JD Batch 2017 Administrative Law Case Digests

PART I.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC, vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,

G.R. No. 47065 (June 26, 1940). EN BANC, LAUREL, J.
On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an application for
authorization to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks, on the ground that they were needed to
comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of
the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC granted with certain conditions. Contending these conditions, petitioner
filed an MR which the PSC denied. WON, PSC’s imposition of the conditions constitutes a valid
delegation of legislative power.
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate,
or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than
fifty years," and when it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribed as a condition for the
issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a)
that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National Assembly
meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More than this, it has thereby also
declared its will that the period to be fixed by the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than
fifty years. All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function,
involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition,
the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner.”
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval
of the practice by the court.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT

ADMINISTRATION (POEA), et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 76633 (October 18, 1988). First Div, Cruz, J.
The widow of an employee sued petitioner-employer for damages before POEA for the
accidental death of her husband. Upon taking jurisdiction, POEA awarded monetary claims pursuant to
its Memorandum Circular No. 2 prescribing the standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and
domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Petitioner
questions the validity of MC No. 2 as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
The reason for the observation that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention . The
growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 1

SOLID HOMES, INC., vs.TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 84811
August 29, 1989, FIRST DIVISION, CRUZ, J.:
Solid Homes contracted to sell to Teresita Payawal a subdivision lot in Marikina for the agreed
price of P 28,080.00. By September 10, 1981, Payawal had already paid Solid Homes the total amount
of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of
sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated
demands because, as it appeared later, the Solid Homes had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a
financing company. Teresita filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City. Solid Homes moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National
Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The private respondent, however, contends that the applicable
law is BP No. 129, which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
mentioned in its Section 19.
Between RTC and NHA, which has jurisdiction over the case?
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under
Presidential Decree No. 957."The language of Section 1 of P.D. 957 leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not
in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority.
The familiar cannon is that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the
latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that-
The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the
special act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a
general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular case.
xxx xxxxxx
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does
not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an
exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is
later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms,
unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to

enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. Following
this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, the Court sustained the
competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested
in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a
subdivision lot.
ANTONIO A. MECANO, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992,
En Banc., J. Campos. Jr.
FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis. In a memorandum to
the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is
entitled to the benefits under Section 699of the RAC. The sole issue of whether or not the
Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was brought
for the consideration of this Court.
HELD: Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to
cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code
which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the
public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still
others.

PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C. VASCO, v. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION,
G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988, Third Division, BIDIN, J.
A dispute arises as to who has the authority to execute contracts of lease covering properties
under the administration of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). Under Art. 567 of the Revised
Admin Code (the 1987 Admin Code), a contract of lease that the CAA will enter into must be executed
by 1) the President of the Philippines, or 2) an officer designated by him, or 3) an officer expressly
vested by law. However, under RA 776 (the law creating the CAA), it is the Administrator of the CAA
who was given the power to administer CAA’s property. Who is authorized to execute contracts of
lease covering properties under the administration of the CAA? It is the CAA Administrator.
The law creating CAA (RA 776) is a special law, thus prevails over the 1987 Admin
Code which is a general law.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC)

vs. ROBERTO MABALOT, February 27, 2002, G.R. No. 138200, EN BANC, BUENA, J.
FACTS: DOTC secretary Jesus Garcia issued MO addressed to LTFRB chairman directing latter to
transfer regional functions of that office to DOTC-CAR regional office, pending the creation of a regular
regional franchising and regulatory office. Respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition praying that MO
be declared illegal and without effect. The court issued a TRO enjoining petitioner from implementing
the MO. Later, Secretary Lagdemao issued DO establishing DOTC-CAR as the regional office of the
LTFRB and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct
supervision and control of the LTFRB central office. The court rendered MO and DO as null and void
and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the constitution against
encroachment on the powers of the legislative department. Were the MO and DO violative of the
provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department to
abolish offices and create new ones.
HELD: NO. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the President - through his duly constituted
political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly decree
the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB
Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance
of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB. At this point, it
is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public
officers that a public office may be CREATED through any of the following modes, to wit,
either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by
Congress), or (3) by authority of law. Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions.
This has been settled by decisions of the Court upholding the validity of reorganization statutes
authorizing the President to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department.
PART II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES and ORGANIZATIONS

Aida D. Eugenio v. CSC, Teofisto Guingona, Jr and Salvador Enriquez, GR No. 115863, 31
March 1995, En Banc, Puno.
Facts: Eugenio is the deputy director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute who applied for a
Career Executive Service Officer rank but a CSC Resolution abolishing the Career Service Executive
Board became an impediment to her appointment.
Held: The CESB was created pursuant to PD No 1 of 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as
the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature, not by the CSC. This follows
an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function, not administrative. Further, CESB is an autonomous entity attached to the CSC. The power
to reorganize does not extend to attached agencies as the relationship of attachment pertains to
“policy and program coordination”.
De La Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
FACTS: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
(BP 129) by imputing the lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the president with regards to his authority to fix compensation and
allowance of the justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. On the one hand, the solicitor general interposed a
defense of legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa. WON the enactment of
BP 129 is unconstitutional by reason of undue delegation
HELD: No. BP 129 is not unconstitutional because there was valid delegation. The basic postulate
that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is
entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being
the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in
Edu v. Ericta: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion
by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied.
Aquilino Larin v. The Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and the Committee Created to Investigate The Administrative
Complaint Against Aquilino Larin, October 16, 1997, GR No. 112745, En Banc, Torres.
The President issued Executive Order 132, reorganizing the BIR, which led to the removal of
Larin from office. Larin was a presidential appointee: Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The position of the Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service.
Under the law, Career Executive Service officers, namely Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, are all appointed by the President. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who
belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the
direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the

power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no
reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-
distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing or
subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project
for which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to
security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the
employees of the civil service.
While the President's power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that
the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that
reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.
Citing Dario v Mison: "As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.”
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 lists down the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of
employees as a result of the reorganization, thus:
The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad
faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or
reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof."
CEBU UNITED ENTERPRISES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JOSE GALLOFIN, Collector of Customs, Cebu

Port, defendant-appellant, G.R. No. L-12859, November 18, 1959, EN BANC, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS. Two imported shipments were refused to be released because the ships carrying them left
after the Import License expired. The cargoes were, however, loaded onto the ship one day before the
expiration thereof. Hence, the date of the bill of lading. The lower court and the Court of appeals held
that the reckoning date should be the date of the bill, in consonance to a Resolution issued by the
defunct Import Control Commission.
HELD. “Although Republic Act No. 650, creating the Import Control Commission, expired on July 31,
1953, it is to be conceded that its duly executed acts can have valid effects even beyond the life span
of said governmental agency.” Hence, the reliance on the Resolution was correct.
ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 106296. July 5, 1996, MENDOZA, J.
Crisostomo was appointed President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) by the
President of the Philippines. During incumbency, two charges were filed against him before the Office
of the President and violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Tanodbayan. He was

preventively suspended. Subsequently, Pres. Marcos passed PD 1341 converting PCC into PUP with the
person who replaced Crisostomo, Dr. Mateo, as President. Crisostomo was then acquitted and all
administrative charges were dismissed.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to

replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. PD 1314 merely states that PCC
is converted into PUP. The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the
PCC were being transferred to the PUP but only that they “stand transferred” to it. Stand transferred
simply means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to
the PUP as the new name of the institution. There was a change in academic status of the
educational institution, but not its corporate life. Reinstatement of petitioner to the position of
president of the PUP could not be ordered by the trial court because P.D. No. 1437 had been
promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6) years,
renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to
terminate the terms of incumbents who were not reappointed.
CESAR G. VIOLA, Chairman, Bgy. 167, Zone 15, District II, Manila v. HON. RAFAEL M.
ALUNAN III, Secretary, DILG, ALEX L. DAVID, President/Secretary General, National Liga ng
mga Barangay, LEONARDO L. ANGAT, President, City of Manila, Ligangmga Barangay, G.R.
No. 115844. August 15, 1997, EN BANC MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: Viola, brgy chair, filed a petition for prohibition contending that Art. III, 1-2 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers is
invalid as it expands the law by creating positions (election of first, second and third VPs and for
auditors for National Liga and local chapters) in excess of those provided in the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160), 493 of which mentions as elective positions only those of president, vice
president, and five members of the board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels. The creation of these positions was
actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Ligang Mga Barangay, adopted by the First
Barangay National Assembly on January 11, 1994. In both Local Chapters and National Liga levels
(article VI), “The Board may create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter” (section 1) or“National Liga (section 2).” The LGC also authorized its
creation: “493. Organization. The ligaxxx directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such
other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter xxx The board shall
coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.”
Issue: Whether, in making a delegation of this power to the board of directors of each chapter of the
LigangMga Barangay, Congress provided a sufficient standard so that, in the phrase of Justice
Cardozo, administrative discretion may be canalized within proper banks that keep it from
overflowing.
Held: Yes. That Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these has been settled
by our decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the
Philippines to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department. Statutory provisions
authorizing the President of the Philippines to make reforms and changes in GOCCs for the purpose of
promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations and empowering the Secretary of
Education to prescribe minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction in private schools and
colleges have been found to be sufficient for the purpose of valid delegation. Judged by these cases,
we hold that493 of the Local Government Code, in directing the board of directors of the liga to create
such other positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapters, embodies a

fairly intelligible standard. There is no undue delegation of power by Congress. Petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION v. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION (1993)
FACTS: E.O. No. 649 authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) to
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA) and regionalized the Offices of
the Registers therein. Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil service
eligible, who was appointed previously to an office under a permanent status, was issued an
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, now under atemporary status, for not being a member of
the Philippine Bar. Garcia was later on terminated on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money"
and such termination was subject of an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB
dropped the appeal of Garcia ratiocinating that since the termination of her services was due to the
expiration of her temporary appointment, her separation is in order. However, in a Resolution, the
Civil Service Commission directed that Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds
II or itsequivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right theory the new requirement of
BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment, would not apply to her (Garcia) butonly to the
filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date saidExecutive Order took
effect."
HELD: THERE IS NO VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE RE-EMPLOYED IN A REORGANIZED

OFFICE. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right
to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
E.O. NO. 649 EXPRESSLY PROVIDED THE ABOLITION OF EXISTING POSITIONS. The
question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one oflegislative intent about which there can
be no controversy whatsoever if there is an explicitdeclaration in the law itself. A closer examination of
E.O. 649 reveals that said law in express terms, provided for theabolition of existing positions. Thus,
without need of any interpretation, the law mandates thatfrom the moment an implementing order is
issued, all positions in the Land RegistrationCommission are deemed non-existent. This, however,
does not mean removal. Abolition of aposition does not involve or mean removal for the reason that
removal implies that the postsubsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. (Arao vs. Luspo, 20
SCRA 722 [1967]) Afterabolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak
of. It is in this sensethat from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure doesnot arise. (De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982])
REORGANIZATION WAS VALID AS IT WAS PURSUED IN GOOD FAITH

Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
alegitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Two questions therefore arise:
(1)was the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and
(2) was it done in good faith?
Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify forkey positions
in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and newdevelopment of the times.
Garcia DID NOT have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any keyposition in the
NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office.Rather, it was a
criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.

DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, et al v. NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, represented by
ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and PERLITA BAULA, G.R. No. 152845. August 5, 2003, FIRST
DIVISION, J. VITUG.
President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 29, entitled Mandating the Streamlining
of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA), a government agency under the Department of
Agriculture. The order was followed by another issuance, increasing from four hundred (400) to not
exceeding seven hundred fifty (750) the positions affected thereby. On 10 June 1996, petitioners, all
occupying different positions at the NTA office received individual notices of termination of their
employment.
The reorganization was valid. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.
It is an act well within the authority of President motivated and carried out, according to
the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but
accept.Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith. Reorganization is carried out in `good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient.
KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, Petitioner, vs.

COMMISSIONER FE B. BARIN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS CARLOS R. ALINDADA, LETICIA V.
IBAY, OLIVER B. BUTALID, and MARY ANNE B. COLAYCO, of the ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION, Respondents, G.R. No. 150974, June 29, 2007, Second Division, J. Carpio.
Facts: RA 9136, known as EPIRA (for electric Power Industry Reform Act) was enacted wherein Sec.
38 of the said law provides for the abolition of the ERB (Energy Regulatory Board) and creation of ERC
(Energy Regulatory Commission). However, KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or
change the ERB’s character, it merely changed the ERB name to ERC and expanded functions and
objectives.
Ruling: The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. There
should not be any controversy if there is an explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself. Section 38
of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB. However, abolition of an office and its related positions is
different from removal of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive
concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no
occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security
of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office
and its related positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions. A
valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good
faith. An abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when
it does not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition of an
office may be brought about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear
and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment.
Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar
functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed
to have never ceased holding office. In this instant case, the Court finds that ERC indeed assumed the

functions of the ERB. However, the overlap in the functions of the ERB and of the ERC does not mean
that there is no valid abolition of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which are
intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry.
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION [G.R.
No. 192935. December 7, 2010, EN BANC, MENDOZA, J
Facts: The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) was formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the
Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an
ad hoc body is one.
The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the creation of PTC is not within the power of the President to organize.
The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided.
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 177131,

7 June 2011.
COA issued Resolution No. 99-011 defining the Commission’s Policy with respect to the audit of the
Boy Scout of the Philippines. For the purposes of audit supervision, the BSP shall be classified among
the government corporations to be audited by employing the team audit approach. The BSP sought
reconsideration of the COA Resolution saying that it is not subject to the COA’s jurisdiction.
The SC finds that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit
jurisdiction.
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality,
which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the
amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are
ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations
or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations” These corporations are
treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of
ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public
purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the
government or any of its Departments or Offices.

Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government
instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of
its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter.
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989. En Banc, Cortes.
Executive Power, defined.
Facts:
Former President Marcos, in his deathbed, signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
However, Aquino stood firmly in her decision to bar the return of the Marcos family in the Philippines
in the interest of national security and public safety.Invoking their right to return under the Bill of
Rights,UDHR and ICCPR, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of
abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.”Nor may
the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Thus, they
advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect. In other words, they contend that the President’s
powers are limited to those specifically enumerated under the Constitution and what is not
enumerated is impliedly denied to her.
Held:
The Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power"
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President. Corollarily,
the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.Herein, the power involved is the President's residual power
to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of
the people. Hence, Aquino did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
Citizen J. Antonio Carpio v.The Executive Secretary, The Secretary of Local Governments,
The Secretary of National Defense, and the National Treasurer, G.R. No. 96409
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES" Carpio, as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar seeks for
declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for temporary restraining order. Carpio
contends that RA 6975 limits the power of the National Police Commission to administrative control
over the PNP, and hence this control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the
National Police Commission and the PNP were placed.
Carpio is mistaken.
To begin with, one need only has to refer to the fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law
that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest Carpio's
contention on the matter.This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by
us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or

modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of
the meaning of Chief Executive."
The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized Department of
Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the
PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.Such organizational set-up does not
detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and
controlled by a national police commission.
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of
the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department."
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS

CORP., ET. AL. TINGA, J.: Second Division, G.R. No. 158540, July 8, 2004.
The Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI") accepted an application from Philcemcor alleging that
the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic
production, depressed local prices, among others. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition of
definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to Rep. Act No. 8800, also known as
the Safeguard Measures Act ("SMA")
The Tariff Commission, as mandated by the SMA, concluded that there was no serious injury to the
local cement industry caused by the surge of imports. The DTI Secretary disagreed. However, the DTI
Secretary made a decision citing the DOJ Opinion that he was bound by the negative finding of the
Tariff Commission.
Issue: Binding Effect of Tariff Commission's Factual Determination on DTI Secretary.

Under the SMA, although the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is a requisite in the
application of the DTI’s safeguard measure, still, the DTI Secretary is tasked to decide by himself
whether or not the application of the safeguard measures is in the public interest.
The measures enumerated by the SMA are essentially imposts, which precisely are the subject of
delegation under Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Nevertheless, the President’s
control power over departments may still be limited by Congress in matters which the President
exercises delegated authority only, such as the fixing of tariff rates, because is this case, tariff rate
fixing is essentially legislative because it involves power of taxation.
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
En Banc (Sandoval-Gutierrez)
The case involves seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition which all allege that
Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (GO No. 5) issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on February 24, 2006 were made with grave abuse of discretion. In gist, PP
1017 declared a state of national emergency while GO No. 5 implements PP 1017 where “the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any
act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary.”

Among others, it was contended that the said issuances usurped the power of Congress because it
arrogates to PGMA the power to enact laws and decrees and that “it amounts to an exercise by the
President of emergency powers without congressional approval.”
The Supreme Court examined such issuances in the light of “emergency governance” where according
to the Court “in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain
amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it
obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.”
As defined in the Administrative Code, proclamations are merely "acts of the President fixing a
date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest upon the existence of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend". A proclamation, on
its own, cannot create or suspend any constitutional or statutory rights or obligations . There
would be need of a complementing law or regulation referred to in the proclamation should such act
indeed put into operation any law or regulation by fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of a
public moment or interest related to such law or regulation. And should the proclamation allow the
operationalization of such law or regulation, all subsequent resultant acts cannot exceed or supersede
the law or regulation that was put into effect.”
[G.R. No. L-27524 July 31, 1970] JOSE C. TECSON, v. HON. RAFAEL SALAS Executive
Secretary, HON. ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, respondent. En Banc. Penned by FERNANDO, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose C. Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of Public Works, sought
through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition the nullification of his detail to the Office of
the President to assist in the San Fernando Port Project thru a directive of the then Executive
Secretary, Rafael Salas, acting by presidential authority. He asserts that it is removal without caue
since it should be approved by the Budget Commissioner and the Commissioner of Civil Service. The
lower court sustainted the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents. The matter was brought on
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the assignment of petitioner to another office, by the President of the Philippines thru the
Executive Secretary, constitutes removal from office without cause?
RULING: The order of dismissal is affirmed.

Principle: The act of the President cannot be countermanded by a department secretary who is a mere
subordinate of the President nor can a subordinate of a department secretary disregard his superior’s
altering his action in the performance of his function as the department secretary who has power of
control over him, acts as the President’s alter-ego and his action is presumed to be that of the
President.
The Villena decision no longer speaks with authority with regard to delineating the President’s power
of control. Justice Padilla in Mondano v. Silvosa states: supervision means "overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties." Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter." Insofar however, as the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus or offices is concerned, the Villena ruling establishing the qualified
political agency concept applies with undiminished force.
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,vs.JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his

capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees., G.R. No.L-
27811.November 17, 1967. En Banc (Sanchez, J)
FACTS: Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of
Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was
elevated to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision
of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not
contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the
matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person.
However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The
president may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform
personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in
person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is
that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order”
that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until
reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence
the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.
Leonardo Montes v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, G.R. No. L-10759, May 20, 1957, EN
Petitioner-appellant was, on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating Equipment
Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case No. R-8182
instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk
because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care), the Commissioner of
Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service
Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not
pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of
duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.
Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision, but the said
court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all
his administrative remedies before he instituted the action.
The dismissal was correct. Clearly under the law, the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals is
subject to review by the President, hence the decision of the former cannot be directly reviewed by
regular courts. The President under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system

as head of the executive department, may be able to grant the remedy that petitioner pursues,
reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be made to him before recourse can be
had to the courts.
EUSTAQUIO M. MEDALLA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO N. SAYO, Judge
of the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXXIII and HONORATO G. MACKAY, acting Hospital
Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital and the CITY MAYOR OF CALOOCAN,
respondents, G.R. No. L-54554. March 30, 1981, First Division (Melencio-Herrera, J.)
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Medalla, Jr. contests the appointment by the City Mayor of Dr. Mackay as Hospital
Administrator of Caloocan City General Hospital because first, the former holds a position higher (Chief
of Clinics) than that of the latter (Resident physician) and second, they have the same qualifications.
Upon review by the Civil Service Commission and affirmed by the Office of the President, Mackay’s
appointment was ordered revoked. Despite such Order, the Mayor still appointed Dr. Mackay. The CSC
disapproved the appointment. Mackay moved to reconsider but before resolution by the CSC, Mackay
sought to enjoin its implementation in the CFI. Medalla says CFI has no jurisdiction because of non-
compliance with the doctrine of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies and that the City Mayor’s
appointing power is limited by Civil Service law.
Ruling: The appointing power of the local executive can be limited by the same law that grants the
power.Under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan (RA No.5502), it is clear that the power of
appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds is subject to Civil
Service law, rules and regulations. The Caloocan City General Hospital is one of the city departments
provided for in said law. The Civil Service Decree (PD No. 807), employees to be promoted must be
drawn from the next-in-rank.
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., represented by its President RODRIGO
S. MACARIO, SR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS,
G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001, SECOND DIVISION, DE LEON, JR., J.
A property called Dominican Hills was donated to the Republic of the Philippines by UCPB
through its President for the priority programs of the Ministry of Human Settlements but which upon
the abolition of the latter, it was transferred to Presidential Management Staff (PMS). The latter
received an application from petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC. (UNITED, for
brevity), a community housing association composed of non-real property owning residents of Baguio
City, to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. On February 2, 1990, PMS Secretary Elfren
Cruz referred the application to the HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC). On May 9,
1990, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and UNITED. The
Memorandum of Agreement called for the PMS to sell the Dominican Hills property to HIGC which
would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED. This was consummated and HIGC executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale to UNITED. However, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property
allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order
from the city mayor. Consequently, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO
RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action for injunction. While
Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time represented by the Land Reform
Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BENEFICIARIES, for brevity), filed a complaint for damages, injunction
and annulment of the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED and HIGC. To forestall the re-
implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed on September 29, 1998 a petition
for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order in the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineers Office, the

City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent
COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. Petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial functions. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis
for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, it does not depart from
its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still,
administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are
they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of
government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches the legislative, the
executive, and the judiciary each department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own
sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one
of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, it is empowered to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 97149, 31 March 1992, En Banc, Romero, J.
The PPA General Manager charge Beja for dishonesty, grave misconduct, etc. The PPA general
manager indorsed it to the AAB “for appropriate action.” May the DOTC Sec and/or AAB initiate and
hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager?
The court qualifiedly rules in favor of petitioner. An attached agency has a larger measure of
independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental
supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship”
between the Department and attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy reform and
program coordination. With respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a
certain extent, free from Departmental interference and control. It is, therefore, clear that the
transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General
Manager should have first conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the
imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the
part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the DOTC Secretary. Only then could the AAB take
jurisdiction of the case.
MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the name B.E. CONSTRUCTION; et. al. v.
MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ALFREDO MATANGGA, ENRICO TICAR AND TERESITA
VILLANUEVA, in their respective capacities as Chairman and Members of the Pre-
qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) et. al., G.R. No. 86695, 3 September 1992,
FIRST DIVISION, Cruz.
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication of an Invitation to Bid for the construction of the Micro
Laboratory Building at ISCOF. Malaga, et. al, submitted their pre-qualification documents. All three of
them were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late,
having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o’clock in the morning of Dec. 2, 1998.Malaga, et.

al filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC
in their official and personal capacities. On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a
restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On
December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the
Court was prohibited from issued restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary
mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.
WON P.D. 1818 is applicable notwithstanding the fact that ISCOF was a state college, it had its
own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local
political subdivision?
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through
a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus
Chartered institution — refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter,
and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, vs.ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES

and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, G.R. No. 120319
October 6, 1995, En Banc. , J. ROMERO.
FACTS: At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers.
Respondent's Position was received. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper
despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. The VA ruled that the Bank has
not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on
promotion.
HELD: The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the
contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his
functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to
said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial
court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must
be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court
shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995, Third Division, FELICIANO, J.
Facts: The National Steel Corporation (NSC), an entity wholly owned by the National Government,
embarked on the construction of a steel mill in Iligan City, requiring it to acquire a tract of land owned
by private corporation Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC). As negotiations between NSC and
MCFC pertaining to the purchase of the land failed, the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), which was
created by PD 272 in order to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines,

instituted expropriation proceedings covering the property. While the trial was ongoing, however, the
statutory existence of ISA expired. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid
judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. For its part, ISA
urged that the Republic of the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be
substituted in the case. Should the RP be allowed to substitute ISA in the expropriation proceedings?
Held: Yes.
First, ISA is a non-incorporated agency, not having a separate and distinct personality from the
Government.
The following are the powers and functions of the ISA as stated on PD 272.
- to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel facilities xxx
- to negotiate, and when necessary, to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the
government xxx
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in PD 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact
appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, or more
precisely of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Second, being a non-incorporated entity, all its powers, duties, etc. revert back to the Republic of the
Philippines upon expiration of its charter.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-
assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law
specifying some other disposition thereof. When the expiring agency is an incorporated
one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter
of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code .
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its
powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no
special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other
entity or agency of the Republic.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through the SUGAR REGULATORY

ADMINISTRATION, and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, 15th Division, THE HONORABLE CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her official capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 26, Manila,
JORGE C. VICTORINO and JAIME K. DEL ROSARIO, in their official capacities as RTC Deputy
Sheriffs of Manila, ROGER Z. REYES, ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., and EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN,

G.R. No. 90482, August 5, 1991, EN BANC, DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: Republic Planters Bank, acting through the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA), et al.,
filed a complaint with the RTC “for sum of money and/or delivery of personal property with restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction” against the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the
National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA). The lower court dismissed the petition. The SOLGEN
maintains that the SRA has no legal personality to file the instant petition in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines for under its charter, E.O. no. 18, the SRA is not vested legal capacity to sue.
Held: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar Regulatory Administration may not
lawfully bring an action behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to represent said petitioner in this case. It is a
fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
(Guerzonvs Court of Appeals, et al., 77707, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA 182,189, citing Makati Stock
Exchange, Inc. vs. SEC, 14 SCRA 620, and Sy vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570.)
The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body.
Office of the Ombudsman and Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio in his capacity as Special Prosecutor,
Office of the Ombudsman v. Atty. Gil Valera and CA Special First Division, GR No. 164250,
30 September 2005, En Banc, Callejo.
Facts: PNP Director filed a complaint against Valera, a Customs director, for violations of the Tariff
Code in entering into compromise agreements with certain cargo companies. Ombudsman Simeon
Marcelo inhibited from Valera’s case and ordered Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his stead.
An order by Villa-Ignacio preventively suspending Valera was assailed through a petition for certiorari
for having been issued by a Special Prosecutor beyond the scope of his authority, as he does not have
such power like the Ombudsman.
Held: The Ombudsman, pursuant to his power of supervision and control over the Special Prosecutor,
may authorize the latter to conduct administrative investigation. The power of the Ombudsman under
the Constitution and RA 6770 is plenary and unqualified but that of the Special Prosecutor is limited to
recommendation of preventive suspension if the same is warranted based on the Special Prosecutor’s
investigation. Stated differently, with respect to the conduct of administrative investigation, the
Special Prosecutors authority, insofar as preventive suspension is concerned, is recommendatory in
nature. It bears stressing that the power to place a public officer or employee under preventive
suspension pending an investigation is lodged only with the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsmen.
Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs. Ermita GR no. 166620
FACTS: This is a challenge on the constitutionality of EO 378 issued by Pres. Arroyo; and is an action
class suit filed by employees of the National Printing Office (NPO). NPO was created by Pres. Aquino
by virtue of EO 285 which was the merger of the Govt Printing Office and printing units of Philippine
Information Agency. On Oct. 25, 1994, President Arroyo issued EO 378, amending Sec 6 EO 285 by
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of govt.
agencies and instrumentalities. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act to its income.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO,
petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers
of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino
when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners
security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO. WON the EO 378 is
constitutional
HELD: YES. It is constitutional. (Reorganization) In the present case, involving neither an abolition
nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the
law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is
an act well within the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of
the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept.
PART III. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN GENERAL
Rufino Matienzo, Godofredo Espiritu, Dioscorro Franco, and La Suerte Transportation

Corporation v Hon. Leopoldo Abellera, Acting Chairman of the Board of Transportation, Hon.
Godofredo Asuncion, Member of the Board of Transportation, Arturo Dela Cruz, MS
Transportation Co., Inc., New Familia Transportation Co., Roberto Mojares, Et al., June 1,
1988, GR No. L-45839, Third Division, Gutierrez.
Private respondents are authorized taxi operators who operate “kabit” taxi units. They sought
the legalization of their “excess taxicab units” with the Board of Transportation (BOT), as the latter
promulgated orders setting the applications for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority
to operate their excess units. Petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to private respondents.
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain
power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was
created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent
should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the
appropriate means are deemed given. Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of
Transportation the power, among others "To grant special permits of limited term for the operation of
public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert
clandestine operators into legitimate and responsible operators."
ALFREDO L. AZARCON, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.

BATAUSA, G.R. No. 116033. February 26, 1997, THIRD DIVISION, Panganiban, J.
FACTS. Azarcon, despite being a private person, who was appointed as depository/custodian of a
truck distrained (or seized) by the BIR, was charged before the Sandiganbayan of malversation under
the RPC, by causing the release of the said truck without the consent of the BIR. The case is sought to
be dismissed because Azarcon was not a public officer, considering that the BIR had no authority to
make him such.
HELD. The criminal case against Azarcon must be dismissed. BIR’s acts did not make him a public
officer, because it did not have the authority to do so under the law.
“It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that its
branches and administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as defined either in
the Constitution or in legislation or in both.x x xthe quantum of powers possessed by an

administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will still be limited to that conferred
expressly or by necessary or fair implication in its enabling act. Hence, (a)n administrative officer, it
has been held, has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in
the exercise thereof. Corollarily, implied powers are those which are necessarily included in,
and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted.”
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION AND/OR MAGDIWANG, REALTY

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUCINA S. SENDINO and the OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila, respondents, G.R. No. 109703 July
5, 1994, KAPUNAN, J., First Division.
Sendino filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the Adjudication and
Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The HLURB, whose
authority to hear and decide the complaint was challenged by REVI, rendered its judgment in favor of
private respondent. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which
affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the
President which dismissed the same.
While E.O. 85 abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), it is patently clear from a
reading of its provisions that the said executive order did not abolish the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC), renamed HLURB, which continued to exercise its powers and
functions. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an
administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. The power
conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its
functions has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function,
unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been withheld."
CESAR G. VIOLA, Chairman, Bgy. 167, Zone 15, District II, Manila v. HON. RAFAEL M.
ALUNAN III, Secretary, DILG, ALEX L. DAVID, President/Secretary General, National Liga ng
mga Barangay, LEONARDO L. ANGAT, President, City of Manila, Ligangmga Barangay, G.R.
No. 115844. August 15, 1997, EN BANC MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: Viola, brgy chair, filed a petition for prohibition contending that Art. III, 1-2 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers is
invalid as it expands the law by creating positions (election of first, second and third VPs and for
auditors for National Liga and local chapters) in excess of those provided in the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160), 493 of which mentions as elective positions only those of president, vice
president, and five members of the board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels. The creation of these positions was
actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Ligang Mga Barangay, adopted by the First
Barangay National Assembly on January 11, 1994. In both Local Chapters and National Liga levels
(article VI), “The Board may create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter” (section 1) or“National Liga (section 2).” The LGC also authorized its
creation: “493. Organization. The ligaxxx directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such
other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter xxx The board shall
coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.”
Issue: Whether, in making a delegation of this power to the board of directors of each chapter of the
LigangMga Barangay, Congress provided a sufficient standard so that, in the phrase of Justice
Cardozo, administrative discretion may be canalized within proper banks that keep it from
overflowing.

Held: Yes. That Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these has been settled
by our decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the
Philippines to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department. Statutory provisions
authorizing the President of the Philippines to make reforms and changes in GOCCs for the purpose of
promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations and empowering the Secretary of
Education to prescribe minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction in private schools and
colleges have been found to be sufficient for the purpose of valid delegation. Judged by these cases,
we hold that493 of the Local Government Code, in directing the board of directors of the liga to create
such other positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapters, embodies a
fairly intelligible standard. There is no undue delegation of power by Congress. Petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI) v. BATARIO (1994)
FACTS: PTFI is engaged in industrial tree planting and it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely
for production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to
engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities
like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-
derivated" products. Sometime on 1989, A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported 4 containers
of matches from Indonesia. PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages
with prayer for a TRO against AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated"
products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC filed a
motion to dismiss alleging, among others, that the Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the
Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality
of an importation…” RTC dismissed the case on the ground that it had “no jurisdiction to determine
what are legal or illegal importations.” Hence, such dismissal is the subject of present petition.
HELD: The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code
is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of PTFI to the RTC to
compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of anylegal basis. To allow the
regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the importedmatches, as petitioner would, is
clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of theBureau of Customs (BOC) over seizure and
forfeiture cases.
The enforcement of statutory rights is NOT foreclosed by theabsence of a statutory procedure. The
Commissioner of Customs has the power to "promulgate allrules and regulations necessary to enforce
the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code … subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Finance." Moreover, it has been held that where the statute does not require any particular
method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency,the agency may adopt any
reasonable method to carry out its functions."
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) v.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEIRS

OF ELIZAR NAMUCO, and HEIRS OF EUSEBIO MANUEL, G.R. No. 96938 October 15, 1991, EN
BANC, NARVASA, J.
In May, 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees
as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with
irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. However, the Civil Service Commission ruled
that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. Thereafter, Commission granted the motion for
execution and accordingly directed the GSIS "to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased
Elizar0020Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to
the date of their demise." GSIS contends that the Civil Service Commission has no power to execute

its judgments and final orders or resolutions. WON Civil Service Commission has the power to execute
its judgments and final orders or resolutions.
In light of constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil
Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders
which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious
that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has
been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or
the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to
include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgmentsit thus renders, unless
the law otherwise provides.
PART IV. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEDRO R. EXCONDE defendant-

appellant, G.R. No. L-9820, 30 August 1957, En Banc, J. J.B.L. Reyes.
Facts: The accused was convicted of violating Central Bank Circular No. 37, limiting to P100 the
amount of Philippine currency that an outgoing passenger could have on his person. The aforesaid
circular was promulgated in connection with sec. 34 of Republic Act 265 (Central Bank Act), which
grants the Monetary Board the power to regulate the expansion and contraction of money supply. The
accused argued that the said Circular went beyond the mandate of the law and that the said law did
not grant authority to the Monetary Board to prohibit the exportation of Philippine currency.
Ruling: It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate
and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes. Circular No. 37 here in question was a valid exercise of the regulatory power delegated by
the Central Bank Act, and that said Circular is in harmony with the objectives sought to be achieved
by that law. Therefore violation of Circular No. 37 comes within the penal sanctions of the Central
Bank Act; because a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a
misdemeanor or a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute, and by virtue of the latter.
LEO ECHEGARAY, v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 132601,

January 19, 1999, En Banc. J. Puno.
FACTS: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray for the crime of rape of the
10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for
the said crime. This is the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto of the
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the execution of the
death convict Leo Echegaray by lethal injection. It is the main submission of public respondents that
the Decision of the case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit
of authority of the executive authority.
HELD: The power to control the execution of the Court’s decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety

of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be
sure, the most important part of litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of
decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary
power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. For this
purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. LEONILA P. CELADA, respondent.

G.R. No. 164876 (January 23, 2006). FIRST DIVISION (YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.)
Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land of which 14.1939 hectares was
identified in 1998 by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The matter was then indorsed to
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for field investigation and land valuation. The DAR
offered the amount determined by LBP as just compensation but it was rejected. The matter was
referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) pursuant to Sec. 16(d) of RA 6657. While the DARAB
case was pending, respondent filed, on February 10, 2000, a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation against LBP, the DAR and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen,
Bohol, before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. The same was docketed as Civil Case No.
6462 and raffled to Branch 3, the designated Special Agrarian Court (SAC). On April 27, 2000, LBP
filed its Answer raising non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as forum-shopping as
affirmative defense. According to petitioner, respondent must first await the outcome of the DARAB
case before taking any judicial recourse.
The SAC did not err in assuming jurisdiction over respondents petition for determination of
just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, it was held that it was clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners. This original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC
would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in
compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decision.
Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57
and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid. It would be
well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not
with administrative agencies.
Eastern Shipping, Supra.
Tatad v. Dept of Sec. Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 5 November 1997. En Banc, Puno.

Delegation of Legislative Power.
Facts:
The constitutionality of RA 8180, “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes”, was questioned to be an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the
Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. Likewise, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of
crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to
the US dollar is considered stable.
Held:
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will
be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end
of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997
is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the
law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin vs. Commision on
Elections, Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), G.R. No.
127325.
Delfin filed a petition with the COMELEC (Delfin Petition) by virtue of the constitutional provision on
people's initiative to amend the Constitutionto Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials. Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for
prohibition contending that the constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. The
petitioners also asservate that while it is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation, it however, failed
to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which
are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. It is not self-
executing. Moreover to put to the fore the argument that COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitutionand cannot therefore
govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and
local laws” by virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution
to pass the implementing law.The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the people's initiative.
The Court held for the petitioners.

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without an implementinglegislation the
same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot
exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.
It has been an established rule that

what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest).
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative. The lifting of the term
limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as
the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs. HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., LTFRB, ET.
AL.KAPUNAN, J.: FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994.
The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda,
circulars and/or orders of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) which, among others, authorize
provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares to
plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, without application therefor with the LTFRB
and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency.
Issue: On the fare range scheme.
The Legislature delegated to the LTFRB the power of fixing the rates of public services. Such
delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the
increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the
difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies
laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or
competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory
bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport
operator, or other public service.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an
undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest . What has been
delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY v. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, G.R. No. L-26803, October
14, 1975. Second Division (Antonio).
Petitioner companies filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, challenging the validity
of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases"
as amended. Said rules was drafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and approved by the
then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. It granted the Director of Patents the power to
designate any ranking official of said office to act as hearing officers in pertinent trademark cases (e.g.
opposition to registration, cancellation) pending with the Patent Office and at the same time it
required that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly
prepared by the Director and signed by him." The companies complained that the designation of

hearing officers contravenes the Trademark Law that vests jurisdiction on the Director of Patents and
that states that the Director must personally hear the cases.
Anent the contest based on the doctrine on “potestas delegata non delegari potest,” the Supreme
Court ruled in this wise: “It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency
to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as
may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions
maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express
provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.”
[G.R. No. 108310 September 1, 1994] RUFINO O. ESLAO, in his capacity as President of
Pangasinan State University, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.,
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS: PSU entered into a MOA with the DENR for the evaluation of 11 government reforestation
operations in Pangasinan as part of the commitment of the ADB. They were given notices to proceed.
The Asst. Project Director requested the Office of the President to have the University’s Board of
Regents confirm the appointments including the rates of honoraria and per diems. The BOR approved
the MOA but this was later found to be higher than the rates provided hence adjusted downward to
conform to NCC No. 53. COA alleged that still there were excess payments leading them to issue
notices of disallowances as based on CPG No. 80-4 which rates were lower. PSU contends that it
should be NCC No. 53 which pertains to foreign-assisted projects; while COA applied CPG No. 80-4.
ISSUE: WON the set of circulars particularly NCC No. 53 or CPG No. 80-4 should apply in respect of
the honoraria to be paid to PSU personnel?
RULING: We consider the Petition meritorious.
CPG No. 80-4 does not control, nor even relate to, the DENR evaluation project for at least 2 reasons:
firstly, the evaluation project was not a "special project" within the meaning of CPG No. 80-4;
secondly, that same evaluation project was a Foreign-Assisted Project to which NCC No. 53 is
specifically applicable.
It seems that COA does not agree with the policy basis of NCC No. 53 in relation to CPG No. 80-4. The
court ruled that “We do not consider that the COA is, under its constitutional mandate, authorized to
substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or
propriety of which, however, it does not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside
by the authorized agency of government — i.e., the courts — as unconstitutional or illegal and void.
The COA, like all other government agencies, must respect the presumption of legality and
constitutionality to which statutes and administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or
regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in an appropriate case by a competent court (and
ultimately this Court).
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

COURT OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,respondents., G.R. No.
119761 August 29, 1996. First Division (Vitug,J).
Facts: Fortune Tobacco registered "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. BIR classified them as
foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign
companies. However, Fortune changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury'and 'More' to 'Premium
More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category.

A 45% Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. Then Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654 was
enacted – 55% for locally manufactured foreign brand while 45% for locally manufactured brands. 2
days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was
issued by the BIR saying since there is no showing who the real owner/s are of Champion, Hope and
More, it follows that the same shall be considered locally manufactured foreign brand for purposes of
determining the ad valorem tax - 55%. BIR sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco
addressed to no one in particular. Then Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox
copy of RMC 37-93. CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to
P9,598,334.00.
Issue: WON it was necessary for BIR to follow the legal requirements when it issued its RMC
Held. YES. CIR may not disregard legal requirements in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers
which publication, filing, and prior hearing.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. BUT when, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, the agency must accord, at least to those
directly affected, a chance to be heard, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
MAYNARD PERALTA, petitioner, vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

G.R. No. 95832, August 10, 1992, En Banc, Padilla, J.
Petitioner questions the following policy of the CSC interpreting RA 2625, amending the
Revised Administrative Code: “when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day
immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also
be without pay.”
When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at
best advisory and not binding upon the courts for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means. Interpretative regulations need not be published. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment.
The construction by respondent of RA 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. RA 2625
specifically provides that government employees are entitled to 15 days vacation leave of absence
with full pay and 15 days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays in
both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide or a
distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their
leave credits in order to enjoy such right. The fact remains that government employees, whether or
not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays, and
Holidays and thus they cannot be declared absent on such non-working days.
MIGUEL MELENDRES, JR., petitioner, vs .THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RUPERTO P.

CONCEPCION, respondents, G.R. No. 129958. November 25, 1999, En Banc (Ynares-Santiago, J.)
Facts: Melendres and Concepcion ran for Barangay Chairman of Caniogan, Pasig City. Concepcion was
proclaimed the winner. When Melendres filed his election protest before the MTC, he failed to pay

filing fees. Concepcion moved to dismiss the protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. But the MTC
denied the motion, ordered Melendres to pay the fees because it an administrative procedural matter
and is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance therewith at theoutset will not operate to deprive
the court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law andacquired pursuant to the Rules. When appealed to
the COMELEC, the MTC was reversed.
Ruling: Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to

implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts
because of its specialized function.The judicial department can set aside an administrative agency’s
action if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6 states that “No protest shall be given due course
without the payment of a filing fee of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) and the legal research fee as
required by law.” Citing Gatchalian v. CA, it is the payment of the filing fee which vests jurisdiction of
the court over the election protest.COMELEC’s decision is upheld as it conforms with the
governing statute and controlling case law that non-payment of filing fees is a jurisdictional
defect.
Land Bank v. Celada, Supra.
WILLIAM C. DAGAN, et. al., v. PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION, MANILA JOCKEY CLUB,
and PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, G.R. No. 175220, 12 February 2009, TINGA, J.:
An 11 August 2004 directive was issued by the Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom)
directing the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to immediately
come up with their respective Clubs House Rule to address Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) problem
and to rid their facilities of horses infected with EIA. Said directive was issued pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 5 by the Department of Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person, firm
or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses from any locality or place except when accompanied
by a certificate issued by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). In
compliance with the directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of racehorses stable in their
establishments to submit the horses to blood sampling and administration of the Coggins Test to
determine whether they are afflicted with the EIA virus. Subsequently, on 17 September 2004,
Philracom issued copies of the guidelines for the monitoring and eradication of EIA.
WON the Philracom directive and the subsequent guidelines are valid?
The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on

compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
4. It must be reasonable.
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed in the Latin
maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. This rule is based upon the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through
the intervening mind of another. This rule however admits of recognized exceptions such as the grant
of rule-making power to administrative agencies. They have been granted by Congress with the
authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-
making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and
variety of public functions.

However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to Philracom’s guidelines.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its
quasi-legislative power does not require notice and hearing. In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission, this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no
determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.
TAYUG RURAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

defendant-appellant, G.R. No. L-46158, November 28, 1986, Second Division., J. Paras.
FACTS: Appellant issued a Memorandum Circular which imposes to all rural banks an additional
penalty interest rate of 10% per annum that would include all past due loans, in pursuance of the
provisions of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks under authority of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 720, as amended.
HELD: There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative agencies. A rule
shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes promulgation of administrative rules
and regulations to implement given legislation, all that is required is that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. There must be strict
compliance with the legislative enactment. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. When promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, the rules and regulations
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction
provided in the law. Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided in the
law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one that is applied
retroactively. Such clause was not a part of the promissory notes executed by Appellee to secure its
loans. The rule cannot be given retroactive effect.
SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., v. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC., ET AL., G.R.
Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957, EN BANC, FELIX, J.
Facts: Congress passed the Fisheries Code and authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to issue rules and regulations on the regulation and banning of certain forms of prohibited
fishing. Now, in response to the general clamor among the majority of the residents in the coastal
towns of San Miguel Bay that resources in the area are in danger of depletion because of the effects of
trawl fishing, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
Issue: The SC resolved that trawl fishing is among the prohibited fishing activities since it obnoxious
for it carries away fish eggs and fry. Hence, the Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to issue
rules and regulations prohibiting trawl fishing. The remaining relevant issue then is: Can the President
of the Philippines exercise that same power and authority?

HELD: Yes, the President can. He has the power of control over executive the department based on
Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines, Section 63 of the Revised Admin Code,
Section 74 of the Revised Admin Code.
Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under
the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law
to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and
recommendation of the respective Department", and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of
the questioned Executive Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, v.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., represented by its President JOSE T. DIZON,
UNITED AUCTIONEERS, INC., represented by its President DOMINIC SYTIN, and MICROVAN,
INC., represented by its President MARIANO C. SONON, G.R. No. 164171, February 20,
2006, EN BANC, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS: President Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Romulo, issued E.O. 156, entitled “Providing
for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and
its implementing guidelines”. Respondents instituted a declaratory relief case praying that judgment
be rendered declaring Article 2, section 3.1. of E.O. 156 unconstitutional and illegal. The trial court
declared that Article 2, Section 3.1. of E.O. 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power
vested by the Constitution with Congress and therefore unconstitutional and illegal. The Court of
Appeals invalidated the article on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue
the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police
power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the president
through an executive issuance is void.
HELD: Police power is inherent in a government to enact law, within constitutional limits, to promote
the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with legislature.
By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative bodies, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay.
Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the
authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. To be valid, an
administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; 2. It must be
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; 3. It must be within the scope of
the authority given by the legislature; and 4. It must be reasonable.
Boie-Takeda Chemicals v. Dionisio Dela Serna, Acting Secretary of the DOLE, GR No. 92174,
10 December 1993, Second Division, Narvasa.
Facts: Secretary Franklin Drilon of the Labor Department issued the 1987 Revised Guidelines on the
Implementation of PD 851 or the 13 th month pay law. Such guidelines specifically included
commissions earned by employees in the computation of 13 th month pay. Petitioner herein was

directed by the Labor Department to deliver the underpayment of the 13 th month pay which should
have included the commissions of its employees based on the Revised Guidelines.
Held: In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay the second paragraph of
Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly
expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that
implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to
implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot
widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress
Miners Association vs. Factoran
FACTS: This petition is about the validity of 2 administrative orders 57 and 82 issued by the Secretary
of DENR to carry out the provisions of EO 279 and 211. Pres. Aquino promulgated EO 211, which
prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals in accordance with the 1987 Constitution. President Aquino
also promulgated EO 279 authorizing the DENR to negotiate and conclude Joint venture, co-production
or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources prescribing for guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or
financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals. In line with EO 279, the DENR Secretary issued AO 57 “Guidelines for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement under EO 279” and AO 82 “Procedural Guidelines on the Award of
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through negotiation.” This order provides that the
person or entity is required to submit a LETTER OF INTENT and MINERAL PRODUCTION SHARING
AGREEMENT within 2 years from affectivity of AO no. 57. Failure to do so within the prescribed period
shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, gravel and sand. Petitioner, Miners Association of the
Philippines, mainly contend that the DENR Secretary issued both AOs 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-
making power because these are inconsistent with the provisions of EO 279. Whether AO nos. 57 and
82, which are promulgated by the DENR, are valid and constitutional.
HELD: AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the fact that EO 279, in
effect, gave the Secretary of Natural Resources the authority to conclude joinly venture, co-production
or production sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources. Furthermore, the constitutionality of these administrative orders goes to show that the
utilization of inalienable lands of public domain is not merely done through “license, concession or
lease” since the options are now also open to the State through direct undertaking or by entering into
co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements.
The People of the Philippines v Hon. Maximo Maceren CFI, Sta Cruz, Laguna, Jose
Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlo Del Rosario, GR
No. L-32116, Oct. 18, 1977, Second Division, Aquino.
Accused were electro fishing in Sta. Cruz (using electrocuting device), and were charged with
violation of Fisheries Admin Order 84-1 (which amended Admin Order 84). Section 11 of the Fisheries
Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. It does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. Notwithstanding such silence in the law, the Commissioner of Fisheries
promulgated the Admin Order prohibiting the act.

The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned
under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
are powerless to penalize it. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, vs.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 112024. January 28,
1999,
SECOND DIVISION, Quisumbing, J.
FACTS. PBComm had an excess tax payment, which it sought to be refunded. Relying on the Revenue
Memorandum issued by the BIR which stated a different period (10 years) within which to file their
petition, instead of the statutory period (2 years), PBComm filed its petition after the 2-year period.
HELD. “Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC No. 7-
85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is
not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the express provision of a statute.
Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute…in
case of discrepancy, the basic Act prevails, for the reason that the regulation or rule issued
to implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter.”
ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES, v. HOME

DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, G.R. No. 131082. June 19, 2000, DAVIDE, JR., C.J., First
Division.
The HDMF Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution amending and modifying the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, the rule provides that for a company to be
entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/
retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund. Petitioner
contends that since the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
7742 involve an imposition of an additional burden, a public hearing should have first been conducted
to give chance to the employers to be heard before the HDMF adopted the said Amendments. Absent
such public hearing, the amendments should be voided.
Rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but
in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. When the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required
that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in
order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And
when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed
Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid,
as they are not within the delegated power of the Board.
PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and MANILA PILOTS' ASSOCIATION,

respondents, G.R. No. 100481. January 22, 1997, EN BANC MENDOZA, J.
Facts: The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is the govt agency which regulates pilotage. President
Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued E.O. No.

1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO
FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The E.O. increased
substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA. Petitioners contend
that E.O. No. 1088 was merely an administrative issuance of then President Marcos and, as such, it
could be superseded by an order of the PPA.
Held: The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation,
promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised
by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088. What determines whether an act is a law or an
administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here, the power to fix the rates of charges for
services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.Nor is there
any doubt of the power of the then President to fix rates. As the President could delegate the
ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby
withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SUTTON, et al. (2005)
FACTS: This case involves land owned by Respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow
and calf breeding. On 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to DAR to avail of
certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, R.A. No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine.
However, on December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of
DAR, SC ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, the Court declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of CARL insofar as
they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of the Luz Farms ruling,
respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was
devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. On December
27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private
agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be
excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to beexcluded, the A.O. fixed
certain retention limits.
HELD: DAR A.O. No. 9 is unconstitutional. The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to
be valid, administrative rules andregulations must be issued by (1) authority of a law and (2) must
not contravene the provisions ofthe Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency
may not be used toabridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be
used to enlargethe power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional
andstatutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may bepromulgated by
administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, thedeliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, interalia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down
as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverageof agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the
1987 Constitution.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO, in his

personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs.
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006,
EN BANC, TINGA, J.

On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826,
reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a
national government site to be known as the National Government Center (NGC). On August 11,
1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares
of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the
disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. On May 14, 2003,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207 otherwise known as the National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003. Named respondents are the ex-
officio members of the National Government Center Administration Committee (Committee). In
accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. WHETHER OR NOT THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003 SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT.
HELD: NO, VALID IRR. In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to
administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered
by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statutes objective of urban poor housing is the power of
the Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to the
beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as
the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions
governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the
law. These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the
discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical expertise
over these matters.
The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-
fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority
is that the rate be reasonable and just.
ATTY. REYNANTE B. ORCEO, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190779, March 26,
2010, En Banc, J. Peralta
Facts: RA 7166 prohibits an unauthorized person from bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or
other deadly weapons in public places, including all public buildings, streets, parks, and private
vehicles or public conveyances, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, during the election
period. However, the term firearm was not defined by the aforementioned law. Hence, Comelec issued
a resolution defining the term “firearm” which includes airgun, airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation
in whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to believe that they are real. Petitioner assailed
such resolution as an invalid one and that Comelec gravely abuse its discretion.
Ruling: COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft guns and airguns in the
term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The
COMELEC’s intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and their resultant coverage by
the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in showing fear ,intimidation or
terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun
and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought
about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun, which is sought to be averted. Ultimately, the
objective is to ensure the holding of free, honest, credible and peaceful elections. However, the
replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term “firearm” in Resolution
No. 8714 because these were not included in any regulation unlike airsoft guns.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. HON. ENRIQUE MEDINA, HON. GREGORIO PANGANIBAN,
HON. JOSUE L. CADIAO, HON. FILOMENO KINTANAR, HON. PAZ VETO PLANAS, as Associate
Commissioners of the Public Service Commission and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
G.R. No. L-32068, October 4, 1971, En Banc, J.B.L. Reyes.
FACTS: Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed an application with the Public Service Commission
seeking approval of revised rate schedules. The Republic and other oppositors filed an opposition to
respondent MERALCO's main application for increase in rate charges on the ground that the floating
rate of exchange notwithstanding, the applicant's sound financial condition is still capable of
maintaining efficient service. Commissioner Enrique Medina, issued an order directing the Auditor
General to conduct an examination of respondent MERALCO's books of accounts. After hearing,
Commissioner Medina approved the application for the increased rate adding that provisional rates
should apply if the decision if appealed.
RULING: Section 16(c) of the Public Service Acgt (Commonwealth Act No. 146), in its first proviso,
expressly prescribes —“That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public
services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within
30 days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected...”If
the Commission is empowered to approve provisional rates even without a hearing, a fortiori it may
act on such rates upon a six-day notice to persons concerned. In fact, when the provisional rates were
approved on 20 May, the full 10 days notice had been published. To be sure petitioner Gonzalez
argues that the proviso quoted applies only to initial, not revised, rates. The Public Service Act
however, makes no distinction; it speaks of rates proposed by public services; and whether initial or
revised, these rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission approves them. The Public
Service Commission practice, moreover, is to hear and approve revised rates without published
notices or hearing. The reason is easily discerned: The provisional rates are by their nature temporary
and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved, and in the case at bar, the
Public Service Commission order so provided. We also conclude that the claim of denial of due process
is unfounded and must be overruled.
SENATOR ERNESTO MACEDA, Petitioner, vs. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD (ERB), et. al.,
G.R. Nos. 95203-05 : December 18, 1990, EN BANC, SARMIENTO, J.
Facts: The petitioners pray for injunctive relief, to stop the Energy Regulatory Board (Board
hereinafter) from implementing its Order, dated September 21, 1990, mandating a provisional
increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. It appears that on September 10, 1990,
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation proferred
separate applications with the Board for permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of
petroleum products and for provisional authority to increase temporarily such wholesale posted prices
pending further proceedings. The petitioners submit that the above Order had been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, and correctible by Certiorari.
The petitioner, Senator Ernesto Maceda, also submits that the same was issued without proper notice
and hearing in violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Executive Order No. 172.
The Court finds no merit in these petitions.

Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of a hearing, have overlooked the provisions
of Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172, which we quote:
"SECTION 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief . — The Board may, upon the filing of an
application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without prior hearing, on
the basis of supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on
motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision
after hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings, together with such affidavits,
documents and other evidence which may be submitted in support of the motion,
substantially support the provisional order: Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule
and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all
affected parties.”
What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does
not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its
final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or
(3) to deny the application. Section 37 paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex parte, and which are subject to the
resolution of the main case.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL

TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), G.R. No. 93237, 6 November 1992.
Private respondent sent two (2) rush telegrams through petitioner RCPI’s facilities. Both telegrams did
not reach their destinations on the expected dates. Private respondent filed a letter-complaint against
the RCPI with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for
the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. The NTC found RCPI
administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service and imposed the penalty of fine.
NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission says so
categorically. “Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule
that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are
limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective.”
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. (PCFI) v. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports, G.R.
No. 78385, 31 August 1987. En Banc, Gancayco.
Notice and Hearing in the exercise of quasi-legislative proceedings.
Facts:
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued Department Order No. 37 prescribing
the maximum school fee that may be charged by all private schools from 10% to 15%. Claiming that
such increase was too high, PCFI sought the suspension of the implementation thereof through a
telegram to the President. Unheeded, PCFI thus files this present Petition for prohibition questioning
the constitutionality of the DO on the ground that such was issued: 1) without any legal basis; and 2)

in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution for PCFI was not given due notice and
hearing before said DO was issued.
Held:
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an

adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the
validity of such rates.
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where
the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact,
then its function is quasi-judicial in character. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum
school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for school year 1987 to 1988.
This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Jose Luis Alcuaz, as NTC Commissioner,

and National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 84818.
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission issued an Order which
directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by PHILCOMSAT for certain
specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions
later. PHILCOMSAT assails this Order for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct,
maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations
and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this
franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals."
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then
Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196,
PHILCOMSAT was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all
its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, NTC
required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity
covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor.
PHILCOMSAT also asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing
for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No.
196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any
standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While PHILCOMSAT in its petition-
in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of
legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an
express conferment by the legislative body.
PHILCOMSAT is mistaken.

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground
that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative
agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-
confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise,
in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional.
In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness,
this standard may be implied.
We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude
that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy
the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, VITUG, J.: FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No.
119761 August 29, 1996
The initial position of the BIR was to classify the products of Fortune Tobacco Corporation, namely:
'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory
as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to
'Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand
category. Later, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 was issued reclassifying cigarettes, and
subjecting the said products to excise tax. BIR sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune
Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular.
Issue: Observance of the prescribed procedure in the exercise of BIR's quasi-legislative functions.
The Supreme Court distinguished between the two kinds of administrative issuances — a legislative
rule and aninterpretative rule. On one hand, a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof . When it
substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that
new issuance is given the force and effect of law. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of
public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing.
In this connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that in the fixing of rates, no rule or final
order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. On another hand, interpretative
rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing. Its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
Evidently, RMC 37-93 subjected the said tobacco products to increased tax rate. The BIR not simply
intrepreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.
RUBLE RUBENECIA, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 115942 May 31, 1995. En
Banc (Feliciano)
Ruble Rubenecia was a school principal of the Catarman National High School in Northern Samar who
was charged with dishonesty, nepotism, oppression and violation of Civil Service Rules by teachers of

the school before the Merit System Protection Board (MPSB) of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The MPSB conducted a preliminary inquiry and then formally charged Rubenecia and required him to
file his answer with the CSC Regional Office in Tacloban where the MPSB transmitted the records of
the case for investigation. Because Rubenecia failed to file an answer despite several opportunities
given to do so, the Regional Office deemed the case submitted for resolution and eventually submitted
an investigation report to the MPSB. However, before the MPSB could render a decision, the CSC
issued Resolution 93-2387 which provided that all cases pending before the MPSB were to be elevated
to the Commission for Decision. Thus, the CSC took over the case and then rendered Resolution No.
94-0553 dismissing Rubenecia from Service.
Raising it as one of two issues, Rubenecia claims that the Commission had no jurisdiction to take over
the case because Resolution 93-2387 was invalid. He reasons that MPSB was created by law and since
a creation of law could only be abolished by law, Resolution No. 93-2387 was accordingly an
ultra vires act on the part of the Commission.
The Supreme Court found that although it is true that P.D. No. 1409 had "created in the Civil Service
Commission [the] Merit Systems Board." Section 16 of the then present Civil Service Law found in the
1987 Administrative Code followed the same line and re-created the Merit Systems Board as an office
of the Commission and gave it a new name: "Merit System Protection Board." The 1987 Administrative
Code thus made clear that the MSPB was intended to be an office of the Commission like any of the
other thirteen (13) offices in the Commission: e.g., the Office of Legal Affairs; the Office of Planning
and Management; the Central Administrative Office, and so forth. The MSPB was, in other words, a
part of the internal structure and organization of the Commission and thus a proper subject of
organizational change which the Commission is authorized to undertake under Section 17 of the then
present Civil Service Law. Moreover, Resolution 93-2387 has been published in a newspaper of
general circulation and such publication substantially complies with the requirement of written
notice as prescribed in the same Resolution.
[G.R. No. 132593. June 25, 1999] PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. EN Banc. Penned by
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS: The PITC is a GOCC created under PD No. 252 for the purpose of promoting and developing
Philippine trade. The PITC Board of Directors approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers
which allows an eligible officer to purchase a vehicle, 50% of which shall be shouldered by the PITC
over a period of 5 years to facilitate greater mobility for employees.
On July 1, 1989, RA 6758, entitled An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes was enacted. It provided for the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates, while the
additional compensation i.e. representation and transportation allowances were exempted from
consolidation. Said section likewise provides that other additional compensation being received by
incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be
authorized.
On post audit, the payment/reimbursement of the above-mentioned expenses was disallowed by

COA on the ground that the subject car plan benefits were not one of the fringe benefits or form of
compensation allowed to be continued after said date. PITC appealed the decision of the resident COA
auditor to the COA. On July 27, 1992, COA denied PITCs appeal and affirmed the disallowance of the
said car plan expenses.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners may still receive their benefits under the car loan agreement?

RULING: Yes, petitioners may still receive their representation allowances under the car loan
agreement.
COA relied on DBM-CCC No. 10 as basis for the disallowance. DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by
the DBM has been declared by this Court in De Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, et al. has of no
force and effect due to the absence of publication thereof in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. “On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the
affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature
of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated
differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines since it is not a mere
interpretative or internal regulation.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., G.R.
No. 164171. August 22, 2006. En Banc.(Ynares-Santiago, J.)
FACTS: Executive Order 156 was issued entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and
directions for the motor vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines." The said
provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the
Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions. Consequently, three separate
actions for declaratory relief were filed praying that judgment be rendered declaring Article 2,
Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the President’s quasi-
legislative power.
HELD:
Requisites for Validity of Administrative Regulations
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and statutory bases.
Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly complied with the
procedures and limitations imposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that
paved way for the issuance of EO 156 but instead, what they challenged was the absence of
substantive due process in the issuance of the EO.
In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the third requisite as
administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. In the
instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation
of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA
7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to
protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations

Implementing RA 7227 which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport
where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs laws are in
force and effect."
Regarding the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the issuance of EO is unreasonable. Since the
nature of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from the deterioration of the local motor
manufacturing firms, the Court however, finds no logic in all the encompassing application of the
assailed provision to the Freeport Zone which is outside the customs territory of the Philippines. As
long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be
prevented or remedied will not arise.
GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD
G.R. No. 148579 February 5, 2007, FIRST DIVISION, CORONA, J.:
GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7,
2000, MTRCB issued an order of suspension against the network for airing "Muro Ami: The Making"
without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. The penalty of suspension
was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998 which provided for the penalties
for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. GMA moved for reconsideration of
the suspension order and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the
suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest
which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for
reconsideration and letter-protest. GMA then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was
dismissed. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.
While MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the
basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987,
particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of
every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the
ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides
for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to
exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be
effective. It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR. Consequently, petitioner
was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.
GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR ALAN PETER
"COMPAÑERO" S. CAYETANO, petitioner-intervenor, G.R. No. 205357. September 2, 2014,
En Banc (Peralta, J.).
Facts: For the 2013 elections, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, Section 9(a) of which
limited broadcast and radio ads of candidates and political parties for national positions to an
aggregate total of 120 minutes and 180 minutes, respectively. COMELEC conducted a public hearing
after promulgation explaining the Resolution. The petitioners in this case question the
constitutionality of Sec. 9(a) particularly because it was issued without public consultation as required
in Sec. 9, Chapter II, Book VII, Administrative Code. Petitioners also argue that the aggregate

limitation is unfair and unreasonable and not in accordance with legislative intent. COMELEC says that
Chapter 1, Book VII of the Administrative Code excepts constitutional commissions from application of
the public consultation requirement.
Ruling: While COMELEC is an independent office and not a mereadministrative agency under the
Executive Department, rules, which apply to the latter must also, be deemed to similarly apply to the
former, not as a matter ofadministrative convenience but as a dictate of due processwhen it
substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed. The agency must accord at
least to those directlyaffected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed,
beforethat new issuance is given the force and effect of law. The aggregate airtime rule contained in
the questioned Resolution is defective and ineffectual for non-compliance with the public consultation
rule.
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally andstatutorily authorized to
enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powerswithout limitations — or reasonable basis. But it
is not free to change the rules without sufficient basis, especially if it had previously ruled in 2 earlier
elections that the limit is per station and not per candidate. COMELEC’s exercise of discretion is limited
by the bounds and intents of the law (Fair Election Act).
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN vs. JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES,
RTC, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, ET
AL., G.R. No. L-64279 (April 30, 1984). SECOND DIVISION (AQUINO, J.)
Petitioners were carabao dealers who transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck twenty-six
carabaos and a calf. In spite of the permit to transport and the certificates, the carabaos were
confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor
Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive
Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos
or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation
and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.” Whether the said EO was valid.
The said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982
because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2
of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2
(article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication
is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs.
Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
Confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate
that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before
violators of the executive order can be bound thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all
Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It
provides that "every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have
general applicability and legal effect.” Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive
orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau
"regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated".

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., v. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 86738 November 13, 1991, FIRST DIVISION, FELICIANO, J.:
Nestle Philippines Inc. ("Nestle") has an authorized capital stock of P600 million divided into 6
million shares with a par value of P100.00 per share. On 16 December 1983, the Board of Directors
and stockholders of Nestle approved resolutions authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares out of the
previously authorized but unissued capital stock of Nestle, exclusively to San Miguel Corporation and
to Nestle S.A. On 28 March 1985, petitioner Nestle filed a letter with the SEC seeking exemption of its
proposed issuance of additional shares to its existing principal shareholders, from the registration
requirement of Section 4 of the Revised Securities Act and from payment of the fee referred to in
Section 6(c) of the same Act.
The SEC responded adversely to petitioner's requests and ruled that the proposed issuance of
shares did not fall under Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act, since Section 6 (a) (4) is
applicable only where there is an increase in the authorized capital stock of a corporation . Chairman
Sulit held, however, that the proposed transaction could be considered by the Commission under the
provisions of Section 6 (b) of the Revised Securities Act. The Commission then advised petitioner to
file the appropriate request for exemption and to pay the fee required under Section 6 (c) of the
statute.
WON the construction thus given by the SEC and the Court of Appeals to Section 6 (a) (4) of
the Revised Securities Act should be upheld?
In the first place, it is a principle too well established to require extensive documentation that
the construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the interpretation and
application of that statute is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the
courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the governing statute or
the Constitution and other laws.
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a
modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for
addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of
specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular
statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs the Court stressed that executive
officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the
meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent
expert opinion thereon.
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and COURT
OF TAX APPEALS, respondents, G.R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969, En Banc, J. Castro.
FACTS: Petitioner, who is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar, requested the
Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond
which was to expire the following day, citing reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags
within the period of one year. However, this request was denied by the Commissioner, due to the
petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance within one year from their
importation.
HELD: Considering that the statutory provisions have not been the subject of previous judicial
interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative construction”
is in order. Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule
applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or executive
departments of the state. The several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle are the
respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they
interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical

working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique
opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, vs. CHINESE GENERAL HOSPITAL AND

MEDICAL CENTER, G.R. No. 163123. April 15, 2005, THIRD DIVISION, CORONA, J.
Facts: Chinese General Hospital (CGH) was an accredited health care provider under the Philippine
Medical Care Commission (PMCC). As such, CGH filed its Medicare claims amounting to more than P8
million with the SSS, which, together with the GSIS, administered the Health Insurance Fund of the
PMMC. While the application was being processed, RA 7875 was passed merging the PMCC with
PhilHealth. PhilHealth then promulgated the rules and regulations implementing said act, requiring
that all claims for payment of services rendered shall be filed within 60 calendar days from the date of
discharge of the patient; otherwise, the claim shall be barred from payment.
For being filed beyond the 60-day period, CGH’s claims were denied by the PhilHealth. Should CGH’s
claim be allowed by the Philhealth?
HELD: Yes. This Court will not hesitate, whenever necessary, to allow a liberal implementation of
the rules and regulations of an administrative agency in cases where their unjustifiably
rigid enforcement will result in a deprivation of legal rights. In this case, respondent had
already rendered the services for which it was filing its claims. Technicalities should not be allowed to
defeat respondent’s right to be reimbursed.
The state policy in creating a national health insurance program is to grant discounted medical
coverage to all citizens, with priority to the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women and children, and free medical care to paupers.
CALIXTO SANADO, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SIMEON G. NEPOMUCENO, G.R. No.
108338, April 17, 2001, Third Division, MELO, J.
FACTS: The Philippine Fisheries Commission issued in favor of petitioner Sanado an Ordinary Fishpond
permit. Petitioner and private respondent Nepomuceno executed a contract of Fishpond Development
and Financing. Based on the modified agreement, private respondent proceeded with the development
of the fishpond area, excluding the area of 10 hectares already developed by petitioner. The Director
of Fisheries and Aquatic resources recommended to then Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion
of Ordinary Fishpond permit into a 25-year loan agreement. Pursuant to said recommendation,
Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued to petitioner. Later, private respondent waived his rights,
interest, and participation over the fishpond area in favor of one Edgar Chu. While this case was
pending, the minister of Agriculture issued an order cancelling the Fishpond Lease Agreement and
forfeiting improvements thereon and private respondent was given priority to apply for the area and
that his improvements were not considered forfeited in favor of the government. Petitioner elevated
the matter to the Office of the president but his appeal was dismissed. The trial court ordered private
respondents to restore possession and control and ordered them to pay to Sanado the rentals of the
fishpond.

Held: The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or
revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is
administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon
which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined (De Leon, Administrative Law:
Text and Cases, 1993 ed., pp. 143-144). As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the
President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive
Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters
relative to the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial
notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the
organization of the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the
President, his powers and duties (Francisco, Evidence [Rules 128-134], 1996 ed., p. 24, citing Canal
Zone vs. Mena, 2 Canal Zone 170). The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision is
premised on the essential function of the executive department - which is to enforce the law. The only
exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave
abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar. It is thus plain in the case at bar that the
July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is a substantial supervening event which
drastically changed the circumstances of the parties to the subject fishpond lease agreement.
PART V. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Emmanuel Peña, RTC Presiding Judge, and
et al represented by Yim Kam Shing GR No. 77663, 12 April 1988, En Banc, Teehankee.
Facts: Between 1986 and 1987, PCGG, created through Executive Order No. 1, ordered the freezing
of the bank accounts of two garment manufacturing corporations. PCGG assigned Saludo as OIC of the
corporations to withdraw necessary funds to pay the debts of the corporation. A certain Yim Kam
Shing was designated as co-signatory to transact with the bank in the absence of the originally
assigned to manage the corporations. The authority of Yim Kam Shing was however revoked by OIC
Saludo upon finding that Yim Kam Shing was in the country only with a mere tourist visa. Upon
petition with the RTC, a TRO was issued on the memorandum revoking authority granted to Shing.
Held: As can be readily seen from the foregoing discussion of the duties and functions and the power
and authority of the Commission, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no
power to control the other." Further, EO 14 which lays down jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases
lodged appellate jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan of PCGG orders, decisions, etc. The memorandum
revoking the authority of the co-signatory should have been contested before Sandiganbayan, not
before the RTC as a co-equal body of PCGG.
RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its
powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the Constitution and therefore
may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. Under
section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or
Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close
Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" 1 whether civil or
criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" 2 and all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the
Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the
Supreme Court.
Hon. Isidro Cariño, in his capacity as Sec. of DepEd, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, in her capacity as
Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, v. The Commission on Human Rights, et. al.

2 December 1991, GR No. 96681, En Banc, Narvasa.
Teachers held mass concerted actions at DECS premises and demanded action on their
grievances. Subsequently, they complained to the CHR that while they were participating in peaceful
mass actions, the learned of their replacements as teachers by DECS without notice and for reasons
unknown to them. Where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case
consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or
government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take
cognizance of the case and grant that relief?
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, v. VICENTE ATILANO, et. al., G.R. No. 166758, June 2012,
SECOND DIVISION, Brion, J.
FACTS. An investment relationship between MERALCO and Corporate Investments Phil, Inc. (CIPI)
turned sour, in that the latter failed to return the expected profits of the former under a financing
agreement. As a result, an estafa case was filed against the officers of CIPI. The Prosecutor, finding
that the essential elements of estafa were not present and that the case was for a non-payment of
debt, not estafa, dismissed it. The Resolution failed to state the facts and the law upon which it was
base, as mandated by the Constitution.
HELD. The Resolution is valid. “[It was] pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function
when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-
judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of
parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court.[This] is not the case
when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice
[reviews] the former's order[s] or resolutions on determination of probable cause. Quasi-judicial
bodies are mandated, not by the Constitution directly, but by Admin Code of 1987, to state the facts
and law. Not being in exercise of quasi-judicial functions, however, the requirements under the Admin
Code are inapplicable to the Office of the Prosecutor.
CARLITO C. ENCINAS, v. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG,
G.R. No. 187317. April 11, 2013, SERENO, CJ., EN BANC.
Respondents were then both Fire Officer I. They claim that petitioner, who was then Provincial
Fire Marshall, informed them that unless they gave him five thousand pesos, they would be
transferred to far-flung areas. For failing to pay the exact amount, they were transferred.
Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint for illegal transfer of

personnel under RA 6975. Respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office (CSCRO), as well as
with the CSC Field Office, their Joint Affidavit/Complaint accusing petitioner of violation of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Petitioner contends forum-shopping for filing two identical complaints.
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits." The dismissal of the BFP Complaint was the
result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined
therein with finality. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers refer to those purely
administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-
judicial character. If the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an
agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to
make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF

EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent, G.R. No. 78385. August 31, 1987, EN
BANC GANCAYCO, J.
Facts: The DECS Secretary issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school
fees as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education. It was decreased to a lower
ceiling of 10% to 15% in D.O. No. 37. Does the power to regulate school fees in educational
institutions always include the power to increase school fees? Does the D.O. constitute a denial of
substantive and procedural due process of law, as students and parents should’ve been afforded an
opportunity for a hearing before school fees were increased?
Held: Both in the negative. Section 57 (3) of B.P.Blg. 232, otherwise known as The Education Act of
1982, vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system in the country. Section 70 of
the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise necessary to
discharge its functions and duties under the law. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise,
this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested
with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the
DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.
fGLOBE WIRELESS LTD. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and ANTONIO B. ARNAIZ, G.R. No.
L-27520 January 21, 1987, SECOND DIVISION.
A message addressed to Maria Diaz in Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B.
Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was
transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe
Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio
Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de
Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its
non-delivery to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz, sent to
then Public Service Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident.
WON PSC has jurisdiction over the instant petition
HELD: NO. The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the
telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed
negligence had nothing to do whatsoever with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the
Commission over petitioner.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CCM GAS CORPORATION, and
TRAVELLERS INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, G.R. No. 103595,
April 18, 1997, Second Division, J. Mendoza.
FACTS: CCM is a customer of petitioner. It was billed for electric consumption but withheld
payment until its questions about the purchased power adjustment were answered. MERALCO gave a
notice disconnection to CCM. Respondent filed under protest and filed this immediate case for a
restraining order against MERALCO. The trial court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction
stating that the matter was cognizable by the Board of Energy.
HELD: Clearly, CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate
and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies, but the regular courts power to
adjudicate cases involving violations of rights which are legally demandable. Thus, the State may
regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service
Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO
may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer.
CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS
(formerly Public Service Commission), RAFAEL J. RUIZ, PETER ENRIQUEZ and CYRIL D.
MOSES, respondents.(FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. L-42783-85, November 29, 1976,
TEEHANKEE, J.)
Facts: In December, 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with respondent Board
of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at
Malate, Manila with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by respondent
board, in that petitioner billed respondents-complainants various specified amounts for their electricity
consumption at their respective apartments for the months of May to September, 1974 in excess of
the Meralco rates authorized by respondent board. Petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaints
asserting that they involved contractual obligations of respondents as apartment tenants and were
beyond respondent board's jurisdiction was denied by the latter. Petitioner questioned the complaints
as beyond the jurisdiction of respondent as a regulatory board, since she is not engaged in the sale of
electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric
current bills in accordance with their lease contracts, and their relationship is contractual in nature.
Ruling: Under the reorganization plan effected by Presidential Decree No. 1 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 458 issued on May 16, 1974, jurisdiction, supervision and control
over public service related to electric light, power and waterworks utilities formerly vested
in the Public Service Act were transferred to respondent board. Respondent board as a
regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the
complaints filed by respondents against petitioner. Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over
petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not
engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
MARIÑO vs. GAMILLA, G.R. No. 132400, 31 January 2005.

This case involves a rift between two groups with respect to the right to represent the UST Faculty
Union. The group of Mariño initially acted as officers of the union and was granted with a free office
space at Room 302 of the Health Center Building of UST. Subsequently, the group of Gamilla was
elected as officers of the union. The Mariño group filed before the Med Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-
NCR a petition for prohibition, injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order against the Gamilla group for the latter’s assumption of office as elected USTFU
officers. The Gamilla group then ousted the Mariño group from the office space given to them by UST
and padlocked the same.This prompted the Mariño group to file another complaint against the Gamilla
group, this time with the RTC Manila. The second complaint was for injunction and damages with a
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order over the use of the USTFU office.
Does the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the complain filed by the Mariño group considering that a
similar petition has already been filed with the Med Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR?
Yes. Unlike the NLRC which is explicitly vested with the jurisdiction over claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages, the BLR is not specifically empowered to adjudicate claims of
such nature arising from intra-union or inter-union disputes.
Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such, can exercise only
those powers that are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. Consequently,
matters over which they are not granted authority are beyond their competence. While the
trend is towards vesting administrative bodies with the power to adjudicate matters coming
under their particular specialization, to ensure a more knowledgeable solution of the
problems submitted to them, this should not deprive the courts of justice their power to
decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws that do not require any particular
expertise or training to interpret and apply.
Utto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150111, 31 January 2002. En Banc, Pardo.
Due Process in Quasi-Judicial Power.
Facts:
Utto was proclaimed as Mayor of Sultan Barongis, Maguindanao despite the exclusion of elections
returns by the Board of Canvassers which would have materially affected the results of the election.
The COMELEC en banc voided the proclamation and likewise included the election returns. Utto argued
his right to due process was denied because the requirement of prior notice and hearing was not
observed and neither was he impleaded as a party to the petition.
Held:
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an

opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.At the hearing before the Comelec en banc of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
petitioner was given full opportunity to present his case. He did not present controverting evidence to
justify the exclusion of the five (5) election returns.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard, the petition
would still be denied. The twin-requirement of notice and hearing in annulment of proclamation is not
applicable because of the illegality of petitioner’s proclamation. Pursuant to Section 20 (i), Republic
Act No. 7166, the municipal board of canvassers may not proclaim any candidate without waiting for
the authorization of the Comelec. Considering that petitioner had a very small margin of 149 votes
over respondent, and there were 944 registered voters from the five excluded election returns, the

results of the municipal election would be undoubtedly adversely affected by the contested
returns. The proclamation thus made is void ab initio.
Sebastian Garcia, petitioner vs. Juanito Pajaro and the City of Dagupan, G.R. No. 141149.
Sebastian Garcia was an employee at the City Treasurers Office and was ordered suspended by the
City Treasurer, JuanitoPajaro and his salary was then withheld due to a formal charge against him.
Garcia refused to honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant,
investigator and judge and there was no complaint against him from the Office of the City Mayor. For
his part, Pajaro contended that he had authority to discipline his subordinates including Garcia who
has been rating unsatisfactory in his performance. In fact, there was an order for investigation but
Garcia failed to submit himself to this. The City of Dagupan, the RTC and the CA held for Pajaro and
that he vested with legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate
officers and employees.
Garcia is mistaken.
The city treasurer of Dagupan has the authority to institute disciplinary actions against subordinate
officers or employees. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity
to explain one’s side, whether written or verbal. The constitutional mandate is satisfied when a
petitioner complaining about an action or a ruling is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration.
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to
heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the
power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted
by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Cod eto the
secretary of a department, the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit,
the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.
Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate
officer or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85,which was issued by the Ministry
of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional
director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action
against officers or employees subordinate to them.
ANG TIBAY, ET. AL. v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR
UNION, INC. LAUREL, J.: EN BANC, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940.
ANG TIBAY temporarily laid off the members of the National Labor Union due to shortage of leather
soles. The Union prayed for a new trial alleging, among others, that the exhibits attached by ANG
TIBAY are so inaccessible to them that they could not be expected to have obtained them.
Issue: Due process in quasi-judicial agencies such as the Court of Industrial Relations.
The petition by the Union is granted. Although the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not mean that it can entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.
The requisites of administrative due process are:
(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) There must be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion.
(4) The evidence must be substantial.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The decision should be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, v. ROGELIO I. RAYALA, G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008.
Third Division (Nachura)
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against NLRC Chairman Rogelio Rayala before
Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Because Rayala
was a presidential appointee, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the Office of the
President. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to
investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. Eventually, the
Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma finding Rayala guilty of
the offense charged and recommending the suspension for six (6) months. Secretary Laguesma
submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the
recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in
accordance with AO 250. Afterwards, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,
dismissing Rayala from Service. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty to suspension
for a maximum of one year.
Among other errors, Rayala decries that his right to due process was violated by the Committee
alleging that the Committee railroaded his trial for violation of RA 7877 and erred when it found him
guilty of “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code and not for
violation of RA 7877.
Citing that the description of the offense charged and not the designation is controlling, the Supreme
Court held that Rayala was accorded due process: [i]n administrative proceedings, due process
has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice
of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards.
Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him, he appeared,
personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
[G.R. No. 115147. January 4, 1995.] GEORGE I. RIVERA, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
EN BANC. Penned by Vitug, J.
FACTS: Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines
("LBP"). He was charged with having committed dishonesty, grave misconduct, acts punishable under
anti-grafts law among others. Rivera allegedly told Perez that he could facilitate the loan application
process provided he would be given a commission. Moreover, he has been serving as the personal
consultant of Lao without prior authority required under the law. He was then placed under preventive
suspension. LBP held Rivera as guilty of grave misconduct and metted the penalty of forced
resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities.

On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") to a mere 1
year suspension. In a subsequent appeal to CSC, the CSC resolved Rivera guilty of grave misconduct.
He filed a motion for reconsideration which the CSC denied. On 26 May 1994, this Court resolved to
dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's
dismissal of the petition, now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P.
Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter
had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC
Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC.
ISSUE: WON it was proper for Hon. Gaminde to participate as CSC Commission in the resolution of
the motio for reconsideration considering she had earlier participated in her capacity as Board
Chairman?
RULING:
NO. In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the
case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision, the Court said: "In order that
the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing
officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could
be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit
that he was mistaken in his first view of the case."
HON. ARTURO C. CORONA v. COURT OF APPEALS, LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG and CRISTETO

E. DINOPOL, Respondents, Third Division (Romeo, J.)
FACTS: On May 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25 creating a
Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability. Pursuant to the mandate of A.O. No. 25,
former DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes issued Office Order No. 88-318 creating the Administrative
Action Board (AAB) “to act, decide and recommend to the Secretary appropriate measures on cases of
administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department.” In line
with the said order series of complaints where then filed in the AAB. Bungubung as one of the
respondents filed his answer and questioned the jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the ground
that it was the General Manager of the PPA who had jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:1. Whether or not the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the PPA?
2. Whether or not Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy apllicable?
HELD:1. That the DOTC Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, has jurisdiction over PPA
personnel like the private respondents herein, is correct only to a certain extent. The DOTC
Secretary’s jurisdiction is circumscribed by the aforequoted provisions of the PPA Charter and the Civil
Service Law which give him only appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary matters involving personnel
below that of Assistant General Manager. He does not have the power to initiate proceedings against a
subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall witness the absurd spectacle of the DOTC
Secretary acing as complainant-initiator of an administrative case which later falls upon him to review.
2. Neither is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable in this case. Besides the
fact that the AAB was patently without jurisdiction to act on the administrative complaints filed against

respondents Dinopol and Bungubung, the instant petition raises only questions of law, one of the
exceptions to the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ombudsman v. Bungubung G . R . N o . 1 7 5 2 0 1 , April 23, 2008,

THIRD DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Ombudsman found respondent Leopoldo F. Bungubung (Bungubung) administratively liable for
grave misconduct, dismissing him from the service and imposing the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and his perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service.
Bungubung then sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89689. He asserted therein that the
Ombudsman erred in (a) holding that there was substantial evidence to make him liable for grave
misconduct, resulting in his dismissal from service and imposition upon him of the accessory penalties.
Bungubung was not denied of due process by the Ombudsman. The fact that no formal hearing took
place is not sufficient ground to say that due process was not afforded Bungubung . It is well-settled
that in administrative proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman, cases may be submitted
for resolution on the basis of affidavits and pleadings. The standard of due process that must be
met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored.
The evidences against Bungubung were not substantial to support his dismissal from service. First, the
evidences of corruption against him were not supported by other evidence. Within the field of
administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings,
nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere
allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. Additionally, the affidavit of desistance filed by the
complainant that the allegations against Bungubung were all fabricated belies the Ombudsman’s claim
that there was substantial evidence against him.
ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner, vs .PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN,

respondents, G.R. No. 164763. February 12, 2008, Third Division. (Reyes, R.T., J.)
Facts: Perez was acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. During an audit there was a shortage
and he was not able to produce P72,784.57. He returned the money to the Provincial Treasurer but an
administrative case was filed against him. In his Answer in the administrative case, he admitted that
the missing money had been used to pay off his brother’s loan, Perez’s own medical and family
expenses. He was also charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds. During
trial, Perez withdrew his first Answer, saying that money was actually in the custody of his staff.
Sandiganbayan found him guilty of malversation (Note: It took the Sandiganbayan 12 years to render
the decision). Perez argues before the SC that the Answer should not be taken against him because it
was given without aid of counsel and that he was not granted his Constitutional right of a speedy

disposition of the case.
Ruling: There is no law, jurisprudence or rule, which mandates that an employee should be assistedby
counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in sayingthat
assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings. Waiver of the right
to counsel (in writing and in the presence of counsel) is not an absolute right and may be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. While
investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a
party in an administrativeinquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of
the charges and of respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations because suchinquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there
are facts that merit disciplinarymeasures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintainingthe dignity of government service.
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., et. al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,MANUEL A. ROXAS

II,FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R.NEREUS O. ACOSTA, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010,
EN BANC, ABAD, J.
Drilon, as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his party’s withdrawal of
support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr.
(Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he
made the announcement without consulting his party. On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a
party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the
assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers,
with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s
electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO),
were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party
officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007. COMELEC
annulled such election and a subsequent election was held where Roxas was the elected president.
WON there was a violation of the constitutional right to due process by the expulsion.
The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political
parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the
state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative
agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power
for the performance of a state function. The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the
exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies. Although political parties play
an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is
still a private organization, not a state instrument.
JOSE R. CATACUTAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 175991, 31 August 2011), First Division, Del Castillo, J.
Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended
because of his refusal to implement promotion/appointments of two employees notwithstanding the
issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing authority. Petitioner questioned the decision of
RTC finding him guilty as charged because it is flawed and grossly violative of his right to be heard

and to present evidence because he was not able to present the CA Decision denying the
administrative case against him.
The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case,
even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter. Thus, the lower courts correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the
CA Decision. Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness.
DR. FERNANDO A. MELENDRES, M.D., Executive Director of the Lung Center of the
Philippines (LCP), v. PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, acting through its duly
authorized representative, COMMISSIONER CESAR D. BUENAFLOR, ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
Executive Secretary, et. al. , all of the Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP), G.R. No.
163859, August 15, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On a complaint lodged by 15 physicians of the LCP, the Secretary of Health issued a

Department Order creating a Fact-Finding Committee to look into their charges against Dr. Melendres.
Said Committee found prima facie case against Dr. Melendres for several offenses. On September 11,
2002, Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 39 directing the
PAGC to conduct a formal investigation against Dr. Melendres, ordering his preventive suspension for
90 days, and authorizing the Secretary of Health to appoint an interim officer-in-charge of the LCP.
Finding sufficient basis to commence an administrative investigation (PAGC-ADM-0112-02), PAGC
Hearing Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor issued an Order on November 8, 2002 directing the
petitioner to submit within 10 days his Counter-Affidavit/Verified Answer. On November 18, 2002,
petitioner submitted his Counter-Affidavit. At the preliminary conference, petitioner appeared with his
counsel. The designated hearing officer, Commissioner Buenaflor, likewise declared that based on the
records/pleadings and the position papers submitted, the case shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.
On November 29, 2002, petitioner through counsel filed a Motion for Formal Hearing and/or
Investigation, invoking Section 22 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACC). The motion for formal hearing was however, denied.
WON PAGC violated his right to due process when it denied his motion for a formal
investigation?
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-
type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred
through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long
as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not
denied due process.
CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING, v. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA V. CARDONA

and NORBERTO DELA CRUZ, in their CAPACITIES as CHAIRPERSON and MEMBERS,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, G.R. No. 209283, March 11,
2015, Second Division, J. Brion.
FACTS: The Commissioners of CHR issued a Resolution and a Show Cause order requesting Petitioner
to submit within 5 days a written explanation why she should not be held administratively liable for
any administrative liability, and to transmit her explanation to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Show Cause order contained allegations of civil service violations such as dishonesty, oppression,
grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Without waiting for

the resolution of her motion to dismiss for lack of due process, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
RULING: Jurisprudence tells us that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the
chance to explain one’s side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long
as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before any definitive action is taken, the demands
of due process are sufficiently met. The petition also fails with respect to the petitioner’s claim of
denial of due process. There can be no denial of due process where a party was afforded an
opportunity to present his case. In the present case, the petitioner was given ample opportunity to air
her side on the allegations against her after being sufficiently apprised of the allegations against her;
she was afforded the chance to submit her written explanation.
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC., v. HON. DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge
Branch 48, Regional Trial Court of Manila, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and A. J.
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 92285 March 28, 1994, FIRST DIVISION,
BELLOSILLO, J.
Facts: PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas
trees which it supplies to a local match manufacturer for production of matches. In consonance with
the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, the Revised
Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against
importation of wood and wood-derivated products.
AJ International Corporation (AJIC) imported containers of matches from Indonesia. Thus,

PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from
importing matches and wood-derivated products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and
releasing the importations. Does the Regional Court have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by PTFI?
HELD: No, it does not. However cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief sought by
PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC.
The enforcement of the importation ban under the Revised Forestry Code is within the
exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs. To allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to
impound the imported matches, is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must
inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an
usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban
under the Tariff and Customs Code does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
over the subject matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence
of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has the power to "promulgate all

rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance.
AGUSMIN PROMOTIONAL ENTERPRISES, INC., v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, P.B. DE JESUS &
CO., INC., BENJAMIN V. GUIANG, and CRISOSTOMO LICERALDE, G.R. No. L-48478,
September 30, 1982, SECOND DIVISION CONCEPCION, JR., J.
FACTS: Guiang and Liceralde and 6 other timber concessionaires in the locality asked the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources if they could consolidate their timber concessions in the name of a
corporation which they will form. The matter was referred to the Director of Forestry. The Secretary
reversed the decision of the Director of Forestry and authorizing Guiang and Liceralde to withdraw
their forest areas from the timber license for the corporation they previously forme (AGUSMIN).
AGUSMIN interposed an appeal in DENR to which Guiang and Liceralde filed an urgent motion to
dismiss appeal contending that appellant failed to comply with all the requirements of EO 19 to perfect
an appeal to the OP by not paying an appeal fee of 20php so that the OP did not acquire jurisdiction
and the decision of the Secretary became final and executory after lapse of 30 days from receipt of a
copy of the said decision. The OP issued a decision in the appealed case, reversing and declared of no
force and effect the decision of the Secretary.
HELD: “[I]n deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced
and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable", little, if any, useful purpose
could be gained in further discussing these issues because Letter of Instruction No. 172, which
ordered the cancellation of the timber license issued to AGUSMIN, in effect, reversed and set aside the
said decisions of the Executive Secretary before the same became final and enforceable. In the words
of the Court of Appeals, the said decisions "did not acquire any finality".
Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally – Rationale: 1. To promote their

object, 2. To assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses.
In re: Contempt Proceedings against Armando Ramos, Carmelo v. Armando Ramos, GR No.
L-17778, 30 November 1962, En Banc, Regala.
Facts: The Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee to investigate anomalies
in the City Treasurer’s office. A subpoena was issued by the committee requiring Ramos to appear
before it in connection with an administrative case against a government employee. Due to Ramos’
refusal, the committee requested the CFI (RTC) to issue a contempt order against Ramos. CFI (RTC)
refused claiming that the committee cannot request such order.
Held: One who invokes this provision [ contempt with aid of court] of the law must first show that he
has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of
hostile witnesses. Further, "where the liberty and property of persons are sought to be brought within
the operation of a power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because necessary to its due
execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to be reached."

Lastimosa vs. Vasquez 243 SCRA 497; G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995.
Petitioner is First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. She and the Provincial Prosecutor refused or
failed to file a criminal charge of attempted rape against Municipal Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
Petitioner was filed with an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross
neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime and a charge for indirect contempt.
They were also placed under 6 mos. Preventive suspension. Prior to this, a complaint was assigned to
a graft investigation officer who found no prima facie evidence and recommended dismissal. However,
the Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation and directed that the Mayor be charged in the RTC.
The Deputy OMB for Visayas then referred the matter to the Prov. Prosecutor and later to Petitioner.
Petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness have been committed and filed a case under such.
ISSUES: WON the Ombudsman has authority to file an administrative case against the petitioners and
preventively suspend them.
HELD: YES. The Ombudsman’s power to investigate and prosecute include the investigation and
prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless if such were related to, or
connected with or arise from, the performance of his official duty. The Ombudsman is authorized to
call on prosecutors for assistance under Sec 31 of RA 6770. WHen a prosecutor is deputized, he is
subject to supervision and control of the Ombudsman. Such supervision and control would mean that
they can alter, repeal or modify their subordinates’ findings. The office also has the power to punish
for contempt under Rule 71, Sec 3 of the Rules of Court.
Pedro Lameyra v. Mayor George Pangilinan, January 18, 2000, GR No. 131675,
Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes.
Lameyra was a janitor/messenger in the Municipal Hall of Famy, Laguna, and was given a
permanent appointment. He was then sent a letter by the Mayor that he was being dropped from the
roll of employees of the local government for insubordination and AWOL. He appealed the decision of
the Mayor to the CHR, which affirmed the Latter’s decision. In his motion for reconsideration, Lameyra
tried to submit new evidence, but this was still denied by CHR. His submission was that he was
prevented by a personnel officer from signing their log book, that he was replaced by someone else,
and that he was asked to submit his resignation, which he refused to do.
While it is settled doctrine that findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected
and this Court should not be tasked to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the
administrative body, it is axiomatic that such findings of fact should be supported by substantial
evidence. Under these circumstances, it is believed that, in equity, and in proper compliance with the
requirements of due process, petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to prove his contention
that the termination of his services was illegal.
Rubberworld v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No. 126773. April 14, 1999, Third Division, Panganiban, J.
FACTS. Even before the effectivity of a temporary shutdown petition, Rubberworld was forced to
prematurely shut down its operation. It workers filed with the NLRC a petition for illegal dismissal and
non- payment of separation pay. Consequently, Rubberworld filed the SEC a petition for declaration of
suspension of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan. SEC then ordered an order, suspending
the payment. Despite the Order, the Labor arbiter ignored the Motion and thereafter rendered a
decision finding Rubberworld of illegal shutdown ordering it to pay separation pay; and moral and
exemplary damages, as affirmed by NLRC.
HELD. The NLRC was not correct. It is plain from the foregoing provisions of law that "upon the
appointment [by, the SEC] of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver," all actions for

claims against the corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be
suspended. The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims "is to enable the
management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from
any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the 'rescue' of the
debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted
in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and
rehabilitation.
Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and severely
encumbers the management committee's time and resources.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PETROLEUM

DISTRIBUTORS AND SERVICES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 113079. April 20, 2001 G.R. No.
114923. April 20, 2001, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., First Division.
Shell filed an application to the Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) for authority to relocate its
Shell Service Station. The BEU rendered a decision denying Shell’s application on a finding that there
was “no necessity for an additional petroleum products retail outlet in the area requested.”
Dissatisfied, Shell appealed to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA). EO 172 was issued creating the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the
BEU. Thus, OEA remanded the case to the ERB. The latter board granted the application of Shell which
was opposed by PDSC and appealed to CA. The CA reversed the decision of ERB.
Court has ruled that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. It is not for the reviewing
court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. The
administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on
proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. Petitioner ERB is in a better position to
resolve petitioner Shell’s application, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise
on the matter. The power to determine whether the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading
area would benefit public interest and the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate courts.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC vs. ANTONIO Q. TIAMSON, G.R.
Nos. 164684-85.November 11, 2005, SECOND DIVISION, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Facts: Tiamson was employed by PLDT as a Radio Technician II assigned at Clark. A complaint was
filed suspecting PLDT’s employees to be in cohorts with the local subscribers in effecting illegal
overseas calls. Among the three employees who issued sworn statements, namely, Busa, Cayanan
and Cruzada, it was only Busa who directly implicated Tiamson. A printout revealed that a total of 469
fraudulent overseas and local calls were connected and completed at the PLDT Clark-TMC Radio Room
for July 29 to Aug 2, 1994. Three overseas calls to Saudi Arabia made on August 1, 1994 were
imputed to Tiamson. Tiamson was terminated for serious misconduct. Tiamson filed a complaint
against PLDT for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, damages and other monetary claims.
Held: It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the
courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented
before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The
decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or
reliability as a condition for the admission of documents.

Although admissible in evidence, affidavits being self-serving must be received with
caution. This is because the adverse party is not afforded any opportunity to test their veracity. By
themselves, generalized and pro forma affidavits cannot constitute relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate. There must be some other relevant evidence to corroborate
such affidavits.
DELOSO v. SPS.MARAPAO (2005)
FACTS: Deloso filed a complaint against Respondents praying that the latter be enjoined from
interfering with her tenurial rights. However, Respondents maintained that Deloso’s late first husband,
from whom Petitioner derived her alleged tenurial right, was not a tenant of theland holding but
merely an overseer paid for the work he rendered. The Provincial Agrarian ReformAdjudicator (PARAD)
declared Petitioner to be a tenant of the landholding and such decision was affirmed by DARAB.
DARAB ruled that the requisites ofagricultural tenancy are present. Specifically, the DARAB held that
the pesadas and vales presented by Petitioner indicate that petitioner shared in the produce of the
landholding and personallycultivated the same even after she remarried. On appeal, CA reversed
DARAB’s decision and brushed aside as self-serving the pesadas and vales presented by Petitioner.
HELD: DARAB’s decision is UNSUPPORTED by substantial evidence. Petitioner Deloso is not a tenant.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. They do not show with reasonable certainty that
petitioner shared in the harvest of the landholding or even whether theshares mentioned
therein pertain to harvest shares.
Petitioner’s evidence fails to establish the existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship. 3
requisites were absent, namely: (1) consent on the part of respondents for petitioner to become a
tenant of the land holding; (2) personal cultivation; and (3) sharing in the produce of the farm.
SOLID HOMES, INC. vs.EVELINA LASERNA and GLORIA CAJIPE, represented by PROCESO F.
CRUZ, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008,
THIRD DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipeas buyers, entered into a
Contract to Sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI), a corporation engaged in the development
and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase
price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not
comply with the demands of the respondents.The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a
Complaint for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damage before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The case was appealed several times until it reached before the
Office of the President. In rendering its Decision, the Office of the President merely adopted by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners.
HELD: It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to
decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only
to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its
provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it
would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative
agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII. This constitutional

mandate does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions," which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals.
The constitutional mandate that, "no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based," does not preclude
the validity of "memorandum decisions," which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals .
GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, Third Division (J. Gonzaga-Reyes)
Facts: Petitioners were charged with alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service for allegedly having conspired among themselves in demanding &
collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee
of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial
ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for such collection.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for misconduct, which meted out
the penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989). DILG implemented the said decision, but petitioners opposed the execution of the same.
Ruling: Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than
one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. It is clear from the above provision that the
punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, not
immediately executory. A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of law. The fact that
the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it
the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as
being appealable would be rendered nugatory.
Therefore, there is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies are immediately executory.
EDMUNDO JOSE T. BUENCAMINO, v. - HON. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, and CONSTANTINO PASCUAL, G. R. No. 175895, April 12, 2007,
First Division., J. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.
FACTS:
Constantino Pascual, the president of Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation filed an
administrative case against Buencamino, the Mayor of Bulacan. The respondent allege that the mayor
demanded a regulatory fee of P1,000.00 for every delivery truck that passes the territorial jurisdiction
of San Miguel, Bulacan is illegal. Buencamino denied the allegations of the complaint, explaining that
he imposed the payment of regulatory fees pursuant to Kapasiyahan Blg. 89A-055, an ordinance
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Miguel, Bulacan. Office of the Ombudsman declared
petitioner administratively liable for abuse of authority and suspended him from office.
RULING:

This Court held in Laja, citing Lopez, that only orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalties of public censure,
reprimand or suspension of not more than one month or a fine not equivalent to one month
salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary
cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right
to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the
lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said
order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The
fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally
carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these
judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.
GOVERNOR FELICISIMO T. SAN LUIS, THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN, PROVINCIAL

ENGINEER JUANITO C. RODIL AND PROVINCIAL TREASURER AMADEO C. ROMEY, ALL OF
LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIANO L. BERROYA, JR., respondents.
(Third Division, G.R. No.L-80160, June 26, 1989, CORTES, J.)
Facts: The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus and/or appeal by certiorari assails the
appellate court's ruling that mandamus lies to compel the reinstatement of a quarry superintendent in
the provincial government of Laguna who was initially detailed or transferred to another office, then
suspended, and finally dismissed following his expose of certain anomalies and irregularities
committed by government employees in the province. The Civil Service Commission and Office of the
President ruled that respondent Berroya was illegally transferred and dismissed from work. The
decisions of both bodies attained finality.
Ruling: Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-
established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule
of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial.
OCHO vs. CALOS, G.R. No. 137908, 22 November 2000.
The Caloses filed a complaint before the Agrarian Reform Provincial Adjudicator seeking a nullification
of the Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title issued petitioner Ocho. Petitioner
claimed, however, that this second action instituted by respondents is barred by the Final Resolution
rendered in a prior action also involving the same parties and subject lands. Petitioner contended that
the resolution of the Hearing Officer in that prior case vesting title and ownership of the lands to
petitioner already became final and executory and the issue of his ownership of other agricultural
lands may no longer be relitigated.

Contrary to the insistence of the Caloses, the doctrine of res judicata applies to both judicial
and quasi-judicial proceedings. The doctrine actually embraces two (2) concepts: the first is “bar
by prior judgment” under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47, and the second is “conclusiveness of
judgment” under paragraph (c) thereof.In the present case, the second concept — conclusiveness of
judgment — applies.
Encinas v. Agustin, JR. G.R. No. 187317, 11 April 2013. En Banc, Sereno.
Res Judicata applies only to Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings.
Facts:
Encinas, as Provincial Fire Marshall, relieved and transferred Agustin and Caubang to different fire
stations when they failed to give him P5,000. He was thus charged with dishonesty and grave
misconduct. Encinas claims that the filing of a complaint in the Bureau of Fire Protection(BFP) for
violation of RA 3019 and Civil Service Commission (CSC) for violation of RA 6713,respectively,
constituted res judicata.
Held:
The dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO
Complaint.
First, there was no “judgment on the merits” as the dismissal of the complaint was a result of a fact-
finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative
offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality.
Further, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to
the exercise of administrative powers. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the
evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the
agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment.In contrast, judicial adjudication signifies the exercise of
power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely
administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining
whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner.
Monico Ligtas, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, respondents
G.R. No. 20075
Monico Ligtas was charged of stealing 1000 kilos of abaca fibers in a plantation owned by Anecita
Pacate. Ligtas presented the unconstested DARAB decision recognizing Ligtas as a bonafide tenant of
the land and is therefore allowed to harvest and cannot be said to have stolen from his own. But the
RTC and the CA both ruled against Ligtas, contending that the burden of proof of tenancy is upon
Ligtas and that the uncontested DARAB decision is not proof enough as jurisprudence is replete with
cases declaring that "findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his
authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy
relationship between the contending parties, are merely are preliminary or provisional and are not
binding upon the courts.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to
respect if supported by substantial evidence.This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence
submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of

evidence."The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine
whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.This court has held that "judicial
determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular
judicial body."Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to: tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, ET.

AL.
TINGA, J.: EN BANC, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006.
Former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land as a
national government site to be known as the NGC. President Corazon Aquino excluded 150 of the 440
hectares. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207 that allowed the disposition
of certain portions of the National Government Center Site to bona fide residents. In accordance with
R.A. No. 9207, the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Petitioner
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association), a homeowners association from the West
Side of the NGC, filed a petition for prohibition directly to the Supreme Court (by-passing the
administrative agency involved) to prevent the implementation of the IRR.
Issue: Judicial review and doctrine of hierarchy of courts in administrative agencies

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where the
act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and
not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was
issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee, hence, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
ALBERT TENG, v. ALFREDO S. PAHAGAC, G.R. No. 169704, November 17, 2010.
Third Division (Brion)
Respondents are workers of Albert Teng Fish Trading who filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
Albert Teng Fish Trading, Teng, and Chua before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Region
Branch No. IX, Zamboanga City. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision in Teng’s favor.
Teng argues that because the workers filed a motion for reconsideration even when it was not
allowed, the VA’s decision had already become final and executory by the time they assailed it before
the CA and therefore it should have already been considered unappealable.
Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Code does not prohibit a motion for reconsideration with
the Voluntary Arbitrator. It noted that in the amendment in the Labor Code, Article 262-A deleted
the word "unappealable" from Article 263.The deliberate selection of the language in the amendatory
act differing from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law,
and the court should endeavor to give effect to such intent. Furthermore, it said that by disallowing
reconsideration of the VA’s decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005
Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor
Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself and compel the courts of justice to
prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of
controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise.

[G.R. No. L-29171 April 15, 1988] INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs.
HON. DUMA SINSUAT etc., et al., respondents-appellees.First Division. Penned by NARVASA, J.:
FACTS: In April of 1965 the Bureau of Supply Coordination of the Department of General Services
issued 2 Invitations to Bid. The first called for 8 units trucks complete and special factory built for the
use of Bureau of Telecommunications; the second amended the first notice by including not only
foreign made products but also of local manufacture. Bidding then took place, among the bidders were
IPSI and Delta. The project was awarded to IPSI, which was duly protested by DELTA claiming that
the trucks offered by IPSI were not factory built, as stipulated in the specifications. The Director ruled
the bidding as proper but however reversed himself later on.
IPSI then appealed to the Office of the President. The appeal notwithstanding, the Letter-Order in
favor of DELTA was released to it on September 17,1965. IPSI then filed with the Quezon City Court of
First Instance on September 21, 1965, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
RULING: The plea made in behalf of respondent Secretary that IPSI had gone to Court without first
exhausting all administrative remedies cannot be sustained in view of the doctrines set out.
Before an action may be entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all the
administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted; and second, that the
administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the
administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. There are however exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of administrative
remedies, these being: (1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act is
patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent
is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the latter's implied or
assumed approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.
There is merit in IPSI's appeal, therefore. The respondent Secretary had indeed acted with grave
abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. His acts must be nullified, and the Trial
Court's judgment upholding those acts must be set aside.
CHUNG FU INDUSTRIES (PHILIPPINES) INC., v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO X.

VELEZ (Presiding Judge, Regional Trail Court of Makati [Branch 57]) and ROBLECOR
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents, G.R. No. 96283 February 25, 1992. Third Division (Romeo,
J.)
FACTS: Chung Fu Industries and private respondents Roblecor Philippines forged a construction
agreement. It was stipulated also that in the event of disputes, the parties will be subjected to an
arbitration resolution, wherein the arbitrator will be chosen by both parties. Roblecor failed to
complete the work despite the extension allowed by Chung Fu. Roblecor filed a petition for
Compulsory Arbitration with prayer for TRO. Subsequent negotiations between the parties eventually
led to the formulation of an arbitration agreement which includes that the “decision of the arbitrator
shall be final and unappealable, therefore, there shall be no further judicial recourse if either party
disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator’s award”. Arbitrator ruled in favor of the
contractor Roblecor. Chung Fu moved to remand the case for further hearing and asked for a
reconsideration of the judgment award.
ISSUES:WON the subject arbitration award is beyond the ambit of the court’s power of judicial review.

HELD:No.It’s stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the finality of the arbitrator’s
award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the conditions described in Arts. 2038, 2039 and
2040 applicable to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award may be
annulled or rescinded.
Additionally, Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law provide grounds for vacating, Modifying or
rescinding an arbitrator’s award. Even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared “final”
by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted.
Ombusman v. Bungubung, Supra.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A.

ROBLES, v. AURORA A. SALVAÑA, G.R. No. 192074. June 10, 2014. En Banc. (Leonen, J.)
Facts: Respondent Atty. Salvaña falsified a medical certificate to support her application for sick leave.
Her employer, the LRTA discovered the falsity and she was investigated and formally charged and
then found guilty of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Insubordination, and ConductPrejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Salvaña appealed the
LRTA’s decision to the Civil Service Commission. The CSC modified the LRTA, finding Salvaña guilty
only of simple dishonesty. The CSC filed a petition for review of the CSC’s decision with the Court of
Appeals which was dismissed due to CSC’s lack of legal standing to file the appeal.
Ruling: An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's
repeal or modification of its original decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept
of a "party adversely affected" by a decision of the Civil Service Commission granted the
statutory right to appeal.TheLRTA has the standing to appealand/or to file its motion for
reconsideration to the CSC’s decision as The employer has theright "to select honest and trustworthy
employees.”
Prior to Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy(1999), government parties were barred from appealing
decisions exonerating the government employee administratively charged. But with Dacoycoy and the
subsequent cases, the rule was that a government party is a "party adversely affected" forpurposes of
appeal provided that the government party that has a right to appealmust be the office or agency
prosecuting the case, not the disciplining authority or tribunal or body which heard the case.
But in 2011, the RevisedRules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service or RACCS was promulgated.
The Civil Service Commission modified the definition of a "party adverselyaffected" to include the
disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision. This
procedural rule is retroactive as it creates new rights.
The present rule now provides that the parties adversely affected by a decision in anadministrative
case who may appeal shall include (1) the respondent in the administrative case, (2) the office or
agency prosecuting the case and (3) the disciplining authoritywhose decision dismissing the employee
was either overturned or modified bythe Civil Service Commission.
PART VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. Hon. FULGENCIO S.

FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary, and ASTERIO BUQUERON,

G.R. No. 75501, September 15, 1987, FIRST DIVISION, PARAS, J.
On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the
location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On September 10,
1973, private respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr."
and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On October 15, 1973, Atlas
registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the same Mining
Recorder. Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof
were duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application
was published in the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post. During the said period of
publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining claims on the ground
that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims. WON here was a valid location and discovery of
the disputed mining claims.
Such issue was a question of fact best left to the determination of the administrative bodies
charged with the implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by the
Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively
stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial
evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course subject to certain guide posts
laid down in many decided cases. The prevailing principle is that: ”in reviewing administrative
decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally
instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative
agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will
not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant.
AMIGO MANUFACTURING, INC., vs. CLUETT PEABODY CO., INC., G.R. No. 139300, 14 March
2001, Third Division, Panganiban, J.
Respondent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s “Gold Toe” trademark since it resembles its
“Gold Top” mark. Petitioner argues, among others, that its trademark was used earlier than
respondent’s actual use of its trademarks.
Based on the evidence presented, the court concurs in the findings of the Bureau of Patents
that respondent had used the trademark and devices in question prior to petitioner’s use of its own.
In any case, absent any clear showing to the contrary, this Court accepts the finding of the
Bureau of Patents that it was respondent which had prior use of its trademark. Administrative
agencies’ findings of fact in matters falling under their jurisdiction are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative
agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment
thereon. The findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted
before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence.

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PETROLEUM
DISTRIBUTORS AND SERVICES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 113079. April 20, 2001,
FIRST DIVISION, YNARESSANTIAGO, J.
Shell initially filed an application with the Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) for authority to
relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paranaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda Marcos Avenue of the
same municipality. The application was denied so Shell appealed to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA).
[note:on May 8, 1987, Executive Order No. 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU]The OEA then
remanded the application of Shell to ERB upon presentation of Shell of a new feasibility study. The
ERB rendered a Decision allowing Shell to establish the service station in Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue.
Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC), the oppositor, filed a motion for
reconsideration with ERB for the above-mentioned decision. The ERB denied the motion for
reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the ERB.
WON the court of appeals gravely erred in making findings of facts contrary to those of the
energy regulatory board whose findings were based on substantial evidence?
The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the ERB, which is tasked to
implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts . A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies
Stated differently, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of

policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Thus, an action by an administrative
agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
DERICK D. WOODEN, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, THELMA

P. GAMINDE AND JOSE F. ERESTAIN, JR., G.R. No. 152884, September 30, 2005,
En Banc, J. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ.
FACTS: Petitioner applied for graduation, subject to completion of a six-unit deficiency. He then joined
the graduation rites, and after, he enrolled and completed his deficiency courses that following
summer. CSC filed against petitioner a Formal Charge for Dishonesty and Falsification. They found him
to be guilty since he applied for the PBET Examination by misrepresenting in his application form that
he graduated from the Course BSED in March 1991, whereas he actually graduated in 1992. CA
affirmed the ruling of CSC. Then, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
present petition.
HELD: In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by this Court. As a general rule, factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the
CSC, that are affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon and generally not reviewable by this Court.
However, this Court has recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible;(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply

briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.Exceptions (4) and (11) find application here.
Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of
intention. The intent to falsify or misrepresent is inexistent at the time petitioner applied for the PBET
when he indicated March 1991 under Date Graduated since he in fact attended the graduation rites on
March 24, 1991. Petitioner should not be faulted for his mistake or confusion in the interpretation of
the term graduated.
PHILEMPLOY SERVICES AND RESOURCES, INC., v. ANITA RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 152616,
March 31, 2006, THIRD DIVISION, CARPIO, J.
FACTS: Anita Rodriguez applied with Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. for deployment abroad
as a factory worker. Subsequently, she executed through Philemploy, a contract of employment as a
domestic helper of one Chao Hung Ching of Taipei, Taiwan. Anita then filed a case for illegal dismissal
in the Philippine labor tribunals. When the case reached the NLRC, it was held that Anita preferred to
go back home earlier than expected as she was not able to adjust to the demands of being a domestic
helper, the job that she wanted being that of a factory worker. Thus, the NLRC dismissed the
complaint. Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the fact of Anita’s dismissal was raised as an issue.
Should the SC take cognizance of the issue of whether or not Anita was illegally dismissed?
HELD: Yes. This Court generally accords respect to the factual findings of the NLRC.
However, the rule is equally settled that this Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions of
the NLRC if the NLRC’s findings of fact on which its conclusions are based are not supported
by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of evidence required to
establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 22 Factual findings
of administrative agencies will be set aside if found arbitrary.
Note: The SC, like the NLRC, dismissed the case for illegal dismissal. However, the factual
findings which served as basis for the rulings are different. While the NLRC based its ruling on the
finding that Anita preferred to go back home earlier than expected, SC based it on the agreed
probationary period in the employment contract.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., v. JOHN MELCHOR A. LAURENTE, substituted

by JUAN A. LAURENTE, JR. and NATIVIDAD A. AQUINO, G. R. No. 158883, April 19, 2006,
FIRST DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO.
FACTS: John Melchor Laurente was employed by petitioner Philippine Transmarine carriers for and in
behalf of its principal, Lucky Ocean Marine Corporation, after he underwent a pre-employment medical
examination at Physician’s Diagnostic Center and was given a clean bill of health. He signed a 12-
month contract. After 3 months, he complained of dizziness and nausea and requested for his
repatriation. The LA ordered petitioner to pay the amount of $50,000 as disability benefit. The NLRC

reversed the decision and reduced the amount to $11,000. However, on motion for reconsideration,
the NLRC reinstated the award. The NLRC ruled that the illness of the complainant was discovered on
May 20, 1994, a date within the twelve-month period of the employment contract and already covered
by the effectivity of the new rate of disability benefits under the Revised Employment Contract for
seafarers.
HELD: Findings of fact of administrative agencies such as the NLRC are binding when
supported by substantial evidence; moreover, they become conclusive when such findings
are affirmed by an appellate court. Therefore, the findings of the NLRC, sustained by the Court of
Appeals, that the illness of the complainant was discovered only on 20 May 1994, is conclusive to this
Court.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Jose Capulong, GR No. 201643, 12 March 2014, First Division,
Reyes.
Facts: For alleged failure to properly file his SALN covering the years between 1987 – 1998, and
failure to declare his wife’s corporate interests, Capulong, a Customs Officer, was preventively
suspended by the Ombudsman. Capulong filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. A TRO was
issued by the CA, and notwithstanding the lifting of the preventive suspension by the Ombudsman,
the CA nevertheless ruled on the propriety of the preventive suspension earlier issued.
Held: The power of the courts to look into administrative acts is not rendered moot and academic
simply because of the lifting of such acts upon finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. It must be noted that the Petition likewise prays for "other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises." This is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which
states that the aggrieved person, that is Petitioner herein, may, among others, pray for "such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require."
Abejo vs. Dela Cruz 149 SCRA 654; G.R. No. L-63558, May 19, 1987.
Case involves dispute between principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell Philippines, Inc., a
“tone and voice paging corporation.” Telectronic Systems, Inc. purchased Abejo’s 133, 000 minority
shareholdings and of 63,000 shares registered in the name of Virginia Braga and covered by 5 stock
certificated endorsed in blank by her (for P1,674,450) and the Spouses Braga, majority stockholders.
With said purchases, Telectronics becomes majority stockholder. Telectronics requested the secretary,
Norberto Braga, to register and transfer to its name. Norberto, son of Sps. Braga, refused to register
the transfer in the corporate books. This triggered off the series of intertwined actions between the
parties, all centered on the question of jurisdiction over the dispute. Telectronics filed before SEC
while the Bragas assert that the regular civil court has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute as
against SEC.
ISSUE: Who between the RTC and the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute
between the principal stockholders of the corporation
HELD: The Court ruled that the SEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between the principal
stockholders of the corporation. The SEC, through its en banc Resolution of May 15, 1984 correctly
ruled in dismissing the Bragas’ question of jurisdiction since the primary issue is on the
nonperformance of the Corporate Secretary. The SEC upheld its primary and exclusive jurisdiction
over the dispute premised on the applicable provisions of PD 901-A which reorganized the SEC with
additional powers. The dispute at bar, as held by the SEC, is an intra-corporate dispute that has
arisen between and among the principal stockholders of Pocket Bell due to the refusal of the corporate
secretary. Mandamus in the SEC to compel the corporate secretary to register the transfer and issue
new certifications in favor of Telectronics and its nominees was properly resorted to therefore.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, represented by Gov. Isagani Amatong v. Court of Appeals
and Zamboanga Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO), October 11, 2000,
GR No. 109853, First Division, Pardo.
Zamboanga del Norte filed with the RTC a complaint against ZANECO for illegal collection of
power bills and preliminary injunction with TRO. Which government agency has jurisdiction over a
complaint for illegal collection of power bills by an electric cooperative?
Since the complaint is one questioning the increase in the power rates, the proper body to
investigate the case is the National Electrification Administration (NEA). The regulation and fixing of
power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives remain within the jurisdiction of the NEA, despite
the enactment of EO 172, creating the Energy Regulatory Board. The body with the technical expertise
to determine whether or not the charges are legal is the NEA. A party questioning the rates imposed
by an electric cooperative may file a complaint with the NEA as it is empowered to conduct hearings
and investigations and issue such orders on the rates that may be charged.
True, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies has certain exceptions as

embodied in various cases. This doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. It is disregarded: (1) when there
is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention; and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no
administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and
(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, v. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V.

TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON.
JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A.
YUSON, G.R. No. L-50444, August 31, 1987, EN BANC, Feliciano, J.
FACTS. Antipolo Realty entered into a Contract to Sell with its customers over subdivision lots, with a
promise to comply with certain amenities in the subdivision for the latter. Failing on this promise,
Antipolo rescinded the contract. The customers filed a case before the National Housing Authority,
which reinstated the contracts. Antipolo Realty cried grave abuse of discretion.
HELD. There was no grave abuse of discretion. “In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency . In
other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such
agency.” Under the law, the developer does not have the right to rescind the contract in case it fails
to deliver. In other words, “[s]uch reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the
NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell.
There is, in any case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally
empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it

and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are
faithfully performed.”
VICENTE VILLLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs v. COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT

LUMBER CO., INC., G.R. No. 95694. October 9, 1997, PANGANIBAN ,J., Third Division.
Two parcels of land are about to be sold to Nasipit Lumber by Villaflor. Villaflor executed a
document, denominated as a “Deed of Relinquishment of Rights,” in favor on Nasipit Lumber in
consideration of the amount of P5,000 that was to be reimbursed to the former representing part of
the purchase price of the land, the value of the improvements Villaflor introduced thereon, and the
expenses incurred in the publication of the Notice of Sale. Nasipit Lumber filed for Sales Application of
the issued lands while Villaflor was in Manila. The same were awarded to Nasipit by the Director of
Lands. Villaflor insists that the P5,000 as per verbal agreement was NOT paid by Nasipit. The Director
of Lands found that the payment of the amount of P5,000.00 in the Deed and the consideration in the
Agreement to Sell were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal of Villaflor’s protest. Villaflor then went
to the trial court for “Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of
Possession (of two parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages” at about the same time that
he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the President. Villaflor
did not get favorable judgment. Villaflor questions the reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on
the factual findings of the Director of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources.
Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In cases where the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position
to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts. The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds
application in this case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual
qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to determine
such matters. Because these issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to
stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
NILO PALOMA v. DANILO MORA, HILARIO FESTEJO, MAXIMA SALVINO, BRYN BONGBONG and
VALENTINO SEVILLA G.R. No. 157783.
September 23, 2005, SECOND DIVISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Paloma was appointed General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. His
services were subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution passed by the Board of PLWD. Paloma
filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC to
contest his dismissal with the prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager. Dismissed.
Paloma filed with CSC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Dismissed.
Held: The appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly within the wide arena
of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in this case is the Board
of Directors of the PLWD.
Petitioner heaves censure on the Court of Appeals for subscribing to the trial court’s view that the
petition for mandamus was prematurely filed. Water districts are government instrumentalities and
their employees belong to the civil service. Thus, the hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are

governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. In a surfeit of cases, this
Court has held that quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC are better-equipped in handling cases involving
the employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service since it is within the field of their
expertise. This is consistent with the powers and functions of the CSC, being the central personnel
agency of the Government, to carry into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other
pertinent laws, including, in this case, P.D. No. 198.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
EURO-MED LABORATORIES,PHIL., INC. v. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS (2006)
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against Respondent for the unpaid balance of
some products delivered to it its government hospitals. Respondent Province moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioners moneyclaim was lodged with the
Commission on Audit (COA). Respondent pointed out that the claim, arising as it did from a series of
procurement transactions with the province, was governed by the Local Government Code provisions
and COA rules and regulations on supply and property management in local governments. Respondent
argued that the case called for a determination of whether these provisions and rules were complied
with, and that was within the exclusive domainof COA to make.
HELD: The claim is well within the COAs jurisdiction under the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines.
This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for although
petitioners collection suit was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances surrounding
petitioners claim brought it clearly within the ambitof the COA’s jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determinationrequires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief mustfirst be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if thematter may
well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originallycognizable in the
courts [CONCURRENT JURISDICTION] and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires theresolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
specialcompetence of an administrative agency.
HEIRS OF LORENZO and CARMEN VIDAD and AGVID CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. v. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), G.R. No. 166461, April 30, 2010, SECOND DIVISION,
CARPIO, J.
Petitioners are the owners of a land located in Isabela with an area of 589.8661 hectares. On
26 September 1989, the land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under Republic Act
No. (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Unable to agree on the revalued
proposal, petitioners instituted before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Tuguegarao
(RARAD) for the purpose of determining the just compensation for their land. In a decision dated 29
March 2000, the RARAD fixed the just compensation for the land at P32,965,408.46.On 12 May 2000,
LBP filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC).
Contrary to petitioners argument, the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent

jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is
judicial in nature.
LBP thus correctly filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC, which
has the original and exclusive jurisdiction in just compensation cases under RA 6657. DARs
valuation, being preliminary in nature, could not have attained finality, as it is only the courts that can

resolve the issue on just compensation. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of LBPs
petition for determination of just compensation.
It is well-settled that the DARs land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means,
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. The courts will still have the
right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU, vs. ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO, G.R. Nos.
167824 and 168622, 2 July 2010, Second Division, J. Peralta.
Facts: Respondent filed blacklisting and deportation case against petitioners with the Bureau of
Immigration, alleging that the latter were Canadian citizens illegally working in the country. Then, the
commissioner adjudged them to be guilty of the same. So, petitioners sought the intervention of the
RTC through a petition for certiorari with TRO and PI. The Respondent assailed such action contending
that it violates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Ruling: When the claim of citizenship is so substantial as to reasonably believe it to be true, a

respondent in a deportation proceeding can seek judicial relief to enjoin respondent BOC from
proceeding with the deportation case. True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine also their citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings. However, the rule enunciated in the
above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship,
the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from
any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable
right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on
the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction.
In the present case, there is a substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino
citizens. Without necessarily judging the case on its merits, as to whether petitioners had lost their
Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact still remains, through the evidence
adduced and undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized Filipinos, unless proven
otherwise.
SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
composed of DEBORAH T. MARCO (Immediate Past President), ATTY. MEDINO L. ACUBA,
ENGR. MANUEL C. OREJOLA, ALFONSO F. QUILAPIO, RAUL DE GUZMAN and PONCIANO R.
ROSALES (General Manager and Ex Officio Director), v. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR.,
G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, Third Division. (J. Peralta)
FACTS:
As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(SAMELCO II), passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005 on January 22, 2005. The said resolution
disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD and disqualified him for
one term to run as a candidate for director. Respondent prayed for the nullification of the resolution
contending that it was issued without any legal and factual bases. He likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order (TRO).
RULING:

The issue is who between the RTC and the National Electrification Administration has primary
jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II. A careful
reading of the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant to its power of
supervision and control, the NEA is granted the authority to conduct investigations and other similar
actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric
cooperatives. Based on the foregoing discussions, the necessary conclusion that can be
arrived at is that, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by
respondent, the NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary
jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution.
LEANDRO P. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE
COCONUT AUTHORITY GOVERNING BOARD, and JOSEFEL P. GRAJEDA, respondents.
(THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 100579, June 6, 2001, VITUG, J.)
Facts: On 01 March 1989, the PCA, through its then Acting Board Chairman, Apolonio B. Bautista, filed
an administrative complaint, docketed Special PCA Administrative Case No. 01-89, against herein
petitioner Leandro P. Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct and
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with his grant of export quota for "fresh young
coconuts" or "buko." Petitioner was then subjected to preventive suspension and pending
administrative investigation, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
the trial court. Petitioner also claims that he was denied due process.
Ruling: Petitioner's immediate recourse to the trial court was premature and precipitate. From the
decision of the PCA Board, once rendered, an administrative remedy of appeal to the Civil Service
Commission would still be available to him.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action,
cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first been
exhausted. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or
interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an administrative body,
like the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special competence. The rule is an element of
petitioner's right of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts.
GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 106028, 9 May 2001.
Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
directing her to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements of the
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines. As a result, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement
and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of
jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of nor
heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of her land.The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. It also held
that Certiorari cannot be used by the petitioner as a substitute for appeal of the assailed issuances.
There was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The proper procedure, which the petitioner

should have taken, is to move for a reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go
directly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD). From there, the petitioner has yet another forum available — the Special
Agrarian Courts, which are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation or determination of
just compensation.
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must
allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.It is presumed
that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide
the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore,
reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper
for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily
becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST), G.R. No. 156109, 18
November 2004. Third Division, Panganiban.
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
Facts:
Regino, a 1st yr. computer science student of PCST was denied the opportunity to take the final
examinations by two of her teachers for failing to purchase tickets for a fund raising campaign dubbed
as a Rave Party and Dance Revolution. Thus, she filed a complaint for damages. PCST filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies claiming that
Regino’s proper recourse should have been to initiate the complaint before the proper administrative
body (CHED) as the question involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of
PCST. Regino argues, however, that such principle was not applicable as her action was not
administrative in nature but one purely for damages arising from PCST’s breach of the laws of human
relations.
Held:
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts;
they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the
CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her
case before the Commission. However, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which
arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner’s
action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a
function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus, there is no need to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Batelec II Electric Cooperative Inc, v. Energy Industry Administration Bureau (EIAB), Puyat
Steel Corporation and National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 135925.
BATELEC II is an electric cooperative authorized to distribute electric power in Rosario, Province of

Batangas. PSC is a galvanizing steel sheet company in the Philippines and having been granted a
pioneer status by the Board of Investments, it embarked to build in Rosario, Batangas Province, its
new plant, envisioned as a modern galvanizing plant utilizing a state-of-the-art non-oxidizing furnace-
type process, the first of its kind in the country.

BATELEC II vouched to complete the installation of the neededyet it failed to do so. Hence, PSC filed
with the Bureau an application for direct connection with the NPC.The Bureau, under the umbrella of
the Department of Energy, derives its mandate from Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 7638. Its
functions include assisting in the formulation of regulatory policies regarding electricity distribution.
As a standard operating procedure, the Bureau, in its evaluation of an application for direct power
connection, whether new or for renewal, takes into account the technical or financial capability of the
electric franchise holder in the applicants site, in this case BATELEC II, to serve the energy needs of
the applicant. The Bureau made the determination that BATELEC II was neither technically nor
financially capable of supplying the 69 kv of power supply to PSC.
BATELEC tried to appeal before the courts. The RTC and CA both ruled in favour of PSC. CA dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari of BATELEC II on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
before filing of a special civil action for certiorari. BATELEC II contends that the instant case falls under
the recognized exceptions.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities to accord them the prior opportunity to decide controversies within their
competence before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is presumed that
an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same
correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity
and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by
administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause
of action of the petitioner.
In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner availed of administrative
relief before filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It did not appeal the
Bureaus Resolution to the Secretary of Energy, which under Section 8 in relation to Section 12 of Rep.
Act No. 7638 has the power over the bureaus under the Department.
Moreover, in light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a motion for

reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of. This
BATELEC II failed to observe.
Holy Spirit Homeowners v. Defensor, Supra.
DIMSON (MANILA), INC. v. LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION, G.R. No. 168656,
September 22, 2010. Second Division (Peralta).
Dimson Manila, Inc. and PHESCO, Inc. filed an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to prevent Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA)
from executing and consequently performing any act under any contract relevant to the Urdaneta
Water District’s Water Supply System Improvement Program on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when respondent post-disqualified petitioners
despite their having placed the lowest calculated bid on the project.
The LWUA, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, maintained that their decision
was factually and legally justified and also noted that petitioners failed to exhaust the available
remedies prior to the filing of the instant petition, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 on protest mechanism and stating that there was no motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an administrative

remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before judicial

intervention may be availed of. No recourse can be had until all such remedies have been
exhausted, and the special civil actions against administrative officers should not be
entertained if there are superior administrative officers who could grant relief.
Accordingly, the party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
Samar II Electric Cooperative v. Seludo, Supra.
LEONARDO A. PAAT, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as

Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents., G.R. No. 111107.
January 10, 1997. Second Division (Torres Jr. J)
FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while
on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the
truck and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation.
The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation
and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary.
Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan
and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia,
that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that
the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004, PANGANIBAN, J.:
For the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections, Comelec
awarded the Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium" an entity that had not participated in the bidding.
Despite this grant, the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with "Mega Pacific eSolutions,
Inc.," a company that joined the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements.

Court holds that petitioners need not exhaust administrative remedies in the light of Paat v. Court of
Appeals. Paat enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may
be disregarded, as follows:
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."
The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as Nos. 7, 10 and 11. As
already stated, Comelec itself made the exhaustion of administrative remedies legally impossible or, at
the very least, "unreasonable."
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs .CHINESE GENERAL

HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER, respondent, G.R. No. 163123. April 15, 2005. Third
Division (Corona, J.).
Facts: Respondent hospital (CGHMC) was an accredited health care provider under Medicare,
PhilHealth’s predecessor. Philhealth, the national health insurance program, was created by Republic
Act No. 7875 with the state policy of granting discounted medical coverage to all citizens, especially
the underprivileged. Philhealth was merged with Medicare. CGHMC’s Medicare claims (P8 million) were
disapproved by Philhealth because of Philhealth’s rules and regulations which required that claims filed
more than 60 days from discharging the patient are not to be paid. For this reason, only P1 million of
the hospital’s claim was approved. CGHMC filed a Petition for Review (Rule 43) with the Court of
Appeals of Philhealth’s denial praying for the liberal application of the 60-day rule under R.A. 7875’s
IRR because the delays are due to late submission by the patients/Philhealth members of the
requirements.
Ruling: The rules and regulations of administrative bodies interpreting the law they are entrusted to
enforce have the force of law, these rules may be relaxed for reasons of public interest. To apply the
IRR’s 60-day cut-off for filing of claims would be to frustrate the state policy of providing Philhealth
members with the medical care at the least possible cost. Courts will allow liberal interpretation of the
rules especially if its rigid enforcement will result to deprivation of rights. In this case, CGHMC had
already rendered medical care and must be paid.
Philhealth too contends that CGHMC failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing with the
Petition with the CA. The SC however said that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the
doctrine of prior exhaustion of remedies because strong public interest is involved.
Sunville Timber vs Abad 206 SCRA 482
Facts: Petitioner was granted a timber license agreement (TLA). Private respondents filed a complaint
for injunction with damages against the petitioner in the RTC. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that plaintiffs have not yet exhausted administrative remedies. Petitioner wishes to
invalidate the decision and order of public respondent judge in dismissing his motion to dismiss and
the decision and order of public respondent Court of Appeals in affirming thereto. Respondents argue
that the case comes under the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
because (1) forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to

judicial action; (2) the question they are raising is purely legal; (3) application of the doctrine will
cause great and irreparable damage; and(4) public interest is involved.
Issue: Whether or not the case comes under the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Ruling: No, the case does not come under the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Even if forestry laws do not expressly required prior resort, the reasons for the doctrine would still
suffice to require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, laws comprehensively
conferring to the DENR and its Forest Management Bureau the responsibility for the enforcement of
forestry laws and regulations implies that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance. The
question raised is not purely legal for it calls for the presentation of supporting evidence. As for the
alleged urgent necessity, the record does not satisfactorily establish extraordinary circumstance.
Moreover, petitioner’s TLA has already been suspended.

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PART I.

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC, vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 1

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 2

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC)

PART II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES and ORGANIZATIONS

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 3

De La Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 4

CEBU UNITED ENTERPRISES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JOSE GALLOFIN, Collector of Customs, Cebu

ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 5

When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 6

NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION v. CIVIL SERVICE

HELD: THERE IS NO VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE RE-EMPLOYED IN A REORGANIZED

REORGANIZATION WAS VALID AS IT WAS PURSUED IN GOOD FAITH

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 7

KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, Petitioner, vs.

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 8

BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 177131,

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 9

Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989. En Banc, Cortes.

Executive Power, defined.

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 10

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS

Issue: Binding Effect of Tariff Commission's Factual Determination on DTI Secretary.

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 11

RULING: The order of dismissal is affirmed.

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,vs.JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 12

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 13

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 14

FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 15

The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, vs.ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 16

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through the SUGAR REGULATORY

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 17

The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body.

Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs. Ermita GR no. 166620

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 18

PART III. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN GENERAL

Rufino Matienzo, Godofredo Espiritu, Dioscorro Franco, and La Suerte Transportation

ALFREDO L. AZARCON, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 19

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION AND/OR MAGDIWANG, REALTY

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 20

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI) v. BATARIO (1994)

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) v.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEIRS

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 21

PART IV. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEDRO R. EXCONDE defendant-

LEO ECHEGARAY, v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 132601,

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 22

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. LEONILA P. CELADA, respondent.

Eastern Shipping, Supra.

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 23

The Court held for the petitioners.

USC Law JD Batch 2017. Administrative Law Review Digests. 24

It has been an established rule that