251. Sison, Jr. v. PAGCOR – May 14, 1991 (BASCO VS. PAGCOR. There’s no Sison Jr. vs. PAGCOR.

FACTS: In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by Presidential
Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling
casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success
hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed
the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection
clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed,
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

ISSUE: W/N PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause

RULING: No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection
is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449)
horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42)
are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for
one, unconstitutional. Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.”
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under
the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal
force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection
clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.

MAIN POINT: in bold

252. Republic v. Sandiganbayan – 230 SCRA 711

FACTS: Before 1986, the Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose de Venecia, Jr.,
was able to obtain foreign loans syndicated by various banks. In view of the magnitude of the loans and the project
risks involved, the banks required that their loans be fully covered by the absolute and unconditional guarantee of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, thus, de Venecia applied for Philippine Government guarantee from
the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee), whose Board of Directors was then
composed of private respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc, et.al. He however misused the proceeds of the loans by
diverting them to other uses and/or appropriation, then for his own personal benefit. Congressman de Venecia’s
group of companies was unable to seasonably service these foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to
assume its obligation as guarantor. Needless to state, the de Venecia group of companies and PHILGUARANTEE
were sequestered by the petitioner, through the PCGG. A case was filed against the De Venecia, Bondoc and et al.
However, Bondoc’s complaint or case was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation on the equal protection clause the dismissal of the complaint to Bondoc.

RULING: No. The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is compelled by the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. De Venecia Jr, and the respondents Bondoc and company are similarly situated.
Respondent Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint only because they allegedly gave unwarranted favors to
De Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the latter’s foreign loans. When petitioner admitted that no undue favour was
granted to de Venecia, Jr. in the grant of such guaranty facilities and dismissed its complaint against respondents
Bondoc and company. To give a more favoured treatment to de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is
to indulge in invidious discrimination.

MAIN POINT: To give a more favored treatment to de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to indulge
in invidious discrimination

253. Himagan v. People – 237 SCRA 538

FACTS: Petitioner Ishmael Himagan, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National
Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr.
and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the information for murder and attempted murder were filed with
the Regional Trial Court, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the
basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, or DILG Act of 1990, which provides that upon filing of a complaint against a PNP
member for grave felonies,  the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. 
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days, which was denied by the judge, pointing out that
under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion
for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied. Hence, this petition wherein petitioner claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of
his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: W/N the imposition of the preventive suspension of over 90 days against the petitioner violates his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

RULING: NO! The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not
violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The special law for police
officers is justified by their status. In upholding the provision, the Court said that the reason why members of the PNP
are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his
case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily
cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.

MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the
equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

254. Almonte v. Vasquez – 244 SCRA 286

Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB)
to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB
for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings
from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez  denied the anomalous activities
that circulate around the EIIB office.  They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an
agency of the Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.

RULING: NO. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and in a manner,” the
framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from
complaining against official wrongdoings. The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through
official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.

MAIN POINT: The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.

255. Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337

FACTS:

 Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of
lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.
 Petitioner GMA Network had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates
radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No.
881.
 Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
o “Comelec Time shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area
of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television
time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.”
 Petitioner contended that:
o While Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment,
o Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge.
 Petitioner GMA Network claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer
even more should it be required to do so again this year.
 Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC TIME denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of
the laws, and that it constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

RULING: NO.

The said provision expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should be considered as part of the public
service time said stations are required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information
and education under their respective franchises or permits. As radio and television broadcast stations do not
own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

256. Tiu v. CA – GR 127410 Jan. 20, 1999

FACTS:

 RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into other productive uses. Section
12 thereof granted special privileges to the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), which includes
the:
o City of Olongapo
o Municipality of Subic, and the
o Lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and.
 EO 97 was issued to clarify the application of the incentives provided by RA 7227.
o Sec. 1- tax and duty-free importations shall only be applied raw materials, capital goods and equipment
brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ.
o Except for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises,
resident individuals are subject to the taxes and duties under Philippine laws.
o Section 1.1 - enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives to the business and enterprises and
residents within the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It excludes the first two
component cities as provided for by RA 7227.

ISSUE: Whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection of the laws?

RULING: NO. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must

(1) rest on substantial distinctions,

(2) be germane to the purpose of the law,
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

The real concern of Republic Act 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into
economic or industrial areas.

257. Aguinaldo v. COMELEC – GR 132774 June 21, 1999

FACTS: Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were incumbent provincial or municipal officials in
Cagayan. Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 elections Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as its
classification of persons running for office is not a valid classification.

 According to petitioners, candidates for elective office are classified into the following groups under Section 67:
o Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. — Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
 According to petitioners, candidates for elective office are classified into the following groups under Section 67:
o First classification: an incumbent elective official who runs for the same position as his present incumbency . .
. (and) another incumbent elective official running for another position; and
o Second Classification: an incumbent elective official who runs for president or vice-president . . . (and)
another incumbent elective [official] running for any other position (i.e., not his incumbency nor for president
or vice president) . . .
 Petitioners also argue that Section 67 effectively shortens the terms of office of elected officials, in violation of
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution
 Respondent’s Claim:
o The classification embodied in Section 67 is reasonable and based on substantial distinction: incumbents
running for the same position are not considered resigned because the intention of the law is to allow them to
continue serving their constituents and avoid a disruption in the delivery of essential services; those running
for different positions are considered resigned because they are considered to have abandoned their present
position by their act of running for other posts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed section violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: NO. Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to the
constitutional pronouncement that public service is a public trust.

Rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and
thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go
back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the
people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

258. De Guzman v. COMELEC – 336 SCRA

FACTS:

 Petitioners assailed the validity of Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act of 1996.
o SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act
or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall
automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district.
o Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to different stations by the
COMELEC.
o Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the
COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years.
They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and
therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING: NO.
Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it.

The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from
developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. It can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be
sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and
every link thereof.

259. People v. Mercado – GR 116239, Nov. 29, 2000

FACTS:

 The accused, being them members of the PNP, kidnapped one Richard Buama, a 17 year old minor and
boarded him in a car against his will thus depriving him of his freedom of liberty, brought him to Tanay, Rizal in a
safe house and there subjected him to extreme/brutal physical violence, and thereafter with abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation hacked and bludgeoned/clubbed said Richard Buama who thereby sustained
mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
 The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them
the punishment of death.
 The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the
case resulting in grave and serious errors committed in convicting the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment."

RULING: NO. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil".
Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are established.

However, this case was decided on November 29, 2000 when death penalty was not yet suspended. It was
suspended on 2006.

260. People v. Jalosjos – 324 SCRA 689

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE: WON there is a violation of equal protection of the law.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable basis for
valid classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison.

MAIN POINT: The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality
nor prejudice shall be displayed.

261. People v. Piedra – 350 SCRA 163

FACTS: Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and
assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. Appellant also invokes the equal
protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro
handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally
charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution
discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguena,
and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
ISSUE: WON equal protection of the law was denied to the appellant.

RULING: NO. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by
itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face,
resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection
unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officer’s regularly performed their duties, and this presumption
can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.

MAIN POINT: The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a
Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers
denied appellant equal protection of the laws. Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that
there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.

262. International School v. Quisumbing – June 1, 2000

FACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and
that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. Filipino teachers in the International
School challenge the legality of the school’s practice of giving higher pay for foreign hires than Filipinos of equal rank.

ISSUE: WON the practice is constitutional.

RULING: NO. The court held that there was no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by “foreign
hires" and “local hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to these teachers. While we recognize the need of the
School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-
hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter.

MAIN POINT: The Court finds the principle of “equal pay for equal work” requires that persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries.

263. Central Bank Employees Assn. v. BSP – 446 SCRA 299

FACTS: Petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP
and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The provision in R.A.
7693 (The Central Bank Act) which creates two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those
exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (the exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file
(Salary Grade 19 and below) (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class
legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the
BSP personnel's position. Petitioner posits that the classification violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents'
implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take
cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.

Respondent BSP contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the
constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and
administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."
ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its
continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law?

RULING: YES. The court ruled that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other
governmental financial institutions (GFIs) removing limitations on employees, the continued operation the limitation
on Central Bank employees under Sec. 15c, Art. II of the Central Bank Law constitutes invidious discrimination on the
2994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP. This is a case of relative constitutionality. The Supreme Court said that
while the “policy determination” argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the
officers of BSP, it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the BSP rank-and-file employees and those of
other Government Financing Institutions (GFIs) (who, in their respective charters, are exempt from the provisions of
SSL). These rank-and file employees (of BSP and GFIs) are similarly situated; thus, the classification made in the
Central Bank Act is not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI.

MAIN POINT: The concept of relative constitutionality. The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in
its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is
open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions

DISSENTING OPINION: Justice Panganiban, “For the record, I am not against the exemption from the Salary
Standardization Law of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) rank and file employees (with Salary Grade 19 and
below). Neither am I against increases in their pay. I simply submit that (1) the factual milieu of this case does not
show a denial of equal protection, (2) the theory of relative constitutionality does not come into play, and (3) petitioner
should have addressed its plaint, not to this Court, but to Congress in the first instance. I am confident that given
sufficient opportunity, the legislature will perform its constitutional duty accordingly. Hence, there is no need or
warrant for this Court to intervene in legislative work.”

264. Ycasuegi v. PAL 569 SCRA 467

FACTS: This case talks about an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to
the weight standards of the airline company. He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming
that he was illegally dismissed. He argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2)
continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he
was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was not unduly discriminated against when he was dismissed while other
overweight cabin attendants were either given flying duties or promoted.

RULING: NO. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are
allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated
and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees. To
make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However,
in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.

MAIN POINT: The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection
guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.

265. SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92

FACTS: Respondent Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified certain areas (Pandacan Pasig
and Sta. Ana, among others) from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operation within six months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences that do not
comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code, and Health and Sanitation Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is partial and discriminatory

RULING: No. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

MAIN POINT: An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law

266. Gobenciong v. CA 550 SCRA 302

FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with Falsification of Public Documents and
Misconduct relative to the anomalous purchase of the expensive hemoanalyzer. Office of the Ombudsman ordered
his preventive suspension. Gobenciong parlayed the theory that the application of RA 6770 which authorized the
Ombudsman to impose a six-month preventive suspension instead of the civil service provisions of the Administrative
Code (which limits the disciplining authority’s prerogative to only imposing a prevention suspension for a period not
exceeding 90 days) violates the equal protection guarantee.

ISSUE: Whether or not application of RA 6770 violates the equal protection guarantee

RULING: No. The fundamental guarantee is not breached by a law which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and provided further that there is a substantial
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination; it does not demand absolute equality.

267. MIAA v. Olongapo 543 SCRA 269

FACTS: MIAA did not renew the janitorial and maintenance service contract of respondents Olongapo Maintenance
Services Inc. (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services Inc. (TCI) but instead awarded such contract to a new service
contractor through negotiated contract and without the benefit of public bidding. Respondents contended that such
was a violation of their right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of the service contracts to new service contractor by MIAA without public bidding
violates the respondents’ right to equal protection of law.

RULING: Yes. The constitutional right of respondents to equal protection was violated by petitioner when no public
bidding was called precisely because the latter was going to award the subject service contracts through negotiation.
Worse, the acts of petitioner smacked of arbitrariness and discrimination as they not only did not call for the required
public bidding but also did not even accord respondents the opportunity to submit their proposals in a public bidding.
Such act is illegal and irregular because of the wrong application of the laws by MIAA and not because the pertinent
laws are discriminatory against them.

MAIN POINT: Although the law be fair on its face and impartial on its appearance, yet if applied and administered by
the public authorities charged with their administration with an evil eye and unequal hand so as to practically make
unjust and illegal determination, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.

268. Nicolas v. Romulo 578 SCRA 438

FACTS: Private respondent Lance Corporal Daniel Smith of the US Armed Forces was convicted of the crime of rape
committed against petitioner. Pursuant to the VFA agreement, Smith’s custody was transferred to the US government
and he was transferred to the US Embassy Compound for detention. Petitioner contended that to allow the transfer of
custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different procedure for that accused which violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of custody of the accused violated the equal protection clause

RULING: No. The equal protection clause was not violated because there was a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. The rule
on international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction,
except to the extent agreed upon.

MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause was not violated because there was a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused

269. League of Cities v. COMELEC 608 SCRA 636

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 16 laws converting the municipality covered thereby into a city
(cityhood laws) and sought to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. To the
petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption
from the standard P100 million minimum income requirement, violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not such exemption granted to respondent municipalities violated the equal protection clause

RULING: No. No deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The conversion of a
municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit. The fundamental right of equal protection does not
require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights and privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. It does not preclude the state from
recognizing and acting upon factual difference between individuals and classes. Equality granted is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification.

MAIN POINT: A law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III
of the Constitution

270. Quinto v. COMELEC 613 SCRA 385

FACTS: A petition to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code as it violates the Equal Protection Clause that it unduly discriminates
against appointive officials because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those
holding elective positions. It provides that appointive officials and employees shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, which the same does not apply to elective officials.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: No, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness which has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

271. CREBA v. Romulo 614 SCRA 605 (supra)

FACTS: Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.(CREBA) is questioning the
constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act (RA) 8424 and the revenue regulations (RRs) issued by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) to implement said provision and those involving creditable withholding taxes and MCIT or
the imposition of 2% tax on gross income. Petitioner also claims that the revenue regulations are violative of the
equal protection clause because the CWT is being levied only on real estate enterprises and were not similarly
imposed to manufacturing enterprise.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: No, MCIT applies to all corporations and the taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be
validly treated differently from other business enterprises.
272. NPC v. Pinatubo 616 SCRA 611

FACTS: National Power Corporation questions the decision of the trial court declaring NPC Circular No. 99-75 which
sets the guidelines in the disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced and provides that qualified bidders
are only limited to partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished
products either purely or partly out of aluminum, or their duly appointed representatives. These bidders may be based
locally or overseas.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: No, Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a
reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government
property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Limiting qualified bidders in this case to partnerships or
corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products made purely or partly of
aluminum was an exercise of discretion by the NPC. Unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or used as a
subterfuge for fraud, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion.

273. Biraogo v. PTC 637 SCRA 78

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity and constitutionality of EO 1 dated July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010. Petitioners contended that it violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets
for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration and does equally apply to all
members of the same class. The OSG maintains that it does not violate the equal protection clause as it was created
for laudable purpose.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: Yes, EO 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the graft and corruption of the previous
administration. The EO 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike other
investigation commissions created in the past.

274. League v. COMELEC 643 SCRA 149

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petitioner for prohibition assailing the assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood
Laws. Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 was passed.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: Yes, the exemption provision merely states, Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x
shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This one sentence
exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities
from those that are not exempted. To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial
distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, not limited to
existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated.

275. PAGCOR v. BIR 645 SCRA 338

Facts: PAGCOR, for the longest time is excluded from paying taxes except from the franchise tax of 5% of the gross
revenue. Based on RA 9337 which ammended the National Internal Revenue Code, 10% Value-added tax was
imposed to PAGCOR which is specifically included in BIR regulations order as one of the franchisees subject to 10%
VAT. PAGCOR now raises the issue of constitutionality in imposing such taxes.
Issue: W/N RA 9337 is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the equal protection clause embodied in the
constitution

Ruling: NO. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997, by excluding petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation from the enumeration of government-
owned and controlled corporations exempted from corporate income tax is valid and constitutional. While BIR
Revenue Regulations insofar as it subjects PAGCOR to 10% VAT is null and void for being contrary to the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by Republic Act No. 9337

Main Point: Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as
to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental
discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned.

276. Gancayco v. Quezon City 658 SCRA 853

Facts: The MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco in violation to the the National Building Code of
the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. Due to non-compliance, the demolition proceeded. The City
Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power. Petitioner filed a petition
for TRO and RTC ruled that ordinance was unconstitutional. CA reversed the ruling and declared that ordinance was
a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to
its police powers.

Issue: W/N MMDA illegally demolished the property and violated the owner’s right to equal protection of laws

Ruling: YES. The structures were illegally demolished. power to enforce building code is vested in DPWH, and no
showing that MMDA was delegated by the agency to enforce such power on their behalf. Instead, it merely
prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. The ordinance itself
clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance

Main Point: The government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare
must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

277. Mendoza v. People, GR 183891, October 19, 2011

Facts: Petitioner, Romarico Mendoza seeks for the reversal of the court's decision convicting him in violation of RA
8282 or the Social Security Act. The court finds that the decree of conviction was founded on proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

However, during the pendency of the appeal, petitioner voluntarily paid the due amount to settle his delinquency. He
now then claims that in view of RA 9903 and its IRR, the settlement of his delinquent contributions entitles him to an
acquittal

Issue: W/N the petitioner can benefit from the terms of RA 9903 and invokes equal protection clause

Ruling: NO. The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or
pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law.
Mere payment of unpaid contributions does not suffice; it is payment within, and only within, the six (6)-month
availment period that triggers the applicability of RA No. 9903.

By paying outside of the availment period, the petitioner effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of
RA No. 9903. This is how the law is written: it condones employers and only those employers with unpaid SSS
contributions or with pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month period following the laws date of effectivity
Main Point: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

278. Bureau of Customs v. Teves, GR 181704, December 6, 2011

Facts: R.A. No. 9335 Attrition Act of 2005 to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) was enacted to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

BOCEA filed a petition against the respondents contending that R.A. 9335 and its IRR (1) gives an undue delegation
of legislative power to the Board; (2) violates the rights of BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b)
security of tenure and (c) due process because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC
employees as compared to employees of other revenue generating government agencies which are not subject to
attrition, (2) that the assailed law because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and
employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the
penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets.

Issue: W/N RA 9335 violates BOCEA members’ rights to equal protection of laws

Ruling: NO. RA 9335 does not violate equal protection of laws. Equal protection simply provides that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the
special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions —
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law.
Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.

279. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary (supra)

Facts: Finance Secretary Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay,
Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, due to the purchase by the LWUA of 445k shares of stock of Express
Savings Bank, Inc. Pichay was ordered by Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr. to submit their respective written
explanations under oath. Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that a same case is already pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman.

This petition seeks to declare unconstitutional EO No. 13 (Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC
created by PGMA, EO No. 12) and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the
Investigatory and Adjudicatory Division, Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, IAD-ODESLA).

Issue: W/N EO 13 is unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of due process and equal protection clause

Ruling: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It does
not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Presidential appointees come
under the direct disciplining authority of the President. Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential
appointees, the President has the authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office.

Main Point: The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, “all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.”
The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupation
bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.

280. Alvarez v. People 677 SCRA 673

FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated June 29, 2011 affirming the conviction of
petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Petitioner contends
that bad faith, manifest partiality and gross negligence were not proven by the respondent. He stresses that there
was substantial compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7718, and while it is true that petitioner may have
deviated from some of the procedures outlined in the said law, the essential purpose of the law – that a project
proposal be properly evaluated and that parties other than the opponent be given opportunity to present their
proposal – was accomplished. Petitioner maintains such actions are presumed to be regular and the burden of
proving otherwise rests on the respondent. Because all the transactions were done by him with the authority of the
Sangguniang Bayan, petitioner argues that there can be no dispute that he endeavored in good faith to comply with
the requirements of R.A No. 7718. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the non-inclusion of all the other members of the
Sangguniang Bayan denied him the equal protection of the laws.

ISSUE: W/N the court failed to consider that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the right of Mayor Alvarez to the equal
protection of the laws

RULING: No. It bears stressing that the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed
even if bad faith is not attendant. Thus, even assuming that petitioner did not act in bad faith, his negligence under
the circumstances was not only gross but also inexcusable.

MAIN POINT: Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations,
but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime.

281. Garcia v. People 677 SCRA 750

FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of the
96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement
of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary
had already been fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal
Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was
initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial
Detention Center. Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial
against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum-security
compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in
Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.

ISSUE: W/N the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause.

RULING: Yes. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.

MAINPOINT: The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.

282. Arroyo v. DOJ

FACTS: Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint
Committee then reported several people, including the petitioner GMA, to be subjected to the preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato.
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and
incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public
officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.

ISSUE: W/N the creation of the joint committee via the joint order is contrary to the due process and equal protection
clause of the constitution.

RULING: No. The Joint Committee was created for conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses during
the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation,
not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in
connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.

MAIN POINT: The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does
not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be
treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

283. Sto. Tomas v. Paneda 685 SCRA 245

FACTS: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of the Section 6 of RA 8042
which defines the term “illegal recruitment”. PASEI claims that the definition by the law is vague as it fails to
distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with
PASEI and he declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of
the RTC judgment.

ISSUE: W/N Sec. 6 of RA 8042 violates the right to equal protection of those that operate with government license or
authorities.

RULING: No. "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s
finding, makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the
appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether they commit the
wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting,
etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if
they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.

284. Republic v. Daisy Yahon, GR No. 201043, 726 SCRA 437, June 16, 2014

FACTS: Sgt Yahon was married to respondent. A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to protect the respondent
from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide reasonable financial spousal support to the
respondent. In his failure to appear before the court with a counsel and with an answer to the charges against him,
the court has granted PPO for the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon should
provide for the financial spousal support to his wife from his retirement benefits. However, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Finance Center contended that half of the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon cannot be given to the
respondent as it is from a military institution. The petitioner contended that money due to government employees is
not liable to the creditors of the said employees in the process of garnishment.

ISSUE: W/N the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court to provide for the financial
spousal support of respondent in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.

RULING: Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the financial spousal support of respondent. As a rule in
statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish. As section 8 (g) of RA No.
9262 used the general term 'employer', it includes in its coverage the military institution, which is the employer of Sgt
Yahon.

MAIN POINT: R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause. The court ruled that
R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and
the widespread bias and prejudice against women.

II. Section 2. The right to of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A. The Purpose of Section 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution

B. Scope of the Protection

Cases

285. Moncada v. People’s Court, 80 PHIL 1

FACTS: The petitioner was accused of the crime of treason. He alleges that he was arrested by the members of the
CIC of the United States Army at his residence. Petitioner contended that the evidence that was illegally acquired in
his domicile cannot be used against him and was not admissible in court as it violated his constitutional rights.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the seizure of documents were unconstitutional

RULING: YES. The SC concurred with the appellant's claim tha he had the right to have his house
respected, his documents should not be confiscated by any authority or agent of authority, without a writ of
registration duly issued. HOWEVER,

These constitutional limitations, however, do not go so far as to exclude as evidence the documents obtained illegally
or unduly. The Rules of the Courts, Rule 123, determines which are the evidence that should be excluded, which are
the admissible and competent, and does not classify as incompetent evidence those obtained illegally.

MAIN POINT

The means used in the acquisition of the document does not alter its probative value. There is no
constitutional or legal provision that frees the accused of all criminal liability because there was no search warrant.
The public vindicta demands that offenders of the penal law be punished. Releasing the blame for the simple fact that
the evidence against him has not been obtained legally is sanctioning the crime judicially.

286. Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383

FACTS: Several judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize
and take possession of properties as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the adverted to above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners argued that
items not under the seize list were seized. An injunction was partially granted. Thus, the documents, papers, and
things seized are those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and those found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the said act violated equal protection of the law

RULING No. Petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
MAIN POINT

It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties. Clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the
mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

287. People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

FACTS: On August 14, 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and
Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and asked if she could
inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for
shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier
company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the
package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported
this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes
opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in
violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming
that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible
as evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained run against Marti's constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore inadmissible in evidence.

RULING: NO.
It will be recalled that Mr. Job Reyes, Anita’s husband, proprietor of the courier and a private individual, was the
one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed
by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

MAIN POINT: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals.

288. Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC, GR 113271, Oct 16, 1997

FACTS: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. She allegedly received a
check amounting to P640 representing as payment for the overpriced purchase order she made to YSP, Inc., a
supplier of medicine. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous
Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico. Waterous
Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. Catolico insist that she only received a token
gift from YSP, Inc. and argued that Saldana invaded her privacy when the she opened an enveloped addressed to
herself. Labor Arbiter and NLRC opposed the termination but rather enforced separation with pay. It found that
petitioner’s evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-
employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But NLRC also declared that the check was inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the check is inadmissible as evidence violating constitutional rights if privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures.

RULING: NO.
The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It clearly appears however that Catolico’s dismissal was based on hearsay information which carried no
probative value. Catolico’s dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee’s dismissal.

MAIN POINT: The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only against the
government and its law-enforcement agencies as a limitation on official action.

289. People v. Mendoza, GR 109279, Jan 18, 1999

FACTS: Accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza allegedly shot his wife Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza which resulted to the
latter’s death. The trial court, upon the testimony of their sole child, Charmaine Mendoza, who was present during the
alleged shooting incident, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide. Cecilia’s
father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughter’s death, decided to remove pieces of property in the
victim’s house including the accused’s personal effects which included a Mission Order No. 86-580-893 that
authorized the accused to carry a Colt Revolver, .38 caliber. As a result, accused-appellant claims that these
documents which was relied s evidence were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy
of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant’s constitutional right to privacy of communication was violated by the
seizure of his personal effects by the Father of the victim.

RULING: NO.
Such right applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies. In the instant case, the
memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellant’s father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a
private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.

MAIN POINT: The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
one’s person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals.

290. People v. Bongcarawan, GR 143944, July 11, 2002

FACTS: On March 11, 1999, the accused boarded M/V Super Ferry 5, sailing from Manila to Iligan City. At about
3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark
Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about a missing jewelry. Diesmo and four (4) other
members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the
economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. Nothing was found after the
body search. But when requested by the security, the accused opened his Samsonite suitcase, revealing a brown
bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the
security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the
suitcase and its contents. Accused was convicted of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not when the Samsonite suitcase was allegedly opened forcibly and searched without his consent
is a violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

RULING: NO.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was
only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

MAIN POINT: The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function.

C. Requisites for a Valid Warrant

a) Probable cause
b) Definition

Case

291. Henry v. US, 361 US 98

FACTS: Without a warrant for search or arrest, federal officers who were investigating a theft from an interstate
shipment of whiskey twice observed cartons being placed in a motorcar in a residential district, followed and stopped
the car, arrested petitioner and another man who were in it, searched the car, and found and seized cartons
containing radios stolen from an interstate shipment. At petitioner's trial for unlawfully possessing radios stolen from
an interstate shipment, his timely motion to suppress the evidence so seized was overruled and he was convicted.
Petitioner was convicted of unlawfully possessing three cartons of radios valued at more than $100 which had been
stolen from the said interstate shipment.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause for the arrest leading to the search that produced the evidence on
which the conviction rests

Held: NO.
On the record in this case, the officers did not have probable cause for the arrest when they stopped the car; the
search was illegal; the articles seized were not admissible in evidence; and the conviction is reversed.

MAIN POINT:
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring: The statute states the constitutional standard, for it is the command of the
Fourth Amendment that no warrants for either searches or arrests shall issue except "upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

MR. JUSTICE CLARK, Chief Justice, dissenting: In my view, the time at which the agents were required to have
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was committing a felony was when they began the search of the
automobile, which was after they had seen the cartons with interstate labels in the car. The earlier events certainly
disclosed ample grounds to justify the following of the car, the subsequent stopping thereof, and the questioning of
petitioner by the agents. This interrogation, together with the sighting of the cartons and the labels, gave the agents
indisputable probable cause for the search and arrest.

1. For arrest

Cases

292. People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil 667

FACTS: The crime alleged against respondent is fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search
warrant issued, the officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy Juco. The validity of a search warrant is
questioned for it is based upon affidavits which contained the statement of "It has been reported to us by a person
whom I considered reliable that in said premises are fraudulent books, correspondence and records.”

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid

RULING: No. It is not stated in the affidavit that the books, documents or records are being used used in the
commission of fraud against the Government, and, notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the warrant avers that
they are actually being used for such purpose

MAINPOINT: The true test of the sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant the issuance of a search warrant is whether it
has been drawn in such a manner that untruthfulness could be charged thereon in case the allegations contained
therein prove false.

293. Alvarez v. CFI , 64 Phil 33

FACTS: Petitioner asks that the warrant issued by Judge Gutierrez ordering the search and seizure of certain
accounting documents be declared illegal. He contends that Agent Almeda has no personal knowledge of the facts
and that he got it only from a reliable source which was served as the basis for the issuance of the warrant, and that
the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant.

ISSUE: WON the requirements to find probable cause was sufficiently made by the judge

RULING: NO. The affidavit in this case, was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but
merely hearsay. The judge who issued the search warrant relied exclusively upon the affidavit and he did not require
nor take the deposition of any other witness. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable
cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.

MAINPOINT: When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and
direct knowledge, it is sufficient the judge is satisfied that there existed probable cause; but when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the
fact is necessary.
294. Webb v. De Leon, GR 121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS: The NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners with the crime of Rape with Homicide.
Petitioners then filed a complaint against respondent Judge who issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination.

ISSUE: WON respondent gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination
before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

RULING: No. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.” Clearly, our laws reject the contention of petitioners that respondent
judges should have conducted “preliminary investigation” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

MAINPOINT: In arrest cases, there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be arrested committed it. Before issuing warrants of arrest, the judges merely determine personally the probability,
not the certainty of guilt, of an accused.

2. For search

Cases

295. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

FACTS: A search warrants for the newspaper WE Forum were issued on the basis of a broad statement of the
military that Burgos, Jr. “ is in possession of has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which are used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion.”

ISSUE: WON such allegation if sufficient to establish probable cause

RULING: No. The reason for the seizure must be well stated, as well as the specifications and the particularities of
the alleged subverssive material that the petitioner has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will
not suffice. Thus, the broad statement is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. The warrant is constitutionally objectionable because they are in the nature of general warrants.

MAINPOINT: Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

296. Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69

FACTS: Police officers applied for a search warrant which was subsequently issued by respondent judge Dayrit that
Petitioner Prundente (PUP) is found in violated of PD No. 1866 Petitioner assailed the validity of the search warrant  
ISSUE:

1. WON the search warrant is valid on the ground that it is based on hearsay evidence
2. WON the search warrant is valid on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place & there were
several rooms
3. WON search warrant is valid on the ground that it violated the rule that it can be issued only with one specific
offense.

RULING:

1. Yes. The police authorities had conducted continuous surveillance for several days and "gathered information
from verified sources" that the holders are not licensed to possess.
2. Yes. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended. The search warrant itself described the place to be
searched
3. Yes. the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, etc.) the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was
issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search
warrant to mention the particular provision does not render the warrant invalid.
 MP: Essential reqs of a valid warrant Bernas page 41

297. United States v. Jones, January 23, 2012

FACTS:  The case concerned Antoine Jones, who was the owner of a Washington nightclub when the police came to
suspect him of being part of a cocaine-selling operation. They placed a tracking device on his Jeep Grand
Cherokeewithout a valid warrant, tracked his movements for 28 days and used the evidence they gathered to convict
him of conspiring to sell cocaine. He was sentenced to life in prison.

ISSUE: WON the FBI violated Jones’ rights

RULING: Yes. The Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor
the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment which states that “right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Here, the
Government’s physical interference on an “effect” for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a “search.”

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court: The Government physically occupied private property for the
purpose of obtaining information

MP: “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”

b. Who determines probable cause?

Case

298. People v. CA, GR 126005, Jan 21, 1999

FACTS: The case is about the fatal shooting of Petitioner Dy’s Mother at pointblank range by private respondent
Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of his father, private respondent Billy Cerbo. After an information for
murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Dy, daughter of the victim Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-
complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing. The prosecution filed a murder case
including Billy Cerbo. The latter filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without
probable cause 

ISSUE: WON CA committed GAD in finding probable cause against cerbo

RULING: Yes. The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that
belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The
determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is judicial  function. The judge, on the other hand, determines
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing
him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report. The
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for the purpose different from that made by the judge. 

c. Kind of evidence needed to establish probable cause

Case

299. Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, GR 140946, Sept. 13, 2004

FACTS: NBI agent Samiano filed several applications for search warrant in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged
violations of Sec. 29 of Intellectual Property and Art 189 of the RPC(unfair competition). Maxicorp filed a motion to
quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for its issuance and the warrants are general
warrants. RTC found probable cause after examining NBI agent Saiano, Sacriz and comp. technician Pante. The
three testified on what they discovered during visits to Maxicorp. The CA held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to
present conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The CA pointed out that the
NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of Joel Diaz.

ISSUE: WON there was probable cause to issue search warrant

RULING: Yes. probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection
with that offense are in the place to be searched. The judge determining probable cause must do so only after
personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause.

MP: The applicant must have personal knowledge of the circumstances. Reliable information is insufficient. Mere
affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.

d. In general

Cases

300. Nala v. Barroso, GR 153087 Aug. 7, 2003

FACTS: SPO3 Alcosar applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and residence of petitioner Nala,
for violating Illegal Possession of Firearms. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash Search and Seizure
Warrant. Respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to Quash but ordered the return of the air rifle to petitioner .
As to the validity of the search warrant, respondent found that probable cause was duly established from the
deposition and examination of witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser who personally
conducted a surveillance to confirm the information given by Nalagon.

ISSUE: WON there is probable cause for the issuing a warrant

Ruling: No. the search & seizure warrant is void for lack of probable cause. While Alcoser testified before the
respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as "personal
knowledge" but only "personal belief" because neither he nor Nalagon verified or secured, a certification from the that
petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm. The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant has been defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.In determining the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, the examining magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not merely routine
or pro forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses.

MP BOLD