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulitand
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered
into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea
warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook
with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence
of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives ‘Committee on
Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings,
the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,recommending to the
President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
Hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.

RULING:
Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers

all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those
officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot
insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious
construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the
inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions
- Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority,
through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline
over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to
address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to
protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of
the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by
impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor,
for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law
without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other
public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutors
Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority
that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid
officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that
affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial
importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent
disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement
offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish
the Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.6770 granting the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the
Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in
pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures
for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing
more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons
under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling
short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of
directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing
any reason therefor cannot, by itself, is considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the
case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases
upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional
mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people. “The factual
circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner’s
request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the
private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine
months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering
the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the
parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence
at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. The
OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon
him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of
neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as
Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind
amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively
against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal
from office as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.

DISPOSITION: The decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

26.BLAS OPLE v. RUBEN TORRES

293 SCRA 141

FACTS:
A.O. No. 308, or the ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM, was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on
December 12, 1996.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members
of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No.
308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent
the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz:
(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and
 (2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers
against further erosion.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the establishment of AO No 308 by the President is unconstitutional as it is a
usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress?
(2) WON the case calls for judicial review? In corollary, does petitioner have locus
standing on the case?

RULING:

(1) Yes. Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: 

a) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities; and

b) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and

misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. 

It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the

issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy
in clear and present danger.

(2) Yes. As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold

issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at
bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold
and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
 requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of
public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional.

27. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118712
October 6, 1995

FACTS:
The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by
Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing the Court of
Appeal’s decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and Development
Corporation or AMADCOR (private respondents) are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR
and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land,
private respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the DAR to expedite
the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of
their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow
them to withdraw the same. The Supreme Court referred the petition to CA for proper
determination and disposition. The CA found the following facts undisputed:
Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting excess in jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust accounts by
the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the
DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided
under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in
trust" or"reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that
before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or inbonds.
On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its
rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial
compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Landbank averred that the issuance of the
Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land
Registration Authority where the words"reserved/deposited" were also used.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9
(1990) insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or
in bonds
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of
right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending
the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.

RULING:
1. NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides:
Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere
does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. There is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit". The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error
of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only
for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative
agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is
that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment,
forsettled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails.

2. YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the
DAR's valuation (P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap/ P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago/ P
15,914,127.77 AMADCOR), and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the
possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It is
unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate
the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same; the landowner is deprived of the
use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is affirmed.
28. LEO ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., 
G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999

DOCTRINE:

Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution is simply the source of power of the President
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by
final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after
their finality

FACTS:

Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at
about 11:30 p.m. When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its
traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 at 10. a.m. to
deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion.

The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be
executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's
allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere
speculations or not.

To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately
dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's
allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and
broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has
no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still
unexpressed The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the
Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). Given these
constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance
by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until
June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress,
unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made."
The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error
of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all
rights stop at the graveyard.

As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some
partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner
as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less
before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

Public respondents' are contending that the "decision in this case having become final and
executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department. By
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII
of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the

President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction by granting
the TRO.

RULING:
No. The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by
the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted
as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.  As
observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the
government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution." 
The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It
is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the
temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied
that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by
no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction.
 The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right
to life

29. TAŇADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915
146 SCRA 446, April 24, 1985

Petitioner seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,

and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Petitioners invoked the right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern as well as the principle that in order for laws to be valid and enforceable, it must
be published in the Official Gazette. Solicitor General representing the respondents, moved for
the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition. Petitioners maintained that the petition is a publicright compelling the performance of a
public duty. The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said
petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
 Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law/statute
becomes valid and
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. This is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws, which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. The clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of the publication itself. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform. The provision in the Civil Code provides that publications of laws
must be made in the Official Gazette. And not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.
The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule on the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify if it
finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances, which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

RULING:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code
provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made
forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
30. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. v. TORRES
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

FACTS:
As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids
employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16,
Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over
the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued
Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of
domestic workers for Hong Kong.

PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA
circulars and to prohibit their implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with
grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable,
unfair and oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.

RULING:
The second and first grounds are unmeritorious. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants
the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. It
reads: “The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment
and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.” On the other
hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order
No. 797 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the
National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment
Services, is broad and far-ranging for among the functions inherited by the POEA from the
defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty to establish and maintain a
registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and
placement of workers, locally and overseas; it assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment
Development Board the power and duty to recruit and place workers for overseas employment of
Filipino contract workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors
as policy may dictate; and from the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over to regulate and
supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of
seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract
seamen workers and secure compliance therewith.

Said administrative issuances merely restricted the scope or area of PASEI’s business
operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong
Kong till after the establishment of the “mechanisms” that will enhance the protection of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of
Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong, PASEI may still deploy other class of Filipino workers
either for Hong Kong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other
countries. Said administrative issuances, are intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations
of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and
other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic
helpers to Hong Kong. They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause
of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is
affected with public interest.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register. As announced in
Tañada vs. Tuvera,

“All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution:
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither
is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.”
 31. PEOPLE VS MACEREN
No. L-32166. October 18, 1977

DOCTRINE: A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right
to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not
be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only
the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.

FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.

It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused resorted to electro fishing in the waters of
Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by “using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a
generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and
electrocuting device locally known as ‘senso’ with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or
other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo
direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which
destroy any aquatic animals within its currect reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the
populace” (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No.
SC-36). The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is
not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section 11 of the Fisheries Law
and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by
substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.

It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish “electro fishing.”
Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative regulation penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD: No. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing,
are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of
“other violations” because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next
lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in
section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for “other violations” of the law and regulations
fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must

be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended.
An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned.

The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government
in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense
and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law. In
other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a
crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter. It has been
held that “to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power
vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency”.
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the
Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly
punish electro fishing.

A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules
and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused
with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the
administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.

Necessity for notice and hearing

a. Rule

32. CORONA VS UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of

procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-
judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing
rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice
and hearing.

FACTS: The PPA was created by virtue of PD No. 505. The PPA promulgated PPA-AO 03-85 2
on March 21, 1985, which embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services,
the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia,
that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in
outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have
achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular appointments by
the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed
by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. Subsequently, then
PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 7 on July 15, 1992. This
was implemented by providing therein that “all existing regular appointments which have been
previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31
December 1992 only” and that “all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts
shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly
renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”

Respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt.
Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation
and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that “the
matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s administrative issuances lies exclusively with
its Board of Directors as its governing body.” Respondents reiterated their request for the
suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his
position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas
appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the
DOTC. The OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of
PPAAO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued
in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a
(viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was
intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.

The OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. 11 He concluded
that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the
act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857,
mandating it “to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port
district.”

On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPAAO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but
merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA’s jurisdictional area.
ISSUE: In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their
right to due process of law?

HELD: YES. In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four
times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score,
however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard,
“which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots’ examinations,” was not
consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the
Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus,
petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the
issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need to be consulted.

Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity
of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions,
such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing.

Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of
harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested
and can only be “withdrawn or shortened” by observing the constitutional mandate of due
process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is
here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law. There is no
dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner
Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of
one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process.” He merely expressed the opinion that
“(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference
with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that
“PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession.” However, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an
administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy
their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job
training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner
revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to
contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent
depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike
are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of performance” which is
conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term
“renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without
due process of law. The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-AO No. 08-92 are
already covered by PPA-MO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in
pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a “surplusage” and, therefore, an unnecessary
enactment.

b. Exception

33. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

COURT OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
G.R. No. 119761. August 29, 1996

DOCTRINE: A ruling which is merely ‘interpretative’ in character may not require prior notice to
affected parties before its issuance as well as a hearing” and “for this reason, in most instances,
interpretative regulations are not given the force of law.” Indeed, “interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature x x x need not be published.” And it is now settled that only
legislative regulations and not interpretative rulings must have the benefit of public hearing
FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation (“Fortune Tobacco”) is engaged in the manufacture of
different brands of cigarettes. On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the
corporation separate certificates of trademark registration over “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More”
cigarettes.

In a letter, of then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., to Deputy Minister
Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, “the initial position of the
Commission was to classify ‘Champion,’ ‘Hope,’ and ‘More’ as foreign brands since they were
listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune
Tobacco changed the names of ‘Hope’ to ‘Hope Luxury’ and ‘More’ to ‘Premium More,’ thereby
removing the said brands from the foreign brand category.

RA 7654 was passed where it amended Section 142(c)(1) of the National Internal Revenue
Code. It was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local brands carrying a
foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on
the three brands classifying them as local brands carrying a foreign name.

In a letter, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a
review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37–93. The request was denied. The following day,
or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting
to P9,598,334.00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.
The CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco. The CIR forthwith filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, questioning the CTA’s resolution. petitioner opines that RMC 37–93
is merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which can thus become effective without any prior
need for notice and hearing, nor publication, and that its issuance is not discriminatory
since it would apply under similar circumstances to all locally manufactured cigarettes.

ISSUE: Whether the RMC Bo. 37-93 is valid?

HELD: NO. It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative
in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand,
the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render
least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law.

A reading of RMC 37–93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been
issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure
(revoking in the process the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as construing
Section 142(c) (1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made
in order to place “Hope Luxury,” "(1). “Premium More” and “Champion” within the classification
of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by
RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally
manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing
foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, “Hope Luxury,” “Premium More,”
and “Champion” cigarettes were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing
foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax.

Hence, without RMC 37–93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate
consequence on private respondent’s products. Evidently, in order to place “Hope Luxury,”
“Premium More,” and “Champion” cigarettes within the scope of the amendatory law and subject
them to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37–93 had to be issued. In so doing, the
BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The
due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have
been then ignored.

Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform
and equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are
to be treated alike or put on equal footing both in privileges and liabilities. 14 Thus, all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class must be taxed at the same rate 15 and the tax
must operate with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found.
Apparently, RMC 37–93 would only apply to “Hope Luxury,” “Premium More” and “Champion”
cigarettes and, unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the submission of private
respondent that the circular should, as in fact my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Bellosillo so
expresses in his separate opinion, be considered adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of
due process following the Ang Tibay 16 doctrine, the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of
taxation.

34. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., vs. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,

CULTURE AND SPORTS
No. L-78385. August 31, 1987

DOCTRINE: The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a

legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice
and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates
prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice
and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by
an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed
apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-
judicial in character.

FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports {hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a
report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees."
The report favorably recommended to the DECS the courses of action with respect to the
Government's policy on increases in school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988. The DECS
took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the
respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Secretary), issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in
school fees as recommended by the Task Force.

The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground that the
increases were too high. Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10,
1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%,
accordingly. Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases. On April 23, 1987,
the petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the President of the Philippines urging the
suspension of the implementation of Department Order No. 37. No response appears to have
been obtained from the Office of the President. Thus, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the
public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that
judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The
petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution in- asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice
and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fixing of school fees through Department Order by DECS is a valid
delegation of legislative power?
HELD: YES. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a
legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice
and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates
prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice
and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by
an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed
apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-
judicial in character.

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We
believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be
charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance. This observation
notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear and convincing
evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not without any
justification for the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to
assume that the report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to
allow an increase in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the
petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the original rates of
15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar to this case,
We cannot consider the assailed Department Order arbitrary. Under the Rules of Court, it is
presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of proof is on the party assailing
the regularity of official proceedings. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not successfully
disputed the presumption.

35. MACEDA VS ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

G.R. Nos. 95119-21. December 18, 1990

DOCTRINE:
FACTS: On September 10, 1990, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, and Petron Corporation proferred separate applications with the Board for
permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products, as follows: Caltex P
3.2697 per liter Shell 2.0338 per liter Petron 2.00 per liter and meanwhile, for provisional
authority to increase temporarily such wholesale posted prices pending further proceedings. On
September 21,1990, the Board, in a joint (on three applications) Order granted provisional relief.

The petitioners submit that the above Order had been issued with grave abuse of discretion,
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, and correctible by certiorari. The petitioner, Senator Ernesto
Maceda, also submits that the same was issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of
Section 3, paragraph (e), of Executive Order No. 172; that the Board, in decreeing an increase,
had created a new source for the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), or otherwise that it had
levied a tax-, a power vested in the legislature, and/or that it had "re-collected", by an act of
taxation, ad valorem taxes on oil which Republic Act No. 6965 had abolished. The petitioner,
Atty. Oliver Lozano, likewise argues that the Board's Order was issued without notice and
hearing, and hence, without due process of law.

The intervenor, the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS/FSM)-W.F.T.U.,
6 argues on the other hand, that the increase can not be allowed since the respondents oil
companies had not exhausted their existing oil stock which they had bought at old prices and
that they can not be allowed to charge new rates for stock purchased at such lower rates.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board’s order violates due process of law?

HELD: NO. There is no merit in the Senator's contention that the "applicable" provision is
Section 3, paragraph (e) of the Executive Order. What must be stressed is that while under
Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from
ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether
or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the
application. Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex parte, and which are subject to
the resolution of the main case. Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each
other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not
to both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for
which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing.
Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally,
without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course,
is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority—which is of
course, the better procedure— however, it can not be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.

We do not therefore find the challenged action of the Board to have been done in violation of the
due process clause. The petitioners may contest however, the applications at the hearings
proper.

36. FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION VS ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 161113. June 15, 2004

DOCTRINE: Two postulates evidently flow from a reading of Section 4(e), Rule 3. First, the
publication of the application itself is required, not merely the notice of hearing issued by the
ERC. Second, in granting a provisional authority, the ERC must consider not only the evidence
submitted by the applicant in support thereof, but also the comments of the consumers and the
Local Government Units (LGUs) concerned.

FACTS: The petition assails the Order of respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
provisionally authorizing respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates
by an average amount of 12 centavos per kilowatt hour. MERALCO filed with the ERC an
Application for an increase in rates and also prayed ex parte for the grant of a provisional
authority to implement the increase according to the schedule attached to its Application.
National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc. (NASECORE), Mr. Genaro
Lualhati and Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) assailed separately, in a letter addressed to
the ERC Chairman Manuel R. Sanchez (Sanchez), informed him of their intention to file an
Opposition to MERALCO’s Application, seeking the dismissal of MERALCO’s Application and
expressed its intention to file an opposition to MERALCO’s Application, respectively.

ERC directed FDC, NASECORE and Lualhati to file the irrespective comments on the
Application within 15 days from their receipt thereof. NASECORE filed a Motion for Production
of Documents to enable it to evaluate MERALCO’s Application. ERC directed MERALCO to file
its comment on NASECORE’s Motion for Production of Documents. ERC issued an Order
directing MERALCO to submit certain documents in connection with the evaluation of its
Application. However, ERC, without first resolving the Motions for Production of Documents of
NASECORE and FDC and apparently without considering Lualhati’s Opposition, issued an
Order provisionally approving MERALCO’s ex parte application for rate increases.

Bayan Muna, Bayan, KMU, Gabriela, Kadamay, Agham, Gabriela Women’s Party and
AnakPawis argued that the Order is void for having been issued by ERC with manifest bias in
favor of MERALCO and without due regard for the rights of consumers, so they filed their
Motion to Intervene and attached thereto their Petition-in-Intervention. Hence, this Instant
Petition and Petition-in-Intervention.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001” (EPIRA); and

2. Assuming that the ERC has the authority to grant provisional orders, whether the grant by the
ERC of the provisional rate adjustment in question was committed with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

HELD: 1. YES. The ERC is endowed with the statutory authority to approve provisional rate
adjustments under the aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. It bears stressing that the
conferment upon the ERC of the power to grant provisional rate adjustments is not inconsistent
with any provision of the EPIRA. The powers of the ERB transferred to the ERC under Section
44 are in addition to the new powers conferred upon the ERC under Section 43.
Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it mandates the continued efficacy of the
applicable provisions of the laws referred to therein. The material provisions of the Public
Service Act which continue to be in full force and effect are contained in Section 16(c), which
states thus:

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing.—The Commission shall
have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this
Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the
contrary: . . .
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll, charges, classifications, or schedules
thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be
imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the
Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and
without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter,
upon publication and notice to the concerned parties operating in the territory affected:
Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is used principally or
secondarily for the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said private business shall
be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purposes of fixing the
rates.

Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of E.O. No. 172 or the ERB Charter continue to be in full force by
virtue of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. It cannot be argued that the clause could not have
referred to the provisions of the prior laws empowering the Public Service Commission (PSC)
and the ERB to grant provisional rate adjustments on the premise that the lawmakers
deliberately deleted the provisions in the crafting of the EPIRA. Such an argument begs the
question. What is clear from Sections 80 and 44 is that the legislators saw the superfluity or
needlessness of carrying over in the EPIRA the same provision found in the previous laws. The
power to approve provisional rate increases is included among the powers transferred to the
ERC by virtue of Section 44 since the grant of that authority is not inconsistent with the EPIRA;
rather, it is in full harmony with the thrust of the law which is to strengthen the ERC as the new
regulatory body.

2. The Court is convinced of the meritoriousness of FDC’s position which is the same stance
taken by the petitionersin-intervention and the OSG. Under Section 16(c), C.A. No. 146 and
Section 8, E.O. No. 172 in relation to Sections 43 and 80 of the EPIRA, the ERC may grant
provisional rate adjustments without first conducting a hearing prior to such grant. However, it is
required to conduct a hearing on the propriety of the grant of provisional rate adjustments within
30 days from the issuance of the provisional order. 87 Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR requires
the ERC to resolve the motion for issuance of a provisional order within seventy five (75)
calendar days from the filing of the application or petition. If, within 30 days from the publication
of the application or receipt of a copy thereof, an affected consumer or the Local Government
Unit (LGU) concerned files with the ERC a comment on the prayed for provisional rate
adjustment and/or the application itself, the ERC is mandated to consider such comment in its
action on the prayer for provisional rate adjustment.

Two postulates evidently flow from a reading of Section 4(e), Rule 3. First, the publication of the
application itself is required, not merely the notice of hearing issued by the ERC. Second, in
granting a provisional authority, the ERC must consider not only the evidence submitted by the
applicant in support thereof, but also the comments of the consumers and the Local
Government Units (LGUs) concerned. The challenged provisional rate increase transgresses
Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR in two major respects. The violations involve a couple of new
requirements prescribed by the IRR. These are, first, the need to publish the application in a
newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the applicant operates; and second, the
need for ERC to consider the comments or pleadings of the customers and LGU concerned in
its action on the application or motion for provisional rate adjustment.

The record shows that MERALCO failed to comply with the publication requirement prescribed
by the IRR. What the IRR requires to be published is the application itself. In fact, it even
requires the applicant to submit the “certification of the notice of publication” of the “application
or petition for rate adjustment” together with the application/petition to the ERC. For its part,
MERALCO alleges that it relied on the ERC’s interpretation that what had to be published “is
simply a notice of the intent to file an application”. So, it “caused the publication of such notice
before it filed the application.”

The ERC’s provisional approval of MERALCO’s application for rate increase was based on
MERALCO’s say-so alone, including the purported value of its assets as of the year 2002 and
its claimed financial difficulties, resulting according to it in its deferral of forty-two (42) major
capital projects and failure to meet its maturing debt obligations. In the assailed Order, the
Commission held that MERALCO’s inability to construct its capital projects to meet the growing
demand of its customers and to ensure the reliability and efficiency of its existing system would
ultimately be to the prejudice of the consumers.

The provisional authority to impose increased rates was approved notwithstanding the fact that
soon after MERALCO filed its Application on October 10, 2003, FDC and NASECORE
expressed their intention to file their respective oppositions to the Application, and later their
respective Motions for Production of Documents. Neither did the ERC consider the Letter dated
October 24, 2003 of Lualhati (a consumer), seeking the dismissal of the Application. Although
on November 13, 2003, the ERC issued an Order requiring MERALCO to comment on
NASECORE’s Motion for Production of Documents, it failed to resolve the same, as well as
FDC’s similar Motion, before issuing its November 27, 2003 Order. The motions filed by
NASECORE and FDC should have been acted upon by the ERC prior to resolving MERALCO’s
prayer for provisional rate increase, because NASECORE and FDC would be able to express
their agreement or opposition to MERALCO’s Application only after perusing the documents
presented, if their Motions were granted; or in case the Motions were denied, they could at least
make known their respective positions on the Application on the basis of the documents
submitted by MERALCO. Certainly, the spirit if not the language of the IRR provision should
have led ERC to treat the motions which are preludes to active opposition to the application in a
more favorable light and in a less cavalier fashion. Without even mentioning the motions in its
Order, ERC granted the motion for provisional rate increase. The foregoing clearly establish that
ERC failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR publication and
comment requirements of Rule 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR.

What makes the challenged Order particularly repugnant is that it involves a blatant and
inexcusable breach of the very rules which the ERC is mandated to observe and implement.
The violated provision which is Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR specifies how the ERC should
exercise its power to issue provisional orders pursuant to Section 44 in relation to Section 80 of
the EPIRA. Since the IRR was issued pursuant to the EPIRA, Section 4(e) of Rule 3 as part of
the IRR has the force and effect of law and thus should have been complied with.

Power to punish contempt

a. Dumarpa vs Dimaporo

37. SALIC B. DUMARPA, MARANAO C. DANGANAN and SAADUDDIN ALAUYA, VS JAMIL

DIMAPORO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. 87014-16.September 13, 1989
DOCTRINE: The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held, must be
exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the preservative principle. It is not to be meted out of
pique, or from an imperial sense of the nature and functions of judicial office.

FACTS: On February 3, 1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of
Canvassers Mayor-elect of Marogong. The annulment of the proclamation and the canvass on
which it was based 4 was sought in two (2) separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty
candidates: one filed on February 15, 1988 by Datu Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom
(docketed as SPC No. 88-646), and the other, on February 17, 1988, by Monabai
Panondiongan Balt. While these petitions were pending adjudgment by the COMELEC First
Division, the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May 19, 1988 a memorandum
addressed to the Regional Director, Region XII of the Department of Local Governments,
designating Maclis Balt “Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur vice
Abdullah Imam.” The memorandum precisely took account of said petitions. It stated that the
designation of the OIC was made “(i)n view of the election controversy that has arisen over the
mayoralty race of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, and to ensure that the democratic process is
respected throughout the transition period.”

The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo’s proclamation were ultimately dismissed by
the First Division of the COMELEC. Motions for reconsideration thereof were seasonably
presented by both petitioners. These were brought up to the Commission en banc for resolution.
Datu Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status as mayor-elect of
Marogong, as confirmed by the First Division’s Decision of July 11, 1988. His counsel,
Mangurun Batuampar, sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor Saidamen B.
Pangarungan, “transmitting x x the ‘RESOLUTION’ of the Honorable First Division of the
Commission on Elections x x,” and praying “that communications and other official matters
involving the affairs of the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur be accorded to DATU JAMIL
DATU MULOK DIMAPORO whose proclamation was affirmed by the Commission on Elections
as aforestated.

The Provincial Fiscal acted promptly on the request. The opinion sought was communicated to
the Vice Governor by 4th Indorsement. It was signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao
C. Danganan, with the conformity of Provincial Fiscal Salic B. Dumarpa. On learning of this legal
opinion, Datu Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa and
Danganan, as well as Vice-Governor Alauya, in contempt. The motion theorized that the act of
Vice-Governor Alauya in seeking legal opinion of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, and the
formulation and communication of the requested opinion by Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan,
constituted “indirect contempt as it is clearly an improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justiceand is also an unlawful interference
with the processes or proceedings of this Honorable Commission en banc. Responses to the
motion for contempt were separately filed by the fiscals and by the Vice-Governor.

In its Resolution of October 28, 1988 anent the contempt incident, the Commission en banc
condemned the fiscal’s conception of “the First Division’s jurisdiction of the pre-proclamation
controversy” as a “distortion of the law and jurisprudence. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. By Resolution, the COMELEC en bancnot only denied the motion for
reconsideration, but also “rebuked” the movants “for insisting upon an erroneous legal position.
ISSUE:

HELD: The Court is constrained to nullify and set aside the conviction by the COMELEC en
banc of the petitioners for contempt. The essential accusation against the petitioners was that
the rendition by the petitioner fiscals of a legal opinion upon request of petitioner Vice Governor
had caused “chaos and confusion among the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the
general public on who is really the legal Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, considering the
conflict of the defendants’ legal opinion and the ‘Resolution’ of the COMELEC Division, as
aforesaid, resulting to damage, injury and prejudice not only upon the complainant but to public
service, particularly the people of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.”

The trouble is, there is nothing in the challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, or
anywhere else in the record, for that matter, to demonstrate the actuality of the alleged (1)
“chaos and confusion among the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public,”
or (2) “suspension of the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo x x (in order to)
pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office by an Officer-inCharge,” or (3) that
the latter “is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions;” or (4) that the legal opinion
was “a deliberate contrivance x x meant to undermine the efficacy of official acts of the
Commission from the municipal board of canvassers to the First Division of the Commission and
even the Commission en banc which had not in any way issued any restraining order to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate.”

On the other hand, there are the facts asserted by the petitioners—never denied or disputed by
respondents— that as of the time that the fiscal’s opinion was solicited and even thereafter,
Datu Dimaporo had never yet “enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of
the mayor,” had never been paid his salary as mayor, and had not as yet “been accorded
recognition as elected mayor x x by the provincial and national government;” and that indeed,
“long before the query for legal opinion was lodged, (Maclis) Balt x x (had been) already
designated as Officerin-Charge” and since then and during all the time material to the inquiry,
had been discharging the functions of mayor of Marogong. It thus appears that the Resolution in
question not only lacks factual foundation of any sort but is contradicted by such of the relevant
facts as may be discerned from the record.

The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held, must be exercised, not on the
vindictive, but on the preservative principle. It is not to be meted out of pique, or from an
imperial sense of the nature and functions of judicial office. What appears to be an honest
difference of opinion has been blown up into something that it is not—a direct and
confrontational challenge to the puissance and prerogatives of the Commission. In a word,
petitioners have been found in contempt because, to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit well
with the Commission and failed to conform to its own views. Judicial sensibilities should not
become too tender or selfprotective. All things considered, the contempt ruling here cannot be
justified on the preservative principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms of the
allegedly contumacious opinion or from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of any intent
to denigrate the authority of the respondent Commission or erode the faith and respect due its
decisions, orders or other actuations.
6. Administrative decisions not part of legal system

38. Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999

DOCTRINE: Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not expansions of the
provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law prevails over them. Administrative
agencies have no legislative power.

Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking

corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the
first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of
P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00,
respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby
showing no income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December
31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported
a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year. But during these
two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and
remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in
1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among
others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and
second quarters of 1985.

Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by
their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.

Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner

instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the
same was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration was
denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme
Court. Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and tax credits are not yet barred by
prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on
April 1, 1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year
prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the
excess quarterly income tax with the BIR with ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea for tax refund or tax
credits on the ground of prescription, despite petitioner’s reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing
the prescriptive period of two years to ten years?

HELD: No. Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not expansions of the
provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law prevails over them. Administrative
agencies have no legislative power.
When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments,
such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so
doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the
statute passed by Congress.

It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in
the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from
time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the
interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is
entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and
will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance
administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the
law they seek to apply and implement.

Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC
No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative
interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the
express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so
would, in effect, amend the statute.

8. Doctrine of Res Judicata

a. Exception

39. Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa

G.R. Nos. 95122-23. May 31, 1991

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Res
Judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following requisites are present; 1) a
person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the finding of
citizenship is affirmed by this Court

FACTS: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of his natural born mother, Marciana Gatchalian. In 1961, William Gatchalian, then a
twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco and
Johnson Gatchalian. They had with them Certificate of Registration and Identity issued by the
Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. After
investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 5, 1961,
admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens and was issued
Identification Certificates.

In 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu
proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board
of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant
was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others. The new Board of
Commissioners, reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion
of, among others, respondent Gatchalian. Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as
the others covered by the July 6, 1961 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with
the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportation case against them was assigned.

Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the
warrant of arrest issued against him. On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau
of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that the respondent Gatchalian
along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion be charged with violation
against the Immigration Act of 1940. The Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of
the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action.
Petitioner, Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order
commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before
Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction
over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Respondent’s wife and
minor children filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela for injunction with writ
of preliminary injunction. That petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the
institution of deportation proceedings against William. Respondent Capulong issued the
questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the
deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.

Petitioners invoke that this Court’s decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca ( supra ), has
already settled respondent’s alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial determination of
respondent’s citizenship specially so where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in
the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled. According to petitioners,
respondent’s alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in the Arocha and Vivo cases

ISSUE: Whether or not Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca already settled respondent’s
alienage?

HELD: No. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was the actual
date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether
the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date)
“20” was erased and over it was superimposed the figure “6” thereby making the decision fall
within the one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be
reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of
respondent’s who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro
Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a
decision rendered therein.

Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners’ decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding
respondent’s claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For
one thing, said decision did not make any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a
Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.

An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic, viz: “We declare it
to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court
or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing
with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this
finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall
constitute conclusive proof of such party’s citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is
made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be
considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in
accordance with the procedure herein stated.”

Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the
following must be present: 1) a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the finding or citizenship is
affirmed by this Court. Gauged by the foregoing. We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca
inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William
Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.

D. Judicial Recourse and Review

i. Doctrine of Exhaustion of administrative remedies

1. The doctrine
2. Coverage

40. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT

AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 110526. February 10, 1998

DOCTRINE: The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may
seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has
obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise
of its rule-making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the
exhaustion doctrine.

FACTS: Seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the Association of

Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) brought suit in the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region in Makati, Metro Manila, to enjoin the Philippine Coconut Authority
(PCA) from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated
coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants
would violate PCA’s Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking
permits to operate in areas considered “congested” under the administrative order. On
November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on November 25,
1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to
Primex Products, Inc., Coco Manila, Superstar (Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the
posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.

Subsequently and while the case was pending in the RTC, the Governing Board of the PCA
issued Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the PCA from all regulation of the
coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product
processors, the registration would be limited to the “monitoring” of their volumes of production
and administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue “certificates of
registration” to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting
petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines not to approve the resolution
in question. Despite follow-up letters sent, petitioner received no reply. The “certificates of
registration” issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to
operate. Hence this petition.

Respondent PCA alleges that this petition should be denied on the ground that petitioner has a
pending appeal before the Office of the President. Respondent accuses petitioner of forum-
shopping in filing this petition and
of failing to exhaust available administrative remedies before coming to this Court. Respondent
anchors its argument on the general rule that one who brings an action under Rule 65 must
show that one has no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before
filing this petition?

HELD: No. The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek
judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has
obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise
of its rule-making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the
exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet
complete and it is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA
abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective. To be sure, the
PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in
P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions
of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President
before they become effective.

In any event, although the APCD has appealed the resolution in question to the Office of the
President, considering the fact that two months after they had sent their first letter on April 26,
1993 they still had to hear from the President’s office, meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing
certificates of registration indiscriminately to new coconut millers, we hold that petitioner was
justified in filing this case on June 25, 1993. Indeed, after writing the Office of the President on
April 26, 1993 6 petitioner sent inquiries to that office not once, but twice, on May 26, 1993 7
and on June 2, 1993, 8 but petitioner did not receive any reply.

41. Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) vs. National Telecommunications Commission

(NTC)
G.R. No. 152063. August 12, 2003

DOCTRINE: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making
or quasi-legislative power.

FACTS: The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15
days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies
thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on
June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale
and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect
90 days from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.

On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service
(CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of
stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6,
2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner
Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as
the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry
under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process
of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service
by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention and this was granted by the trial court. Respondent NTC
and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD: No. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making
or quasi- legislative power.

In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held:

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial
review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no
application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-
making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative
agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion
doctrine.

Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in
this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even
during the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines.
They submitted their respective position papers setting forth their objections and submitting
proposed schemes for the billing circular. 21 After the same was issued, petitioners wrote
successive letters dated July 3, 2000 22 and July 5, 2000, 23 asking for the suspension and
reconsideration of the socalled Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October
6, 2000, when respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum implementing certain
provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests
contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.

ii. Doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction

42. PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, Regional Chairman, Special Task Force on

Environment and Natural Resources (STF-ENR) of Region 8, Tacloban
City, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Leyte, Branch 34, and SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V. AGUILAR, Office of the Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Tacloban City, Respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2001
DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Also, the plaintiff in the
replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the
administrative remedies available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to
dismiss the replevin outright.

FACTS: A water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of
Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee to said
cargo. While the cargo was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's
accompanying documents where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the
NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three
cargo trucks were seized and impounded.

NBI-EVRO Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a Criminal Complaint for the violation of
Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. 705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as amended,
against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K.
Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad
V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-
296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.

On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the three trucks, through
the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice were issued to the consignee, Robert
Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director. Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for
replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR. On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued
to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296 and on March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were
conducted by the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed
Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to
deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of
the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City. Thus, the filing of this
Administrative complaint against respondent. The complaint avers that replevin is not available
when properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings. He also submits
that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely
disregarded them.
Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L Hadja and to
prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor
on the  Philippine Coast Guard.

Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was premature since
there is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case. Further, he
claimed that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same,
he issued an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession
of the subject items, pending resolution of an urgent manifestation by the complainant.
Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard to prevent the
departure of subject vessel since he does not have the means to physically prevent the vessel
from sailing. He further claimed that he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it
came from a legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order.
Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent
any instruction to the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence
for issuing the writ of replevin.
HELD: Yes. The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the vessel on
which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also
stated that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and
appropriate action". These allegations would have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge
that the DENR had custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have
already been commenced concerning the shipment.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who
seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin
outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his representatives
may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed or
abandoned, including the conveyances involved in the offense.

It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement of forestry laws,
rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall
within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free
hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The court held that the assumption of the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes
an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative ageny's prerogative. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an administrative body
of special competence.

The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly
demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be an embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. To measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep
abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.
On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA that they should be
dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his material duty to serve the writ with
reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance with the mandates.

iii. Doctrine of finality of administrative action

 43. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP),
petitioner, vs. PERLITA BATHAN-VELASCO, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor
Relations, ALERT AND CONCERNED EMPLOYEES FOR BETTER SSS (ACCESS), SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.
G.R. No. 108765. August 27, 1999

DOCTRINE: The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. This rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary and premature
resort to courts. Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself of and exhausted the
appropriate administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the
dismissal of the petition.

FACTS: Respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better Social Security System
(ACCESS) filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election to
determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of
respondent Social Security System (SSS). On August 24, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relations
ordered a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of the SSS
in its main office and regional branches. Petitioner Social Security System Employees
Association (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP) was one of the contending parties in the certification
election, with respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better SSS (ACCESS) as the
other party. On October 11, 1991, the certification elections were held, with ACCESS garnering
1,378 votes, SSSEA obtaining 1,116 votes, and “No Union” collecting 40 votes.

SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, an election protest and/or motion to annul the
certification Election. Director Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations denied the protest and/or
motion. SSSEA filed an Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections in the
SSS Regional Office. Respondent Velasco denied the Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify
Certification Elections in the Regional Offices After October 11, 1991, declared ACCESS the
winner in the certification election, and certified ACCESS as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the rank and file employees of SSS for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not SSSEA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to
the courts?

HELD: Yes. The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. This rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary and premature
resort to courts.

In this case, petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code. Absent a
showing that petitioner had availed itself of and exhausted the appropriate administrative
remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.
Moreover, the issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual findings of public
respondent. Petitioner argues that the certification election should not have proceeded because
of the pendency of a formal charge of a company-initiated, dominated, or supported union with
the Bureau of Labor Relations. 8 Petitioner further contends that no certification election was
held in the regional offices of respondent SSS on October 11, 1991, resulting in incomplete
certification election, thereby rendering null and void the proclamation of ACCESS as the winner
of the election. Unfortunately for petitioner, factual issues are not proper subjects of an original
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasijudicial tribunals or officials. Judicial
review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.

XI. ELECTION LAW

A. Suffrage
i. Who may Vote? (Sec. 1, Art. III)

44. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.

ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Petitioner sought to declare certain provisions of RA No. 9189 as unconstitutional,

contending that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional being in violation of Sec. 1, Art. V of the 1987
Constitution requiring that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an
election. Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his
claim. In that case, the Court held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the United States is
deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Does section 5(d) of rep. act no. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intention to return to the philippines, violate the residency requirement in
section 1 of article v of the constitution?

HELD: No. Section 5(d) provides:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. — The following shall be disqualified from voting

under this Act:
xxx
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall
also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall
be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of the
Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr,
and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding an election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court
may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the
presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed
not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No.
9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino
abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must
declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return
to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to
vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if
such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was
conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to
return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not
be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying
intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers,
which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right
to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No.
9189 is not constitutionally defective.

B. Registration of Voters (Chapter XII, OEC)

i. Necessity of registration (Sec 115, OEC)
 ii. System of continuing registration (Sec. 8, RA 8189)

45. Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections

G.R No. 147066, March 26, 2001

DOCTRINE: The right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute.
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law.

FACTS: Petitioners—representing the youth sector—seek to direct the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General
Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed
to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC
under Republic Act No. 8189. 2 Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator
Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People’s
Participation, through a Letter invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of
discussing the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able
to register before the COMELEC deadline. Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and
Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended
the public hearing called by the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roco.

Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report
on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only. Immediately,
Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and representatives,
and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the
consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to
disapprove the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A.
8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time
left to accomplish all pre-election activities.

Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the request while
Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the students’
request. With this impasse, the Commission construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II
(YOUTH), et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition

ISSUE: Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary
writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the
COMELEC’s imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

HELD: The right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute.
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law.
Section 8 of R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing registration, is explicit, to wit:
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters.—The Personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election.”

Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period within
which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voter’s list, provides:
“SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List—Any registered voter, representative of
a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election x x
x.”

In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present
case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may validly
and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the letter of Section
28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in
cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period
prior to election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is, to our mind,
anchored on the sound premise that these certain “pre-election acts” are still capable of being
reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct
of other related pre-election activities required under the law.

Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request of petitioners to
hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the
matter—Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC
simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters;
evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and
one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally- mandated powers.
Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,
specifically on matters involving voters’ registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the
legality of the act.
46. Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010

FACTS:

The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list organization,
manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be
chosen should CIBAC obtain the number of qualifying votes. Prior to the elections, the list of
nominees was amended. The nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil
Galang were withdrawn. Armi Jane Borje was substituted. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and
Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.

Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as
second nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and
Cruz-Gonzales. The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list
of nominees and the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved
the amendment of the list of nominees. The COMELEC en banc  proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as
the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List
Representative of CIBAC.

A petition for certiorari was filed assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging
that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its nominees.

ISSUE: 

Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act; and whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and
allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and
after the close of polls.

RULING: 

Election protest is a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on
the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who obtained the higher number
of votes entitling them to hold the office. On the other hand, a special civil action for quo
warranto questions the ineligibility of the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for
certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in
accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an administrative agency, it
cannot amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the
provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides
that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any
elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately
preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed
after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of
the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.

There is no room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8
clearly prohibits the change of nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which
an organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been
submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee dies; (2) when the nominee withdraws in
writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. When the statute
enumerates the exception to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but
reasonably construed.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 when it provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as
statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend, or
add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law it
intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is
itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804  was declared invalid and of no effect to the extent
that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of  a nominee once it has
submitted the nomination to the COMELEC.
47. Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766)

FACTS: 

Approximately 280 groups and organizations manifested their desire to participate in the
party-list elections in line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013. 52 of these
groups were subsequently disqualified by COMELEC, including some that were duly registered
and accredited as political parties. The reasons for their exclusion were based on the contention
that said groups failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and that their nominees were indeed members of the sectors they
were seeking to represent. 

ISSUE: 

Whether COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from participating in the
May 2013 elections. 

RULING:

No, COMELEC merely followed existing jurisprudence set forth by the Supreme Court in
its earlier rulings. For purposes of setting uniform standards and understanding of the party-list
system in the Philippines, the Court provides a lengthy account of the history and dynamics of
the party-list system as embodied in the 1987 Constitution and as envisioned by the Framers,
and institutes new guidelines to be used in resolving issues of similar nature in the future. 

The party-list system can be found in Section 5, Art. VI; Sections 7 and 8, Art. IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution. The rationale behind the party-list system is to democratize political
power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win
seats in the House of Representatives. The party-list system is not synonymous with sectoral
representation. Under the party-list system, all voters get to have two votes: one for their
choice of legislative district representative, and another for their choice of party-list
representative. But under sectoral representation, majority of the electorate will only have one
vote, which is for their choice of legislative district representative. In contrast, members of
sectoral communities (e.g. farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, etc.) will have
two votes: one for their district representative and another for their choice of sectoral
representative.

The party-list system is open to both sectoral and non-sectoral groups. The framers
intended sectoral groups to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.
As per Section 5(1) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, any of the following can take part in
party-list elections: national parties and organizations, regional parties and organizations, and
sectoral parties and organizations.  

In BANAT v. COMELEC, the Court held that party-list nominees must come from the
sector they seek to represent. Thus, a party-list representing farmers should have farmer
nominees, too. This was one of COMELEC's bases in disqualifying the 52 petitioners. However,
the Court reverses its ruling in BANAT v. COMELEC by instituting new parameters, including the
guidelines for the choice of nominees. Under the new parameters, a nominee may either be a
member of the sector he seeks to represent or at the very least, should have a track record of
advocacy for such sector.
48-49. Banat v. Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)

FACTS: 

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. The recommendation of the head of the legal
group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic
was approved by the COMELEC en banc and declared further in a resolution that the winning
party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling.

ISSUE: 

Whether the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling; and whether the 2% threshold and “qualifier”
votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

RULING:

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The
20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. In computing the
allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional.

The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. The Court strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the 
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the 
House of Representatives.” The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. By vote of 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. 
50. MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC, GR No. 196804, 2012-10-09

FACTS:

Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates
of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City. Castillo filed with the COMELEC a
petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as
Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena.
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his Certificate of
Candidacy. Barbara Ruby filed her own Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Lucena City in
substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA)
issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD. On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained
printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as
his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby with 44,099 votes as against Castillo's
39,615 votes. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his Certificate
of Candidacy had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be
considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three
days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.

ISSUES:

Whether the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband is valid.

RULING:

Existence of a valid Certificate of Candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid
substitution. The filing within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any
person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election.  This is clear from Section 73
of the Omnibus Election Code. A person's declaration of his intention to run for public office and
his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by
the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid Certificate of Candidacy that render the
person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.

Declaration of Ramon's disqualification rendered his Certificate of Candidacy invalid. He

was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted. The Court concurs with the conclusion of
the COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to
render his Certificate of Candidacy invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the
COMELEC's declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no
candidate at all. A non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.
51. RENATOM. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, GR No. 199612, 2013-01-22

FACTS:

Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya (Maligaya) were
candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Armando Sanchez,
husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died. Two days
later, Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then
filed a new Certificate of Candidacy for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her
deceased husband.

Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to run as substitute candidate for
Edna because the period to file the Certificate of Candidacy for substitute candidates had
already lapsed. COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute
gubernatorial candidate in the Batangas province and to that of Federico as substitute
mayoralty candidate in Sto. Tomas. On the day of elections, the name "SANCHEZ, Edna P." was
retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest number of
votes against Maligaya.

Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent Renato M. Federico. Meanwhile,
Maligaya's petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of Federico was denied by the
Comelec.

ISSUE:

Whether Federico could validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy for the
mayoralty position and whether he should be succeeded by Intervenor Silva under the Local
Government Code or replaced by Maligaya.

RULING:

Federico's substitution of Edna Sanchez as mayoralty candidate was not valid. Comelec
En Banc annulled Federico's proclamation as mayor on the ground that his substitution of Edna
was invalid, the substitute COC and CONA having been filed after the deadline provided for
under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678. The substitute for a candidate who withdrew
may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided for the office affected not later than
December 14, 2009. Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had
already lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of
then Governor Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race
could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.

The Court agrees with the OSG that Resolution No. 8889 was void as it was in
contravention of the guidelines set forth under Resolution No. 8678. With respect to Federico, it
cannot be regarded as a valid source of any right, like the right to be voted for public office.
Indeed, a void judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time
"Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare
such nullity and annul the proclamation." The votes garnered by Edna could not be credited to
Federico as he was never a legitimate candidate.
52. ARATEA VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 09, 2012

FACTS:

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. On 8 December
2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida's certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010
elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate
of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought
election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive terms for the same position.

Lonzanida's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending
during the May 2010 elections, Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest
number of voles and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge
Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010. On the same date, Aratea wrote
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on
whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of
Lonzanida's disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 2010 stated that Lonzanida was
disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida's
disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should
assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC's
resolution of Lonzanida's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is
the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
RULING:

Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida's
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All
votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

A petition for disqualification tinder Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of

prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the
offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code,
not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68
that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment
of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses
covered under Section 68. Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his
conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not
constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of  prision mayor,
disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public
office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction,
before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was
cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of
candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on
such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May
2010 elections. Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
53. JOY CHRISMA B. LUNA v. COMELEC, GR NO. 165983, 2007-04-24

FACTS:

Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as
a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy. Ruperto Blanco, Election
Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and
placed the name of Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna made a false material
representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan,
Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra.

ISSUES:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there
was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.

RULING:

Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid. When a candidate files his certificate of
candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. Section
76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code). In this case, when Hans Roger filed his
certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the
ministerial duty to give due course to Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy. Section 77 of the
Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political
party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of
certificate of candidacy. Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC
found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can
validly substitute for Hans Roger. In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger
did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to
deny due course to or cancel Luna's certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without
the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy and declared the
substitution by Luna invalid.
54. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the
Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian
citizenship in September 2009. He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for
registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay
Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, Sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.

Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province.

Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes
of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a
person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal
presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but
one domicile at a time.
 It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos
has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. Quezon City
was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the
age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia
became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. When he came to the Philippines in
November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so
with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts,
Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile
there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite
the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of
law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he
has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support
such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have
a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or
relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual
physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
54 and 56. LABO VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105111, July 03, 1992

Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner Ortega filed on
March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on
the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the
Comelec on March 27, 1992 to petitioner Labo followed by a telegram dated April 1, 1992,
requiring him to file his Answer within three (3) non-extendible days but the latter failed to
respond. The Comelec issued another order directing the Election Registrar of Baguio City to
personally deliver the summons.

ISSUE:

The validity of the citizenship and/or Labo's alienage - the very essence which strikes at
the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested office, he being an alien
and not a Filipino citizen. Whether the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate
(Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate
for mayor of Baguio City.

RULING:

The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as
the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the mayor of Baguio
City.

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of
city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo
was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was
then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not
make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. In the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec, held: "Finally,
there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto
petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City."
57. Penera vs. COMELEC and Andanar G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009

FACTS:

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon
the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express
mandate of the law that “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing]
period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he
filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and
clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The ultimate winner in this case is Mayor
Rosalinda Penera after the Supreme Court promulgated its November 25, 2009 Decision
overturning its earlier decision (September 11, 2009 Decision) after a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by aggrieved Mayor Penera.

Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed
before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a
Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and
Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized campaign
period on 30 March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in
Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the
day of the elections. Penera alone filed an Answer denying the charges but admitted that a
motorcade did take place and that it was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby
cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a
motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. The COMELEC disqualified
Penera but absolved the other candidates from Penera’s party from violation of section 80 and
68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the new definition of the term “candidate” in Section 15 of RA 8436 as
amended by RA 9369 is in conflict with Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code such that
premature campaigning may no longer be committed.
RULING:

In denying Penera’s petition, the Supreme Court, through Associate Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario, found that Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of
two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored balloons; the motorcade
went around three barangays in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their
hands and threw sweet candies to the crowd. Thus, for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign
period, Penera was disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica. The Court
declared that “there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. “True, that pursuant to Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of the
campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person,
upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate
in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches,
etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her
intended candidacy.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy,
his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of
his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a
candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified.
Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the campaign
period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the promotion
of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as
there is no candidate, whose disqualification may be sought, to begin with.

A person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior
to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section
79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity.
However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the
campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of
the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature
campaigning.

As explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Lanot vs. COMELEC, a person who
files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Thus,
the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done
outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a “candidate.” Under Section 79(a), a
candidate is one who “has filed a certificate of candidacy” to an elective public office. Unless
one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a “candidate.” The third element requires
that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political
activity is committed.

Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the
last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the
campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior
to such last day. Before such last day, there is no “particular candidate or candidates” to
campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign
period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done “outside”
the campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may
only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and
after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why
those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day
or close to the last day.

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May
2007. Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate
on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did
not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed
by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a “candidate,” even if
constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizen’s protected
freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not covered
by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
58. HENRY P. LANOT v. COMELEC, GR NO. 164858, 2006-11-16

FACTS:

On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot ("Lanot"), Vener Obispo ("Obispo"), Roberto Peralta
("Peralta"), Reynaldo dela Paz ("dela Paz"), Edilberto Yamat ("Yamat"), and Ram Alan Cruz
("Cruz") (collectively, "petitioners"), filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80
of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat,
and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor in the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day
itself, Chairman Abalos issued the first of the three questioned COMELEC issuances. In a
memorandum, Chairman Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing the COMELEC First
Division's 5 May 2004 resolution due to Eusebio's motion for reconsideration.

On 11 May 2004, the day after the elections, petitioners Lanot, Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat,
and Cruz filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion to suspend the counting and canvassing
of votes and the proclamation of the winning mayoral candidate for Pasig City.

ISSUES:

Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on

various occasions outside of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large
group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering
defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting
his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname
across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce
their parents to vote for him.

RULING:

Consequently, pursuant to Section 68 (a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code,
respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO shall be DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor, Pasig
City for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Ruling of the COMELEC
disqualification of respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO from being a candidate for mayor of Pasig
City in the May 10, 2004 elections.
 Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First
Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code which requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of
candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.

59. People vs. Basilla, G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989

FACTS:

The Provincial Fiscal filed three separate criminal complaints against the three accused
but respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed it on the ground that the
complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC and the COMELEC did
not investigate the case which violates Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) which states that The
Commission on Election shall “investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of
election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices."

The private complainants alleged that the act of Respondent Judge dismissing the three
criminal information constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since
the COMELEC has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals
and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and
that the COMELEC did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal information thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC has the authority to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the
Government for the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

RULING:

While Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the COMELEC, it at the same
time authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the
COMELEC would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.

The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the COMELEC of the
prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to
ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-
keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C
of the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly interpretation of the authority of
the COMELEC to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and
instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition
of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses
are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election
precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff
members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair
investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of
nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the COMELEC had a
bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers
designated by the COMELEC become deputies or agents of the COMELEC and pro tanto subject
to the authority, control and supervision of the COMELEC in respect of the particular functions
covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their
delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the COMELEC itself. The only
limitation the Constitution itself places upon the COMELEC’s authority over its deputies relates
to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions.
60. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 199082 : July 23, 2013

FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating
and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Fact-Finding
Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. The Fact-
Finding Team recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the
election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be subjected to another
preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; and, that Mike
Arroyo be subjected to further investigation.

The Comelec resolved, among others, that an information for electoral sabotage be filed
against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. The RTC issued a Warrant for GMAs arrest which was duly served. GMA was later
arraigned and she entered a plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but
was able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At present, she is
again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal case.

Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in
nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ
should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his earlier pleadings
before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving the electoral sabotage case
were rushed because of pressures from the executive branch of the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the creation of Joint Panel is valid.

RULING:

In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List

v. Commission on Elections, the constitutionality of Section 43 of RA 9369 had already been
raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelec’s
exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not
have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be
amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in
the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing deputation of
prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the investigatory and
prosecutory functions of the task force pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code.
However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the later resolutions
to reflect the new mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and
prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY

61. TAN VS. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727

DOCTRINE: A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the
participation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform
to the constitutional requirements.
FACTS: B.P. 885 took effect in December 3, 1985, the said B.P. was enacted for
the purpose of creating the new province of Negros del Norte. Petitioners here are
residents of the various municipalities of Negros Occidental filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite, as they
contends that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and is not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code.

The Constitution provides that “Art. XI Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or

barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected.”

The OSG Solicitor General, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the
questioned Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality
and claimed that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not infringe the Constitution
because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with.
Furthermore, the case is now become moot and academic with the proclamation of
the new Province of Negros del Norte.

ISSUE: WON THE PLEBISCITE CREATING NEGROS DEL NORTE IS

VALID?
RULING: NO, the plebiscite creating Negros Del Norte is not valid.

A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of the
residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to the constitutional
requirements.

When the law says the “plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas/unit/units
affected” this means that residents of the political entity who stand to be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have the right to
participate in said plebiscite.

In the case at bar, plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of
Negros del Norte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B.
Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto, it did not include the inhabitants of other
municipalitites in the province of Negros Occidental which is the mother province
to be affected by the creation of the new province of Negros Del Norte.
62. UMALI VS. COMELEC, 723 SCRA 170
DOCTRINE: By the qualified voters it means the qualified voters not only in the
city proposed to be converted to an Highly Urbanized City (HUC) but also the
voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion.
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed a resolution
requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC).
Acceding to the request, the President issued a Presidential Proclamation
proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
Comelec issued a proclamation resolving that registered residents of Cabanatuan
City should participate in the said plebiscite.
The governor of Nueva Ecija filed a motion for reconsideration maintaining that
the qualified voters of the province should be included in the said plebiscite. The
phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the
conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded.
ISSUE: WON the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva
Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called
for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC
RULING: QUALIFIED REG, VOTERS OF N.E CAN PARTICIPATE. NOT
ONLY CABANATUAN. - All the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija
should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose; To
limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded
from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to
vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to
nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
“by the qualified voters therein” in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only
in the city proposed to be converted to an Highly Urbanized City (HUC) but also
the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to
harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
In identifying the Local Government Unit (LGU) or LGUs that should be allowed
to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not
the unit or units that desire to participate will be “directly affected” by the change.
The conversion into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC) carries the accessory of
substantial alteration of boundaries and that the province of Nueva Ecija will,
without a doubt, suffer a reduction in territory because of the severance of
Cabanatuan City. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a
material and substantial change to the province’s economic rights, warranting its
participation in the plebiscite.
63. BASCO VS. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52
DOCTRINE: The principle of local autonomy does not make local governments
sovereign within the state, it simply means decentralization.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter, because it is allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and order, and because, that the law creating PAGCOR P.D.
1869 intrudes into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license
fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy, it also violates the equal protection clause since it legalizes gambling.
Respondent questioned the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant
petition.

ISSUE: WON THE LAW CREATING PAGCOR VIOLATES THE

PRINCIPLE OF LOCAL AUTONOMY?

RULING: NO. there is no violation of the principle of Local Autonomy, since the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
decentralization.
The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
operative law until amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption clause remains as
an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and
fees. It cannot therefore be violative, but rather is consistent with the principle of
local autonomy, since the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
simply means decentralization.
In the case at bar, City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has
long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate
gambling thru the grant of franchise, licenses or permits was withdrawn by P.D.
No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.
Hence, only the National Government has the power to issue licenses or permits
for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license
fees which is a consequence of the issuance of licenses or permits is no longer
vested in the City of Manila.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. PAGCOR
role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government,
PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, and all of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government.
64. MAGTAJAS VS, PRYCE PROPERTIES 234 SCRA 255
DOCTRINE: Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
FACTS: In 1992 due to the success of PAGCOR business in several cities,
PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in Cagayan De Oro City. Thus, it leased
a building/property belonging to the respondent, and they renovated the said
building and prepared it for opening of the Casino during the Christmas of 1992.
Upon learning of the said intention of Pagcor, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cagayan De Oro, made an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permit to
any establishment for allowing its property to be use for casino operations. In 1993
it made another ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and provides for
penalty for such violation.
Respondent questioned such ordinance in the CA, the CA thus declared that the
said ordinance as invalid and prohibited its enforcement.
Petitioner then files this instant petition to the Supreme Court, and argued that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they
involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. According to the
petitioner gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution
itself and that the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit
them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local
Government Code
ISSUE: WON THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO MAY PROHIBIT THE
OPERATIONS OF PAGCOR IN ITS AREA?
RULING: NO. the city of Cagayan de Oro may not prohibit the operations of
PAGCOR. Since the Ordinance issued by the Sangguniang panglungsod violates
P.D. 1869.
To be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must
not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must
not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public
policy. and 6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute
is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. Municipal corporations
owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature.
It breathes into them the breath of life without which they cannot exist. This basic
relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not
been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy
of local autonomy. Congress retains control of the local government units although
in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
In the case at bar, the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local
Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or
suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
65. DADOLE VS. CA, 393 SCRA 262
DOCTRINE: Any directive by the President or any of his or her alter egos
seeking to alter the wisdom of a law—conforming judgment on local affairs of a
local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local
autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in
governing municipal corporations.
FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving
monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. In 1991, it was
increased to P1,500. In 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
issued the Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that additional
allowances should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in
municipalities.
As a result of the DBM directive, the auditor of Mandaue City reduced the
allowances of the petitioners to P1,000 and were asked to reimbursed the amount
they received in excess.
The Petitioners protested such disallowances to the COA, and argued that the LBC
55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a
uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances
to judges stationed therein.
ISSUE: WON THE DBM CIRCULAR (LBC 55) INFRINGE ON THE
LOCAL AUTONOMY OF MANDAUE CITY?
RULING: YES, Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) infringes on the local
autonomy of Mandaue City.
Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) allows the grant
of additional allowances to judges “when the finances of the city government
allow.” The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to
the additional allowances granted to judges.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate
way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160.
In the case at bar, the DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local
government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it
sought to implement

66. NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BRGY. VS. PAREDES; 439 SCRA 130
DOCTRINE: The Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief
Executive or his alter ego. The President’s power of the general supervision, as
exercised by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego extends to the Liga ng mga
Barangay.
FACTS: Sometime in 1997 respondent Manuel A. Rayos Punong Barangay of
Barangay 52 in Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with
preliminary injunction andTRO in the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that petitioner
Alex David Punong Barangay of Barangay 77,Caloocan City and then president of
the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and the President Liga ng mga Barangay
National Chapter, committed some irregularities in the conduct synchronized Liga
ng mga Barangay elections in 1997.
As a result of these alleged irregularities he failed to meet said deadline and was
not able to obtain a certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of Canvas and
Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which were needed to be a delegate, to vote
and be voted for in the Liga election.
A TRO was issued, effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of
the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City.
However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David,
and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as scheduled.
Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga- Caloocan, and thereafter
took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Caloocan City.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo
warranto, mandamus and prohibition, preliminary injunction and TRO against
David. Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter
in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan. The TRO
was granted, enjoining therein petitioners from proceeding with the synchronized
elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga, but only for the
purpose of maintaining the status quo within 72 hours.
The DILG through Sec. Barbers field an Urgent Motion invoking the President’s
power of general supervision over all local government unit and prays that That the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), pursuant to its
delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to
manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of
National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office.
Petitioner David opposed the DILG’s Urgent Motion and alleged that the DILG’s
request to be appointed interim caretaker constitutes undue interference in the
internal affairs of the Liga, since the Liga is not subject to DILG control and
supervision.
The RTC granted the Urgent Motion of the DILG as Caretaker of the Liga. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: WON THE DILG SECRETARY AS ALTER EGO OF THE
PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE LIGA?
RULING: NO, the DILG secretary as alter ego of the President has no power of
control over the liga. The Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the
Chief Executive or his alter ego.
Art. 10 Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution provides that: “The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces
with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.”
From the foregoing provision it means that The Liga ng mga Barangay is not
subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego, It only gives the
President the power of general supervision, as exercised by the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary as his alter ego.
In the case at bar, when respondent judge appointed the DILG as interim caretaker
to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the
management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the
DILG. The Acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and
constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but
more importantly, of the barangay as an institution.
What the DILG wielded was the power of control which even the President does
not have. The DILG’s authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules
are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the
discretion to modify or replace them.
67. DRILON VS. LIM, 235 SCRA 135
DOCTRINE: Where the Secretary of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax
measure enacted by a local government unit to determine if the officials performed
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for
the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers under the Local
Government Code, the same is an act of mere supervision, not control.
FACTS: The City of Manila enacted Ordinance 7794, otherwise known as Manila
Revenue Code. The four (4) major oil companies during that time questioned the
said ordinance and appealed to the then Secretary of Justice Drilon (Petitioner) for
being non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and
public policy.
The Petitioner set aside the Manila Revenue Code and issued the assailed
Resulution on the ground that there were no written notices of public hearings on
the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required
by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were
copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a) and on the basis of
Section 187 of the Local Government Code which authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
The City of Manila appealed to the RTC, the RTC ruled and revoked the resolution
issued by the petitioner and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the
procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section
187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of
the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific
provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of
supervision over local governments.
On appeal the petitioner argued that the Section 187 is constitutional and that the
procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the
Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
ISSUE: WON THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE
ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCE 7794 (MANILA REVENUE CODE) HAVE
BEEN OBSERVED?
RULING: Yes, the procedural requirements in the enactment of Ordinance 7794
(Manila Revenue Code) have been observed.
In the case at bar, it shows that the proposed ordinances were published in the
Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the
approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions are the
posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity,
considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general
circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the
ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the
approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local
government unit and not to tax ordinances.
68. MUN. OF PARAÑAQUE VS. V.M. REALTY, 292 SCRA 676
DOCTRINE: A Local Government Unit (LGU), like the Municipality of
Parañaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere
resolution of its lawmaking body.
FACTS: Sometime in 1991, the Sangguniang Bayan of Mun. of Parañaque issued
Resolution No. 577, for purposes of entering into a negotiated sale of the property
with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. In 1993, the Municipality
of Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation against the respondent over two
parcels of land, with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at
Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila. the purpose of the expropriation is
to alleviate the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the
homeless through a socialized housing project.
The RTC of Makati issued a resolution granting the complaint of Petitioner and
authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit of an
amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value of the property based on its
tax declaration.
Respondents filed their answer alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160 (Local Government Code)
As a result the RTC dismissed the complaint of the petitioner.
On Appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE
CAN EXERCISE ITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN PURSUANT TO A
RESOLUTION BY ITS LAW-MAKING BODY?
RULING: No, the municipality of Parañaque cannot exercise its power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution.
A Local Government Unit (LGU) may exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and
restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
An LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted
by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is
exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and
the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor
be authorized through an ordinance; RA 7160, the present Local Government Code
which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed,
explicitly required an ordinance for the purpose.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character,
but a resolution is temporary in nature.
69. MALINAO VS. REYES, 255 SCRA 616
DOCTRINE: Every administrative offense. On the other hand, any administrative
disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the meantime he is
reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of whatever misconduct
he might have committed during his previous term.
FACTS: Petitioner is the Human Resource Manager of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque.
Respondent the then Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque filed a case against her in the
Ombudsman for gross negligence of duty, inefficiency and incompetence. While
the case was pending respondent hired a replacement. As a result the petitioner
filed an administrative case against the respondent before the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan of Marinduque for abuse of authority and denial of due process.
The Sanguniang Panlalalwigan found the respondent guilty of the chanrge and
imposed a penalty of suspension against the respondent. The respondent
questioned the decision of the Sanguniang on the ground that it was only signed by
the presiding chairman of the Sanguniang. Thereafter, respondent wrote to the
DILG Secretary regarding the validity of the decision of the Sanguniang. The
DILG secretary opined that the decision of the sanguninag does not appear to be in
accordance with Section 66 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and settled
jurisprudence.
The Petitioner then wrote to the Governor demanding the suspension of
respondent Mayor without any further delay, the Governor informed the
Sanggunian that he agreed with the opinion of the DILG for which reason he could
not implement the ruling of the Sanguninan. Thereafter the Sangunian acquitted
the respondent of the charges against him.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE: WON THE SANGUNIAN RENDERED A VALID DECISION?
RULING: NO, the Sangunian did not rendered a decision.
In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local
officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must thus be “in writing stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision.
In the case at bar, what the Sanggunian, did on August 12, 1994 was not to render
a decision, they merely took a vote on the administrative case against the
respondent Mayor. In addition it also lacks the signature of the majority.
Pursuant to Section 66(b) of the Local Government Code, the penalty of
suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six
(6) months for every administrative offense. On the other hand, any administrative
disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the meantime he is
reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of whatever misconduct
he might have committed during his previous term.
70. ABUNDO V. COMELEC, 688 SCRA 149

DOCTRINE: To be considered as interruption of service, the law contemplates a

rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.

FACTS: For four successive regular elections, Abelardo Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, the
Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Torres,
who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo
protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest. In the 2010 elections Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, predicated on
the three-consecutive term limit rule.

The COMELEC ruled in favor of Abundo. Respondent Vega filed a quo warranto
petition in the RTC to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres
raised.

The RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor because he has
already served three consecutive terms. Petitioner then appealed to the
COMELEC En Banc which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONER IS DEEMED TO HAVE SERVED
THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS?

RULING: NO, the petitioner has not served 3 consecutive terms.

Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government
Code provides that, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective
local official for any length of time shall not, in determining service for three
consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office, the following

requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.

In the case at bar, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as
mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly
elected candidate for only a little over one year and one month. The reality on the
ground is that Abundo actually served less. The almost 2 year period during which
Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an
involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered
as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.
71. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408
DOCTRINE: The term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall
be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency.
FACTS: The respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the
Government under the Proclamation 50, decided to sell Manila Hotel in a public
bidding. The Petitioner a Filipino corporation offered to buy 51% of the Manila
Hotel at P41.58 per share, also another group, a Malaysian firm, bids for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Under the GSIS bidding rules the highest bidder is the winner, and it is clear that
the Malaysian Firm is the highest bidder, pending the declaration of the Malaysian
Firm as the winning bidder, the petitioner wrote a letter to the GSIS that they will
match the offer of the Malaysian firm, and the petitioner send a manager’s check as
a security to match the bid of the Malaysian firm, but it was not accepted by the
GSIS.
As a result of the non-acceptance, petitioner then filed prohibition and mandamus
to the Supreme Court, and invoked petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture and it has became part of
national patrimony. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON MANILA HOTEL FALLS UNDER THE NATIONAL
PATRIMONY?
RULING: YES, Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. When the Constitution speaks of “national patrimony,” it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. The term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall be
given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. The term “qualified Filipinos” as
used in the Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned
by Filipinos.
72. GAMBOA V. FINANCE SECRETARY, 652 SCRA 690
DOCTRINE: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

The constitutional requirement of at least 60 percent Filipino ownership applies not

only to voting control of the corporation but also to the beneficial ownership of the
corporation. It is therefore imperative that such requirement apply uniformly and
across the board to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and category,
comprising the capital of a corporation.

FACTS: The petitioner Wilson P. Gamboa, is a stockholder of Philippine Long

Distance Telephone, he claimed that PLDT was granted a franchise to engage in
telecommunications business. In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics
Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26
percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings,
Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by several persons, subsequently PHI became the
owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of Deeds of Assignment. In
1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the
PCGG. The 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the
outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by
the Republic of the Philippines. Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by
the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect
sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of
PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific's common shareholdings in PLDT increased
from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of
foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent.
As a result, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief,
and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. On the ground that it
violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits
foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent.
ISSUE: WON THE SALE OF COMMON SHARES TO FOREIGNERS IN
EXCESS OF 40 PERCENT OF THE ENTIRE SUBSCRIBED COMMON
CAPITAL STOCK VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT ON
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF A PUBLIC UTILITY?
RULING: YES, the sale of common shares to foreigners violates the
constitutional limit on foreign ownership rule of a public utility.
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
“No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. xxxxx
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the
executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be
citizens of the Philippines.”
The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. Mere legal title is
insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the
Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the
hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate.
Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]."
In the case at bar, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn
less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the
express provision of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that "no franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
The Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly
reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the
national interest.

73. LA BUGAL B’LAAN vs. RAMOS, G.R. 127882, December 1, 2004

Doctrine: The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the
primary power and responsibility in the Exploration, Development and Utilization
thereof.
FACTS: In 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO)
No.279, authorizing the secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources(DENR) to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals. In 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved Republic
Act (RA) No. 7942 which governs the exploration, development, utilization and
processing of all mineral resources and its Implementing rules and regulations was
embodied in the DENR Administrative Order 96-40 series of 1996.
Thereafter President Ramos entered into a financial and technical assistance
agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining Corporation Philippines, Inc. (WMCP)
an Australian Mining Company, covering 99,387 hectares of land in South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
In 1997, the Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 7942 and DENR
Dept. Order, they alleged that RA 7942 and DENR Admin. Order was
unconstitutional, because it allowed fully foreign-owned corporations to explore,
develop and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2 (paragraph
4) of Article XII of the Constitution. Petitioners also claimed that the FTAA
between the President of the Republic of the Philippines and WMCP was illegal
and unconstitutional.
WMCP in their manifestation claimed they had already sold all its shares to
Sagittarius Mines, a corporation 60% Filipino owned.
ISSUE: WON RA 7942 IS UNCONSTITITIONAL?
RULING: Yes, R.A. 7942 is unconstitutional. The FTAA between he WMCP and
the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is
a service contract.
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution provides that: “All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands,
all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law.”
“President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country.”
In the case at bar, R.A. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional since
it permits foreign owned corporation to engage in mining activities, the WMCP is
an Australian-Indonesian Mining Company.
The FTAA is likewise unconstitutional since it grants WMCP a fully foreign
owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all
minerals, which is contrary to the Constitution since FTAAs should be limited to
technical or financial assistance only. It does not extend to the foreign-owned
corporation’s management and operation of the mining activity.