1.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-12792             February 28, 1961

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: In expropriation case, the parties should be given an opportunity to present their respective
evidence upon factors that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact
involved.

Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to
extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc,
Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger
parcel belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns
the San Beda College, a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been able
to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted the present expropriation
proceedings.

On June 8, 1957, Defendant, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds:

I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is
not subject to expropriation.

II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.

III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which would entail
less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property
dedicated to education.

IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is discriminatory.

V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push through its project of
constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate
defendant's property at this time would be only to needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its
property.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of expropriation case has merit?

Ruling: Supreme Court ruled that the parties should have been given an opportunity to present their
respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining
the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and
solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.
2. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, HON. ADRIANO D. DAEZ, MUNICIPAL MAYOR,
MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PHILIPPINE PIPES & MERCHANDIZING
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity of a public character.

Facts: In 1975, respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the
Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a
width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 215165
and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy
equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports,
wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes,
and parts for low cost housing.

In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed
Resolution No. 258, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879.

On March 10, 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan
disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the
Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road.

On October 21, 1983, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez,
passed Resolution No. 21, for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's land. The Provincial
Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25, 1984.

Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation.

Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine
National Bank, the trial court on March 1, 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not Petition filed has merit?

Ruling: Supreme Court ruled on the negative. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from
the Court of Appeals is limited to the review of errors of law, factual issues not being proper in certiorari
proceedings.

This Court reviews and rectifies the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals only under certain established
exceptions such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when
the court, in making its finding, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee.
There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public use upon payment
of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefore.

In the case of City of Manila vs Chinese Community Manila, the Court held that the foundation of the right
to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public
character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the
legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity therefore .

There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which
was offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a
real need for another connecting road.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

3. THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-14355             October 31, 1919

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

Facts: The City of Manila prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into
an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made
in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were
available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and
injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would
have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in
question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and
that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same
filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.
Ruling: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not
the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed
by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

Here, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains
no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and
adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the
plaintiff. Thus, the petition was dismissed.

4 . NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
SPS. MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-60077             January 18, 1991

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: The power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to the
expropriator.

Facts: Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its
objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission
lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of
Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit.

Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the aforementioned lots
for the construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, said corporation was
constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against the herein defendants on January 20, 1965.

Upon filing of the complaint, plaintiff corporation deposited the amount of P973.00 with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to cover the provisional value of the land of the defendant spouses
Ricardo Malit and Misericordia Gutierrez. And by virtue of which, the plaintiff corporation was placed in
possession of the property of the defendant spouses so it could immediately proceed with the
construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV transmission line. 

In this connection, by the trial court's order of September 30, 1965, the defendant spouses were
authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00.

Issue: Whether Petitioner should made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land
traversed by its transmission lines?

Ruling: The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that "While it is true that plaintiff
are only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said
transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-
tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused
beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to
defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their
property
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should
be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of said property.

Petitioner only sought an easement of right-of-way, and as earlier discussed, the power of eminent
domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to the expropriator.

5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines filed on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against
defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso
de Castellvi, over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Florida blanca, Pampanga,and
against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over two parcels of land 

The Republic alleged, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the
Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total
market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10,
that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount
with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga;

On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10.

After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10,
the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually
placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959.

ISSUE: whether or not the taking happened on 1959 ?

Ruling: The court ruled that under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of
the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court,
on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for
eminent domain was filed.
6. MARINA Z. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondent.
G.R. No. 147511            January 20, 2003

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: The refusal to pay just compensation, allegedly for failure of petitioners to pay capital gains tax
and surrender the owners' duplicate certificates of title, to be unfounded and unjustified.

First, under the expropriation judgment the payment of just compensation is not subject to any condition.
Second, it is a recognized rule that although the right to enter upon and appropriate the land to public use
is completed prior to payment, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation

Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate complaints for the expropriation of
sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the cadastral survey of
Dasmariñas, Cavite belonging to the petitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite,. The
stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to
accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court
rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. This
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on October 29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs.
Zaballero2 and which became final on November 26, 1987.3

For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to comply with the above order, petitioners filed on April 28,
1992 a complaint for forfeiture of rights before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79. They
alleged that respondent NHA had not relocated squatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the
expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and had not paid the just
compensation fixed by the court. 

 In its Answer, respondent NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial amount to petitioners and
that the expropriation judgment could not be executed in view of several issues raised by respondent
NHA before the expropriation court concerning capital gains tax, registration fees and other expenses for
the transfer of title to respondent NHA, as well as the claims for attorney's fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco,
Jr., collaborating counsel for petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of Petitioner to return back the property has merit?

Ruling: The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the
construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries
cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. The low cost
housing project of respondent NHA on the expropriated lots is compliant with the "public use"
requirement.

The expropriation judgment declared that respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties
"for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project." The taking here is
absolute, without any condition, restriction or qualification. 
The refusal of respondent NHA to pay just compensation, allegedly for failure of petitioners to pay capital
gains tax and surrender the owners' duplicate certificates of title, to be unfounded and unjustified.

First, under the expropriation judgment the payment of just compensation is not subject to any condition.
Second, it is a recognized rule that although the right to enter upon and appropriate the land to public use
is completed prior to payment, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation

With respect to the amount of the just compensation still due and demandable from respondent NHA, the
lower courts erred in not awarding interest computed from the time the property is actually taken to the
time when compensation is actually paid or deposited in court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as follows:

1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay petitioners the amount of

P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the
expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall have been fully paid;

2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and

3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent National Housing Authority the owners'

duplicate certificates of title of the expropriated properties upon full payment of just
compensation.

7. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-59603               April 29, 1987

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court's findings.

Facts: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a
certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and
covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, for the establishment of an export processing zone by
petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, , four (4) parcels of land
with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the private
respondent. The petitioner, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance
with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. However, the
parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels
of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66,, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings
any property for the establishment of export processing zones, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan
Export Processing Zone.

ISSUE: whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or
deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just
compensation is concerned?

Ruling: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded
and how to arrive at such amount

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the
decreed compensation

8. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM 
 GR No. 78742, July 14, 1989

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the Landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
Landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated

Facts: On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land
Transfer in the name of the private respondents.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is
anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The petitioner also
invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his
small parcels of rice holding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution

Issue:
Whether or not CARP law violates due process ?

Ruling:
NO. The general rule, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.

The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the Landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the Landowner. No
outright change of ownership is contemplated. Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate
the due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid must be rejected.

9. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents
G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993

CIVIL LAW

Doctrine: When the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is
not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be
exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned

Facts: This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate complaints for damages filed
against the NPC and Benjamin Chavez before the trial court. The plaintiffs therein, now private
respondents, sought to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to
property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978. The
flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the
spillways of the Angat. In said complaints, the plaintiffs alleged,  that: 1) defendant NPC operated and
maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan; 2)
defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident in question; 3) despite the
defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they
failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam; 4) when the said water level went
beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, opened three
(3) of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the
Angat River; and 5) as a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their
animals, drowned, and their properties were washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early
hours of 27 October 1978.

In their Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that: 1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence
and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the
diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different
municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of
water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions; 4) the water
released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to
people and property; 5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still
not contain or control the flood that resulted and; 6) the damages incurred by the private respondents
were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum
absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be
sued because it performs a purely governmental function.

Issue: Whether or not National Power Corporation is guilty negligence?

Ruling: The court ruled that upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor
cannot escape liability.

It has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss,
such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act
of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned

Petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure  to escape liability for the loss or
damage sustained by private respondents since the petitioners, were guilty of negligence.

Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to
acts of God.

10. . REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE EDGARDO

GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE G. LIM, respondent.
G.R. No. 161656               June 29, 2005

EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

Doctrine: The doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,however, in cases where the government failed
to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
Facts: On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for
expropriation with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar
Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine
Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and
covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters.

After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated
October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI
rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of ₱4,062.10 as just
compensation.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons’ successors-in-
interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an
action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in possession of the property. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent can recover the possession of the property?

RULING:: The court ruled that while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,however, in cases
where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that "the government cannot keep
the property and dishonor the judgment. Wherefore, the Respondent has the right to recover the
possession of the property.

11., DEMOSTHENE AGAN vs PIATCO

GR no. 155001, May 5, 2003

POLITICAL LAW

Doctrine: Article XII sec 17 of the constitution pertains to the right of the State in times of national
emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business
affected with public interest.

Facts: On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the
DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a
build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 

On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the Prequalification Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project
On February 13, 1996, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III
project.

On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation
for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's unsolicited proposal, 

On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc.
(Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC.  PBAC awarded
the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine International
Airport Terminals Co., Inc.

AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.

On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement for the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession
Agreement).  The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal
during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the
rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement.  The Agreement provided that the
concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years starting from the in-service date, and may be
renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years.  At the end of
the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and
II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport
services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they
would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for prohibition.
Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.

RULING:
Yes.  Under Article XII sec 17 of the constitution pertains to the right of the State in times of national
emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business
affected with public interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long
the temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary takeover by the government
extends only to the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the government
is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer
of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the temporary
takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said business and its properties as
the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its police power and not of its power of
eminent domain. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use
of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.
12. LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997

ADMINISTRSTIVE LAW

Doctrine: No law that makes the payment of an obligation illegal.

Facts: Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s
office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade
and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-
Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986
reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction
and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release
of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal
was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the
PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for
said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch.
Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery
thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs.
Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the second
withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last
withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter-
request for a manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor
branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was
loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs.
Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the
amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta were
charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large.. On 12 October 1990, they were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the
Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

Ruling:
No, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted in strict
compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and
bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the
presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law
makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution
constrains one to act swiftly without question.
13. RESTITUTO YNOT, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO AND THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 74457 MARCH 20, 1987

POLITICAL LAW

Doctrine: The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed.

Facts:The former President Ferdinand E. Marcos has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626, effective October 25, 1980.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the
court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. 626-A is unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of Php 12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, therefore petitioner was denied of due process.

14. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 139465           January 18, 2000

POLITICAL LAW

Doctrine: The Doctrine of Incorporation is applied whenever the municipal tribunal are confronted with a
situation where there is a conflict between a rule of international law and Constitution. However, the
provision must be harmonize to give effect to both,but if conflict is irreconcilable, municipal law must be
upheld. Eventhough the International Law has been made part of the law of the land, it does not imply
the primacy of international law over municipal law.

FACTS: The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the
United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609
prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a foreign country.
Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given ample time to comment on the said
request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Issue: Whether or not treaty stipulations must take precedence over an individual’s due process rights?
Ruling::The court ruled that the human right of person and the accused guaranteed in the Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is
applied whenever the municipal tribunal are confronted with a situation where there is a conflict between
a rule of international law and Constitution. However, the provision must be harmonize to give effect to
both,but if conflict is irreconcilable, municipal law must be upheld. Eventhough the International Law has
been made part of the law of the land, it does not imply the primacy of international law over municipal
law. In state where the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, both statute and treaties maybe
invalidated if they are in conflict with the Constitution.
.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private
respondents due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by
constitutional guarantees. Therefore,  Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.