COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

IN LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

Submitted by:

Joselle Velasco
Rosbert Serona Jr.
Harold John Lasquero

Chot Reyson Dela Cruz

Juris Doctor 1B2, SSC-R College of Law

08 July 2020
 CHAPTERS 1-3

INTRODUCTION • PHILIPPINE HISTORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM •

THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS CONSTRUCTION
__________________________________________________________________________________

Ordillo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990

Facts:

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled ―An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region‖, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.The
province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population. COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and ratified by majority
of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting
elections in CAR of Ifugaoon first Monday of March 1991.- Even before COMELEC
resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority
to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly
created under Executive Order No. 220. March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative
Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera
Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of
the ratification of Organic Act. The petitioners contend there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766
require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

Issue:

Whether or not the province of Ifugao, which voted favorably for CAR can alone, validly
constitute such region.

Ruling:

The province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Article X,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution provides that provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connote that ―region‖ is to be made up of more than one constituent unit.
Republic Act No. 6766 is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of
Ifugao constituting the Region. It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. If this were so, there would be an absurd
situation of having two sets of officials. Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional
Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a
lone and small province.
 Province of North Cotobato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain,
G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008

Facts:

Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domainproceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro

homeland, the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue
of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain. It is brought about by the Government of the
republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as an aspect of Tripoli
Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This
agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition
with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity to which it grants the authority
and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro,
authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters.

Issue:

Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

Ruling:

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is
amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001,
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually
be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to
make such a guarantee.
 Animas v. Minister of National Defense,
G.R. No. L-51747, December 29, 1986

Facts:

Yanson was a political leader of Ernesto Montilla, candidate for Mayor of Pulupandan,
Negros local elections. The petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the
alleged killing of Yanson on the of the November 11 elections. The petitioners were
recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering that one of them,
petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate
General filed the corresponding charge sheet, but he modified the crime charged from
murder to violation of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code in Relation to
Presidential Decree No. 9, "Illegal Possession of Firearms with Murder and Section 2692 of
the Administrative Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the Military Commission No. 27 has jurisdiction over the case where both
civilians and military personnel are involved

Ruling:

Military Commission No. 27 has no jurisdiction over the present case where both civilians
and military personnel were involved in the same offense. P.D. No. 1822 provided that
members of the armed forces charged with offenses related to the performance of their
duties shall continue to be exclusively tried and punished by court martial. Inspite or because
of the ambiguous nature of the decrees insofar as civilian takeover of jurisdiction was
concerned and notwithstanding the shilly-shallying and vacillation characteristic of its
implementation, this Court relied on the enunciated policy of normalization in upholding the
primacy of civil courts. This policy meant that as many cases as possible involving civilians
being tried by military tribunals as could be transferred to civil courts should be turned over
immediately. In case of doubt, the presumption was in favor of civil courts always trying
civilian accused.

The petitioners were investigated for murder. When the charge sheet was prepared, the
offense charged was no longer murder but "Violation of Sec. 878 of the Revised
Administrative Code in Relation to Sec. 2692 of the same Code and P.D. No. 9. The change
in the offense charged was obviously to bring it within the jurisdiction of a military court. The
jurisdiction vested by Gen. Order No. 59 is over. Violations of the Laws on firearms and
explosives found in the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, as amended, in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 including crimes
committed with the use of illegally possessed of firearms and explosives.
 Re: COA Opinion on Computation of Appraised Value of Properties Purchased by
Supreme Court Justices,
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012

Facts:

On June 2010, the Legal Services Sector issued its opinion, the Office of the General
Counsel of the COA found an underpayment of Php 221, 021.50 resulted when five retired
Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties
assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this
underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA,
the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in
compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 03-12-01, when it should
have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4.

Issue:

Whether or not COA‘s interference violates the judiciary‘s autonomy

Ruling:

Under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, the COA's authority to conduct
post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided. This
authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in
relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing
jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.

No less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial
independence is protected and maintained. The Constitution mandates that the judiciary
shall enjoy fiscal autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over
all courts and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision
as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of
fiscal autonomy.Under the guarantees of the Judiciary‘s fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who,
what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges,
court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court‘s granted power; they
determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.The use of the
formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court‘s exercise of its
discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and
benefits can be availed of.
 Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado,
G.R. No. L-3066, May 22, 1950

Facts:

The Supreme Court purchased a Webster Teletalk Model 206 MA and six Webster
Telephone Speakers, including installation, labor and materials. The purchase was certified
by the Clerk of Court and was of urgent character and necessary to public service. C. L.
Dacanay, Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee appointed by the President,
disapproved the purchase and installation under EO No. 302 and EO No. 298. Radiowealth,
Inc., the vendor of the equipment and its accessories, took the matter up with the Auditor
General with the request that the payments be approved. The Auditor General withheld his
signature, citing the same orders, EO No. 302 and EO No. 298, and commented on it,
saying: ―there is no evidence to show that the requirements of the law and regulations afore
cited had been complied with.‖

Issue:

Whether the Auditor General‘s decision to withhold his countersignature on purchases made
by the court is valid.

Ruling:

Auditor General may not question the court's expenditures except when they are, in the
words of the organic law, "irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant." The Auditor
General's ruling under review does not criticize the expenditure in question on any of the
above purchase and installation of a teletalk and telehome speakers in the offices of the
Chief Justice and of the clerk of court has been explained in the clerk's statement; the cost
of the equipment and labor has been certified to be the lowest obtainable on the market, and
there is appropriation from which the items may lawfully be paid for.

Distribution of powers is a fundamental maxim of constitutional law and essential to the

separation of the three branches of government, separation which, though incomplete, is
one of the chief characteristics of our Constitution. The Supreme Court is independent of
executive or legislative control as the Executive and the Congress are of the judiciary. The
Judiciary‘s independence is not confined only to matters related to the exercise of judicial
functions. The Court cited the case Province of Tarlac, etc. vs. Gale (26 Phil., 338) which
ruled that the prerogatives of the courts granted in the Constitution include not only the
powers to adjudicate causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice, free from encroachment by neither the Executive nor the
Legislative.
 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211,
September 15, 1989

Facts:

After being ousted for three years from the position of President and being exiled to Hawaii,
the dictator Ferdinand Marcos on his deathbed wished to return to the Philippines to die.
However, Cory Aquino, as the President, barred his return based on the consideration that
his return will further threaten the stability of the government already unstable. Marcos and
his family filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Courts to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Marcos and the immediate members of his family
and to enjoin the implementation of the President‘s decision to bar their return to the country.

Issue:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:

The President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance the national interest. Allowing the Marcoses to return would only
worsen the unstable situation of the country. Their return poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. The petition of the Marcoses cannot be considered in the light solely of
the constitutional provisions granting liberty of abode and the right to travel. Although the
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the president, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of ―executive
power.‖Corollarily, the powers of the president cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers enumerated. Whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
 Republic of the Philippines v. Bayao,
G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013

Facts:

EO 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of
SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the
national government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of
operations to Koronadal City. A memorandum was issued by DA Undersec for Operations
Edmund to transfer their regional offices to Koronadal City. The private respondents
addressed a memorandum to DA Sec. Arthur Yap opposing the transfer and the alleging that
former president Arroyo made a pronouncement during one of her visits in Cotabato City that
the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City. Respondents justified their
appeal saying that a building was constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate the
whole staff of DA- RFU XII. On the other hand, there is no building yet in Koronadal City
where rent is very expensive. Moreover, if the regional office remains in Cotabato City, the
government need not spend over P7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other
expenses for equipment hauling and construction. Finally, respondents alleged that the
proposed third floor of the ATI Building in Tantangan has a sub-standard foundation and will
not be issued a certificate of occupancy by the City Engineering Office of Koronadal City as
per information from an auditor. Even so, the OIC ordered the transfer to be carried out.

Issue:

Whether the issuance by the RTC of a preliminary injunction against the transfer of the DA
Regional Office to Koronadal City violates the separation of powers

Ruling:

The transfer of the regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN region to Koronadal City is an
executive function. The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of
the executive. When the trial court issued its October 9, 2006 Order granting preliminary
injunction on the transfer of the regional center to Koronadal City when such transfer was
mandated by E.O. No. 304, the lower court did precisely that.This Court has held that while
the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for expressly in the Constitution, it
is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments according to the Constitution and
the Local Government Code. In Chiongbian v. Orbos, the court held that the power of the
President to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the
regional center. A verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should
not have been given weight. An executive order is valid when it is not contrary to the law or
Constitution. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
government branches has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within
its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
 Belgica v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

Facts:

Sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation, Janet Lim
Napoles, had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using
dummy NGOs. Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five lawmakers for Plunder, and three other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also, some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -
of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three implementing agencies, and
the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Janet are recommended to be charged.
Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‗s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the Congressional Pork Barrel Laws is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas
of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle.
 National Electrification Administration v. COA,
G.R. 143481, February 15, 2002

Facts:

Joint Resolution No. 01 was passed by the Congress, urging the President to revise the
existing compensation and position classification system in the Government. Approved by
then President Ramos, Joint Resolution No. 01 adjusted the salary schedule of all officials
and employees of the government, and that the new salary schedule shall be implemented
within four years beginning in 1994. The president then issued EO 389, which directs the
payment of the fourth and final salary increases in two tranches, in January 1, 1997 and in
November 1, 1997. The DBM issued Implementing Guidelines under NBC No. 458 of 1997,
reiterating the schedule of payments in EO 389. In January 1997, National Electrification
Administration, a GOCC, did not implement the salary increases in accordance with the
schedule of payment specified in EO 389 and NBC No. 458. Instead, NEA implemented in
one lump sum beginning January 1, 1997. Otherwise stated, NEA accelerated the
implementation of the salary increase by paying the second tranche starting January 1, 1997
instead of November 1, 1997. The COA issued a Notice of Suspension requiring the
submission of the legal basis for the full implementation of the new salary schedule. The
NEA failed to submit the basis for its advance implementation and resulted for Notices of
Disallowance issued by the Commissions resident auditor.

Issue:

Whether or not NEA‘s accelerated implementation is in accordance with law

Ruling:

NEAs accelerated implementation is not in accordance with law. The Memorandum, which
allows full implementation of the salary increases not earlier than November 1, 1996, does
not automatically accelerate the staggered salary increases for 1997. It specifically provides
that accelerated implementation can be availed of by GOCCs and GFIs x x x only upon prior
approval of the DBM. Evidently, in order to avail of the benefits of accelerated
implementation, NEA must secure the approval of the DBM by complying with the terms and
conditions prescribed by the Memorandum. NEA failed to do this. Absent any authority or
approval from the DBM or the President authorizing NEA to accelerate implementation of the
last phase of the salary increase, NEAs accelerated payment is without legal basis.
 PNB v. Bitulok Sawmill Inc.,
G.R. L-24177-85, June 29, 1968

Facts:

Upon the initiative and insistence of the late President Manuel Roxas, the Philippine Lumber
Distributing Agency, Inc. was organized. He promised and agreed to finance the agency by
making the Government invest P9.00 by way of counterpart for every peso that the members
would invest therein. Accordingly, Roxas instructed the Hon. Emilio Abello, then Executive
Secretary and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, for the
latter to grant said agency an overdraft in the original sum of P250,000.00 which was later
increased to P350,000.00, payable on or before April 30, 1958, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum, and secured by the chattel mortgages on the stock of lumber of said agency.
The Government did not invest the P9.00 for every peso coming from defendant lumber
producers. The loan extended to the Philippine Lumber Distributing Agency by the Philippine
National Bank was not paid. PNB sought the recovery from defendant the balance of their
stock subscriptions. Though the defendants plead that they would not have subscribed to the
capital stock of the Philippine Lumber Distributing Agency were it not for the assurance of
the then President of that it would back it up.

Issue:

Whether or not the non-compliance with a plain statutory command, considering the plea
that defendants would "not have subscribed to the capital stock were it not for the assurance
of the President, a condition which was not fulfilled, such commitment not having been
complied with, be justified.

Ruling:

It is unnecessary to ascribe to the late President Roxas the view that the payment of the
stock subscriptions, as thus required by law, could be condoned in the event that the
counterpart fund to be invested by the Government would not be available. Even if such
were the case, however, and such a promise were in fact made, to further the laudable
purpose to which the proposed corporation would be devoted and the possibility that the
lumber producers would lose money in the process, still the plain and specific wording of the
applicable legal provision as interpreted by this Court must be controlling. It is a well-settled
principle that with all the vast powers lodged in the Executive, he is still devoid of the
prerogative of suspending the operation of any terms in statutes.
 Adolfo v. Court of First Instance of Zambales,
G.R. No. L-30650, July 31, 1970

Facts:

Merchant was charged for a crime, which was committed outside a base. Although a citizen
of the United States, he is a civilian employee or component of the U. S. Naval Base at
Subic Bay, and not a member of the armed forces of the US within the purview of the US-PH
Military Base Agreement. Petitioner asserted that Merchant should be in custody of a
commanding officer pursuant to the MBA. That in all cases over which the Philippines
exercises jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial and final judgment, shall be
entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall
acknowledge in writing that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending
trial. In addition, even if the right of custody of a commanding officer over the person of an
accused civilian component of the base is not prescribed by the original Base Agreement,
nonetheless such a right is now provided for in paragraph 5 of the Agreed Official Minutes of
the Agreement entered into between the Philippines and the United States. The Mendez-
Blair Agreement is the exchange of notes on August 10, 1965.

Issue:

Whether or not the Mendez-Blair Agreement validly modify or amend the provisions of the

Military Bases Agreement

Ruling:

Since the power to make treaties is lodged under our Constitution with the President with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, the power to amend these treaties must similarly be
vested in those organs of the government. After all, an amendment to a statute produces
one law, usually the statute as amended. In pari materia is the observation that only
Congress, with its legislative power, can make laws and alter or repeal them. The Chief
Executive, with all his vast powers, cannot suspend the operation of a statute; a fortiori, he
cannot exercise the greater power to amend or to revoke a statute. Therefore, the August
10, 1965 notes to the US - PH Military Base Agreement of 1947, not having been ratified yet
by the Senate, remain as mere proposals. The making of the treaty having been undertaken
under the joint auspices of the President and the Senate, its amendment or revision must
similarly be undertaken by both agencies of the State as directed by the Constitution.
 Tuason v. Register of Deeds,
G.R. No. 70484, January 29, 1988

Facts:

In 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc., the Spouses Tuason brought a piece of land in Caloocan
City by virtue of which they were issued a title in their names and they took possession of
their property. In 1973, President Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issued PD 293
cancelling the certificates of titles of Carmel Farms, which had earlier purchased from the
Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public.
The PD 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price of the
lands, and declare the lands covered to be open for disposition and sale to members of the
Malacañang Association Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof. On the strength of
this Presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on
the Tuasons‘ title, that their certificate of title is declared null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the President has the power to cancel Torrens Title

Ruling:

Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Since he was never vested with judicial
power such power, being vested in the SC and such inferior courts as may be established by
law the judicial acts done by him were under the circumstances alien to his office as chief
executive. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring
what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts of power and authority
to hear or try and decide or determine a cause essentially constitute a judicial function, or an
exercise of jurisdiction.
 Macabago v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 152163, November 18, 2002

Facts:

Macabago was proclaimed Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner had a
lead of 198 votes over respondent Jamael M. Salacop. Respondent filed a petition against
petitioner and the proclaimed vice mayor for the alleged fact that there was a massive
substitution of voters, rampant irregularities in voting procedures in some precincts and the
failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of
Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus
rendering the election process in those precincts a mockery and the proclamation of the
winning candidates a nullity. In support of his petition, private respondent appended thereto
photocopies of random Voters Registration Records (VRRs) evidencing the fraud and that
allegedly permeated the electoral process, as well as affidavits tending to prove that serious
irregularities were committed in the conduct of the elections in the subject precincts. The
petitioner denied the material and averred that it is a pre-proclamation controversy. The
COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and issued an order directing the
Election Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur to bring to and produce before the COMELEC
Office in Manila the original VRRs of the questioned precincts for technical examination.
After its examination, comparing the original copies of the VRRs with the voter‘s signatures
and fingerprints, the COMELEC concluded that there was convincing proof of massive fraud,
therefore it is a failure of conducting elections in the four precincts.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in taking cognizance of the petition of private respondent and in issuing the
assailed order.

Ruling:

COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, the
concurrence of two conditions must be established, namely, no voting has taken place in the
precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect, the votes cast would affect the result of the
election. The grounds alleged by private respondent in his petition before the COMELEC are
those for a regular election protest and are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy nor
is such petition one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of failure of elections
in the municipality of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC should have ordered the
dismissal of the petition instead of issuing the assailed order. The error is correctible by the
special civil action for certiorari. The COMELEC thus committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same.
 David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr.,
G.R. No. 153690, February 15, 2011

Facts:

David Lu filed a case against respondents Paterno LU YM, Sr., Ludo and LuYm
Development Corporation (LLDC), et. al for Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue,
Receivership and Dissolution claiming that the respondents, being members of the Board of
Directors, caused the issuance of unsubscribed and unissued shares at less that par value.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner by annulling the subscription and ordering the
dissolution and asset liquidation of LLDC. In G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father and
sons challenged the appellate court‘s resolution restraining the trial court from proceeding
with their motion to lift the receivership order which was filed during the pendency of G.R.
No. 153690, the Court, by Decision of August 26, 2008 resolved that the issue was mooted
by the amendment of the complaint and by the trial court‘s decision on the merits. The
respondents moved to reconsider the decision that the complaint filed by the petitioner was
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The respondents pointed out that the case filed by the
petitioner contains the alleged real value of the shares, based on underlying real estate
values. The Court, in a turnaround resolution on August 4, 2009, reconsidered its position on
the matter of docket fees.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioner

Ruling:

The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioner. A court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed fees. Hence, without
payment of the correct docket fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
filed.
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay,
G.R. No. 188376, December 14, 2011

Facts:

The Court has declared In Land Bank v. Suntay, that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6657 pertains to the Regional Trial
Court as a Special Agrarian Courtthat any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary to the
CARL and that what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to
the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. Bearing this pronouncement in mind,
the court granted the petition for review on certiorari and reverse the decision promulgated
on June 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106104 entitled Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Hon. Conchita C. Mi as, Regional Agrarian Adjudicator of Region IV, and
Federico Suntay, as represented by his Assignee, Josefina Lubrica, dismissing the petition
on the ground of its being moot and academic.

Issue:

Whether or not RARAD Casabar's orders dated December 15, 2008 and December 18,
2008 rendered Land Bank's petition for certiorari moot and academic

Ruling:

An issue is said to become moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.
However, the application of the moot-and-academic principle is subject to several exceptions
already recognized in this jurisdiction. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court has declared
that the moot-and-academic principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades
courts from resolving cases, because they will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic.
In addition, in Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), the Court has come to consider a voluntary
cessation by the defendant or the doer of the activity complained of as another exception to
the moot-and- academic principle. The exception of voluntary cessation of the activity
without assuring the nonrecurrence of the violation squarely covers this case. Hence, the
CA's dismissal of CAG.R. SP No. 106104 on the ground of mootness must be undone. Yet
another reason why the Court should still resolve derives from the fact that the supervening
RARAD Casabar's recall order did not at all resolve and terminate the controversy between
the parties.
 Visayas Geothermal Power Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 197525, June 4, 2014

Facts:

Visayas Geothermal Power Company filed an administrative claim for refund with BIR on the
ground that it was entitled to recover excess input VAT payments for the four quarters of
taxable year 2005, pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136 which is the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001. Subsequently, while the above claim was pending, VGPC filed
its judicial claim with the CTA. The CTA Second Division partially granted the petition,
reducing the amount to the one that was substantiated. The CTA En Banc reversed and set
aside the decision and resolution and dismissed the original petition for review for having
been filed prematurely.

Issue:

Whether or not the CIR should have been estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
CTA

Ruling:

It is a well-settled rule that the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes, errors or
omissions of its agents.32It has been specifically held that estoppel does not apply to the
government, especially on matters of taxation. Taxes are the nation‘s lifeblood through which
government agencies continue to operate and with which the State discharges its functions
for the welfare of its constituents. 33 Thus, the government cannot be estopped from
collecting taxes by the mistake, negligence, or omission of its agents. Upon taxation
depends the ability of the government to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are
collected. To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of government officials entrusted
with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or detriment to the people.
The petitioner‘s argument that the CIR should have been estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CTA after actively participating in the proceedings before the CTA Second
Division deserves scant consideration.
 Cabuay, Jr. v. Malvar,
G.R. No. 123780, September 24, 2002

Facts:

Lopez filed his homestead application docketed as Homestead application No. 138612 for
the land in Barrio De La Paz, Antipolo City that he inherited from his father, Fermin Lopez,
upon knowing that the said application was not acted upon. Hermogenes continued to
occupy the land until he transferred his rights to Ambrosio Aguilar. Records show though
that the said land was registered in the name of Fernando Gorospe under Original Certificate
of Title 537. Gorospe, in turn, sold the land to spouses Salvador and Rosario De Tagle.
Tagle sold the land to Antonio Zuzuarregui Sr., who issued TCT 7357. When Antonio died,
the property was adjudicated to his widow, Beatriz. Beatriz Zuzuarregui sold the land to
Eduardo Santos. Lopez filed a complaint for annulment of Oct 537. However this was
dismissed on the complaint that Lopez was not the real party-in-interest since he sold the
property to Aguilar. Aguilar was then prompted to file similar action against the defendants.
The courts rendered judgment in favor of Aguilar.

Lopez heirs on July, 16, 1984 filed a complaint of cancellation of the deed of sale between
Hermogenes and Aguilar over the land, alleging that Hemrogenes was ―insufficiently
educated‖ when he made the sale. Court rendered its decision declaring void an initio the
Lopez-Aguilar deed of sale and restoring the Lopez heirs‘ possession. Adia heris filed a
separate action for partial quashal of the writ of execution with application for preliminary
injuction against the Lopez heirs‘. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Adia heirs
then filed filed a protest with the Land Management Bureau hoping that the property be titled
to their names. LMB disregarded the final decision of SC and ordered the reconstruction of
the homestead application of Adia. Lopez heirs together with Dr. Potenciano Malvar, who
bought a portion of the land, filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution of
the decision. This caused Col. Pedro Cabuay Jr. to file with the SC petition for clarification as
to the validity and forceful effect the final and executoy but conflicting decisions.

Issue:

Whether or not Lopez heirs or Adia heirs lawfully owns the subject property

Ruling:

The First Division, through Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, recognizes the right of ownership of
Hermogenes Lopez over the property by reason of his continuous possession since 1920
and his full compliance with the requirements by the Public Land Act for the issuance of a
homestead patent. Hermogenes Lopez complied with the requirements of the Public Land
Act.

Subsequently, he was able to prove compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Act
and, as a matter of course, the land was surveyed by a government surveyor and on 7
February 1939 the resulting plan H-138612 was approved by the Director of Lands. The
latter thereafter ordered the issuance of the corresponding patent in the name of
Hermogenes Lopez. He has been in actual and continuous possession thereof and was
recognized as its owner until he transferred his rights to Ambrosio Aguilar, private
respondent herein, on 31 July 195. With the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 90380 that
Hermogenes Lopez is the lawful owner, LMB Director Abelardo Palad should have refrained
from adjudicating the property to the Adia heirs since it ceased to be of the public domain
and beyond his authority to dispose of. Jurisprudence consistently declares that the mere
lapse of the statutory period of 30 years of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
disposable public land automatically transforms the same into private property and vests title
on the possessor.
 Villagracia v. Fifth Shari’a District Court,
G.R. No, 188832, April 23, 2014

Facts:

Mala purchased a 300-square meterparcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang,

Maguindanao from one Ceres Canete. A TCT no. 15633 covering the parcel of land was
issued in Roldan‘s name. At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied
parcel of land. By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Original na Titulo Blg P-60192
issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land. It was
only on October 30, 2006 when Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed, found out that
Vivencio occupied the said parcel of land. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the Barangay
level, Roldan filed an action to recover possession of the parcel land with respondent Fifth
Shari‘a District Court. In its decision dated June 11, 2008 respondent ruled that Roldan, as
registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to
vacate the property, turn it over Roldan, and pay damages as well as Attorney‘s fees. A
notice of writ of execution was sent to Vivencio giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice
to comply with the decision. Meanwhile, Vivencio, filed a petition from relief from judgement
with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. He cited Article 155, paragraph 2
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines and argued that Shari‘a District
Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering
that he is a Christian, hence the respondent had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Roldan‘s Action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. However, respondent denied
Vivecio‘s petition for relief from judgement for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not Shari‘a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the
parties is not a Muslim

Ruling:

The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth
Shari‘a District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175
of the Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim
law.Hence, Shari‘a District Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from
customary contracts. In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is
no reason for Shari‘a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari‘a District
Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the Civil
Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action. This is the
reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari‘a District Courts over real actions not arising
from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts. However, as discussed,
this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are Muslims. Considering that
Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari‘a District Court had no jurisdiction over
Roldan‘s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings before it are
void, regardless of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in
resolving the action. This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was
necessary for respondent Fifth Shari‘a District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio‘s
person. However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari‘a District Court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the
proceedings before respondent Shari‘a District Court, including the service of summons on
Vivencio, are void.
 Tomawis v. Balindog,
G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010

Facts:

Respondents Amma A. Pumbaya, Jaliliah A. Mangompia, and Ramila A. Musor, filed with
the Shari‘a District Courts (SDCs) an action for quieting a title of a parcel of land in
Banggolo, Marawi City against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis. Respondents allege that
they are the absolute owners of the land, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia. Tomawis
debunked the sisters‘ claims and raised a motion to dismiss SDCs lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. As argued that, the regular civil court have jurisdiction over
the said case and not the SDC.

Issue:

Whether or not the Shari‘a District Courts has jurisdiction over the action for quieting the title
of a parcel of land.

Ruling:

PD 1083 created the Shari‘a Courts, classified as regular courts, in which Art 143 of PD
1083 vests in certain cases exclusive original jurisdiction over certain causes of action.
Subsequently BP 129, later amended by RA 7691, took effect which vests the RTC or the
MTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title or possession of
real property. BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of
general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to
Sharia courts. It was held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are
statutes in pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view
to giving effect to both.

In the instant case, it applies the principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law
does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the special law in the specific and
particular subject embraced in the latter. BP 129 and PD 1083 must be read and construed
together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two
laws. This is so since the legislature has not made any express repeal or modification of PD
1083, and it is well-settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. Implied
repeals will not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. SDC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims to
the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Laws are assumed to be
passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject,
and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law
relating to the same subject matter
 Kabigting v, Acting Director of Prisons,
G.R. No. L-15548, October 30, 1962

Facts:

Petitioner Jose Kabigting for the third time filed a petition for Habeas Corpus. Since January
5, 1938 he has been serving prison terms by virtue of final judgments of conviction in
nineteen criminal cases. His first two petitions were denied. On his third petition for Habeas
Corpus, petitioner alleges that he had overserved the total period of his prison terms.
Respondent Director of Prisons opposed this petition. On April 23, 1959 the court a quo
rendered its decision and held that petitioner had already served more than the maximum
period of his prison terms and consequently ordered the Director of Prisons to release him
from custody "unless held on charges other than those mentioned and covered in this
Proceeding‖. The Solicitor General, representing the Director of Prisons, filed a notice of
appeal from the decision and an urgent motion for the re-arrest of petitioner. The Court of
First Instance of Rizal Judge Felix Domingo presiding, gave due course to the appeal and
ordered petitioner's re-arrest, but allowed him to post a bail bond in the amount of P5,000.00
for his temporary liberty pending appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent's appeal has been properly taken, considering first the time
element and secondly the fact that petitioner had already been released, which release, he
now contends, rendered the decision appealed from final and executor.

Ruling:

The respondent, thru the office of the Solicitor General, received a copy of the decision at
12:25 in the afternoon of Saturday, April 25, 1959, and since the next day, being Sunday,
was not be included in the computation of the 24-hour period, the appeal interposed by
respondent at 9:45 in the morning of the following Monday, April 271959, was timely. With
respect to the release of the petitioner, which was carried out by the Superintendent of the
Bureau of Prisons in Manila, in whose office petitioner was then detailed, there can be no
doubt that the same was premature and contrary to law, for according to section 20 of Rule
41,"a judgment remanding the person detained to the custody of the officer or person
detaining him shall not be stayed by appeal (but) a judgment releasing the person detained
shall not be effective until the officer or person detaining has been given opportunity to
appeal, an appeal taken by such officer or person shall stay the order of release unless the
person detained shall furnish a satisfactory bond in an amount fixed by the court or judge
rendering the judgment."
 Bagabuyo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008

Facts:

Cagayan de Oro‘s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed House Bill House Bill No.
5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of
Cagayan De Oro. This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. For the election
of May 2007, CDO‘s voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second
district, depending on their place of residence. On March 13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. 9371. On March 27, 2007, Petitioner Bagabuyo filed
a petition against the COMELEC asking for the nullification of R.A. 9371 and Resolution
No. 7837. Bagabuyo argued that the COMELEC cannot implement said law without
providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite
which is indispensible for the division of a LGU.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provides for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government
unit

Ruling:

Legislative apportionment, as defined by Black‘s Law Dictionary, is the allocation of seats in

a legislative body in proportion to the population of a State, county or other subdivision to
equalize population and voting power among districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand,
is the realignment or change in the legislative districts brought about by changes in the
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Under both Sec. 5, Article VI and Section 10 , Article X of the 1987 Constitution, the
Legislature is entitled to (1) make an apportionment and reapportionment of legislative
districts and (2) create, divide, merge, abolish local government units and alter
boundaries of local governments, respectively. However, the distinction between Sec. 5,
Article VI and Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The LATTER requires a
plebiscite while the FORMER does not.

Legislative districts are mere political units. They have no legal personality that can be
created or dissolved and have no capacity to act. They merely delineate the areas occupied
by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs. Thus, a plebiscite is
not required. Local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units.
They are an instrument of the state in carrying the functions of the government and an
agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. In light of said roles, the
Constitution saw it fit to expressly to secure the consent of the people through a plebiscite.
However, in the case at bar, R.A. 9371 increases the legislative district of Cagayan de
Oro through legislative reapportionment. Thus, Cagayan de Oro‘s territory remains
completely whole and intact; there is only an addition of another legislative district.
 Catly v. Navarro,
G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010

Facts:

Navarro, et. al. filed a Complaint against Las Piñas Ventures, Inc., was substituted by Ayala
Land Inc. (ALI) because of merger, for annulment of TCT No. T-5332 and recovery of
possession with damages. Respondents were represented by petitioner Atty. Catly, now
deceased and substituted in this case by his wife, Lourdes Catly. Later on, Respondents
Navarro, et.al., and ALI executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), expressing their
desire toward an amicable settlement. Petitioner later on filed a Manifestation and Motion
alleging that should there be an amicable settlement of the case, his attorney‘s fees should
be awarded in full as stipulation in the Contract for Legal and Other Valuable Services.
Hence, petitioner, respondents Navarro et. al., and ALI executed an Amendatory Agreement
incorporating the provision that, in addition to the ten million attorney‘s fees as previously
agreed upon, petitioner would also be entitled to the amount of twenty million pesos as
additional attorney‘s fees.

Issue:

Whether the attorney‘s fees are reasonable.

Ruling:

The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of
Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyer‘s freedom in fixing his professional fees.
The moment he takes his oath, ready to undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the
exercise of his profession, and second, as an officer of the court in the administration of
justice, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic
therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of
attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of
the courts. And this Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an
agreement between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees though
fixed in the contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in documents such
as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect to attorney's fees in the form of
penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable. The principle of
quantum meruit may be a basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorney‘s fees.
Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate
that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. It is applicable even if there
was a formal written contract for attorney‘s fees as long as the agreed fee was found by the
court to be unconscionable.
 Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. v. The Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,
G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010

Facts:

Secretary of DAR issued DAR A.O.1-02 entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced all private
agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all
untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural
uses after 15 June 1988. March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The 2 earlier AOs was further
amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion covers
all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use. The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the conversion
to lands to non-agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing and approval of land
conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims that there is a slowdown of housing
projects because of such stoppage.

Issue:

Whether the Memorandum No. 88 is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling:

It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the
President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real
estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such
measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice
cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said Memorandum No. 88
was made pursuant to the general welfare of the public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was
made without any basis.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative
issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of rights of the
parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any
judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions.
 National Association of Electricity Consumer for Reforms, Inc. v. Ilagan,
G.R. No. 190795, July 6, 2011

Facts:

The Energy Regulatory Commission used to apply the Return on Rate Base method to
determine the proper amount a distribution utility may charge for the services it provides.
The RORB scheme had been the method for computing allowable electricity charges in the
Philippines for decades, before the onset of the EPIRA. Section 43(f) of the EPIRA allows
the ERC to shift from the RORB methodology to alternative forms of internationally accepted
rate-setting methodology, subject to multiple conditions. The ERC, through a series of
resolutions, adopted the Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) method to set the allowable
rates DUs may charge their customers. Meralco, a DU, applied for an increase of its
distribution rate under the PBR scheme on 7 August 2009. Petitioners NASECORE, FOLVA,
FOVA, and Engineer Robert F. Mallillin all filed their own Petitions for Intervention to oppose
the application of Meralco.

Petitioners NASECORE and FOLVA failed to appear despite due notice. And again, FOLVA
failed to appear despite due notice. Likewise, on 19 November 2009, petitioners
NASECORE, FOVA, and FOLVA all failed to appear despite due notice. NASECORE had
sent a letter requesting that it be excused from the said hearing. The latter objected to this
request by virtue of the ERC‘s Rules of Practice and Procedure. ERC ruled that the absence
of NASECORE and FOVA was deemed a waiver of their right to cross-examine Meralco‘s
first witness. For another time and despite due notice, NASECORE and FOLVA failed to
attend.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners‘ right to due process of law was violated when the ERC issued its
Order before the expiration of the period granted to petitioners to file their comment.

Ruling:

There has been no denial of due process and that any irregularity in the premature issuance
of the assailed Decision has been remedied by the ERC through its Order which gave
petitioners the right to participate in the hearing of the MR filed by Mallillin. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is granted, there
is no denial of due process. It must not be overlooked that prior to the issuance of the
assailed Decision, petitioners were given several opportunities to attend the hearings and to
present all their pleadings and evidence in the MAP2010 case. Petitioners voluntarily failed
to appear in most of those hearings. The opportunity granted by the ERC of, technically,
allowing petitioners to finally be able to file their comment in the case, resolves the
procedural irregularity previously inflicted upon petitioners.
 Ocampo v. Abando,
G.R. No. 16830, February 11, 2014

Facts:

A mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine
Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The mass grave
contained skeletal remains of 67 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal
Disease" launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of
suspected military informers. Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty. On 16
March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge
Abando and the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional
release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further proceedings
during the pendency of the petition. Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion
against him and 44 others was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC
Makati).Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that
common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion
when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrant of arrest

Ruling:

Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance
of the warrants of arrest. A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to
protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While
the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional,
it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal
justice. In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails
the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent's side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall
decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has
been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the
investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint. "The essence of due process is
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's defense." What
is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance
to present one's own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.
 Lim v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002

Facts:

In start of year 2002, the personnel of Armed Forces of the US started to arrive in the
Philippines which will participate in the Balikatan 02-1 pursuant to the VFA signed in 1999.
The Balikatan is a simulation of joint‘ military maneuvers or exercises of Filipino and
American which was pursuant to Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral agreement entered into
by the Philippine Government and US Government in 1951. The entry of the American
troops in the Philippines is partly rooted from the campaign od US Pres. Bush against
internation terrorism as a result of terrorist attacks in US which the cause of numerous loss
of lives. The petitioners, Lim and Ersando, as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition and attacking the constitutionality of Balikatan or the joint
exercise. Subsequently, they were joined by SANLAKAS and Partido ng Manggagawa by
filing a petition-in-intervention, the claimed that some of their members were situated in the
places were the exercise are being conducted, However, The Solicitor General, claimed that
there were lack of locus standi, does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct
personal injury.

Issue:

Whether the Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the VFA

Ruling:

The VFA permits the US personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities, the
exact meaning of which was undefined. The permit under VFA grants US personnel a wide
scope of undertaking subject only to approval of the Philippine Government. In general US
personnel must abstain from any activities inconsistent with the agreement and in particular
from political activities. All other activities are fair game. In aid of the case at bar, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 and 32 which contains the provisions governing
the interpretation of international agreements. The cardinal rule of interpretation must involve
an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the intentions of the parties.
 Elma v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012

Facts:

There were several letters showing that there exists agreement between PCGG and
respondent Jacobi entitling the latter of incentive percentage for efforts in recovering ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Respondent Jacobi filed before the Sandiganbayan thru his
counsel Atty. Reyes, a petition for mandamus, prohibition and certiorari (with prayer for
injunction) against PCGG for allegedly re-hiring two ―trojan horse‖ consultants preventing the
enforcement of claims against the Marcoses. Another similar thrust was filed before the
Ombudsman against PCGG in violation of R.A. No. 3019, with a later manifestation of
withdrawing a letter because Jacobi is allegedly part of said letter. PCGG claimed that said
that the letter is a falsified document there being nothing on their records that such ever
existed. PCGG through Chairman Elma filed before the DOJ criminal complaint under
Art.171 par.2 and Art. 172 pars.1 and 3 of RPC against respondents. No summons were
issued to respondents. DOJ found no probable cause on the complaint and the case was
dismissed.

Issue:

Whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling:

The ruling on Jacobi‘s second MR and on Atty. Reyes‘ first MR cannot be appreciated as
grave abuse of discretion. While it seemingly violated established rules of procedure, it
provided ample justification therefore the avoidance of possibility of two conflicting rulings on
two motions treating of the same inseparable subject matter. The existence of several letters
and reports made by the respondents to the PCGG, shows that the PCGG was at least
aware of the respondents‘ efforts to assist in the recovery efforts of the government, in
general, and of the PCGG, in particular. Therefore, forging a letter that would simply be
evidence of an implied agreement for those services hardly makes any sense. Considering
the inapplicability of the presumption of authorship and the dearth of evidence to support the
allegation of conspiracy, much less of evidence directly imputing the forgery of the De
Guzman letter to Jacobi, SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ in
absolving respondent Jacobi.
 Spouses Chua v. Ang,
G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009

Facts:

The petitioners and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. executed a Contract to sell a condominium
unit. Despite the lapse of three (3) years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted
condominium unit to the petitioners. As a result, the petitioners filed on September 3, 2002 a
Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the private
respondents, as officers and directors of FEPI, of violating P.D. No. 957, specifically its
Sections 17 and 20, in relation with Section 39.

The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not construct and failed to deliver the
contracted condominium unit to them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the
Register of Deeds of the seven private respondents, only private respondent Alice
Odchique-Bondoc filed a Counter-Affidavit.5 She countered that the City Prosecutor has no
jurisdiction over the case since it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Chua vs. Ang, 598 SCRA 229, G.R. No. 156164
September 4, 2009The petitioners argue that jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints is
lodged with the city prosecutor and that the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. No. 957 is
limited to the enforcement of contractual rights, not the investigation of criminal complaints.
Chua vs. Ang, 598 SCRA 229, G.R. No. 156164 September 4, 2009. In their Comment, the
private respondents submit that the petition should be dismissed outright because the
petitioners failed to avail of other remedies provided by law. In their Reply, the petitioners
reiterate that the public respondents abdicated their authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation and to indict the private respondents for criminal violations of P.D. No. 957
when they dismissed the criminal complaint for being premature.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners are filed their criminal complaint in the right jurisdiction of the
HLURB and with the city prosecutor

Ruling:

The petitioners have expressly chosen to pursue the criminal prosecution as their remedy
but the prosecutor dismissed their complaint. The prosecutor‘s dismissal for prematurity was
apparently on the view that an administrative finding of violation must first be obtained before
recourse can be made to criminal prosecution. This view is not without its model in other
laws; one such law is in the prosecution of unfair labor practice under the Labor Code where
no criminal prosecution for unfair labor practice can be instituted without a final judgment in a
previous administrative proceeding. The need for a final administrative determination in
unfair labor practice cases, however, is a matter expressly required by law. Where the law is
silent on this matter, as in this case, the fundamental principle that administrative cases are
independent from criminal actions fully applies, subject only to the rules on forum shopping
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, forum shopping is not
even a matter for consideration since the petitioners have chosen to pursue only one remedy
criminal prosecution.
 Sarsaba v. Vda. De Te,
G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009

Facts:

A decision was rendered by NLRC finding Patricio Sereno to have been illegally dismissed
and ordering Teodoro Gasing to pay him his monetary claims. After the Writ of Execution
was returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho issued an Alias Writ of Execution
on June 10, 1996, directing Fulgencio R. Lavarez, Sheriff II of the National Labor Relations
Commission to satisfy the judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez, accompanied by
Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck, which at
that time was in the possession of Gasing. On July 30, 1996, the truck was sold at public
auction, with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de
Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC, a Complaint
for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and
that the same should be filed against petitioner‘s estate, since Sereno died before summons
was served on him.

Ruling:

The case against Patricio Sereno will be dismissed and the same may be filed as a claim
against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the three other accused
will proceed. As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno since there was indeed no valid service of
summons insofar as Patricio Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the
summons, together with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, could be served upon him.
However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the
defendants herein does not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three other
defendants, namely, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the NLRC, were
validly served with summons and the case with respect to the answering defendants may
still proceed.
 The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

Facts:

Petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod on February 21, 2013. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet by
ten feet in size posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message ―IBASURA RH Law‖ The second tarpaulin contains the heading
―Conscience Vote‖ and lists candidates as either ―Anti-RH Team Buhay‖ with a check mark
or ―Pro-RH Team Patay‖ with an ―X‖ mark who were the petitioners of the case. The
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. The respondents acknowledged that the tarpaulin
was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also agreed that the
tarpaulin contains 2013 candidates‘ names but not of politicians who helped in the passage
of the RH Law.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court‘s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners‘ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners‘ right to property.
6. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
Held:

1. No, the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question
of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
2. No, COMELEC‘s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners
is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal
litigation is enough to curtail petitioners‘ speech. Exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs their freedom of
speech as a violation.
3. No, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
4. Yes, the Court held that every citizen‘s expression with political consequences enjoys
a high degree of protection. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda.
5. Yes, the Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property
is likewise protected by the Constitution.
6. No, the Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the
RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin
as religious speech solely on such basis.
 First Gas Power Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 169461, September 2, 2013

Facts:

A petition filed before the RTC, petitioner sought for the original registration of two parcels of
land situated at Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City. No oppositor appeared during the said
hearing except Prosecutor Amelia Panganiban who appeared in behalf of the Office of the
Solicitor General (respondent). Consequently, the RTC issued the corresponding Order of
Special Default and the reception of evidence was delegated to the Branch Clerk of Court.
For land registration purposes, the subject lots were both investigated and inspected
separately by Special Land Investigators of DENR CENRO of Batangas City. Based on their
findings, the subject lots are within the alienable and disposable zone under project no. 13,
lc map no. 718 issued on March 16, 1928. It is stated that the subject lots are not portion
of/nor identical to any approved isolated survey. During the reception of evidence, the
government, through respondent, was given the opportunity to examine the authenticity of
the documents presented by petitioner in support of its application for land registration as
well as cross-examine the latter‘s witnesses. Without any objection from the former, all
exhibits offered by petitioner were admitted by the RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not
present any evidence to contradict application of the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC Decision and Amended
Order as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
lots.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit. It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have a
land registered in his name has the burden of proving that he is its owner in fee simple, even
though there is no opposition thereto. Records disclose that petitioner itself manifested
during the proceedings before the RTC that there subsists a decision in a previous cadastral
case, i.e., Cad. Case No. 37, which covers the same lots it applied for registration. Petitioner
even posits in the present petition that it was apprised of the existence of the foregoing
decision even before the rendition of the RTC Decision and Amended Order through the
LRA Report dated as early as November 24, 1998 which, as above-quoted, states that the
subject lots were previously applied for registration of title in the cadastral proceedings.
Since it had been duly notified of an existing decision which binds over the subject lots, it
was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the said decision would not affect its claimed
status as owner of the subject lots in fee simple.
 Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. V. Yanagisawa,
G.R. No. 175393, April 11, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Yanagisawa, a Japanese national, and Castañeda, a Filipina, contracted

marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila. Evelyn purchased a townhouse unit
located at Bo. Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila. The Registry of Deeds for Parañaque
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to Castañeda, Filipino, married to
Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen, both of legal age. Yanagsiwa filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the
pendency of the case, Yanagsiwa asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or
encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. At the hearing on the said motion,
Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the properties registered in her
name during the pendency of the case, thus rendering Yanagsiwa‘s application and motion
moot. Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance
Ltd. To secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PAFIN over the
Parañaque townhouse unit. The instrument was submitted to the Register of Deeds of
Parañaque City for annotation on the same date.

At the time of the mortgage, Yanagsiwa‘s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending
before the CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Yanagsiwa and Evelyn‘s marriage, and had
ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, including the Parañaque townhouse
unit, with its proceeds to be divided between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did
not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn‘s commitment not to dispose of or
encumber the properties registered.

Issue:

Whether or not Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same issue
was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA

Ruling:

The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of
Yanagsiwa and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is
pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates
that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an "insurmountable
barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC. Petitioner maintains that it
was imperative for the Parañaque RTC to rule on the ownership issue because it was
essential for the determination of the validity of the REM. The Court disagrees.

A review of the complaint shows that Yanagsiwa did not claim ownership of the Parañaque
townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment. It
was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Yanagsiwa‘s incapacity to own real property as their
defense to the suit. They maintained that Yanagsiwa, as an alien incapacitated to own real
estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this
argument is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Yanagsiwa.
This defense does not negate Yanagsiwa‘s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the
Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the registered property, to the
annotations entered on the title.
 Cabili v. Balindong,
A.M. No. RJT-10-2225, September 6, 2011

Facts:

Civil Case No. 06-2954 is an action for damages against the Mindanao State University, et
al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical
injuries to several others. The Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable
for damages. The Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. The MSU, however, failed to
comply with the writ. Thus, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the
MSUs depository bank.

The respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90
from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account. complainant Atty. Cabili, counsel of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave
Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service for interfering with the order of a
co-equal court by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing an amount the
bank.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Balindong acted with gross ignorance of the law, violating the Doctrine
of Judicial Stability or Non-Interference

Ruling:

When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. Non-interference or the
judicial stability doctrine in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice that no court can interfere by injunction
with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to
grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept
of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein
has jurisdiction over its judgment.
 The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Pimentel Jr.,
G.R. No. 136760, July 28, 2003

Facts:

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged mismanagement
of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits
System. During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the
AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However,
the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot
was only P3,000 per square meter. The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to
Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear
and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO directing
the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of
action. The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling:

The issuance of the assailed resolution is without legal basis made by the respondent The
principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress,
execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is
prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with
its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in
Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. The RTC of General Santos City, or any court
for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent appear
and testify before it. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved and the subject matter
of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than the legislature.
 MERALCO v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc.
G.R. No. L-37878, November 25, 1932

Facts:

The Manila Electric Company filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme Court
to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the
Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation paid to the latter. This
relates to the validity of Section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 was
passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted
to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines
and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall
use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other
person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court can sit as board of arbitrators.

Ruling:

Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal
for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
Supreme Court represents one of the three divisions of power in the government. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power,
to perform any task, or to assume any duty pertaining to or connected with the administration
of judicial functions.
 Lopez v. Roxas,
G.R. No. L-25716, July 28, 1966

Facts:

Lopez and Roxas were candidates for the position of vice president of the Philippines in the
general elections. Petitioner Fernando was later proclaimed to the latter office. Respondent
filed, with the presidential electoral tribunal, contesting the election of petitioner herein as
Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he, but said respondent,
who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office. Petitioner Lopez instituted in
the Supreme Court the present original action, for prohibition with preliminary injunction,
against respondent Roxas, to prevent the presidential electoral tribunal from hearing and
deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 1793,
creating the tribunal is unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 1793 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

The Constitution intended to vest Congress with discretion to determine by law whether or
not the election of a president-elect or that of a vice-president-elect may be contested and, if
Congress should decide in the affirmative, which court of justice shall have jurisdiction to
hear the contest. Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has
merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with
original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are
booth trial courts and appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one
Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority
to discharged said dual functions. So, the PET is not inferior to the SC , it is the same Court
although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the
SC in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of RA no. 1793 does not
entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in
the President.
 Vera v. Avelino,
G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946

Facts:

Commission on Elections submitted to the President and the Congress a report regarding
the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of
terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and
Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the
report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been
included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members
of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election. Petitioners
then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution,
praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their
senatorial duties.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

No court has ever held and will ever hold that it possesses power to direct the Chief
Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. The rule is
non-interference. The Court could not order one branch of the Legislative to reinstate a
member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the
classic pattern of checks and balances.
 Electromat Manufacturing and Recording Corporation v. Lagunzad,
G.R. No. 172699, July 27, 2011

Facts:

Respondent applied for the registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations with its
supporting documents. BLR issued Certification of Creation of Loca, pursuant to Department
Order No.40-03. The union has submitted copies of the ratified CBL, the minutes of the
CBL‘s adoption and ratification, the minutes of the organizational meetings, the names and
addresses of the union officers, the list of union members; the list of rank-and-file employees
in the company, a certification of non-existence of a CBA in the company, the resolution of
affiliation with WASTO and the latter‘s acceptance and their Charter Certificate. These
submissions were properly verified as required by the rules. In sum, the petitioner has no
factual basis for questioning the union‘s registration, as even the requirements for
registration as an independent local have been substantially complied with. Petitioner filed a
petition to cancel the union‘s registration certificate for the union‘s failure to comply with
Article 234 of the Labor Code. DOLE-NCR dismissed the petition. In the appeal, the BLR
affirmed the dismissed petition. Petitioner sought relief from the Court of Appeals through a
petition for certiorari contending that BLR committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the union‘s registration.

Issue:

Whether or not D.O. 40-03 expanded or amended the Labor Code resulting in an invalid
exercise of its delegated rule-making power.

Ruling:

The issuance of D.O. 40-03 is a valid exercise of delegated powers as it merely

implemented the intent of the law that in imposing lesser requirements in the case of a
branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a
local union with a federation or national union in order to increase the local union‘s
bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor. D.O. 40-03 was made to
recognize the distinctions made in the law itself between federations and their local chapters,
and independent unions; local chapters seemingly have lesser requirements because they
and their members are deemed to be direct members of the federation to which they are
affiliated.
 Valmonte v. Belmonte,
G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989

Facts:

Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Belmonte, GSIS General Manager, requesting that he be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure a clean loan. Belmonte replied through the Deputy General Counsel of the
GSIS whose opinion is that is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all
those who borrow from it; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

Issue:

Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional
right to information

Ruling:

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that
these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured government employees. The public nature of the loanable funds of the
GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly
a matter of public interest and concern. The Court is convinced that transactions entered into
by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within
the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings. However, although citizens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution
does not accord them a right accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
 Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano,
G.R. No 133215, July 15, 1999

Facts:

Integrated Labor Organization-Pagpalain Haulers Workers Union filed a petition for

certification election with the Department of Labor and Employment. ILO-PHILS attached to
the petition copies of its charter certificate, its constitution and by-laws, its books of account,
and a list of its officers and their addresses. Then, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the books of account submitted by ILO-PHILS were not verified
by its treasurer and attested to by its president, a required by Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is a legitimate union

Ruling:

As can be gleaned from the above, the Labor Code does not require the submission of
books of account in order for a labor organization to be registered as a legitimate labor
organization. The requirement that books of account be submitted as a requisite for a
registration can be found only in Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, prior to its amendment by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997.

Under Article 234 of the Labor Code, the requirements for registration of a labor organization
shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law
to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the
following requirements, registration fee, names of its officers, their addresses, the principal
address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of
the workers who participated in such meetings, names of all its members comprising at least
twenty percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, if the
applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial
reports and four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its
adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it.
 People v. Veneracion,
G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995

Facts:

On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in
a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding
from it was seen floating along Del Pan St. Binondo, Manila. On the basis of sworn
statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of the
victim, Abundio Lagunday, and Henry Lagarto, of Tondo, Manila were later charged with the
crime of Rape with Homicide, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071. Subsequently
thereafter, Ernesto Cordero, Rolando Manlangit, , Richard Baltazar, and Catalino Yaon, of
Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape with Homicide, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-138071.

The two criminal cases were consolidated and all the accused pleaded ―Not Guilty‖. Abundio
Lagunday who was already dead, was dropped from the Information. The trial court
rendered a decision finding the defendants Lagarto and Cordero guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law. Disagreeing with the
sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying
that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents
Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not death be imposed instead of reclusion perpetua

Ruling:

The law plainly and unequivocably provides that "when by reason or on the occasion of
rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for
the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the
circumstances described, other than a sentence of death. The trial judge's misgivings in
imposing the death sentence because of his religious convictions. The Rules of Court
mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and
civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." This is not a case of a magistrate
ignorant of the law. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to
roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. This
is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to
impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction
in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of
Death.
 Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General of the Philippines,
G.R. No. L-17888, October 29, 1986

Facts:

Petitioner seeks a refund from respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from
the margin fee under Republic Act No. 2609 for the importation of urea and formaldehyde,
as separate units, used for the production of synthetic glue of which it was a manufacturer.
Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
'urea' and 'formaldehyde', as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resins known as 'urea formaldehyde'. Congress intended to exempt 'urea' and
'formaldehyde' separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called 'urea fomaldehyde' not the latter as a finished product. Furthermore, it is well
settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and
formaldehyde' is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President.

Issue:

Whether or not Resin‘s contention is with merit

Ruling:

It has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and
is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
Certainly, whatever may be said of the statutory language found in Republic Act 2609, it
would be going too far to assert that there was such a clear and manifest intention of
legislative will as to compel such a refund. In the same way that the Auditor General, which
is intended to implement the constitutional mandate that no money can be paid out of the
treasury except in the pursuance of appropriation made by law, must carefully see to it that
there is in fact such statutory enactment, no refund, which likewise represents a diminution
of public funds in the treasury, should be allowed unless the law clearly so provides. The
Auditor General would be sadly remiss in the discharge of his responsibility under the
Constitution if, having the statute before him, he allows such a refund when, under the terms
thereof, it cannot be done.
 Barrera v. Barrera,
G.R. No. L-31589, July 31, 1970

Facts:

Respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico of the Court of First Instance of Cavite was cited for
contempt in accusing that the court had delegated its Clerk a power which is applicable only
to Chief Justice. When this case was set for hearing, the presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, the Hon. Judge Jose B. Jimenez, was appointed as District Judge
for the Court of First Instance of Manila, and on said date, he did not hold court session. This
case was left pending, and it was reset for hearing however the case was not again heard
because the new Presiding Judge did not arrive due to bad weather.

The counsel for the plaintiff in Barrera v. Barrera, a civil case requested that the Court,
presided over by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico be authorized to continue with the hearing
of the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. When the judge assumed
his duties, he found no written authority by the Honorable Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court extended to this branch for it to be able to continue trying the case. Rule 22 on the
subject of adjournments and postponements, the Court can only apply its clear and express
provisions; and that upon the lapse of three months from the first day of trial on the merits,
the trial judge lost control of the same, and may not continue trying the same for the only
thing possible to be done is to dismiss the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the refusal by respondent Judge to apply the law as interpreted by the
Highest Tribunal lead him to his contempt

Ruling:

Under the said rule, not even the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court could validly, legally
and morally extend power to the trial Judge to reacquire control of the case tantamount to
reacquiring jurisdiction of the subject matter when the said written authority is extended far
beyond the three months limit in the said Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. Reiterated by the
Hon. Tribunal that when it comes to time or period in order that it could be extended, the
petition for extension should be filed before its expiration or there is nothing that could be
extended.

The respondent judge was further reprimanded not for his opinions but in his allegation that
the clerk of court was permitted to exercise an authority which applicable only to the chief
Justice. Judges are not expected to be wholly in agreement with every decision of this
Tribunal. Nor are they required to keep locked up within their breasts their own views on
such matters. The misdeed of respondent Judge is compounded by such an accusation
apparently arising from his adamantine conviction that a doctrine of this Court that fails to
meet his approval need not be applied. No inferior court judge, to repeat, can be permitted to
arrogate unto himself such a prerogative at war with everything that the rule of law stands
for. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their
bearings. The rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position
that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned
and he has only one legal way to do that.
 Macalintal v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

Facts:

Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition as a taxpayer and as a
lawyer. He seeks for a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated.

He speculates that Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency
requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. The petitioner further argues that Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should
not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suff rage by
providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence
requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should
not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the
qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 9189 unconstitutional

Ruling:

Contrary to petitioner‘s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the Philippines
abroad" is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are
components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile
in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from
this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country
does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin,
the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that
he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit
required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law. The petition was partly granted. Some portions
of R.A. No. 9189 are declared void for being unconstitutional.
 Angara v. Electoral Commission,
G.R. 45081, July 15, 1936

Facts:

Angara took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth
Government. The National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those
who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
However, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner
before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest
that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier
resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent‘s
protest. The case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

Issue:

Whether or not the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly

Ruling:

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
 Alejandrino v. Quezon,
G.R. No. 22401, September 11, 1924

Facts:

The respondent senators, including Senate Pres. Manuel Quezon, issued a resolution
depriving petitioner, Senator Jose Alejandrino for senator of the Twelfth District, of all the
prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first
of January 1924, having found the petitioner guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Vince de Vera,
Senator for the Sixth District, on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in
the course of the debate regarding the credentials of Senator Alejandrino. The petitioner filed
mandamus and injunction against the senate president from executing the said resolution
and to declare the said resolution null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to annul a senate resolution against the
petitioner

Ruling:

No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it possesses the power
to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular
action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of either of the other
departments, it will be the end of popular government as we know it in democracies. Neither
the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of
their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to
consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. The power to control is the power
to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may,
nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
 Bengzon v. Drilon,
G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992

Facts:

Some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court‘s
General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court
providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided
for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. It turns out that PD 644
which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no
law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried
to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 produce no
result.

Issue:

Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.

Ruling:

Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto
is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item.
 Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

Facts:

The Philippines and the USA entered into an agreement called the VFA. The agreement was
treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Estrada
with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA
defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, that
the VFA violates Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether the Visiting Force Agreement is constitutional

Ruling:

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met. The phrase ―recognized as a treaty‖
means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit
the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to
accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. It is inconsequential whether the
United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international
law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to
be taken equally as a treaty.
 Manalo v. Sistoza,
G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999

Facts:

Former President Corazon signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating the DILG. The said
Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed
by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant
thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to
permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent
to Director. The police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective
positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject
appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contends that RA 6975 requires
confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and
higher by the CA, the PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically
requires confirmation by the CA, and Respondent in allowing disbursements in favor of
respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is
acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional

Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP

Ruling:

Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments
to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the
Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is
well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute
and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and
enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections.

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the
military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under
the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
 Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors,
G.R. No. 109713, April 6, 1995

Facts:

The petitioner was proclaimed winner in election for SK chairman of Barangay Mabalor,
Ibaan, Batangas and is by the Board of Election Tellers acting as the Board of Canvassers,
on the basis of its tally which showed Mercado winning by one vote over his rival, private
respondent Crisanto. The petitioner‘svictory was, short-lived because after proclamation as
the winner, Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the BES questioning the results of the
election. He alleged that the BET Chairman, drinking gin and coke during the counting, had
invalidated some votes without consulting the other board members. The BES ordered the
reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The recount
reversed the earlier tally in favor of Pangilinan, who was proclaimed the duly elected SK
Chairman by the BES, which issued for that purpose its own Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC has jurisdictions over contests involving SK elections

Ruling:

Court recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts performed by the BES
pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 under the operative fact doctrine;
thus, we hold that the Regional Trial Court is competent to review the decision of the BES in
election controversies within its level. As correctly stated by the petitioner, it is a basic
principle in administrative law that the absence of a provision for the review of an
administrative action does not preclude recourse to the courts. It is generally understood
that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an
underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial
review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial
rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and unjust adjudications and forestalls arbitrary.
 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

Facts:

President Aquino signed the Philippine Truth Commission as executive order no.1. the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper
and subject to his control.

The petitioners argue that Executive Order No.1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation, illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the ―Truth
Commission‖ with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987 and that it violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

On the other hand, respondents‘ arguments are Executive No.1 does not arrogate the
powers of Congress because the President‘s executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of
1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies and does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.

Issue:

Whether or not the said executive order is constitutional

Ruling:

No, Executive No. 1 violates of the equal protection clause therefore must be removed. It
cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared
towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to
remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the means. No matter how noble
and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in
accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be
allowed. The Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will
upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in
consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. The
Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law.
Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.
The Executive No. 1 declared to be unconstitutional.
 De Castro v. JBC,
G.R. No. 1912002, March 17, 2010

Facts:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next
Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does
not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred. Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of
the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to
appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy.

Issue:

Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

Ruling:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Section 14, Section 15, and
Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President
to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is
absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that
was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be
clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely
within Section 4 (1) thereof.
In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice del Castillo,
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010

Facts:

Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted from their
works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya v. Romulo case. The
Malaya Lolas Organization members, seek reconsideration of the Court‘s decision which
dismissed their charges, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against the ponente in
connection with the decision he wrote for the Court in the said case. In the Blacks Law
Dictionary, the worlds leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision,
defines plagiarism as the deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original
ideas or creative expressions as ones own.

Issue:

Whether or not the decisions of Supreme Court applicable to plagiarism.

Ruling:

The Court said, the evidence found by the Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to
these authors appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision. The Court believed since
there‘s no motive for omitting the attribution for the accidental delete the same at the time of
cleaning up the final draft. In short, with the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-
up, the passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their face that
the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off
as his own.

Indeed, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original
piece of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government for the
public good. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the object of every decision of a court
of law. Maria Lourdes Sereno cites in her dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial
Opinion Writing Handbook:

A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts
published in a legal periodical or language from a partys brief are used without giving
attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve
the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings
intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more
importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating
cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
 Vinuya v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

Facts:

The petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS. They narrate that during the
Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the
women as part of the destruction of the village. As a result of the actions of their Japanese
tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries,
pain and disability, and mental emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they
have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered
the establishment of the ―comfort women stations in the Philippines.

However, said officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japan‘s compliance
with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also argued that the
comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture.
They alleged that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from
which no derogation is possible, as such, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal
obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.

Issue:

Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners‘ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.

Ruling:

In this case, the Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners‘ cause
would be inimical to our country‘s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the Court to
overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed. In the international sphere, traditionally, the
only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has
been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but
rather, the states own rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its
protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. The Court fully
agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as
well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. However, it does not
automatically imply that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute
international crimes.
 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011

Facts:

Four days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez
upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao. HOR
Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2,
directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business Private respondents.
Reyes group filed an impeachment complaint against a herein petitioner endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus. HOR
provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th
Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who
then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House Committee on Justice.

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in
form. The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was
published. After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust, sufficient in substance. Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging
Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these
violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public respondent
committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to
impeachment proceeding

Ruling:

The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in
the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted asa whole and "one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Indubitably, the Court is not
asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 176951, June 28, 2011

Facts:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities
into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into
cities.During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of
RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No.
29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.During the 13th
Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which
was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law without the President‘s
signature.Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:

Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal
protection clause

Ruling:

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or
determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not
have pending cityhood bills.
 Aquino v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Facts:

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of
candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10
months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in
his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed
the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting
on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later
issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the
issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for
the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Consequently, the order
of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he obtain the winning number of
votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now
encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or
whether or not he was domiciled in the same.

Ruling:

The COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against
the petitioner is valid. The Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that
he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the
same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. His certificate indicated that he was
also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as
the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands consistently
clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac. While property
ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the
fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with
the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate
that the sole purpose of transferring his physical residence is not to acquirer‘s new residence
or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of Makati
City.
 Bitonio, Jr. v. COA,
G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004

Facts:

The petitioner was appointed as Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE.
The Acting Secretary Brillantes of DOLE designated him to be the DOLE representative to
the Board of Directors of Philippine Economic Zone Authority. Due to his designation, he
receives per diems from PEZA for every meeting he attended. On July 31, 1998, the
respondent disallowed the payment due to the principle established in Civil Liberties case
stating that it is unconstitutional for Cabinet member, their deputies and assistants holding
other offices in addition to their primary office and to receive compensation.

On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration to the COA on the
following grounds:

1. The Supreme Court in its Resolution dated August 2, 1991 on the motion for clarification
filed by the Solicitor General modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which
limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials
given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other
appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.

2. Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 provides the legal basis for the movant to receive per diem.
Said law was enacted in 1995, four years after the Civil Liberties Union case became final. In
expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to have been
aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties
Union case.

On January 30, 2001, the COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, thus filing this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors‘ meetings as representative of the Secretary of
Labor.

Ruling:

The petitioner‘s contentions are untenable. It must be noted that the petitioner‘s presence in
the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or special
appointment for such position.11 Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving
compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the
petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. It cannot allow the
petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a
better right as his principal. Whatever laws and rules the member in the Board is covered, so
is the representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the
representative is, likewise, not exempted.
 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000

Facts:

On June 18, 1999, Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S. a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the U.S. for violation
of conspiracy to commit offense, attempt to evade tax, fraud by wire, radio, or television,
false statement, and election contribution in name of another. The respondent requested the
petitioner during the evaluation process of the extradition to furnish him copies of the
extradition request from the U.S. government, that he be given ample time to comment
regarding the extraition request against him after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the meantime. The petitioner denied
the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the Republic of the Philippines and US Extradition
Treaty. The respondent filed a mandamus, a certiorari and a prohibition to enjoin the
petitioner, secretary of DFA and NBI from performing any acts directed to the extradition of
the respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of notice and hearing.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process

Ruling:

The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights
that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked
by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.
P.D. No. affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once
the petition is filed in court. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable
extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US
government request for his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still
under evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear
of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to
flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. As
it comes from the branch of our government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it
deserves the careful consideration of this Court.
 Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment,
G.R. No. L-58184, October 20, 1981

Facts:

On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair
labor practices and the implementation of the Code of Conduct. Several conciliation
meetings called by the Ministry followed, with the Minister manifesting its willingness to have
a Revised Code of Conduct but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being
imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent.
Subsequently, respondent certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
and enjoined any strike at the private respondent‘s establishment. Private respondent,
following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding
the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh,
resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal cause
of the labor dispute. It is the submission of petitioner labor union that "Batas Pambansa Blg.
130 in so far as it amends article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable Minister
of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify
strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect
make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative
powers.

Issue:

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:

The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of
scrutiny. The President ―shall have control of the ministries.‖ It may happen, therefore, that a
single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent,
however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is
an official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a
parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character. However, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore
the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to
labor. Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or likely to cause
strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is required to assure the rights of
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work. An instance of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is
ordained by the fundamental law, the protection of labor, is ignored or disregarded.
 United BF Homeowner’s Association v. BF Homes, Inc.
G.R. No. 124873, July 14, 1999

Facts:

Because of financial difficulties in year 1988, SEC place respondent under receivership to
undergo a 10 year rehabilitation program appointing attorney Orendain as receiver.
Preliminary to the rehabilitation, attorney Orendain entered in to tripartite agreement with the
BF Paranyake homes owners association and the confederation homes owners association
which resulted in the creation of the united home owners association and was registered
with the Home insurance guaranty corporation. Respondent through its receiver turn over to
the petitioner the administration and operation of the subdivision clubhouse at 37 Pilar st.
and a strip of open space in Concha Cruz garden row. On 1994, the first receiver was relief
and a new committee of receivers was appointed and based on the BFI‘s title on the main
road, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the different Home owners
association informing them that they are now responsible for the security of the subdivision
as a basic requirements. For its rehabilitation. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with a
preliminary injunction with the HIGC against the respondent who issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent from taking over the clubhouse. Respondent filed
a petition for prohibition for the issuance of the temporary restraining order and to enjoin the
HIGC from proceeding with the case.

Issue: Whether or not, the HIGC was correct in promulgating the rules of procedure

Ruling:

The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised
rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of
Presidential Decree 902-A. The legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative
officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose,
the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which
conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-
making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate. Rule II,
Section 1(b) of HIGC's "Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners'
Disputes" is void, without ruling on the validity of the rest of the rules. The HIGC exercises a
very limited jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes.
 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton,
G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005

Facts:

The respondents made a voluntary offer to sell their land to DAR to avail of certain
incentives under the law, the land they inherited is in Masbate which has been devoted to
cow and calf breeding. When CARP took effect, it included to its coverage farms used for
raising livestock, poultry and swine. , respondents filed with DAR a formal request to
withdraw their offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from the coverage of CARL,
when Supreme Court declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included in the
definition of agricultural land in Luz Farms Case. DAR partially granted the application of the
respondents for exemption applying the retention limits.

Issue:

Whether or not DAR Administrative Order is constitutional.

Ruling:

It is unconstitutional. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or
agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.

Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial,
not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Respondents‘ family acquired
their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle
in Masbate. There is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in
or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may
lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed
that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural
purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in
the case of respondents. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended
by the 1987 Constitution.
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts:

As the nation celebrating the 20 th anniversary of EDSA, Arroyo issued Presidential

Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and General Order No. 5
implementing PP 1017. The reason of the issuances was the conspiracy among some
military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People‘s Army, and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to assassinate the president. All programs related to celebration
of Edsa are cancelled and all permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments
are revoked. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless
arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented. During the
dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested petitioner Randolf David, a UP
professor newspaper columnist without a warrant. After one week, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1021 to lift PP 1017.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

Ruling:

The lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 would have normally rendered the
case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were
committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied powers are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility
and private business affected with public interest.

On the other hand, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President
acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the
provisions of PP 1017. But the words acts of terrorism found in G.O. No. 5 have not been
legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from
the said G.O.

The warrantless arrest of petitioners, the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members, the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint
on the press and the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of
some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the
law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
 Banda v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010

Facts:

Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of
all their co-employees at the National Printing Office. On October 25, 2004, President
Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over
the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of
the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that it is beyond the
executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by
former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and because it
paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO, Executive Order No. 378 violates
petitioners security of tenure.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition is qualified as a class suit.

Whether or not President Arroyo can amend or repeal EO No. 285 by the mere issuance of
another executive order

Ruling:

In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, the Court held that an action does
not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Section
12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit as the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it
is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to
be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all
concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have
the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.

It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. In
the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action
is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of
streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well
within the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of
the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept.
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,
G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006

Facts:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor introduced Philippine Senate Resolution
No. 455, "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation, Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation due to the alleged improprieties in
their operations by their respective Board of Directors."

Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No.1 that ―No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.‖

Issue:

Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding.

Ruling:

Congress‘ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal.
Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the
PCGG members and staff from the Congress‘ power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress‘ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even
extends ―to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.‖ PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress,
in the absence of constitutional basis. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to
respond to subpoena, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to
testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
 Lina v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna,
G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001

Facts:

Respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz,
Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor‘s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied
by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. As a result of
this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint,
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for
the following reliefs, a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the
defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, an
order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet, and an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995. The respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

Ruling:

The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's
permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the
mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in
the province of Laguna.As a policy statement expressing the local government‘s objection to
the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government‘s autonomy to air its
views which may be contrary to that of the national government‘s. However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government
units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming
from Congress.
 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994

Facts:

PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations
angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and
cancelling existing business permit to establishment for the operation of casino, and
Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its
violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that both violated P.D.
1869, permitting the operation of casinos centralized and regulated by PAGCOR. Petitioners
contends that pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority
to prohibit the operation of casino for the common good.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinances are valid

Ruling:

Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those
of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
The power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on
land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D.
1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
 Solicitor General v. MMDA,
G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991

Facts:

The Court held in Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M.
Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD
1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled
vehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of driver‘s licenses for traffic
violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for
reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor.
Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein
there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the
confiscation of driver‘s licenses and removal of license plate numbers.

The MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself to detach license plate
of unattended motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the
Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that
the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance. The
Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it
represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 11 is valid

Ruling:

No. There is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it

appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. The
completeness of the statute making the delegation and the presence of a sufficient standard.
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms
and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to
implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law
shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in
the case at bar. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only
as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and
conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case, the
requisites of a valid ordinance must be applied which is laid by the accepted principles
governing municipal corporations. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were
enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the
effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and
enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators.
 Balacuit v. Court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City,
G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988

Facts:

Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya
and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. The
Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640 on 21 April 1969, ―penalizing
any person , group of persons , entity or engaged in the business of selling admission tickets
to any movie to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket
should only be charged one half.‖ Petitioners Carlos Balacuit, et al as managers of theaters
assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour
of the respondents hence the petition for review. Petitioners contend that it violates due
process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, and confiscatory and
an undue restraint of trade.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 640 is constitutional and a valid exercise of police power

Ruling:

The ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the assailed ordinance be held
constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To invoke the exercise the police power,
it must be for the interest of the public without interfering with private rights and adoptive
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. It is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that
such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must
be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner to fix a
price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself
and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of
admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve
could stay away. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation
of a common right.
 Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013

Facts:

St. Scholastica College is an owner of four parcels of land, the property is enclosed by a tall
concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an ordinance which provides that wall and
fences shall be built within a five-meter allowance between the front monument line and the
building line. The Marikina City Government sent a letter to SSC ordering them to replace
the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the RTC of
Marikina which was granted and affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power by the
City Government of Marikina.

Ruling:

The CA was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances
to promote the health, moral, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people. The test of a valid ordinance substantive requirements are it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute, must not be unfair or oppressive, must not be
partial or discriminatory, must not prohibit but may regulate trade, must be general and
consistent with public policy and must not be unreasonable.

The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment
of prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of
crime to ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners,
however, is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly
oppressive to private rights. Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will
substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
 Tañada v. Angara,
G.R. No. 118298, May 2, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners pray to nullify, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine

Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement
through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads
of various executive offices concerned therewith. They contended that WTO agreement
violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to ―develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos to give preference to qualified Filipinos
and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods‖ as the WTO requires the Philippines ―to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products‖ and that the WTO ―intrudes,
limits and/or impairs‖ the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court. As
it gives foreign trading intervention, they believe that the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution was taken for granted.

Issue:

Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly
limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power

Ruling:

The agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty,
particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was
acting in the proper manner when it concurred with the President‘s ratification of the
agreement.

In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution ―adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.‖ By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. ―A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.‖ The WTO reliance cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in
fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on ―equality and reciprocity,‖ the fundamental law
encourages industries that are ―competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,‖ thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in
favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability
and tenacity to compete internationally.
 Wylie v. Rarang,
G.R. No. 74135, May 28, 1992

Facts:

Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James Williams was the
commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Aurora Rarang was
assigned as merchandise control guard in the Office of Wylie, in his capacity as asstistant
admin. officer, supervised the publication of ―Plan of the Day‖ published daily by the US
Naval Base Station. The POD featured important announcements to military personnel. One
features of the POD was the ―action lineinquiry‖, a telephone answering device intended to
provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer. The line inquiry mentioned a certain
―AURING‖ as a disgrace to her division. The PR was the only one who was named ―Auring‖
in the Office of the ProvostMarshal. As a result thereof, she was investigated by her
superior. The PR commenced an action for damages in the CFI of Zambales against M.H.
Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the US Naval Base alleging that the article constituted
false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her. The TC ruled in
favor of the PR and dismissed the suit against the US Naval Base. The IAC affirmed the
judgment of the TC with modifications as to the amount of damages awarded.

Issue:

Whether or not the American naval officers who commit a crime or tortious act while
discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit.

Ruling:

The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed
to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or
where there is showing of bad faith. In this particular case, the records show that the
offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and that he approved
it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person‘s act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, stating that, Whoever by act or omission, causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Moreover, Art. 2219(7), Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case
of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Indeed, the imputation of theft contained in
the POD was a defamation against the character and reputation of the PR. Such act or
omission was ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty.
 Deutsche Bank Ag Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013

Facts:

The petitioner remitted to the respondent an amount of P 67,688,553 as fifteen percent of

the profit remittance tax on its regular banking unit net income remitted to the Deutsche bank
for 2002 and prior taxable years pursuant to the National Internal Revenue Code.
Considering that they made an overpayment, the petitioner filed with the BIR Large
Taxpayers Assessment and Investigation Division an administrative claim for refund or a tax
credit certificate representing the alleged excess BPRT paid. Also, they requested from the
International Tax Affairs Division for a confirmation of its entitlement to a preferential tax rate
of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty. The alleged inaction of the BIR on the claim, the
petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals reiterating its refund. The
claim was denied on the ground that the application for tax treaty relief was not filed with
ITAD prior to the payment of BPRT, thereby violating the fifteen-day period mandated under
Section III, par 2 of the Revenue Memorandum Order No.1-2000. Also, the CTA Second
Division relied on an en banc decision of the CTA that before the benefits of a tax treaty may
be extended to a foreign corporation, the latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax
treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure to strictly comply with the provision of RMO No. 1-2000 will
deprive persons or corporations the benefit of a tax treaty

Ruling:

Article II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides for the adherence to the general principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. Every treaty is binding upon the parties and
obligations must be performed. There is nothing in RMO 1-2000 indicating a deprivation of
entitlement to a tax treaty for the failure to comply with the fifteen-day period. The denial of
availment of tax relief for the failure to apply within the prescribed period would impair the
value of the tax treaty. Moreover, the obligation to comply with the tax treaty must take
precedence over the objective of RMO 1-2000 because the non-compliance with tax treaties
would have negative implications on international affairs and would discourage foreign
investments. There is no reason to deprive petitioner of the benefit of a preferential tax rate
of 10% BPRT in accordance with the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
 Bayan Muna v. Romulo,
G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011

Facts: Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was
impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover
those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge
d·Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant
petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification,
approval and concurrence process.

Issue:

Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in violation of the Rome Statute and
Philippine Sovereignty

Ruling:

Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US or with the consent of the RP or the
US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both
countries to the Rome Statute have been met. There is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws... and the Rome Statute.

President Arroyo signed into law Republic Act No. (RA) 9851, otherwise known as the
"Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other
Crimes Against Humanity." The authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused
persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State
pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties. The basic premise rests on the
interpretation that if it does not decide to prosecute a foreign national for violations of RA
9851, the Philippines has only two options, to surrender the accused to the proper
international tribunal or surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is pursuant
to the applicable extradition laws and treaties. Rome Statute itself rejects the concept of
universal jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated therein as evidenced by it requiring State
consent.
 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 104768, July 21 2003

Facts:

After a successful EDSA revolution, President Aquino issued EO No.1 creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government created an AFP Anti-Graft Board tasked to
scrutinize the reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by any AFP personnel
(active or retired). The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged―ill-gotten‖ wealth of
respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas. Along with this, the Constabulary raiding team
served a search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas‘ alleged mistress, Elizabeth
Dimaano. The Board then concluded that Ramas be prosecuted for violating the―Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)‖ and ―Forfeiture of unlawfully Acquired Property (RA
1379)‖. Thereafter, they filed a petition for forfeiture against him before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case on several grounds one of which is that there was
an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated

Issue:

Whether or not the search of Dimaano‘s home lawful

Ruling:

In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental and
natural right, we were aided by philosophy and history. Even in the absence of a
Constitution, the right against unlawful seizure can be found in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nevertheless,
even during the interregnum, the Filipino people under the Covenant and Declaration
continued to enjoy almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
As stated in Article 2(1) of the Covenant, the State is required ―to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant. Further, under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that no one else shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration also provides
in its Article 17(2) that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. ―The Court has
taken into consideration the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.
 Pandi v. CA,
G.R. No. 116850, April 11, 2002

Facts:

Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the Department of Health
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao issued a Memorandum designating Pandi,
who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-
APGH, Lanao del Sur on August 9, 1993. In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr.
Mamasao Sani, then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the
DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mutilan
issued Office Order No. 07 designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge. On September 15,
1993. Dr. Sani challenged the Memorandum transferring him in a complaint filed with the
RTC claiming therein that he was appointed as provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH in
a permanent capacity. Dr. Saber filed a petitioner for quo warranto with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, claiming that he is lawfully designated OIC. The CA issued a TRO
enjoining Pandi from further discharging his functions as OIC of the IPHO-APGH.

Dr. Sani filed a Motion for Intervention. After President Ramos issued E.O. 133 transferring
the powers & functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of ARMM, Dr.
Macacua issued a 2nd Memorandum reiterating the designation of Dr. Pandi as OIC and the
detail of Dr. Sani to the Regional office in Cotabato City. Drs. Pandi & Macacua sought the
dismissal of Dr. Saber‘s petitioner on the ground that the issues therein had become moot &
academic because of the enactment of the ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the
execution of the Memo of agreement between the DOH-National Government and the
ARMM Regional Government.The Court of Appeals designation of Dr. Saber as OIC upheld,
the Provincial Governor has the power to appoint the provincial health officer under the LGC
of 1991; Dr. Sani cannot claim to have permanent designation as provincial health officer
because he was not appointed by the governor.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment of Saber is valid

Ruling:

The appointment of Sani is void. When he was detailed in Cotabato City, the powers
andfunctions of the DOH were not yet transferred to the Regional Government, and the
Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the
provincial health officers in the ARMM. When Saber was appointed by the provincial
governor on September 15, 1993, the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a
national government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer
was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. The
Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial health officer. The
Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health
officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial
Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH,
Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void.
The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only
after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly
on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994.
 CHAPTERS 4-8
JUDICIAL REVIEW • CASE LAW AND PRECEDENT • ANALYTIC REASONING •
THE DECISION • THE DISSENTING OPINION
________________________________________________________________________

Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 156556-57, October
4, 2011.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and supplemental petition for mandamus,
specifically assailing National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, as
well as Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known
as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). Also assailed is Rule 33 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA.
On June 8, 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the
electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation
(NPC).
On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the
NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all NPC
personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003and shall be entitled to separation
benefits.
As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with
thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated.
However, amongst the petitions raised – it is noteworthy that petitioners argued that Section
11, Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being violative of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of secretaries as board of directors of National Power
Corporation valid.
HELD:
The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were designation by
Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they were
designated as members of the Board of Directors. Designation connotes an imposition of
additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon
the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.
The legal basis of an employee‘s right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued
and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation. This Court,
therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the Cabinet, as ex-officio
members of the NPB, valid.
SMART Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No.
151908, August 12, 2003.

FACTS:
Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to
effect the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc.
(Globe). Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss
the case. I also pointed out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such
service without prior NTC approval. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
ruled that both Smart and Globe were ―equally blameworthy‖ and issued an Order penalizing
both on the ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior
approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the NTC Order.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS
or texting services.
Whether or not SMS is a VAS under Public Telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995.

HELD:
No. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue
providing SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to
classify it as VAS. However, the move should be implemented properly, through
unequivocal regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-
handed manner. This should not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit
of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad
grant, jurisdiction over Globe and Smart‘s SMS offerings, including questions of rates and
customer complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication could have been avoided
had the NTC adopted a proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules and regulations
to cope up with the advent of the technologies it superintends. With the persistent advent of
new offerings in the telecommunications industry, the NTC‘s role will become more crucial
than at any time before.

No. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the
NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on
whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity
with the PTA. The Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within
a cumbersome regulatory regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the
traditionally regimented business in an elementary free state to make business decisions,
avowing that it is under this atmosphere that the industry would prosper. It is disappointing
at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately. But it is ignominious if the
spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented
haphazardly.
 Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara and respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the
first district of the Province of Tayabas in the September 17, 1395 election. Petitioner was
proclaimed to be a member-elect of the National Assembly by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers. Thereafter, petitioner took his oath. The National Assembly passed a
Resolution, confirming proclamation of Angara. Ynsua filed before the respondent Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of petitioner, and praying that said
respondent be declared elected member, or that the election of said position be nullified. The
respondent denied petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest." The Solicitor-General
interposing the special defense that the Commission has been created by the Constitution
as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the
Commonwealth Government.
ISSUE: WON the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly
HELD: The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. If the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a void would be created in our constitutional
system, which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework. Upon principle,
reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly." The transfer of the power of determining the election returns and
qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the
science of government. The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. The creation of
the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by
the Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting
through their delegates to the Convention to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created,
and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the
Supreme Court. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the Legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. If the power claimed for the National
Assembly to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of
the Electoral Commission to lay down a period within which protest should be filed were
conceded, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.
 Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957
FACTS: Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed
to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into
and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying
the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes, pending this action. Petitioners likewise prayed that judgment be rendered ousting
respondents from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that
they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary injunction permanent.

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it
questions the legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of
respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as
technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents,
likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without
power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest
the Court of Jurisdiction.

HELD:
No. It was held that the term ―political question‖ connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus
Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to ―those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.‖ It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are
called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate,
as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on
behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen ―upon nomination .. of the party having the
second largest number of votes‖ in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a
political question. The Senate is not clothed with ―full discretionary authority‖ in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in
connection therewith.
 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989.

FACTS:
Ferdinand E. Marcos who was deposed from his seat through the EDSA people power
revolution was forced into exile in 1986. When Marcos was dying, he wished to return to the
country along with his family. However, Pres. Aquino, the president under the revolutionary
government, stood in his way and contended that Marcos cannot return to the country
considering that his return would be a threat to the stability of the government and the
country‘s economy which was just beginning to rise and moving forward. The Marcoses
assert that their right to return to the country is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution and that under international law, the right of Marcos and his family to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

ISSUE:
WON it is within the Executive power of the President to prevent a petitioner from returning
to the Philippines

HELD:
The Supreme Court, by an 8-7 vote, sustained the refusal of the government to allow the
petitioner‘s return on the grounds that it would endanger national security. It is the court's
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land.
However, the right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The
request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect the general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to
the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must
be granted or denied.
 The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015. Page 107

FACTS:
Two tarpaulins were posted in a private housing compound in San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod on February 21, 2013. Each of the two tarpaulins were approximately sized six (6‘)
by ten (10‘) feet, which was posted at the front walls of the cathedral and could be seen by
the whole community. One of the tarpaulins contained a message that says, ―IBASURA RH
Law‖ which was pertaining to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012. The second tarpaulin
contains the heading that said, ―Conscience Vote‖ and below is a list of candidates that are
categorized as ―(Anti-RH) Team Buhay‖ and ―(Pro-RH) Team Patay.‖ These candidates were
classified according to their vote or stand in the passing of the RH Law.
COMELEC said that the tarpaulin was not sponsored nor paid for by any candidate, while
the Diocese of Bacolod admitted that the tarpaulin has names of the candidates of the 2013
elections & not of those politicians who helped in passing the RH Law.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the there was a violation of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies on the part of the petitioners since it was not brought first to the
attention of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether or not the removal notice of the tarpaulin violates the fundamental right of
the petitioner to freedom of expression.

HELD:
No. It was held that there was no violation of the said principle since the controversy
of the case was very evident and that which could be already ripe for adjudication. The
threat of filing an election offense against the petitioner is already enough for them to not
raise it to COMELEC.
Yes. COMELEC‘s argument that the said tarpaulin was election propaganda is not
valid. The Court held that the tarpaulins can merely influence the outcome of the elections,
but it does not necessarily automatically qualify it as election propaganda. Personal opinions
are not covered by the election law thus, there was a violation of the petitioner‘s freedom of
speech.
 Mantruste Systems Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 86540-41, November 6, 1989.
P108

FACTS:
A four interim lease agreement was entered into by Mantruste Systems Inc. (MSI)
with the Development Bank of the Philippines, the owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel. MSI
entered into the agreement in the hopes of operating the hotel for a minimum of three
months or until the properties are sold to MSI or a third party. Under Proclamation No. 50,
the Bayview Hotel was then transferred the Asset Privatization Trust in which DBP informed
MSI of such happening. DBP informed MSI about the termination of the four interim lease in
which the APT granted MSI an extension of 30 days to turnover Bayview Hotel to APT.
MSI then sent a letter saying that they have a legal lien on the Bayview Hotel since
they made advances for the hotel operations and had repairs for the hotel which amounted
to 12 million pesos and that they have leased the property for over a year now. However,
APT said that there was a bidding that MSI did not participate in and that Makati-Agro
Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were the highest bidders for 85 million
pesos. They were awarded the property. MSI them filed an injunction on transferring the
property to the said highest bidders.
The Court of Appeals then said that the Proclamation No. 50 is not unconstitutional
and that it upholds the effectivity of the Constitution. The CA also said that there was no
deprivation of any sort of MSI‘s property rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals‘ decision in not declaring Sec. 31 of
Proclamation No. 50 is right.

HELD:
It was held that Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50 does not violate any provisions of the
Constitution and it does not impair the inherent powers of the court to decide upon and settle
actual controversies.
 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009

FACTS:
The Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation of 1996 or R.A. 8479 was enacted after years of
controlling the downstream oil industry in the Philippines. The Court then said that the law
was invalid because of three provisions but the Congress enacted it nonetheless. Petitioner
Enrique T. Garcia, a congressman then sought to declare the said law as unconstitutional,
saying that it violates Sec. 19 of Article 12 of the Constitution. Petitioner Garcia argued that
the implementation of the said law would be against public interest and that the oligopoly in
the oil industry would just continue and would be dominated by three big companies. He
stated that Section 19 of R.A. 8479 is ―glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition and anti-
people.‖ Petitioner is asking the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has the right to invoke its power of judicial review and
declare the said provision unconstitutional.

HELD:
It was held that the petition of Congressman Garcia fails to raise an actual controversy and
must be an actual case that needs judicial decision. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity as well.
 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 2010.

FACTS:
The broad definition of the crime of terrorism under R.A. 9372 or the Human Security
Act of 2007 which causes a confusion in the implementation of the law by different law
enforcement agencies. The crime of terrorism was defined as ―widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace‖ does not give an actual consideration of what the crime
is. The petitioners are then arguing that this vagueness is a ground for unconstitutionality of
the said act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the vagueness of the definitions of the Human Security Act of 2007
can be a ground for its unconstitutionality.

HELD:
No. The Court held that in order for the petition to prosper, the four requisites of
judicial review should be present and in this case, it lacks the first two requisites which are
the following: an actual case or controversy and that the petitioners should possess locus
standi or legal standing in the controversy at hand.
 Agra v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 133317, June 29, 1999. Page 110

FACTS:
A loan was granted by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to Fil-Eastern Wood
Industries Inc. (Fil-Eastern) amounting to 2.5 million pesos with an interest rate of 12% per
annum. For Fil-Eastern to secure the said loan, it gave the following names for surety:
Cayetano Fererria, Pedro Atienza, Vicente Novales, Antonio Agra, and Napoleon Gamo.
Eventually, Fil-Eastern failed to pay for their loan which amounted to Php 5,297,976.17, with
the attorney's fees still not included.
PNB filed an action for the collection of money from Fil-Eastern and the abovementioned
sureties. The plaintiffs said that the Surety Agreement was void ab initio since it was
acquired with moral influence and pressure. PNB is also barred by laches and estoppel for
not immediately demanding payment from Fil-Eastern even though it fully knew of its
deteriorating finances.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners are held liable as the sureties of Fil-Eastern.
Whether or not PNB is barres by laches and estoppel.

HELD:
It was held by the Court that the petitioners are held liable as sureties of Fil-Eastern because
the Surety Agreement makes them bound with the same obligations as the principal debtor.
It was held that PNB cannot be barred by laches and estoppel because it was raised within
the ten-year prescriptive period.
 Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998. Page 110
FACTS:
In the last quarter of 1995, the government conducted an investigation of the involvement of
different public officials, both local and national, in jueteng and other forms of illegal
gambling. Potenciano A. Roque, who claimed personal knowledge of such gambling
activities, was under the witness protection program. It was then questioned as to why
Roque is under the said program. A petition for review of certiorari was then filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a witness testimony requires prior or simultaneous corroboration at the time
he is admitted into the witness protection, security and benefit program.

HELD:
It was held by the Court that the petition shall not prosper due to its invalidity. There is no
warrant for exercise of judicial power in the aforementioned case.
Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar Regulatory Administration, G.R. No. 208660, March 5,
2014. Page 110

FACTS:
Petitioner Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. (PENSUMIL), a corporation duly established and
existing under Philippine laws, is engaged in the business of milling sugar, while respondent
Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) is a government entity created pursuant to Executive
Order No. 18, series of 1986[6] (EO 18, s. 1986) which is tasked to uphold the policy of the
State "to promote the growth and development of the sugar industry through greater and
significant participation of the private sector, and to improve the working condition of
laborers." Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PENSUMIL committed forum-shopping in filing the case a quo.

HELD:
It was held that the case at bar should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
 Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012. Page 110

FACTS:
Citing previous instances when President Aquino openly... expressed his rejection of
petitioner's appointment as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the
leadership of petitioner for "derailing his administration's mandate," petitioner concluded that
the move to impeach him was the handiwork of President Aquino's party... mates and
supporters, including "hidden forces" who will be benefited by his ouster.

Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs:

(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii)
implementation of Resolution dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or... representatives of
BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting documents on petitioner's or his family's
bank accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on
paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;

(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment:

(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio;

(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and
2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;

(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court's Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February
2011, as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and Making the TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction permanent.
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno on the ground of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner
aside from the fact that they have been openly touted as the likely replacements in the...
event that petitioner is removed from office.
Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint,
and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding
the prosecution during the hearings.
They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this
Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-
Judges during the proceedings.

By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court,
Senator- Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors
and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any... semblance of partiality on
the part of any Senator-Judges.

ISSUES:
Whether respondents committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or
excess of jurisdiction which would require corrective measures from the Court.

HELD:
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"was
foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions
with the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more... by the comparative
strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt."[15] Given their
concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a
matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches
while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this
jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those
traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are... proper subjects of judicial review if
tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
The power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution.
Impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the
influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution's provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution.
Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3,... In the
meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by
more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted
the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar
Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of
the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day
period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional
issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
 Lihaylijhay v. The Honorable House of Representatives, et al.,
G.R. No. 199509, September 11, 2012.

FACTS:
The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery, conviction, and punishment of tax
offenses is a discretionary quasi-judicial matter that cannot be the subject of a writ of
mandamus. It is not a legally mandated ministerial duty. This reward cannot be given to a
person who only makes sweeping averments about undisclosed wealth, rather than specific
tax offenses, and who fails to show that the information which he or she supplied was the
undiscovered pivotal cause for the revelation of a tax offense, the conviction and/or
punishment of the persons liable, and an actual recovery made by the State. Indiscriminate,
expendable information negates a clear legal right and further impugns the propriety of
issuing a writ of mandamus.

A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While this Court exercises original
jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed
without exhausting administrative remedies, in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and when their filing amounts to an act of forum
shopping.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Lihaylihay‘s petition should be granted.

HELD:
It was held that Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It cannot
be a prospective entitlement that is yet to be settled. In Lim Tay v. Court of Appeals,18 this
Court emphasized that "mandamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one
that is already established." In Pefianco v. Moral, this Court underscored that a writ of
mandamus "never issues in doubtful cases."
 Mendoza v. Familara, G.R. No. 191017,
November 15, 2011. Page 116

FACTS:
This petition questions the constitutionality of Section 2[1] of Republic Act No. 9164 (entitled
"An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections,
amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991"). As other barangay officials had done in previous cases, petitioner Constancio F.
Mendoza (Mendoza) likewise questions the retroactive application of the three-consecutive
term limit imposed on barangay elective officials beginning from the 1994 barangay
elections.
Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro in
the 29 October 2007 Barangay Elections. As required by law, Mendoza filed a certificate of
candidacy. Prior thereto, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Balatasan for three (3) consecutive terms.
On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to Disqualify
Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run again
for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and having served, in the
same position for three (3) consecutive terms immediately prior to the 2007 Barangay
Elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 is constitutional
Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 may be applied retroactively

HELD:
In COMELEC v. Cruz settles, the Court ruled that the constitutionality of the three-
consecutive term limit rule no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit
has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect; it was continued under the Local Government Code and can still be
found in the current law. We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of
the law.
The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it
imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679
(1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit.
This consistent imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the
congressional intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the LGC -
followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a
three-term limit for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this issue.
 Automotive Industry Workers’ Alliance v. Romulo,
G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005.

FACTS:
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its affiliated unions call upon the Supreme
Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive
order assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. In an
original action for certiorari, they invoke their status as labor unions and as taxpayers whose
rights and interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive Order 185 dated 10
March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor
arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment. In support of their position, the Unions argue that the NLRC --
created by Presidential Decree 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, during Martial Law
– was an integral part of the Department (then Ministry) of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice. During the time of President
Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was endowed with legislative functions after EDSA I,
Executive Order 292 was issued whereby the NLRC became an agency attached to the
DOLE for policy and program coordination and for administrative supervision. On 2 March
1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act 6715 declaring
that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination only
while the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel,
was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. The subject EO 185, in authorizing the Secretary of
Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and
personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715 set-up, amending the latter law which only
Congress can do. Alberto Romulo (in his capacity as Executive Secretary) and Patricia Sto.
Tomas (in her capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment), as represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on procedural and substantive grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Unions -- which contend that they are suing for and in behalf of their
members (more or less 50,000 workers) –-- has the requisite standing.

HELD: No. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a ―personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.‖ For a citizen to have standing, he must establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Herein, the Unions have not shown that
they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
enactment of EO 185. As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that EO
185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority
conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse,
revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of Labor‘s
disciplinary authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said
to have a direct and specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, and if
at all, only Congress, and not the Unions herein, can claim any injury from the alleged
executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws.
Neither can standing be conferred on the Unions as taxpayers since they have not
established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution.
 Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010. Page 117

FACTS: Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for
being a violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

HELD:
It was held that Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before
this Court involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon.
Unquestionably, theoverarching frameworkaffirmed inTecson v. Commission on Electionsis
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential
election protests while concurrentlyacting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203775, August 5,
2014.

FACTS:
Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC Resolutioncancelling the certificate of registration of the
Alliance of BarangayConcerns (ABC) Party-List which won in the party-list elections in the
2010 national elections. petitioners Associationof Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar
Hernandez (Hernandez) filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorariand/or
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued Minute Resolution.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Minute
Resolution.

HELD: We dismiss the petition. Petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue.In their petition,
it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims "is a non-profit and non-partisan
organizationin the process of formal incorporation, the primary purpose of which is for the
benefit of the common or generalinterest of many flood victims who are so numerous that it
is impracticable to join all as parties," and that petitionerHernandez "is a Tax Payer and the
Lead Convenor of the Association of Flood Victims."
 GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014.

FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9
(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They
contend that such restrictive regulation on allowablebroadcast time violates freedom of the
press, impairs the people‘s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the
exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an ―aggregate total‖ airtime instead of the previous
―per station‖ airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates‘ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime

limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on ―aggregate-based‖ airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the ―aggregate-based‖ airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is especially so in the absence of a clear-
cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-

based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among
the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as
many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his
message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more
readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would
greatly hamper the abilityof such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his
political speech.
 Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015.

FACTS:
June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in
the petition, are the toothed whales and dolphins. Petitioners then applied to this Court for
redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others,
violation of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law
prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction.

HELD:
No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand
Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the
utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum
benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.
 Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011.

FACTS: COA issued a Resolution No. 99-011 on August 19, 1999, with the subject ―Defining
the Commission‘s Policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scout of the Philippines.‖ The
BSP which was created as a public corporation, and that in BSP vs. NLRC, the Supreme
Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a Government Owned and
Controlled Corporation within the meaning of Art. IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution, and that
the BSP is regarded as a government instrumentality under the Administrative Code. For the
purposes of audit supervision, the BSP shall be classified among the government
corporations to be audited by employing the team audit approach. The BSP sought
reconsideration of the COA Resolut

ion in a letter signed by then BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay, saying that it is not
subject to the COA‘s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is under the jurisdiction of the COA?

HELD:
It was held that since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public
corporation or a government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is
subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the
provisions of the BSP Charter.
 Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as ―Acting Director IV‖
of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity.
Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively.
Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the
case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation
of their appointments.

Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a

memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of herein
respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions
on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

ISSUE:
Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the Constitution
Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character

HELD:
No. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC ―shall be independent‖, this
provision should be harmonized with the President‘s power to extend ad interim
appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office
will negate the President‘s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the
rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will
also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original draft of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad interim
appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with
ad interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout
the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the need to
avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it
wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly,
the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the
President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that
otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.
 Castro v. Deloria, G.R. No. 163586, January 27, 2009.
FACTS:

Sharon Castro was a BIR Officer of BIR Buenavista, Guimaras. The petitioner was charged
before theOmbudsman with Malversation of Public Funds due to misappropriating the
amount of P556, 681.53. Castro pleaded not guilty to the charge and filed a Motion to Quash
to the RTC on the ground that theOmbudsman lacked jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation and filing of such information. Castro highlighted that employees of her salary
grade (SG 27) can only be filed on RTC and be prosecuted only by the public prosecutor
and not by the Ombudsman, whose prosecutorial was limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.RTC denied the motion to quash. The said court upheld the 2001 resolution
of the Uy vs. Sandiganbayanand therefore setting the former 1999 Uy vs. Sandiganbayan
decision. Here, the Ombudsman is granted prosecutorial authority on cases cognizable even
by RTC.The petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied by RTC. The petitioner
furthers the case in CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for Malvesation
of Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in
light of this Supreme Court's ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared
that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for Malvesation
of Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in
light of this Supreme Court's ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared
that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
 Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,
G.R. No. 124360, December 3, 1997.

FACTS: Francisco Tatad assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 8180 entitled ―Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996‖. Under the deregulated environment, "any person or
entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a
foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil
facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy. Moreover, under Section 5 of the assailed Act
provides that:
b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act,
tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three
percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent
(7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for
imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided,
further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress."
Its validity was challenged on the following constitutional grounds: a) that the imposition of
different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates
the equal protection clause; b) the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the
downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry; c) the inclusion of the tariff
provision in Section 5 (b) of RA 8180 violates the one title-one subject requirement of the
Constitution; d) that Section 15 thereof constitutes undue delegation of legislative power to
the President and the Secretary of Energy and violates the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies; and e) that Executive Order No. 392 implementing R.A. 8180 is arbitrary and
unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of OPSF fund — a
condition not found in the law.
ISSUE: WON the assailed tariff differential is not violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution
HELD: The assailed tariff differential is likewise not violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. It is germane to the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8180 which is to
achieve (1) fair prices; and (2) adequate and continuous supply of environmentally clean and
high quality petroleum products. Said adequate and continuous supply of petroleum
products will be achieved if new investors or players are enticed to engage in the business of
refining crude oil in the country. Existing refining companies, are similarly encouraged to put
up additional refining companies. All of this can be made possible in view of the lower tariff
duty on imported crude oil than that levied on imported refined petroleum products. In effect,
the lower tariff rates will enable the refiners to recoup their investments considering that they
will be investing billions of pesos in putting up their refineries in the Philippines. That
incidentally the existing refineries will be benefited by the tariff differential does not negate
the fact that the intended effect of the law is really to encourage the construction of new
refineries, whether by existing players or by new players.
 Caltex v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966.

FACTS:
In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest". It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex Station will dispense during a specified period. For the priviledge to
participate, no fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were required.
Forseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made
by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing.
The acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of sections
1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code and declined to grant the
requested clearance.

ISSUES:

Whether or not construction should be employed in this case.

Whether or not the contest violates the provisions of the Postal Law

HELD:
Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary:
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention
of the author's of the law with respect to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided
for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably
require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words therein. This is as much as
question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond
the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious
tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.
Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift
enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their
market value but by way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery. In the present
case, the element of consideration is not observed. No payment or purchase of a
merchandise was required for the priviledge to participate.
 Abaria v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 154113, December 11, 2011
FACT:
Several students who are members of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, were expelled from
their school for disobedience of RA 1265 and DECS Order 8, series of 1955, by refusing to
salute the flag of the Philippines, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge.
These acts were considered to be ―acts of worship‖ which they ―cannot conscientiously give
to anyone or anything except God.‖

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses from the
school violates the Constitution and the right to receive free education.

HELD:
It was held that forcing a small religious group, through the law, to participate in acts
that violate their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for
duly constituted authorities. Hence, petition is granted, expulsion orders are annulled and set
aside
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
FACTS:
The Respondent, Hardwick, stated that he was a practicing homosexual, that the
Georgia statute placed him in danger of arrest, and that the statute violated his constitutional
rights. The respondent brought suit in a federal district court challenging the constitutionality
of a Georgia statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. The District Court granted
a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
decision ruling that the statute violated the Respondent‘s ―fundamental rights because his
homosexual activity was a private and intimate association…‖

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of consensual homosexual sodomy is protected under the
fundamental right to privacy.

HELD:
It was held that the act of consensual sodomy is not protected under the fundamental
right to privacy under the United States Constitution. There is no precedent to support the
Respondent‘s claimed constitutional right to commit sodomy. The judgement of the Eleventh
Circuit was reversed.
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)

FACTS:
In Houston, Texas, Harris County Police officers were dispatched to a private home
in response to reported weapons disturbance. They entered the house of John Geddes, and
saw Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sex act. The men were
arrested, held overnight, and charged with violating a Texas statute making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in a certain intimate sexual conduct. The two men were
then convicted before a Justice of the Peace.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a statute prohibiting specific sex acts violates liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

HELD:
It was held that intimate sexual conduct between consenting adults is a liberty
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 Ebralinag v. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993.
FACTS: Petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan
Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted
by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses. All the
petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955. Petitioners stress, however, that while
they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts"
or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony.

ISSUE: WON the Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955 is unconstitutional

HELD: Petitioners were accorded the exception with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem
to others. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom
to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
 Gerona v. Secretary of Education
A.C. No. L-350, August 7, 1959.

FACTS: The Secretary of Education, authorized by Republic Act No. 1265 to issue or cause
to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony, issued
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 on July 21, 1955 which provided for compulsory
daily flag ceremony in all public and private schools. Petitioners' children refused to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement
of Department Order No. 8; as a result, they were expelled from school. They consider that
the flag is an "image‖ prohibited to be served or bowed down to by their religion and
therefore to salute the same is to go against their religious belief. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955.

ISSUE: WON Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 is unconstitutional

HELD: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem
of national sovereignty, national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and
the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under the complete separation of church and state
in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting
the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds.
One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same
may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of
society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter.
 Maliksi v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013

FACT:
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of
votes in 209 clustered precincts. The RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the
results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus. Saquilayan
appealed to the COMELEC. The RTC granted Maliksi‘s motion for execution pending
appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC
First Division decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards without giving notice to the parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of recount by the first division of the COMELEC is
proper.

HELD:
It was held that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount
proceedings because there is no existing rule of procedure allowed to conduct a recount in
the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC
Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests
involving elective regional, provincial, and city officials.
 Maliksi v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203302, April 11, 2013.

FACT:
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of
votes in 209 clustered precincts. The RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the
results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus. Saquilayan
appealed to the COMELEC. The RTC granted Maliksi‘s motion for execution pending
appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC
First Division decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards without giving notice to the parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of recount by the first division of the COMELEC is
proper.

HELD:
It was held that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount
proceedings because there is no existing rule of procedure allowed to conduct a recount in
the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC
Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests
involving elective regional, provincial, and city officials.
 Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,
G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987.
FACTS: The petitioners were charged for subversion. The respondent Chief of Staff of the
AFP created the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed against
the petitioners. An amended charge sheet was filed for seven offenses, namely: (1) unlawful
possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President
and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile,
Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco,
Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7)
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. Sometime thereafter,
trial ensued. In the course of the proceedings the petitioners went to this Court and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They sought to enjoin the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought
their release from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments
is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have
been committed during the period of martial law.

ISSUE: WON military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to
have been committed during the period of martial law

HELD: Military commission has no jurisdiction to try civilians when the civil courts are open.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to
lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The
trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as
a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military
commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the
Philippine judicial system.
 Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation
G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011.

FACTS: On January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease on an eight
hundred sixty (860)-square-meter prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by
the respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership
through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to some conditions. On October 10, 2000, before
the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68, Pasig City. The respondent
used as a ground for ejectment the petitioner‘s violation of stipulations in the lease contract
regarding the use of the property. MTC decide in favor of the respondent. RTC-Branch 155
affirmed. The case, however, was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, granted petitioner's
motion, thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC-Branch 68 decision. Accordingly, Civil
Case No. 8084 was dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a
petition for review with the CA. During the pendency of the petition for review, the
respondent filed on May 3, 2002 another case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner
before the MTC. Respondent used as a ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties‘
lease contract. MTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the RTC-
Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed Civil
Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE: Whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the same cause of action.

HELD: The Court ruled that the Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of
action. Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others. Several tests exist to
ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether
the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action
(also known as the ―same evidence‖ test),or whether the defenses in one case may be used
to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining
whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint. Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case,
i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint – and to which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of
the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner‘s violation of stipulations in the lease
contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease
contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000,
the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of
two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the
parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of
the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and
made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of
action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment
case. Thus, the respondent cannot be said to have committed a willful and deliberate forum
shopping.
 Veloso v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 116680, August 28, 1996.
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Veloso owns a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila covered by a
TCT issued by the Registry of Deeds-Manila. He acquired the subject property before he
got married from Philippine Building Corporation. Hence, the property did not belong to the
conjugal partnership. The said title was subsequently canceled and a new one was issued in
the name of Aglaloma B. Escario. Subsequently, petitioner filed an action for annulment of
documents, reconveyance of property with damages and preliminary injunction alleging that
he was the absolute owner of the subject property and he never authorized anybody to sell
it. He alleged that when his wife left for abroad, he found out that his copy was missing. The
transfer of property was supported by a General Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute
Sale, executed by Irma Veloso, wife of the petitioner. Petitioner denied executing the power
of attorney and alleged that his signature was falsified. He also denied having known the
supposed witnesses in the execution of the power of attorney. Thus, he contended that the
sale of the property, and the subsequent transfer were null and void. Defendant Aglaloma
Escario alleged that she was a buyer in good faith and denied any knowledge of the alleged
irregularity. She allegedly relied on the general power of attorney which was sufficient in
form and substance and was duly notarized. Witness for the plaintiff Atty. Julian G. Tubig
denied any participation in the execution of the general power of attorney, and attested that
he did not sign. RTC ruled in favor of Escaro as the lawful owner of the property as she was
deemed an innocent purchaser for value. The trial court ruled that there was no need for a
special power of attorney when the special power was already mentioned in the general one.
CA affirmed in toto the findings of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the general power of Attorney was valid

HELD: The assailed power of attorney was valid and regular on its face. It was notarized and
as such, it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
While it is true that it was denominated as a general power of attorney, a perusal thereof
revealed that it stated an authority to sell. "2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or
otherwise hypothecate lands, tenements and hereditaments …." Thus, there was no need to
execute a separate and special power of attorney since the general power of attorney had
expressly authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the subject property. The
general power of attorney was accepted by the Register of Deeds when the title to the
subject property was canceled and transferred in the name of private Respondent.
249. Tolentino v. Loyola, G.R. No. 163809, July 27, 2011.

Agustin v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 107846, April 18, 1997.

FACTS: A woman carrying her love child sues the child‘s alleged biological father, petitioner
in this case. Filing the complaint for support and support pendente lite before the QC RTC
she alleges that: the father of her child courted her and they had a relationship. On
Valentines‘ Day, the couple availed a romantic Valentines‘ Day offer in a motel where he
impregnated her. Despite the petitioner‘s insistence for the woman to continue to an
abortion, she decided otherwise; and that the alleged father should shoulder the pre-natal
and hospital expenses that the private respondent procured, however the petitioner refused
despite the requests for support.

In his answer he denied having sired the child because he said his affair with her ended long
before the child‘s conception. In his counter affidavit he alleged that:

(1) She had at least one other secret lover and that she proved to be possessive and
scheming and over-demanding that she resorted to various devious ways and means to
alienate him from his wife and family. In short, she was obsessed with him and he was
unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children so he terminated the affair; and

(2) That his signatures on his alleged sedula and the issued birth certificate of the child
were all falsified.

Woman and child therefore filed a motion in court for issuance of an order to direct all parties
to submit themselves to DNA Paternity testing. Defendant now petitioner to this case
opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action since under the law
an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. The trial
court denied his motion and granted the previous motion ordering the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing. Consequently he petitioned the CA for certiorari which
merely affirmed the earlier lower court ruling.

ISSUE: WON the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner‘s MTD

HELD: No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner‘s motion to dismiss because the
private respondents‘ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against
the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff‘s primary right and the
defendant‘s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the
defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
 Jaca v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013.
FACTS: Petitioners occupied appointive positions in the city government of Cebu when the
controversy arose: Gaviola was the City Administrator, Cesa was the City Treasurer, and
Jaca was the City Accountant. All three petitioners, together with a certain Benilda
Bacasmas (Chief Cashier of the Cash Division under the Office of the City Treasurer), were
charged and found guilty before the Sandiganbayan of violating Section 3 of RA No. 3109 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. City Auditor Rodolfo Ariesga and his team
conducted a surprise audit of the cash and other accounts handled by the accountable
officers of the Cash Division, Office of the City Treasurer, including disbursing Officer
Rosalinda G. Badana, the paymaster for eight departments in Cebu City
government. The audit team covered the period from September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998,
the day Badana disappeared without notice from work. Badana was found to have incurred a
cash shortage to a total of Php18,527,137.19. On the administrative aspect of the case, the
Ombudsman found Jaca and Cesa guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed on them the
penalty of suspension for six months; while the case against petitioner Gaviola was
dismissed for being moot and academic. On Cesa‘s appeal, CA and SC sustained the
Ombudsman‘s ruling. The Ombudsman supported the findings of the Prosecution that the
petitioners failed to comply with the laws, rules, and regulations governing the granting,
utilization, and liquidation of cash advances by allowing the vouchers for cash advances
to lack an indicated specific purpose for which the amount was being requested, as well as
lack the specified office or department to be paid, number of payees, and the payroll period
to be paid. It was further found that the amounts requested were not equal to the amount of
payroll for the specified pay period, and that the vouchers covering cash advances for the
payment were not supported by payrolls needed for the purpose. Thus, although the monthly
payroll of the eight departments within Badana‘s responsibility required more than P5 million,
the cash advance granted for each month averaged more than Php 7million. Also, the
petitioners repeatedly affixed their signatures and allowed the disbursement of
public funds through cash advances, even if there were previously unliquidated cash
advances.
ISSUE: WON the the tax imposition is constitutional
HELD: The Court held that the power to tax is inherent in the State as an attribute of
sovereignty. The same is not true for provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, as they
are not the sovereign, but rather, are merely territorial and political subdivisions. As
summarized in Icard v. CityCouncil of Baguio, ―the charter or statute must plainly show an
intent to confer that power, or the municipality cannot assume it. And the power when
granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term
used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality.‖ As such, the power
of a province to tax is limited, and should be delegated to it either by the Constitution or by
statute, as is also specified in Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Section 133 of
RA 7160or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) provides limitations on the taxing
powers of LGUs, with Section 133 (i) specifically prohibiting LGUs to levy percentage or
value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or
services except as otherwise provided by the LGC. Pelizloy‘s contention that Section 59,
Article X of the Tax Ordinance levies a prohibited percentage tax is correct; however,
provinces are not barred from imposing amusement taxes even if in the form of percentage
taxes. An exception to the general rule laid down in Section 133 (i) can be found in Section
140, which expressly allows provinces to impose amusement taxes on ―the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement.‖
General Milling Corporation-Independent Labor Union v. General Milling Corporation,
G.R. No. 183122, June 15, 2011.
FACTS: On 28 April 1989, GMC and the Union entered into a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) which provided, among other terms, the latter‘s representation of the
collective bargaining unit for a three-year term made to retroact to 1 December 1988. On 29
November 1991 or one day before the expiration of the CBA, the Union sent a draft CBA
proposal to GMC, with a request for counter-proposals from the latter. In view of GMC‘s
failure to comply with said request, the Union commenced the complaint for unfair labor
practice which was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, said dismissal was reversed and
set aside in the 30 January 1998 decision rendered by the NLRC, the Union filed the
petitions for certiorari before the CA, which in turn reversed and set aside the NLRC‘s
resolution and reinstated the aforesaid 30 January 1998 decision. Aggrieved by the CA‘s
resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, GMC elevated the case to this Court via
the petition for review on certiorari. In a decision dated 11 February 2004 rendered by the
Court‘s then Second Division, the CA‘s 30 January 1998 decision and 26 October 2000
resolution were affirmed,12 upon the following findings and conclusions. Petitioners hold that
GMC‘s refusal to make a counter proposal to the union‘s proposal for CBA negotiation is an
indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to
the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain
collectively. Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union‘s
proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor
practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the circumstances, guilty of
unfair labor practice. Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a
labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring
party should not be allowed with impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going through
empty gestures. With the ensuing finality of the foregoing decision, the Union filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution dated 21 March 2005, to enforce the claims of the
covered employees which it computed in the sum of P433,786,786.36 and to require GMC to
produce said employee‘s time cards for the purpose of computing their overtime pay, night
shift differentials and labor standard benefits for work rendered on rest days, legal holidays
and special holidays. GMC filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the imposed CBA has full force and effect considering that it was not
agreed upon by the Union and GMC
HELD: Anent its period of effectivity, Article XIV of the imposed CBA provides that "(t)his
Agreement shall be in full force and effect for a period of five (5) years from 1 December
1991, provided that sixty (60) days prior to the lapse of the third year of effectivity hereof, the
parties shall open negotiations on economic aspect for the fourth and fifth years effectivity of
this Agreement." Considering that no new CBA had been, in the meantime, agreed upon by
GMC and the Union, we find that the CA correctly ruled in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02226 that,
pursuant to Article 253 of the Labor Code, the provisions of the imposed CBA continues to
have full force and effect until a new CBA has been entered into by the parties. Article 253
mandates the parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms
and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of
the old CBA and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. In the same manner
that it does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of
the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect, the law does not distinguish
between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed CBA like the one under
consideration.
 Spouses Sy v. Young, G.R. No. 169214, June 19, 2013.

FACTS: The case involves 2 petitions for review under Rule 45 which were consolidated.
Both petitions originated from a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-
judicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration filed by the petitioner
Genalyn D. Young. In her complaint, she alleged that the extra-judicial partition executed by
her mother that adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely in favor of the latter, is
unenforceable, since at the time of the execution, she (petitioner) was only 15 years old and
no court approval had been procured; that the partition had been registered with the Register
of Deeds; that Lilia Dy obtained a loan from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy
(respondents) and mortgaged the subject property; that the property was foreclosed and
sold to the highest bidder, respondent Manuel Sy; that a Certificate of Sale for this purpose
had been registered with the Register of Deeds; and that, thereafter, respondents obtained
in their name a tax declaration over the property in question. The petitioner filed with the
RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint, attaching the Supplemental Complaint and
she invoked her right, as co-owner, to exercise the legal redemption. The RTC denied the
Motion hence the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA denied the petition and held that the cause of action of the petitioner
in the Supplemental Complaint is entirely different from the original complaint; that the
Supplemental Complaint did not merely supply its deficiencies; and that, at any rate, in the
event the trial court issues an adverse ruling, the petitioner can still appeal the same, hence,
the petition under Rule 65 is not proper. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. While the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus (re: Supplemental Complaint)
was pending in the CA, trial in the RTC continued. On August 29, 2001, a day before the
hearing slated for August 30, 2001, the petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing, alleging
that she was indisposed. On the day of the hearing, respondents, through counsel, objected
to the postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case for non-suit. The RTC
sustained the objection and issued the assailed August 30, 2001 Order dismissing the
Complaint. On top of the foregoing appeal, the petitioner, four months after filing her Notice
of Appeal to the CA, filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 70610 to annul the same RTC Orders that comprise the subject matter of
the ordinary appeal. The petitioner raised essentially the same issues. CA denied the
petition and held that the dismissal of the case by the RTC on the ground of non prosequitur
has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits that may constitute an error of judgment
correctible by ordinary appeal and not by certiorari; that the petitioner actually chose the
mode of ordinary appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal on January 31, 2000; and that since the
remedy of appeal was available, then the petition for certiorari, being an extraordinary
remedy, must fail.

ISSUE: WON there is forum shopping

HELD: The petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA,
engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months
had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which
eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition
 Marquez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995.

FACTS: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy,
a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued
by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on
account of his alleged ―flight‖ from that country. Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for
cancellation of respondent‘s certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidate‘s
disqualification was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Private
respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the
petition.

ISSUE: WON the private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant
of arrest comes within the term ―fugitive from justice‖

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

―Article 73. Disqualifications – The following persons shall be disqualified from

running for any elective local position:

―(a) xxxx

―(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive
from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.‖

It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been
convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on
whether the private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition
for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed
with the case.
 Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996.

FACTS: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province
of Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was
Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a
―fugitive from justice.‖ Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance
claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the
petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a ―fugitive from
justice‖ which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local
Government Code according to Marquez. Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from
the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985-
roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him
before the Los Angeles Court.

ISSUE: WON Rodriguez is a ―fugitive from justice‖

HELD: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a ―fugitive from justice‖ includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that animates one‘s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only
be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.
 Agustin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107846, April 18, 1997.

FACTS: A woman carrying her love child sues the child‘s alleged biological father, petitioner
in this case. Filing the complaint for support and support pendent lite before the QC RTC she
alleges that: the father of her child courted her and they had relationship. On Valentines‘
Day, the couple availed a romantic Valentines‘ Day offer in motel where he impregnated her.
Despite the petitioner‘s insistence for the woman to continue to an abortion, she decided
otherwise; and that the alleged father should shoulder the pre-natal and hospital expenses
that the private respondent procured, however the petitioner refused despite the requests for
support.

In his answer he denied having sired the child because he said his affair with her ended long
before the child‘s conception. In his counter affidavit he alleged that:

(1) She had at least one other secret lover and that she proved to be possessive and
scheming and over-demanding that she resorted to various devious ways and means to
alienate him from his wife and family. In short, she was obsessed with him and he was
unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children so he terminated the affair; and

(2) That his signatures on his alleged sedula and the issued birth certificate of the child
were all falsified.

Woman and child therefore filed a motion in court for issuance of an order to direct all parties
to submit themselves to DNA Paternity testing. Defendant now petitioner to this case
opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action since under the law
an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. The trial
court denied his motion and granted the previous motion ordering the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing. Consequently he petitioned the CA for certiorari which
merely affirmed the earlier lower court ruling.

ISSUE: WON the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner‘s MTD

HELD: No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner‘s motion to dismiss because the
private respondents‘ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against
the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff‘s primary right and the
defendant‘s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the
defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
 People v. Malabago, G.R. No. 108613, April 18, 1997.

FACTS: Accused Malabago was convicted of parricide for killing his wife, Letecia, and was
imposed with death penalty. The mother-in-law of the accused was tending to her sari-sari
store when her daughter, Letecia, arrived and later, the accused came. An altercation
started between the spouses regarding money and the husband‘s jealousy of someone. The
deceased cried out, ―Agay!‖ and the mother-in-law saw Letecia‘s bloodied face with a slash
along her right ear. The accused was facing Letecia, he was then holding a bolo and struck
her again only this time he hit her lower left side of her face which caused Letecia‘s death.
Accused alleges that he was in another población and that he does not know who killed his
wife, and he further alleges that his mother-in-law‘s testimony was due to the reason that
she was against their marriage.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of parricide

HELD: Yes, however the court modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, since
there was no treachery involved but there was voluntary surrender. Parricide, as indicated by
the Revised Penal Code, is committed when: (1) a person killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
the accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused
and the deceased is their marriage certificate. The essential elements of parricide are all
present in the cause at bar. More so, his defense of alibi was not appreciated by the court
because the two poblacions were only 4 kilometers apart and could easily be accessed via
motor vehicles.
 League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 176951,
177499, 178056, November 18, 2008.

FACTS: Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for
violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for
reconsideration, which was denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for
reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the judgement
becomes final and executory. The Court then on the 19th of December 2009,
unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUE: WON the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered

HELD: Yes. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an

unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains
unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of
nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact
doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the
unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws
remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of
their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the ―new cities‖ or their
issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and
effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only
the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed
validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court‘s declaration of their unconstitutionality.
 League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 176951,
177499, 178056, December 21, 2009.

FACTS: Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for
violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for
reconsideration, which was denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for
reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the judgement
becomes final and executory. The Court then on the 19th of December 2009,
unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUES: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause

HELD: The petitions were granted, however the Court held that the Cityhood Laws violate
Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall
prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and a just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are
clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the
intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills
or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
 League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176951,
February 15, 2011.

FACTS: Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for
violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for
reconsideration, which was denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for
reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the judgement
becomes final and executory. The Court then on the 19th of December 2009,
unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUES: WON the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution

HELD: The petitions were granted, however the Court held that the Cityhood Laws violate
Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and is thus unconstitutional. First, applying
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall
prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are
clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the
intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills
or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
 League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011.

FACTS: Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for
violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for
reconsideration, which was denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for
reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the judgement
becomes final and executory. The Court then on the 19th of December 2009,
unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUES: WON the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause

HELD: The Court ruled that the Cityhood Laws is violative of Sections 6 and 10, Article X of
the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application,
because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for
the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and a just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of
the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained
an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the
deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the
exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
 First Philippine Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125948, December 29, 1998.

FACTS: Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387.
Sometime in January 1995, petitioner applied for mayor‘s permit in Batangas. However, the
Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on gross receipts amounting to
P956,076.04. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the taxes for the first
quarter of 1993 amounting to P239,019.01 under protest. On January 20, 1994, petitioner
filed a letter-protest to the City Treasurer, claiming that it is exempt from local tax since it is
engaged in transportation business. The respondent City Treasurer denied the protest, thus,
petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas for tax refund.
Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term ―common carrier‖ which refers
solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and
such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether a pipeline business is included in the term ―common carrier‖ so as to entitle
the petitioner to the exemption

HELD: Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person,
corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services
to the public." The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:

(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for
person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation

(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;

(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over
his established roads; and

(4) The transportation must be for hire.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a
common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e.
petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons
indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the
goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not
exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.
 Republic of the Philippines v. Gomez, G.R. No. 189021, February 2, 2012.

FACTS: On January 12, 2004, shortly before 5:00 a.m., defendant Alphonso Gomez broke
into a restaurant. He took money from an ATM machine in the lobby, searched the upstairs,
and then left the building. The restaurant manager, Raymond Baltazar, observed defendant
leaving and followed him in his truck while calling the police. Defendant fired two shots at
Baltazar to scare him off and was arrested shortly thereafter. Defendant was convicted of
second-degree robbery and commercial burglary and received a sentence of twenty years
for firing a gun during the robbery. He appealed his robbery conviction on the basis that the
victim was not present when he initially took the money. The Court of Appeal affirmed,
reasoning that, "defendant's use of force to retain the stolen property and remove it from [the
victim's] immediate presence was sufficient to support the robbery conviction.‖ The Supreme
Court of California, granted review.

ISSUE: WON the Trial Court erred in denying his application for bail after his arraignment

HELD: No. Regarding the issue of bail, accused-appellant argues that although his counsel
was given the chance to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses at the bail hearings, he
was not given the opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence to disprove that the evidence of his
guilt was strong. In such cases, where the prosecution was not given the chance to present
evidence to prove that the guilt of the accused was strong, the Court held that the proper
remedy was for him to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This same principle must
apply to cases where the defense was not accorded a chance to present any rebuttal
evidence. When the trial court denied his application for bail accused-appellant should have
filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court.
Hence, it is also too late for him to question the trial court‘s decision of denying his
application for bail. Besides, the conviction of accused-appellant undoubtedly proves that the
evidence of guilt against him was strong.
 Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829, July 18, 2012.

FACTS: Respondent filed a case against the petitioner for falsification of a public document,
the City Prosecutor filed the information to the MeTC. The Petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC dismissed the case on
the ground of lack of probable cause. Respondent appealed to the RTC. RTC granted the
appeal and ordered the MeTC to proceed with the trial. Petitioner petitioned to the CA to
review the RTC decision. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Petitioner when to the SC to petition
the review of the decision of the CA. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report submitted as
evidence by respondent to the prosecutor‘s office, showed that the findings therein are not
conclusive and, thus, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
HELD: No. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
 Nazareno v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc., G.R. No. 168703, February 26, 2013.

FACTS: On February 16, 2001, petitioner Ramon G. Nazareno was hired by Maersk
Filipinas Crewing Inc. (MCI) as Chief Officer on board its vessel M/V ArtkisHope for a period
of six (6) months with a basic salary of US$1,129.00. On March 25, 2001, the vessel was
docked at Port Belem, Brazil to load timber. While petitioner was checking the last bundle of
timber to be loaded, he suddenly lost his balance and fell at a height of two meters. He
landed on the timber and injured his right shoulder. Due to the pain he felt in his right
shoulder, he was later examined at Philadelphia, U.S.A. and was considered not fit for work.
Petitioner was not permitted to disembark as there was no one available to replace him.
Petitioner went overseas for surgery and then to Manila for rehabilitation. However, after
almost two (2) months of therapy, petitioner did not notice any improvement. He informed
Dr.Periquet that when he was in Philadelphia, U.S.A., he was advised to consult a
neurologist and undergo MRI. When Dr. Periquet ignored him, he consulted another doctor.
After a series of examinations, it was concluded that petitioner will no longer be able to
function as in his previous disease-free state and that his condition would hamper him from
operating as chief officer of a ship. On the basis of the findings of his doctors, petitioner
sought payment of his disability benefits and medical allowance from respondents, but was
refused. Petitioner therefore instituted the present Complaint against the respondents. On
February 24, 2003, after the parties submitted their respective pleadings, the Labor Arbiter
(LA) rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to pay the former his
disability claims, sickness allowance, and attorney fees. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On April 15, 2004, the NLRC, Third
Division, rendered a Decision affirming with modification the decision of the LA.
Respondents sought recourse before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC. On April 27, 2005, the CA rendered a
Decision granting the petition. The CA set aside the decision and resolution of the NLRC and
dismissed petitioner's complaint.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decisions of both
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in finding petitioner already unfit to work as a result of the
injury he sustained during the accident on board the respondent vessel and therefore
entitled to disability benefits.
HELD: The petition is meritorious. In the case at bar, the CA relied on the provisions of
Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC in concluding that the disability of a seafarer can only
be determined by a company-designated physician and not the seafarer own doctors. In any
case, the bottom-line is that the certification of the company designated physician would
defeat petitioner claim while the opinion of the independent physicians would uphold such
claim. In such a situation, the Court adopts the findings favorable to petitioner. The law looks
tenderly on the laborer. Where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent
ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor
consistent with the principle of social justice.
 Lasoy v. Zenarosa,
G.R. No. 129472, April 12, 2005.

FACTS: Lasoy and Banisa were charged before the RTC with violation of Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 for transporting and selling 42.41 grams of marijuana fruiting tops. Both pleaded
guilty on arraignment and were later sentenced to suffer a jail term of 6 months and 1 day.
Both accused applied for probation. Subsequently, the prosecutor filed two separate
motions: (1) to admit amended Information, and (2) to set aside the arraignment of the
accused. The prosecutor intended to amend the filed information because for some reason,
petitioners were charged of selling 42.41 grams instead of 42.41 kilograms of marijuana. The
motions were granted. Thus the information now states ―kilograms‖ instead of ―grams". Both
accused filed a motion to quash. Judge Zenarosa denied the motion to quash and scheduled
the arraignment of the accused under the amended information. Lasoy and Banisa raises a
petition for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy. In response, respondent claims that
the trial based on the first information was a sham and that the petitioners participated in
tampering the information.

ISSUE: WON double jeopardy attaches

HELD: To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present:
(1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. An information
is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a
person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can
decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid.
The inescapable conclusion, then, is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the
law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably
complied with. Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court designated Regional
Trial Courts to exclusively try and decide cases of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved. (PP. vs. Velasco)
Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being present, the defense attaches.
 Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986.

FACTS: On October 22, 1983, then President Marcos created a Fact-Finding Board to
investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The minority and majority reports of the Board
both agreed that Rolando Galman was not the assassin but was merely a fall guy of the
military which plotted the assassination itself. The minority report tags 26 persons, headed
by General Ver, as respondents to the case. Marcos rejected the reports of the Board and
stuck to his claim that it was Galman who killed Aquino. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan acquitted the respondents of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability. In this petition, Petitioners Saturnina Galman, wife
of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 others filed the present action alleging that respondent
courts committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. Allegedly, then President Marcos had ordered the
respondent courts to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and
produce a verdict of acquittal. In his comment, the Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera,
affirmed the allegations and revealed that Malacañang had planned the scenario of the trial.
Respondents-accused prayed for its denial.

ISSUE: WON the trial was a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of
justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and
justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial
justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or
redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and
prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the
military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process
of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and
the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due
process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court
is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the
predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
 Bigornia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 17317, March 17, 2009.

FACTS: Petitioner assails the respondent court‘s dismissal of petitioners appeal and denial
for motion for reconsideration. Private respondent filed an action for replevin with damages
against the petitioner before the RTC of Lanao del Norte. Petitioners allegedly detained
private respondent‘s fishing vessel for 14 days afer it was seized in a seaborne patrol. On
August 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent, in which the
petitioners appealed. On January 19, 2004, the counsel of the petitioners received a notice
requiring them to file an appellants‘ brief within 45 days or until March 4, 2004. Petitioner
filed their brief 14 days beyond the given deadline. The CA issued the challenged resolution.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal

HELD: The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure of the
appellant to file the appellants' brief on time. However, such dismissal is directory and not
mandatory. Therefore, the court has the power to dismiss or not dismiss such an appeal.
The power conferred on the court is a duty vested upon the legislative departments. The
discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.

In the case at bar, petitioners had 45 days until the given deadline to file an appellants‘ brief.
However, petitioners could not be located, and so it was their counsel who were given the
liberty of filing a brief in their behalf.
 Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965.

FACTS: The President of the Philippines, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised

Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted a special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him and his representatives
and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, on the
ground that Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Hence, since January 1, 1960, when
Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed" except by the Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is situated."

ISSUE:

WON there is an undue delegation of legislative power upon the chief executive

HELD:

The Court ruled that although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law.
It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither
does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this
connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of
Section 68, the President:... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision
to such places therein as the public welfare may require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause that the phrase "as the public
welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the
place to which the seat of the government may be transferred.
 Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.
G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994.

FACTS: The municipal district of San Andres was created pursuant to an executive order.
After 30 years, the municipality of San Narciso, its other province, sought the declaration of
that executive order contending that since it is a presidential act, it was a usurpation of the
inherent powers of the legislature.

The municipality of San Andres filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had already
become moot and academic with the enactment of the Local Government Code which
provides that municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such.

ISSUE: WON the alleged unconstitutionality of the creation of the municipality of San Andres
has been cured by the enactment of the Local Government Code

HELD: Petitioner challenged the legality of the creation of San Andres only after almost 30
years after its creation where in the meantime it existed as a duly created local government
unit. The Local Government Code provides that municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Curative laws, which in
essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been
invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted
in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
 Salva v. Makalintal, G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000.
FACTS: In 1998, the Sangguinang Panlalawigan of Batangas enacted Ordinance 05, which
abolished Brgy. San Rafael and ordered its merger with Brgy. Dacanlao. The Governer of
Batangas vetoed the ordinance as it was not shown that it complied with the requisites in
Sections 7 & 9 of the LGC. The governor‘s veto was overridden by Resolution 345.
Consequently, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2987 to govern the conduct of the
needed plebiscite. The petitioners, officials and residents of Brgy. San Rafael, filed for the
issuance of a TRO against the plebiscite with the trial court. The trial court denied their
petition, claiming that it had no jurisdiction over acts, resolutions, or decisions of the
COMELEC. The trial court directed the petitioners to bring the case to the Supreme Court.
Apparently, the plebiscite was conducted during the pendency of the case. The petitioners
maintain that since their action is based on the validity of Ordinance 05 and Resolution 345
(basis of COMELEC Res. 2987) the trial court had jurisdiction. They further maintained that
the SC only had exclusive jurisdiction when COMELEC exercises its quasi‐judicial functions.
However, when the COMELEC acts in a purely ministerial manner, the case may be subject
to the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES. COMELEC Resolutions on the conduct of plebiscites are administrative in
nature and subject to RTC. In the case of Filipinas Engineering v. Ferrer, it was held that
what is contemplated by the term ‗final orders, rulings and decisions‘ of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In this case, Resolution 2987 was only issued after the
COMELEC took cognizance of Ordinance 05 and Resolution 345. Resolution No. 2987 is
thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its
administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of the
respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to
hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party litigants, relative to the
conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws. COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of
the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC‘s quasi-judicial functions
but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
plebiscites, thus, Resolution 2987 may not be deemed as a ―final order‖ reviewable by
certiorari by this court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
 Torralba v. Sibagat, G.R. No. L-59180, January 29, 1987.

FACTS: Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of Sibagat,
Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its validity for being violative of Section 3,
Article XI, 1973 Constitution:

Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the
creation of any province, city, municipality, or barrio and since no LGC had yet been enacted
as of the date BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any
criteria when the Municipality was created. The Local Government Code came into being
only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was not yet in
existence.

ISSUE:

WON BP 56 is creating respondent municipality is null and void

HELD:

The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor
was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3,
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It
contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does
not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional provision
means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local
government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before
the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation
of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed
to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected
endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of
said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively
taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus been
created. The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence
of any constitutional limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems
essential for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new
Municipality was a valid exercise of legislative power vested by the 1973 Constitution in the
Interim Batasang Pambansa.
 The Decision

Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004.

FACTS: On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition)
before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered
political party, sought the following: (1) interpretation of several constitutional provisions,[8]
specifically on the separation of church and state; and (2) a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office,
or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

The trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II,
Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law. It then
proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church
and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its
discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the endorsement of specific candidates
in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. After its essay
on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its
assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration
which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court. Hence, this Petition for Review.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.

ISSUE: WON the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court

HELD: NO. The RTC Decision did not conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court. The Constitution commands that [n]o decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. The
RTC‘s Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on
which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
 Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132426, October 24, 2000.

FACTS: Petitioner George Yao was convicted for unfair competition for the sale of
counterfeit General Electric (GE) lamp starters. He filed a motion for reconsideration which
as denied by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amount to lack of
jurisdiction in denying petitioner‘s due process of law

HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that the faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair
play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. More than that,
the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgement, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is thus a safeguard against the impetuosity of
the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.
 Pengson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65622, June 29, 1984.

FACTS: Pacific Merchandising Corp (PMC) owning shares in the Aluminum Product (Alpro)
up to 96% share. PMC indebted to Reynold‘s Corp more than 800,000, because of such
PMC pledged with Reynolds his shares in Alpro as collateral. Because PMC needs money, it
decided to sell its shares with Alpro to plaintiff Pengson as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
Plaintiff assumed the obligation of PMC to Reynold which was reduced to 500,000. The
consent of Reynolds was obtained since the certificate covering the share was pledged to
him. Pengson paid the debt in installment and as a security he mortgaged a parcel of land.
Upon failure to pay despite the demands, the mortgage was foreclosed by Reynolds. Plaintiff
filed a suit for the declaration of nullity and inefficacy of sale or rescission of sale and
mortgage with damages. Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff because of
the refusal of Reynold to deliver the certificate subject of sale which renders the deed of sale
ineffective. CA reversed upon appeal.

ISSUE: WON there is an existing obligation between plaintiff and Reynolds in returning the
certificate of stocks in order not to invalidate the sale.

HELD: No. Reynold was not a party of the contract between PMC and plaintiff having no
obligation on the strength of such contract. While plaintiff undertook the obligation of PMC to
Reynolds, the latter and the former has no reciprocal obligations. Reynold has no obligation
to return the certificate of stocks pledged by PMC because there was no absolute agreement
by Reynold to that effect in the consent it gave to the sale by PMC of the said shares in favor
of the plaintiff. Furthermore, SC ordered the case to be returned to IAC to make a complete
findings of the facts.
 University of the Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012.

FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement
with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and
renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first
and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its
disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to
collect the unpaid balance. On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering
UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon
Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably,
Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due
course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon
motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution. On appeal, both the CA and
the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence, Stern
Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having
already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11,
2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC
had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff
served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release
of the funds. Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the funds of UP can be validly garnished

HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP
remains to be a ―chartered institution‖ performing a legitimate government function. As a
government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and
income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from
the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as
expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP
constitute a ―special trust fund,‖ the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the
UP‘s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds
of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income
accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives. The Constitution strictly mandated that ―no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.‖ The
execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the
COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim
against the UP. The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the primary
jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the RTC having already validated the
claim.
 Nicos Industrial Corp v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992.

FACTS: The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the
aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the Constitution.
The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and
distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners complain that there
was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely
confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no
jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis
for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals. On
January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from
private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a
real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was
foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July
11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction
was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.

The CA ruled that that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving
much to be desired, substantially complies with the rules.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the trial court is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of
how the Court reached its decision with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that
led to the conclusions of the court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he
may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed.
 People v. Judge Bellaflor, G.R. No. 103275, June 15, 1994.

FACTS: Ruben Albano was charged with the crime of arson. Upon arraignment, private
respondent pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued and the parties rested
their case before Judge Fortun. Judge Fortun promulgated his decision convicting Albano of
the crime of arson. Albano moved for the reconsideration of the said decision and was
granted and thus acquitted of the crime charged. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Private respondent argues that the resolution acquitting him of the
offense charged has become final and executory and a reconsideration thereof would place
him under double jeopardy.

ISSUE: WON the appeal by the petitioner will place the accused in double jeopardy and thus
invalidates the appeal

HELD: Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of
the case was effected at the instance of the accused. And there are only two instances
where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact the case was dismissed with the
express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for the dismissal is
insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the second is where the criminal
proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial (People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 [1988]). None exists in the case at bar.

Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the dismissal of the criminal case filed against
him and therefore, the protective mantle of double jeopardy does not cover him.

Secondly, private respondent cannot successfully seek refuge in the assailed resolution of
respondent judge. For one thing, it was an empty judgment of acquittal — a bare
adjudication that private respondent is not guilty of the offense charged anchored on the
mere supposition that the decision rendered by Judge Fortun was a nullity. Indeed,
respondent judge acquitted private respondent without expressing the facts and the law on
which it is based, as required by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
 Miguel v. JCT Group, Inc., G.R. No. 157752, March 16, 2005.

FACTS:

Glorious Sun was a garment exporter until it folded up. Thereafter, De Soleil & American
Inter-Fashion Corp. (AIFC) took over Glorious Sun‘s manufacturing plant, facilities and
equipment, and absorbed its employees, including the petitioners. Following the EDSA
Revolution, the PCGG sequestered De Soleil & AIFC & took over their assets & operations.
JCT Group, Inc. (JCT) & De Soleil executed a Management & Operating Agreement (MOA)
for the purpose of servicing De Soleil‘s export quota & preserve its profitability. When the
MOA expired, De Soleil ceased business operations, effectively terminating petitioners‘
employment. Petitioners filed complaints for illegal dismissal & payment of back wages &
other monetary claims before the NLRC against De Soleil, AIFC, PCGG, Glorious Sun, JCT,
& Cuevas. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioners. The NLRC modified the labor
arbiter‘s decision by absolving Glorious Sun from liability & dismissing respondents‘ appeal.
The CA reversed the decision & remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings. It found no factual basis for the ruling that JCT had become the employer of
petitioners after the cessation of operations of Glorious Sun.

ISSUE:

Whether the labor arbiter and the NLRC gravely abused their discretion when they ruled in
favor of petitioners without determining the existence of an Er-Ee relationship between them
and respondents

HELD:

Yes. In finding for petitioners, the labor arbiter considered them regular employees for the
reason that ‗they performed duties, responsibilities and functions necessary and desirable to
the business of garments manufacturing and exportation and had also been working for
more than a year at the time of the cessation of business operation. Save for this conclusion,
the labor arbiter made no determination whether there was Er-Ee relationship between
respondents and petitioners and, if so, whether the former assumed the obligations of the
latter‘s previous employers. The NLRC decision is also silent on the basis for its ruling that
JCT became the employer of petitioners after Glorious Sun ceased operations, save for its
conclusion that petitioners were absorbed by, or their work continued under JCT. The
defense of respondents is anchored on an alleged lack of ErEe relationship with petitioners
as stipulated in the former‘s MOA w/ De Soleil. JCT further claims that any relationship with
De Soleil & the latter‘s employees was severed upon the termination of the MOA. It is
therefore imperative to determine the nature of the MOA --- whether or not it partook only of
a consultancy agreement, in which no ErEe relationship existed between respondents and
petitioners. The test for determining an ErEe relationship hinges on resolving who has the
power to select employees, who pays their wages, who has the power to dismiss them, and
who exercises control in the methods & the results by w/c the work is accomplished. The last
factor, the ―control test‖, is the most important. In resolving the status of a MOA, the test for
determining an ErEe relationship has to be applied.
 Nunal v. Commission on Appointments, G.R. No. 78648, January 24, 1989.

FACTS: Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents
and ordered the partition of the property of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon.
The order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in July 1982 then
remanded to the lower court and two years later, a writ of execution was issued by the latter.
On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom
Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary
injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her
rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a
judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share,
right, ownership and participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within
the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court. On January 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of
Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property. The petitioner
filed an appeal before the CA assailing the decision of the lower court whether or not the trial
court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the
partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party
defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and
that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory.

ISSUE: WON the proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded heir to a final and
executory judgment of partition is a motion to quash said judgment

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The Court said that when a final judgment becomes
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment
is void." Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and
executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings
held for that purpose." In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872
has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction
over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the
inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon
Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other
heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove
their respective claims
 China Airlines v. Chiok, G.R. No. 152122, July 30, 2003.

FACTS: Daniel Chiok purchased a ticket from China Airlines Ltd. Covering Manila-Taipei-
Hong Kong-Manila. The ticket was exclusively endorsable to Philippine Airlines. The trips
covered by the ticket were pre-scheduled and confirmed. In Taipei, Chiok went to CAL office
to confirm his Hong Kong-Manila flight. CAL attached a yellow sticker, indicating that flight
was OK. In Hong Kong, Chiok went to PAL office to confirm his Manila flight. PAL confirmed
and attached its own sticker. During the scheduled flight bound to Manila, it was cancelled
due to a typhoon. All confirmed ticket holders were booked automatically for it‘s next flight
(next day). However, on the following day, a PAL employee informed Chiok that his name
did not appear in PAL‘s computer list of passengers and therefore could not be permitted to
board PAL flight no. PR 307. Chiok filed a complaint for damages. The Regional Trial Court
held that CAL and PAL jointly and severally liable to correspondent, affirmed by Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE: WON China Airline is liable as a principal carrier

HELD: In citing several cases: as the principal in the contract of carriage, the petitioner in
British Airways v. Court of Appeals was held liable, even when the breach of contract has
occurred, not on its own flight, but on that of another airline. The Decision followed our ruling
in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, in which we had held that the obligation of
the ticket-issuing airline remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact that another
airline had undertaken to carry passengers to one of their destinations.

In the instant case, following the jurisprudence cited above, PAL acted as the carrying agent
of CAL. In the same way that we ruled against British Airways and Lufthansa in the
aforementioned cases, we also rule that CAL cannot evade liability to respondent, even
though it may have been only a ticket issuer for the Hong Kong-Manila sector
 Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, G.R. No. L-30001, June 23, 1970.

FACTS: Respondent Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never
to return to the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by
order of the Executive Secretary. He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also
denied it. But the CA recommended that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first
available transportation abroad. The Solicitor General assailed this CA decision, claiming
that the recommendation by the CA should not be part of the decision, because it gives the
decision a political complexion, because courts are not empowered to make such
recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers. The
Solicitor General contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the
state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of
sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts should
not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE: Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations

HELD: No. The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there was whether
the RTC correctly denied the petition. The CA was not called upon the review any sentence
imposed upon Ang. The sentence against him had long become final and in fact, he was
pardoned. The opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the decision of the
RTC, and no more. The recommendatory power of the courts is limited to those expressly
provided in the law, such as Art 5 Revised Penal Code.

The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or not under the
Director of Prisons (for violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA justices to make a
recommendation that would suggest a modification or correction of the act of the
President. The matter of whether an alien who violated the law may remain or be deported
is a political question that should be left entirely to the President, under the principle of
separation of powers. It is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or a
suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an action by the President, which
are purely political in nature.

After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the
interpretation and application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant
opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon the competence and the
propriety of their judicial actuations.
 Caltex Refinery Employees Association v. Brillantes,
G.R. No. 123782, September 16, 1997.

FACTS: Anticipating the expiration of their CBA on July 31, 1995, petitioner and private
respondent negotiated the terms and conditions of employment to be contained in a new
CBA. The negotiation between the two parties was participated in by the NCMB and the
Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Some items in the new CBA were
amicably arrived at and agreed upon, but others were unresolved. To settle the unresolved
issues, eight meetings between the parties were conducted. Because the parties failed to
reach any significant progress in these meetings, petitioner declared a deadlock. On July 24,
1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. 6 conciliation meetings conducted by the NCMB
failed, failed. Marathon meetings at the plant level, but this remedy proved also unavailing.
Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered ―Accordingly, any strike or lockout, whether
actual or intended, is hereby enjoined.‖xxx But the members of petitioner defied them and
continued their mass action (despite repeated orders). Thereafter, the contending parties
filed their position papers pertaining to unresolved issues. Because of the strike, private
respondent terminated the employment of some officers of petitioner union. The legality of
these dismissals brought additional contentious issues. Again, the parties tried to resolve
their differences through conciliation. Failing to come to any substantial agreement, the
parties decided to refer the problem to the secretary of labor and employment.

ISSUE: WON the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of
discretion in resolving the instant labor dispute

HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. In the present case, the foregoing
requirement has been sufficiently met. Petitioner‘s claim of grave abuse of discretion is
anchored on the simple fact that public respondent adopted largely the proposals of private
respondent. It should be understood that bargaining is not equivalent to an adversarial
litigation where rights and obligations are delineated and remedies applied. It is simply a
process of finding a reasonable solution to a conflict and harmonizing opposite positions into
a fair and reasonable compromise. When parties agree to submit unresolved issues to the
secretary of labor for his resolution, they should not expect their positions to be adopted in
toto. It is understood that they defer to his wisdom and objectivity in insuring industrial
peace. And unless they can clearly demonstrate bias, arbitrariness, capriciousness or
personal hostility on the part of such public officer, the Court will not interfere or substitute
the said officer‘s judgment with its own.
 Velarde v. Social Justice Society,
G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004.

FACTS: On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition)
before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered
political party, sought the ff: (a) interpretation of several constitutional provisions,[8]
specifically on the separation of church and state; and (b) a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office,
or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

The trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II,
Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law. It then
proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church
and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its
discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the endorsement of specific candidates
in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive
portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court. Hence, this
Petition for Review.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.

ISSUE: WON the SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief raised a justiciable controversy

HELD: NO. Its Petition for Declaratory Relief failed to raise a justiciable controversy. A
justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. An initiatory
complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x.[20]Yet,
the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.

It merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious
leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle
on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and
duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights.
 Sebastian Jr. v. Reyes,
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1638, September 18, 2009.

FACTS: Petitioner, Judge Sebastian Jr., read the judgment from a computer screen without
giving the accused couple a written copy or computer print-out of the decision. She merely
required the couple to read it from the computer screen in camera without the presence of
their counsel. The couple raised on appeal that the trial court failed to comply with the
mandate of Rule 120, or the Rules of Court and Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
requiring that the decision must be written and signed by the judge with a clear statement of
the facts and the law on which the decision is based. Complaint against Judge JR for gross
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and inefficiency.

ISSUE: WON the conduct of petitioner judge is violative of the Constitution

HELD: The Court ruled that petitioner judge‘s conduct is a violation of the Constitution. The
judge could have simply printed and signed the decision. Offering to a party‘s counsel a
diskette containing the decision when such counsel demands a written copy thereof, is
unheard of in the judiciary. A verbal judgment is, in contemplation of law, in esse, ineffective.
If petitioner judge was not yet prepared to promulgate the decision as it was not yet printed,
she could have called the case later and have it printed. A party should not be left in the dark
on what issues to raise before the appellate court. It is a requirement of due process that
parties to litigations be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost so he
may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which
it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to point the possible errors of the court for
review by a higher tribunal.

If judges were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond the boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then the law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority.

For having been found guilty of these charges, among others, Judge JR was declared unfit
to discharge her functions a judge and dismissed from the service.
 So v. Food Fest Land, Inc., G.R. No. 183628, February 9, 2011.

FACTS: Food Fest Land Inc. (Food Fest) entered into a Contract of Lease with Daniel T. So
(So) over a commercial space in San Antonio Village, Makati City for a period of three years
on which Food Fest intended to operate a Kentucky Fried Chicken carry out branch. The
parties entered into a preliminary agreement, the pertinent portion of which stated: The lease
shall not become binding upon us unless and until the government agencies concerned shall
authorize, permit or license us to open and maintain our business at the proposed Lease
Premise. In such case, the agreement may be canceled and all rights and obligations
hereunder shall cease. While Food Fest was able to secure the necessary licenses and
permits for the first year(1999), it failed to commence business operations. For the year
2000, Food Fest‘s application for renewal of barangay business clearance was held in
abeyance. Food Fest communicated its intent to terminate the lease contract to So who,
however, did not accede and instead offered to help Food Fest secure authorization from the
barangay. In August 2000, Food Fest, for the second time, purportedly informed So of its
intent to terminate the lease, and it in fact stopped paying rent. So reiterated his offer to help
it secure clearance from the barangay. Food Fest demurred to the offer. So demanded
payment of rentals from Food Fest from September 2000 to March 2001. Food Fest denied
any liability, however, and started to remove its fixtures and equipment from the premises.
On April 2, 2001, So sent Food Fest a Final Notice of Termination with demand to pay and to
vacate. On April 26, 2001, So filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against Food
Fest before the (MeTC) of Makat iCity. The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of So. On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MeTC Decision. On petition for review,
the Court of Appeals declared that Food Fest‘s obligation to pay rent was not extinguished
upon its failure to secure permits to operate.

ISSUE: WON the acquisition of subsequent business permits etc. is a suspensive condition
to the lease contract making the obligation not binding to the parties upon not acquiring such
documents

HELD: The Court ruled that it is clear that the condition set forth in the preliminary
agreement pertains to the initial application of Food Fest for the permits, licenses and
authority to operate. The cause or essential purpose in a contract of lease is the use or
enjoyment of a thing. A party‘s motive or particular purpose in entering into a contract does
not affect the validity or existence of the contract; an exception is when the realization of
such motive or particular purpose has been made a condition upon which the contract is
made to depend. The exception does not apply here. Food Fest was able to secure the
permits, licenses and authority to operate when the lease contract was executed. Its failure
to renew these permits, licenses and authority for the succeeding year, does not, however,
suffice to declare the lease functus officio, nor can it be construed as an unforeseen event to
warrant the application of Article 1267.
 Obra v. Spouses Badua, G.R. No. 149125, August 9, 2007.

FACTS: Respondents allege that their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned
by them situated in La Union, were located west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases,
and Baduas, that their only access to the national highway was a pathway traversing the
northern portion of Resurreccion Obra‘s property and the southern portion of the properties
of the Bucasases and Baduas, that the pathway had been established as early as 1955. In
1995, however, Obra constructed a fence on the northern boundary of their property, thus,
blocking respondents access to the national highway. Respondents demanded the
demolition of the fence, but Obra refused. The RTC dismissed the complaint. Respondents
were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim of an easement of right of
way. When Obra fenced the northern portion of her property, respondents were able to use
another pathway as ingress and egress to the highway, traversing the southern portion of
Obra‘s property. (2000 decision) In 2001, Obra constructed a fence on the southern portion
of her lot, which again restricted the use of respondents new pathway. Respondents filed a
Motion to Enforce the 2000 decision. They alleged that the decision of the RTC dismissing
the case was based on the existence of a new pathway. Thus, Obra was prohibited from
closing said passage. The RTC granted the dismissal of the complaint in 2000 depended on
Obra‘s representation that she was allowing respondents to use the southern portion of her
property as an alternative pathway. This made the southern portion a voluntary easement of
right-of-way which Obra should respect.

ISSUE:

Can the RTC issue an order clarifying its 2000 decision, effectively establishing an
easement on Obra‘s property?

HELD:

NO. The dismissal of the case in 2000 meant that no easement was ever established on
Obra‘s property. However, the trial court, by issuing its 2001 decision, effectively created a
right-of-way on Obra‘s property in favor of respondents allegedly on the basis of a voluntary
agreement between the parties. This directive was in contravention of its 2000 decision.
Thus, it was null and void for having been issued outside of the court‘s jurisdiction.
(immutability of judgment). Nevertheless, the records of the 2000 case do not reveal any
agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the
terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon by the parties, more particularly, the
payment of the proper indemnity. The evidence is not ample enough to support the
conclusion that there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the southern portion.
Moreso, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it should be
drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and ordinarily must
be in writing. No written instrument on this agreement was adduced by respondents.
 Galang v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 139448, October 11, 2005.

FACTS: Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigo‘s parents
were strongly opposed to their marriage. They lived as husband and wife in the house of one
Adolfo Dagawan until Rodrigo left and never returned. The evidence on other pertinent facts
is however conflicting. Plaintiff tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were engaged despite the
opposition of the latter‘s mother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to give dowry and
defray the expenses of the marriage. The father even took them to the house of Dagawan
for them to stay as husband and wife. However when Rodrigo was not able to secure a
marriage license for lack of a residence certificate, he went back to his hometown to get
such certificate but never returned.

On the other hand, the defendants sough to establish that he and plaintiff were engaged but
his parents were opposed to the marriage. Rodrigo was agreeable to marry the plaintiff after
his graduation but the latter was impatient and wanted the marriage to take place sooner.
Because of continued relationships with the plaintiff, Rodrigo‘s parents told him to leave the
parental home. He later told this to plaintiff. The plaintiff convinced him to go to Dagawan‘s
house where she followed and stayed thereafter. Because of his continued refusal to marry
the plaintiff, the latter‘s relatives, accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers
intimidated him. He was allowed to go home and was then placed under the custody of a
town mayor by his parents. He refused to acknowledge the marriage application, which was
provided by Dagawan for him to sign, when he did not appear before a notary public.

Plaintiff filed an action against Rodrigo and his father Maximo Quinit to recover damages for
breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo to marry her. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of plaintiff, which on appeal, was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff may recover damages for breach of promise to marry.

HELD: It is urged by the plaintiff that said Court had erred in not awarding moral damages to
her. She insists that moral damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible under our
laws, but this question has already been settled adversely to plaintiff‘s pretense in
Hemosisima vs. Court of Appeals. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not
collectible.
 Lim v. HMR Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 201483, August 4, 2014.

FACTS: On February 2001, petitioner (Lim) filed a case for illegal dismissal and money
claims against respondents (HMR Phil Inc.) and its officers, Teresa G. Santos-Castro, Henry
G. Bunag and Nelson S. Camiller. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On April
2003, the NLRC reversed the LA Decision and declared Lim to have been illegally
dismissed. Respondents were then ordered to pay the Lim his full backwages ―reckoned
from his dismissal on February 3, 2001 up to the promulgation of this Decision.‖ Lim and
HMR Phil Inc. appealed to CA. The CA affirmed the NLRC Decision with modification.
Consequently, HMR Phil Inc. appealed to SC and was denied. On September 2007, Lim
moved for execution. On November 2007, the Computation and Research Unit (CRU) of the
NLRC computed the backwages from February 3, 2001, the date of the illegal dismissal, up
to October 31, 2007, the date of actual reinstatement. HMR opposed the computation
arguing that the back wages should be computed until April 11, 2003 (the date of
promulgation of the NLRC decision), as stated in the dispositive portion of the NLRC
decision, which provided that backwages shall be ―reckoned from his dismissal on February
3, 2001 up to the promulgation of this Decision.‖ Lim argued that the body of the NLRC
decision explicitly stated that he was entitled to full backwages from the time he was illegally
dismissed until his actual reinstatement, which was also in accord with Article 279 of the
Labor Code and all prevailing jurisprudence. The LA issued the order granting the motion for
execution filed by Lim. Holding that the backwages should be reckoned until April 11, 2003
only in accordance with the NLRC decision and not up to his actual reinstatement. The
NLRC sustained the computation of the LA.

ISSUE: WON back wages should be computed from the time the employee was illegal
dismissed until his actual reinstatement

HELD: Yes. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code it is clear that an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to his full back wages computed from the time his compensation was
withheld up to the time of his actual reinstatement. The April 2003 NLRC decision expressly
recognizes that Lim is entitled to his full back wages until his actual reinstatement. There is
nothing in the NLRC decision that restricted the award of back wages. Nonetheless, the fallo
of the said decision limited the computation of the back wages up to its promulgation on April
11, 2003.
 Phil. Trust Co. v. Spouses Roxas, G.R. No. 171897, October 14, 2015.

FACTS: The Spouses Roxas procured loans from Philippine Trust Company (PTC) to
finance their real estate business, which were secured by real estate mortgages on the
Spouses Roxas' real properties. Subsequently, the Spouses Roxas, PTC, and Roben
Construction entered into "a contract of building construction," under which PTC granted an
additional loan to the Spouses Roxas. Such contract was superseded by a new "contract of
building construction" wherein Rosendo P. Dominguez, Jr. (Dominguez) substituted Roben
Construction as the contractor under the same terms and conditions of the previous
contract. Spouses Roxas did not finish the housing project due to financial difficulties
resulting in non-payment of the loans.
As a result, Dominguez sued PTC and Spouses Roxas for breach of contract. On the other
hand, Spouses Roxas in turn filed a complaint against Dominguez and the insurance
company.
In the first case, Spouses Roxas filed an answer with a cross-claim against PTC. PTC also
filed an answer with a counterclaim against Spouses Roxas for unpaid loan obligation and,
in default of such payments, the foreclosure of the real estate mortgages. The RTC ruled in
favor of Dominguez and denied PTC‘s counterclaim for insufficiency of evidence without
prejudice to the filing of a complaint against Spouses Roxas. Both PTC and Spouses Roxas
appealed to the CA but the same is still pending (CA-G.R. CV No.30340). PTC in the
meantime filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure against Spouses Roxas in Bataan
RTC. The latter in turn filed an opposition and a complaint for damages with Preliminary
Injunction which was granted by the court. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s decision. The
decision became final and executory, prompting the Spouses Roxas to file a motion for
execution to enforce the judgment against PTC. PTC filed an Opposition where it raised for
the first time the defense of legal compensation to offset the judgment debt due to the
Spouses Roxas. The same was denied by the RTC. PTC filed two motions for
reconsideration but both were denied again. PTC filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
which was dismissed. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: WON PTC engaged in forum shopping.

HELD: The SC ruled in the affirmative. PTC appears to have willfully engaged in forum
shopping. Forum Shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present, viz: a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interest in both
actions; b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res
judicate in the action under consideration. We find that the elements of litis pendentia – and,
as a consequence, forum shopping – exists in this case. PTC‘s claim for legal compensation
is founded on the same unpaid loan obligation now being litigated in CA-G.R. CV No. 30340.
Although that case originated from a complaint filed by Dominguez for breach of contract,
PTC counterclaimed the entire unpaid loan obligation, plus interest, owed to it by the
Spouses Roxas.
 Natividad v. Mariano, G.R. No. 179643, June 3, 2013.

FACTS: Respondent Lilia V. Domingo was the owner of the lot in dispute covered under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-165606.On July 18, 1997, without her consent,
RadeliaSy (Sy) petitioned before the RTC for reissuance of new owner‘s copy and, as proof,
presented a deed of sale dated July 14, 1997 executed by Domingo in her favor, and an
affidavit of loss dated July 17, 1997, stating that her bag containing the owner‘s copy of TCT
No. N-165606 had been snatched while she was at the SM City, North EDSA.
After the RTC granted the petition, the Register of Deeds cancelled the TCT No. N-165606
and issued a new TCT No. 186142 in favor of Syby virtue of the deed of absolute sale date
July 14, 1997. Sy immediately subdivided the property and sold each half to Spouses De
Vera and Spouses Cusi, and were issued TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569 respectively,
annotatedon the TCT a consideration of onlyPhp 1M each but the entire lot had an actual
valueof not less than Php 14M.
It was only on July 1999 when the respondent learned the situation.She filed an action
against Spouses Sy, Spouses De Vera, and the Spouses Cusi seeking annulment of titles,
injuction, and damages. She also applied for the issuance of writ of preliminary prohibition
and mandatory injunction, and a temporary restraining order (TRO).

HELD: The RTC granted her application, however, the title of Spouses De Vera and
Spouses Cusiremain valid as they were held purchasers in good faith. Dissatisfied with the
decision, Domingo filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC set aside its first decision and
declaring the sale between the respondent and Sy void; the buyers were not purchasers in
good faith; cancellation of TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569; the TCT No. 165606 shall be
revalidated in the name of Domingo.
 Sangguniang Barangay v. Exploration Permit Application of PNOC,
G.R. No. 162226 (Resolution), September 2, 2013.

FACTS: On July 3, 1996, PNOC-EDC applied for an exploration permit, denominated as

EXPA-000005-VIII (subject application) with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB),
Regional Office No. VIII, covering a total area of 16,144 hectares in the Province of Leyte
and located within the Leyte Geothermal Reservation. On November 19, 1996, petitioner
passed Resolution No. 58, Series of 1996, expressing its deep concern for the possible
environmental damages that may be brought about by PNOC-EDC‘s activities. Thereafter, it
filed a Complaint dated February 18, 1997 praying for the denial of the subject application
with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators (PA). In its Position Paper filed on August 15, 1997,
petitioner argued, inter alia, that the area covered by the subject application is within a
watershed area that is protected under existing laws, which, if granted, would endanger the
water supply of the residents and nearby municipalities and cause damage to rivers and
forests. For its part, in its Position Paper dated August 14, 1997, PNOC-EDC argued that the
area covered by the subject application is not closed to mining applications as it is not a
proclaimed watershed area and no initial components of National Integrated Protected Areas
Systems covers the same.

ISSUE: WON the MAB is correct in giving due course to the subject application

HELD: The petition is denied. At the outset, it should be made clear that petitioner itself
admits that it is assailing the MAB‘s Order dated January 21, 2004. However, it is well to
emphasize that such Order merely declared the MAB‘s earlier Decision dated September 24,
2002 final and executory for failure of petitioner to either move for reconsideration or appeal
the same.1âwphi1 It is well-settled that under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck
down. This doctrine has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration
of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b)
to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not a mere
technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-
honored principle of procedural law.
 FGU Insurance Corp. v. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66
G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011.

FACTS: GPS agreed to transport thirty (30) units of Condura refrigerators from CII to Central
Luzon Appliances. However, the delivery truck collided with another truck resulting in the
damage of said appliances. FGU Insurance Corporation, the insurer of the damaged
refrigerators, paid CII, the insured. FGU, in turn, as subrogee of the insured‘s rights and
interests, sought reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS. The RTC ruled, among
others, that FGU failed to adduce evidence that GPS was a common carrier and that its
driver was negligent, thus, GPS could not be made liable for the damages of the subject
cargoes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. When elevated to
the Supreme Court, it agreed with the lower courts that GPS was not a common carrier but
nevertheless held it liable under the doctrine of culpa contractual. GPS filed its Opposition to
Motion for Execution with the RTC, praying that FGU‘s motion for execution be denied on
the ground that the latter‘s claim was unlawful, illegal, against public policy and good morals,
and constituted unjust enrichment. The RTC issued an order granting GPS motion to set
case for hearing.

ISSUE: WON the RTC unlawfully neglect the performance of its duty when it re-opened a
case which already attained finality

HELD: Where the judgment of a higher court has become final and executory and has been
returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out
the decision and issuing the writ of execution. In addition, a final and executory judgment
can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief not originally included.

But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the
so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments;
and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.

The Court agreed with the RTC that there is indeed a need to find out the whereabouts of
the subject refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to determine the issue of
whether or not there was an actual turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the
assured CII.
 SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority,

G.R. No. 203655 (Resolution), September 7, 2015.

FACTS: SM Land, Inc. submitted an unsolicited proposal to develop Bonifacio South

Property. Respondent BCDA, under the current presidency of Casanova, however,
terminated the competitive challenge on the following grounds: a) SMLI‘s offer was
incompatible with public interest and, therefore, void; b) the whole process that lead to the
issuance of a Certificate of Successful Negotiation was highly irregular, citing a dubious
process that lead to the naming of SMLI as the original proponent given the fact that another
developer has submitted a proposal to develop the land in question two months before
SMLI. BCDA also submitted that the Joint Venture Selection Committee‘s recommendation
and BCDA‘s Boards approval using competitive challenge, instead of the usual public
bidding process, are themselves questionable. BCDA also submitted that the government
stands to lose P13 B in the agreement. In this MR, respondent argued that BCDA and SMLI
do not have a contract that would bestow upon the latter the right to demand that its
unsolicited proposal be subjected to a competitive challenge. Assuming arguendo the
existence of such an agreement between the parties, respondents contend that the same
may be terminated by reason of public interest.

ISSUE: WON BCDA may terminate the same by reason of public interest

HELD: The Court ruled that this agreement is the law between the contracting parties with
which they are required to comply in good faith. Verily, it is BCDA‘s subsequent unilateral
cancellation of this perfected contract which this Court deemed to have been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. BCDA could not validly renege on its obligation to subject the
unsolicited proposal to a competitive challenge in view of this perfected contract, and
especially so after BCDA gave its assurance that it would respect the rights that accrued in
SMLI‘s favor arising from the same.
 Go v. Echavez, G.R. No. 174542, August 3, 2015.
FACTS: Nick Carandang (Carandang) is Kargo's Manager at its General Santos City
Branch. On December 20, 1996, Kargo (owned by petitioner) and Carandang entered into a
Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase (lease contract) over a Fuso Dropside Truck
(truck). The lease contract stipulated that Kargo would execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the truck upon Carandang's full payment of five equal monthly installments of P78,710.75. If
he failed to pay any of the installments, Carandang should return the truck and forfeit his
payments as rentals. The lease contract also prohibited Carandang from assigning his
rights, as lessee-buyer, to third persons. Carandang sold the truck to respondent Lamberto
Echavez (Echavez) without Go's knowledge. Later, Go learned about the sale but did not
know to whom the truck was sold. Hence Go filed before the RTC a Complaint for Replevin
against Carandang and John Doe. The sheriff seized the truck from Echavez who filed his
Answer with Cross-Claim and Counterclaim. Echavez denied knowledge of the lease
contract, and claimed that he bought the truck in good faith and for value from Kargo through
Carandangand that Go could not deny Carandang's authority to sell Kargo's trucks because
she represented to the public that Carandang was Kargo's manager.

After trial on the merits, the RTC held Go and Carandang solidarity liable to Echavez for
damages.

ISSUE: WON the lease contract between Go and Carandang bound Echavez

HELD: The Court ruled that the lease contract bound only Go and Carandang because
Echavez was found to be a buyer in good faith and for value.
 Libongcogon v. PHIMCO Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 203332, June 18, 2014.

FACTS: Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly authorized bargaining
representative of PHIMCO‘s daily-paid workers. The 47 individually named respondents are
PILA officers and members. When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to
expire on December 31, 1994, PHIMCO and PILA negotiated for its renewal. The negotiation
resulted in a deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to disagreements on salary increases
and benefits. On March 9, 1995, PILA filed with NCMB a Notice of Strike on the ground of
the bargaining deadlock. PILA then staged a strike. PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition
for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO), to enjoin the strikers from
preventing – through force, intimidation and coercion – the ingress and egress of non-
striking employees into and from the company premises. NLRC issued an ex-parte TRO,
effective for 20 days. PHIMCO sent a letter to 36 union members, directing them to explain
within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during
the strike. Three days later the 36 union members were informed of their dismissal. PILA
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal (illegal dismissal case) with the
NLRC. Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute,
and ordered all the striking employees (except those who were dismissed) to return to work.
PHIMCO filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case) with the NLRC, with
a prayer for the dismissal of PILA officers and members who knowingly participated in the
illegal strike. PHIMCO claimed that the strikers prevented ingress to and egress from the
PHIMCO compound, thereby paralyzing PHIMCO‘s operations. Respondents countered that
they complied with all the legal requirements for the staging of the strike, they put up no
barricade, and conducted their strike peacefully, in an orderly and lawful manner, without
incident.

ISSUE: WON the strike was contrary to law

HELD: Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural
requirements, a strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal. The
means become illegal when they come within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the
Labor Code which provides: No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. Based on our
examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC and the CA, we
find the PILA strike illegal. While the strike indisputably had not been marred by actual
violence and patent intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA officers and members
undertook as part of their strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress
from PHIMCO‘s premises, thus preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles
from entering the PHIMCO compound. In this manner, the picketers violated Article 264(e) of
the Labor Code.
 Phil. Airlines, Inc. v. Bichara, G.R. No. 213729, September 2, 2015.

FACTS: Bichara was included in PAL's Purser Upgrading Program in which he graduated.
As flight purser, he was required to take five (5) check rides for his performance evaluation
and earn at least an 85% rating for each ride. However, Bichara failed in the two (2) check
rides with ratings of 83.46% and 80.63%. Consequently, Bichara was demoted to the
position of flight steward. Bichara appealed his demotion to PAL, but no action was taken.
Hence, he filed a complaint for illegal demotion against PAL before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) – Regional Arbitration Branch. Labor Arbiter (LA) issued a
Decision (June 16, 1997 Decision) declaring Bichara's demotion as illegal, and accordingly,
ordered PAL to reinstate Bichara to his position as flight purser. PAL filed an appeal before
the NLRC and later before the Court of Appeals (CA), both of which, however, upheld LA‘s
finding. PAL no longer appealed to the Court, thus, it rendered the June 16, 1997. Decision
final and executory. During the pendency of the illegal demotion case before the CA, PAL
implemented another retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of Bichara's
employment. This prompted him, along with more than 1,400 other retrenched flight
attendants, represented by the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines
(FASAP), to file a separate complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal retrenchment with
claims for reinstatement and payment of salaries, allowances, backwages, and damages
against PAL. On July 9, 2005, Bichara reached the 60 year-old compulsory retirement age
under the PAL-FASAP Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). On January 31, 2008,
Bichara filed a motion for execution of the LA's June 16, 1997 Decision, which PAL opposed
by arguing that the "complaint for illegal demotion…was overtaken by supervening events,
i.e., the retrenchment in 1998 and his having reached the compulsory retirement age in
2005." In an Order dated February 4, 2009, Labor Arbiter (LA) granted Bichara's motion for
execution, thus, directing the issuance of a writ of execution against PAL and/or a certain
Jose Garcia to jointly and severally pay Bichara: (a) separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
equivalent to one (1) month's pay for every year of service counting from October 28, 1968
up to the present, excluding the period from April 1, 1971 until May 15, 1975, or a period of
35 years; and (b) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00. LA declared that,
notwithstanding the pendency before this Court of the illegal retrenchment case, Bichara's
termination was invalid, given that: (a) PAL did not use a fair and reasonable criteria in
effecting the retrenchment; (b) PAL disregarded the labor arbiters' rulings in the illegal
demotion and illegal retrenchment cases which were both immediately executory; and (c)
retrenchment was made during the pendency of the illegal demotion case without the
permission of the court where the case was pending. For these reasons, Bichara was
entitled to reinstatement to his position as flight purser. However, since Bichara may no
longer be reinstated in view of his compulsory retirement in accordance with the CBA, LA
Macam, instead, ordered PAL to pay Bichara separation pay with the salary base of a flight
purser. The NLRC reversed LA Macam.

ISSUE: WON the monetary award is correctly awarded to Bichara.

HELD: Yes. PAL's supervening retrenchment of its employees, which included Bichara, in
July 1998, and his compulsory retirement in July 2005, prevents the enforcement of the
reinstatement of Bichara to the position of flight purser. Nonetheless, since the Decision had
already settled the illegality of Bichara's demotion with finality, this Court finds that Bichara
should, instead, be awarded the salary differential of a flight purser from a flight steward from
the time of his illegal demotion up until the time he was retrenched. The award of salary
differential is not dependent on the validity of his termination. Hence, with this direct relation,
there should be no obstacle in rendering this award
 Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Galandia, G.R. No. 144412,
November 18, 2003.

FACTS: Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase,

petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be
assigned outside of Cebu City. However, private respondent refused to be transferred to
Bacolod City in a letter by reason of parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that
would result if he is away from his family. He thereafter filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for constructive dismissal. Subsequently, petitioner informed private respondent that
he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch, however, private respondent again refused.
As a result, petitioner warned and required him to follow the said orders; otherwise, he shall
be penalized under the company‘s discipline policy. Furthermore, private respondent was
required to explain and defend himself. The latter replied stating that whether he be
suspended or dismissed, it would all the more establish and fortify his complaint pending
before the NLRC and further charges petitioner with discrimination and favoritism in ordering
his transfer. He further alleges that the management‘s discriminatory act of transferring only
the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of management prerogative
when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some new officers who
happen to enjoy favorable connection with management. As a result, petitioner, through a
Memo, informed private respondent that Allied Bank is terminating him. The reasons given
for the dismissal were: (1) continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu
City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application for
additional vacation leave. The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner had abused its management
prerogative in ordering private respondent‘s transfer and the refusal by the latter did not
amount to insubordination. The NLRC likewise ruled that: (1) petitioner terminated the
private respondent without just cause considering family considerations; (2) the transfer is a
demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem
branch, a regional office, and because the bank wanted him, an assistant manager, to
replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran branch; (3) the termination was illegal for
lack of due process as no hearing appears to have been conducted and that petitioner failed
to send a termination notice and instead issued a Memo merely stating a notice of
termination would be issued, but petitioner did not issue any notice; and (4) petitioner
dismissed private respondent in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the
dismissal undermined the latter‘s right to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws.
The ruling of NLRC was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WON Allied Bank afforded private respondent due process

HELD: 1. Yes. To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1,
Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which provides:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of
the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds of termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to
the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented
against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

The first written notice was embodied in Allied Bank‘s letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice
required private respondent to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him for his refusal to comply with the transfer orders. On the requirement of a hearing, the
Court has held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. An
actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange of several letters gave him an opportunity to
respond to the charges against him.
 French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 126477, September 11, 1998.

FACTS: Private respondents Ludo and Luym Oleo Chemical Co., filed a complaint for
breach of contract with damages against petitioner foreign corporation and the latter‘s
alleged Philippine agent Trans-World Trading Company. Summons were served on Trans-
World which moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that it is not petitioner‘s agent.
Petitioner itself filed a special appearance with Motion to Dismiss contending that the court
had not jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. Petitioner argued
that a) it is not doing business in the Philippines and b) Trans-world is not its agent, therefore
the procedure of Section 14 and 16, Rules 14 of the Rules of Court should have been
observed. The court a quo initially dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
petitioner. But on private respondent Motion for Reconsideration, said court reversed the
order of dismissal and ruled that summons were properly served on petitioner whom it found
doing business in the Philippines and Trans-World as its agent.

ISSUE: Is petitioner doing business in the Philippines?

HELD: It is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant corporation is
doing business. For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of doing business must first
be established by appropriate allegations in the complaint and the court in determining such
fact need not go beyond the allegations therein. In any case, the determination that a foreign
corporation is doing business is merely tentative and only to enable the local court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the foreign corporation through service of summons. It does
not foreclose a subsequent finding to the contrary, depending on the evidence.

Under the Rules of Court, if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, summons may be served on a) its resident agent designate in accordance with
law; b) if there is no resident agent, the government official designated by law to that effect;
or c) any of its officer or agent within the Philippines.

Private respondent alleged in its complaint that Trans-World is petitioner‘s agent, so that the
service was made on the latter. Such general allegation is insufficient to show the agency
relationship between petitioner and Trans-World. However, although there is no requirement
to first substantiate the allegation of agency yet it is necessary that there must be specific
allegations in the complaint that establishes the connection between the foreign corporation
and its alleged agent with respect to the transaction in question.
 Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-Natu v. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd.,

G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971.

FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association - NATU, FGU
Insurance Group Workers and Employees Association - NATU, and Insular Life Building
Employees Association - NATU (herein referred to as the Unions), while still members of
the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining
agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., and the FGU Insurance Group
(herein referred to as the Companies). Two of the lawyers and officers of the Unions
namely Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia, tried to dissuade the Unions from disaffiliating with
the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail. Enaje
and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice and were thereafter hired by the companies - Garcia as assistant
corporate secretary and legal assistant, and Enaje as personnel manager and chairman of
the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions. On
October 1957, negotiations for the collective bargaining was conducted but resulted to a
deadlock. From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but
with no satisfactory results due to the stalemate on the matter of salary increases. This
prompted the Unions to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the
Companies‘ unfair labor practices. On May 20, 1958, the Unions went on strike and
picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga. On May 21, Jose M.
Olbes, the acting manager and president, sent individual letters to the striking employees
urging them to abandon their strike with a promise of free coffee, movies, overtime pay, and
accommodations. He also warned the strikers if they fail to return to work by a certain date,
they might be replaced in their jobs. Further, the Companies hired men to break into the
picket lines resulting in violence, and the filing of criminal charges against some union
officers and members. When eventually, the strikers called off their strike to return to their
jobs, they were subjected to a screening process by a management committee, among the
members were Garcia and Enaje. After screening, eighty-three (83) strikers were rejected
due to pending criminal charges, and adamantly refused readmission of thirty-four (34)
officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike. The CIR prosecutor
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies, specifically (1) interfering
with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the
strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. After
the trial, the Court of Industrial Relations dismissed the Unions‘ complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
striking members of the Unions in readmission of employees after the strike

HELD: Some of the members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had
pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact they were able to secure clearances,
34 officials and members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they
committed acts inimical to the Companies. It should be noted, however, that non-strikers
who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal‘s office, arising from the
same incidents whence against the criminal charges against the strikers are involved, were
readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is an act of
discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a
violation of Sec. 4(a)(4) of the Industrial Peace Act.

The respondent Companies did not merely discriminate against all strikers in general since
they separated the active rom the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or
lack of it, on the picket lines. Discrimination exists where the record shows that the union
activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were
denied reinstatement.
 China Airlines v. Chiok, G.R. No. 152122, July 30, 2003.

FACTS: Daniel Chiok purchased from China Airlines a passenger ticket for air transportation
covering Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila. The said ticket was exclusively endorsable to
PAL. Before Chiok his trip, the trips covered by the ticket were pre-scheduled and confirmed
by the former. When petitioner arrived in Taipei, he went to CAL to confirm his Hong Kong-
Manila trip on board PAL. The CAL office attached a yellow sticker indicating the status was
OWhen Chiok reached Hong Kong, he then went to PAL office to confirm his flight back to
Manila. The PAL also confirmed the status of his ticket and attached a ticket indicating a
status OK. Chiok proceeded to Hong Kong airport for his trip to Manila. However, upon
reaching the PAL counter, he was told that the flight to Manila was cancelled due to a
typhoon. He was informed that all confirmed flight ticket holders of PAL were automatically
booked for the next flight the following day. The next day, Chiok was not able to board the
plane because his name did not appear on the computer as passenger for the said flight to
Manila.

ISSUE: WON CAL is liable for damages

HELD: The contract of air transportation between the petitioner and respondent, with the
former endorsing PAL the segment of Chiok‘s journey. Such contract of carriage has been
treated in this jurisprudence as a single operation pursuant to Warsaw Convention, to which
the Philippines is a party.

In the instant case, PAL as the carrying agent of CAL, the latter cannot evade liability to
respondent, Chiok, even though it may have been only a ticket issuer for Hong Kong- Manila
sector.
 Dosch v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-51182, July 5, 1983.

FACTS: Petitioner is an American citizen and the resident Manager of Northwest Airlines,
Inc. in the Philippines. He had been with the respondent company for 11 years, 9 of which
was served in the Philippines as Northwest manager in Manila. On August 18, 1975 he
received an inter-office communication from R.C. Jenkins, Northwest's Vice President for
Orient Region based in Tokyo, promoting him to the position of Director of International
Sales and transferring him to Northwest's General Office in Minneapolis, U.S.A., effective
the same day. Petitioner, acknowledging receipt of the above memo, expressed appreciation
for the promotion and at the same time regretted that for personal reasons and reasons
involving his family (living in the Philippines), he is unable to accept a transfer from the
Philippines. On September 9, 1975, the Vice-President for the Orient Region of Northwest
advised petitioner that "in view of the foregoing, your status as an employee of the company
ceased on the close of business on August 31, 1975" and "the company therefore considers
your letter of August 28, 1975, to be a resignation without notice." On September 16, 1975,
Northwest filed a Report on Resignation of Managerial Employee i.e., Helmut Dosch before
the Department of Labor, copy thereof furnished petitioner. The Report was contested by the
petitioner and the parties were conciliated by Regional Office No. IV, Manila but failed to
agree on a settlement. The case was thus certified to the Executive Labor Arbiter, National
Labor Relations Commission, for compulsory arbitration.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is considered resigned from his employment

HELD: The Court agree with the Labor Arbiter that petitioner did not resign or relinquish his
position as Manager-Philippines, Indeed, the letter sent by petitioner to R.C. Jenkins cannot
be considered as a resignation as petitioner indicated therein clearly that he preferred to
remain as Manager-Philippines of Northwest. The SC treated the Jenkins letter as directing
the promotion of the petitioner from his position as Philippine manager to Director of
International Sales in Minneapolis, U.S.A. It is not merely a transfer order alone but as the
Solicitor General correctly observes, "it is more in the nature of a promotion that a transfer,
the latter being merely incidental to such promotion." The inter-office communication of Vice
President Jenkins is captioned "Transfer" but it is basically and essentially a promotion for
the nature of an instrument is characterized not by the title given to it but by its body and
contents. The communication informed the petitioner that effective August 18, 1975, he was
to be promoted to the position of Director of International Sales, and his compensation would
be upgraded and the payroll accordingly adjusted. Petitioner was, therefore, advanced to a
higher position and rank and his salary was increased and that is a promotion. It has been
held that promotion denotes a scalar ascent of an officer or an employee to another position,
higher either in rank or salary. There can be no dispute that the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure mandated under the Constitution applies to all employees and laborers,
whether in the government service or in the private sector. The fact that petitioner is a
managerial employee does not by itself exclude him from the protection of the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure. Even a manager in a private concern has the right to be
secure in his position, to decline a promotion where, although the promotion carries an
increase in his salary and rank but results in his transfer to a new place of assignment or
station and away from his family. Such an order constitutes removal without just cause and
is illegal. Nor can the removal be justified on the ground of loss of confidence as now
claimed by private respondent Northwest, insisting as it does that by petitioner's alleged
contumacious refusal to obey the transfer order, said petitioner was guilty of insubordination.
 Consing v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 78272, August 29, 1989.

FACTS: Merlin Consing, petitioner, sold a house and lot to Caridad Santos. Provided in their
contract of sale were particular terms of payment in which the purchase price shall be paid
(installment basis, plus interest). In the process, Santos defaulted in her payments. Consing
demanded for her payment and had planned to resort to court litigation. Santos expressed
her willingness to settle her obligation. However, this is upon the condition that the Consings
comply with all the laws and regulations on subdivision and after payment to her damages
because of the use of a portion of her lot as a subdivision road. In response, the Consings
submitted a revised subdivision plan. CA did not comply with the certification requirement.

ISSUE: WON Court erred in arriving to its conclusion without meeting certification
requirements

HELD: The certification is a new provision introduced by the framers of the 1987
Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement
that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after consultation with the
members of the court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a
member thereof for decision-writing. The decision is thus rendered by the court as a body
and not merely by a member thereof [I Record of the Constitutional Commission 498-500],
This is in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only
after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required
majority vote. The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the
case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to
one member for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of
official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at
the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification
requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission to account
therefore. Such absence of certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
 Prudential Bank v. Castro
A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988.

FACTS: Petitioner, Prudential Bank, instituted an administrative case seeking for the
disbarment of Atty. Benjamin Grecia in connection with his actuations in a civil case where
the latter represented the plaintiff. Grecia filed a petition for redress and exoneration and for
voluntary inhibition.

ISSUE: WON a constitutional provision has been disregarded in the Court‘s Minute
Resolution dated 12 Jan 1988

HELD: NO. It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so the constitutional
mandate that ―no…motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be…denied
without stating the legal basis therefor‖ is inapplicable.
 Borromeo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990.

FACTS: Villamor was the distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller and the plaintiff
Borromeo being Villamor‘s friend and former classmate borrow a large sum of money for
which he mortgaged his property as a security because of his obligation to Mr. Miller. Miller
then filed a civil action against Villamor and attached his properties including the mortgaged
property to the plaintiff. Plaintiff then pressed the defendant to settle his obligation, but the
defendant however offered to execute a document promising the plaintiff to pay his debt
even after the lapse of 10 years. Defendant then signed a promissory note to pay his debt
and with 12% interest per annum. Despite repeated demands from plaintiff, defendant still
failed to settle his debt.

Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution
of the document as there was no property registered in defendant‘s name, who furthermore
assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the last war, plaintiff
made various oral demands, but defendants failed to settle his account, — hence the
present complaint for collection.

ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in their interpretation.

HELD: It is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the
literal sense of the words employed is to be followed, such is not the case where they
―appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties,‖ which ―intention
shall prevail. However, the above decision, had occasion to reiterate, under the view that
such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion based
upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the
clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in cases where the latter, by an established
connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation,
and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion.‘ The
rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an
unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule
applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute
expressly or necessary implication declares the entire contract void.
 Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No.002, March 29, 2005.

FACTS: Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the
representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in
a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly
elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232
votes for the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of
Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004. Refusing to concede
defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest
before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer
with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As counsels for the parties exchanged lively
motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the controversy, an act of
God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment at St. Luke‘s Hospital. However, neither the Protestee‘s proclamation by Congress
nor the death of her main rival as a fortuitous intervening event, appears to abate the
present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass
actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral
protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all. Together with the formal Notice of the
Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a
MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE
FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ, by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe claiming that
because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of her
deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people,
there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election
protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004
elections. In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v.
Mencias and subsequent cases including analogous cases decided by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate
is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal
and not a property that passes on to the heirs. Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot
substitute for her deceased husband because under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the
presidency may contest the election of the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive
the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the presidency in the
election that is being contested. Citing pertinent PET Rules, protestee also stresses that this
Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of the
electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto
cases.

ISSUE: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency
of the latter‘s protest case?

HELD: No. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of
the PET Rules. Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest
the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real
parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. This Tribunal, however, does not
have any rules on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and
suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the
decision of the electoral tribunals.
 Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998.

FACTS: Petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the government of Indi.
While the respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
law. Both parties entered into a contract obligating Pacific Company to supply Oil and
Natural Gas with $,300 metric tons of oil well cement. Pacific failed to deliver the cargo to Oil
and Natural Gas Commission after he received payment and several demands.Oil and
Natural Gas won in the Arbitral case him US $899,603.77. Pacific refuse to pay the amount
adjudged by the foreign court. Oil and Natural Gas then filed a complaint with the RTC of
Surigao City. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds: plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; ack of cause of action; and plaintiffs claim or
demand has been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. RTC ruled in favor of
Pacific for jurisdiction over the caseCA affirmed the RTC/s decision saying that the foreign
court could not validly adopt the arbitrator‘s award

ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner
and the private respondent under Clause 16 under the contract.

HELD:

No . The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not
preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

In Francisco v. Permskul, this Court held that the following memorandum decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution.
 Yao v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000.

FACTS: George Yao‘s legal dilemma commenced when the Philippine Electrical
Manufacturing Company (PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE)
lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, Remandaman was able to purchase
from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design.
Assessing that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search
warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each
containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan
City. The indictment charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and in conspiracy sold
fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers,
making them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public to
believe them as such.. Both accused pleaded not guilty. The MeTC acquitted Roxas but
convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to
prove that he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. YAO
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied. He then appealed to the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered a one-page Decision
which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision.

YAO filed a motion for reconsideration and assailed the decision as violative of Section 2,
Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of
merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal
and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons. YAO appealed
to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals granted YAO an
extension of twenty (20) days to file the Appellant's Brief. However, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a Resolution declaring that the decision of RTC has long become final and
executory and ordering the records of the case remanded to said court for the proper
execution of judgment. YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment
contending that the resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal but the Court of
Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit.

ISSUES: WON Yao was denied due process

HELD: Yes he was. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO transgressed
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states:
 SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

The Court finds that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore,
fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision achieved nothing and attempted
at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. The Court
cannot consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to
comply with the measures of validity. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without
saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly
meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.
 Francisco v. Permskul,

G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989.

FACTS: On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private
respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant
to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of
P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when
caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the
property. He thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00,
representing the rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the
lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed him for other
charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of
the leased premises to restore them to their original condition. The private respondent sued
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission of position papers by the
parties, a summary judgment was rendered, sustaining the complainant and holding that the
repainting was not chargeable to him. This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This
was done in a memorandum decision reading in full as follows:

ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum decision of the regional trial court violates Article
VIII Section 14 of the Constitution.

HELD: NO. There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum
decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as
the courts themselves. Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration
of justice, the Constitution now contains a number of provisions aimed at correcting this
serious difficulty that has caused much disaffection among the people. The memorandum
decision can be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with the
case load of the courts of justice, but expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot
excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the end does not
justify the means. In the case at bar, the court finds that a judgment was made by the
metropolitan trial court in compliance with the rule on summary procedure. It is not really
correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court which was the subject of the petition for review. A reading of its own
decision will show that it dealt extensively with the memorandum decision and discussed it at
some length in the light of the observations and reservations. The law does not define the
memorandum decision and simply suggests that the court may adopt by reference the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution on
appeal before it. When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its
constitutionality. The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against the
memorandum decision as now authorized by law.
 Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. L-29352, February 19, 1986.

FACTS: Central bank promised to rehabilitate overseas bank of manila ―OBM‖ (now
combank) however it tried to evade its promise to help OBM. Respondent Central Bank of
the Philippines was directed by the SC to comply with its obligations under the voting trust
agreement. CA asked for the enforcement of collection for the sum of 100k representing the
value of its time deposit together with an interest from November 9, 1964. OBM appealed to
the SC insisting that since the suspension of its operations on august 2, 1968, the bank
hasn‘t resumed its normal operation yet. SC held that OBM is exempt from the payment of
interest because obligation to pay interest on the deposit ceases the moment the operation
of the bank is completely suspended by the duly constituted authority, the Central Bank.
Central Bank filed for a motion for reconsideration against the Supreme Court‘s resolution
dated October 19, 1982 upholding the Tapia ruling of the Supreme Court which provides
that, ―the obligation to pay interest on the deposit ceases the moment the operation of the
bank (The Overseas Bank of Manila) is completely suspended by the duly constituted
authority, the Central Bank.‖ the date of suspension of its banking operations on 2 August
1968? The 1971 Tapia ruling was also upheld in the subsequent similar cases such as
TOBM v. CA and Vicente Cordero (March 30, 1982) and TOBM v. CA and Julian Cor-dero
(April 27, 1982); that TOBM is not liable to pay the interests of time deposits during the
period of its closure from August 2, 1968 to January 8, 1981 where its banking operations
were suspended.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is exempt from the payment of interest time deposits from

HELD: In its En Banc Resolution, the Supreme Court once again upheld its prior decision,
citing that the Central Bank has failed to adduce any cogent argument to persuade the Court
to reconsider its prior Resolution. As provided in Art. 1956, no interest shall be due unless it
has been expressly stipulated in writing. It should be deemed read into every contract of
deposit with a bank that the obligation to pay interest on the deposit ceases the moment the
operation of the bank is completely suspended by the duly constituted authority, the Central
Bank.
 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

FACTS: After Gore won the popular vote, the election‘s outcome was contingent upon
Florida and its twenty-five electoral votes. Once the deadline for counting the votes had
passed, no clear winner of Florida‘s electorate vote was announced. Gore then requested a
manual recount under Florida‘s statute. The state statute provided for ―contest‘ of election
results when a receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes
sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.‖ The trial court found for Bush
ruling that Gore failed to prove his burden with ―reasonable probability.‖

ISSUE: Does the use of manual recounts, absent any standard, violate the 14th
Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause?

HELD: Yes. In a contested presidential election, a state is required to conduct a manual

recount of the votes and issue uniform rules governing the recount to give equal weight to
each vote and determine the intent of the vote under the Equal Protection Clause. The
decision of the state Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded to the state
legislature for further consideration of appropriate standards governing a recount. Until the
state chooses a statewide election method to implement its power to appoint members of the
Electoral College, any individual has no constitutional right to vote for the electors for
President of the U.S. Once a state holds such election, the right to vote becomes
fundamental and the weight given to each vote must be equal. Compromising equality can
result if the process permits more weight to some votes over others.
Here, the counting dispute is driven by the procedure of voting with a ballot machine
designed to record votes by perforating each ballot by a stylus.In Some cases, a portion of
the ballot remained hanging or merely indented rather than fully perforated.
 People v. Ebio, G.R. No. 147750, September 29, 2004.

FACTS: The appellant, GERRY EBIO, was charged with rape before the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. The private complainant is his 11-year old daughter, DORY
EBIO. ‗That sometime in April 21, 2000 at more or less 10:00 o‘clock in the evening, at
Barangay Tughan, Municipality of Juban, Province of Sorsogon, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with force and intimidation, with lewd
designs and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy and the tender age of the child, did
then and there, willfully/unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge of DORY EBIO, his
own 11-year old daughter, against her will and without her valid consent, to her damage and
prejudice.

ISSUE: WON Ebio is guilty of raping her daughter.

HELD: YES, Ebio is proven beyond reasonable doubt guilty of committing a heinous crime of
raping his 11 year-old daughter. The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the Court
meets by Division. There should be at least three members present for the Division to
conduct its business. This may be deduced from paragraph 3 of Section 4 Article VIII. There
is no similar pronouncement, however, when the Court meets en banc. The second
paragraph of Article VIII Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution does not expressly state the
number of Justices required to be present to constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. The
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum when the
Court is composed of only fourteen members. In case of doubt in a criminal case, especially
where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
 Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004.

FACTS: Mrs. Dantes alleged that his husband is a philanderer. Atty. Dantes purportedly
engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate
children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular
support to his wife and their children, thus forcing her to work abroad to provide for their
children‘s needs. Atty. Dantes admitted the fact of marriage with her and the birth of their
children, but alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen years before after
his wife had abandoned him in their residence. He further asserted that Mrs. Dantes filed the
case just to force him to remit 70% of his monthly salary to her. Mrs. Dantes then presented
documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and
Christian Dave, all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of his husband and his paramour to
prove the fact that he sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different
women.

ISSUE: WON having an illicit relationship during the subsistence of marriage warrants the
disbarment of a lawyer

HELD: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community.To be the basis of disciplinary action, the
lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency.

Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral
conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken
in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents
commission of marital infidelity and immorality.

Atty. Crispin G. Dantes has been DISBARRED.

 In re: Wenceslao Laureta,
G.R. No. L-68635, March 12, 1987.
FACTS: Incriminating acts of Eva Maravilla Ilustre: wrote threatening letters to the Justices
of the Supreme Court; filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan that completely
disregarded facts, circumstances, and legal considerations; instigated the circulation of a
false headline implying graft and corruption charges against Justices. The involvement of
Atty. Wenceslao Lauret is that he likely wrote the threatening letters sent to the Justices in
Ilustre‘s name; likely encouraged Ilustre‘s pursuit of her Affidavit-Complaint with the
Tanodbayan and her disparaging remarks regarding the Justices in her letters
and comments to the media; was responsible for all the acts of his client.

ISSUE: WON the Justices of the First Division acted in bad faith

HELD: No. The Court ruled that Ilustre has lost three times in court, and by virtue of res
judicata, the Escolin Decision and the Javellana Resolution, which bar her from acquiring
Maravilla‘s properties, serve as final judgment of the case. The SC gave ample time and
consideration to her petitions, but ultimately held that they had no merit (as stated in their
Banc Decision). Justice Yap clarified that he was not aware that his former partner Atty.
Sedfrey Ordoñez was the counsel for the respondents, and inhibited himself immediately
upon finding out. Therefore, the Court is not duty bound to issue signed Decisions all the
time, if it deems it unnecessary.
 Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited and North British & Mercantile
Insurance Company Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,
G.R. No. L-43342, October 30, 1978.

FACTS: Respondent company shipped to a consignee in the United States certain cargoes
covered by two "all risks" marine insurance policies issued by petitioners containing express
stipulations that respondent company has an interest therein. The shipments, which were
undertaken in accordance with the instructions of the insurer‘s surveyor, sustained damage
in transit prompting private respondent to file the corresponding insurance claims which were
rejected. Consequently, respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance a
complaint for recovery of damages which was dismissed for lack of cause of action. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited,
Et. Al. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Et. Al. trial court‘s order of dismissal.
Hence, this petition for certiorari (herein treated as an appeal) wherein petitioners contend,
among others, that respondent company is not the real party in interest and has no
personality to sue and that respondent‘s complaint has no cause of action against the
insurers.

ISSUE: WON there is a prima facie showing in respondent‘s complaint and pleadings that it
is a real party in interest under the policies and that it has a cause of action against
petitioners as insurers

HELD: The Court ruled that based (1) on express stipulation in the two subject marine
insurance policies that respondent company has an interest therein and (2) on the facts that
it was the shipper (and presumably the owner) of the insured cargoes, that the shipments
were undertaken in accordance with the instructions of the insurer‘s marine surveyor and
that it was respondent company that filed the corresponding claim with the adjuster when the
cargoes were damaged, the Supreme Court, without prejudging the merits of respondent
company‘s case and petitioners‘ affirmative defenses, ruled that there is prima facie showing
in respondent‘s complaint and pleadings that it is a real party in interest under the policies
and that it has a cause of action against the petitioners as insurers.
 Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc
G.R. No. 196358. March 21, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner‘s case for review on the Court of Appeal‘s dismissal of his case on
serious misconduct and dishonesty, was denied by the Supreme through a minute
resolution dated 15 June 2011. Petitioner‘s motion to rescind said minute resolution was
again denied through the Court‘s 21 September 2011 resolution. Upon receipt, Agoy filed a
motion to rescind the same or have his case resolved by the Court En Banc for proper
disposition through a signed resolution or decision.

ISSUES: WON the copies of the minute resolutions dated 15 June 2011 and 21 September
2011 that Agoy received are authentic; and Whether or not it was proper for the court to
deny his petition through a minute resolution.

HELD: Yes. The stated minute resolutions signed by the Assistant Clerk of Court and the
Deputy Clerk of Court are authentic. The signatories are duly authorized by the Court. As
held in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals (264 SCRA 388), minute resolutions are the results of
the deliberations by the Justices of the Court but are promulgated by the Clerk of Court or
his assistants to effect prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court.

Yes. It is proper for the Court to deny Agoy‘s petition through a minute resolution. While the
Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the
law on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to a
petition for review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial. Such legal basis is the
absence of reversible error in the challenged decision, resolution or order of the court. In
addition, when there is no reversible error in the decision of the CA and the Court denies the
petition, there is no need for it to fully explain the denial, since it already means that it agrees
with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.

The motion to rescind was denied for lack of merit.

 Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Galvante,
G.R. No. 56280, July 6, 1981.
FACTS: Villamor was the distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller and the plaintiff
Borromeo being Villamor‘s friend and former classmate borrow a large sum of money for
which he mortgaged his property as a security because of his obligation to Mr. Miller. Miller
then filed a civil action against Villamor and attached his properties including the mortgaged
property to the plaintiff. Plaintiff then pressed the defendant to settle his obligation, but the
defendant however offered to execute a document promising the plaintiff to pay his debt
even after the lapse of 10 years. Defendant then signed a promissory note to pay his debt
and with 12% interest per annum. Despite repeated demands from plaintiff, defendant still
failed to settle his debt.
Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution
of the document as there was no property registered in defendant‘s name, who furthermore
assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the last war, plaintiff
made various oral demands, but defendants failed to settle his account, — hence the
present complaint for collection.
ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in their interpretation.
HELD: The Court said that minute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing
unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the
exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be
known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains
the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."
 Novino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-21098, May 31, 1963
FACTS: This petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals has been, by
resolution, dismissed "for lack merit". Now comes petitioners' counsel to argue that the
resolution "does not interpret or clarify any law or right raised by the petitioners but simply
denied or dismissed the petition without (giving) any reason for such action.'' And by citing
sec. 12 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, counsel impliedly suggests that we disregarded it in
failing to state the facts and the law on which our resolute rested.

ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals has failed to decide one question of law (Art. 144 of the Civil
Code) that herein petitioners had submitted

HELD: In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the
laws are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
 Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998.

FACTS: Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau
of Energy Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI
asked the Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks. IEI
was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will
assign all its rights and interests to MMIC. IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus
damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of
Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks prior to finalization of the
memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation be granted back. Philippine
National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of
MMIC. It was dismissed. Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and
MMIC. RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the
contract in favor of IEI. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no
jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the petition

HELD: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an
ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of
Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is
inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of
whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI
would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development and with the
objective of rationalizing the country's overall coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of
action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the
operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering rescission of the
Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating
contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three
(3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED. In
recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is
such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, wherein it finds application in this case
since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity
should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized
expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide
matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and
extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial
determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have
statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative
agency.
 Judge Madrid v. Dealca
A.C. No. 7474, September 9, 2014.

FACTS: The complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in
collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a pending case docketed at the Court of
Appeals wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant. The parties agreed upon PhP
15,000.00 as attorney‘s fees with the following breakdown: 50% payable upon acceptance of
the case; and the remaining balance upon termination of the case. Complainant paid the
respondent PhP 7,500.00. Prior to preparing the appellant‘s brief, respondent demanded
payment of PhP 4,000.00. The complainant obliged though it was contrary to the original
agreement. Before filing the appellant's brief, respondent demanded payment of the balance
amounting to Php 3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent withdraw
his appearance as complaint‘s counsel without informing the complainant. Thus, the
complainant charged the respondent with misconduct and praying the respondent be ―sternly
dealt with administratively.‖

ISSUE: Whether respondent committed misconduct and violated the provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR)

HELD: The Supreme Court find the respondent violated Canon 22 of the CPR for
withdrawing from the complainant‘s case without a good cause. Respondent also violated
Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the CPR for demanding full payment before submission of the
complainant-appellant‘s brief even though they have an agreement that final payment will be
given upon termination of the case. The Supreme Court reprimanded the respondent.
 Tayamura v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987.
FACTS: In a complaint for damages filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 8
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8679, petitioner Joaquin T. Borromeo charges Attys. Julieta
Y. Carreon and Alfredo P. Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of
Court, respectively, of the Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial
Records Office of this Court, with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously
and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of
Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273. Summons were issued by the lower court requiring the
respondents to answer the complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Since the
summons arose from a complaint against a resolution of the Third Division and the complaint
is against personnel of the Third Division acting in their official capacity upon orders issued
to them by the Third Division, the summons were initially referred to the Third Division. In a
resolution dated April 25, 1990, the summons were referred by the Third Division to the
Court En Banc.

ISSUE: WON a case without merit may be disposed by the Court through minute resolutions
and need to be signed by its members who took part in the deliberation, considering that the
petitioner contends that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they
did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the
Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void

HELD: The Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly
and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions.
Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that,
"No petition for review ... shall be refused due course ...without stating the legal basis
therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a
petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to
deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis
stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
 Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama,
G.R. No. 186614, February 23, 2011.

FACTS: Respondent was hired by petitioner as security guard. Almost 4 years after, he was
relieved from service and was not given any assignment thereafter. He filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal and nonpayment of 13th month pay. Petitioner presented a different
version. It alleged that respondent was not constructively or illegally dismissed, but had
voluntarily resigned. The LA declared respondent to have been constructively dismissed. On
appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision. It declared that respondent was neither
constructively terminated nor did he voluntarily resign. As such, respondent remained an
employee of petitioner. The NLRC thus ordered respondent to immediately report to
petitioner and assume his duty. The CA set aside the resolutions of the NLRC and reinstated
that of the LA. The CA sustained respondent‘s claim of constructive dismissal and pointed
out that respondent remained on floating status for more than six (6) months, and petitioner
offered no credible explanation why it failed to provide a new assignment to respondent

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining respondent‘s claim of constructive

dismissal.

HELD: In cases involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever
employment relationship between a security guard and his agency. An employee has the
right to security of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right to his position as would
deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where his
service, as security guard, will be most beneficial to the client. Jurisprudence is trite with
pronouncements that the temporary inactivity or ―floating status‖ of security guards should
continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable for
constructive dismissal. In this case, respondent remained on ―floating status‖ for more than
six months. He was relieved on January 30, 2006, and was not given a new assignment at
the time he filed the complaint on August 2, 2006.
 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 103412, February 3, 2000.

FACTS: On January 18, 1985, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite
City a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. N-4614 to nullify Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. (555) RT-2957 and its derivative titles, and to revert the lands covered by these
titles to the public domain. The complaint alleged that said TCT was a falsely reconstituted
title, issued by an unauthorized recorder at the Office of the Register of Deeds. It further
alleged that the lot covered by said title was foreshore land and cannot be privately
appropriated. On January 8, 1986, private respondent A. Sison & Sons, Inc., moved to
dismiss the complaint, which the RTC granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On March
18, 1986, petitioner moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied. According to the trial
court, since petitioner's objective was reversion of the lots to the public domain, a reopening
of the land registration case would be necessary, and it had no jurisdiction to do so.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals err in finding petitioner's claim barred by res judicata

HELD: The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies
and constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action.

For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be satisfied:

1. There must be a final judgment;

2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties;
3. It must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be between the first and second actions an identity of parties, identity of
subject matter, and identity of causes of action.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two elements of res judicata. Anent the
third element, petitioner argues that the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. N-4614 is not a
decision on the merits and that it was error for the appellate court to rule otherwise. A
judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on
the ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial. It is not
necessary that there should have been a trial, actual hearing, or arguments on the facts of
the case.For as long as the parties had full legal opportunity to be heard on their respective
claims and contentions, the judgment is on the merits.

In the present case, the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. N-4614 was issued only after an
actual hearing and after the lower court had considered the evidence of both parties.
Further, petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard on its motion for reconsideration.
Without doubt, the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. N-4614 is a judgment on the merits.
 Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009.

FACTS: On January 27, 2000, the respondent CIR sent petitioner assessment of deficiency
taxes, both Value-Added Tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) in the total amount of
P224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996 and 1997. Petitioner protested such assessment in
a letter, but the respondent did not act on the protest which led the petitioner to file a petition
in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the cancellation of said assessments. CTA
partially granted the petition wherein the petitioner is ordered to pay the deficiency VAT and
set aside the DST deficiency tax. Respondent appealed in Court of Appeals (CA) with regard
to the cancellation of DST assessment. CA granted the petition. The Court affirmed CA‘s
decision. Hence, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is liable to pay the DST on its health care agreement pursuant
to Sec.185 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997

HELD: Petition granted. Petitioner is not contemplated to be included in ―or other branch
insurance‖ covered by Section 185 of NIRC because it is a Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) and not an insurance company. HMOs primary purpose is rendering service to its
members by lowering prices and reducing the cost rather than the risk of medical health. On
the other hand, insurance businesses undertakes for a consideration to indemnify its clients
against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. The term
―indemnify‖ therein presuppose that a liability or claim has already been incurred. In HMOs,
there is no indemnity precisely because the member merely avail of medical services to be
paid or already paid in advance at a pre-agreed price under the agreements. Moreover,
HMOs play an important role in society as partners of the State in achieving its constitutional
mandate of providing citizens with affordable health services. Also, the DST assessment of
the petitioner for the years 1996 and 1997 became moot and academic since it availed tax
amnesty under RA 9480 on December 10, 2007. Thus, petitioner is entitled to immunity from
payment of taxes for taxable year 2005 and prior years.
 Philipine National Bank v. Lim,
G.R. No. 171677, January 30, 2013.

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
assail the Decision dated September 29, 2005 and Resolution dated February 23, 2006 of
the Comi of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82435 entitled "Philippine National Bank
substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul Land, Inc.,
the Office of the President and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board."

ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court has already ruled in a final and executory decision that
the 1994 mortgage contract is valid

HELD: The Court ruled that the validity of the subject mortgage between PALI and PNB was
the primary issue raised by the parties and resolved by the RTC after the conclusion of a full-
blown trial. On September 10, 2004, the issue was finally laid to rest. A final and executory
judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court. Inevitably, res
judicata operates to bar PALI and PNB from raising the same issue lest there will be no end
to litigation. The HLURB has the authority to take cognizance of a complaint for nullification
of a mortgage, but in the case at bar, its ruling shall only affect Unit 48C of Vista de Loro,
which was the subject of the Contract to Sell executed between PALI and Lim. The
jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include
jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. This is pursuant to the intent of P.D.
No. 957 to protect hapless buyers from Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power
Corporation, G.R. No. 156556-57, October 4, 2011.
 Li v. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman,

G.R. No.165279, June 7, 2011

FACTS:

On July 7, 1993, respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy
of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC).Results
showed that Angelica was suffering from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, a high-grade
(highly malignant) cancer of the bone which usually afflicts teenage children. Following this
diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelicas right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime
Tamayo in order to remove the tumor.As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining
cancer cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from
spreading to other parts of the patient‘s body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by
Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr.
Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.

On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died on September 1,
1993, just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration of the first cycle of the
chemotherapy regimen. Because SLMC refused to release a death certificate without full
payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of Angelica to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-mortem examination. The
Medico-Legal Report issued by said institution indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic
shock secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation."

On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella,
Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with
negligence and disregard of Angelicas safety, health and welfare by their careless
administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions
in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the
chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely
demise.

On her part, Dr. Balmaceda declared that it is the physicians‘ duty to inform and explain to
the patient or his relatives every known side effect of the procedure or therapeutic agents to
be administered, before securing the consent of the patient or his relatives to such
procedure or therapy. The physician thus bases his assurance to the patient on his personal
assessment of the patient‘s condition and his knowledge of the general effects of the agents
or procedure that will be allowed on the patient.Dr. Balmaceda stressed that the patient or
relatives must be informed of all known side effects based on studies and observations,
even if such will aggravate the patient‘s condition.

In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as
she observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in
the administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient
died.
ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the
parents of the child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence
of finding that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment.

HELD:

No, There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise
would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The
gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant
undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to
undergo it.

Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material
risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas
parents. Respondents could not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and
amputation of Angelicas lower extremity, that her immune system was already weak on
account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When petitioner informed the respondents
beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and
red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin
darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents
understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all
patients undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each
patient‘s reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be
precisely determined by the physician. That death can possibly result from complications of
the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the
administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other
major medical procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general
side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.

As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the
variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening
illness. On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents claim that petitioner
told them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like
petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured
patients of chemotherapies success rate. Besides, informed consent laws in other countries
generally require only a reasonable explanation of potential harms, so specific disclosures
such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary. The element of ethical duty to
disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot thus be reduced to one
simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action based
on lack of informed consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that
duty through expert testimony. Such expert testimony must show the customary standard of
care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.

PETITION DENIED.
 Tolentino vs. Ongsiako

G.R. No. L-17938

FACTS:

Appellant is the successor of interest in behalf of the late Severino Domingo who has a case
against Ongsiako. It took 20 years before he came to know about the decision of the case,
prompting him to file a complaint for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion of the case
and asserting erroneous decision of the court. The same was dismissed by the court due to
lack of merit and without cause of action.

ISSUES:

1. WON an action for the enforcement of a dissenting opinion may be filed before the
court.
2. WON the court should act before the complaint on erroneous decision of the court.
HELD:

(1) No because a dissenting opinion merits no right or claim as it is just merely a dissent
from the majority decision of the case.

(2) Appellant is barred from assailing the decision of the court by res judicata and the
decision has already been final and executory already.
 Ruiz v. Ucol

G.R. No. L-45404, August 7, 1987

Facts:

The petitioner‘s laundrywoman filed an administrative complaint against the respondent who
alleged that the petitioner is using the laundrywoman in retaliation for the charges filed by
the respondent against petitioner. The case was dismissed by the court. The petitioner filed
a case of libel against the respondent which was likewise dismissed. The petitioner again
filed for damages based on the information in the case of libel which the court dismissed on
grounds of res judicata. On one hand, Ucol files an appeal for certiorari questioning the
dissenting opinion of the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not an appeal may be filed questioning a court‘s dissenting opinion.

Held:

It would be elementary to know that a dissenting opinion is not the decision of the case.
What is subject to appeal or a special civil action would be the majority opinion of the court.
 NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 125561. March 6, 1998

Facts:
This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated February 7, 1996, [1] which
affirmed the November 4, 1993 order of the med-arbiter holding that the strike held by
petitioners on October 13 and 14, 1993 was illegal and declaring the 15 officers who
knowingly participated in the strike to have lost their employment status.
Petitioners claim that the signing of that CBA by the Union officers, headed by one Rudolpho
Genato, and representatives of the Hotel was tainted with irregularities, prompting the Union
to file a notice of strike on the ground of a CBA deadlock. It was further asserted that instead
of proceeding with said strike, the Union officers and the officers of its national office
thereafter mysteriously signed the CBA without consulting the general membership of the
local chapter. These anomalies created anxiety in the Union which continued to prevail in the
following years.
On February, 1993, some of the union members submitted a letter-petition which was to be
the first of a series of demands for the resignation of the incumbent union officers on the
ground that the latter were purportedly abusive and neglectful of their duties. [6] Because the
demands went unheeded, a faction of the Union conducted what was ostensibly an
impeachment proceeding, causing the removal from office of the incumbent officers headed
by Genato. The faction proclaimed itself as the Interim Union Junta, now the petitioners in
this case.
Subsequent to the supposed impeachment of Genato and his group, the Junta requested
from the Hotel to conduct of a special election of officers. The Hotel referred the request to
the NUWHRAIN-LMC-IUF, the Union‘s national office. The latter disallowed the holding of
the election on the ground that it did not recognize the Junta because it was allegedly
constituted illegally

The Junta nonetheless conducted the election resulting in the choice of a set of officers led
by petitioner Melvin Cowan, but which the supposedly impeached employees, the Union‘s
national office, and the Hotel refused to recognize. On August 10, 1993, a notice of strike
was filed by the Junta on alleged acts of the Hotel constituting unfair labor practice (ULP),
particularly, discrimination, undue interference in the exercise of the right to self-
organization, and bias in favor of the impeached officers. The NCMB dismissed said notice
on the ground that the imputed ULP acts were mere conflicts between two sets of union
officers or intra-union disputes, and being categorized under the nomenclature of ―non-
strikeable acts,

Meanwhile, the Union, headed by Genato, filed a petition for injunction in the DOLE to enjoin
the Junta from usurping the functions of the rightful officers. The Junta filed a second notice
of strike on September 9, 1993. Additional grounds were set forth therein, including the
suspension of an alleged Junta officer, one Sammie Coronel, which the Junta claimed
constituted an unfair labor practice. This notice of strike was likewise dismissed by the
NCMB as the grounds were found to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the
preceding notice,[ hence, likewise non-strikeable.

Coronel was eventually dismissed from employment and allegedly because the Junta
believed that said dismissal was a ULP act, [15] it staged a wildcat strike on October 13 and
14, 1993, notwithstanding the prohibition to strike issued by the NCMB, an order was issued
by the med-arbiter in the interpleader and injuction cases declaring illegal the formation of
the Junta, the impeachment of the union officers led by Genato, and the subsequent election
of officers led by Cowan. It acknowledged the incumbency of the Genato group as officers
and ordered the Hotel to recognize them as representatives of the rank and file employees
Consequently, the dismissal of the 15 officers of the Junta was declared to be valid.
Issue:
Whether the strike was valid

Ruling:
No, this Court finds the petition at bar to be unmeritorious. Generally, a strike based on a
―non-strikeable‖ ground is an illegal strike; corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no
such acts actually exist. As an exception, even if no ULP acts are committed by the
employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP acts exist so as to constitute a
valid ground to strike, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. [26] As a
general rule, therefore, where the union believed that the employer committed ULP and the
circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be considered
legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be
groundless.
An established caveat, however, is that a mere claim of good faith would not justify the
holding of a strike under the aforesaid exception as, in addition thereto, the circumstances
must have warranted such belief. It is therefore, not enough that the union believed that the
employer committed acts of ULP when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima
facie showing to sustain such belief.

The Court finds that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
subject strike was illegal, and accordingly holds that the circumstances prevailing in this
case did not warrant, as it could not have reasonably created, a belief in good faith that the
Hotel committed acts of ULP as to justify the strike.
The dismissal of Coronel which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike ] was not a sufficient
ground to justify that radical recourse on the part of the Junta members. As the NLRC later
found, the dismissal was legal and was not a case of ULP but a mere exercise of
management prerogative on discipline, the validity of which could have been questioned
through the filing of an appropriate complaint and not through the filing of a notice of strike or
the holding of a strike.[30] Evidently, to repeat, appropriate remedies under the Labor Code
were available to the striking employees and they had the option to either directly file a case
for illegal dismissal in the office of the labor arbiter [31] or, by agreement of the parties, to
submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that it may be subjected to
voluntary arbitration proceedings.
With respect to the claim of petitioners that additional acts of discrimination by the Hotel
generated their belief in good faith that ULP acts existed as to justify a strike, the Court
deems it unnecessary to again scrutinize and expound the same. The NLRC has already
held that the alleged acts of discrimination are not ―strikeable‖ grounds as found and
explained by the NCMB when it dismissed the two notices of strike filed by the Junta.
 BUSUEGO vs. CA

G.R. No. L-48955 (1987)

Facts:

CFI- Pasig City. Petitioner Bernardo Busuego commenced action against Jose, Romeo,
Ernesto (all surnamed Lazaro) and Vivencio Lopez, to recover possession of a parcel of land
and a three (3) unit apartment house standing thereon. Immediately thereafter, summons
was issued in the name of the four defendants and per sheriff‘s return, was personally
served at the address given in the complaint, upon the defendants ―through defendant
Dr. Ernesto Lazaro, personally.

Defendants, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed two motions for extension of time.
Both were granted by the CFI. Notwithstanding, they still failed to file an Answer. Upon
motion, the CFI declared them in default and eventually decided in favor of plaintiff.

Almost two years later, plaintiff filed before the CFI an ex parte motion for execution of the
default judgment, which the lower court granted.

Romeo Lazaro filed a motion to hold execution in abeyance praying that ―for humanitarian
reasons, an extension of 30 days, within which to vacate the premises be allowed to give
them sufficient time to look for another place; CFI granted.

The defendants through Atty. Roldan filed with the lower court a MR of the judgment by
default and/or to dissolve the writ of execution. Motion denied for being dilatory and plain
harassment.

The defendants, through their new counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, filed with the same court an
omnibus motion, which included a motion to lift the order of default, a second MR and a
motion to quash the writ of execution, alleging for the first time that their failure to answer
was due to lack of notice. Denied.

The defendants, through their new counsel, filed what in effect was a third MR of the
judgment by default, alleging that the lower court never acquired jurisdiction over their
persons because of lack of proper service of summons. Denied.

Issue:

WON jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the persons of the
respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lazaro.

Held:

In the present case, it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted service in seeking to
serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving a copy thereof ―through Dr. Ernesto
Lazaro personally.‖ Perusal, however, of the sheriff‘s return reveals that the sheriff failed to
specify therein what prior efforts, if any, had been exerted to serve summons upon the other
defendants personally within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of such
efforts, before proceeding to substituted service. We therefore uphold the CA‘s finding that,
while Ernesto Lazaro was validly served, with respect to respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo
Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, there was no valid service of summons effected.
We are, nonetheless, unable to sustain its conclusion that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the said respondents.

In the case before us, the defendants appeared before the trial court a number of times
without raising any objection to the improper service of summons:
 the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo Roldan, appeared in court and filed two
successive motions for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint;
 more than two years after rendition of the judgment by default by the trial court,
defendants, through their co- defendant Romeo Lazaro, filed a motion for extension
of time within which to vacate the premises involved and to look for another place to
live in, raising no question concerning the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
persons of the defendants; and
 the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Roldan, moved for reconsideration of the
judgment of the trial court and for dissolution of the writ of execution, again without
contesting the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.

We hold that by anyone or more of these acts, and certainly by the whole series of acts, the
defendants, respondents herein, effectively waived the initial lack of jurisdiction over their
persons and submitted to the authority of the trial court.
 Co vs. Electoral Tribunal
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

Facts:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held. Among the
candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the
citizenship of respondent Ong since Ong‘s father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and
questioned Ong‘s residence qualification since Ong does not own any property in Samar.

Issues:
1. Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2. Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3. Whether Ong is a resident of Samar.

Held:

(1) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process
on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
(2) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondent‘s father, an immigrant from China
was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his
oath, the private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino
citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino
mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
(3) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of
origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned
said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of
respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

 Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS:

The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground
that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule
was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US
citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was
questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.

ISSUE:

WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:

YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand,
naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No.
530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a

mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this
law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess
certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of

the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath
in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship
 Vera v. Avelino

G.R. L-543, August 31, 1946

Facts:

In May 25, 1946, the Philippine Senate passed a resolution excluding Senators-elect Jose
O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero from taking their seats in the Senate while the
election protest against them was still pending. The protest involved alleged electoral fraud
due to ―certain specified acts of terrorism and violence‖ in Pampanga, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija,
and Tarlac. Petitioners are now filing this action against the Senate resolution, praying for its
annulment and compelling respondents to let them take their seats.

Issues:

1. Whether Or not the Court had jurisdiction over the case.

2. Whether or not the Senate has exceeded its powers.
3. Whether or not it was respondents‘ legally inescapable duty to permit petitioners to
take their seats.
4. Whether or not respondents can be called to account for their votes regarding the
assailed resolution.

Held:

Due to the separation of powers, the Court has no actual jurisdiction over the case. It had
already established this in Alejandrino vs. Quezon. It is however alleged that the ruling in
Angara vs. Electoral Commission modified this doctrine; this is not true as the Court
specifically cited Alejandrino in Angara to justify their lack of jurisdiction over that case, as
well as this one.

The Senate did not exceed its powers. Independent of any constitutional or statutory grant, it
still has the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and that member‘s right to
participate in its deliberations. The assignment of contests regarding elections to the
Electoral Tribunal does not negate this power. It may also be approached in the viewpoint of
the Senate exercising its powers under Art. VI, Sec. 10 (3) of the 1935 Constitution to set its
own rules for its proceedings, and it exercises this power to promulgate orders to maintain its
prestige and dignity. It could be said to have done this in this case in order to make sure that
these Senators really were elected properly.

Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 725 provides that those who are elected are to come to
Manila and assume office, but it does not imply that the House could not deny admission in
the case of disqualification. The Constitution provides, under Art. VI, Sec. 15, that Senators
and Congressmen cannot be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate made
in Congress. Therefore, the Court cannot question or permit respondents to question the
votes made regarding the resolution before it.
 Vinuya vs. Sec. Romulo

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the ―comfort women‖ stations
in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japan‘s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against
them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women‘s Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners‘ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

HELD:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners‘ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer ―to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.‖

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that ―the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative–‗the political‘–departments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision.‖ are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However,
the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In
this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners‘ cause would be
inimical to our country‘s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the
Executive Department‘s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such
an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty‘s conclusion and our
consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests
of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are
sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade
a government to bring a claim on the individual‘s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection
by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do
is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty
to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained
the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a
whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term ―jus cogens‖ (literally, ―compelling law‖) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 Salcedo v COMELEC

G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999

Facts:

This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the
earlier Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.

Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true
copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without
his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent
Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office
of the Civil Registrar.

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for
the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of
them having filed their respective certificates of candidacy However, petitioner filed with the
Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy
on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname
was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said
surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.

In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the
time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of
his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with
Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a
petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali
Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the
present she has been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and
public transactions.

Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between
Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private
respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname
"Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy.

However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling
that private respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material
misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the
division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation.

Issue:

1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of
candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74
of the Omnibus Election Code.

Held:

Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname
"Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy.
A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office.
The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's
identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the
inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent.
Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when
they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into
voting for someone else by the use of such name.

The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the
petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy.
 Anthony T. Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities

GR No. 171435, July 30, 2008

Facts:
Pearlbank is a domestic corporation engaged in the securities business.
Westmont Investment Corporation (WINCORP) is a domestic corporation operating as an
investment house.
Pearlbank denied having any outstanding loan obligation with WINCORP or its investors
constituted falsification of commercial and private documents.
Pearlbank served on WINCORP a final demand letter asking for a full and accurate
accounting of the identities and investments of the lenders/investors WINCORP approved a
credit line in favor of Pearlbank in the amount of P250M
Both motions for reconsideration denied.

Issues:
Whether or not persons who invested in WINCORP demanding payment of their matured
investments

Held:
Pearlbank denied having any outstanding loan obligation with WINCORP or its investors.
 MERALCO vs. Bartolome
G.R. No. L-49623, June 29, 1982

FACTS:

Respondent-appellees.The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at Tanay,
Rizal on August13, 1976 from Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition
and the corresponding appeal was likewise rejected.

It elevates its appeal with the following arguments; firstly, the land in question had
essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription as a
result of open continuous and notorious possession and occupation for more than thirty
years by the original owner, Olimpia Ramos and his predecessor in interest, Piguing
spouses, whom Meralco acquired the disputed land, and f inally, the
substantial rights acquired by Ramosspouses and Peguing spouses for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, extend to Meralco by virtue of the provision of the Public Land
Law.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the law to hold landsof
public domain and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
2. Does the possession tacked to predecessor Private Corporation automatically
guarantee its rights to possession and title of the land.
3. Whether or not it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant
would be extended to a juridical person.

HELD:
(1) No. Private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the law
to hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits
private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease
of lands not exceeding one thousand hectares.
(2) No. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person who
occupied the land in open, continuous and notorious possession of the public land
for more than thirty years, does not automatically amount to rights and
possession. It would cease to be public only upon the issuance of the certificate
of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under the law.
(3) This conlusion is anchored on the principle that
a l l l a n d s t h a t w e r e n o t a c q u i r e d f r o m t h e Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain
.
The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his predecessors-in-interest
 Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73002, Dember 29, 1986

FACTS:

Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in
the complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance
from his parents, the former owners thereof.

Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court,
amended the answer. In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears.
The alleged ownership of the land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with an
allegation that the defendant is the owner of the land as he bought it from the
plaintiff‘s parents while they were still alive.

A f t e r t r i a l , t h e l o w e r c o u r t u p h e l d t h e d e f e n d a n t ‘ s ownership of the land. On

appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his
original answer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct

HELD:

No, The original pleading had been amended such that it already disappeared
from the record, lost its status as a pleading and cease to be a judicial admission. While
the said pleading may be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must,
in order t o h a v e s u c h e f f e c t , b e formally offered in evidence.
 Colinares vs. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two
years and four months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of
prison mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law
was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the
Court of Appeals sustained the RTC‘s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal‘s
decision, petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position that he should
be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that
makes his offense probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General
reiterating that under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained
once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme
Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of frustrated
homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court

HELD:

Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his
case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation,
he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found
him only liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that
no accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous
judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.
 CHAPTERS 9-13
RATIO DECIDENDI AND OBITER DICTUM • AUTHORITIES • LEGISLATION
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION • AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
_________________________________________________________________________

Dario v. Mison
176 SCRA 84
August 8, 1989

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, providing for the intention of the President
to, ―completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures,
and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.‖ Subsequently, Pres. Aquino
promulgated E.O. No. 127, ―Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance‖, where, in Sec. 59, it
provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. Pursuant to the reorganization,
Commissioner Mison issued separation notices to a total of 394 officials, including the
petitioner, Cesar Dario, in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner.

Thus, Cesar Dario petitioned for reinstatement on the ground that the Provisional
Constitution giving the power to dismiss public officials without cause ended on February
25, 1987, seeing as the public officials enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. However, respondent Commissioner Mison contended that Sec.
16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) allows the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs under E.O. No. 127 (authorizing separation without cause) to continue even
after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution – citing the case of Jose v. Arroyo, wherein
the Court decided in favor of a similar notion. Thus, there was no violation of security of
tenure.

The Civil Service Commission, nevertheless, ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner.
Whereas, the respondent motioned for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Does E.O. No. 127, providing reorganization, allow the “separation” of Dario from the
Bureau of Customs despite his right to security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution?

HELD: No. The Court held that E.O. No. 127, providing reorganization, does not allow the
―separation‖ of Dario from the Bureau of Customs despite his right to security of tenure
under the 1987 Constitution. In line with this, the Court maintains that reorganization entails
that an office is abolished, thus there actually no separation or dismissal such that these
concepts imply that there is an office to be separated from. However, the Court asserts that,
reorganizations abolishing an office would only be valid if it passes the test of good faith. A
Reorganization carried out in good faith must have for its purpose the efficiency of both the
economy and bureaucracy. In this case, there is lack of good faith such that there is no
showing that legitimate structural changes were made, only that personnel were reduced.
Thus, it cannot be said that it was done by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
Thus, since there is lack of good faith, there is no valid reorganization that would allow the
―separation‖ of the petitioners, in keeping with their security of tenure. The act of
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs dismissing Dario is unconstitutional
 Intramuros Tennis Club Inc. vs. Philippine Tourism Authority

GR. No. 135630

September 26, 2000

Facts:

Private respondent Philippine Tourism Authority ("PTA") owns the Victoria Tennis Courts
located in Intramuros, Manila by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1763. In a Memorandum
of Agreement ("MOA") executed on June 11, 1987, the PTA transferred the management,
operation, administration and development of the Victoria Tennis Courts to petitioner
Philippine Tennis Association ("PHILTA") for a period of ten (10) years. During the effectivity
of the MOA, PTA wrote a letter to PHILTA enumerating alleged violations by PHILTA of the
terms and conditions of the MOA and demanding the surrender of the possession of the
Victoria tennis courts PTA wrote a second letter to PHILTA requesting the latter to vacate
the premises of said tennis courts to give way to PTA's golf course expansion program with
private respondent Club Intramuros. Petitioners instituted a case for "preliminary injunction,
damages, and prayer for temporary restraining order" with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. RTC also granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners, based
upon a finding that PTA in pursuing the golf course expansion program was in effect
unilaterally pre-terminating the MOA. In the same order, it declared that "petitioner ITC is an
affiliate of PHILTA that has a right to be protected. Private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss, stating that in view of the expiration of the MOA petitioners' cause of action was
rendered moot and academic. petitioners maintained that their petition was also an action for
damages; hence, there are other issues for resolution despite the termination of the MOA.
Petitioners maintain that the said RTC order could not be the proper subject of execution
because it was still appealed to respondent court, but this merely confuses the concept of a
"final" judgment or order from one which has "become final" (or to use the more established
term, "final and executory") --- a distinction that is definite and settled.

Addressing petitioners' argument that the dispositive portion of the RTC order only provides
that private respondents' motion to dismiss is granted and does not order private
respondents to regain possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts, suffice it to say that
although as a rule, execution must conform to the dispositive portion of a decision, the other
parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi of the
court.

Issue: Whether respondent court gravely abused its discretion in finding good reasons to
grant private respondents' motion for execution pending appeal.

Ruling: It must be remembered that the determination of the existence of "good reasons" is
also a discretionary power, and the reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of this
discretion absent a showing of grave abuse thereof. In the present case, we find that
respondent court was well within its discretion in issuing its questioned resolutions, which
clearly set out the reasons for granting private respondents' motion for execution pending
appeal. Clearly, the restoration of PTA into the possession and management of Victoria
Tennis Courts is in order, being a necessary consequence of the lifting of the preliminary
injunction and the termination of the MOA or lease agreement, and does not prejudice in any
way the resolution of the other issues in petitioners' pending appeal with respondent court
such as their claim for damages from PTA which petitioners admit to be independent of the
terms of the MOA. Thus, we find that respondent court did not gravely abuse its discretion in
finding "good reasons" for allowing private respondents' motion for execution pending
appeal.

This rule has been held to extend to judgments decreeing the dissolution of a writ of
preliminary injunction, which are immediately executory.

CHAMBER OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

 vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-23244

June 30, 1965

FACTS:For a background of the case, it must be recalled that on December 9, 1949,

because of a foreign exchange crisis, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, claiming to act under section 74 of its Charter (Republic Act 265), and with
the approval of the President, promulgated Circular No. 20, entitled "Restriction on Gold
and Foreign Transactions," restricting sales of exchange by the Central Bank, subjecting
all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to licensing, and requiring the surrender of
foreign exchange acquisitions to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.

The petitioners insist that (a) the maintenance of the partial retention of export receipts
(CB Circulars 171 and 133) is illegal, in view in this Court's decision in the Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co. case (supra); (b) that maintenance of said circulars beyond December
31, 1964 contravenes paragraph 2 of Republic Act 2609; (c) that said Circulars involve an
unlawful delegation of powers; (d) that they are confiscatory and are an invalid exercise of
police power and that of eminent domain; (e) that they deprieve exporters of property
rights without due process; (f) that they actually impose a tax on exports, beyond the
power of the Central Bank to impose.

The respondent Central Bank denies the legal propositions advanced by the petitioners,
and contends that the maintenance of the 20% retention at parity of export dollars is a
measure of exchange restriction designed to protect the international reserve of the
Central Bank.

ISSUE: Whether the Central Bank is authorized by law to compel sale to it of 20% of
exporter's foreign exchange receipts four years after the enactment of Republic Act No.
2609.

RULING: While the petitioners proceed on the assumption that the pronouncement of
the ponente, Mr. Justice Labrador, in Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Central Bank, G.R. No.
L-12610, October 25, 1963, to the effect that the Central Bank Act (R.A. 265), does not
authorize it to require the surrender (commander) of foreign exchange earned by exporters
and pay for it the price fixed by the Central Bank, was part of the ratio decidendi of the case
and, therefore, a binding precedent. This is a misconception of the actual ruling in the case.

Regarding the allegation that the grant of authority to the Central Bank to issue the same
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, this Court has also held in the case
of People vs. Jolliffe that the standards set forth in the Central Bank Charter (Rep. Act No.
265) are "sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of
administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said authority
beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers ..." .

We conclude, therefore, that the continuation by Central Bank Circular No. 171 of the 20%
retention of foreign exchange receipts for sale to the Central Bank at parity is a valid
exercise of the emergency powers granted to the Bank under section 74 of Republic Act No.
265 (Central Bank Act), and that said powers continue in existence at the expiration of
Republic Act No. 2609.
 DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROBERTO M.
LAGMAN, and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.

G.R. No. 121075

July 24, 1997

FACTS:

Private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (hereinafter, SIHI) brought an action for
a sum of money against DELTA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch VI.
The decision could not be served on DELTA, either personally or by registered mail, due
to its earlier dissolution., SIHI moved for execution of the judgment, which the trial court
granted in its order of 11 March 1987 on the ground that no appeal had been taken by
DELTA despite publication of the decision. The writ of execution was issued and pursuant
thereto certain properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and sold.
The sheriff likewise levied on some other properties of DELTA. DELTA then commenced
a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 23068, wherein DELTA insisted that: (a) the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (DELTA) since there was no valid/proper
service of summons, thus rendering the decision null and void; and (b) the void decision
never became final and executory.

Delta prayed for the: (a) annulment of the order of the trial court dated 3 June 1992
dismissing the Notice of Appeal dated 6 November 1991; (b) annulment of the order of
the trial court dated 14 September 1992 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
former; and (c) elevation of the original records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 to the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the questioned orders of respondent court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing
the notice of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order dated September 14, 1992
of the same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner through
counsel) is valid.

RULING:

We are more than convinced that respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in denying DELTA's Omnibus Motion. The decision of the Court of Appeals of 17
June 1993 in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 29147 had long become final insofar as DELTA was
concerned, and it very well knew that the only issues raised therein concerned the trial
court's orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. As a matter of fact, at the time
Delta filed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the orders sought to be declared null
and void in the Omnibus Motion had already been issued, they having been so issued at
the commencement of CA-G.R. SP No. 23068. In short, if DELTA intended such orders to
be challenged in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, it could have explicitly alleged them as sources
of additional causes of action and prayed for the corresponding affirmative relief
therefrom, and if this course of action initially proved unavailing then DELTA could and
should have moved for reconsideration on that aspect. After the finality of the decision in
said case, any attempt to introduce or revive the issue had become procedurally
impermissible. Plainly, the issues raised in the Omnibus Motion could have been allowed
during the pendency of said case by way of amendments to the petition.

Clearly then, the Court of Appeals could only consider errors raised by petitioner in CA-
G.R. SP No. 29147, which were limited to the trial court's orders of 3 June 1992 and 14
September 1992.

In light of the dispositive portions of the Court of Appeals' decisions of 22 January 1991 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23068, and of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we cannot agree
with SIHI that DELTA is barred by res judicata. The Court of Appeals likewise did not
commit reversible error in deleting the phrase SIHI protested as obiter dictum.
 THE CITY OF MANILA vs. JUAN ENTOTE

G.R. No. L-24776

June 28, 974

FACTS:

Juan Entote is the registered owner of five (5) lots located in the City of Manila covered by
separate certificates of title. All these five lots are contiguous to each other and form one
integrated parcel which abuts Padre Herrera Street, a public thoroughfare. When Entote
acquired Lot 3 Pcs-2672 which is the lot involved in this litigation and to which We shall refer
simply as Lot 3, the same was already subject to an easement of a right-of-way annotated
on T.C.T. 45531.

Adjacent to the property of respondent Entote is that of intervenor Fernando Vinzons who is
the registered owner of several lots which like those of Juan Entote are adjacent to each
other and also constitute one integrated parcel which borders Lorenzo Chacon Street. With
the consolidation of the 35.87-sq. m. portion of Lot 2 Pcs-2672 with Lot 15-A Psd 12716, a
new certificate of title No. 46726 was issued for the consolidated parcel now described
as Lot 1 Pcs-232.

On March 12, 1957, respondent Entote applied to the City Engineer of Manila for a permit to
construct a two-storey building on his aforementioned property. The City Engineer, however,
required as a condition to the issuance of said permit that Lot 3 be converted into an
approved private alley subject to nine (9) conditions. Believing that he had no other recourse
but to accede to the conditions imposed by the City Engineer, respondent accepted the
same, and the nine conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title of Lot 3.

We have before Us an easement of right-of-way voluntarily constituted over Lot 3 Pcs-2672

by its original owner, Petrona Vera Vda. de Marzan, in favor of Lots 1 and 2 also of Pcs 2672
likewise owned by her. When owner Marzan sold a small portion of 35.87 square meters of
Lot 2 to intervenor Fernando Vinzons, the vendor and vendee agreed in writing that the
parties "waive, quitclaim and renounce their right-of-way easement to the adjoining lot
known as Lot 3 of Plan Pcs-2672" for the reason that the sold portion was to be consolidated
with another lot of the vendee which gave it an outlet to Lorenzo Chacon Street.

Intervenors assert, however, that the Appellate Court erred in denying them the enjoyment of
the easement, the waiver executed by Fernando Vinzons notwithstanding, for the simple
reason that the herein intervenors are embraced within the phrase: "any and all other
persons whomsoever, for their respective use.

Intervenors assail the application of the "ejusdem generis" rule which gives the "easement a
restricted and restrictive construction" and claim that under the "primordial rule of
construction that where the terms of an instrument are clear, there is no room or occasion for
interpretation either to enlarge or restrict their plain meaning.
ISSUE:

Whether or not The Appellate Court rightly held that the quoted portion of the trial court's
opinion in civil case 33076 was but an obiter dictum because the right of the public to the
use of the private alley.

RULING:

It is claimed by intervenors that the above pronouncement in civil case 33076 from which
no appeal was taken by respondent Entote, is now the law of the case "between the
parties". We disagree. The Appellate Court rightly held that the quoted portion of the trial
court's opinion in civil case 33076 was but an obiter dictum because the right of the use of
the private alley, Lot 3, was never an issue in said case. For under the maxim of
"ejusdem generis" which means "of the same kind, class or nature", when general words
follow an enumeration of particular cases, such words apply only to cases of the same
kind as those expressly mentioned. 9 Thus, when broad expressions are used, such as,
"and all others" or "any others" these are usually to be restricted to persons or things of
the same kind or class with those specifically named in the preceding words.

When the applications, plans, and specifications conform to the requirements of this title
and of title thirteen hereof, the city engineer shall issue a permit for the erection of the
building and shall approve in writing such plans and specifications, one copy of which
shall be returned to the owner or his agent and one copy shall be retained by the city
engineer; Provided, That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on
a private street or alley which has been officially approved; And provided, further, That
any private street or alley opened in an interior lot for the purposes of this section once
officially approved, shall be open to the general public, and with its approved width
preserved, shall be maintained and kept in good repair by the grantee of the permit, his
heirs, executors and assigns, and shall never be closed by any person so long as there is
a building or other structure abutting or facing upon such private street or alley.

We can summarily dismiss this argument of intervenors by referring to the case of Li Yao,
supra, where there was a similar undertaking made by the property owner to maintain the
private alley open to the public but which did not stand on the way of the Court when it
allowed the property owner to cancel said undertaking. However, a stronger reason why
intervenors' contention cannot be sustained is given by the Appellate Court.

On the basis of all that We have stated above, We find that the Appellate Court did not
commit any error when it ordered the intervenors herein "to close completely and forever
any and all openings and appertures of their houses intended for ingress, egress and
regress' abutting on the alley in question, 23 the latter being a necessary consequence of
the finding that intervenors have no right to any easement of right-of-way over Lot 3. The
claim of intervenors that Dominga Vinzons-Cu would undergo considerable expense if
required to tear down her existing wall, demolish and remodel her house is of no moment
considering that she built with the knowledge that her brother had waived and renounced
his easement over Lot 3; if she was not told of that fact, then it is her co-intervenor,
Fernando Vinzons, who is to blame.
 EQUITORIAL VS MAYFAIR

G.R. No. 106063

November 21, 1996

FACTS:

Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two 2-storey buildings at Claro
M. Recto Avenue, Manila, and covered by TCT No. 18529.

On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. fpr
20 years. The lease covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey
building with about 1,610 square meters of floor area, which respondent used as Maxim
Theater.

Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a second Lease with Carmelo
for another portion of the latter‘s property this time, a part of the second floor of the two-
storey building, and two store spaces on the ground floor. In that space, Mayfair put up
another movie house known as Miramar Theater. The Contract of Lease was likewise for
a period of 20 years. Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first refusal
to purchase the subject properties. Sadly, on July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease
term -- the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development,
Inc. for eleven million smackers, without their first being offered to Mayfair.

As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance, and damages. RTC decided for
Carmelo and Equatorial. CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a petition
questioning the CA decision. What happened is that the contract did get rescinded,
Equatorial got its money back and asserted that Mayfair have the right to purchase the
lots for 11 million bucks.

Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited with the clerk the 11M (less
847grand withholding) payment for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after Mayfair submitted its Motion for
Execution, Equatorial demanded from Mayfair back rentals and reasonable compensation
for the Mayfair‘s continued use of the subject premises after its lease contracts expired.
Remember that Mayfair was still occupying the premises during all this hullabaloo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Equatorial was the owner of the subject property and could thus enjoy the
fruits and rentals.
HELD:

NO.

Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial since there was failure
to deliver the property to the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was even
rescinded.

The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that belonged to the owner of the
property producing it by right of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time
of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should
belong to the owner of the property during that period.

We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, ―one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the other
to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.‖

Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of
the thing to him ―in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the
vendee.‖ This right is transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. There
is delivery if and when the thing sold ―is placed in the control and possession of the
vendee.‖ While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent
to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely
presumptive. It is nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the
land sold. For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery of property or title,
and transfer of control or custody to the buyer. Possession was never acquired by the
petitioner. It therefore had no rights to rent.
 CIR vs. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION

GR NO. 187485

FEBRUARY 12, 2013

FACTS:

San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation, and Philix Mining Corporation,
are all domestic corporations having their respective line of business.

The petition stemmed from the separate claims of the parties before the CIR for tax refund
and/or credit. The respective petitions were decided on the basis of their filing of such within
the periods prescribed by the law.

Thus, after review, the CTA En Banc rendered the following judgments:

With respect to San Roque Corporation, the CTA En Banc denied CIRs petition holding that
San Roque's judicial claim was not prematurely filed.

As regards to Taganito Mining Corporation, the CTA En Banc granted the CIRs petition on
the fround that Taganitos judicial claim was prematurely filed.

As to Philex Mining Corporation, the CTA En Banc denied Philexs petition on the ground that
its judicial claim long after the expiration of the 120-day period.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judicial claims for tax refund or credit were filed within the mandatory
period prescribed by law.

HELD:

Records show that a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the
Commissioner on 28 March 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA
docketed as CTA Case No. 6647.

Clearly, San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period, the time expressly
given by law to the Commissioner to decide whether to grant or deny San Roque's
application for tax refund or credit. It is indisputable that compliance with the 120-day waiting
period is mandatory and jurisdictional. The waiting period, originally fixed at 60 days only,
was part of the provisions of the first VAT law, Executive Order No. 273, which took effect on
1 January 1988. The waiting period was extended to 120 days effective 1 January 1998
under RA 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Thus, the waiting period has been in the
statute books for more than fifteen (15) years before San Roque filed its judicial claim.
Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates a mandatory provision of law. It
violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition
premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire
jurisdiction over the taxpayers petition. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases
upholding and reiterating these doctrinal principles.

San Roque's failure to comply with the 120-day mandatory period renders its petition for
review with the CTA void. San Roque's void petition for review cannot be legitimized by the
CTA or this Court because Article 5 of the Civil Code states that such void petition cannot be
legitimized except when the law itself authorizes its validity. There is no law authorizing the
petitions validity. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it was a
response to a query made by a government agency tasked with processing tax refunds and
credits, the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance. This government agency is also the addressee, or the entity
responded to, in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.

San Roque, therefore, cannot benefit from BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 because it filed its
judicial claim prematurely on 10 April 2003, before the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 on 10 December 2003. To repeat, San Roque cannot claim that it was misled by
the BIR into filing its judicial claim prematurely because BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was
issued only after San Roque filed its judicial claim. At the time San Roque filed its judicial
claim, the law as applied and administered by the BIR was that the Commissioner had
120 days to act on administrative claims.
 GPI vs Springer

Gr No. L-26979

April 1, 1927

Facts:

This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the
Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who were elected to
their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and
2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No.
2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all
such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine
Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: ―The voting power … shall be
vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.‖

In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which
divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO
emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the
head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does
not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate
President and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the
House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still
elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning
the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

Issue: Whether or not EO no. 37 is invalid.

Rulings: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of

powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it
has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a
public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled
corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it,
through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is
already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed
there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public
office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill
offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken
the executive branch.
 Ople vs Torres

G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that the Court invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
―Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System‖ on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry‘s protected zone of privacy.

Issue: Whether or not AO No. 308 is violative of the right to privacy

Held: Yes. The court prescinds from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O.
No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No.
308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people‘s right to privacy in
clear and present danger.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must
present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and
security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded– whether
it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual‘s file may
include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of
the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through
the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our
authorities to resist.

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources– governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government
which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to
perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
 Ople vs Torres

G.R. No. 127685

July 23, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that the Court invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
―Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System‖ on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry‘s protected zone of privacy.

Issue: Whether or not AO No. 308 is violative of the right to privacy

Held: Yes. The court prescinds from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O.
No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No.
308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people‘s right to privacy in
clear and present danger.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must
present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and
security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded– whether
it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual‘s file may
include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of
the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through
the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our
authorities to resist.

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources– governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government
which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to
perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
 League of Cities of the Philippines vs COMELEC

GR No. 176951

February 15, 2011

Facts:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities
into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into
cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),
which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the
words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, ―the mad rush‖ of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they
are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement
in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate
again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which
was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various
dates from March to July 2007 without the President‘s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters
in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether or not the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional

Held: The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. ―We should not ever lose sight of the fact
that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during
the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government
Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave
these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court
should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent
and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,‖ the SC said.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered
by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher
income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.

―The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well
aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered
by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the
12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House
of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt
Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint
Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1
during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again
failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the
Lower House and were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the
Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress
show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the
express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without
exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the
LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in
the exemption clauses

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local
sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. ―While the Constitution mandates that the creation of
local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be
justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC
despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the
LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant
national growth.
 Juanito Mariano v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577

March 7, 1995

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the
Municipality of Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.
Petitioners contend that the special law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with
technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart
the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials; that it increased the legislative
district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and the LGC.

ISSUES:

(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials.

(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special
law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of
every census.

(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the
title of the bill.

(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the
city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The court take
judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds
description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary dispute.

(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied
with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would
be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory
relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time.

(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully
index, or completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR

G.R. No. 96700

November 19, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner was assessed real estate taxes on its properties in Lanao del Sur. It filed a protest
alleging that it is exempt from tax pursuant to Commonwealth Act 120, Sec 2 of RA 358 and
RA 6395.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges, including its
exemption from payment of real property taxes.

HELD:
NO. Section 40(a) of the Real Property Tax Code, PD 464, as amended, expressly exempts
them from such tax. Said section provides:

―Exemptions from Real Property Tax. -- The exemption shall be as follows:

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions and any government-owned corporation so exempt by its
charter. Provided, however, that this exemption shall not apply to real property
of the abovenamed entities the beneficial use of which has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.The exemption is not only
legally defensible, but also logically unassailable.

The properties in question comprise the site of the entire Agus II Hydroelectric Power
Plant Complex, which generates and supplies relatively cheap electricity to the island of
Mindanao. These are government properties, wholly owned by petitioner and devoted
directly and solely for public service and utilized in the implementation of the state policy
of bringing about the total electrification of the country at the least cost to the public,
through the development of power from all sources to meet the needs of industrial
development and rural electrification.
 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN vs. CA

GR NO.125183

September 29, 1997

FACTS:

On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716
reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposescertain parcels of land located in
the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. After resettling hundreds of squatter families
occupying the land covered by the proclamation, the Municipality of San Juan started to
develop its government center. On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened
on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716 by excluding from its operation the parcels of land not being utilized
for government center sites purposes but actually occupied for residential purposes. On
June 1, 1998, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of the herein
private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer for restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the
Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the
houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have
been awarded to them by Proclamation No 164. The regional trial court dismissed the
petition and the appeal before the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed. This decision
became final. Disregarding the ruling of the court, private respondent hired a private
surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the
same to respondent DENR in connection with their application for a grant under
Proclamation No. 164. To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents,
petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private
respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association. The regional trial court sustained
petitioner municipality but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, hence, the present
recourse.

ISSUES: Is proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More specifically, is
Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?

HELD: Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. Not withstanding the
fact that the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon the issue
of res judicata, there, exists a more basic reason for setting aside the appealed decision and
this has reference to the fundamental and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No.
164. Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand Marcos in the due
exercise of legislative power vested upon him. Being a valid act of legislation, said
Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No.
164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution of
February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary
government. On March 24, 1986, she issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the
Provisional Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a
legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. When Congress was
convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power
was already solely in Congress. The Supreme Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation
No 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is
hereby declared void. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby set aside.
Public respondent DENR is hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing Proclamation No.
164
 La Bugal B’laan Tribal Ass. vs Ramos

G.R. No. 127882. January 27, 2004

FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws,
covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative
Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996. Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its
implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to
exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is

unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine
natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian
Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State.The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. The 1987 Constitution has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of
assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and
financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign
contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of
the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President to
enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‗s natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the
said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial
and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. The underlying assumption in the
provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like
the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or
operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation‗s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with
nothing but bare title thereto. The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence,
permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for
corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources. Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned
corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large
scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
 G.R No. 180016

April 29, 2014

Lito Corpuz vs People of the Philippines

Facts:
An information was filed against Lito Corpuz for the crime of estafa, wherein said
Danilo Tangcoy is engaged in the business of lending money to casino players, that on May
2, 1991 petitioner Lito Corpuz approached him and offered to sell his jewelry pieces in a
commission basis in which Danilo Tangcoy agreed. He then gave Lito Corpuz several
jewelries that has an aggregate value of P98,000 as evidence by a receipt. Both agreed that
within sixty days Lito Corpuz shall remit the proceeds of the sale or if unsold shall return the
same. Lito Corpuz then promised to pay the value of the said items.

On the information filed by Danilo Tangcoy it was said that Lito corpuz with an intent to
defraud said Tangcoy misappropriated, misapply and convert such jewelries into his
personal used. Herein, Lito Corpuz filed a not guilty plea but the Regional Trial Court ruled in
favor of Tangcoy and sentenced Corpuz guilty of the crime of estafa and to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment under the indeterminate sentence law of 4yrs and 2mons to 14yrs and
8mons.

Lito Corpuz appealed to the Court of Appeals where it denied the appeal and ruled
the same, Corpuz then appealed to the Supreme Court by way of Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in their ruling and that the punishment was
harsh

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that indeed the petitioner Lito Corpuz was guilty of the
crime of estafa. In its decision about the punishment the Supreme Court stated that there
seems to be a perceived injustice brought by the range of penalties, but the high court said
that they modify the penalties for that would constitute judicial legislation and that such duty
does not belong to the court but to the legislature. Other Justices has their own opinion as to
the punishment, some concurs with the ponente, others invoked the art 5 of the RPC that in
cases of excessive penalties the court shall render the proper decision and shall report to
the chief executive the reasons that such said act should be made subject of legislation and
without suspending the sentence. Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion said that the first
paragraph of article 315 should be held unconstitutional as it is against article 19(1) of the
Constitution and that according to the universal declaration of human rights "torture, cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment should be ban", the Philippines was one of the
approving State/community during the UDHR and although is a non binding instrument, such
UDHR forms part of the Philippine law for it is a generally accepted principle of international
law.
 RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR
ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER
III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA
June 16, 2015

Longevity pay should be given to the Justices and Judges of courts for each five years
of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary. However, the service outside
of the judiciary is considered continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a
judge or justice left the judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post and
then he returned to the judiciary.

Facts:

This case involves the letter-requests of CA Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-

Fernando, CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and CA Associate Justice Vicente
Veloso for their claim of longevity pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary
as part of their compensation package. They anchored their claim under Section 42 of B.P.
Blg. 129 and the Court's ruling in In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. In such case,
Justice Pardo was an incumbent CA Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman,
and was appointed to the Supreme Court after his service with the COMELEC, without any
interruption in his service. Accordingly, the court considered Justice Pardo‘s one-time
service outside of the judiciary as part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of
determining his longevity pay.

Issue:

Whether or not they are entitled to longevity pay for their services rendered outside the
judiciary.

Ruling: No. Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that longevity pay should be given to the
Justices and Judges of courts for each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious
service in the judiciary. However, the service outside of the judiciary is considered
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a judge or justice left the
judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post and then he returned to the
judiciary.

Hence, in this case, Associate Justice Salazar-Fernando was an incumbent MTC

Judge, then she served as Chairman of LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC, then she was appointed
as Commissioner of COMELEC, then as a consultant of COMELEC, and only then that she
was appointed as Associate Justice of CA. Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service
intervened which did not comply with the requirement of service in a single non-judicial
position. On the other hand, Associate Justices Gacutan and Veloso served as
Commissioners of NLRC before they were appointed in the CA. However, NLRC is an
agency attached to the DOLE, an Executive Department, and hence such is not considered
as continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary for the purpose of longevity
pay.
 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455

October 30, 1995

Facts:

The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court‘s decision
dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all,
have been filed by the several petitioners.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the
press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press. At any rate, it is averred, ―even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional‖, citing in support of the case of Murdock v.
Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand,
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions
as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be
uniform and equitable and that Congress shall ―evolve a progessive system of taxation‖.

Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt
a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution
embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore,
be to infringe a constitutional policy.

Issue:

Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.

Held:

No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the
press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive
the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law
merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago
been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not
discriminate against the press because ―even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.‖ The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v.
Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its
imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of
its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise
of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden
the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to
general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such
taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and
lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and
release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the
Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true
legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and
veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally
essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are
essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the
NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No.
7716 granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting those of petitioner to the
payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section
28(1) which provides that ―The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation‖. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of
taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the
statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar
situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect
taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall
―evolve a progressive system of taxation.‖ The constitutional provision has been interpreted
to mean simply that ―direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect
taxes should be minimized.‖ The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a
progressive tax system.

As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying that
under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the
Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions,
churches, and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no constitutional
infirmities and is thus upheld.
 Datu Abas Kida v. Senate

GR No. 197271

February 28, 2012

Facts:

Constitutionality of RA 10153 which: postponed the regional elections in ARMM which were
scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011 to the second Monday of May
2013, in order for the ARMM elections to be synchronized with Philippine national elections,
recognized the Presidents power to appoint OICs to temporarily assume these positions
upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. Datu Kida, et al, alleged that RA
10153 is invalid because it did not conform to the voting requirements set forth by RA 9054,
the organic act which created the ARMM, which states that:

Art. 17, Sec1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be
reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of
the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

This means that the law that created the ARMM may be amended or revised only upon 2/3
vote of the Congress and Senate. SC declared the 2/3 vote requirement or the
supermajority requirement is unconstitutional as only a majority vote is required by the
Constitution for Congress to have a quorum and to pass, amend, revise law

ISSUE: WON the 2/3 voting requirement set forth by RA 9054 is unconstitutional? - YES

HELD: Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law. Under our
Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority
vote, provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply
with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which
enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we sought to establish in
Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands
of, future legislatures. Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for
each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054
beyond the reach of Congress amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce
the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold
than what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed
fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation,
to amend the Constitution.
 City of Davao vs RTC

G.R. No. 127383

August 18, 2005

FACTS:

GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding
of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total
of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline
extension given by Davao City.

On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of
land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS
filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao
City RTC.

During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local
Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also
withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC

HELD:

Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of
LGUs cannot extend to the levy of ―taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.‖However, under sec. 234,
exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC.
GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption,
Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second
paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the
Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint
on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may
operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These conditions
imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of
Congress. Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second
paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous
means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent
mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the
LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS. Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of
interpretation of LGC states that ―any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU
pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming
it.‖ The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by
the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were
assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the
City of Davao.
 Atitiw V. Zamora

G.R. No. 143374

Facts:

The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in

Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts
pursuant to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers
of President Cory Aquino she promulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress
enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organic act for the cordillera autonomous region, a
plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. The court declared that E.O 220 to
be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended. Later on February 15, 2000,
President Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which
includes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the
implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O
328. The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of
RA 870 (GAA 2000) directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its
activities and pay the separation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and
employees.

Issue:

1. Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such

is unconstitutional.

2. Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO

220.

3. Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in

EO.220

Held:

In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an appropriations
bill covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared
to an ordinary bill. The title of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is
not feasible to come out with a title that embraces all the details included in an
appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of the RA8760 does not constitute a rider; it
follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations bill must relate
specifically to some particular appropriations.
On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is
rejected, there is no such thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the
Congress from amending or repealing the E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other
law. The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes
mutual respect. Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while
the sourcing of funds is within the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any grave
abuse of discretion, the court cannot correct the acts of either the Executive or the
Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR.
 GSIS v. CA
G.R. No. 183905
April 16, 2009

Facts:

GSIS, a major shareholder in Meralco, was distressed over the proxy validation proceedings
and the resulting certification of proxies in favor of the Meralco Management. The
proceedings were presided over by Meralco‘s assistant corporate secretary and chief legal
counsel instead of the person duly designated by Meralco‘s Board of Directors. Thus, GSIS
moved before the SEC to declare certain proxies, those issued to herein private
respondents, as invalid. Private respondents contend that dispute in the validity of proxies is
an election contest which falls under the trial court‘s jurisdiction. GSIS argues there was no
election yet at the time it filed its petition with the SEC, hence no proper election contest over
which the regular courts may have jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the proxy challenge is an election contest cognizable by the regular courts.

Ruling: YES.

Section 2, Rule 6 of the Interim Rules broadly defines the term ―election contest‖ as
encompassing all plausible incidents arising from the election of corporate directors,
including: (1) any controversy or dispute involving title or claim to any elective office in a
stock or non-stock corporation, (2) the validation of proxies, (3) the manner and validity of
elections and (4) the qualifications of candidates, including the proclamation of winners.

Under Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, in relation to the SRC, the jurisdiction
of the regular trial courts with respect to election-related controversies is specifically confined
to ―controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of
corporations, partnerships, or associations.‖ Evidently, the jurisdiction of the regular courts
over so-called election contests or controversies under Section 5(c) does not extend to every
potential subject that may be voted on by shareholders, but only to the election of directors
or trustees, in which stockholders are authorized to participate under Section 24 of the
Corporation Code.

The power of the SEC to investigate violations of its rules on proxy solicitation is
unquestioned when proxies are obtained to vote on matters unrelated to the cases
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. However, when proxies are
solicited in relation to the election of corporate directors, the resulting controversy, even if it
ostensibly raised the violation of the SEC rules on proxy solicitation, should be properly seen
as an election controversy within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts by
virtue of Section 5.2 of the SRC in relation to Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.

That the proxy challenge raised by GSIS relates to the election of the directors of Meralco is
undisputed. The controversy was engendered by the looming annual meeting, during which
the stockholders of Meralco were to elect the directors of the corporation. GSIS very well
knew of that fact.
 Republic vs Caguia

GR No. 168584

October 15, 2007

Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992 which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF) and the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No. 7227 of the law provides
that no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone.
Pursuant to the law, Indigo Distribution Corporation, et al., which are all domestic
corporations doing business at the SBF, applied for and were
granted Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption by the SBMA.

Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all applicable taxes,
duties, charges, including excise taxes due thereon shall be applied to cigars and cigarettes,
distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or
legislated freeports of the Subic Economic Freeport Zone. On the basis of Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9334, SBMA issued a Memorandum declaring that, all importations of cigars, cigarettes,
distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF, shall be treated as ordinary
importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and charges, including excise taxes.

Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of the directives on the
imposition of duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by the Collector of Customs and the
SBMA Administrator. Their request was subsequently denied prompting them to file with the
RTC of Olongapo City a special civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions of
R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional. They prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was subsequently granted by Judge
Ramon Caguioa. The injunction bond was approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000).

ISSUES:

Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing the injunctive writ in favor of
private respondents despite the absence of the legal requisites for its issuance

HELD:

One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when Judge Caguioa issued his Order
of May 4, 2005 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 11, 2005 despite the absence
of a clear and unquestioned legal right of private respondents. In holding that the
presumption of constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 9334 was overcome by private
respondents for the reasons public respondent cited in his May 4, 2005 Order, he
disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, private respondents needed also to show a clear legal right that
ought to be protected. That requirement is not satisfied in this case. To stress, the possibility
of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right would not justify an injunctive
relief.

Indeed, Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC provide for the recovery of erroneously or illegally
collected taxes which would be the nature of the excise taxes paid by private respondents
should Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334 be declared unconstitutional or invalid.

The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into the delicate area which courts
are cautioned from taking when deciding applications for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. Having ruled preliminarily against the prima facie validity of R.A.
No. 9334, he assumed in effect the proposition that private respondents in their petition for
declaratory relief were duty bound to prove, thereby shifting to petitioners the burden of
proving that R.A. No. 9334 is not unconstitutional or invalid.

In the same vein, the Court finds Judge Caguioa to have overstepped his discretion when he
arbitrarily fixed the injunction bond of the SBF enterprises at only P1million. Rule 58, Section
4(b) provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all
damages which it may sustain by reason of the injunction. The purpose of the injunction
bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case
the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is
usually conditioned accordingly.

Whether this Court must issue the writ of prohibition, suffice it to stress that being possessed
of the power to act on the petition for declaratory relief, public respondent can proceed to
determine the merits of the main case. Moreover, lacking the requisite proof of public
respondent‗s alleged partiality, this Court has no ground to prohibit him from proceeding with
the case for declaratory relief. For these reasons, prohibition does not lie.
 Tatad vs Secretary of Energy

G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

Petitioner: Francis Tatad

Respondents: The Secretary of the Department of Energy and the Secretary of the
Department of Finance

Facts:

In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of R.A.
No. 7638) to control energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180
(Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the
deregulation of the power and energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any
person or entity was allowed to import and market crude oil and petroleum products, and to
lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities.

Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since
the imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the
oil industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the
constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title.

In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique
Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt
Coalition and Sanlakas argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is unconstitutional
because it: (1) gives undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the
Secretary of Energy by not providing a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an order declaring the implementation of the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was
enacted due to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a condition not found
in R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation
of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of constitutional prohibition
against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled by
the court) and that the petitioners have no locus standi since they did not sustain direct injury
as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

Issues:

1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.

3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.

4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power.

Held:

1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution
prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. The
deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three major league players in the
oil industry.

2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore considered
void. The depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A. No. 8180 to be
considered in declaring full deregulation of the oil industry. Therefore, the executive
department, in its declaration of E.O. No. 392, failed to follow faithfully the standards set in
R.A. No. 8180, making it void.

3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any
number of provisions as long as they are not inconsistent with the foreign subject. Section 5
providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of the deregulation of the
downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does not violate the one title-one
subject rule.

4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
legislative power. The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are
the completeness test and the sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it
must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the
law to delineate the delegate‘s authority. Section 15 provides for the time to start the full
deregulation, which answers the completeness test. It also laid down standard guide for the
judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil
and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test. The petitions were granted. R.A.
No. 8180 was declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.
 Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR

GR No. 86889

December 4, 1990

FACTS:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to
be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.Luz Farms questions
the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.

(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to
summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and
other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive
xxx

ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32
of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

HELD:

Said provisions are unconstitutional. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay
ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock
workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657
which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine
raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited
agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the
State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of
agrarian reform.

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT

 G.R. No. 166471

March 22, 2011

FACTS: Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, organized to provide

domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water
District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and
commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate
of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay
Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application, arguing that its franchise is exclusive as
provided under PD 198. A CPC is however granted. LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied by NWRB. LTWD then appealed to the RTC where it court set
aside the NWRB decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition may be granted

HELD: Yes. RTC Decision Set Aside. Political Law- No franchise, certificate, or any other
form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,nor shall
such franchise, certificate or authorizationbe exclusive in characteror for a longer period than
fifty years.

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear
franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,"nor shall such franchise x x x
be exclusive in character."There is no exception. When the law is clear, there is nothing for
the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded.
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a
reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done
directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.Indeed, the President,
Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.
What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do
indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly. In PD No.
198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created
indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the
LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. In case of conflict
between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the
Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is
to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. Petition
Granted. Section 47 of PD 198 is unconstitutional.
 Betoy vs Board of Directors National Power Corp
GR Nos. 156556-57
Oct 4, 2011

FACTS: Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and supplemental petition
for mandamus, specifically assailing National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and
No. 2002-125, as well as Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136,
otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). Also assailed
is Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA. On June 8,
2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power
industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). On
November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB
passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel
shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003and shall be entitled to separation benefits.
As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with
thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated. However, amongst the
petitions raised – it is noteworthy that petitioners argued that Section 11, Section 48 and
Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of secretaries as board of directors of National

Power Corporation valid.

HELD: The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were
designation by Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e.,
they were designated as members of the Board of Directors.

Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person

already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail
payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the
salary attached to the position.Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the
officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee‘s right to claim
the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and
not a mere designation. This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective
members of the Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the NPB, valid.
PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA
SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), etc. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, etc.

G.R. No. 147811.

APRIL 10, 2012

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential

decrees and executive orders of the martial law era and under the incumbency of Pres.
Estrada relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds, particularly: Section 2 of P.D. 755,
(b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313.

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment Fund
(CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing. Coconut
farmers were to capitalize and administer the Fund through the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC) whose objective was, among others, to advance the coconut farmers
interests.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy ofP0.55on the coconut farmers first
domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get
a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock.

In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a commercial
bank for the benefit of the coconut farmersto enable such bank to promptly and efficiently
realize the industry's credit policy.Thus, the PCA bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First
United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.Dueto changes in its corporate identity and
purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975, resulting in a
change in the banks name from First United Bank United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312,
establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate income
supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable local market
demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.The Executive Order sought to establish
aP1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of entities
supported by those funds.A committee was created to manage the fund under this
program.A majority vote of its members could engage the services of a reputable auditing
firm to conduct periodic audits.

At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an irrevocable
trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed to provide financial
assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry, and to other agri-related
programs.The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Funds initial capital.These
shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding
capital stock of SMC.E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust
Funds trustee bank.The Trust Fund Committee would administer, manage, and supervise
the operations of the Trust Fund. The Committee would designate an external auditor to do
an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit
(COA) to intervene.

To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other government agencies to exclude
the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled Republic of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift
the sequestration over those shares.

On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the
suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner
organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s
312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional.On April 24, 2001
the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify
Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being
unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Are the coco-levy funds public funds?

Are (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312,
and (d) E.O. 313 unconstitutional?

Have petitioners legal standing to bring the same to court?

HELD: Coco-levy funds are public funds. The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds
were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental purpose.They were raised
with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut
industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds.The BIR treated
them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public
character.

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and
can only be used for public purpose.Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from
persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the
government and for all itspublic needs. Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to
law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276.The funds were collected and managed by the PCA,an
independent government corporation directly under the President.And, as the respondent
public officials pointed out, thepertinent laws used the termlevy, which meansto tax, in
describing the exaction.

R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the governments general funds butto
provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut
industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the
State. The funds sought to support the coconut industry,one of the main economic
backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers and farm
workers.

Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. Its character as such fund was made
clear by the fact that they were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned government
bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury.

The Court has already passed upon this question in Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic of the Philippines. It held as unconstitutional
Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of theCCS Fundto
pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the
CCS Fund levies with UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID
Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or
fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall
be deemed private funds.

In any event, such declaration is void.There is ownership when a thing pertaining to a person
is completely subjected to his will in everything that is not prohibited by law or the
concurrence with the rights of another. An owner is free to exercise all attributes
ofownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume, and
dispose or alienate the thing owned. The owner is free to waive all or some of these rights in
favor of others.But in the case of the coconut farmers, they could not, individually or
collectively, waive what have not been and could not be legally imparted to them.

Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III,Section 5of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation.And
since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private
properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.

These assailed provisions,which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds of the
government and declared them private properties of coconut farmers,do not appear to have
a color of social justice for their purpose.The levy on copra that farmers produce appears, in
the first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base.The concept of farmers-
businessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice
and so should be beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings.
 Sen. Pimentel vs Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 158088 , July 6, 2005

Facts :This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the
Supreme Court to require the Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute which
established the International Criminal Court for the Senate‘s concurrence in accordance with
Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate. That under the treaty law and customary
international law, Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute.

Respondents on the other hand, questioned the legal standing of herein petitioners and
argued that executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence.

Issues : Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant suit.

Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have the
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by the
Philippine Member to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

Ruling : Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the extent of his power as member of
Congress. Other petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a direct injury from the
non-transmittal and that they can seek redress in our domestic courts.

Petitioners‘ interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. The power to ratify treaties does not
belong to the Senate.

Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) prepares the ratification papers
and forward the signed copy to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified
it, DFA shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence.

The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that ―no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.‖ The
participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.

It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the power to ratify is vested in the
President subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The President has the discretion even
after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify a treaty.

The signature does not signify final consent, it is ratification that binds the state to the
provisions of the treaty and renders it effective.
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, concurrence to the ratification. It is
within the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or having secured its consent
for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of mandamus. Thus, the petition
was dismissed.
 LAMP vs Secretary of Budget and managemet

GR No. 164987

April 24, 2012

Facts:

LAMP filed an action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). LAMP,
this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving
and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect
intrude into an executive function.

Issue:

Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional

and illegal

Held:

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support
that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner‘s request for
rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
 Calilung vs Datumanon

G.R. No. 160869

May 11, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner herein prays for the prohibition to stop the respondent from implementing RA 9225
(An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for
Other Purposes.‖ Petitioner avers the constitutionality of RA 9225, specifically its Section 3
and 3:

Section 2: Declaration of Policy: It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine Citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the condition of this Act.

Section 3: Retention of Philippine Citizenship: Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, together allow dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship.

HELD:

During the deliberation of the Congress, it was clarified that the purpose of these contended
sections is to recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and his loyalty
to the Republic.

Further, Rep. Locsin averred that doing what section 2 and 3 say, the problem of dual
citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath
that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of the allegiance to the Philippines and to the
United States, as the case may be. And by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Further it was held that the
bill recognizes the Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship. Wherefore the petition is denied.
 RE: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF ALL
COURT AND SHERIFF'S FEES OF COOPERATIVES DULY REGISTERED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9520 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
PHILIPPINE COOPERATIVE CODE OF 2008

PERPETUAL HELP COMMUNITY COOPERATIVE (PHCCI), Petitioner

A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 March 13, 2012

Facts:

PHCCI requests for issuance of a court to clarify and implement the exemption of
cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff‘s fees pursuant to RA No. 6938, as amended
by RA No. 9520 (Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008).

PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriff‘s fees but the Executive Judge ruled that
the matter is of national concern and should be brought to the attention of the Supreme
Court for a uniform answer.

Executive Judge Antonio Estoconing (Executive Judge Estoconing), MTCC, Dumaguete

City, Negros Oriental, issued an Order treating the motion filed by PHCCI as a mere
consulta considering that no main action was filed in his court. He reported that many cases
filed by PHCCI are small claims cases and under Section 8 of the Rule on Small Claims, the
plaintiff is required to pay docket fees and other related costs unless he is allowed to litigate
the case as an indigent.

Issue: WON cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriff‘s fees.

Held:

No. Stressed in the 1987 Constitution is a stronger and more independent judiciary that took
away the power of congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure; and held that the power to promulgate these Rules is no longer
shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with the Executive. (Echagaray vs Secretary of
Justice)

The court has fiscal autonomy which recognizes the power and authority of the court to levy,
assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic
components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and SAJF expressly declare the
identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as
mandated by the Constitution and public policy. An exemption from payment of legal fees
granted by Congress will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. It impairs the Court‘s
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.

RA No. 6938, as amended by RA No. 9520 as basis for exemption from payment of legal
fees for cooperatives can longer be invoked.
 Imbong v. Ochoa

G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

Facts:

The increase of the country‘s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and
the legislative‘s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples‘ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated
differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current
laws on contraception, women‘s health and population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality
of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that
the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of
―responsible parenthood‖ and ―reproductive health‖ are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.

Issue:

Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

Ruling: NO

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country‘s population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is
to reduce the number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners‘
contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.

In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the ―one title-one subject‖
rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the
rule ―so as not to cripple or impede legislation.‖In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both ―reproductive health‖ and ―responsible parenthood‖
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle
that the title of a law must not be ―so uncertain that the average person reading it would not
be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act.‖Considering the close intimacy between ―reproductive health‖ and
―responsible parenthood‖ which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving ―sustainable
human development‖ as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation. The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as not unconstitutional except with respect
to certain provisions which are declared unconstitutional. The Status Quo Ante Order issued
by the Court is hereby lifted, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been
herein declared as constitutional.
Remman Enterprises, Inc., and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association vs.
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and Professional Regulation
Commission
G.R. 19767

February 4, 2014

Facts:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as
unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.

R.A. No. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was signed aims to
professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers,
appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment,
real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP),
in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of
Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the new law. The implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated by the PRC and PRBRES under
Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010. Petitioners filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, asking the court to declare as void and unconstitutional Sections 28 (a), 29 and 32,
of R.A. 9646 that the trial court denied thus, this petition.

Issues:

W/N R.A. No. 9646 is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under
Section 26 , Article VIof the Philippine Constitution

Held:

NO. The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution
is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title. It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect. R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real
Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board
of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." The new
law extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties. The
inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law‘s primary goal of developing "a
corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service
practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will
promote the growth of the real estate industry." R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title,
one-subject rule. Therefor, the petition was denied.
 HENRY GIRON vs. COMELEC

G.R. 188179

January 22, 2013

FACTS: A special civil action was filed before the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14
(Repealing Clause) of R.A 9006: ―An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.‖

Petitioner Henry R. Giron asserts that the insertion of Secs. 12 and 14 in the Fair
Election Act violates Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner avers that
these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of
the ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted
candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code - resignation of elective officials
immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other
than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity

On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC,
opposes the Petition and argues inter alia that the Supreme Court has already resolved
the matter in Farinas vs. Exec. Secretary.

ISSUE: WON the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the ―one subject-one title‖
rule.

HELD: NO.

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should
not be so narrowly construed as to cripple as to impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.
 The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding, to the other provisions of RA 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the ―one subject-one title‖ rule.
This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title,
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature
and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have
not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section67 of
the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House.
 TOBIAS vs. ABALOS

GR No. 114783

December 8, 1994

Facts:

As taxpayers and residents of mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.

7675 otherwise known as ―An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the statute,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to one legislative district. Hon Congressional
representative Hon. Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and signed by pres. Fidel Ramos
becoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscite
was only 14.41% of the voting population: 18, 621 voted ―yes‖ while 7,911 voted ―no‖. Thus,
RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Issue:

1) RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional for being violative
of three specific provisions of the Constitution. First objection is that it contravenes
the ―one-subject-one bill‖ rule as enunciated in Art VI section 26(1) of the Constitution
(every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.) this section embraces two principal subjects 1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC and 2) the division of the congressional
district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

2) Second and third objection involve Art VI, Sec 5 (1) and (4) of the COnsti. Petitioners
argue that division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts has resulted in increase in the composition of the House of representatives
and that it preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislatives districts
pursuant to Sec 5(4).

Held: Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED for lack of merit.

The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a HUC. A liberal construction of the ―one title-one
subject‖ rule, it should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement is the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions germane to that general subject

Statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into HUC with a population of not less than 250
thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the one city, one representative proviso in the
constitution—the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts.
The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The phrase ―unless otherwise provided by
law‖ indicates that composition of Congress may be increased if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment—therefore increase is not unconstitutional.

Congress drafted and deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law- Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself (reapportioning of legislative
districts.

The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city—the inhabitants of san juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of Mandaluyong.

On the issue of GERRYMANDERING: (practice of creating legislative districts to favor a

particular candidate or party)—rep Ronald Zamora, author of the law is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/mandaluyong district-by dividing the district his
constituency has in fact been diminished and not favorable to him.
 Cordero vs. Hon. Cabatuando

G.R. No. L-14542 October 31, 1962

Facts:

Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this
act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of
Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: An Act
Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199. Section 19of the amendatory act says
that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20
also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy
Mediation Commission.

ISSUE:W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the
constitutional provision that No bill which may been acted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

HELD:

Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement is complied with as

long the law has a single general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional
provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
 ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056

September 1, 2005

Facts:

ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;

Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and

Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after
specified conditions have been satisfied.

Issues:

Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the
Constitution.

Held:

No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was
acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage,
and excise and franchise taxes.
No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of
legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State‘s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.
 American Tobacco v. Camacho

GR No. 163583

April 15, 2009

FACTS:
June 2001, petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold Lucky Strike, Lucky
Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes w/ SRP P 9.90/pack - Initial
assessed excise tax: P 8.96/pack (Sec. 145 [c]). February 17, 2003: RR 9-2003: Periodic
review every 2 years or earlier of the current net retail price of new brands and variants
thereof for the purpose of the establishing and updating their tax classification. March 11,
2003: RMO 6-2003: Guidelines and procedures in establishing current net retail prices of
new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products. August 8, 2003: RR 22-2003: Implement the
revised tax classification of certain new brands introduced in the market after January 1,
1997 based on the survey of their current net retail prices. This increased the excise tax to
P13.44 since the average net retail price is above P 10/pack. This cause petitioner to file
before the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction sought to enjoin the implementation
of Sec. 145 of the NIRC, RR No. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and 6-2003 on the ground that they
discriminate against new brands of cigarettes in violation of the equal protection and
uniformity provisions of the Constitution .RTC: Dismissed. While petitioner's appeal was
pending, RA 9334 amending Sec. 145 of the 1997 NIRC among other took effect on January
1, 2005 which in effect increased petitioners excise tax to P25/pack. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Admit attached supplement and a supplement to the petition for review assailing the
constitutionality of RA 9334 and praying a downward classification of Lucky Strike products
at the bracket taxable at P 8.96/pack since existing brands are still taxed based on their
price as of October 1996 eventhough they are equal or higher than petitioner's product
price. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Incorporated, Fortune Tobacco Corp., Mighty
Corp. and JT International Intervened. Fortune Tobacco claimed that the CTA should have
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the BIR in tax disputes

ISSUE:

1. W/N the RTC rather than the CTA has jurisdiction.

2. W/N RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution
3. W/N RR Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and RA 8243 even prior to its amendment by RA
9334 can authorize the BIR to conduct resurvey and reclassification.
HELD:
1. Yes. The jurisdiction of the CTA id defined in RA 1125 which confers on the CTA
jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes in general. BUT does NOT include cases where the
constitutionality of a law or rule is challenged which is a judicial power belonging to regular
courts.

2. No. In Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, the court held that "xxx It suffices then that the laws operate
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. If the law be looked upon in tems of burden on
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. xxx" Thus, classification if
rational in character is allowable. In Lutz v. Araneta: "it is inherent in the power to tax that a
state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation" SC previously held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation
means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation"

Under the the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal protection
challenge, must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest . The classifications
must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation

A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws. The classification is considered valid and reasonable
provided that: (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and (4) it
applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.

Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact extent of such impact as the
price is not the only factor that affects competition.

3. NO. Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains
a prerogative of the legislature which cannot be usurped by the former. These are however
modified by RA 9334.
 Fabian v. Desierto

G.R. No. 129742

16 September 1998

FACTS: Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for
government construction projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District
(FMED), and private respondent Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly
taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship.
After misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents, Fabian eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against Agustin in a letter-complaint. The Graft
Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under
the law. On a motion for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative
charges.

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that —

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis
supplied)

ISSUE: 1. Can the Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
not raised in the trial?

2. Is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional?

HELD

1: YES.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court‘s own motion. The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case
where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.
2: YES.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was
intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should
be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
 First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs CA

G.R. No. 110571

October 7, 1994.

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division sustaining the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the Board of
Investments and, consequently, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the Board of
Investments.

RULING:

Yes. The authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it by the BOI must be
deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to be exercised by it in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.
 Macalintal vs COMELEC

GR No. 150713

FACTS:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this
case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement
in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the
Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend,
and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections,
promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-
A of the Constitution.

HELD:

(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this
Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she
shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years
from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of
the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of
the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least
one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the
Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for
without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified
Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the
Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of
registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a
temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise
consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right
to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it
if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was
conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to
return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall
not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the
Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that
underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of
the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the
unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that
Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as
its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the
authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but
to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
 ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

Facts:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The
law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards
and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality
of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards
and incentives, the law ―transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters‖ as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a
system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets
to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of
RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their
revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the
revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of
the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation
and enforcement of the law.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of
a congressional oversight committee.

Discussions:

1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers‘ Union, which
states that ―the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality.

The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. ―

2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It
lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive
branch.

Held:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that
has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 22 With respect to RA
9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the
law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of
taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the
BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law
under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as
sufficient standards: ―public interest,‖ ―justice and equity,‖ ―public convenience and
welfare‖ and ―simplicity, economy and welfare.‖ 33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On
May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function
of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
 Belgica vs Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking
that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System"
be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in
the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‗s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse
of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative
power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.

HELD:

1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congress‗role must be confined to mere oversight that must be
confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation
or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase ―and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President‖‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‗s
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives
the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law.‖

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects‖ was declared constitutional.
IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE
PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION
PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)‖ and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines‖ was
declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO
USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO
DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION
OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE,
LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.
Abakada Guro v. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005

Facts:

Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al.,
insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-
on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the
one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for
the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in
agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the
end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners
argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version
and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because ―a House
provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.‖

Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional
imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT.

Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337‘s stand- by authority to the
Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power
granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They
submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the
occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark
necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy
making.

Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right.
Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory
privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.

Issue:

Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional?

Held:

The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of
either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined
and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to
gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right,
and a VAT-registered person‘s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory
privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere
creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve
legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was
passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to
choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds.
 Vivas v. Monetary Board (G.R. No. 191424)
Facts:

Petitioner Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest in Rural Bank Faire, a
bank whose corporate life has already expired. BSP authorized extending the banks‘
corporate life and was later renamed to EuroCredit Community Bank (ECBI). Through a
series of examinations conducted by the BSP, the findings bore that ECBI was illiquid,
insolvent, and was performing transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound
banking practices. Consequently ECBI was placed under receivership. Petitioner contends
that the implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad
faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing in
violation of his and the bank‘s right to due process.

Issue:

Whether or not ECBI was entitled to due and prior hearing before its being placed under
receivership.

Ruling: YES.

In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela, the
Court reiterated the doctrine of ―close now, hear later,‖ stating that it was justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:

The ―close now, hear later‖ doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the
protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds
that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the
government against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is
certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the
losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the
protection of the government,.

In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court also wrote that

x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to
be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of
a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In
the process, fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire
banking community.

The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted

dissipation of the bank‘s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the
depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. Swift, adequate and determined
actions must be taken against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government
agencies lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the
national economy.
 FRANCISCO V. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD (2010)

GR No. 166910

October 9, 2010

FACTS:

Marcos issued PD 1112 which authorized the establishment of toll facilities on public
improvements. It explicitly acknowledged "the huge financial requirements" and the
necessity of tapping "the resources of the private sector" to implement the government‗s
infrastructure programs. In order to attract private sector involvement, the PD allowed
collection of toll fees for the use of public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate
of return on investments. It also created the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) and invested it with
the power to enter into contracts for the operation of tollways and issue the necessary Toll
Operation Certificate (TOC), fix initial toll rates, and adjust the same after due notice and
hearing. Same day, PD 1113 was issued which granted the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), for a period of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the North
Luzon and South Luzon Expressways, with the right to collect toll fees at such rates as TRB
may authorize because the franchise was not self-executing, TRB and PNCC signed a Toll
Operation Agreement (TOA) on the North and South Luzon Tollways, providing for
construction, maintenance, and operation of the expressway. PD 1894 was issued, granting
PNCC a franchise over the MMEX, and the expanded NLEX and SLEX. PNCC was granted
the "right, privilege and authority to construct, maintain and operate any and all such
extensions, together with the toll facilities in any part of NLEX & SLEX and to divert routes as
may be approved by the TRB. Then came the 1987 Consti and its franchise provision 1 The
Government Corporate Counsel (GCC), on PNCC‗s request, issued an Opinion, later
affirmed by the Sec of Justice, holding that PNCC may enter into a joint venture (JV)
agreement (JVA) with private entities without going into public bidding. In 1994, DPWH,
TRB, PNCC, and other private and govt entities executed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) for the entry of private capital in the extension of the expressways north of Manila,
over which PNCC has a franchise. hey executed execute Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreements (STOA) to implement the TOA and so, PNCC entered into JVAs with private
entities.

Petitioners (as taxpayers and expressway users) seek to nullify the STOAs and the
corresponding TRB resolutions fixing initial rates and approving toll rate adjustments. They
argue that the STOAs and the toll rate-fixing resolutions violate the Constitution because
they impose on the public the burden of financing tollways by way of exorbitant fees and
thus deprive the public of property without due process. These STOAs are also alleged to be
infirm as they effectively awarded purported "build-operate-transfer" (BOT) projects without
public bidding in violation of the BOT Law (R.A. 6957, as am by R.A. 7718). They also
assail the constitutionality of some sections of PD 1112 because they vested the TRB, on
one hand, toll operation awarding power while, on the other hand, granting it also the power
to issue, modify and promulgate toll rate charges. The TRB cannot be an awarding party of a
TOA and, at the same time, be the regulator of the tollway industry and an adjudicator of rate
exactions disputes. They also argue that only Congress has, under the 1987 Constitution,
the exclusive prerogative to grant franchise to operate public utilities . Last argument: since
the Manila North Tollways Corporation (MNTC) is the transferee of PNCC‗s franchise, then it
steps into the shoes of PNCC. The act is tantamount to an amendment of PNCC‗s original
franchise and hence unconstitutional, considering that the constitutional power to appoint a
new franchise holder is reserved to Congress. For the 2nd and 3rd petitions, petitioner, for
the most part, raised the same issues in the first petition (e.g. the public bidding
requirement)]

ISSUES

Whether the TRB is vested with the power and authority to grant what amounts to a
franchise over tollway facilities --- YES it is

1. Whether the TRB can enter into TOAs and promulgate toll rates and rule on petitions
for toll rate adjustments --- YES it can

3. Whether the President is authorized to approve contracts, inclusive of assignment of

contracts, entered into by the TRB relative to tollway operations --- YES he is
4. Whether the subject STOAs covering the NLEX, SLEX and SMMS and their
respective extensions are valid ---- YES they are
5. Whether a public bidding is required or mandatory for these tollway projects --- NO it
is not

Held::
1.

TRB Empowered to Grant Authority to Operate Toll Facility /System. It is clear that by
explicit provision of law, the TRB was given the power to grant administrative franchise for
toll facility projects. Secs 3 (a) and (e) of PD 1112 in relation to Section 4 of PD 1894 have
invested the TRB with power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct,
maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the toll operating permit or TOC. Sections 3
(a) and (e) of PD 1112 and Sec 4 of PD 1894 provide the power to grant authority to operate
toll facilities The Sc disagree with the argument, the limiting thrust of the constitutional
provision on the grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate public utilities
may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as
contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed 50 years. A franchise
is basically a legislative grant of a special privilege to a person. The term ―franchise‖
includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but
also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has
been delegated by Congress. The power to authorize and control a public utility is
admittedly a prerogative that stems from the Legislature. Any suggestion, however, that only
Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is not accurate. As in Albano v.
Reyes—a case decided under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution—there is nothing in the
Constitution, remotely indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise before "each and
every public utility may operate‖ Therefore, a special franchise directly emanating from
Congress is not necessary if the law already specifically authorizes an administrative body to
grant a franchise or to award a contract. The SC has already upheld the view that
administrative agencies may be vested with the authority to grant administrative franchises
or concessions over the operation of public utilities under their respective jurisdiction and
regulation, without need of the grant of a separate legislative franchise. Under the 1987
Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it
may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate legislation Such
delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to
the increasing complexity of modern life. Its charter empowered the TRB to authorize the
PNCC to operate toll facilities so it may be stated as a corollary that the TRB, subject to
certain qualifications, can alter the conditions of such authorization. Well settled is the rule
that a legislative franchise cannot be modified or amended by an administrative body with
general delegated powers to grant authorities or franchises. However, in the this case, the
law granting a direct franchise to PNCC specifically conferred upon the TRB the power to
impose conditions in an appropriate contract

2.

TRB‘s power to enter into contracts, modify and promulgate toll rates; and to rule on
petitions relative to toll rates level and increases valid administrative bodies have expertise
in specific matters within the purview of their respective jurisdictions. Accordingly, the law
concedes to them the power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations ("IRR") to
carry out declared statutory policies – provided that the IRR conforms to the terms and
standards prescribed by that statute. SC does not see an irreconcilable clash in the TRB‗s
statutory powers, such that the exercise of one negates another. Petitioners have NOT
shown that the TRB lacks the expertise, competence, and capacity to implement its mandate
of balancing the interests of the toll-paying motoring public and the imperative of allowing the
concessionaires to recoup their investment with reasonable profits. Also, PD 1894 provides
a formula for adjustment of toll rates that takes into account the Peso-US Dollar exchange
rate, interest rate and construction materials price index, among other verifiable and
quantifiable variables. The fact that an admin agency is exercising its administrative or
executive functions (such as the granting of franchises or awarding of contracts) and at the
same time exercising its quasi-legislative (e.g. rule-making) and/or quasi-judicial functions
(e.g. rate-fixing), does not support a finding of a violation of due process or the Constitution

3.

President is vested with statutory power to approve TRB Contracts. The President‗s
approving authority is of statutory origin. There is nothing unconstitutional with the delegation
to the President of the authority to approve the assignment by PNCC of its rights and interest
in its franchise, the assignment and delegation being circumscribed by restrictions in the
delegating law itself. Should GAD in some way infect the exercise, then the approval action
may be nullified for that reason, but not on the ground that the underlying authority is
constitutionally doubtful.
4.

STOAs validly entered. (The SC seems exasperated) SC has already held that admin
agencies may be empowered by the Legislature (by a law) to grant franchises or similar
authorizations. Cites Albano again: Our statute books are replete with laws granting
administrative agencies the power to issue authorizations. This delegation of legislative
power to administrative agencies is allowed "in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of
modern life." The SC has also held that the "privileges conferred by grant by local authorities
as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had
been made by an act of the Legislature." n this case: TRB‗s charter itself specifically
empowers it to "grant authority to operate a toll facility and to issue the necessary Toll
Operation Certificate‗ subject to such conditions as shall be imposed by the TRB

5.

Public bidding is not required. The BOT Law does not apply to the peculiar case of PNCC,
which exercised its prerogatives under its franchise to pursue the construction, rehabilitation
and expansion of the tollways with chosen partners. The tollway projects may qualify as a
build-operate-transfer undertaking. However, given that these projects have been
undertaken by PNCC in the exercise of its franchise under PD 1113 and 1894, in joint
partnership with its chosen partners at the time when it was held valid to do so by the OGCC
and the DOJ, the public bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply. The
conclusion would be different if the tollway projects were to be prosecuted by an outfit
completely different from, and not related to, PNCC.

EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT INC vs. DFA (September 19, 2006)

FACTS:

On September 16, 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon, a native of Lemery, Batangas and an
overseas Filipino worker, died of acute cardiac arrest while asleep at the dormitory of the
Samsong Textile Processing Factory in South Korea. Thereafter, the Philippine Overseas
Labor Office (POLO) at South Korea immediately relayed the incident to the Philippine
Embassy.

Forthwith, the [Labor] Attaché of the Philippine Embassy dispatched a letter to Eleuterio N.
Gardiner, administrator of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), which
stated that Razon (29 years old baka i-ask lang), an undocumented worker, died from an
apparent pancreatic attack or ―bangungot‖ and that according to verbal reports from his co-
workers, he was already found lifeless inside their quarters at around 11 am and was
declared dead on arrival at the hospital.

In turn, the OWWA, through Atty. Cesar L. Chavez, indorsed the matter, for appropriate
action, to Director R. Casco of the Welfare Employment Office of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (WEO-POEA). It was discovered that Razon was recruited and
deployed by petitioner Equi-Asia, Inc., and was sent to South Korea in April 2000 to work-
train at Yeongjin Machinery, Inc. Thereupon, POEA sent a telegram to the President/General
Manager of the petitioner, requesting for a Prepared Ticket Advice (PTA) for the repatriation
of the remains and belongings of Razon to the Philippines, and to submit a report regarding
the death of Razon as well.

However, petitioner, thru its President Daniel Morga, Jr., refused to grant POEA‘s request
because Razon allegedly violated his employment/training/dispatching contracts by
unlawfully escaping/running away (TNT) from his company assignment without prior Korea
Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSMB) authorization and working/staying in an
unknown company/place. But petitioner stated that Razon‘s relatives can still avail of all the
benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal Filipino workers
abroad.

Director Ricardo Casco of the WEO-POEA sent a letter to petitioner, stating that pursuant
Sections 52-55 of the Implementing Rules Governing RA 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995), the repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and transport of his
personal effects is the primary responsibility of the principal or agency and to immediately
advance the cost of plane fare without prior determination of the cause of worker‘s
repatriation. Further, the Rules provide for the procedure to be followed in cases when the
foreign employer/agency fails to provide for the cost of repatriation, compliance of which is
punishable by suspension of the license of the agency or such sanction as the
Administration shall deem proper. As such, petitioner Equi-Asia is required to provide the
PTA for the deceased OFW in compliance with the requirement in accordance with RA 8042.

Thereafter, petitioner wrote back to Director Casco and claimed that Sections 53 and 55 of
the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8042 covering the following: (1) the
responsibility of the agency to advance the cost of plane fare without prior determination of
the cause of the deceased worker‘s termination; (2) the recovery of the same costs from the
estate of the dead worker before the NLRC; and (3) the action to be imposed by POEA for
non-compliance therewith within 48 hours are violative of due process and/or the principle on
due delegation of power. This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior
notice and hearing before responsibility thereunder could be established against the agency
that sets up the defense of sole fault – in avoidance of said responsibility -. Besides, the
sections in question unduly grant the powers to require advance payment of the plane fare,
to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension in case of non-compliance therewith,
within 48 hours and to recover said advance payment from the dead worker's estate upon
the return of his remains to the country before the NLRC, when the law itself does not
expressly provide for the grant of such powers.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042), issued by
DFA and POEA, is illegal or violative of due process

HELD: No. The Court held that it is well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern
life. Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today‘s society, it
is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of
everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the principal
agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All
that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.

Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test or the sufficient standard
test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.

As such, the Supreme Court resolved that the questioned provisions of the Omnibus Rules
meet these requirements.

Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be primarily responsible
for the repatriation of a deceased OFW is specious and plain nitpicking. While Republic Act
No. 8042 does not expressly state that petitioner shall be primarily obligated to transport
back here to the Philippines the remains of the deceased Razon, nevertheless, such duty is
imposed upon him as the statute clearly dictates that "the repatriation of remains and
transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto
shall be borne by the principal and/or the local agency." The mandatory nature of said
obligation is characterized by the legislature's use of the word "shall." That the concerned
government agencies opted to demand the performance of said responsibility solely upon
petitioner does not make said directives invalid as the law plainly obliges a local placement
agency such as herein petitioner to bear the burden of repatriating the remains of a
deceased OFW with or without recourse to the principal abroad. In this regard, we see no
reason to invalidate Section 52 of the omnibus rules as Republic Act No. 8042 itself permits
the situation wherein a local recruitment agency can be held exclusively responsible for the
repatriation of a deceased OFW.

Nor does the Court see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as invalid for
allegedly contravening Section 15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall not
be responsible for a worker's repatriation should the termination of the employer-employee
relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. To their mind, the statute merely states the
general principle that in case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's
own undoing, it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her
homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a
placement agency from establishing the circumstances surrounding an OFW's dismissal
from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such determination would most likely take
some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest
possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that
recruitment agency contests its liability for repatriation.
As the Solicitor General pointed out, this is the same reason why repatriation is made by law
an obligation of the agency and/or its principal without the need of first determining the
cause of the termination of the worker's employment. Repatriation is in effect an
unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an
investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a
foreign land without the financial means to return home and being at the mercy of
unscrupulous individuals is a violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These are
the same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect.

As for the sufficiency of standard test, the Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient
standards the following: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and
welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."
 REPUBLIC VS DRUGMAKER‘S LAB (GR NO. 190837 MARCH 5, 2014)

Republic of the Philippines vs Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc.

GR No. 190837 March 5, 2014

Facts: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the ―Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act‖ primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality
measure of foods, drugs and devices and cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the
Department of Health, thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989,
entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical products. Among
others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with
FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory
bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for
these products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on
hold because there was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of
circulars no. 1 s. of 1997 resumed the FDA‘s implementation of the BA/BE testing
requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the
FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided additional implementation details
concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.

Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.

Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only
if there exist a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so
promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statutes and must not involve
discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the
execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the
doctrine of separation of powers and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of
legislative powers.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule or a

contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a d designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement
existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly
delegated by the congress amd effect a change in existing law or policy which affect
individual rights and obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret,
clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates.
Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statue being administered and purpory
to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and
refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same
class which may be covered by the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by
an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by
EO 292 s. of 1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice,
hearing and publication in order to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an
interpretative rule. This is because when an administrative rule is merely intepretative in
nature its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that ca facilitate
or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed before that new issuance
is given the force and effect of law.

A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that A0 67 is actually the rule that
originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the
issuamce of CPR covering certain pharmaceutical products as such, it is considered an
administrative regulation – a legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health
in consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the
statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to
their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its
issuance, the court deems that AO 67 complied with the requirements of prior hearing,
notice and publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded tl the govt in the
exercise of its official duties.

On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: a.) implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof; b.) Interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulation under which FDA
operates and/or; c.) Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to administer
and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s. of 1989 including those
covering the BA/BE testing requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore,
the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since theu would not affect
the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly
speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation and
publication are needed for their validity.
 PASEI v. Sec. of Labor, G.R. No. 101279, Aug. 06, 1992

FACTS: PASEI is the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies
duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas
employment for Filipino land-based workers. DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued
Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment of PASEI of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. Hence, PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to
annul the said order and prohibit its implementation.

ISSUES: W/N the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.

HELD: Although the respondents acted within their authority and did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in restricting and regulating recruitment, the orders and circulars issued are
invalid and unenforceable. This is because of lack of proper publication and filing in the
Office of the National Registrar as required in Administrative Code.
 MACAILING vs. ANDRADA

G.R. No. L-21607 January 30, 1970

FACTS:

A dispute over four (4) parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato, arose between plaintiffs,
settlers thereon occupying four hectares each, and Salvador Andrada, sales applicant of a
bigger parcel, which includes the lands occupied by plaintiffs. The District Land Officer of
Cotabato decided in plaintiffs' favor. The Director of Lands, however, reversed, declared that
the portions adjudged to the four plaintiffs shall be restored to the heirs (of Salvador
Andrada) who should include them proportionately in the new application to be filed by them
respectively.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on October 27, 1956, reversed
the Director of Lands by awarding to plaintiffs the lands they claimed. Defendants sought
reconsideration. On May 30, 1957, the Secretary denied. Defendants moved once more to
reconsider. On September 12, 1957, the Secretary rejected the reconsideration. The
Secretary ruled that the Office has no more jurisdiction to entertain the said motion. The
Secretary categorically stated that the case was considered a closed matter insofar as this
Office is concerned.

On October 23, 1957, defendants appealed to the Office of the President. Assistant
Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, by authority of the President reversed the decision
of the Secretary and declared that the lands involved should be restored to the heirs of
Andrada to be included in their individual applications.

Plaintiffs started the present suit in the Cotabato court. They raised the issue of
finality of the decision of the Secretary.

Defendants take the view that plaintiffs' remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil
action before the Court of First Instance. They aver that since plaintiffs did not avail of the
proper remedy, the action should be dismissed.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to avail the
proper remedy
2. Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President become null and void due
to the the finality of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
RULING:

1. No. In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially
provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not
necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary
according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general
rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the
accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available.

Deducible from the foregoing is that where administrative agencies have original
jurisdiction in the premises, the court's interference with administrative action is
necessarily limited. A review thereof cannot be done through an ordinary civil action if
constitutional or legislative authority therefor is wanting. The remedies that can be
availed of where the statute is silent, as in the present case, are the special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus specified in the Rules of Court. In this case,
therefore, we have no alternative but to hold that the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy
is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.
2. Yes. Defendants' appeal to the President was time-barred. The provisions of Lands
Administrative Order No. 6 are thus brought to the fore. Section 12 thereof provides:
Finality of decision promulgated by the
Secretary.—The decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (now Agriculture and
Natural Resources) or the Under Secretary on an
appealed case shall become final, unless otherwise
specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30)
days from the date of its receipt by the interested
parties.

Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary's

decision of October 27, 1956 within 30 days from their receipt thereof. Indeed, they
attempted to appeal only on October 23, 1957. They merely contend that their
appeal was but 9 days after October 14, 1957, the date defendants received the
September 12, 1957 ruling of the Secretary denying their second motion for
reconsideration. That ruling, it must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that
the Secretary's decision "had long become final and executory." By reason of
which, declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had no more jurisdiction
to entertain the said motion."

In administrative law, an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law, is law.

Administratively speaking then, 30 days after receipt by the interested parties, the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources becomes final,
except in cases of mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect.

The court hold that the August 20, 1959 letter decision of the Assistant Executive
Secretary "by authority of the President" reversing the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in this case is null and void and of no force and
effect.
 VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 73705 August 27, 1987

FACTS: On April 28, 1981, the Iloilo Port Manager of Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) wrote
Victorias Milling requiring it to (1) have its tugboats and barges undergo harbor formalities,
(2) pay entrance/clearance fees as well as berthing fees effective May 1, 1981, (3) secure a
permit for cargo handling operations at its Da-an Banua wharf, and (4) remit 10% of its gross
income for said operations as the government's share.

To these demands, Victorias Milling sent two letters wherein it maintained that it was exempt
from paying PPA any fee or charge because: (1) the wharf and its facilities were built and
installed in its land; (2) repair and maintenance thereof were solely paid by it; (3) even the
dredging and maintenance of the Malijao River Channel from Guimaras Strait up to said
private wharf were being done by its equipment and personnel; (4) at no time had the
government ever spent a single centavo for such activities; and (5) the wharf was being used
mainly to handle sugar purchased from district planters pursuant to existing milling
agreements.

Victorias Milling filed a petition before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) but it was dismissed
on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. The CTA recommended that the appeal be
addressed to the Office of the President (OP). Victorias Milling elevated the case to the
Supreme Court (SC) but it was likewise denied. Thereafter, it appealed to the OP but it was
denied on the ground that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. Hence, the
instant petition.

Victorias Milling maintained and submitted that there was no basis for the PPA to assess
and impose the dues and charges it was collecting since the wharf was private, constructed
and maintained at no expense to the government, and that it existed primarily so that its
tugboats and barges would ferry the sugarcane of its Panay planters.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement to remit 10% of its gross income for its arrastre and
stevedoring operations is valid

RULING: Yes. The requirement to remit 10% of its gross income for its arrastre and
stevedoring operations is valid.

Section 6B-(ix) of the Presidential Decree No. 857 authorized the PPA "To levy dues, rates,
or charges for the use of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or for services provided
by or belonging to the Authority, or any organization concerned with port operations." This
10% government share of earnings of arrastre and stevedoring operators is in the nature of
contractual compensation to which a person desiring to operate arrastre service must agree
as a condition to the grant of the permit to operate.

As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the fees and charges PPA collects are not for
the use of the wharf that petitioner owns but for the privilege of navigating in public waters, of
entering and leaving public harbors and berthing on public streams or waters
 Cawad v. Abad et al.
G.R. No. 207145
July 28, 2015

Facts:
On March 26, 1992, RA 7305, aka The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed
into law. On September 3, 2012, the respondents DBM and CSC issued DBM-CSC Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe rules on the grant of Step Increments. The joint
circular provided that ―an official or employee authorized to be granted longevity pay under
an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to length of service.‖ Then
on November 29, 2012, DBM and DOH issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 Series of
2012, which provided for the definition of hazard pay and that it may only be granted to
public health workers (PHWs) if the nature of their duties and responsibilities actually expose
them to danger. It also stated that the longevity pay should be granted only when the
following criteria are met:

a. The PHW holds a position in the agency plantilla of regular positions; and
b. He/She has rendered at least satisfactory performance and has not been found guilty of
any administrative or criminal case within all rating periods covered by the 5-year period.

In short, the joint circulars diminished and limited the benefits granted by the Magna Carta to
PHWs.

According to Section 35 of RA 7305, the rules and regulations implementing the provisions
of the act should take effect only after thirty days after publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. The DBM-DOH joint circular was made effective on January 1, 2013, just three
days after it was published in a newspaper of general circulation on December 29, 2012.

Issue:
Was the joint circular valid despite it not meeting the publication requirement of RA 7305?

Ruling:
Yes. The joint circular did not modify, amend, or supplant the revised IRR. It gave no real
consequences to what the law itself has already prescribed. As an exception to the rule on
publication, interpretative regulations which ―need nothing further than their bare issuance
for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself already prescribed‖ need not
be published. These kinds of regulations do not need to be published to be effective since
they do not add anything to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person.
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PERFECTO OBIAS, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 184406;
March 14, 2012).

FACTS: Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of P.D. No. 27, an
aggregate area of 34.6958 hectares composing three parcels of agricultural land located at
Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur owned by Perfecto, Nellie, OFe, Gil, Edmundo and Nelly, all
surnamed Obias, (landowners) were distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries namely: Victor
Bagasina, Sr., Elena Benosa, Sergio Nagrampa, Claudio Galon, Prudencio Benosa, Santos
Parro, Guillermo Breboneria, Flora Villamer, Felipe de Jesus, Mariano Esta, Benjamin
Bagasina, Andres Tagum, Pedro Galon, Clara Padua, Rodolfo Competente, Roberto Parro,
Melchor Brandes, Antonio Buizon, Rogelio Montero, Maria Villamer, Claudio Resari, Victor
Bagasina, Jr., Francisco Montero and Pedro Montero.

As a result, the owners had to be paid just compensation for the property taken.The
Department of Agrarian Reform, using the formula under P.D. 27 and E.O. 228, came up
with a computation of the value of the acquired property atP1, 397,578.72.However, the
amount was contested by the landowners as an inadequate compensation for the land.
Thus, they filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC of Naga
City, as the assigned Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

To ascertain the amount of just compensation, a committee was formed by the trial
court.The Provincial Assessor recommended the above average value ofP40,065.31 per
hectare as just compensation;LBP Representative Edgardo Malazarte recommended the
amount ofP38,533.577 per hectare; andthe representative of the landowners, Atty. Fe
Rosario P. Buevasubmitted aP180,000.00 per hectare valuation of the land.

However, none of these recommendations was adopted in the 3 October 2000 judgment of
the trial court in fixing the just compensation at (P91,657.50) per hectare or in the total
amount of P3,180,130.29. thus, directing the LBP to pay the said amount.

Both the landowners and LBP appealed before the CA.

On 31 January 2008, the appellate court vacated the decision of the trial court. It relied
heavily on the Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 148223, 25 November
2004) ruling wherein the Court fixed the rate of the government support price (GSP) for one
cavan of palay at P35.00, the price of the palay at the time of the taking of the land.
Following the formula,Land Value= 2.5 multiplied by the Average Gross Production (AGP)
multiplied by the Government Support Price (GSP),provided by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. 228,
the value of the total area taken will beP371,015.20 plus interest thereon at the rate of 6%
interest per annum, compounded annually, starting 21 October 1972,until fully paid.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that the payment of interest shall be made until full payment
of compensation?
HELD: It is correct that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the
law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great
respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statuteand have in their favor a
presumption of legality.And a literal reading of A.O. No. 13, as amended, will be in favor of
the LBP.

However, these administrative issuances or orders, though they enjoy the presumption of
legalities, are still subject to the interpretation by the Supreme Court pursuant to its power to
interpret the law.While rules and regulation issued by the administrative bodies have the
force and effect of law and are entitled to great respect, courts interpret administrative
regulations in harmony with the law that authorized them and avoid as much as possible any
construction that would annul them as invalid exercise of legislative power.

***

To answer the contention of LBP that there should be no payment of interest when there is
already a prompt payment of just compensation, the Court discussed that even though the
LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just compensation due to the petitioners
after the Court had fixed the value of the expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential
fact from the time that the State took the petitioners properties until the time that the
petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed. This is the rationale for imposing
the 12% interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have
made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking.

This Court is not oblivious of the purpose of our agrarian laws particularly P.D. No. 27, that
is, to emancipate the tiller of the soil from his bondage; to be lord and owner of the land he
tills.

Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm
workers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. It also provides that the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands subject to the
payment of just compensation.

Further, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on this subject reveal that
just compensation should not do violence to the Bill of Rights, but should also not make an
insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian reform program. Hence, the landowner's
right to just compensation should be balanced with agrarian reform.

The mandate of determination of just compensation is a judicial function,hence, the Court

will exert all efforts to consider and interpret all the applicable laws and issuances in order to
balance the right of the farmers to own a land subject to the award the proper and just
compensation due to the landowners. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORP. v. COA, GR No. 183517, June 22, 2010

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul
Decision No. 2447 dated July 27, 1992 of the Commission on Audit (COA) denying
Philippine International Trading Corporation's (PITC) appeal from the disallowances made
by the resident COA auditor on PITC's car plan benefits; and Decision No. 98-048 dated
January27, 1998 of the COA denying PITC's motion for reconsideration. The PITC is a
government-owned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
252 on July 21, 1973, primarily for the purpose of promoting and developing Philippine trade
in pursuance of national economic development. On October 19, 1988, the PITC Board of
Directors approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers. Under such car plan
program, an eligible officer is entitled to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value
of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the remaining fifty percent (50%) will be
shouldered by the officer through salary deduction over a period of five (5) years. Maximum
value of the vehicle to be purchased ranges from Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) to Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00), depending on
the position of the officer in the corporation. In addition, PITC will reimburse the officer
concerned fifty percent (50%) of the annual car registration, insurance premiums and costs
of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car for a period of five (5) years from the date
the vehicle was purchased. The terms and conditions of the car plan are embodied in a "Car
Loan Agreement". Per PITC's car plan guidelines, the purpose of the
plan is to provide financial assistance to qualified employees in purchasing their owntranspor
tation facilities in the performance of their work, for representation, and personal use. The
plan is envisioned to facilitate greater mobility during official trips especially within Metro
Manila or the employee's principal place of assignment, without having to rely on PITC
vehicles, taxis or cars for hire.

On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other
Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation
of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates save for certainad
ditional compensation such as representation and transportation allowances which wereexe
mpted from consolidation into the standardized rate. Said section likewise provides
thatother additional compensation being received by incumbents as by of July 1, 1989 notint
egrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. The legislature
has similarly adhered to this policy of non-diminution of pay when it provided for the
transition allowance under Section 17 of RA 6758 which reads: Sec. 17.
Salaries of Incumbents. —
Incumbents of position presently receiving salaries and additionalcompensation/fringe benef
its including those absorbed from local government units and other emoluments the
aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall
continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as transition
allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment
that the incumbent shall receive in the future. Based on the foregoing pronouncement,
petitioner correctly pointed out that there was no intention on the part of the legislature to
revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of
the virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. There is no dispute that the PITC officials who
availed of the subject car plan benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July 1, 1989.
Thus, it waslegal and proper for them to continue enjoying said benefits within the five year
period from dateof purchase of the vehicle allowed by their Car Loan Agreements with PITC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of COA is not valid.

HELD:
The repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of "all corporate charters that exempt agencies from
the coverage of the System" was clear and expressed necessarily to achieve the purposes
for which the law was enacted, that is, the standardization of salaries of all employees in
government owned and/or controlled corporations to achieve "equal pay for substantially
equalwork". Henceforth, PITC should now be considered as covered by laws prescribing aco
mpensation and position classification system in the government including RA 6758. This is
without prejudice, however, as discussed above, to the non-diminution of pay of incumbents
as of July 1, 1989 as provided in Sections 12 and 17 of said law. Wherefore, the Petition is
hereby GRANTED, the assailed Decisions of the Commission of Audit are set aside. RA
6758 which is a law of general application cannot repeal provisions of the Revised Charter
of PITC and its amandatory laws expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage being
special laws. Our rules on statutory construction provide that a special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere

implication; that a statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be
construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do
so is manifested; that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper
step is to so express it
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BF HOMES, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999

Facts:

United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (UBFHAI) is the sole representative of all

homeowners of BF Homes while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) is the owner-
developer of the subdivision. Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was placed under
receivership by SEC for 10 years under Atty. Orendain for 10 years.

Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI. Preliminary to the
rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into an agreement with the two major homeowners'
associations, the BF Parañaque Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the
Confederation of BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single,
representative homeowners' association and the setting up of an integrated security program
that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision.
Subsequently, this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of agreement, and
was amended.

Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and recognized as the sole representative of
all the homeowners' association inside the subdivision. Respondent BFHI, through its
receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of the
subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of open space respectively. The first receiver was
relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHI's board of
directors was appointed.

Based on BFHI's title to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a
letter to the different homeowners' association in the subdivision informing them that as a
basic requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be responsible for the
security of the subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation of
squatters. On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for mandamus
with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging that the committee of receivers
illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver.

The HIGC issued ex parte a TRO which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking over the
clubhouse, securing all entry and exit points, impeding or preventing the execution and sale
of properties and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or agreement or
petitioner with the BFHI. Without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's petition with the
HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from
proceeding with the case.

The HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for
preliminary injunction, until such time that respondent BFHI's application for prohibition with
the appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of the temporary
restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the status quo.

Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition. Motion
for reconsideration by the petitioners was denied. Hence this petition.

Issues:

Whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the case as provided for in sec1
(b) rule II of HIGC‘s rules of procedure.

Ruling:

HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Originally, administrative supervision was vested
by law with the SEC but pursuant to PD902-A, this function was delegated to the HIGC. As
stated in PD92- A, HIGC was given the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
homeowner‘s disputes arising out of the following intra-corporate relations: 1. Between and
among members of the association; 2. Between any and/or all of them and the association of
which they are member; and 3. In so far as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity,
between the association and the state. When HIGC adopted its revised rules of procedure in
the hearing of homeowners‘ disputes, it added the phrase ―between the association and the
state/general public or other entity.‖

The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised
rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of
Presidential Decree 902-A.
The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC
cannot legally do. The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated
legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or
the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The rule-making power
must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law
as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute." If a discrepancy occurs
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.

Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and
boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with
the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but
constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers
should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and
reasonable execution‖

Hence, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, for lack of merit. The decision
and resolution appealed from in CA-G.R. SP. NO. 37072 are AFFIRMED
 Granger Associates vs Microwave Systems Inc.

FACTS:

Granger Associates is a foreign corporation which was organized in the United States and
has no license to do business in this country. Microwave Systems, Inc., is a domestic
corporation which has been sued for recovery of a sum equivalent to US$900,633.30
allegedly due from it to the petitioner.

The claim arose from a series of agreements concluded between the two parties, giving MSI
the license to manufacture and sell its products in the Philippines and extended to the latter
certain loans, equipment and parts. Payment of these contracts not having been made as
agreed upon, Granger filed a complaint against MSI and the other private respondents in the
Regional Trial Court.

MSI alleged the affirmative defense that the plaintiff had no capacity to sue, being an
unlicensed foreign corporation, and moved to dismiss.

Motion to dismiss was granted by RTC which was affirmed by the CA.

In this petition, Granger seeks the reversal of the respondent court on the ground that MSI
has failed to prove its affirmative allegation that Granger was transacting business in the
Philippines. It insists that it has dealt only with MSI and not the general public and contends
that dealing with the public itself is an indispensable ingredient of transacting business. It
also argues that its agreements with MSI covered only one isolated transaction for which it
did not have to secure a license to be able to file its complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Granger Associates was doing business in the Philippines?

RULING:

YES. It can be shown that the parties entered into a series of agreements, as in successive
sales of the foreign company's regular products, that company shall be deemed as doing
business in the Philippines.

The quoted stipulations show that Granger had extended its personality in the Philippines
and would receive orders for its products and discharge its warranty obligations through the
agency of MSI It would even appear that Granger intended to transact business in the
Philippines through the instrumentality of MSI not only for the sale and warranty of its
products in this country.

There is also a showing that the investment of Granger in MSI is quite substantial, enabling it
to participate in the actual management and control of MSI In fact, it appointed a
representative in the board of directors to protect its interests, and this director was so
influential that, at his request, the regular board meeting was converted into an annual
stockholder's meeting to take advantage of his presence.

We are convinced from an examination of the terms and conditions of the contracts and
agreements entered into between petitioner and private respondents indicate that they
established within our country a continuous business, and not merely one of a temporary
character. Such agreements did not constitute only one isolated transaction, as the petitioner
contends, but a succession of acts signifying the intent of Granger to extend its operations in
the Philippines.
 Villegas vs Subido

GR No. L-31711

September 30, 1971

Ponente: Fernando, J.

Facts:

A letter dated June 31, 1968, respondent Eduardo Z. Romualdez, Sec. of Finance,
authorized respondent Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume
the duties of Asst. City Treasurer effective June 1, 1968.

Vice Felino Fineza retired from government June 17 1968, petitioner Antonio
Villegas, Mayor of the City of Manila, directed respondent Jose Gloria to ―desist and refrain
from exercising the duties and functions of Asst. Treasurer‖, on the grounds that respondent
Romualdez ―is not empowered to make such designations.‖

January 1, 1969, Mayor Villegas appointed petitioner Manuel D. Lapid, Chief of the
Each Division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila as the Asst. City Treasurer.

February 14, 1969, in a 1 st indorsement, Civil Service Commissioner – Abelardo

Subido disproved the appointment of Lapid besed on Sec. of Justice opinion, September 19,
1968 that said; ―the appointment of Asst. Treasurer is still governed by the Sec. 2088 (A) of
the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Sec. 4 of the Decentralization Law, R.A. No.
5185.‖

Issue:

WoN the lower court erred in deciding to dismiss the special civil action for
prohibition, quo warranto and mandamus of Mayor Villegas?

Held:

No. The lower court did not err in its decision. It is understandable why the choice for
the lower court was not difficult to make. What has been clearly ordained in the Charter is
―controlling‖. It survives in the face of the assertion that ―the additional power granted to local
officials to appoint employees paid out of the local funds would suffice to transfer such
authority to petitioner Mayor Villegas.‖

A perusal of the words of the statute, even if from searching would not justify such an
interpretation.
 This is more evident considering the fidelity by this Court to the doctrine that looks
with less than favour on implied repeals. The decision now on appeal, to repeat, MUST BE
AFFIRMED.

The purpose of the rule requiring foreign corporations to secure a license to do business in
the Philippines is to enable us to exercise jurisdiction over them for the regulation of their
activities in this country, If a foreign corporation operates in the Philippines without
submitting to our laws, it is only just that it not be allowed to invoke them in our courts when
it should need them later for its own protection. While foreign investors are always welcome
in this land to collaborate with us for our mutual benefit, they must be prepared as an
indispensable condition to respect and be bound by Philippine law in proper cases, as in the
one at bar.

Philippine Petroleum Corporation vs Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, GR 90776

FACTS:

 Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business enterprise engaged in

the manufacture of a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya,
Pililla, Rizal, conducting its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
 Under Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, manufactured oils
and other fuels are subject to specific tax.
 Respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, through Municipal Council Resolution No.
25, S-1974 enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1, S-1974 otherwise known as
―The Pililla Tax Code of 1974‖. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a
tax on business, except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax
Code
 The respondents then filed a complaint for the collection of business tax, storage
permit fees, mayor‘s permit and sanitary inspection fees.

ISSUE 1:

WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay
tax on business unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal

HELD 1: YES, a tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself.

RATIO 1: While Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum
products, said decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by
P.D. 426, wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of
manufacturers, importers, producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature.
The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present
Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73
(1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances.
Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may
be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments.

ISSUE 2: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still
liable to pay the storage fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal

HELD 2: NO, Provincial Circular No. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal treasurers to
refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials
imposed in the local tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the
payment of storage permit fee.

RATIO 2: The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla‘s tax ordinance is a fee for the
installation and keeping in storage of any flammable, combustible or explosive substances.
Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla, but by
petitioner PPC, same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality
as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code.

ISSUE 3: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still
liable to pay the permit fees unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal

HELD 3: YES.

RATIO 3: Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla‘s Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 prescribing a permit
fee is a permit fee allowed under Section 36 of the amended Code.

ISSUE 4: WON the mayor has authority to waive payment of the mayor‘s permit and sanitary
inspection fees

HELD 4: NO HE DOES NOT, it is the law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor,
who can make an exemption.

RATIO 4: The trial court did not err in holding that ―since the power to tax includes the power
to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a municipal
mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a
policy thru the enactment of a tax.‖
In the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver
cannot be recognized. Under Section 36 of the Code, a permit fee like the mayor‘s permit,
shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or
occupation under the provisions of the Code.
 G.R. No. L-51353 June 27, 1988

SHELL PHILIPPINES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On May 1, 1970, Congress approved the Act imposing a stabilization tax on consignments
abroad (RA 6125)that there shall be imposed, assessed and collected a stabilization tax on
the gross F.O.B. peso proceeds, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of
receipt of such proceeds, whether partial or total, of any exportation. And that "Any export
products the aggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States
dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to
the rates of tax in force during the fiscal years following its reaching the said aggregate
value."

The apellee Shell Philippines reach 5 M dollars of their by product petroleum, the Monetary
Board issued its Resolution No. 47 to the stabilization tax effective January 1, 1972. Under
the Central Bank Circular No. 309, implemented by Resolution No. 47, appellee had to pay
the stabilization tax beginning January 1, 1972, which it did under protest. The n later filed a
suit against Central Bank praying that the resolution be declared bul and void. The lower
court sustained that the resolution as void. The TC opined mentioning the difference
between calendar year and fiscal year wherein calendar year refers to one year starting from
January to December. Fiscal year, as it is usually and commonly used, refers to the period
covered between July 1 of a year to June 30 of the following year. The Central appealed the
above cited decision of TC

ISSUES:

WON Monetary Board Resolution No. 47is null and void?

Which should prevail in case of discrepancy, the basic law or the rule and regulation issued
to implement said law?
HELD:

1) YES.

While it is true that under the same law the Central Bank was given the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the statutory provision in question but its
authority is limited only to carrying into effect what the law being implemented provides. The
trial court was correct in declaring that "Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 is void insofar as
it imposes the tax mentioned in Republic Act No. 6125 on the export seria residue of
(plaintiff) the aggregate annual F.O.B., value of which reached five million United States
dollars in 1971 effective on January 1, 1972." The said resolution runs counter to the
provisions of R.A. 6125 which provides that "(A)ny export product the aggregate annual
F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year
during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the
fiscal year following its reaching the said aggregate value."

2) In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement
said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091) The rule or regulation should
be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social
Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558)

The respondent was liable to pay the tax and that the Central Bank merely collected the said
tax prematurely. There is likewise no controversy over the rate of tax in force when payment
became due. Thus, the tax refund granted by the trial court was not proper because the tax
paid was in fact, and in law due to the government at the correct time.

The Court decline to grant to the respondent an amount equivalent to the interest on the
prematurely collected tax because of the well entrenched rule that in the absence of a
statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing payment of interest on the
amount to be refunded to the taxpayer, the Government cannot be required to pay interest.
Likewise, it is the rule that interest may be awarded only when the collection of tax sought to
be refunded was attended with arbitrariness (Atlas Fertilizer Corp. v. Commission on Internal
Revenue, 100 SCRA 556). There is no indication of arbitrariness in the questioned act of the
appellant.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY MOCHAEL DEFENSOR;
GR. NO. 163980; AUGUST 3, 2006

FACTS: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.

ISSUE: Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may be reviewed by Courts

HELD: Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and

quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi- legislative or rule-making power
is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and
not when the assailed act pertained to its rule- making or quasi-legislative power.

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the
object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon
the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed
IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Court‘s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise
of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when
said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity‘s or person‘s jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or

any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [20][21]
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-
legislative functions.

Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is
the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior
court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners‘ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.

In any case, petitioners‘ allegation that ―respondents are performing or threatening to

perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction‖ may appropriately be enjoined by
the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. WHEREFORE,
the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
 REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO

GR No. 180046

April 2, 2009

Facts:

- There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination
were circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A.
Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of
500 questions and answers in two of the examinations‘ five subjects, particularly Tests III
(Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage
and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals
restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.

- President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the
CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities
in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49
series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).

- Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent

review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other
things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs)
or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent
review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the
implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.

- A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved.
Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude
independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the
requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it
conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHED‘s coverage to public and private institutions of
higher.

- In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the
operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict
the intention of the said Executive Order No. 566; As to the request to clarify what is meant
by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with
an HEI.

- Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the
annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of
legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to
intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.

- On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO
21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing
independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the
RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved to require the parties to observe the
status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.

Issues: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative

power as it expands the CHED‘s jurisdiction [Yes, it expands CHED‘s jurisdiction, hence
unconsititutional]; and

2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive‘s rule-making power. [Yes, it is
invalid.]

Held/Ratio: 1. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED‘s coverage
under RA 7722. The CHED‘s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private
institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-
secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for
the regulation of review centers and similar entities.

The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a
program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for
the licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program
that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only intended to
"refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees." Thus,
programs given by review centers could not be considered "programs x x x of higher
learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is
defined as "education beyond the secondary level‖ or "education provided by a college or
university."
Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services"
in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although
not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial
services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.

2. ) The exercise of the President‘s residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book III of
EO (invoked by the OSG to justify GMA‘s action) requires legislation; as the provision
clearly states that the exercise of the President‘s other powers and functions has to be
"provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the
functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to
amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is
"the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has
vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere.The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the
power of control, he is granted administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with
the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power,
the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED‘s quasi-legislative power. Administrative
agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of
rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the
confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and similar
entities.

Other issues: Re: issue judicial hierarchy, the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its
primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside
technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to its importance to the public.

Re: police power, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the
President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers.
Re: RA 8981 as the appropriate law, the PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve
the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations. However, this power should properly
be interpreted to refer to the conduct of the examinations. The power to preserve the
integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations should be read together with these
functions. These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the regulation of review
centers.
 Caltex vs Palomar

G.R. No. L-19650

29 September 1966

Facts:

In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest". It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex Station will dispense during a specified period. For the priviledge to
participate, no fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were required.

Forseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made
by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing.
The acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of sections
1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code and declined to grant the
requested clearance.

Issues:

W/N construction should be employed in this case and W/N the contest violates the
provisions of the Postal Law

Held:

Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black's Law
Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning
and intention of the author's of the law with respect to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words therein. This is as
much as question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look
beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and
pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.

Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift
enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their
market value but by way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery. In the present
case, the element of consideration is not observed. No payment or purchase of a
merchandise was required for the priviledge to participate.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge G.R. No. L-34568 (1988)

Facts. Mr. and Mrs. Agonoy filed the adoption of a certain Bonillia and a certain Marcos.
While the court heard the petition, minors Daoang, with their father, filed an opposition
arguing that the Agonoy‘s cannot adopt because they had a daughter, the oppositor‘s
mother. The mother is dead now, but they contend that they are the Agonoy‘s grandchildren.
The petitioners bank their petition on Art. 335 of the Civil Code enumerates entities who
cannot adopt and one of which are ―those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction.‖

Issue. Can Agonoy spouses adopt? –Yes

Ratio.They can adopt because the law does not include grandchildren as one of the
prohibitions of adopting. Again, the law provides that entities who cannot adopt are ―those
who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal
fiction.‖ The Agonoys having no living children, can adopt Borillia and Marcos. That the
petitioners are grandchildren of the Agonoys is undisputed. However, the Agonoys having a
grandchild does not prohibit them from adopting children. Hence, the Agonoy‘s are entitled
to adopt.

It should be noted however that the Spanish Civil Code, from which PH Civil Code was
adopted, disqualified persons who have legitimate/d descendants from adopting which would
have been favorable to the opposition. In its adoption in the Civil Code, the framers dropped
―descendants‖ and inserted ―children‖. Relevant law is clear that having grandchildren is not
included in the list of entities who cannot adopt. As per statutory construction, what needs to
be remembered for this case are the following: ―A statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.‖ In so far as Art. 335 is clear,
the courts need not inquire further to its meaning.
 Montelibano v. Ferrer
GR No. L-7899

June 23, 1955

Facts:

In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and general manager,
leased a lot to Benares for five years, with an option in favor of Benares of another five crop
years. On 1951, the Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which
rendered a decision ordering him to eject from the said lot. However, Benares
continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to Subdivision. Acting upon
Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land of sugarcane planted by Benares. Hence, a
criminal case was filed by Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then filed to
the petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the complaint and
warrant of arrest A civil case against Municipal Judge and Benares was filed alleging that
the said judge had o jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case.

Issue:

Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying upon CA 326,
section 22 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides that the City Attorney shall charge
of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the
Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of Bacolod.

Held:

No, the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case.

In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they
received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which
such status originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the
same effect.

Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field,
have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the
question under consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a
different conclusion.

In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police wherein it
was held that in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal
who is given the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said
city, under the provisions of its Charter found in Sec 39 of Act # 183. The provisions of the
Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially identical to that of Manila should then be
interpreted the same.

Therefore, the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest issued by the judge
shall be annulled.
 Miramar Fish Co. Inc., Petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR),
Respondent (G.R. No. 185432, June 4, 2014)

Facts:
Petitioner is a duly organized corporation under Philippine laws. It is registered with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Board of Investments (BOI). Miramar filed its
administrative claim for refund in years 2003 and 2004 with the BIR. The latter did not take
action on the claims; hence Miramar filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) on March 30 2004.
The CTA denied the petition stating that Miramar failed to imprint the word ―zero-rated‖ on
the invoices or receipts.

Issue:
Is Miramar entitled to the issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC)?

Held:
The SC ruled that petitioner filed its judicial claim for refund insofar as to the four quarters of
taxable year 2002 beyond the 30-day period. The Court explained:

―We summarize the rules on the determination of the prescriptive period for filing a tax
refund or credit of unutilized input VAT as provided in Section 112 of the 1997 Tax Code, as
follows:

―(1) An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were made.

―(2) The CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of
the administrative claim within which to decide whether to grant a refund or issue a tax credit
certificate. The 120-day period may extend beyond the two-year period from the filing of the
administrative claim if the claim is filed in the later part of the two-year period. If the 120-day
period expires without any decision from the CIR, then the administra-tive claim may be
considered to be denied by in action.

―(3) A judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the CIR‘s
decision denying the administrative claim or from the expiration of the 120-day period
without any action from the CIR. ―(4) All taxpayers, how-ever, can rely on BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this
Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional
120+30 day periods.‖
In denying the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Court stressed:
―By way of reiteration, the CTA has no jurisdiction over petitioner‘s judicial appeal covering
its refund claim for taxable year 2002 on the ground of prescription, consistent with the ruling
in the San Roque case. While as to its refund claim for taxable year 2003, the same shall
likewise be denied for failure of petitioner to comply with the mandatory invoicing
requirements provided for under Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended,
 Relox vs People

GR No. 195694

June 11, 2014

FACTS:

RTC convicted Rolex Rodriguez of Unfair Competition. After promulgation of sentence, he

filed for a motion for reconsideration before the RTC on last day of the reglementary period
to appeal. Fourteen days after receipt of the RTC denying his motion for reconsideration, he
filed his Notice of Appeal. Thus, the denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being
filed out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (29 days after
promulgation).

Rodriguez asserted that the fresh period rule should be applied after the motion for new trial
or reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the fresh period rule should apply.

RULING:

The SC held that the fresh period rule should also apply to criminal cases.

As was the decision in Yu v. Tatad, the fresh period rule should also apply to Rule 122, Sec.
6 of the Rules of Court. The SC said that the privilege should also accord those in criminal
cases and not just in civil cases.

Carpio vs Executive Secretary

GR No. 96409

February 14, 1992

ACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this
petition, questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.

RA 6875, entitled ―AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER
A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES,‖ allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution:
―The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by
 law.‖

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution

o Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an ―encroachment upon, interference with, and
an abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers‖

HELD: Power of Administrative Control

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of
Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means ―the power of the President to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.‖ It is said to be at
the very ―heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.‖

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the ―Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency.‖ As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same
time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, ―all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Thus, ―the President‘s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department.‖

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an
administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation
among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and
public safety agencies.

Power of Executive Control

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for
the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the
civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the
President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in
reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a
member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-
Chief provision ―represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other
functions are clearly civil in nature.‖ His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is
consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that ―civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military.‖
 Dela Cruz vs Paras
G.R. Nos. L-42571-72
July 25, 1983

Facts:

The Local Government of Bocaue, Bulacan enacted Ordinace No. 82 which sought to
prohibit the operation of night clubs and the employment of hostesses in such night clubs.
The Petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injuction alleging that (1) the ordinance is null and void as the municipality has no authority
to prohibit a lawful business, (2) it violated the petitioners‘ right to due process and equal
protection of the law as their permits were withdrawn without judicial hearing, and (3) that
under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, the power to license and regulate tourist-
oriented business including night clubs has been transferred to the Department of Tourism.

In answer, the municipality responded that (1) it has been authorized by law to prohibit the
establishment and operation of night clubs under Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative
Code, (2) it was not violative of their rights as property rights are subordinate to public
interests because night clubs has been the principal cause of decadence of morality and has
adverse effects to the community, and (3) Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not
deprive municipal councils to regulate or prohibit night clubs.

The Court of First Instance upheld the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 84 as enacted is a valid exercise of police power
by the local government unit.

Held: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. According to the Court, police power is
granted to municipal corporations, which may enact such ordinances and make regulations
as may be necessary to carry out its powers and duties to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order and convenience of the
municipality. However, citing Justice Moreland, an ordinance is valid unless contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, an act of national legislature, or unless it is against public
policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, discriminating, or in derogation of common right.
Hence, an ordinance passed must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
pronounced invalid. The general rule found in the general welfare clause must be
reasonable, consonant with the general powers of the corporation, and not inconsistent with
the law of the State.

In the present case, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. All
the petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A
refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject
to judicial correction. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Petition is granted. Decision of the RTC is reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 84, series
of 1976 is declared unconstitutional.

Marcelino vs Cruz

G.R. No. L-42428 (1983)

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his
case on August 4, 1975.

On the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved for time within which to
submit their respective memoranda. The trial court granted the motion and the parties are
given until September 4, 1975 to submit their respective memoranda. Thus, the case was
deemed submitted for decision on the said date.

Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was
filed by the People.

On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in
said case for promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975.

On the date set for promulgation of the decision, January 26, 1975, counsel for accused
moved for postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial
court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision based
on Section 11(1), Article X of the 1987 Constitution:

Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or
matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen
months for the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months
for all inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.

ISSUES:

WON the decision was rendered beyond the 3-month period? (NO, it should be counted
from the filing of the signed decision with the Clerk of Court and not from the date of
promulgation)
WON the 3-month period prescribed by Section 11(1) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution,
being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof
results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case. (NO, see ratio)
RATIO:

The established rule is that constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory,

unless by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest.

The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on

grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law.

Authorities are one in saying that statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or
immediately after the trial or verdict have been held by some courts to be merely directory so
that noncompliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would clearly have indicated it.

Such construction applies equally to the constitutional provision under consideration. In

Mikell v. School District of Philadelphia, it was ruled that ―the legal distinction between
directory and mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws.

To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the
exception rather than the general rule.

By the phrase ―unless reduced by the Supreme Court, it is evident that the period prescribed
therein is subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its prerogative under
Section 5(5) of Article X of the New Constitution to ―promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts‖

And there can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of
expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure.

Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. vs. Morris declares that constitutional provisions are directory, and
not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.
 RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN GONTANG v LEONCIO BARRAMEDA

G.R. No. L-29906, 30 January 1976

FACTS

Barrameda mortgaged his land in Taban, Camarines Sur, to DBP, for P22,000. He forfeited
the land due to failure to pay. DBP foreclosed the loan extrajudicially.

The land was auctioned by the provincial sheriff and was bought by DBP (as the highest
bidder), April 23, 1962. TCT was transferred from Barrameda to DBP Sept 2, 1963, upon
registration of sale and affidavit. The next day, Sept 3, 1963, Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang purchased the land from DBP. This sale was noted on TCT on Nov 26, 1963.

Barrameda offered to redeem the land on Nov 20, 1963. After being refused by DBP, he filed
suit. On August 12, 1964, Barrameda deposited with the clerk of court P7,271.22 (the exact
amount of the winning bid of DBP).

The trial court held that the one-year period redemption began on April 23, 1962, when the
public auction was held, and that period ended on April 24, 1963.

Appellate Court decision overturned the trial court, declaring 1. the sale to General and
Gontag null and void; 2. the TCT with the names of General and Gontang cancelled; 3. the
mortgaged property redeemed, and a new TCT issued in Barrameda‘s name.

ISSUES

1. In the interpretation and application of Section 31, Commonwealth Act 459, shall the
period of redemption start from the date of auction sale or the date of the registration
of the sale in the register of deeds as the respondent Appellate Court held?
2. Were petitioners under obligation to look beyond what appeared in the certificate of
title of their vendor the Development Bank of the Philippines and investigate the
validity of its title before they could be classified as purchasers in good faith?

Held:

Section 31, Commonwealth Act 459 (Law that created the Agricultural and Industrial Bank,
now Development Bank of the Philippines). The Mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank whose real property was sold at public auction, judicially or extra- judicially,
for the full or partial payment of an obligation to said bank shall, within one year from the
date of' the auction sale, have the right to redeem the real property

Act 3135 of 1924, Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the
special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem
the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and
such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four
to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

Rule 39 of Rules of Court. Section 30. Proof required of redemptioner. — A redemptioner

must produce to the officer, or person from whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his
notice to the officer a copy of the judgment or final order under which he claims the right to
redeem, certified by the clerk of the court wherein the judgment or final order is entered, or, if
he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record thereof, certified by
the registrar of deeds, or an original or certified copy of any assignment necessary to
establish his claim; and an affidavit executed by him or his agent, showing the amount then
actually due on the lien.

1. SC says the correct ruling is not just the determination of the meaning of ―auction
sale‖ and ―sale‖, but to determine the legislative intent. Registered land falls under
the Land Registration Act, ―the operative act is the registration of the deed of
conveyance.‖ In other words: The registration of the deed of conveyance is also the
notice to the whole world that a transaction involving the same had taken place. The
objective is to give the mortgagor a chance to redeem the land, and the one-year
from registration of sale better serves justice and equity. Also, the P7,271.22 is the
remaining balance on the mortgage, so Barrameda, in effect, was simply paying his
debt in full.
2. In the light of the foregoing, the SC no longer deemed it necessary to tackle the
second issue.
Decision of the respondent Appellate Court is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.
 Molina vs Raferty

Facts:

The present case was a rehearing granted to the appellee for a trail court decision on Feb 1,
1918. The petition was granted and oral argument of the motion was permitted. Jacinto
Molina was the owner of various fish ponds in Bulacan. He was required to pay the
merchant‘s tax required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Molina protested that he was an
agriculturist and not a merchant and therefore exempt from the taxes imposed by the
Internal Revenue Law upon the gross sales of merchants. Plaintiff contends that the fish
produced by him are to be regarded as an ―agricultural product‖ within the meaning of the
term used in paragraph (c) of Section 41 of Act No. 2339 (Now section 1460 of the
Administrative Code of 1917), enforced when the disputed tax was levied and that he is
exempt from the percentage tax on merchants‘ sales established by section 40 of Act No.
2339.

Paragraph (c) of Act No. 2339 sec. 41 reads:

In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the following commodities shall be
excluded:

(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of the land where grown,
whether in their original state or not. In the Trial Court, the Honorable Jose Abreu in a
carefully prepared decision ordered defendant to refund the P71.81 paid by plaintiff as
internal-revenue taxes and penalties under protest, with legal interest thereon from
November 26, 1915, the date of such payment under protest.

Issue:

WON fish produced as were those upon which the tax in question was levied are an
agricultural product

Held:

Decision set aside. Judgment of lower court affirmed.Purpose of legislative in establishing

the exemption – exempting agricultural products from the tax the farming industry would be
favored and the development of the resources of the country encouraged. As a
consequence, it is fairly to be inferred from the statute that the object and purpose of the
Legislature was to levy the tax in question (merchant‘s tax) upon all persons engaged in
making a profit upon goods produced by others but to exempt from the tax all persons
directly producing goods from the land. Products were grouped under ―agricultural products‖.
It is also the public interest to encourage the artificial propagation of food. However, if the
artificial production of fish is held not to be included within the exemption of the statute this
conclusion must be based upon the inadequacy of the language used by the Legislature to
express its purpose, rather than the assumption that it was actually intended to exclude
producers of artificially grown fish from the benefits conferred upon producers of other
substances brought into the store of national wealth by the arts of husbandry and animal
industry. Court held that the ponds where the fish were grown is agricultural land within the
definitions set by the Acts of Congress, the Philippine Commission, and the Mapa vs. Insular
Gov‘t case. With regard to the question that that the fish artificially grown and fed in a
confined area are agricultural products and therefore exempt, the Court looked deeper. It
said that a man might cultivate the surface of a tract of land patented to him under the
mining law, but the products of such soil would not for that reason be any the less
"agricultural products." Conversely, the admission that the land upon which these fishponds
are constructed is not to be classified as mineral or forest land, does not lead of necessity to
the conclusion that everything produced upon them is for that reason alone to be deemed an
"agricultural product" within the meaning of the statute under consideration. Courts and
lexicographers are in accord in holding that the term agricultural products is not limited in its
meaning to vegetable growth but includes everything which serves to satisfy human needs
which is grown upon the land, whether it pertains to the vegetable kingdom or to the animal
kingdom. Purpose of agriculture – obtain from the land the products to which it is best
adapted and through it will yield the greatest return upon the expenditure of a given amount
of labor and capital. This is similar to the process of enclosing an area for fish production
and one of the diets of the products are marine plants rooted at the bottom of the
pond. Another distinction was made between fishermen and the people artificially growing
fish in ponds so as to delineate the scope of the occupation tax. Fishermen were made liable
to the occupation tax. The ones growing fish in ponds were not included. As the present
case related to US vs Laxa, the court held that Laxa wasn‘t controlling due to evidence that
the fish subsisted solely upon free floating algae in Laxa while in Molina, the fish subsisted
through plants which grow from roots which attach themselves to the bottom of the pond,
thereby making Molina‘s fish in the real sense a product of the land!
 Angara vs. Electoral Commission

GR No.L-45081

July 15, 1936

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of
the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of

the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed
the last date to file election protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of
the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day
for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict
of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and
the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it
is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department
of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental
law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise
of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When,
therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet
met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to
be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest
against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with
cost against the petitioner.
 G.R. No. L- 6355-56 August 31, 1953

Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo

Vs.

Saturnino David, as Collector General of Internal Revenue

Facts:

After the ruling of the Court of first Instance of Manila declaring R.A. 590
unconstitutional and thereby ordering Saturnino David to refund Justices Endencia and Jugo
of the income taxes decreased from their salary, petitioners questioned the constitutionality
of the R.A. 590. The lower court held that the said collection made to Justice Endencia and
Jugo was a diminution of their compensation and a violation of the constitution citing the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer. Thereafter, according to the solicitor general on behalf of David
said that the congress did not favorably received the ruling of the Perfecto case, because
immediately after its promulgation the congress enacted R.A. 590, if not to counteract the
ruling in the Perfecto case, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax
on the salaries of judicial officers. The court questioned the legal basis of section 13 of R.A.
590 which states that:

Sec. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution particularly section 9,

Article VIII, has held that judicial officers were exempt from payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically
prohibited by the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 13 of R.A. 590 can justify and legalize the collection of
income taxes on the salary of Judicial Officers?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of R.A. 590 unconstitutional as it

violated the clear and express provision of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court further explained that the interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial Department, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental
law the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the constitution. The legislative
cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before it passage, so
as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would
be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. It also cannot, upon passing a law which
violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent attack thereon in the courts, by
a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
 Ebarle v. Sucaldito

G.R. No. L-33628

December 29, 1987

Facts:

Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a candidate for re-
election in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed complaints
with the city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and
Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner filed petitions
for prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they were dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme
Court and alleged that the City Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the
provisions of EO 264, which outlined the procedure how complainants charging the
government officials and employees with the commission of irregularities should be guided.

Issue:

Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and not to criminal
complaints

Held:

Petition dismissed. The title of the EO 264 is of ―Commission of Irregularities‖. It speaks of

commission of irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended to make it
applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific terms like ―accused,‖
―convicted,‖ and the like.
 Commissioner of Customs v. Relunta

G.R. No. L-11860

May 29, 1959

Facts: RPS Misamis Oriental, a unit of the Philippine Navy, was dispatched to Japan to
transport contingents bound for Puson, Korea, and carry Christmas gifts for our soldiers
there. It was used for transportation purposes and it made trips between Korea and Japan.
While RPS Misamis Oriental was in Japan, it loaded 180 cases containing various articles
which are subject to customs duties. Upon arrival in the Philippines, these articles were
forfeited because of violations of Customs Law. Commissioner of Customs argued that RPS
Misamis Oriental is subject to Administrative Code Sec. 1363 which says that unmanifested
merchandise found in the vessel shall be forfeited.

Issue: Are Navy vessels, like RPS Misamis Oriental, required to have a manifest?

Held: Yes.

Ratio: Even if Sec. 1221 of the Administrative Code is entitled ―Entrance of Vessels in
Foreign Trade,‖ Sec. 1228 states that it is required that ―every vessel from a foreign port or
place must have on board complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargoes. Also,
RPS Misamis Oriental claimed to have submitted one to a certain Mr. Ysla, but was denied
by the latter. Hence based on statutoty construction ―The title can be resorted to as an aid
where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or as to the intention of the legislature in
enacting it, and not otherwise.‖
 MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS

GR No. 169435

February 27, 2008

Facts:

The Petitioner Municipality of Nueva Era seek to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) to a certain extent that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag
City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of
Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva
Era in Ilocos Norte.

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran,
Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously
organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. In the
virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916 united these rancherias
and created the township of Nueva Era. The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was
created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating
the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753
provides:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and
Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from
the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as
the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,
by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at
the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West
and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7
or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8
Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of
Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of
Ilocos Norte."

Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. In
view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was
cut into two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality must be
compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer be
considered as its territory but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not
only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern portion.
These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva Era.

Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It
alleged that since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the
"tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land
being claimed by Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of
Nueva Era. Nueva Era claimed R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of
Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond
the territory of said barrios.

On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its
decision. R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos,
but none of Nueva Era's barangays were mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A.
No. 3753 in creating Marcos.

Issues: Whether or not, CA erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that MARCOS East
is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That it has no
factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand) and
Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and disintegrating Brgy.
Sto. Niño, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Niño, there lies Abra, not Mt. Province or
Kalinga-Apayao.

Held: No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No.
3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory,
Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a
statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily
and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide to
probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the
human mind. Legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of
Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended
to other matters. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Furthermore, this conclusion on the
intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the
way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother
municipality of Marcos. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may
resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of
the statute. Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating
Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on
the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
 86 SCRA 542

G.R. No. L-42050-66

PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (1978)

FACTS:

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one
Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to
quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective
cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing
or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege
facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to
state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUES:

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD
for short) No. 9?

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon
outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory
construction.

HELD:

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL
DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among
others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which
justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence.
 Echegaray vs Sec. of Justice

G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

FACTS :

On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse‘s ten
year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the
constitutionality of RA 7659 ― The Death Penalty Law‖, and the imposition of death penalty
for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it
unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its
imposition.

Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The
mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of
Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the
Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of
Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that
RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of
the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to
enjoin them from setting a date of execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to
mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request
for TRO until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in
question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed
a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the
death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how
other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists
in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman
and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
ISSUE :

WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the unconstitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, violative of international treaty and
obligations , discriminatory and an undue delegation of legislative powers.

RULING :

I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes the imposition of "cruel,
degrading or inhuman" punishment. This is the challenge thrown at RA 8177 and its
implementing rules and regulations.
The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying
out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel
which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to
the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. The Constitution, however, does
not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."
II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates the International
Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines on December
19, 1966 and October 23, 1986, respectively.
Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an individual‘s right to life, it also particularly
recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the
limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol has gone
astray since dates and circumstances related to its adoption prove that the Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177
TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is
the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non
delegari potest." (what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however
exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is ― Delegation to
Administrative Bodies ―
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of
lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity
of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
– and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of
carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits,
map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales Inc G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992

Facts: TMX Sales Inc. filed its quarterly income tax for the 1st quarter of 1981. It declared
P571,174.31 and paying an income tax of P247,019 on May 13, 1981. However, during the
subsequent quarters, TMX suffered losses. On April 15, 1982, when TMX filed its Annual
Income Tax Return for the year ended in December 31, 1981, it declared a net loss of
P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with the Appellate Division of BIR for refund in the
amount of P247,010 representing overpaid income tax. His claim was not acted upon by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On May 14, 1984, TMX Sales filed a petition for review
before the Court of Tax Appeals against CIR, praying that the CIR be ordered to refund to
TMX the amount of P247,010. The CIR averred that TMX is already barred for claiming the
refund since more than 2 years has elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the
filing of the claim in court (March 14, 1984). The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision
granting the petition of TMX Sales and ordered CIR to refund the amount mentioned. Hence,
this appeal of CIR.
Issue: Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is entitled to a refund considering that two years gas
already elapsed since the payment of the tax

Held: Yes. Petition denied.

Ratio: Sec. 292, par. 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code stated that ―in any case, no
such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of the
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment.‖ This should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code. The
most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the 2-year
prescriptive period at the time of the filing of the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual
Income Tax Return, where it can finally be ascertained if the tax payer has still to pay
additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax. Since TMX
filed the suit on March 14, 1984, it is within the 2-year prescriptive period starting from April
15, 1982 when they filed their Annual Income Tax Return.

The intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every
part of the act is taken into view.
 In Re: Estate of Johnson G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918

Facts:

On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated
amount of P231,800. The will was written in the testator‘s own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the
provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and
hence could not have been proved under section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a
petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of
this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of
Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the
laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his father‘s will

Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition

Held: No.

Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week
publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in
view of the statute concerned which reads as ―A will made within the Philippine Islands by a
citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of
the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of
these Islands‖ the ―state‖, being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is
excluded from the phrase (because during this time, Philippines was still a territory of the
US).
 Aquino III V. Comelec
Apr. 7, 2010

Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled ―An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment.‖

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009
creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2

distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No.
9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue: w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

creation of a new legislative district in a province?

Held:
We deny the petition. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject
provision of a comma to separate the phrase ―each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand‖ from the phrase ―or each province‖ point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
 ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766

April 2, 2013

FACTS:

The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed
by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list electionsDecember 5,
2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division‘s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida‘s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because
PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. 13 petitioners
were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners
in the printing of the official. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the
COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the
groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections
have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). 39 petitioners were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these
39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections. Petitioners prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court
issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the
Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners,
we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who
are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming
elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. Moreover, Section 5(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows
again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for
any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list
system. Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section
5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is
not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties. R.A. No. 7941 does not
require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will
these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system?
To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and
express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
 HIDALGO V HIDALGO
GR No. L-25326
May 29 1970

Facts:
Case jointly decided two petitions for review of decisions with the same issue involving the
same landowners and vendees which dismissed petitioner‘s actions as share tenants for the
enforcement of the right to redeem agricultural lands. Petitioners have been working on the
lands as share tenants for several years.

1. First case: respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo owned lands and sold it with
two other parcels of land for 4,000. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales as
tenants alleged that the area of land they worked on is worth 1, 500 and thus
they seek the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount by
respondents-vendee in their favor by way of redemption.
2. Second case: parcel of land worth 750 was sold by respondent. Petitioner-
spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo sought the execution of a deed of
sale for the same price by way of redemption.
Sec12 of the Land Reform Code or RA 3844 is available to leasehold tenants only
but not to share tenants. It provides that:
Lessee‘s Right of Redemption—In case the landholding is sold to a third
person without the knowledge of agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the
right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration.; Provided:
further, that where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be
exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have the
priority over any right of legal redemption.
No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the pre-
emption prescribed by Sex11 of the Agricultural Land Reform was given

Issue: WON the right of redemption granted by Sec12 of RA 3844 is applicable to share
tenants also. Or, WON the plaintiffs, as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of
land they are working from the purchasers thereof where no notice was previously given to
them by the vendor, who was their landholder, of the latter‘s intention to sell their property
and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec13 of RA 3844 before the
registration of the deed of sale.

Held:

The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right
of redemption granted by Sec12 of Land Reform Code is available to ―leasehold tenants‖
only and not ―shares tenants‖ and that their respective rights and obligations are not
coextensive or coequal. The very essence of Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition
of agricultural share tenancy. It was error of the agrarian court to state that ―the systems of
agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy‖
even after the enactment of the Land Reform Code. The difference between share and
leasehold tenancy as premised in the agrarian court‘s decision refers to the contractual
relationship between the tenant and the landowner, but the Land Reform Code forges by
operation of law a vinculum juris (civil obligation)—whether for a leasehold tenant or
temporarily a share tenant. Juridical consequences coming from thus are security of tenure
of the tenant and the tenant‘s right to continue in possession of the land he works despite
the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and the
farmer‘s pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates as well as the right to redeem the
land if sold to a third person without his knowledge.The Code did not mention tenants,
whether leaseholds or share tenants, because it outlaws share tenancy and envisions the
agricultural leasehold system as its replacement, and the agrarian court‘s literal construction
would wreak havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and announced legislative intent and
policy of the State of establishing owner-cultivatorship for the farmers who invariable were all
share tenants before the enactment of the Code and whom the Code would now uplift to the
status of the lessees. Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must
prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute,
since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and
would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.Basbas v Entena is not applicable, as
there, the tenant-redemptioner was shown by the evidence to have no funds and had merely
applied for them to the Land Authority which was not yet operating in the locality and hence,
the Court held that no part of the Code ―indicates or even hints that the 2-year redemption
period will not commence to run until the tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or
―stops the tenant from securing redemption funds from some other source.‖ In the present
case, the sole legal issue is the right of redemption being available to the redemption of the
share tenants.The historical background for the enactment of the Code‘s provisions on pre-
emption and redemption further strengthens the Court‘s opinion. In this case the SC applied
the statutory construction concept ―Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or
spirit must prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the
statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions
and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute‖.
 Greater Balanga Developmant Corp. vs Municipality of Balanga

GR No. 83987

December 24, 1997

Facts:

This case involves a parcel of land, situated in Barrio San Jose, Municipality of Balanga,
Province of Bataan. Petitioner is a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the
Camacho family, which donated the present site of Balanga Public Market to the
Municipality. The lot in dispute is behind the said market.

Petitioner discovered portions of the property had been ―unlawfully usurped and invaded‖ by
the Municipality, which ―allowed/tolerated/abetted‖ construction of shanties and market stalls,
while charging market fees and entrance fees from occupant and users of the area.

Petitioner applied for a permit to operate a business, which was revoked soon by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga. Petitioner then filed a case, praying for the reinstatement of
the permit, or a prohibitory injunction on the revoking of the said permit.

Respondents argued that the Mayor may issue, deny or revoke municipal licenses and
permits. The revoking of the permit was a legitimate xcercise of local legislative authority,
therefore making it not tainted with any grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner argued that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there was no reason to
revoke the Mayor‘s permit. Petitioner alleged that the respondent violated due process in
revoking the permit, and challenged the legality of the collection of market and entrance
fees.

The revoking of the permit was based on a Civil Case, pertaining to the subdivision of the
property into nine lots. The property was originally owned by Camacho, donated the land to
her daughter Aurora, which donation was canceled and was transferred to the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is the owner of the property

Held: The case involving ownership of the property had already been settled with finality by
the Supreme Court. When the Mayor‘s permit was revoked, five years had elapsed since the
case was decided. Petition was able to survey the land and have the survey approved.
Petitioner even obtained a title in its name for the property. Clearly, for all intents and
purposes, petitioner appeared to be the true owned of the property when respondents
revoked its permit to engage business in its own land.

Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of
its right over the land. Of course, the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its
police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the
conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked.

But the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders cannot be a
valid ground for revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the stallholders and traders were
doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal government. Indeed, the claim
that the executive order and resolution were measures "designed to promote peace and
order and protect the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is too amorphous and
convenient an excuse to justify respondents' acts.

Since respondent Municipality is not the owner of the disputed property, there is no legal
basis for it to impose and collect market fees and market entrance fees. Only the owner as
the right to do so.
 CIR vs PAL
GR No. 160528
October 9, 2006

Facts:

The case involving ownership of the property had already been settled with finality by the
Supreme Court. When the Mayor‘s permit was revoked, five years had elapsed since the
case was decided. Petition was able to survey the land and have the survey approved.
Petitioner even obtained a title in its name for the property. Clearly, for all intents and
purposes, petitioner appeared to be the true owned of the property when respondents
revoked its permit to engage business in its own land.

Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of
its right over the land. Of course, the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its
police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the
conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked.

But the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders cannot be a
valid ground for revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the stallholders and traders were
doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal government. Indeed, the claim
that the executive order and resolution were measures "designed to promote peace and
order and protect the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is too amorphous and
convenient an excuse to justify respondents' acts.

Since respondent Municipality is not the owner of the disputed property, there is no legal
basis for it to impose and collect market fees and market entrance fees. Only the owner
as the right to do so . Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) for the period starting March 1995 through February 1997.
One month after, Atty. Curbita again filed with the CIR another written request for refund
of the amount of P1,048,047.23, representing the total amount of 20% final withholding
tax withheld by various depository banks of the CIR which amount includes the 20%
withholding tax withheld by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Equitable Banking
Corporation (EBC), and the Jade Progressive Savings & Mortgage Bank (JPSMB) for the
period starting March 1995 through November 1997.
CIR failed to act on PAL‘s request for refund, thus a petition was filed before the CTA.
The CTA ruled that PAL was not entitled to the refund. Section 13 1 of PD No. 1590,
PAL‘s franchise, allegedly gave CIR the option to pay either its corporate income tax
under the provisions of the NIRC or a franchise tax of two percent of its gross revenues.
Payment of either tax would be in lieu of all ―other taxes.‖ Since it chose to pay its
corporate income tax, payment of the final withholding tax is deemed part of this liability
and therefore not refundable.
 CA reversed the decision of the CTA. The CA held that PAL was bound to pay only the
corporate income tax or the franchise tax. Section 13 of PD No. 1590 exempts
respondent from paying all other taxes, duties, royalties and other fees of any kind.
Respondent chose to pay its basic corporate income tax, which resulted in a zero tax
liability. This zero tax liability should neither be taken against respondent nor deprive it of
the exemption granted by the law. Having chosen to pay its corporate income tax liability,
respondent should now be exempt from paying all other taxes including the final
withholding tax.
Issue/s: WON the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law ruling that the ‗in lieu of all
other taxes‘ provision in Section 13 of PD No. 1590 applies even if there were in fact no
taxes paid under any of subsections (A) and (B) of the said decree. (NO)

Held:
NO – CA was not wrong in ruling that the ‗in lieu of all other taxes‘ provision in Section 13 of
PD No. 1590 applies even if there were in fact no taxes paid under any of subsections (A)
and (B) of the said decree. Thus, PAL is entitled to refund.

The resolution of the instant case hinges on the interpretation of Section 13 of PAL‘s
franchise, which states in part:
―SEC. 13. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee
shall pay to the Philippine Government during the life of this franchise whichever of
subsections (a) and (b) hereunder will result in a lower tax:

‗(a) The basic corporate income tax based on the grantee‘s annual net
taxable income computed in accordance with the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code; or

‗(b) A franchise tax of two percent (2%) of the-gross revenues derived by the
grantee from all sources, without distinction as to transport or non- transport
operations; provided, that with respect to international air- transport service,
only the gross passenger, mail, and freight revenues from its outgoing flights
shall be subject to this tax.‘

―The tax paid by the grantee under either of the above alternatives shall be in lieu of
all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license, and other fees and charges of
any kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied, established, assessed, or collected
by any municipal, city, provincial, or national authority or government agency, now or
in the future, xxx.‖

Two points are evident from this provision:

First, as consideration for the franchise, PAL is liable to pay either a) its basic
corporate income tax based on its net taxable income, as computed under the
National Internal Revenue Code; or b) a franchise tax of two percent based on its
gross revenues, whichever is lower.
Second, the tax paid is ―in lieu of all other taxes‖ imposed by all government entities
in the country.
 Del Mar v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 138298 / November 29, 2000

Facts:

PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is
authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country in relation to
Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869. The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of
PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is
a form of sport or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a
legislative franchise for the purpose. On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a Petition for
Prohibition to prevent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque
pelota games on the ground that the act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either
from the Constitution or PAGCOR‘s own Charter. On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR
entered into an agreement with BELLE and FILGAME wherein the latter parties would
provide all the required facilities and requirements for the establishment and operation of jai-
alai. On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
questioning the validity of the agreement stating that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction,
authority, legislative franchise, or authority to enter into such agreement for the operation
and establishment of jai-alai games. A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico S. Sandoval II
and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction. A Petition in Intervention was filed by
Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is
not included in PAGCOR‘s scope. Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor, and intervenor
Zubiri are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as the members of the House of
Representatives. Respondent questions the locus standi or the standing of the petitioners to
file the petition at bar as taxpayers and as legislators because the operation of jai-alai does
not involve the disbursement of public funds.

Issue:

WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal standing to file the petition

Held:

YES. As stated by the Court, Respondent‘s stance is without an ―oven ready‖ legal support.
A party suing as taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue
where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. The
record shown under their agreement is barren of evidence that the operation and
management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of public money. The Court
also holds that as members of the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing
to file the petition at bar. The operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of
the legislature‘s exclusive power to grant franchise. Hence, powers of Congress are being
impared, so as the powers of each of its members. Petitioners have legal standing to file the
petition

The states issue is only a ―procedural issue‖ questioning when can taxpayers file a suit.

The substantive issue concerns whether PAGCOR‘s legislative franchise includes the right
to manage and operate jai-alai. It was ruled that PAGCOR DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT to
operate jai-alai because:

 It was not stated under its scope.

 In accordance with its historical creation, there is a separate Executive Order which
controls the operating of Jai-Alai (controlled by the Romualdezes) in Manila.
PACGOR‘s franchise was never given a franchise to operate jai-alai.
 Tax treatment between jai-alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct from
each other.
 PAGCOR is engaged in the business affected with public interest.
 COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC.

G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975

FACTS:

Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining
plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During
the five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free
of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories,"
respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax (which it paid under protest).

Court procedures:

The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject to
the payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by
R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest.

On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the
Commissioner of Customs who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector
of Customs. 3

On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for review
of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. The Court of Tax Appeals, on September
30, 1967, reversed the decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs and ordered
refund of the amount of P775.62 to respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under
protest.

Statutes subject of construction:

a. R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) – title, Art. 103, Art. 102, Art. 104;

b. R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW), as amended by R.A. No. 2352 - title

ISSUE: WON the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO from custom
duties granted by R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) should embrace or include
the special import tax imposed by R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW).

HELD:

Yes. Petition denied. The title of R.A. No. 1394 (Special Tax Law) indicates unmistakably
that it is repealing six prior statutes (all these laws dealt with the imposition of a special
excise tax on foreign exchange or other form of levy on importation of goods into the
country). On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act), has not
been repealed (although this law had granted more concessions and tax exemption
privileges than any of the statutes that were amended, repealed or revoked by R.A. No.
1394. The CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES saw fit to preserve the privileges granted
under the Petroleum Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open to exploitation and
development of the petroleum resources of the country. The SC is convinced that R.A. No.
387 or the Petroleum Act of 1949 was intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration
and development of the petroleum resources of the country by
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al.,

G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989

FACTS: On June 30, 1972 in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Feliciano Muñoz,
Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men, went
out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by
cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of
them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. Mauro Bulatao was shot in the
mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. Alejandro Bulatao was
forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified
wife and son. Aquilino Bulatao, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until
he bled before he too had his brains blown out. The four identified accused were convicted
for the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was
modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that excessive
fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. It further
provides that neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: WON Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death penalty.

HELD: A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing
therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely
says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough.
And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain,
it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation. Thus, Article III, Section 19(l) does not
change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it
to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
 People vs Degamo

GR No. 121211

April 30, 2003

Facts:
Complainant Ellen Vertudazo and her children were living in a rented apartment at
Barangay Punta, Ormoc City. She was not personally acquainted with the appellant and only
came to know him through her brother in law who stayed with her for a period of time. At one
o‘clock in the morning on October 1, 1994, complainant heard someone calling her name.
Thinking that her brother in law had returned, she unwittingly opened the door. Appellant
then forced his way inside the house and poked a knife at complainant‘s neck. He then laid
her on the concrete floor and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. Appellant was
holding the knife while having sexual intercourse with complainant. He warned her not to tell
anyone about the incident andafter that he left. Overwhelmed with fear, complainant went
upstairs and just cried. In the morning of the same day, complainant reported the incident to
the Barangay Captain and to the police. On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before
the trial court charging appellant with the crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty.On January 17, 1995, before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed
the complaint to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape,
the victim has become insane . The trial court then found complainant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and imposed a punishment of death penalty upon him.

Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of insanity of the victim by reason or
on occasion of the rape committed against complainant should likewise be considered in the
imposition of the proper penalty

Held:

Yes. Although the trial court observes that there is no jurisprudence yet which construed the
provision ―has become insane,‖ it is a hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that it is the
duty of the court in construing a law to determine legislative intention from its language. The
history of events that transpired during the process of enacting a law, from its introduction in
the legislature to its final validation has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts
turn to construe an ambiguous act.Republic Act No. 2632 is the first law that introduced the
qualifying circumstance of insanity by reason or on occasion of rape, amending Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code. An examination of the deliberation of the lawmakers in enacting
R.A. No. 2632, convinces us that the degree of insanity, whether permanent or temporary, is
not relevant in considering the same as a qualifying circumstance for as long as the victim
has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape.
Facts:
Complainant Ellen Vertudazo and her children were living in a rented apartment at
Barangay Punta, Ormoc City. She was not personally acquainted with the appellant and only
came to know him through her brother in law who stayed with her for a period of time. At one
o‘clock in the morning on October 1, 1994, complainant heard someone calling her name.
Thinking that her brother in law had returned, she unwittingly opened the door. Appellant
then forced his way inside the house and poked a knife at complainant‘s neck. He then laid
her on the concrete floor and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. Appellant was
holding the knife while having sexual intercourse with complainant. He warned her not to tell
anyone about the incident andafter that he left. Overwhelmed with fear, complainant went
upstairs and just cried. In the morning of the same day, complainant reported the incident to
the Barangay Captain and to the police. On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before
the trial court charging appellant with the crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty.On January 17, 1995, before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed
the complaint to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape,
the victim has become insane . The trial court then found complainant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and imposed a punishment of death penalty upon him.

Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of insanity of the victim by reason or
on occasion of the rape committed against complainant should likewise be considered in the
imposition of the proper penalty
Held:
Yes. Although the trial court observes that there is no jurisprudence yet which construed the
provision ―has become insane,‖ it is a hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that it is the
duty of the court in construing a law to determine legislative intention from its language. The
history of events that transpired during the process of enacting a law, from its introduction in
the legislature to its final validation has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts
turn to construe an ambiguous act.Republic Act No. 2632 is the first law that introduced the
qualifying circumstance of insanity by reason or on occasion of rape, amending Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code. An examination of the deliberation of the lawmakers in enacting
R.A. No. 2632, convinces us that the degree of insanity, whether permanent or temporary, is
not relevant in considering the same as a qualifying circumstance for as long as the victim
has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape.
 REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

FACTS:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as
such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with
Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the
commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.

Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term ―foreshore land‖ than that in
the definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed
by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the term ―foreshore land‖ includes the submerged area.

II. Whether or not ―foreshore land‖ and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

HELD:
 The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term ―foreshore land‖ includes the submerged areas. To repeat,
the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide.

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore
between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper
limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third
New International Dictionary)

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress
were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not
so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term ―foreshore
lands.‖

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
 Vera vs Avelino

GR No. L543

August 31, 1946

Facts:

The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a
report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain
specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva
Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of
the local electorate.

During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the
report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been
included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members
of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.

Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the
resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise
their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

Issues:

Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not
votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno
and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged
against their elections.

Held:

The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding
that the case was not a ―contest‖, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to
determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the
Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical
review of the courts

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President
allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials
of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government
corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the
provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and
their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further
states that ―Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B
stated ―unless otherwise allowed by law‖ which is construed to be an exemption from that
stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is
constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of
the constitution.

RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both
Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in
the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials
and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to
the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Thus the phrase ―unless otherwise provided by the Constitution‖ in Section 13, Article
VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary
to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and
strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member
and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court
thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
 G.R. No. 158540. August 3, 2005]

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CEMENT

MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the laws
enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.[3] The SMA provides
the structure and mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to
protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict
serious injury on them.

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation.
Its principal stockholders are Taiheiyo Cement Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation,
purportedly the largest cement manufacturers in Japan.[5]

Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation[6] (Philcemcor) is an

association of domestic cement manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members,[7] per
Record. While Philcemcor heralds itself to be an association of domestic cement
manufacturers, it appears that considerable equity holdings, if not controlling interests in at
least twelve (12) of its member-corporations, were acquired by the three largest cement
manufacturers in the world, namely Financiere Lafarge S.A. of France, Cemex S.A. de C.V.
of Mexico, and Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland (formerly Holderbank Financiere Glaris, Ltd., then
Holderfin B.V.).

the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time,
ultimately denying Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that the
he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.

Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[11] seeking to set aside the DTI
Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division,
in a Decision[13] penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion,[14]
partially granted Philcemcors petition.

On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of
Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for
review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff
Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of
general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding
force was cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003,
wherein he ruled that that in light of the appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any
legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures.

The Court of Appeals had held that based on the foregoing premises, petitioner‘s prayer to
set aside the findings of the Tariff Commission in its assailed Report dated March 13, 2002
is DENIED. On the other hand, the assailed April 5, 2002 Decision of the Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry is hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the case is
REMANDED to the public respondent Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry for a
final decision in accordance with RA 8800 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Hence, the appeal.

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in
light of the appellate courts Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his
deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures.[41] He made a
determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement
industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.[42] Accordingly, he
imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the
form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on
imported gray Portland Cement. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard measures is valid.

Held:

NO, due to the nature of this case, the Court found that the DTI should follow the regulations
prescribed by SMA. The Court held that he assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25
June 2003 is also DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. No Costs.

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in
light of the appellate courts Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his
deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures. [41] He made a
determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement
industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges. [42] Accordingly, he
imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the
form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on
imported gray Portland Cement.
 People vs. Degamo

Facts:
Complainant Ellen Vertudazo and her children were living in a rented apartment at
Barangay Punta, Ormoc City. She was not personally acquainted with the appellant and only
came to know him through her brother in law who stayed with her for a period of time. At one
o‘clock in the morning on October 1, 1994, complainant heard someone calling her name.
Thinking that her brother in law had returned, she unwittingly opened the door. Appellant
then forced his way inside the house and poked a knife at complainant‘s neck. He then laid
her on the concrete floor and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. Appellant was
holding the knife while having sexual intercourse with complainant. He warned her not to tell
anyone about the incident andafter that he left. Overwhelmed with fear, complainant went
upstairs and just cried. In the morning of the same day, complainant reported the incident to
the Barangay Captain and to the police. On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before
the trial court charging appellant with the crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty.On January 17, 1995, before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed
the complaint to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape,
the victim has become insane . The trial court then found complainant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and imposed a punishment of death penalty upon him.

Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of insanity of the victim by reason or
on occasion of the rape committed against complainant should likewise be considered in the
imposition of the proper penalty

Held:

Yes. Although the trial court observes that there is no jurisprudence yet which construed
the provision ―has become insane,‖ it is a hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that it is
the duty of the court in construing a law to determine legislative intention from its
language. The history of events that transpired during the process of enacting a law, from its
introduction in the legislature to its final validation has generally been the first extrinsic aid to
which courts turn to construe an ambiguous act.Republic Act No. 2632 is the first law that
introduced the qualifying circumstance of insanity by reason or on occasion of rape,
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. An examination of the deliberation of the
lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 2632, convinces us that the degree of insanity, whether
permanent or temporary, is not relevant in considering the same as a qualifying
circumstance for as long as the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the
rape.
 CIR vs SM Prime Holdings Inc.

FACTS:

In a number of CTA cases, the BIR sent SM Prime and First Asia a Preliminary Assessment
Notice (PAN) for VAT deficiency on cinema ticket sales for taxable year 2000 (SM), 1999
(First Asia), 2000 (First Asia), 2002 (First Asia), and 2003 (First Asia).SM and First Asia filed
for protest but the BIR just denied them and sent them a Letter of Demand subsequently.All
the PANs were subjected to a Petition for Review filed by SM and First Asia to the CTA.The
CTA First Division ruled that there should only be one business tax applicable to theater and
movie houses, the 30% amusement tax. Hence, the CIR is wrong in collecting VAT from the
ticket sales.CIR appealed the case to the CTA En Banc.The CTA En Banc affirmed the
ruling of the CTA First Division.

ISSUE: Whether the cinema ticket sales are subject to VAT and thus included in the
meaning of ―Sale or Exchange of Services‖?

RULING:

No, when VAT was enacted it replaced the tax on original and subsequent sales tax and
percentage tax on certain services. When the VAT law was implemented, it exempted
persons subject to amusement tax under the NIRC from the coverage of VAT. When the
Local Tax Code was repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government
continued to impose amusement tax on admission tax on ticket sales. The following
amendments to the VAT law have been consistent that those subject to amusement tax is no
liable under VAT. Only lessors or distributors of cinematographic films are included in the
coverage of VAT.

It can be seen from the foregoing that the legislative intent was not to impose VAT on
persons already covered by the amusement tax. To hold otherwise would impose an
unreasonable burden on cinema/theater houses operators and proprietors, who would be
paying an additional 10% VAT on top of the 30% amusement tax.

Sec. 108 of the NIRC provides that, there shall be levied, assessed and collected, a VAT
equivalent to 10% of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services, including
the use or lease of properties. The phrase ―sale or exchange of services‖ means the
performance of all kinds of services in the Philippines for others for a fee, remuneration or
consideration, including those…….lessors or distributors of cinematographic films……..and
similar services regardless of whether or not the performance thereof calls for the exercise
or use of the physical or mental faculties. The phrase ―sale or exchange of services‖ shall
likewise include: (7) lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and discs.

A reading of the foregoing provision clearly shows that the enumeration of the ―sale or
exchange of services‖ subject to VAT is not exhaustive. The words, ―including,‖ ―similar
services,‖ and ―shall likewise include,‖ indicate that the enumeration is by way of example
only.
 Laurel vs. Judge Abrogar

G.R. No. 155076

January 13, 2009

Facts: Laurel was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the
unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or
domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.

PLDT alleges that the ―international phone calls‖ which are ―electric currents or sets of
electric impulses transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the human
voice to a receiver,‖ are ersonal properties which may be the subject of theft. Art. 416(3)
deems ―forces of nature‖ (which includes electricity‖ which are brought under the control by
science, are personal property.

Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a communication

carried out using the telephone. It is not synonymous to electric currents or impulses. Hence,
it may not be considered as personal property susceptible of appropriation. Laurel claims
that the analogy between generated electricity and telephone calls is misplaced. PLDT does
not produce or generate telephone calls. It only rovides the facilities or services for the
transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists that ―business‖ is not personal
property. It is not the ―business‖ that is protected but the ―right to carry a business.‖ This right
is what is considered as property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as
―property,‖ the same may not be the subject of theft.

Issue: Is Laurel guilty of theft of personal property?

Held: YES. The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment
or apparatus to PLDT‘s telephone system, through which Laurel is able to resell or re-route
international long distance calls using PLDT‘s facilities constitutes acts of subtraction.

The business of roviding telecommunication is likewise ersonal property which cann be the
object of theft.

Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code
in force at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared
to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the
enumeration of real roperties. Art. 414 provides that all things which are or may be the object
of appropriation are considered either real property or personal property. Business is
likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in
business, however, it may be appropriated. Business should also be classified as ersonal
property. Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Art.
415. It is therefore personal roperty.

In making the international phone calls, the human voice is converted into electrical impulses
or electric current which are transmitted to the arty called. A telephone call, therefore, is
electrical energy. Intagnible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation
because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under art. 416(3)
which enumerates ―forces of natur which are brought under control by science.‖

It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes
the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Therfore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service is personal
property.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

 Navaro vs Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 180050

Facts:

Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to
nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the
Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the
Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576
inhabitants with average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and
with a land area of 802.12 square kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance.

Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a province may be
created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991
constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than
250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000
square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities,
which do not contribute to the income of the province. Thereafter, the bill creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a plebiscite was held subsequently
yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the people
from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands,
Dinagat Islands was created  into a separate and distinct province. Respondents argued
that exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local
Government Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules
and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects
and purposes of the law.

Issue: Whether or not Navarro et al has a locus standi being the movant-intervenors in the
case at bar?

Holdings:

It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent
Motion is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene is denied with finality. Indeed, they
have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case its
concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique
circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court
simply because their interest in this case became manifest only after the case had already
been decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their
disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute.
Such decision would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for
protection. This controversy should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than
dismissed on account of mootness.
 Ombudsman vs CA
GR No. 160675
June 16, 2006

FACTS:

Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with Omb against
several DENR a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of
the Revised Penal Code against. It was also treated as an administrative complaint for
abuse of authority and misconduct.

DENR entered without permission and despite a big "NO TRESPASSING" sign. DENR:
There was an RTC order involving a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title for
them to conduct a relocation survey of the questioned lots and the Sudlon National Park.
They entered the property with some police and tanods and did their job.

OMB: dismiss criminal complaint but found them guilty of simple misconduct and imposed on
them the penalty of suspension for one month for the admin case (except for Arregadas who
was a DENR ee but not part of the team and wasn‘t even there.)

CA: affirmed Ombudman, finding that they were guilty of simple misconduct but Omb
committed GAD in ordering their suspension. Ombudman does not have power to suspend
accdg to Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman‘s power is limited only to the
recommendation of the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. Besides, assuming
arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his
position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph 3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found
to be at fault, to the public official concerned.

ISSUE:

Won the CA erred mistake in their decision

HELD:

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals: the Court categorically pronounced that the statement in
Tapiador on the Ombudsman‘s power "is, at best, merely an obiter dictum" and, as such,
"cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme Court."

Also in Ledesma SC cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of
the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer
concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public
official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the Court,
the said provision, construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770,
is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. SC made
reference to the Senate delibs of RA 6770. Sen. Angara explained that the grant of
disciplinary power is something that the Constitution does not forbid. The disciplinary power
is necessary to achieving that objective of making an effective Ombudsman. The legislative
history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the
Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution
of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of
the Ombudsman to be "an activist watchman," not merely a passive one.Clearly, the
Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is
merely to receive and process the people‘s complaints against corrupt and abusive
government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed
with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in
the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may
be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad
powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

[G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]

 METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE O.
GARIN, respondent.

Facts:

One day, Respondent, Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR)
and his driver‘s license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo,
Manila, on 05 August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR‘s validity (which is 48 hours from date of
apprehension), the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his driver‘s license, and expressing his preference for his case to be
filed in court

Since there was no reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, on 12 September
1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that
the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore
unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that
the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection
and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and
executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty
imposed. The MMDA also refuted Garin‘s allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the
governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the
implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the court‘s attention to
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995 which authorizes
confiscation of driver‘s licenses upon issuance of a TVR. Respondent Garin, however,
questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it
was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.

On 23 October 1995, the RTC granted the preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered
the MMDA to return the respondent‘s driver‘s license. On 14 August 1997, the RTC rendered
the decision in favor of the respondent.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando,
implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the
use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are
issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no
longer confiscate drivers‘ licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All
motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of
the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates

Although this case was considered as moot and academic by the implementation of
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, the Supreme Court believed that it was but
proper to address the current issue for the proper implementation of the petitioner‘s future
programs.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924, which created the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), authorizes the MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke
driver‘s licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations

Ruling:

By virtue of the doctrine promulgated in the case of Metro Manila Development Authority v.
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police
power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.

Police power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised
by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs).
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body.

Thus, as held in the aforementioned case, . . .

―[T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants
the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and
these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:..‖

Although petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend
or revoke drivers‘ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, it still needs a valid
law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source. This is consistent with the
ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people‘s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce,
but not enact, ordinances.

Hence, the power of MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers‘ licenses without
need of any other legislative enactment, is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
 Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Philippines

GR No. L-8888

November 29, 1957

Facts:

The question in this appeal is whether cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for
the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601
as amended.

During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported
sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totaling
P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the
Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included the
Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the term
"chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.

Issue:

Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of
exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

Held:

No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in mind
the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation, we are of the opinion
and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include
"cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter
is ready for human consumption; the former is not.

On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by
substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate." However, since statutes operate prospectively,
the amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar. The appellant's cocoa beans had
been imported during January - October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree which is
after September 3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62.
 AFP General Insurance vs Molina

GR No. 151133

June 30, 2008

Facts:

The private respondents are the complainants in a case for illegal dismissal against Radon
Security & Allied Services Agency and/or Raquel Aquias and Ever Emporium, Inc. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that the private respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered Radon
Security to pay them separation pay, backwages, and other monetary claims. Radon
Security appealed the Labor Arbiter‘s decision to public respondent NLRC and posted a
supersedeas bond, issued by herein petitioner AFPGIC as surety. The NLRC Sheriff issued
a Notice of Garnishment against the supersedeas bond. AFPGIC entered the fray by filing
before the Labor Arbiter an Omnibus Motion to Quash Notice/Writ of Garnishment and to
Discharge AFPGIC‘s Appeal Bond on the ground that said bond ―has been cancelled and
thus non-existent in view of the failure of Radon Security to pay the yearly premiums‖
AFPGIC contends that under Section 64 of the Insurance Code, which is deemed written
into every insurance contract or contract of surety, an insurer may cancel a policy upon non-
payment of the premium. Said cancellation is binding upon the beneficiary as the right of a
beneficiary is subordinate to that of the insured. Further, AFPGIC argued that the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error in not holding that under Section 7723 of the Insurance
Code, the surety bond between it and Radon Security was not valid and binding for non-
payment of premiums, even as against a third person who was intended to benefit
therefrom. Recall that the heart of the dispute is not an ordinary contract of property or life
insurance, but an appeal bond required by both substantive and adjective law in appeals in
labor disputes: ART. 223. Appeal.—. . . x x x x In case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. In any event,
the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as
the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein. The perfection of an appeal by an employer
―only‖ upon the posting of a cash or surety bond clearly and categorically shows the intent of
the lawmakers to make the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the
exclusive means by which an employer‘s appeal may be perfected

Issue:

Whether or not the said bonds should still be issued to the workers?

Held:
Yes, AFPGIC‘s reliance on Sections 64 and 77 of the Insurance Code is misplaced. The said
provisions refer to insurance contracts in general. The instant case pertains to a surety bond;
thus, the applicable provision of the Insurance Code is Section 177,31 which specifically
governs suretyship. It provides that a surety bond, once accepted by the obligee becomes
valid and enforceable, irrespective of whether or not the premium has been paid by the
obligor. The private respondents, the obligees here, accepted the bond posted by Radon
Security and issued by the petitioner. Hence, the bond is both valid and enforceable. A
verbis legis non est recedendum

Further, The petitioner‘s reliance on Sections 64 and 77 of the Insurance Code is misplaced.
The said provisions refer to insurance contracts in general. The instant case pertains to a
surety bond; thus, the applicable provision of the Insurance Code is Section 177.
 In the matter of the application of FRANK STANLEY ALLEN for a writ of habeas
corpus.

G.R. No. 1455. October 29, 1903.

Facts:

Frank Stanley Allen, who is an alien, claims that he is unlawfully detained and
restrained of his liberty in Manila, P. I., by W. Morgan Shuster, as Collector of Customs for
the Philippine Archipelago, who threatens to deport the petitioner from the Islands for the
reason that said Collector claims that the petitioner is a prohibited alien contract laborer
whose importation is forbidden by the act of Congress approved March 3, 1903, entitled "An
act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States."

The petitioner insists that the said Collector of Customs is without jurisdiction to act in
the premises, as he has not been authorized to execute the provisions of the law by the
Secretary of the Treasury.

Issue:

Whether or not the Act of March 3, 1903 is valid?

Ruling:

Yes. There is nothing in the act of March 3, 1903, which indicates that the provisions
it contains with respect to the exclusion of contract laborers were not to be enforced in the
Philippine Islands by the Treasury Department, through the Commissioner-General of
Immigration. If there is any inconsistency between the act of July 1, 1902, providing for the
administration of the Philippines through the War Department and the act of March 3, 1903,
the latter law must prevail. The Collector of Customs, in the absence of officials appointed
for that purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury, has authority to enforce those provisions
of the act of Congress of March 3, 1903, which restrict the immigration of aliens and contract
laborers into the Philippine Islands.

When Congress passed the immigration law, on March 3, 1903, all the existing laws
were enforced here, not under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Commissioner-General of Immigration, but by the collectors of customs, their
inspectors and immigration officers, with the right of appeal to the Insular Collector.
 G.R. No. 113079 April 20, 2001

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PETROLEUM

DISTRIBUTORS AND SERVICES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 114923 April 20, 2001

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and

PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTORS AND SERVICES CORPORATION

FACTS:

The propriety of building a state-of-the-art gasoline service station along Benigno Aquino, Jr.
Avenue in Parañaque, Metro Manila is the bone of contention in these consolidated petitions
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the construction of
such a modern edifice is a necessity dictated by the "emerging economic landscapes."
Respondents say otherwise.Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is
engaged in the business of importing crude oil, refining the same and selling various
petroleum products through a network of service stations throughout the country.Private
respondent Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates a
Caltex service station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City. On June
30,1983, Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for
authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda
Marcos Avenue of the same municipality. The application, which was docketed as BEU
Case No. 83-09-1319, was initially rejected by the BEU because Shell's old site had been
closed for five (5) years such that the relocation of the same to a new site would amount to a
new construction of a gasoline outlet, which construction was then the subject of a
moratorium. Subsequently, however, BEU relaxed its position and gave due course to the
application. PDSC filed an opposition to the application on the grounds that: 1.] there are
adequate service stations attending to the motorists' requirements in the trading area
covered by the application; 2.] ruinous competition will result from the establishment of the
proposed new service station; and 3.] there is a decline not an increase in the volume of
sales in the area. Two other companies, namely Petrophil and Caltex, also opposed the
application on the ground that Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements. On
June 3, 1986, the BEU rendered a decision denying Shell's application. Meanwhile, on May
8, 1987, Executive Order No. 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU. On May 9, 1988,
the OEA rendered a decision denying the appeal of Shell and affirming the BEU decision.
Shell moved for reconsideration and prayed for a new hearing or the remand of the case for
further proceedings. In a supplement to said motion, Shell submitted a new feasibility study
to justify its application. The OEA issued an order on July 11, 1988, remanding the case to
the ERB for further evaluation and consideration, noting therein that the "updated survey
conducted by Shell" cited new developments such as the accessibility of Imelda Marcos
Avenue, now Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue, to Parañaque residents along Sucat Road and
the population growth in the trading area. After the records of BEU Case No. 83-09-1319
was remanded to the ERB, Shell filed on March 3, 1989 an amended application, intended
for the same purpose as its original application. This amended application was likewise
opposed by PDSC. On September 17, 1991, the ERB rendered a Decision allowing Shell to
establish the service station in Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue. PDSC filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing Decision. The motion was, however, denied. PDSC
elevated its cause on to the Court of Appeals.
CA reversed the ERB judgment. A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 6 April 1994. 2 Dissatisfied, both Shell and ERB elevated the
matter to this Court by way of these petitions, which were ordered consolidated by the Court
in a Resolution dated July 25,1994.

ISSUE(S)

1. Whether CA gravely erred in making findings of facts contrary to those of the ERB
whose findings were based on substantial evidence? – YES.
2. Whether the CA gravely erred in passing judgment and making pronouncements on
purely economic and policy issues on petroleum business, which are within the realm
of the ERB which has a recognized expertise in oil economics? – YES.
3. Whether assuming CA has the power to consider new evidence presented for the
first time before the said court, it should have referred such matter to the ERB under
the doctrine of prior resort or primary jurisdiction? – YES
HELD:

The policy of the government in this regard has been to allow a free interplay of market
forces with minimal government supervision. The purpose of governing legislation is to
liberalize the downstream oil industry in order to ensure a truly competitive market under a
regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply, environmentally clean and high-
quality petroleum products. Indeed, exclusivity of any franchise has not been favored by the
Court, which is keen on promoting free competition and the development of a free market
consistent with the legislative policy of deregulation as an answer to the problems of the oil
industry. The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the ERB, which is
tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
Thus, an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial department if
there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.However, there is no cogent reason to
depart from the general rule because the findings of the ERB conform to, rather than conflict
with, the governing statutes and controlling case law on the matter.Prior to Republic Act No.
8479, the downstream oil industry was regulated by the ERB and from 1993 onwards, the
Energy Industry Regulation Board. These regulatory bodies were empowered, among
others, to entertain and act on applications for the establishment of gasoline stations in the
Philippines. The ERB, which used to be the Board of Energy (BOE), is tasked with the
following powers and functions by Executive Order No. 172, which took effect immediately
after its issuance on May 8, 1987. A distinct worldwide trend towards economic deregulation
has been evident in the past decade. Both developed and developing countries have
seriously considered and extensively adopted various measures for this purpose. The
country has been no exception. Indeed, the buzzwords of the third millenium are
"deregulation", "globalization" and "liberalization." It need not be overemphasized that this
trend is reflected in our policy considerations, statutes and jurisprudence. Tested against the
foregoing legal yardsticks, it becomes readily apparent that the reasons relied upon by the
appellate court in rejecting petitioner's application to set up a gasoline service station
becomes tenuous. This is especially clear in the face of such recent developments in the oil
industry, in relation to controlling case law on the matter recently promulgated to address the
legal issues spawned by these events. In other words, recent developments in the oil
industry as well as legislative enactments and jurisprudential pronouncements have
overtaken and rendered stale the view espoused by the appellate court in denying Shell's
application to put up the gasoline station. On the contrary, the record discloses that the ERB
Decision approving Shell's application in ERB Case No. 89-57 was based on hard economic
data on developmental projects, residential subdivision listings, population count, public
conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic count, fuel demand, growth of private cars,
public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles, etc., rather than empirical evidence to
support its conclusions.

G.R. Nos. 154470-71, September 24, 2012

Bank of commerce vs Planters Development Bank

Facts:

RCBC owned two sets of Central Bank Bills (CB Bills): (1) 7 CB Bills worth 70Million; and (2)
2 CB Bills worth 20Million. The first set was sold to BOC which the latter in turn sold to PDB.
PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P 70 million, with maturity date of June
29, 1994. The second set of CB Bills was sold by RCBC to PDB and subsequently acquired
by BOC. All in all, the BOC acquired the first and Second sets of CB bills.

On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, PDB requested the
BSP to record its claim in the BSP‘s books, explaining that its non- possession of the CB
bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer."

BSP denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations Governing
Open Market Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and
Redemption of the Public Debt) which requires the presentation of the bond before a
registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP

In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB filed
with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB
has no cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. On the
other hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular
No. 28 because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond,"
of which the PDB is neither.

Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the
claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the
subject CB bills‘ face value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful
owner.

PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate their
respective claims on the subject CB bills. However, the total face value of the subject CB
bills should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order of
the RTC.

Accordingly, the BOC and the PDB entered into two separate Escrow Agreements.
Accordingly, the BSP released the maturity proceeds of the CB bills by crediting the Demand
Deposit Account of the PDB and of the BOC with 50% each of the maturity proceeds of the
amount in escrow.

RTC granted the BSP‘s motion to interplead. In October 2000, the BOC filed its Amended
Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its earlier arguments
asserting ownership over the subject CB bills. In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus
Motion, questioning the RTC‘s jurisdiction over the BOC‘s "additional counterclaims."

ISSUE: Whether or not a motion for interpleader may be made an alternative defense in an
answer.

HELD:

The answer is in the affirmative. The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is
primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and
secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions.136 Indeed, Rule 62 does
not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in- interpleader as part of, although separate
and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule
9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim, a form of
defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a
motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP‘s "counter-complaint/cross-
claim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.

What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through
an original complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if
it is considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to
have its claim recorded in the BSP‘s books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be
considered even as a potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus,
the interpleader was only an alternative position, made only in the BSP‘s Answer.

Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court
through the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter
complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a
motion, seeking relief which essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to
litigate with each other so that "payment is made to the rightful or legitimate owner" of the
subject CB bills.
 Nestle Philippines Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 86738, November 13, 1991

FACTS:

Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of petitioner Nestle Philippines Inc.
("Nestle") was increased from P300 million divided into 3 million shares with a par value of
P100.00 per share, to P600 million divided into 6 million shares with a par value of P100.00
per share. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures involving Board and stockholders
approvals and effected the necessary filings to secure the approval of the increase of
authorized capital stock by respondent Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which
approval was in fact granted.

Nestle has only two (2) principal stockholders: San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A

On 16 December 1983, the Board of Directors and stockholders of Nestle approved

resolutions authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares out of the previously authorized but
unissued capital stock of Nestle, exclusively to San Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A.
San Miguel Corporation subscribed to and completely paid up 168,800 shares, while Nestle
S.A. subscribed to and paid up the balance of 175,700 shares of stock.

On 28 March 1985, petitioner Nestle filed a letter signed by its Corporate Secretary, M.L.
Antonio, with the SEC seeking exemption of its proposed issuance of additional shares to its
existing principal shareholders, from the registration requirement of Section 4 of the Revised
Securities Act and from payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c) of the same Act.

The Commission then advised petitioner to file the appropriate request for exemption and to
pay the fee required under Section 6 (c) of the statute, which provides:

(c) A fee equivalent to one-tenth of one per centum of the maximum aggregate price or
issued value of the securities shall be collected by the Commission for granting a general or
particular exemption from the registration requirements of this Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that there is a need to file a petition for exemption under Section 6(b) of the
Revised Securities Act with respect to the issuance of the said 344,600 additional shares to
their existing stockholders out of their unissued capital stock?

RULING:

Yes.

The reading by the SEC of the scope of application of Section 6(a) (4) permits greater
opportunity for the SEC to implement the statutory objective of protecting the investing public
by requiring proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true financial
conditions and prospects of the corporation.

When capital stock is issued in the course of and in compliance with the requirements of
increasing its authorized capital stock under Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the SEC as
a matter of course examines the financial condition of the corporation, and hence there is no
real need for exercise of SEC authority under the Revised Securities Act.

In contrast, under the ruling issued by the SEC, an issuance of previously authorized but still
unissued capital stock may, in a particular instance, be held to be an exempt transaction by
the SEC under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the requirements of registration
under the Revised Securities Act are "not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of the investors" by reason, inter alia, of the small amount of stock that is
proposed to be issued or because the potential buyers are very limited in number and are in
a position to protect themselves

The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of
the government, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily
control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction
that no authorities need be cited to support it.
 Adasa vs Abalos

February 19, 2007

Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints and affidavits that petitioner
Bernadette Adasa was encashed two checks issued in the name of the respondent through
deceit without knowledge of respondent Abalos. Adasa failed to pay to the proceeds of the
checks despite demands of Abalos. Adasa filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she
received and encashed the checks and alleged further in a supplemental affidavit that Bebie
Correa instead received the 2 checks and that she left the country. The Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan City issued a resolution finding probable cause against Adasa
and ordered for filing of two separate informations for Estafa through falsification of
commercial document by a private individual. This petition only concerns one of the two
(Criminal Case #8782) criminal cases (8781 & 8782) that were docketed. Petitioner Adasa
filed a motion upon the trial court in order for the OCP to conduct a reinvestigation, in which
the OCP has reaffirmed its finding of probable cause. Adasa has entered a not guilty plea
during her arrangement on October 1, 2001 and later filed a petition for review before the
DOJ where it reversed and set aside the resolution of the OCP and ordering it to withdraw
the information for estafa.

Respondent Abalos filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the DOJ should have
dismissed the petition for review outright contending that Sec 7 of DOJ Circular no 70
mandates that ―If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution
the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned‖ the
aggrieved party cannot file a petition for review as the secretary of Justice shall deny it
outright.

The trial court has granted the petitioner‘s ―motion to withdraw information‖ and dismissed
the criminal case, on February 2003. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
on the DOJ resolution and it reversed the sad resolution. The appellate court emphasized
that DOJ Circular 70 Sec 7 used the phrase ―shall not.‖

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari contending that section 12 of the same DOJ
Circular used the word ―may‖ that would give discretion to the Secretary of Justice to
entertain an appeal, thus this petition.
Issue: WON the overall language and the intent of DOJ Circular no 70 is directory that it
would give discretion to the Secretary of Justice to entertain an appeal even if the accused
has been arraigned.

Held: No. the court held that CA is correct, the DOJ cannot give an appeal/petition for review
due course and must dismiss such actions if the accused has already been arraigned.
Therefore in Sec 12 if the ground for the dismissal is the arraignment of the accused, it must
go back and act upon through Section 7. If Sec 12 is given a directory application it would
render earlier mandatory provisions invalid/negligible and would undermine the main
objectives of the said circular which is ―for the expeditious and efficient administration of
justice.‖

MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA

G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784

Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard
the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the
DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into
the premises because of the refusal of the owner.On 3 April 1990, the team was able to
secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the
petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa. On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the
premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative
seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding
certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and
origin.The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as
opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not
be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No,The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber.

While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing
plant."Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. The Code uses the term
lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in
the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should
be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of
timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.

Domingo vs COA

GR no. 112371

October 7, 1998

Facts: An original petition for certiorari seeks to nullify a COA decision preventing
reimbursement for transportation expenses of DSWD Director Aida where transportation
vehicle is already provided.

Issue: WON a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government

official provided with a government vehicle for the days official did not actually use the
vehicle?

Held: No, according to Sec 14 of PD 733 an official furnished with motor corporation
allowance shall be allowed to use motor vehicle transportation operated and maintained
from funds appropriated.

Ratio: It is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language
there is no need in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary for any interpretation.
Words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary and common
usage meaning.
 SCHMID & OBERLY, INC. vs. RJL MARTINEZ FISHING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 75198 October 18, 1988

Cortes, J.

Facts:

RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation is engaged in deep-sea fishing. In the course of its
business, it needed electrical generators for the operation of its business. Schmid and
Oberly sells electrical generators with the brand of ―Nagata‖, a Japanese product. D. Nagata
Co. Ltd. of Japan was Schmid‘s supplier. Schmid advertised the 12 Nagata generators for
sale and RJL purchased 12 brand new generators. Through an irrevocable line of credit,
Nagata shipped to the Schmid the generators and RJL paid the amount of the purchase
price. (First sale = 3 generators; Second sale = 12 generators).

Later, the generators were found to be factory defective. RJL informed the Schmid that it
shall return the 12 generators. 3 were returned. Schmid replaced the 3 generators subject of
the first sale with generators of a different brand. As to the second sale, 3 were shipped to
Japan and the remaining 9 were not replaced.

RJL sued the defendant on the warranty, asking for rescission of the contract and that
Schmid be ordered to accept the generators and be ordered to pay back the purchase
money as well as be liable for damages. Schmid opposes such liability averring that it was
merely the indentor in the sale between Nagata Co., the exporter and RJL Martinez, the
importer. As mere indentor, it avers that is not liable for the seller‘s implied warranty against
hidden defects, Schmid not having personally assumed any such warranty.

Issue:

1) WON the second transaction between the parties was a sale or an indent transaction?

2) Even is Schmid is merely an indentor, may it still be liable for the warranty?

Held:
As to the first issue, the SC held it to be an indent transaction. An indentor is a middlemen in
the same class as commercial brokers and commission merchants. A broker is generally
defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative
to property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other
parties, never acting in his own name but in the name of those who employed him; he is
strictly a middleman and for some purpose the agent of both parties. There are 3 parties to
an indent transaction, (1) buyer, (2) indentor, and (3) supplier who is usually a non-resident
manufacturer residing in the country where the goods are to be bought. The chief feature of
a commercial broker and a commercial merchant is that in effecting a sale, they are merely
intermediaries or middle-men, and act in a certain sense as the agent of both parties to the
transaction.

RJL MARTINEZ admitted that the generators were purchased ―through indent order.‖ RJL
admitted in its demand letter previously sent to SCHMID that 12 of 15 generators ―were
purchased through your company, by indent order and three (3) by direct purchase.‖ The
evidence also show that RJL MARTINEZ paid directly NAGATA CO, for the generators, and
that the latter company itself invoiced the sale and shipped the generators directly to the
former. The only participation of Schmid was to act as an intermediary or middleman
between Nagata and RJL, by procuring an order from RJL and forwarding the same to
Nagata for which the company received a commission from Nagata.

Even as SCHMID was merely an indentor, there was nothing to prevent it from voluntarily
warranting that twelve (12) generators subject of the second transaction are free from any
hidden defects. In other words, SCHMID may be held answerable for some other contractual
obligation, if indeed it had so bound itself. As stated above, an indentor is to some extent an
agent of both the vendor and the vendee. As such agent, therefore, he may expressly
obligate himself to undertake the obligations of his principal.
 Gallego vs Sandiganbayan

GR No. L-57841 July 30,1982

Facts:
An information was filed in the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor
Punzalan-Castillo against Gallego et al. for violation of Sec. 3( e ) of RA 3019 which they
gave a score of 18 out of 20 to an examinee‘s answer notwithstanding the fact that said
examinee wrote the Lord‘s prayer, petitioners filed a motion to quash the information against
them on the grounds of:
1. The facts alleged do not constitute an offense; or in the alternative,
2. The information charges more than one offense
3. MANILY CONTENDS THAT THE TERM UNWARRANTED IS AMBIGUOUS
Sandiganbayan sustained conviction and denied motion to quash.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in the decision.
Held:

Section 3(e) of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and
"gross inexcusable negligence merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Section 3(e) of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases
in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses.
The information definitely states the names of the parties, the tune, place, manner of
commission and designation of the offense. The argument that failure in the information to
state the reasons why the benefits bestowed are unwarranted renders it defective is without
merit informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved
during the trial.The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act considers
a corrupt practice and makes unlawful the act of a public officer in:

... or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, ... (Section 3[e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended.)

It is not all difficult to comprehend that what the afore-quoted penal provisions penalizes is
the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions,
in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which are unjustified,
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Neither is the information defective. As held in the case of People vs. Buenviaje, 47 Phil.536,
where the defendant was charged with violation of the Medical Law and the information
charged both illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor, it was
held that "the information was not bad for duplicity inasmuch as the acts charged were
merely different means of committing the same offense, notwithstanding the fact that they
are prohibited by separate sections of the statute."
 G.R. No. 99859 September 20, 1996

PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY & INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY vs NLRC

Facts:

Private respondent security guard worked for the petitioner until retired for reaching 60 years
old but was denied of retirement benefits since he is not governed by the CBA. He filed a
complaint in NLRC which granted him of separation under the Labor Code Article 283
because of equity and since there was no CBA that was governing the private respondent.
The reached the SC and the Solicitor General argued that there was not statutory basis for
retirement benefits.

Issue

Whether or not the private respondent is entitled of retirement benefits.

Held:
Section 14 (a) refers to "termination pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month for every
year of service" while Section 14 (b) mentions "termination pay to which the employee would
have been entitled had there been no such retirement fund" as well as "termination pay the
employee is entitled to receive." It should be recalled that Sections 13 and 14 are found in
Implementing Rule I which deals with both "termination of employment" and "retirement." It is
important to keep the two (2) concepts of "termination pay" and retirement benefits separate
and distnct from each other. Termination pay or separation pay is required to be paid by an
employer in particular situations identified by the Labor Code itself or by Implementing Rule
I. Termination pay where properly due and payable under some applicable provision of the
Labor Code or under Section 4 (b) of Implementing Rule I, must be paid whether or not an
additional retirement plan has been set up under an agreement with the employer or under
an "established employer policy.

What needs to be stressed, however, is that Section 14 of Implementing Rule I, like Article
287 of the Labor Code, does not purport to require "termination pay" to be paid to an
employee who may want to retire but for whom no additional retirement plan had been set
up by prior agreement with the employer. Thus, Section 14 itself speaks of an employee
"who is retired pursuant to a bonafide retirement plan or in accordance with applicable
individual or collective agreement or established employer policy."

Therefore he is not entitled for retirement benefits because it lacks statutory basis and the
new retirement law is not applicable because of prospectivity.
 Tano vs Socrates

GR No. 110249

August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1,
1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said
ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted
them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and
7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation‘s marine wealth. The so-called ―preferential right‖ of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their ―exploration,
development and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily
includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the
municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the
LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of
police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.
 Valderrama v NLRC

GR No 98239

Facts:

In 1983, Saavedra filed a complaint against COMMODEX Inc, Valderrama (owner), and
other executives of the corporation. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor and held that she
was illegally dismissed, hence she is entitled to backpay wages.

A writ of execution was granted bu it was returned and unsatisfied since the corporation had
ceased operation, and the respondents too k the position that the writ could not be enforced
against them on the ground that the dispositive portion mentioned only COMMODEX.

Saavedra then filed a motion for clarification, in which she prayed that the executives be held
liable. The petitioner filed an opposition, saying that the decision cannot be amended since
it‘s already final and executory. Saavedra replied that it was not an amendment she sought,
but merely a clarification.

NLRC granted Saavedra‘s motion. This is an appeal by Valderrama.

Issues/Held:

1. WON the decision can be amended/clarified – YES

2. WON Valderrama should be held liable – YES

Ratio:

1. The rule that once a judgment becomes final, it can no longer be disturbed, altered,
or modified, is not an inflexible one. It admits of exceptions, as where facts and
circumstances transpire after a judgment has become final and executory which
render its execution impossible of unjust. In such a case, the modification may be
sought and alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts.

In the case at bar, modification of the judgment is appropriate considering that the
company is no longer in operation and there is no showing that it has filed bankruptcy
proceedings in which private respondent might file a claim and pursue her remedy
under Article 110 of the Labor Code. Holding petitioner personally liable for the
judgment in this case is eminently just and proper considering that, although the
dispositive portion of the decision mentions only the ―respondent company,‖ the text
repeatedly mentions ―respondents‖ in assessing liability for the illegal dismissal of
private respondent. For indeed petitioner and others were respondents below and
there can be no doubt of their personal liability. The mere happenstance that only
the company is mentioned should not, therefore, be allowed to obscure the fact that
 in the text of the decision petitioner and her corespondents below were found guilty
of having illegally dismissed private respondent and of claiming that private
respondent‘s employment was terminated because of retrenchment, when the truth
was that she was dismissed for pregnancy. Hence they should be held personally
liable for private respondent‘s reinstatement with backwages.

2. Jurisprudence and law (PD 525) hold that where a corporation fails to pay wages, the
prescribed penalty shall be imposed upon the employers. This is because a
corporation can only act through its officers and agents. Valderrama, as owner of
COMMODEX, shall be held liable.
 CHAPTER 14
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
_________________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. L-20479 February 6, 1925

YU CONG ENG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs. W. TRINIDAD, Collector of Internal Revenue, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

The allegations of the petition center on the unconstitutionality of Act No. 2972,
entitled ―AN ACT TO PROVIDE IN WHAT LANGUAGE ACCOUNT BOOKS SHALL BE
KEPT, AND TO ESTABLISH PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION.‖ Section 1 of said act
makes it unlawful for any person, company, partnership or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in
accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than English,
Spanish or any local dialect.

On March 2, 1923, the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the exercise of
their legitimate functions, inspected the books of account of the Chinese merchant Yu Cong
Eng. Upon finding that said books were not kept in accordance with their understanding of
the provisions of Act No. 2972, they took possession of the merchant's books and referred
the matter to the city fiscal of Manila for appropriate action. It was alleged that that the
accused merchant had kept his books of account only in Chinese, thus rendering it difficult
for the agents and authorized representatives of the Government of the Philippine Islands
and of the City of Manila, to examine and inspect the aforementioned books of account.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Petition denied without costs.

The Act is a fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of the government agents
and to prevent fraud in the returns of merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the
income tax. Under the general police power, persons and property in the Philippines have
been subjected to various kinds of restrictions and burdens, in order to secure the general
health, comfort, and prosperity of all. The police power is not limited to regulations necessary
for the preservation of good order or the public health and safety, but the prevention of fraud,
cheating, and imposition is equally within its scope. The means to accomplish a necessary
interference with private business are no more oppressive upon individuals than is
necessary to maintain the State. The law is not intended for the convenience of the trader or
the protection of the creditors, but has relation to the public welfare, to the power of taxation,
to the right of the government to exist. The Chinese must bear their just proportion of the tax
burden, however unwelcome it may be, without flinching.
 G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
ARROYO, Respondents.

FACTS:

The Court Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002
and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being
premature.

To summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for

reconsideration, in the aforementioned order:

1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because
the JBC has not yet decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the
incumbent President has the power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and because
the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted a short list to the
President.

2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is
necessary for the President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as
bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The statement undermines the independence
of the JBC.

3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its
constitutional mandate and its implementing rules and regulations.

For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his
comment even if the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so.
He states that the motions for reconsideration were directed at the administrative matter he
initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:

1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the
decision and the separate opinion.

2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Courts power of supervision over
the JBC as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished
from the Courts adjudicatory power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the
requisites for judicial review are not required, which was why Valenzuela was
docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take
a position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has
effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the
JBC.

3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to
amend the Constitution.

4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the

dissent of Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for
reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article
VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).
 It denied the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being
thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March
17, 2010

ISSUES:

Is the decision on March 17 2010 controlling?

Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII?

RULING:

Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply
means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same
jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of
competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of
appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts
and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but
also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like
ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate
authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested
with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights.

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.
The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United
Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed.
A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the
latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.

For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or

abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this
case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that
the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in
division.

The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records
of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section
4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the
Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to
include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his
or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to
include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"such that
the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits
any reference to the Judiciary, to wit: Section 13. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity
or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman,
or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
 G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner, Former President Joseph Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be

prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), assailed
the constitutionality of the said law based on the following grounds: (1) the law suffers from
vagueness; (2) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal prosecutions; and
(3) it abolishes the element of mens rea or criminal intent in the crimes already punishable
under the Revised Penal Code. The foregoing, according to Estrada, violated his
fundamental rights to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

ISSUE:

Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?

RULING:

No. The plunder law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Republic Act 7080
also known as Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7569, provides for comprehensive guide or
rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to
its penalties. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensive
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ
in application. However, the questioned law is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein or because of the employment of terms without
defining them. The petitioner‘s reliance on ―void-for-vagueness‖ doctrine is clearly
misplaced. It can only be invoked against the specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. Being one of
the senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was
extensively deliberated upon by the senate and its appropriate committees by reason of
which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and
due observance to the constitution.
 G.R. No. 159149 June 26, 2006

The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary

of the Department of Energy, Petitioner,
vs.
LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

 BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration,

underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of
adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders.
 The law sets a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000 as penalties.
 The Department of Energy issued Circular No. 2000-06-010 to implement the law.
 Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines asked the DOE to set aside the
Circular for being contrary to law but to no avail, hence they filed an action before the
RTC to nullify the circular.
 RTC granted the petition and nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new
offenses not included in the statute.
o Moreover, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, there
is a possibility that the P50,000 maximum penalty might be exceeded.
o The Circular has a range of P1,000-5,000/cylinder for first offenses and a range
of P5,000-10k/cylinder for third offenses. For retails outlets, the max penalty is
20k.
o Aside from the monetary fines, some offenses also include the recommendation
the closure of the business to the proper LGU.
 Meanwhile, petitioner Sec. Perez of the DOE argues that DOE is empowered by the ff.
provisions to penalize the acts it enumerated in the circular:
o BP Blg. 33, as amended:
―SEC. 3-A. Rules and Regulations; Administrative sanctions for violation thereof. –
The Bureau of Energy Utilization shall issue such rules and regulations as are
necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act, subject to the approval of the
Minister of Energy, after consultation with the affected industry sectors. Said rules
and regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.

―The Bureau of Energy Utilization is empowered to impose in an administrative

proceeding, after due notice and hearing, upon any person who violates any provision
of such rules and regulations, a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) or to suspend or remove the license or permit of a hauler, marketer,
refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retail outlet: Provided, That hearing in any administrative
proceedings may be waived by respondent. Provided, Further, That during the
pendency of such administrative proceeding, the Bureau may suspend the business
operations of such hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retailer or retail
outlet operator when the suspension is consistent with public interest. …
xxxx
―The administrative sanction that may be imposed shall be without prejudice to the
filing of a criminal action as the case may warrant.‖
o Sec. 23 of RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998):
Section 23. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The DOE, in coordination with the
Board, the DENR, DFA, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department
of Health (DOH), DOF, DTI, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
 and TLRC, shall formulate and issue the necessary implementing rules and
regulations within sixty (60) days after the effectivity of this Act.
o Sec. 5(g) and Sec. 21 of RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992):

(g) Formulate and implement programs, including a system of providing incentives

and penalties, for the judicious and efficient use of energy in all energy-consuming
sectors of the economy;

xxx

Subject to existing rules and regulations, the funds and monies collected or which the
otherwise come into the possession of the Department and its bureaus from fees,
surcharges, fines, and penalties which the Department and its bureaus may impose
and collect under this Act

ISSUE:

WoN the Circular is valid/legal.

RULING:

Yes.

 For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following must
concur:
o the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and
o the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself
 As for the first requirement:
o BP Blg 33 only states merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal
acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no
tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade
name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no
embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering
LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders.
o The acts and omissions stated in the circular are well within the modes
contemplated by the law and serve the purpose of curbing pernicious practices of
LPG dealers.
 As for the second requirement:
o The statute provides a minimum and maximum amount as penalties.
o The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within
the range allowed by law. While the circular is silent as to the max penalty for
refillers, marketers, and dealers, such does not amount to violation of the
statutory maximum limit.
o The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does
not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the
minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
 The law was intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal
measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well
as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted

 G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996

MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
The HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DAVAO ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, The HON.
MINISTER, (NOW SECRETARY) of NATURAL RESOURCES AND PHILLIP
CO, respondents.

FACTS:

In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses

under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7
stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later
petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLE‘s petition, Davao
Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao)
alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCOR‘s timber
concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had
recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the
Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from
MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the
finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply
with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m 3 worth of timbers. The Minister then
issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the
Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from
pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of
the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was
sued – a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has
been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued
patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPI‘s constitutional
rights under the due process clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI‘s right to due process has been violated.

RULING: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not
bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued
only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis
for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without
giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the
issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all
furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR‘s letter requesting for the Execution of the Minister‘s
decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the
respondent Secretary‘s expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same,
apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCOR‘s letter requesting for the Order, and without
hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not
included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in
DAVENCOR‘s timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic
tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the
procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make
conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned.
 G.R. No. 166199 April 24, 2009

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, Respondent.

FACTS

 BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous letter requesting the

deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien, for having been found guilty for
attempted possession of cocaine under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the
State of Washington.
 Koruga was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation
of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, declaring him
an undesirable alien or public burden.
 BOC ordered the deportation of respondent, the DOJ denied Koruga‘s appeal. The CA
reversed the decision stating that there was no valid and legal ground for the deportation
of respondent since there was no violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because:
o Respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on
prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed the case.
o That even if respondent was convicted and sentenced for the alleged offense, his
deportation under Section 37(a)(4) is improper, since the prohibited drugs law
referred to therein refers not to a foreign drugs law but to the Philippine drugs
law.
ISSUE:

W/N there is a valid and legal ground for the deportation of Koruga? YES.

RULING:

 The Supreme Court ruled against Koruga.

 Respondent was charged with violation of Section 37(a) (4) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended.
 Respondent contends that the use of the definite article ―the‖ immediately preceding the
phrase ―law on prohibited drugs‖ means that the ONLY law covered is the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. (And not other drug laws, like the Washington law in this case.)
 Koruga is incorrect. If his interpretation of the law is allowed, it would create a situation
where only aliens convicted of Philippine prohibited drugs law would be deported, while
aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws would be allowed entry in the country.
 Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which
defeats the very purpose for which the law was passed.
 Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes no distinction between a foreign prohibited
drugs law and the Philippine prohibited drugs law, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
 Thus, Section 37(a)(4) should apply to those convicted of all prohibited drugs laws,
whether local or foreign.
PETITION GRANTED.
 G.R. No. 115507 May 19, 1998

ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED MORENO, petitioners,

vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan
Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump
truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred
Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989,
this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another
dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by
Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as
the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no
documents showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the
forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were confiscated.

Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E
Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with
violation of Section 68,[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. The accused were all
convicted for failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code which requires: (1) an auxiliary
invoice, (2) a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber
dealer permit. The CA found no cogent reason for the reversal or modification of the
decision.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is unconstitutional.

(2) Whether or not "lumber" is to be construed as "timber" and/or forest product within the
contemplation of PD 705.

RULING:

(1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
forest products without license.". One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial
inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court
of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not ―charged with the [unlawful] possession
of ‗firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, ‗the associated water‘ or
fish;‖ thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 ―is absolutely of no
concern‖ to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a
judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said
provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the
ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.

(2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court held that lumber is included in the term
timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses
the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster‘s
Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as ‗timber or logs after being
prepared for the market.‘ Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. To exclude
possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Section 68 would emasculate the law
itself.
 G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions
and Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., respondents.

FACTS:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,

shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, DENR organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming
out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain
entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge
Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue
thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of
narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately
200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner
failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the
lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as
opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not
be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber.

While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section
3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing
plant." Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. The Code uses the term
lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
 G.R. No. L-5872 November 29, 1954

ENRIQUE BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs. CRISOSTOMO S. BERNARDO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

Enrique Bernardo the petitioner sold his lot to the respondent Crisostomo S.
Bernardo. That lot also found that the house of the petitioner since July 13, 1944; that
because of family relationship the petitioners "were able to remain in the premises due to the
tolerance of, and out of charity from, the appellee (respondent Crisostomo Bernardo) and his
deceased parents who were the rightful lessees of the lot in question."

Due to his long stay in that parcel of land; the petitioner argue that he is a bona fide
occupants therof because of his long stay in said parcel of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating
that "actual" and "bona fide" are synonymous based on the existing laws.

RULING:

No, the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that
"actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts deleted the
term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing the
requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate
tenure.
 G.R. No. L-56028 : July 30, 1981
NILO A. MALANYAON, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. HON. ESTEBAN M. LISING, as Judge
of the CFI of Camarines Sur, Br. VI, and CESARIO GOLETA, as Municipal Treasurer of
Bula, Camarines Sur, Respondents-Appellees.

FACTS:

Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while
the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the
payment of the Mayor's salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA
3019 which provides - should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose
all retirement or gravity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive
during his suspension. Malanyaon was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula,
Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as
Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the salary of the late Mayor
as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16,
1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground
that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes
acquittal.

RULING:

No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It
means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of
the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the
case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to
acquittal.
 G.R. No. 154491 November 14, 2008

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga Plant, petitioner,

vs.
QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY
GALICIA", respondents

FACTS:

Petitioner Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding empty
Coke bottles in Pepsi‘s yard, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the IP
Code. MTC issued the search warrants and the local police seized the goods. Later, a
complaint against respondents was filed for violation of the IP Code. Respondent contended
that the hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not involve fraud and deceit for them to be liable
for unfair competition. MTC upheld the validity of the warrants. RTC voided the warrant for
lack of probable cause of the commission of unfair competition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent‘s hoarding of Coke bottles constitute unfair competition.

RULING:

NO. From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or
palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or business of one person
as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public.
One of the essential requisites in an action to restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the
intent to deceive must be shown before the right to recover can exist. The advent of the IP
Code has not significantly changed these rulings as they are fully in accord with what
Section 168 of the Code in its entirety provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the
public are still the key elements that must be present for unfair competition to exist.

As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks of a
person who has earned goodwill with respect to his goods and services and who is entitled
to protection under the Code, with or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as previously
discussed, refers to the general definition of unfair competition. Section 168.3, on the other
hand, refers to the specific instances of unfair competition, with Section 168.3(a) referring to
the sale of goods given the appearance of the goods of another; Section 168.3(b), to the
inducement of belief that his or her goods or services are that of another who has earned
goodwill; while the disputed Section 168.3(c) being a ―catch all‖ clause whose coverage the
parties now dispute.

Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the ―hoarding‖ – as defined and
charged by the petitioner – does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section
168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that
the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the
petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently ―passing off‖ their products or
services as those of the petitioner. The respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking
any representation or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of
the petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges
is an act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as
alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to limit the opposition‘s sales by depriving it
of the bottles it can use for these sales. In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is
closer to what another law, R.A. No. 623 covers.
 G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL
C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:

The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona‘s departure. Originally, the members
of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that ―(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.‖ In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the
JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the
ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During
the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating ―a representative of the National
Assembly‖ to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change
to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The
respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence
of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one
house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of
representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC‘s purpose of providing balance
nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide
balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object
of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right
to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
ISSUE:

Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
that in the phrase, ―a representative of Congress,‖ the use of the singular letter ―a‖ preceding
―representative of Congress‖ is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It
is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention
that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded
or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be
ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or
restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that
the word ―Congress‖ used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative
may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional
Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the
members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it
was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason
leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents‘ contention that each representative should be admitted from
the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held that ―Congress,‖ in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still
differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution,
the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between
the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the
Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Hence, the term ―Congress‖ must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.
 The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of
the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative
influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-
half (1/2) a vote each, would ―negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.‖

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half
(1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing
Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees
to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be
countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the
basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of
the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified.
 G.R. No. 169143 February 2, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES, Appellee

vs. SIMPLICIO DELANTAR, Appellant.

FACTS:

In August 1996, accused Simplicio Delantar was indicted for violating RA 7610 for
selling in prostitution his putative daughter, AAA, to an Arab national and for pimping and
delivering AAA, who was then 11 years of age to Congressman Jalosjos. He entered a plea
of not guilty and trial proceeded in due course. The RTC found accused guilty, for two
counts, of violation of RA 7610. The CA upheld the decision except that the appellate court
ruled Delantar should be convicted for one count only. The case reached the SC where
accused appellant decried the imposition of the maximum penalty when in fact there was no
showing of the qualifying circumstance of filial relationship between him and AAA.

ISSUE:

WON there is a filial relationship between Delantar and AAA

RULING:

No. The SC held that the birth certificate of AAA, which did not contained Delantar‘s
signature, is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to
appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAA‘s biological father. Further,
according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase
susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated 87 Section 31(c) of R.A.
No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and
the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the
perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which
"guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description
we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal
relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the ward‘s
biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither
AAA‘s biological parent nor is he AAA‘s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
"guardian" contemplated by law.
 G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982

MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189
of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970. A Policy was issued by Perla thru its author
representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as
Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of
policy, information was filed against the wife of Rodrigo because allegedly she unlawfully
acted as an agent in the solicitation of the insurance without having been first secured a
certificate of authority to act as an agent from the office of the Insurance Commission. The
People of the Philippines presented evidence that aforementioned policy was issued with
active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense
sought to show that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his
work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had
called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so
she left a note on top of her husband‘s desk to renew …
RTC and CA find the accused guilty and fined petitioner 500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency for the violation of the Insurance Act. Solicitor General
was made to comment on the case and the same said that the petitioner is not guilty
because she does not fall under the definition of agent as provided under par. 2 of the sec.
189 of the Insurance Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same
section?

RULING:

No. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance
agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word
―agent‖ mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More
significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an
insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence—Any person who for
compensation … shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.

Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true
with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The
second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify
the term ―agent‖ mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole.

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second

paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a
compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the
aforesaid section. The appellate court has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused
did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for
direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as
an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive
compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. It must be noted that the
information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts
by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential,
and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-
settled in our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be
alleged and proved.
 G.R. No. 112940 November 21, 199

DAI-CHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
156, Pasig, Metro Manila and ADONIS C. LIMJUCO, respondents.

FACTS:

July 1993, petitioner filed a complaint for damages with RTC Pasig against Limjuco, a former
employee. Dai-Chi alleged that Limjuco violated their contract of employment. Dai-Chi
claimed that Limjuco became an employee of Angel Sound Philippines Corp. engaged in the
same business as Dai-Chi. Dai-Chi alleged also that Limjuco was the head of material
management control department at the competing corporation while employed in Dai-Chi.

Dai-Chi sought to recover liquidated damages in the amount of 100,000 as provided in their
contract. Then Judge Villarama, ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy because the complaint is arising from employer-employee relations. Dai-Chi
contends that the action did not arise from employer-employee relations, even though the
claim is based on the employment contract.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner's claim for damages one arising from employer-employee relations?

RULING:

No. Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code, it seeks to recover damages
agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent‘s breach of his contractual
obligation to its "damage and prejudice".

On appeal to this court, we held that jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the civil
courts. We stated that the action was for breach of a contractual obligation, which is
intrinsically a civil dispute. We further stated that while seemingly the cause of action arose
from employer-employee relations, the employer's claim for damages is grounded on
"wanton failure and refusal" without just cause to report to duty coupled with the averment
that the employee "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the
contract to the damage of the employer. Such averments removed the controversy from the
coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and brought it within the purview of Civil Law.

Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article
217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with
any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other
claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee
relations.
 G.R. No. 169637 June 8, 2007

BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITY represented by its President ROGELIO D.

COLTING, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

FACTS:

Congress passed Republic Act No. 8292 entitled An Act Providing for the Uniform
Composition and Powers of the Governing Boards, the Manner of Appointment and Term of
Office of the President of Chartered State Universities and Colleges, and for Other
Purposes, commonly known as the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997.

Pursuant to Section 4 (d) of the said law, the Board of Regents of BSU passed and
approved Board Resolution No. 794 on October 31, 1997, granting rice subsidy and health
care allowance to BSUs employees. The sums were taken from the income derived from the
operations of BSU and were given to the employees at different periods in 1998. A Notice of
Disallowance was issued stating that RA 8292 does not provide for the grant of said
allowance to employees and officials of the University. BSU requested the lifting of the
disallowance with COA Regional Office but was denied. It held that the grant of said
allowances lacked statutory basis, transgressed the constitutional proscription on additional,
double, or indirect compensation and ran counter to the provisions of the Salary
Standardization Law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to BSU employees is
repugnant to Section 8 of Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution

RULING:

Yes. BSU cannot cite Section 4(d) of RA 8292 as its basis for granting allowances. What is
clear from the said provision is that income generated by the university may be disbursed by
its Governing Board for ―instruction, research, extension, or other programs/projects of the
university or colleges.‖ BSU was wrong in theorizing that the phrase ―other
programs/projects of the university or college‖ in Section 4 (d) covers ALL projects and
programs of the university, INCLUDING those designed to uplift the economic plight of the
employees. Rather, as COA contended, it must be LIMITED to those programs which the
university may specifically undertake in pursuance of its PRIMARY OBJECTIVE to achieve
quality education.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular kind
accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to
things of a SIMILAR NATURE with those particularly enumerated. The COA correctly ruled
that the ―other programs/projects‖ under the Act should be the SAME NATURE as
instruction, research, and extension.
 G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same,
and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of
Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.

In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two
(2) ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business
permit to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation.
(ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR
as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.

Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.

RULING:

NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils
exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As
a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise
of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been
said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative
of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are
answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their
acts, and not to the courts of justice.
 G.R. No. 119122 August 8, 2000

PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

FACTS:

The PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
for the payment of deficiency amusement tax.

The PBA contested the assessment by filing a protest with the CIR who denied the same.
The PBA then filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), in which they
held against the PBA.

The PBA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was also denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games is a national tax.

2. Whether the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to Vintage Enterprises, Inc.
subject to amusement tax.

RULING:

1. YES. The Local Tax Code does not provide for professional basketball games but
rather in PD 1959. It is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of professional
basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax of 15% of their gross
receipts to the BIR, which payment is a national tax.

2. YES. The definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of
advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the
proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. The law being clear, there is
no need for an extended interpretation.
 G.R. No. 155703 September 8, 2008

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs. DOMINADOR SANTUA, respondent.

FACTS:

Dominador Santua was claiming that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro. He could not, however, produce the original copy of the certificate as it was lost
during an earthquake in 1994. The records of the Registry of Deeds were destroyed due to a
fire in 1977. There are no encumbrances on the land. Santua then filed for reconstitution. He
presented a tax declaration, a survey plan and technical description of the land as evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not tax declarations, technical description and lot plans are sufficient
bases for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles.

HELD:

No. Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides:

SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner‘s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner‘s, mortgagee‘s or lessee‘s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal
custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the
description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been
registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the description of which is
given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f)Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Santua anchored his argument on Section 3 (f) of RA 26. However, applying the principle of
ejusdem generis, Section 3 (f) of RA 26 should be pertinent to the items preceding it.
Meaning, these should be documents issued by or are on file with the Register of Deeds.

Moreover, they are documents from which the particulars of the certificate of title or the
circumstances which brought about its issuance could readily be ascertained. At most, the
tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of possession or a claim of ownership.

As for the survey plan and technical descriptions, these are not the documents referred to in
Section 3(f) but merely additional documents that should accompany the petition for
reconstitution. Moreover, a survey plan or technical description prepared at the instance of a
party cannot be considered in his favor, the same being self-serving.
 G.R. No. 162411 June 30, 2008

NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI),

represented by RAMON M. CALO, petitioner,
vs. NASIPIT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (NELU)-ALU-TUCP, represented by DONELL
P. DAGANI, respondent.

FACTS:

NIASSI is a domestic corporation with office at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del

Norte. Respondent Nasipit Employees Labor Union (Union) was and may still be the
collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of NIASSI and is a local chapter
of the Associated Labor Union.

The dispute started when, in October 1999, the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board (Wage Board) of Caraga Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage
Order No. (WO) RXIII-02 which granted an additional PhP12 per day cost of living allowance
to the minimum wage earners in that region. Owing allegedly to NIASSI‘s failure to
implement the wage order, the Union filed a complaint before the DOLE Caraga Regional
Office for the inspection of NIASSI‘s records and the enforcement of WORXIII-02. A DOLE
inspection team was accordingly dispatched and reported that WO RXIII-02 was
not applicable to NIASSI‘s employees since they were already receiving a wage rate higher
than the prescribed minimum wage. Upon motion by the Union, the DOLE Regional
Director indorsed the case to the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch for further hearing,
which in turn referred the case to the NCMB for voluntary arbitration. On February 22, 2002,
Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez rendered a decision granting the Union‘s prayer for the
implementation of WO RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not specifically prohibit
the grant of wage increase to employees earning above the minimum wage.

On the contrary, Chavez said, the wage order specifically enumerated those who are
outside its coverage, but did not include in the enumeration those earning above the
minimum wage. He also held that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between
NIASSI and the Union provides that wage increases granted by the company within one
year from CBA signing shall not be creditable to future legally mandated wage increases.

Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NIASSI filed with the CA a
petition for review, which affirmed the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.

ISSUE:

WON the wage order may be made to apply and cover Nasipit‘s employees who, at
the time of the issuance and effectivity of the wage order, were already receiving a wage
rate higher than the prevailing minimum wage.

RULING:

No. It is abundantly clear from the above quoted provisions of WO RXIII-02 and its
IRR that only minimum wage earners are entitled to the prescribed wage increase.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others.
 The beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is specific nough to cover only
minimum wage earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates above the
prescribed minimum wage. The only situation when employees receiving a wage rate higher
than that prescribed by the WO RXIII-02 may still benefit from the order is, as indicated in
Sec. 1 (c) of the IRRs, through the correction of wage distortions. Clearly then, only
employees receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage
increase set forth under WO RXIII-02, without prejudice, of course, to the grant of increase
to correct wage distortions consequent to the implementation of such wage order.
Considering that NIASSIs employees are undisputedly already receiving a wage rate higher
than that prescribed by the wage order, NIASSI is not legally obliged to grant them wage
increase.CA reversed.** Petitioner‘s reliance on the above quoted CBA provision and on the
flawed arbitrator‘s case disposition is really misplaced. Consider that in his decision, Chavez,
after admitting that NIASSI‘s employees were receiving a wage rate higher than the
prescribed minimum wage, proceeded to fault NIASSI for not presenting evidence to show
that the overage or excess resulted from general wage increases granted by the company
itself within one year from the effectivity of the CBA in 1997. By simplistically utilizing the
adage "doubt is resolved in labor," instead of relying on the case records and the evidence
adduced, the voluntary arbitrator extended the coverage of WO RXIII-02 to include those
who, by the terms of the order, are not supposed to receive the benefit. If only the voluntary
arbitrator was circumspect enough to consider the facts on hand, he would have seen that
the CBA provision on non-creditability finds no application in the present case, because
creditability is not the real issue in this case. And neither is the interpretation of the CBA
provision.

The real issue in this case, as discussed above, is the coverage and application of
WO RXIII-02.While it behooves the Court to accord protection to the working class, tilting the
balance of justice in its favor whenever appropriate, it is not possible to resolve every dispute
to further the cause of labor. In every case, justice is to be granted to the deserving and
dispensed in the light of established facts and the applicable law and doctrine, DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
 G.R. No. 157095 : January 15, 2010

MA. LUISA G. DAZON, PETITIONER, VS. KENNETH Y. YAP AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Respondent Kenneth Yap is the president of Primetown Property Group, Inc. On

November 1996: petitioner Ma. Luisa G. Dazon entered into a contract with Primetown for
the purchase of Unit No. C-108 of the condominium project. Dazon made a downpayment
and several instalment payments which totalled to 1, 114, 274.30 pesos.

Unfortunately, Primetown was not able to finish the condominium project. On March
22, 1999: Dazon demanded for the refund of her payments from Primetown, pursuant to
Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 of 1976 (―The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers‘ Protective Decree‖).

Even though Dazon demanded for the refund, Primetown failed to give back Dazon‘s
money. On October 26, 2000, yap filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City against Dazon, for violation of Section 23 in relation to Section
39 of P.D. 957.

Yap, in connection with the resolution finding probable cause, filed a Petition for
Review with the DOJ. On June 14, 2002, the DOJ rendered a Resolution ordering the trial
prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the Information. Therefore, the prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information with the RTC.

The result was that Yap‘s Motion to Withdraw Information was granted. This meant
that the Information filed against him is withdrawn and was transmitted back to the City
Prosecutor‘s Office of Lapu-Lapu City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising
from violation of P.D. 957?

RULING:

Yes. The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from
violation of P.D. 957.

The petition has merit.

1. The DOJ Resolution dated June 14, 2002 which ordered the withdrawal of the
information was based on the finding that the HLURB, and NOT the regular court, HAS
jurisdiction over the case
 A perusal of the allegations in the complaint-affidavit would show Dazon‘s grievance
against Yap, was the failure of Yap‘s firm to refund the payments Dazon made for
one of the unites in the aborted Mactan Condominium project in the total amount of
P1, 114, 274.30
 Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal: the SC had ruled that the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory (HLURB) has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estated
 business and practices under P.D. 957 (*this statement has also been proven by
other jurisprudence)
2. Jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of P.D. 957 is vested in the
regular courts
 Jurisdiction is ―conferred by law and determined by the material averments in the
complaint as well as the character of the relief sought‖
 The scope and limitation of the jurisdiction of the HLURB are well-defined. Its
precursor, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was vested under P.D. 957 with
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business, specifically the
registration of subdivion or condominium projects and dealers, brokers and salesmen
of subdivision lots or condominium units, issuance and suspension of license to sell;
and revocation of registration certificate and license to sell. Its jurisdiction was later
expanded under P.D. 1344 of 1978 to include adjudication of certain cases, such as
the following:
a.) Unsound real estate business practices;
b.) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesmen; and
c.) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker, or salesman
 The primordial function of the HLURB, is the regulation of the real estate trade and
business and NOT the conviction and punishment of criminals
 Administrative agencies being tribunals of limited jurisdiction can only wield such
powers as are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes
 P.D. 957 makes the following specific grant of powers to NHA (now HLURB) for the
imposition of administrative fines, and it also mentions penalties for criminal cases:
Section 38. Administrative Fines – The Authority may prescribe and impose fines not
exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of the provisions of this Decree or any rule or
regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable through writs
of execution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court

Section 39. Penalties – Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Decree
and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty-thousand pesos and/or
imprisonment of not more than ten years: provided, that in the case of corporations,
partnership, cooperatives, or associations, the President, Manager or Administrator or the
person who has charge of the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible
for any violation of this Decree and/or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto

 Under Section 38 of P.D. 957, the grant of power to the former NHA, now HLURB,
over the imposition of fines to those which do not exceed ten thousand Pesos, it is
clear that the power in relation to criminal liability mentioned in the immediately
succeeding provision, to impose, upon conviction, fines above ten thousand pesos
and/or imprisonment, was not conferred on it. Section 39, unlike Section 38,
conspicuously does not state that it is the MIA that may impose the punishment
specified therein

 Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which
are criminal in nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that the
HLURB has no jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of P.D. 957 (it
is the RTC that has jurisdiction over criminal cases arising from violations of P.D.
957)
 In the present case, the affidavit-complaint alleges the violation of Section 23 of P.D.
957 and asks for the institution of a criminal action against respondent Yap, as
President of Primetown; The office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause for
the filing of an Information for the subject offense. The DOJ made no reversal of such
finding of probable cause. Instead, it directed the withdrawal of the information on the
erroneous premise that it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the case. It is not
the HLURB but the RTC that has jurisdiction to hear the said criminal action
 G.R. No. 171427 March 30, 2011

STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) and JOAQUIN G. MENDOZA, in
his capacity as General Manager of LLDA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its products are
manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan Luis
Faustmann (Faustmanns), located in Barangay (Brgy.) Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City.

For creating loud unceasing noise and emitting toxic fues coming from the plant, one of
petitioners neighbors filed a complaint with the Barangay. During conciliation proceedings,
petitioners management undertook to relocate its operations within a month. The parties
signed an Agreement to that effect. However, petitioner failed to abide by the undertaking
and continued to manufacture its products in its Brgy.

Alicia P. Maceda (Maceda), another neighbor filed a complaint before the barangay and a
formal complaint with the DENR. After, investigation a Notice of Violation and a Cease and
Desist Order (CDO) were served on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without
an LLDA Clearance and Permit, as required by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850.

Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Contending that, as a cottage industry, its jewelry business is exempt from the requirement
to secure a permit from the LLDA. The RTC denied the petition. Upon denial of its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appeals to the CA. The CA however dismissed the appeal.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied the same.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to obtain a clearance
from the LLDA to operate its business.

RULING:

No. CA decision affirmed.

Political Law- Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and
intangible, including, inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which
belong to any person, including a corporation and the estate of a decedent.

In view of the emphasis in law after law on the capitalization or asset requirements, it is
crystal clear that the same is a defining element in determining if an enterprise is a cottage
industry.

Petitioner argues that its assets amount to onlyP312, 500.00, representing its paid-up capital
at the time of its SEC registration. The law then in force was R.A. No. 6977, which, to
recapitulate, states:
 SEC. 3. Small and Medium Enterprises as Beneficiaries. "Small and medium enterprise" shall be
defined as any business activity or enterprise engaged in industry, agribusiness and/or services,
whether single proprietorship, cooperative, partnership or corporation whose total assets, inclusive
of those arising from loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business entity's office,
plant, and equipment are situated, must have value falling under the following categories:
xxx

cottage:P50,001 P500,000

Accordingly, it should be considered as a cottage industry, petitioner insists.

The P312,500.00 represents the total amount of the capital stock already subscribed and
paid up by the company's stockholders. It does not, however, represent the totality of its
assets, even at the time of its registration. By the expert opinion of petitioners own
consultant, independent CPA Maximiano P. Sorongon, Jr., it does not mean that the paid-up
capital is the only source of funds of the corporation for it to support its recurring operational
requirements, as well as its increased financial requirements later on, as and when the
business grows and expands.

In other words, its paid-up capital is not the only asset of the company. Under R.A. No. 6977,
the term total assets was understood to mean "inclusive of those arising from loans but
exclusive of the land on which the particular business entity's office, plant, and equipment
are situated."

Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including,
inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which belong to any person,
including a corporation and the estate of a decedent. It is the entire property of a person,
association, corporation, or estate that is applicable or subject to the payment of his, her, or
its debts.

Petitioner cannot insist on using merely its paid-up capital as basis to determine its assets.
The law speaks of total assets. Petitioners own evidence, i.e., balance sheets prepared by
CPAs it commissioned itself, shows that it has assets other than its paid-up capital.
According to the Consolidated Balance Sheet presented by petitioner, it had assets
amounting to P4,628,900.80 by the end of 1998, and P1,746,328.17 by the end of 1997.
Obviously, these amounts are over the maximum prescribed by law for cottage industries.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage industry.
Therefore, it is not exempted from complying with the clearance requirement of the LLDA.
 A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

FACTS:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located
in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and
Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to
vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to
conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case.
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed
an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

YES. Respondent was suspended for six (6) months. Respondent was found guilty of
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be
fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the
written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
 G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner,

vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as theSamahang

Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the
chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a
contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a consequence, an information was
filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno
filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable
or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the
construction of a chapel.

ISSUE:

Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include
a religious purpose?

RULING:

No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public
welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended
to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no
reason why it would not have so stated expressly.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended
for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as
earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore
acquitted.
 G.R. No. 146943 October 4, 2002

SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner,

vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG
and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Sario Malinias and Roy Pilando were candidates for governor and
congress representatives respectively during the May 15, 1998 elections in Mountain
Province. Petitioners filed a complaint with COMELEC against private respondents
Governor Dominguez, and Provincial Director Corpuz and Police Chief Tangilag for
alleged violations of:
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646 and,
Section 232 of BP 881, respectively.

Petitioners alleged that on May 15, 1998, an illegal police checkpoint set-up at
Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their
way to Bontoc Provincial Capitol Building for the canvassing of votes. They likewise
alleged that the Provincial Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made
public and consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates
except those of Dominguez. To support their claims, their supporters executed so-called
―mass affidavits‖

Private respondents submitted counter-affidavit stating that the checkpoint was not a sole
case and that it was set-up to enforce COMELEC‘s gun ban and that no group will disrupt
the canvass proceedings which happened several times in the past.

After investigation was conducted, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed the case
against the private respondents for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE:

Can COMELEC prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Sections 25 of

RA 6646 and232 of B.P. Blg. 881?

RULING:

No. The alleged violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec. 232 of B.P.
Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election offenses
under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. The
COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of
B.P.881.

While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred
therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses
criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act
involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense.
Though not a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after
proper hearing, the imposition of administrative penalties.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there
is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation
of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act. It is a settled
rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
 G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,* Respondent.

FACTS:

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It
was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue miller‘s tax and
manufacturer‘s sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987 particularly on
SPMC‘s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the
deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured
products. SPMC opposed the assessments. The Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC
appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for
review. docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal application of the rules
because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller‘s tax. It
maintains that the crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM
as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller‘s tax pursuant to
Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC‘s milled products,
subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from the miller‘s tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SPMC‘s sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller‘s
task.

RULING:

NO. Petition was denied. The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987
Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil,
palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an
ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the
factory or by the miller himself.

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be
construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom
and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the
statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict
its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its
application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC‘s claim for tax exemption will violate these
established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
 G.R. No. 168062 June 29, 2010

VICTORIAS MILLING CO., Petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC. Respondents.

FACTS:

On March 4, 2004, petitioner Victorias Milling Co. (VMC), Inc., filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages against respondent IPI before the MCTC of E.B. Magalona-Manapla,
docketed as Civil Case No. 392-M. On March 10, 2004, the sheriff served the summons
upon Danilo Maglasang, IPI's Human Relations Department Manager.

On March 19, 2004, IPI filed its Answer with express reservation that said Answer should not
be construed as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the person of IPI, for
non-service of summons on the proper person. It then filed an Omnibus Motion for Hearing
of Affirmative Defenses raised in the Answer and moved for the suspension of proceedings.

On August 30, 2004, the MCTC issued an Order 2 denying the suspension of the
proceedings of the case sought by IPI. The motion for reconsideration was denied.

Thus IPI filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, Cebu City to question the jurisdiction of the
MCTC over its person.

On May 6, 2005, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the public
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court of E. B. Magalona-Manapla, Municipality of
Magalona from proceeding with Civil Case No. 392-M and disturbing the possession of the
petitioner over the leased premises during the pendency of this petition until further orders
from said court.

VMC no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Resolution, on the ground that
the questioned CA Resolution is patently null and void and due to the urgency of VMC's
predicament. It instead immediately filed the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether x x x the public respondent CA had gravely abused its discretion amounting to an
excess of its jurisdiction by failing/refusing to dismiss/deny outright the petition for certiorari
and prohibition as filed before it in CA-G.R. CEB-SP NO. 00365 (against interlocutory orders
in an ejectment suit) notwithstanding its expressly being a prohibited/ disallowed
petition/pleading under the provisions of rule 70, sec. 13(7) of the Rules of Court

RULING:

The petition is granted and the orders of CA were set aside.

Although it is alleged that there may be a technical error in connection with the service of
summons, there is no showing of any substantive injustice that would be caused to IPI so
as to call for the disregard of the clear and categorical prohibition of filing petitions
for certiorari. It must be pointed out that the Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of
exception, permits only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. It is
a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. From this it can be gleaned that
allegations on the matter of lack of jurisdiction over the person by reason of improper service
of summons, by itself, without a convincing showing of any resulting substantive injustice,
cannot be used to hinder or stop the proceedings before the MCTC in the ejectment suit.
With more reason, such ground should not be used to justify the violation of an express
prohibition in the rules prohibiting the petition for certiorari.
 G.R. No. 172087 March 15, 2011

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner,

vs.
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), represented herein by HON. JOSE
MARIO BUÑAG, in his official capacity as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Public Respondent,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, who are persons acting for, in behalf, or under the
authority of Respondent. Public and Private Respondents.

FACTS:

PAGCOR was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A on January 1,
1977. Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-B (supplementing P.D. No. 1067-A) was
issued exempting PAGCOR from the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of
five percent (5%) of the gross revenue. Thereafter, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1399 was
issued expanding the scope of PAGCOR's exemption.

To consolidate the laws pertaining to the franchise and powers of PAGCOR, P.D. No.
1869 was issued. PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed in June 1984 through P.D. No.
1931, but it was later restored by Letter of Instruction No. 1430, which was issued in
September 1984. On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424 otherwise known as the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 provides that
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall pay corporate income tax,
except petitioner PAGCOR, the Government Service and Insurance Corporation, the Social
Security System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. The particular amendment that is at issue in
this case is Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs that
are exempt from payment of corporate income tax.

Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
validity and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, in particular:

Section 4, Section 5, and Section 6, were alleged to be violative of Section 28 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, which section vests in Congress the exclusive authority to fix the rate of
taxes, and of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution on due process, as well as of Section
26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which section provides for the "no amendment rule"
upon the last reading of a bill. Sections 8 and 12 were alleged to be violative of Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, or the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and Section 28
(1), Article VI of the Constitution; On September 1, 2005, the Court dismissed all the
petitions and upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337. On the same date, respondent
BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-2005, specifically identifying PAGCOR as one
of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Is Republic Act 9337 constitutional insofar as it excluded PAGCOR from the enumeration of
GOCCs exempt from the payment of corporate income tax?
RULING:
YES. The original exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax was not made pursuant
to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions so that the law may operate only on
some and not on all. Instead, the same was merely granted due to the acquiescence of the
House Committee on Ways and Means to the request of PAGCOR.

The argument that the withdrawal of the exemption also violates the non-impairment clause
will not hold since any franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.

However, the Court made it clear that PAGCOR remains exempt from payment of indirect
taxes and as such its purchases remain not subject to VAT, reiterating the rule laid down in
the Acesite case.
 G.R. No. 153866 February 11, 2005

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), respondent.

FACTS:

A VAT-registered enterprise, STP has principal office address at the new Cebu Township
One, Special Economic Zone, Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu. STP is registered with the
Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA) and certified to engage in the manufacture of
recording components primarily used in computers for export. VAT returns were filed for the
period 1 April 1998 to 30 June 1999. With supporting documents, a claim for refund of VAT
input taxes in the amount of 28 million pesos (inclusive of the 12-million VAT input taxes
subject of this Petition for Review) was filed on 4 October 1999.

CIR did not act promptly upon STP's claim so the latter elevated the case to the CTA for
review in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period.

On appeal, CIR asserted that by virtue of the PEZA registration alone of STP, the latter is
not subject to the VAT. According to CIR, STP's sales transactions intended for export are
not exempt.

ISSUE:

Is STP entitled to refund or tax credit for puchases?

HELD:

Yes, STP is entitled to refund or tax credit

As a PEZA-registered enterprise within a special economic zone, STP is entitled to the fiscal
incentives and benefit provided for in either PD 66 or EO 226. It shall, moreover, enjoy all
privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions under both Republic Act Nos. (RA) 7227 and
7844. Its sales transactions intended for export may not be exempt, but like its purchase
transactions, they are zero-rated. No prior application for the effective zero rating of its
transactions is necessary. Being VAT-registered and having satisfactorily complied with all
the requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT paid on capital goods
purchased, STP is entitled to such VAT refund or credit.

STP, which as an entity is exempt, is different from its transactions which are not exempt.
The end result, however, is that it is not subject to the VAT. The non-taxability of
transactions that are otherwise taxable is merely a necessary incident to the tax exemption
conferred by law upon it as an entity, not upon the transactions themselves.
 G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI
PIPO, respondents.

FACTS:

On March 16, 1996, Lynette Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. However, her
application was denied by the Board of Election Tellers since she exceeded the age limit.
She then filed a ―Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataan Member and Voter‖ with the
Municipal Trial Court which was granted by the said court. Then, on April 23, 1996, Garvida
filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. On the same date,
Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per advise of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo,
disapproved petitioner‘s certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner then
appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon Asperin who set aside the order of
respondents and allowed petitioner to run. Earlier and without knowledge of COMELEC
officials, private respondent and petitioner‘s rival Florencio Sales Jr. filed with the COMELEC
en banc a ―Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy‖ via facsimile
and registered mail on April 29, 1996. And, on May 2, 1996 respondent Riso issued a
memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving hr 24 hours why her
certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Also on the same date, the COMELEC
en banc issued an order directing the Board Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to
suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. This is why on
May 6, 1996, Election Day, Garvida was not proclaimed the winner. She was only
proclaimed on June 2, 1996. Said proclamation was ―without prejudice to any further action
by the Commission on Elections or any other interested parties.

ISSUES:

Whether or not COMELEC erred in the cancellation of her candidacy on the ground
that she has exceeded the age limit.

RULING:

Petition dismissed. Lynette Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age
qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan. The
general rule is that an elective official of the SAngguniang Kabataan must not be more than
21 years old on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the
age of 21 years during his incumbency.
 G.R. No. 141386 November 29, 2001

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, Represented by

Provincial Auditor ROY L. URSAL, petitioner,
vs. PROVINCE OF CEBU, Represented by Governor PABLO P. GARCIA, respondent.

FACTS:

In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of
Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed
by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise
charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, the
COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for
the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers
appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, may be charged
to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned.

RULING:

Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers
handling extension classes. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the
SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring
of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may
be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and
the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes.

Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally with the
DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of
teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a
reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not
among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated.
 G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss
the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said
motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of ―expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius‖. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

RULING:

YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was
remanded for trial on the merits.

The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case
is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons
already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of
terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee‘s contention that justices of the
peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to
render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
―expressio unius, est exclusion alterius‖ in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the
peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had
intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears
no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion
alterius has been erroneously applied.
 G.R. No. 166735 November 23, 2007

SPS. NEREO & NIEVA DELFINO, Petitioners,

vs. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC., and THE HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent assails the Decision on the ground that the Court had erroneously
interpreted the 1991 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) or the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance of the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, in ruling that the St. James Hospital is
a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and that the expansion of the
St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the
Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance. Respondent contends that the case must now be decided in accordance with the
latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning Ordinance

Respondent claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance shows
that commercial and institutional uses were expressly allowed in Sec. 2, par. 1 of said
Ordinance as it retained uses that are commercial and institutional as well as recreational in
character and those for the maintenance of ecological balance. Respondent explains that
what appears is the fact that parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers are deemed to have
been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Respondent contends that St.
James Hospital and its expansion are consistent with the uses allowed under the zoning
ordinance.

ISSUE:

WON the (1) St. James Hospital is a non-conforming structure and the (2) expansion
into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo
Subdivision is prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance

RULING:

(1) Yes. Under the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express
mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned.
Interpreting the whole of Section 2, Article VI, it expressly enumerated the allowable uses
within a residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded.
Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as allowable
uses within the residential zone, thus hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from those
structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in Santa Rosa, Laguna.

(2) Yes. Section 1. Existing non-conforming uses and buildings. The lawful uses of
any building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may
be continued, although such does not conform with the provisions of this Ordinance.

That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended to occupy a

greater area or land that has already been occupied by such use at the time of the adoption
of this Ordinance, or moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land
where such non-conforming use exist at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance.
 It is clear from the above quoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the
expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that the
expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution
within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance.

According to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing omitted must
be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase
"hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the
corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical
conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those
allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St.
James Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance.
 G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES,
INC., and DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the
properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The
latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine
British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to
the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the
properties of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of
Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court.
A temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint
of was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on
the counterbond of the petitioner.

RULING:

YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs
against petitioner.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic,
is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be
accorded their natural and general significance. The rule requires that a general term or
phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to
justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no
distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not
authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer
the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with
the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the
payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory
judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal.
 G.R. No. L-48817 January 22, 1943

JUANA YAP DAES, ET AL., petitioners,

vs. WE KO (alias KUA), respondent.

FACTS:

The petitioners, who are respectively the widow and children of Pedro Basa, brought an
action under Act No. 1874 for damages in the amount of P2,000 for the death of said Basa
while working for the respondent.

It appears that the respondent was having some repairs done on his house. He engaged
Basa to take from the river to his residence four logs which were needed, at a compensation
of P1.20 per log. The deceased engaged three persons to help him. They succeeded in
loading three of the logs on carts furnished by the respondent, but as they were trying to
load the fourth log, it slipped down, and hit Basa, killing him.

The Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals held
that Basa was not an "employee" of respondent within the purview of Act No. 1874, and
dismissed the case.

ISSUE:

Whether Act No. 1874 distinguished temporary or permanent employees?

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court believes that the Court of Appeals erred.

Act No. 1874 does not require that the work should be more or less permanent. It is enough
that the laborer is engaged to do any job for another person. The temporary or occasional
character of the work is immaterial, for two reasons:

1. Act No. 1874 uses the term "employee" without any distinction between occasional or
permanent employees. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. It is
significant that while the Workmen's Compensation Act (No. 3428) specifically excludes
purely casual employment, Act No. 1874 on the other hand does not. It is thus plain that
Act No. 1874 which applies only to mishaps in small industries and other activities in
which the gross annual income is less than P20,000, is intended to safeguard all
laborers, regardless of the duration or character of their employment. Finespun
distinctions would fritter away the salutary substance of this law.
2. Act No. 1874 being remedial legislation, envisaged to protect laborers, its scope must
not be so limited as to defeat this paramount objective, unless its terms clearly warrant
such restrictive interpretation.
 G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days
after, the petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994
respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for
failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions
and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of
candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law
that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost".

ISSUE:

Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and

expenditures after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.

RULING:

The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of
candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a
candidate may have incurred. Petitioner‘s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his
liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his
candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of
his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts have
also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.
 G.R. No. 93828 December 11, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. SANTIAGO EVARISTO and NOLI CARILLO, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

Peace officers composed of Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of Philippine
Constabulary together with Sgt. Daniel Maligaya and 2 other members of the Integrated
National Police were on routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At 5:00 in the
afternoon, the officers heard a successive burst of gunfire and they came upon Barequiel
Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of Evaristo prompting the lawmen to
pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced
upon Evaristo and Carillo. They inquired as to the whereabouts of Rosillo. The police patrol
members were told that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Vallarta
noticed a bulge around the waist of Carillo and upon being frisked he admitted the same to
be a revolver.

As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo‘s permission to
scour through the house which was granted. Romaroso found a number of firearms and
paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms. Evaristo and
Carillo were ound guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in accidental discovery of evidence is
admissible.

RULING:

There are constitutional provisions that prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. For a
search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly
issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence
has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these
exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view.

The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant
Evaristo to enter his house. The officer‘s purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw
had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not
Romerosa‘s purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject as
inadvertent and even accidental.

With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly
of the firearm‘s seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized
warrantless arrests.
 G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia,
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a ―hostile and furious mood‖ and in a manner offensive
to petitioner‘s dignity and personality,‖ contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.‖.
Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled ―An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.‖ Petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred
the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision declaring the trial court‘s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the
motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of
a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

RULING:

NO. Petition denied. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the
statute.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Petitioner‘s contention that the phrase ―private communication‖ in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include ―private conversations‖ narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
―communication‖ to a point of absurdity.
 G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,

vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA),
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO;
THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,
Respondents.

FACTS:
Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the
complainant whom he had a dating relationship with. The said violence constituted the
pulling of hair, punching the complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye which have
demeaning and degrading effects on the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a
human being, in violation of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act 9262. In Dabalos' defense, he
averred that the relationship had already ceased at the time of the alleged incident.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 9262 be construed when the dating relationship was not the proximate
cause of the violence?

RULING:

Yes. The law provides that any act can be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm when it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is
the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or
with whom he has a common child, and when it results in or is likely to result in physical
harm or suffering.

Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. It did not distinguish that the act of
violence should be a consequence of such relationship.
 G.R. No. 155282 January 17, 2005

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner,

vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents.

FACTS :

On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an
episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by
respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them
to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps,
customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women‘s University
(PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU
Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The
showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de
Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers
Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Acting on the letter-complaints,
the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating
Committee, alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not submit "The Inside Story" to
petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating
Section 74 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and Section 3,6 Chapter III and Section
7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations respondents explained that the "The
Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial," the
airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of
the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form
of prior restraint upon respondents

ISSUE:

WON the ―inside story‖ is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression
and of the press

RULING:

Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at
all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a
preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the
jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification
to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to respondents, is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no
preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCB‘s power of review are those
expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels.
 G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner,

vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING
PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S.
MENDOZA, respondents.

FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program ―Ang Iglesia ni Cristo‖ of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated ―X‖ – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board
of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly
―offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited
by law‖ because of petitioner INC‘s controversial biblical interpretations and its ―attacks‖
against contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered
the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But
on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the
respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program ―Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,‖ and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of ―Ang Iglesia ni Cristo‖ on the
ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found
the subject TV series ―indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.‖ Dissatisfied
with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner‘s TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner‘s religious program?

RULING

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner‘s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term ―television program‖ [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the
respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious
programs like its program ―Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.‖ A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will
contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that ―no law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.‖

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner‘s religious program.

Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It
failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for ―attacking‖
either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show
that the so-called ―attacks‖ are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they
were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as
indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing
under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech
and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
 G.R. No. 168697 December 14, 2009

GINA M. TIANGCO and SALVACION JENNY MANEGO, Petitioners,

vs. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC. and JIMMY GOW, Respondents.

FACTS:

Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club Inc. (UNIWIDE) was a domestic corporation under the
presidency of Jimmy Gow. Gina Tiangco was employed as concession manager and was
later designated as group merchandising manager for the fashion and personal care
department (P45k salary). On the other hand, Salvacion Jenny Mañego was initially
employed as buyer and was later promoted as senior category head (P25k salary).
Sometime in 2001, Tiangco and Mañego filed separate complaints against UNIWIDE for
illegal dismissal with money claims. Labor Arbiter then consolidated said cases and
submitted the same for decision. UNIWIDE and Gow filed a motion for the suspension of the
proceedings on said cases on the ground that UNIWIDE was placed under suspension of
payments by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a receivership has in fact
been appointed. In 2002, LA then suspended the proceedings. Two years thereafter,
Tiangco and Mañego move to reopen the case for SEC already approved the second
amendment to UNIWIDE‘s rehabilitation plan. UNIWIDE and Gow opposed said reopening.
LA issued an order directing the parties to file their respective memoranda. UNIWIDE and
Gow filed a petition for certiorari on ground that LA committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing said order. CA granted the petition ad denied the motion for reconsideration of
Tiangco and Mañego. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the consolidated illegal dismissal cases can be reopened at this point of the SEC
proceedings for respondent USWCI‘s rehabilitation.

RULING:

NO. The relevant law dealing with the suspension of payments for money claims against
corporations under rehabilitation is Presidential Decree No. (PD) 902-A, as amended.

The term ―claim,‖ as contemplated in Section 6 (c), refers to debts or demands of a

pecuniary nature. It is the assertion of rights for the payment of money. Here, petitioners
have pecuniary claims—the payment of separation pay and moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioners seek to have the suspension of proceedings lifted on the ground that the SEC
already approved respondent USWCI‘s SARP. However, there is no legal ground to do so
because the suspensive effect of the stay order is not time-bound. As we held
in Rubberworld, it continues to be in effect as long as reasonably necessary to accomplish
its purpose. We ruled in Sobrejuanite v. ASB Development Corporation [31] that the Interim
Rules, under Section 1, Rule 1 thereof, are applicable although (as in this case) the petition
for declaration of suspension of payments was filed prior to the effectivity of such rules

In sum, when the labor arbiter proceeded with the consolidated cases despite the SEC
suspension order, he exceeded his jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal dismissal cases
and the CA correctly reversed his order.

Petition is denied.
 G.R. No. 126773 April 14, 1999

RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.), INC., or JULIE YAP ONG, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MARILYN F. ARELLANO, EMILY S.
LEGASPI, MYRNA S. GALGANA, MERCEDITA R. SONGCO, WILFREDO V. SANTOS,
JOSEPHINE S. RAMOS, REDENTOR G. HONA, LUZ B. HONA, ROLANDO B. CRUZ,
GUILLERMA R. MUZONES, CARMELITA V. HALILI, SUSAN A. REYES, EMILY A.
ROBILLOS, PLACIDO REYES, MANOLITO DELA CRUZ, VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO,
ROGER B. MARIÑAS, VIOLETA ALEJO, RICARDO T. TORRES, EMMA DELA TORRE,
PERLA N. MANZANERO, FRANCISCO D. SERDONCILLO, LUISITO P. HERNANDEZ,
RAYMOND PEREÑA, EDITHA A. SERDONCILLO, FRANCISCO GENER, MARIO B.
REYES, VALERIANO A. HERRERA, JORGE S. SEÑERES, ELENA S. IGNACIO,
EMERITA S. CACHERO, NERIZA G. ENRIQUEZ, LOLITA M. FABULAR, NORMITA M.
HERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR P. ENRIQUEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Rubberworld, Inc. (petitioner) is a domestic corporation which used to be in the business of

manufacturing footwear, bags and garments. On 24 Nov 1994, it filed with the SEC a petition
requesting that their corporation be declared in a state of suspension of payments and that
their creditors be restrained from enforcing their claims against the corporation. A creation of
management committee and the approval of a proposed rehabilitation plan were also prayed
for. The SEC ruled in favor of the corporation. Accordingly, because of the creation of a
management committee, ALL ACTIONS FOR CLAIMS against Rubberworld, Inc. pending
before any court are hereby deemed SUSPENDED. Private petitioners, on the other hand,
are employees of the said corporation. They filed against the latter several complaints,
among others: illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, etc. (take note that these are labor-
related issues) The petitioner moved to have the complaints dismissed on the strength of the
SEC order (that which suspends all actions for claims against them) The labor arbiter denied
the petitioner‘s motion. Petitioner then appealed to the NLRC but the same also dismissed
their motion. NLRC contended that the SEC order does not cover labor cases because those
are within their exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide labor cases, quoting Article 217 of
the Labor Code. They further contended that the right of workers and employees must be
preferred.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC was correct in affirming labor arbiter‘s order despite SEC‘s order?

RULING:

No. NLRC should not have upheld decision of labor arbiter. The applicable law in this case
PD 902-A and not the Labor Code. NLRC‘s contention that labor cases are not within the
scope of the SEC order was misplaced as there was no exception mentioned in the law.
Elementary in statcon: when the law does not distinguish, you do not distinguish. Hence,
article 217 of the Labor Code should be construed in harmony with PD 902-A in order to
avoid conflict. As for the preferential right of workers and employees (Article 110, LC), it may
only be invoked ONLY upon the institution of insolvency or judicial liquidation.
 G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161 January 21, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of consummated and attempted
murder. On February 25, 1963, Tamani‘s counsel received a copy of the decision and
consequently filed for a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963. It was denied. On July
13, 1963, the lower court sent a denial order to the counsel through his wife via registered
mail. On September 10, 1963, the said counsel appealed the lower court‘s decision. Then,
the appellees argued that the appeal should be dismissed contending that the appeal should
have been made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15 day period of appeal from the date of
notice and not from the date of promulgation. Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal
was filed 47 days late.

ISSUE:

Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation or from the date
of notice of the decision.

RULING:

Appeal was dismissed. The 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation.
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.— an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.

The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when
a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not
well-taken. The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to
"judgment" while the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That
construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each;
referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let each be put in its proper
place, that is, the words should be taken distributively". Therefore, when the order denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on
appellant's counsel, he had only 1 day within which to file his notice of appeal and not 11
days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58 days late.
 G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, et
al, Petitioner,
vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE
TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

FACTS:

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed
as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers
that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places
offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do
they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can
only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City
likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

RULING:

The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to
be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was
an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.
The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different from sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques,
cabarets, dance halls. The Supreme Court Said that it is baseless and insupportable.

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the

respondent of the beneficial use of its property. Ordinances placing restrictions upon the
lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and
conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid. The Ordinance however is not a regulatory
measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit The foregoing premises show
that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal
rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
 G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.

Facts:

1. Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo.

2. On March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. José Rizal in said city upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor.

3. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started
to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side.

4. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado
Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence.

5. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of
the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to
know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon
instruction of his teacher.

6. Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001).

7. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña, reserved
her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused.

8. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old
when he committed the crime.

9. In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin
Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of
P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña.

10. Defendants set up the defense that if anyone should be held liable for the death of
Isidoro Caperiña, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the
accident, the former was not under the control, supervision 'and custody of the latter.

11. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence, it only convicted
Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the
appeal only involves questions of law.

Issue:

Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with
his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the
negligent act of his son, minor Dante Capuno?
Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno
shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the
costs of action.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who
live with them, is obvious.

Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5:

"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding

articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused
by the minor children who live with them.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for

any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody."

This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on
the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles
154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of
this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This,
defendants failed to prove.
 G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A.

YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR
LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO
DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN,
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

FACTS:

Alfredo Amadora, seventeen years old was about to graduate, however while in the school,
Colegion de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit
Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. Damon was convicted of homicide
thru reckless imprudence.Herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos,
its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Damon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped

The trial court held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the
respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved. The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the
custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo had gone to
the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in
their custody because the semester had already ended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not school of
arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be in its custody.

RULING:

The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for
the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments
of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts
of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers"
should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and
trades" to the word "apprentices."

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. While the court deeply sympathize with the petitioners over
the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related, the court nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law
they have invoked. Wherefore, the petition is denied.
 G.R. No. 212081 February 23, 2015

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Petitioner,

vs. UNITED PLANNERS CONSULTANTS , INC. (UPCI), Respondent.

FACTS:

 July 26, 1993 - Petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau (LMB), entered into an
Agreement for Consultancy Services (Consultancy Agreement) with respondent United
Planners Consultants, Inc. in connection with the LMB‘s Land Resource Management
Master Plan Project (LRMMP). Under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner committed
to pay a total contract price of P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined percentage
corresponding to the particular stage of work accomplished.
 December 1994 - Respondent completed the work required, which petitioner formally
accepted on December 27, 1994. However, petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the
total contract price in the amount of P2,038,456.30.
 October 25, 1994 - The Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical Services
Office Report (TSO) finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14% excessive.
This notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998, acknowledged its
liability to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured payment at the
soonest possible time.
 For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated
demands, respondent instituted a Complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Due to the existence of Arbitration clause, the respondent moved
for the issue to be tried through arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award
dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award) in favor of respondent
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Arbitral Tribunal claimed that it had already
lost jurisdiction over the case after it had submitted to the RTC its Report together with a
copy of the Arbitral Award
 March 30, 2011, the RTC merely noted petitioner‘s aforesaid motions, finding that copies
of the Arbitral Award appear to have been sent to the parties by the Arbitral Tribunal,
including the OSG, contrary to petitioner‘s claim. On the other hand, the RTC confirmed
the Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A)36 of the Special ADR Rules and ordered
petitioner to pay respondent the costs of confirming the award, as prayed for, in the total
amount of P50,000.00. From this order, petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration.
 June 15, 2011 - Respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, to which no
comment/opposition was filed by petitioner despite the RTC‘s directive therefor. In an
Order dated September 12, 2011, the RTC granted respondent‘s motion. Petitioner
moved to quash the writ of execution, positing that respondent was not entitled to its
monetary claims. It also claimed that the issuance of said writ was premature since the
RTC should have first resolved its May 19, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration and June 1,
2010 Manifestation and Motion, and not merely noted them, thereby violating its right to
due process.
 In an Order dated July 9, 2012, the RTC denied petitioner‘s motion to quash.
 July 12, 2012 - Petitioner received the RTC‘s Order dated July 9, 2012 denying its
motion to quash. Dissatisfied, it filed on September 10, 2012 a petition for certiorari
before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 126458, averring in the main that the RTC
 acted with grave abuse of discretion in confirming and ordering the execution of the
Arbitral Award.
 March 26, 2014 - The CA dismissed the certiorari petition on two (2) grounds, namely:
(a) the petition essentially assailed the merits of the Arbitral Award which is prohibited
under Rule 19 of the Special ADR Rules and (b) the petition was filed out of time, having
been filed way beyond 15 days from notice of the RTC‘s July 9, 2012 Order, in violation
of Rule 19.2852 in relation to Rule 19.853 of said Rules which provide that a special civil
action for certiorari must be filed before the CA within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside (or until July 27, 2012).
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules, resulting in
the dismissal of petitioner‘s special civil action for certiorari.

RULING:

 The petition is DENIED, Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,‖ institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute
Resolution System (ADR System) in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without
prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of
achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving cases pending before all courts in the
Philippines.
 May 7, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Arbitral Award in favor of respondent.
Under Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no motion for reconsideration or new
trial may be sought, but any of the parties may file a motion for correction of the final
award, which shall interrupt the running of the period for appeal, Moreover, the parties
may appeal the final award to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
 G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,

vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION
and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

FACTS:

Republic Act 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as
for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 (Coverage) of R.A. 6683 provides
who are qualified to avail the benefits under the law which includes all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered two consecutive years of government
service as of the date of separation with the exception of uniformed personnel of (Armed
Forced of the Philippines) AFP and (Philippine Constabulary Integrated National Police)
PC/INP.

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the Early
Retirement Law, filed an application to the Respondent National Irrigation Administration
(NIA), which was denied since petitioner is a co-terminus employee.

She appealed with respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) but which was also denied
because contractual employees are excluded from the coverage. The date of the petitioner's
separation from the service is co-terminus with the NIA project which is contractual nature.

Chua then elevated the issue to the Supreme Court by way of Special Civil action for
certiorari insisting that she is entitled to the benefits under R.A. 6683.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the coverage
of R.A. 6683.

RULING:

No. There is no substantial between a co-terminus employee and a contractual, casual,

emergency employee which are all tenurial employees with no fixed term, non career and
temporary. The Early Retirement Law would violated equal protection clause if a group or
class of employees would be denied with benefits that are received by a class of equal or
similar footing. The doctrine of necessary implications should be applied. The doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute us as much as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate
its object and purpose.
 G.R. No. 116194 February 2, 2000

SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC., petitioner,

vs. HON. UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER ACHILLES MANIT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7, CEBU CITY, AND SUGBUANON
RURAL BANK, INC. — ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL, SUPERVISORY, OFFICE,
AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES UNION-TRADE UNIONS CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a duly-registered banking
institution with principal office in Cebu City and a branch in Mandaue City. Private
respondent SRBI Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees
Union (APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions
Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).

On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted Certificate of
Registration No. R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEU-TUCP, hereafter referred to as the
union.

On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory
employees of SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor
organization duly-registered with the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more
supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these employees supported the petition: (4) there
was no existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between any union and SRBI; and
(5) no certification election had been held in SRBI during the past 12 months prior to the
petition.

On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition. The pre-certification
election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.
On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the union‘s petition. It sought to
prevent the holding of a certification election on two grounds. First, that the members of
APSOTEU-TUCP were in fact managerial or confidential employees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or
highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor
organizations and engaging in union activities.
2. Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election
upon the filing of a petition for certification election by a registered union, despite the
petitioner‘s appeal pending before the DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the
union‘s registration.

RULING:

1. Petitioner‘s explanation does not state who among the employees has access to
information specifically relating to its labor to relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia
Maluya, who serves as the secretary of the bank‘s Board of Directors may not be so
classified.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in
regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies
 [specifically in the field of labor relations].9 The two criteria are cumulative, and both
must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his superior officer; and
that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from
engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees. The
confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the
normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies relating to
labor relations. It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have
access to confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against
confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.

2. One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor
Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with
the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a legitimate labor
union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification election shall
automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate
labor organization.16 Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the
certification election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity of the union‘s
registration. On this score, petitioner‘s appeal was correctly dismissed.
 G.R. No. 93468 December 29, 1994

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK

SUPERVISORS CHAPTER, petitioner,
vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining
agent of its supervisory employees. The bank (Private respondent) moved to dismiss the
petition alleging that the supervisory employees are actually managerial employees hence
prohibited from joining unions. The Med Arbiter granted the petition but the decision was
modified by the Sec. of Labor on the ground that the ff employees are deemed as
managerial and/or confidential employees and are therefore ineligible to join or form labor
unions (Dept. Managers, Asst. Managers, branch Cashiers and Controllers).

ISSUE:

W/N the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential employees hence
ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.

RULING:

The subject employees are supervisory and not managerial.

As provided under 212 of the Philippine Labor Code, a Managerial employee is a) one
vested with power to lay down and execute management policies, or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, and b) one vested with
both the power or prerogative.

Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, Department Managers do not possess the
power to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. They occupy supervisory positions, charged with the duty among
others to "recommend proposals to improve and streamline operations.

On one hand, a confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters,
or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property.

Therefore only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent bank
who are deemed as confidential employees are ineligible to join or assist petitioner NATU-
Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter, or join, assist or form any other labor
organization.

Doctrine of Necessary Implication

The disqualification of managerial employees from joining a union is due to the evident
conflict of interest as they are supposed to be on the side of the management. As to
confidential employees, their disqualification is due to the undue advantage they possess.
Branch managers/Cashiers/Controllers are all considered confidential employees and hence
disqualified from joining a labor organization. Do note that this is not applicable to all banks
in general.
 G.R. No. 74425 October 7, 1986

BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, PRIMITIVA C.
BATERBONIA, ROLANDO G. OLALIA, ISIDRO S. MOLINA, EDUARDO C. MORALES,
ZACARIAS F. FLORES, JR., PEDRO M. GALLO, LORETO F. MIJARES, LUIS B.
ILAGAN, ERNESTO O. VALDEZ, EUGENIO L. RIVERA, BENJAMIN B. BERNAS,
LORETO D. DE LOS REYES, BONIFACIO A. SOTELO, FE F. ARRE, FELIPE R.
OLARTE, RAYMOND T. RIVERA, STEWART C. CACHO, DOMINADOR V. CURAY,
FERNANDO S. LAZARO, ERNESTO L. BAUTISTA, VICENTE O. ABANILLA, JOSE B.
BERNAL, RAMIRO A. NEBRES, ALCANTARA S. DE LA PAZ and LUIS F.
GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner corporation has been engaged in the business of newspaper and magazine
publishing for over half a century. its current publications include the national daily ―Bulletin
Today‖ (now Manila Daily Bulletin), the tabloid ―Tempo‖, and a weekly magazine called
―Panorama‖. The total number of the personnel complement of the said firm (exclusive of the
editorial staff, contract workers and casuals, etc.), constituting the rank-and-file regular
members, is said to be over three hundred persons. The supervisory employees number
forty-eight. About three hundred employees belonging to the rank-and-file had previously
formed the Bulletin Employees Union. This labor organization (BEU) presently administers
their current Collective Bargaining Agreement. Ever since, there has been only one
bargaining unit in the petitioner company and this is the BEU – the union of the rank-and-file
employees. Supervisory employees were never included in said bargaining unit nor had they
ever sought inclusion in the said BEU labor union, much less registered any protest or
challenged to their non-inclusion therein.

25 out of 48 supervisors in the Bulletin Publishing Corporation formed a labor union and
adopted a charter therefor, calling themselves members of the ―Bulletin Publishing
Corporation Supervisors Union‖ or BSU. A petition for registration of BSU, was filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment. Registration Certificate No. 10547-LC was issued. A
letter was sent to the management of petitioner corporation by BSU giving notice of the
registration of the BSU and demanding its recognition as the sole bargaining agent of all the
supervisors in the company. BSU supervisors union, is, at present, an affiliate of the National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and the Kilusang Mayo Union (KMU). BSU is alleged
to be supported in its strike move by the said groups.

A petition for direct certification was filed by the BSU as the bargaining representative of the
supervisors. A notice of strike by BSU was filed with the Ministry of Labor due to certain acts
allegedly performed by petitioner which BSU claims, in effect, to be union busting and unfair
labor practices. Refusing to recognize the BSU, the Bulletin Publishing Corporation filed a
petition seeking cancellation of the registration of the BSU on the ground that Article 246 of
the Labor Code and Section 11 of Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules thereof, prohibit
supervisors from forming labor organizations.

Following the expiration of the fifteen-day cooling-off period, petitioner was prompted to file a
petition with the Ministry of Labor, urging therein that said office assume jurisdiction in the
matter of the impending strike. When the Minister of Labor failed to exercise his jurisdiction
or act on the matter, petitioner then felt that the remedy it seeks should be sought from this
Court because, further resort to the Ministry of Labor may be construed as a tacit recognition
by petitioner of the supervisors union (BSU) which would be inconsistent with petitioner‘s
challenge to the assertion of BSU to exist as a legitimate labor union.

ISSUE:

Whether or not supervisors in petitioner company may, for purposes of collective bargaining,
form a union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by the rank-and-file
employees of the same company.

RULING:

The supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a supervisors
union, separate and distinct from the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-
and-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that most of the
private respondents are considered managerial employees. Also it is distinctly stated in
Section 11, Rule I I, of the Ommibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, that supervisory
unions are presently no longer recognized nor allowed to exist and operate as such.

Article 246 of the Labor Code explicitly excludes managerial employees from the right of
self-organization, the right to form, join and assist labor organizations. A perusal of the job
descriptions corresponding to the private respondents as outlined in the petition, clearly
reveals the private respondents to be managers, purchasing officers, personnel officers,
property officers, supervisors, cashiers, heads of various sections and the like. The nature of
their duties gives rise to the irresistible conclusion that most of the herein private
respondents are performing managerial functions. Their responsibilities inherently require
the exercise‘ of discretion and independent judgment as supervisors. They possess the
power and authority to lay down or exercise management policies. Managerial employees
are those vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies
and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or
to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this
definition are considered rank-and file employees (Article 212 (k), Labor Code).
 G.R. No. 79869 September 5, 1991

FORTUNATO MERCADO, SR., ROSA MERCADO, FORTUNATO MERCADO, JR.,

ANTONIO MERCADO, JOSE CABRAL, LUCIA MERCADO, ASUNCION GUEVARA,
ANITA MERCADO, MARINA MERCADO, JULIANA CABRAL, GUADALUPE PAGUIO,
BRIGIDA ALCANTARA, EMERLITA MERCADO, ROMEO GUEVARA, ROMEO
MERCADO and LEON SANTILLAN, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), THIRD DIVISION; LABOR
ARBITER LUCIANO AQUINO, RAB-III; AURORA L. CRUZ; SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE
BORJA and LETICIA DE BORJA; and STO. NIÑO REALTY,
INCORPORATED, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners were agricultural workers of the private respondent's sugar land who were
dismissed. They had worked in all agriculture phases for several years in the said sugar
land. The respondent denied that petitioners were regular employees alleging that their
services were engaged through 'mandarols' or supply workers to do a particular phase of
the agricultural work.

As a result, the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter held that
the petitioners were not regular employees and the NLRC affirmed this ruling.

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers

RULING:

No, they are project/seasonal employees. A project employee is one whose employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion has been determined at the
time of engagement, or where work or service is seasonal in nature and employment is for
the duration of the season.

As such, the termination of employment cannot be considered as illegal dismissal. The

petitioners are free to contract their services to work for other farm owners.
 G.R. No. 125359 September 4, 2001

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners,

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

On Dec. 27, 1991, Imelda Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Sec.
10 of Circular no. 960 in relation to Sec. 34 of the Central Bank Act (RA 265 as amended) in
five informations filed with RTC. It was alleged that they failed to submit reports of their
foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by the Circular no 960. Said
Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank. It also required all residents of the
Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally
or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank.

On the same day, nine additional informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the
same offense involving different accounts were filed with RTC.

On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the
same offense, in relation to different accounts, were filed. On the same day these were filed,
the Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318 which revised the rules governing non-trade
foreign exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.

On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 1358 which amended Circular
1318 deleting the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded
expenditures obtained from the banking system. However, the aforementioned circulars
contained a saving clause, excepting from their coverage pending criminal actions involving
violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, violations of both
Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.

On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return
to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against
them, including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.

On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not
guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier
entered a similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.

On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them
grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the repeal
of Circular No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central Bank‘s reporting requirement,
and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise agreement entered into with
the government.

On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners‘ motion. Petitioners‘ motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioners filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals which
were consequently dismissed.

Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON erred in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court, forum shopping by the prosecution, and absence of a valid preliminary
investigation. (NO)
2. WON the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular
No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of
petitioners. (NO)

RULING:

1. Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by
the law in force at the time the action is instituted. The 25 cases were filed in 1991- 92.
The applicable law on jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1606. Under P.D. No.
1606, offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years fall within the
jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, not the Sandiganbayan.

In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in relation to
Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for transgressions of
Republic Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of
Circular No. 960 are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine
of not more than P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the imposable penalty is less than six years of
imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960 are,
therefore, cognizable by the trial court.

2. For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending
in one court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.

In this case, the SC found that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on
Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and
unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses,
penalize different acts, and can be applied independently.

With respect to the RTC cases, act to be penalized is the failure to report the interest
earnings from the foreign exchange accounts to the proper authority. As to the anti-graft
cases before the Sandiganbayan involving the same interest earnings State seeks to
punish in these anti-graft cases is the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings.
 G.R. No. 149110 April 9, 2003

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. CITY OF CABANATUAN, respondent.

FACTS:

NAPOCOR, the petitioner, is a government-owed and controlled corporation created under

Commonwealth Act 120. It is tasked to undertake the ―development of hydroelectric
generations of power and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal, and other
sources, as well as, the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis.‖
For many years now, NAPOCOR sells electric power to the resident Cabanatuan City,
posting a gross income of P107,814,187.96 in 1992. Pursuant to Sec. 37 of Ordinance No.
165-92, the respondent assessed the petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41,
representing 75% of 1% of the former‘s gross receipts for the preceding year.
Petitioner, whose capital stock was subscribed and wholly paid by the Philippine
Government, refused to pay the tax assessment. It argued that the respondent has no
authority to impose tax on government entities. Petitioner also contend that as a non-profit
organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees in
accordance with Sec. 13 of RA 6395, as amended.

The respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC of Cabanatuan City, demanding that
petitioner pay the assessed tax, plus surcharge equivalent to 25% of the amount of tax and
2% monthly interest. Respondent alleged that petitioner‘s exemption from local taxes has
been repealed by Sec. 193 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code). The trial court issued an
order dismissing the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC and ordered the petitioner to pay the city government the tax assessment.

ISSUES:

1. Is the NAPOCOR excluded from the coverage of the franchise tax simply because its
stocks are wholly owned by the National Government and its charter characterized is as
a ‗non-profit organization‘?
2. Is the NAPOCOR‘s exemption from all forms of taxes repealed by the provisions of the
Local Government Code (LGC)?

RULING:

1. NO. To stress, a franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership but on the
exercise by the corporation of a privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the
corporation which exercises the franchise, and not the individual stockholders. By virtue
of its charter, petitioner was created as a separate and distinct entity from the National
Government. It can sue and be sued under its own name, and can exercise all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code. To be sure, the ownership by the
National Government of its entire capital stock does not necessarily imply that petitioner
is not engaged in business.

2. YES. One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket
exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the National Government from the
coverage of local taxation. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees,
or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
this rule now admits an exception, i.e. when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the
LGUs to impose taxes, fees, or charges on the aforementioned entities. The legislative
purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing laws or charter is clearly
manifested by the language used on Sec. 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such
exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be tedious and
impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax
exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of
such exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used.
 CHAPTER 15
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE AS A WHOLE
_________________________________________________________________________

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (Corp.) v. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE (CIR), REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REVENUE REGION NO. 8, and
CHIEF, ASSESSMENT DIVISION, REVENUE REGION NO. 8, BIR
&
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, REVENUE DISTRICT NO. 44, TAGUIG and
PATEROS, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

G.R. No. 158885 & G.R. No. 170680

October 2, 2009

NATURE:

Motion for Reconsideration of SC‘s Decision dated April 2, 2009 which granted the
consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation (Corp.) where
the C CIR was (1) restrained from collecting from the Corp. the amount of P28,413,783.00
representing the transitional input tax credit due it for the fourth quarter of 1996; and (2)
directed to refund to the Corp. the amount of P347,741,695.74 paid as output VAT for the
third quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting transitional input tax credit available to the
Corp. for the said quarter, or to issue a tax credit corresponding to such amount.

FACTS:

In the April 2, 2009 Decision, which is what CIR wants to be reconsidered in this
case, the Court struck down Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being in conflict with the law. It
held that the CIR had no power to limit the meaning and coverage of the term "goods" in
Section 105 of the Old NIRC sans statutory authority or basis and justification to make such
limitation. This it did when it restricted the application of Section 105 in the case of real
estate dealers only to improvements on the real property belonging to their beginning
inventory.

Petitioner claims that "the 10% value-added tax is based on the gross selling price or
gross value in money of the 'goods' sold, bartered or exchanged, " Petitioner likewise claims
that by definition, the term "goods" was limited to "movable, tangible objects which is
appropriable or transferable" and that said term did not originally include "real property."

Respondents argue that no transitory input tax on inventory of land is

allowed. Section 105 of the Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7716, and as
implemented by Section 4.105-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, expressly provides that
no transitional input tax credit shall be allowed to real estate dealers in respect of their
beginning inventory of land brought into the VAT regime beginning January 1, 1996 (supra).
Likewise, the Transitory Provisions [(a) (iii)] of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 categorically
states that "for real estate dealers, the presumptive input tax of 8% of the book value of
improvements constructed on or after January 1, 1998 (effectivity of E.O. 273) shall be
allowed." For purposes of subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) above, an inventory as of December
31, 1995 of such goods or properties and improvements showing the quantity, description,
and amount should be filed with the RDO not later than January 31, 1996. It is admitted that
petitioner filed its inventory listing of real properties on September 19, 1996 or almost nine
(9) months late in contravention [of] the requirements in Revenue Regulations No. 7-95."
ISSUES:

1. Whether the transitional/presumptive input tax credit under Section 105 of the NIRC may
be claimed only on the "improvements" on real properties.

2. Whether there must have been previous payment of sales tax or value-added tax by
petitioner on its land before petitioner may claim the input tax credit granted by Section
105 (now Section 111[A]) of the NIRC.

RULING:

1. On its face, there is nothing in Section 105 of the Old NIRC that prohibits the inclusion of
real properties, together with the improvements thereon, in the beginning inventory of
goods, materials and supplies, based on which inventory the transitional input tax credit
is computed. It can be conceded that when it was drafted Section 105 could not have
possibly contemplated concerns specific to real properties, as real estate transactions
were not originally subject to VAT. At the same time, when transactions on real
properties were finally made subject to VAT beginning with Rep. Act No. 7716, no
corresponding amendment was adopted as regards Section 105 to provide for a
differentiated treatment in the application of the transitional input tax credit with respect
to real properties or real estate dealers. It was Section 100 of the Old NIRC, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 7716, which made real estate transactions subject to VAT for the first
time. Prior to the amendment, Section 100 had imposed the VAT "on every sale, barter
or exchange of goods", without however specifying the kind of properties that fall within
or under the generic class "goods" subject to the tax.

2. Section 25 of E.O. No. 273 perfectly remedies the problem assumed by the CTA as the
basis for the introduction of transitional input tax credit in 1987. If the core purpose of the
tax credit is only, as hinted by the CTA, to allow for some mode of accreditation of
previously-paid sales taxes, then Section 25 alone would have sufficed. Yet E.O. No.
273 amended the Old NIRC itself by providing for the transitional input tax credit under
Section 105, thereby assuring that the tax credit would endure long after the last goods
made subject to sales tax have been consumed.

If indeed the transitional input tax credit is integrally related to previously paid sales
taxes, the purported causal link between those two would have been nonetheless
extinguished long ago. Yet Congress has reenacted the transitional input tax credit
several times; that fact simply belies the absence of any relationship between such tax
credit and the long-abolished sales taxes. Obviously then, the purpose behind the
transitional input tax credit is not confined to the transition from sales tax to VAT.
 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs. CITY OF DAVAO and ADELAIDA B. BARCELONA, in her capacity as the City
Treasurer of Davao, respondents.

G.R. No. 143867

March 25, 2003

FACTS:

PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three percent (3%) of its gross receipts. The
franchise tax was paid ―in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof‖ pursuant to
RA 7082. The exemption from ―all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof‖ was
subsequently withdrawn by RA 7160 (LGC), which at the same time gave local government
units the power to tax businesses enjoying a franchise on the basis of income received or
earned by them within their territorial jurisdiction. The LGC took effect on January 1, 1992.

The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 519, Series of 1992, which in pertinent
part provides: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by law or other special laws, there is
hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, a rate of seventy-five percent
(75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year
based on the income receipts realized within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City.

Subsequently, Congress granted in favor of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio

Corporation (Globe) and Smart Information Technologies, Inc. (Smart) franchises which
contained ―in leiu of all taxes‖ provisos.

In 1995, it enacted RA 7925, or the Public Telecommunication Policy of the

Philippines, Sec. 23 of which provides that any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or
immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto
become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises. The law took effect on
March 16, 1995.

In January 1999, when PLDT applied for a mayor‘s permit to operate its Davao Metro
exchange, it was required to pay the local franchise tax which then had amounted to
P3,681,985.72. PLDT challenged the power of the city government to collect the local
franchise tax and demanded a refund of what had been paid as a local franchise tax for the
year 1997 and for the first to the third quarters of 1998.

ISSUE:

Whether or not by virtue of RA 7925, Sec. 23, PLDT is again entitled to the
exemption from payment of the local franchise tax in view of the grant of tax exemption to
Globe and Smart.

RULING:

Petitioner contends that because their existing franchises contain ―in lieu of all taxes‖
clauses, the same grant of tax exemption must be deemed to have become ipso facto part of
its previously granted telecommunications franchise. But the rule is that tax exemptions
should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law ―expressed in a language
too plain to be mistaken‖ and assuming for the nonce that the charters of Globe and of
Smart grant tax exemptions, then this runabout way of granting tax exemption to PLDT is not
a direct, ―clear and unequivocal‖ way of communicating the legislative intent. Nor does the
term ―exemption‖ in Sec. 23 of RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers to exemption
from regulations and requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). For instance, RA 7925, Sec. 17 provides: The Commission shall exempt
any specific telecommunications service from its rate or tariff regulations if the service has
sufficient competition to ensure fair and reasonable rates of tariffs. Another exemption
granted by the law in line with its policy of deregulation is the exemption from the
requirement of securing permits from the NTC every time a telecommunications company
imports equipment.

Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provision of law on
the basis of language too plain to be mistaken.
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 185969

November 19, 2014
 ALPHA INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY AGENCY, INC. (AISA), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THIRD DIVISION, and WILLIAM
GALIMBA, NESTOR LOLOQUISEN, NESTOR IBUYAT, CARLITO CASTRO, JOSE
PERDIDO, FELIPE TOLENTINO, LEONARDO IBUYAT, FELINO CULANNAY RONIE
NINO, ROMAN NALUNDASAN, JAIME FONTANILLA, WILFRED BUTAY, JOSE ACIO,
EDISON VALDEZ, CRESENCIO AGRES, RODRIGO LUIS, MARIO SUGUI, BENEDICTO
SUGUI, ROGER RAMBAUD, respondents.

G.R. No. 111722

May 27, 1997

FACTS:

On August 17, 1992, Labor Arbiter Emiliano T. de Asis rendered a decision that the
respondent Alpha Investigation and Security Agency and Mariano Marcos State University to
pay each complainant the amount of P41,459.51 representing salary differential for the
period from February 16, 1990 to September 30, 1991, or the total amount of P787,730.69 to
the nineteen (19) respondents.

AISA and DMMSU interposed separate appeals. The NLRC, on May 7, 1993,
rendered a decision affirming the solidary liability of AISA and DMMSU and remanding the
records of the case to the arbitration branch of origin for computation of the salary differential
awarded by the Labor Arbiter.

Only AISA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC on July
1, 1993, for lack of merit.

In this petition, AISA alleges that payment of the wage increases under the current
minimum wage order should be borne exclusively by DMMSU, pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic Act 6727 (RA 6727) which reads as follows: "Sec. 6. In the case of contracts for
construction projects and for security, janitorial and similar
services, the prescribed increases in the wage rates of the workers shall be borne by the
principals or clients of the construction/service contractors and the contract shall be deemed
amended accordingly. In the event, however, that the principal or client fails to pay the
prescribed wage rates, the construction/service contractor shall
be jointly and severally liable with his principal or client."

It further contends that Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code generally refer to
the failure of the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages in accordance with the Labor
Code with a mandate that failure to pay such wages would make the employer and
contractor jointly and severally liable for such payment. AISA insists that the matter involved
in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials or wages increases, as prescribed in the
aforequoted Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general, as provided by the Labor
Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code generally refer to the
failure of the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages involve only on wage
differentials or wages increases (and not wages in general)?
RULING:

This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that

in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the
whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. In fact, legislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not an isolated
part of the provision alone.

AISA's solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards finds support in
Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. The joint and several liability of the contractor
and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions,
including the statutory minimum wage. The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status
as direct employer, while the principal becomes the indirect employer of the former's
employees for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the contractor to
pay them. This gives the workers ample protection consonant with the labor and social
justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
 JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, petitioner,
vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), HON. GREGORIA S. ONG, DIRECTOR,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. SALVACION DALISAY, PROVINCIAL
AUDITOR, respondents

G.R. No. 143596

December 11, 2003

FACTS:

 Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes was formerly assigned to the Municipality of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court. He received:
a. Salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) from the SC
b. A monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds of of Naujan starting 1984
 On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan, through Resolution No. 057, sought the
opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any
budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner
judge.
a. On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution No.
101 increasing petitioner judge‘s monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 starting
May 1993.
b. In 1994, the Municipal Government of Naujan again provided for petitioner
judge‘s P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual budget which was again
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget
and Management of Oriental Mindoro.
 On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them:
a. To stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA
b. To require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the judge.
 She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in
addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court based on
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993, stating that: ―No one shall
be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.‖
 Petitioner judge appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong.
a. COA Reg Dir Ong upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay
b. She added that Resolution No. 101 failed to comply with Section 3 of Local
Budget Circular No. 53 outlining the conditions for the grant of allowances to
judges and other national officials or employees by the local government units,
particularly ―That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by
the national government to the officials/employees assigned to the LGU.‖
 Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the
Commission on Audit.
a. Disallowance of the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner was
issued. Thus he received his P1,600 monthly allowance from the Municipality of
Naujan only for the period May 1993 to January 1994.
 On September 14, 1999, the COA issued its decision affirming the resolution of Regional
Director Gregoria S. Ong. It ruled that:
a. The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (that the finances of the municipality allow the grant thereof) and
Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act of 1993 [RA 7645] (No one shall be
allowed to collect RATA from more than one source) have been harmonized by
the Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated 01 September 1993 (provided that similar
allowance/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to
the official/employee assigned to the local government unit), issued by the
 Department of Budget and Management pursuant to its powers under Section 25
and Section 327 of the Local Government Code;
b. The subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11 May 1993 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro is null and void;
c. The Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national government official is
prohibited to receive additional RATA from the local government fund.
 Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the COA. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner judge was entitled to receive the additional allowances granted
to him by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, in addition to that provided by the
Supreme Court.

RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of petitioner judge.

a. An administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. A

statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or amend it.
 In the present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere administrative circular, cannot
repeal a substantive law like RA 7160.
b. Repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, unless it is manifest that the legislature
so intended. The legislature is assumed to know the existing laws on the subject and
cannot be presumed to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
 There was no other provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of Section
447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied.
c. The presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger when one law is special and
the other is general. (Generalia specialibus non derogant or a general law does not
nullify a specific or special law)
 The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character,
considers and makes special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt
with by the special law.
d. The General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 7645), being a general law, could not have, by
mere implication, repealed Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160).

 In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law which exclusively deals
with local government units (LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in
consonance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy.
 RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) was a general law which outlined the share in the
national fund of all branches of the national government.
 Therefore, RA 7645 being a general law, could not have, by mere implication,
repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA 7160 should be taken as the exception to RA
7645 in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.
e. In construing NCC No. 67, force and effect should not be narrowly given to isolated and
disjoined clauses of the law but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in
one rational view.
 Because a statute is enacted as a whole and not in parts or sections, one part
is as important as the others, the statute should be construed and given effect
 as a whole. A provision or section which is unclear by itself may be clarified
by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute.
 Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection
of RATA by a national official from the budgets of ―more than one national
agency.‖


 NCC No. 67 applies only to the national funds administered by the DBM, not
the local funds of the LGUs to prevent the much-abused practice of multiple
allowances, thus standardizing the grant of RATA by national agencies. By no
stretch of the imagination can NCC No. 67 be construed as nullifying the
power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges under the Local Government
Code of 1991. It applies only to the national funds administered by the DBM,
not the local funds of LGUs.
f. To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges will threaten the
principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
 The power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their
discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on
the availability of local funds ensures the genuine and meaningful local
autonomy of LGUs.
g. Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is invalid.
 Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from
granting allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted
by the national government, or (2) similar to the allowances granted by the
national government, violates Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
h. An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is not in
accordance with the law.
 The resolution of the Municipality of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly
allowance to petitioner judge fully complied with the law. Therefore, valid.
 JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) AND ULPIANO L. DELOS
SANTOS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 109835

November 22, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner JMM Promotions and Management Inc. appealed to the respondent NLRC
with regard to the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond.

NLRC, in support of the decision, cited Article 223 of the Labor Code, as provided
and amended: Article 223 - In a case of judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

Rule VI, Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC as amended reads as
follows: Section 6 - Bond - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or
the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the award.

The Petitioner contended that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying these rules to decisions rendered by POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not
necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are
already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a
license fee of P30,000.00 but also a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of
P50,000.00.

Petitioner also claimed it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000.00 with PNB in
compliance of Section 17, Rule II, Book II to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.

The office of the Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond requirement but
suggested that the rules cited by NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiter
and not of POEA.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond even after posting a
cash and surety bond of P150,000.00 and placing an escrow money of P200,000.00 as
required by POEA rules to perfect the appeal from a decision of POEA to NLRC?

RULING:

Yes. POEA rules are clear. In addition to the cash and surety bond, and the escrow
money fund, there should be also an amount equivalent to the monetary award to perfect the
appeal.

An appeal bond is intended to further insure payment of the monetary award in favor
of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
 In legal hermeneutics, caution should be taken that every part thereof be given effect
on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure. and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Under the petitioner's interpretation,
the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA rule should be disregarded because of
the earlier bonds and escrow fund. The Court ruled that it is not a redundancy, but rather a
complement between Section 6, Section 4 and Section 17.

The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible
as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
 ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF
QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.

G.R. No. 102377

July 5, 1996

FACTS:

On September 22, 1983, spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential

land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Sajonas on instalment basis as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the names of the
Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal.

On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse
claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was
inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes
executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple
on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or
on August 28, 1985.

Meanwhile, it appears that Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed a Civil Case for

collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 1980, a Compromise
Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary obligation to Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay
the same in two years. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the
compromise agreement, Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the
decision based on the compromise agreement, which the court granted in its order dated
August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI
of Quezon City. Pursuant to the order of execution a notice of levy on execution was issued
on February 12, 1985. On the same date, defendant sheriff Garcia of Quezon City
presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the
same was annotated at the back of the TCT of the subject land.

When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4, 1984 was registered on August
28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was
issued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by
defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple
filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the
subject property did not push through as scheduled.

On January 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of
levy on execution upon Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer. Despite said demand,
defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In view
thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint in the RTC of Rizal, against Pilares, the
judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
Sajonas couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from TCT No. N-109417.

The court a quo stated, thus:

…It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction that actual notice of an
adverse claim is equivalent to registration and the subsequent
registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal effect in any
respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim annotated on
the title of the Uychocdes.
 On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs (Sajonas) are buyers in good faith of the
property of the spouses Uychocde even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said
sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors, the Court finds that
the evidence in this instance is bare of any indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had
notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said property or that the same is
involved in a litigation between said spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the opposite
of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any bad faith must be established by competent
proof.

Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the CA assigning errors on the part of the lower
court. The appellate court reversed the lower court‘s decision, and upheld the annotation of
the levy on execution on the certificate of title.

The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents‘ theory when it ruled:

The above staled conclusion of the lower court is based on the

premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-appellees is still effective
despite the lapse of 30 days from the date of registration. However, under
the provisions of Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be
effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of its registration.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

The lower court erred in holding that the rule on the 30-day period for adverse claim
under Section 70 of P.D No. 1529 is absolute inasmuch as it failed to read or construe the
provision in its entirety and to reconcile the apparent inconsistency within the provision in
order to give effect to it as a whole.

RULING:

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent CA dated October 17, 1991
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC finding for the cancellation
of the notice of levy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby
REINSTATED. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is
hereby CANCELLED.

The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the TCT still in force
when private respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and
annotated in the said title, considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it
was annotated ? (Pilares argues that the adverse claim ceases to have any legal force and
effect (30) days after August 27, 1984 pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529).

In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious
whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different
from the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with those
with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse
claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of
P.D. 1529 provides: “The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the
date of registration.”
 At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the
adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated
separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads: After the
lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
verified petition therefor by the party in interest.

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect
after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing
caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it
has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required
the party in interest to do a useless act. The law, taken together, simply means that
the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective; otherwise, the
inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property.

To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long
time to complete payments on their property, convinced that their interest was amply
protected by the inscribed adverse claim.

In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the TCT No. N-79073 was still
in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the
notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the
property sought to be levied upon the execution was encumbered by an interest the same as
or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over
the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.
 CHAPTER 16
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES
_________________________________________________________________________

AKBAYAN - Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II - Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI,

PATRICIA Q. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY
ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE
MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION, respondents.

G.R. No. 147066

26 March 2001

FACTS:

Petitioners―representing the youth sector―seek to direct the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the 14 May 2001 General
Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth
failed to register on or before the 27 December 2000 deadline set by the respondent
COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the
Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only is submitted but was then
denied by the COMELEC under Resolution No. 3584 on 8 February 2001.

Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.

Section 8 (System of Continuing Registration of Voters) of R.A. No. 8189 The Voter‘s
Registration Act of 1996 provides: The personal filing of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing COMELEC Resolution dated 8 February 2001.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters
during the period between the COMELEC‘s imposed 27 December 2000 deadline
and the 14 May 2001 general elections.

RULING:

1. It is well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. A two-day
special registration for new voters would give rise to time constraints due to
additional pre-election matters. Accordingly, COMELEC acted within the bounds and
confines of the applicable law on the matter. In issuing the assailed Resolution,
respondent simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

2. The Supreme Court cannot control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where
the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court. The remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
 PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Represented by
Mr. Renato P. Legaspi, President/CEO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 188866

October 19, 2011

FACTS:

 Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), formerly the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA), and Green Asia Construction & Development Corporation (hereinafter
Green Asia) were parties to a contract for a road network/storm drainage project.
 Tagumpay R. Jardiniano, administrator of the then EPZA and Renato P. Legaspi, the
president of Green Asia, signed the contract on 23 September 1992.
 The stipulations in the contract include (1) the contract price, (2) the mode of payment,
(3) advance payment, and (4) the progress payment.
 On 26 March 1996, Green Asia sent a letter to the PEZA Director General, invoking
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1594, notifying PEZA of Green Asia‘s claim for price
escalation in the amount of P 9,860,169.58.
 This claim was denied by PEZA. The denial of the claim was anchored on Green Asia‘s
failure to establish that the increase in the cost of labor, equipment, materials and
supplies required for the construction were due to the direct acts of the government.
 Despite the denial, Green Asia insisted on its claim and followed it up with three letters
sent to PEZA from 1997 to 2000, which were all denied by PEZA.
 The exchanges of correspondence pertaining to Green Asia‘s claim continued until 2006.
PEZA was, however, consistent in its position that Green Asia was not entitled to its
claim, as the latter failed to prove the legal necessity of applying the price escalation
provided for in PD 1594.
 In its letter dated 30 November 2006, PEZA pointed out that the contract price was fixed,
as stipulated in Article IV of the contract, and that this provision was in effect a waiver of
the provisions of PD 1594.
 On 2 August 2007, Green Asia sent to PEZA another notice, labeled ―final demand
notice,‖ a copy of which was furnished to the Office of the President.
 Green Asia disagreed with PEZA and posited that the fact that the contract stipulated a
fixed price did not mean that it was the final receivable amount for the contractor. The
fixed price, according to Green Asia, would apply only when the work orders in the
construction did not vary during the construction period.
 Subsequent to the final demand notice to PEZA, Green Asia sent then PGMA a letter
with the heading ―Appeal for the Settlement of Unpaid Claims for Price Escalation Under
Project of the Philippines Economic Zone Authority.‖
 In this letter, Green Asia asked PGMA to intervene for the affirmative resolution of its
claim against PEZA.
 The Office of the President (OP) took cognizance of the letter as an appeal and ordered
Green Asia to pay the appeal fee and PEZA to forward the complete records of the case.
 After summary proceedings in the OP, the case was decided in favor of Green Asia and
PEZA was ordered to pay claimant the total amount of P12,360,526.70 plus interest.
 The OP‘s reason for granting Green Asia‘s claim was that proof of increase in relevant
construction prices due to the direct acts of the government was not required by law,
before a price escalation may be invoked.
 The OP also interpreted the phrase ―due to direct acts of the Government.‖ It held that
PD 454, a prior enactment on government infrastructure projects, authorized price
escalation; and that ―direct acts of the government‖ included increases in the prices of
 gasoline, fuel oil and cement. It was, therefore, not necessary to actually show that the
prices of those commodities increased because of the direct acts of the government.
 In effect, the OP Decision held that price escalation is automatically awarded to
contractors of all government infrastructure projects.
 The CA sustained the OP Decision. It found the OP‘s construction of PD 1594, in
connection with PD 454, proper. Since PD 1594 did not expressly repeal PD 454, and
since there was no apparent conflict between the two laws, the appellate court deemed it
best to harmonize them. The result was again a favorable decision to Green Asia.
 PEZA appealed CA‘s decision. It argues that certain conditions must be met before an
adjustment of the contract made be made: (1) there was an increase or decrease the
cost of labor, equipment, materials and supplies for construction; (2) the said increase or
decrease is due to the direct acts of the government.

ISSUE:

Whether PD 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price increase of
construction materials was due to the direct acts of the government before a price escalation
is granted in this payment dispute in a construction contract.

RULING:

No, there was no need to prove that the price increase was due to acts of the
government. Proof of increase is sufficient to grant payment for price escalation.

The phrase was first used in RA 1595, which was amended by PD 454. The latter
amended RA 1595 by supplying the meaning of the phrase ―direct acts of the government‖
and expressly including the increase of prices of gasoline within the coverage of that
phrase.

Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the phrase without supplying a contrary or

different definition, the definition provided by the earlier enacted PD 454 was deemed
adopted by the later decree.

Thus, proof of an increase in fuel and cement price and a subsequent increase in the
cost of labor and relevant construction materials during the contract period are considered a
compliance with the IRR requirements for a claim for price escalation.

It was therefore wrong for PEZA to disregard PD 454 by automatically denying the
claim of Green Asia for price escalation or to require the latter to prove that the increase in
the construction cost was due to the direct acts of the government. PD 454 actually bridges
the gap between PD 1594 and its IRR. PD 1594 no longer explains the provision on price
adjustment, because it is already found in PD 454 and in older laws.

Section 1 of PD 454 provides: If during the effectivity of the contract, the cost of
labor, materials, equipment rentals and supplies for construction should increase or
decrease due to the direct acts of the government; and for purposes of this Decree the
increase of prices of gasoline and other fuel oils, and of cement shall be considered direct
acts of the Government;
 TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182249

March 5, 2013

FACTS:

August 30, 2001, Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as

Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was
included in TIDCORP‘s Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was
submitted to the CSC – Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office.

September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman‘s

appointment because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in
the DBM‘s Index of Occupational Service.

TIDCORP‘s Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation

of De Guzman‘s appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC- NCR. According to
Tambanillo, Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORP‘s charter, empowers its
Board of Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to
approve its own compensation and position classification system and qualification standards.

CSC-NCR Director Padilla denied Tambanillo‘s appeal because De Guzman‘s

appointment failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
which requires that the position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform
with the approved Position Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational
Service. Since the position of Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the
Index of Occupational Service, de Guzman‘s appointment to this position must be invalid.

TIDCORP‘s President and CEO Joel C. Valdes sent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David a Letter appealing Director Padilla‘s decision to the CSC-Central Office
(CO). Valdes reiterated TIDCORP‘s argument that RA 8494 authorized its Board of Directors
to determine its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and exempted TIDCORP
from all existing laws on compensation, position classification and qualification standards.

In its Resolution No. 30144, the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR‘s decision that de
Guzman‘s appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, as
amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15. Rule III, Section 1(c) is explicit in requiring
that the position title indicated in the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation
List and found in the Index of Occupational Service. Otherwise, the appointment shall be
disapproved. In disallowing De Guzman‘s appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director
Bugtong was simply following the letter of the law.

TIDCORP moved to reconsider the CSC-CO‘s decision, but this motion was denied,
prompting TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The petition asserted
that the CSC-CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 030144 and
Resolution No. 031037.

CA denied TIDCORP‘s petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in Resolution
No. 30144 and Resolution No. 31037. The CA noted that filing a petition for certiorari was an
improper recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review under Section 1,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, brushed aside the procedural defect, ruling
that the assailed resolutions should still stand as they are consistent with law and
jurisprudence.

In its present petition for review on certiorari, TIDCORP argued that the CSC‘s
interpretation of RA 8494 is misplaced

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant

to the Position Classification Act despite its exemption from laws involving position
classification.

RULING:

No, under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis is derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) and rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent and preclude the
court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

The phrase "to endeavour" means to "to devote serious and sustained effort" and "to
make an effort to do." It is synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek. The
use of "to endeavour" in the context of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORP‘s exemption
from laws involving compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it
should still strive to conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in
RA 6758. The phrase "as closely as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP‘s duty "to
endeavour to conform," recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from the
Position Classification Act, but it should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes.
Had the intent of Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply
with the Position Classification Act, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead,
the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavour to conform to the principles and modes of
RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.
 BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO, DD, PABLO R. MANALAST AS, JR., PhD, MARIA
CORAZON AKOL, CONCEPCION B. REGALADO, HECTOR A. BARRIOS, LEO Y.
QUERUBIN, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, FELIX P. MUGA, II, PhD, ATTY. GREGORIO T.
FABROS, EVITA L. JIMENEZ, and JAIME DL CARO, PhD, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EN BANC, represented by Acting Chairperson
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and SMARTMATIC-TIM CORPORATION, represented by
Smartmatic Asia-Pacific President CESAR FLORES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 216098

April 21, 2015

FACTS:

 Pabillo filed a case for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC resolution (No. 9222)
approving a direct contract with Smartmatic for the PCOS machines and extended
warranty program dated January 30, 2015.
 Pabillo contends that it is violative of the GPRA (Procurement Law)
 Under R.A. No. 9369, the COMELEC is authorized to use an Automated Election
System.
 May 10, 2010 – beginning of 10 year warranty for parts, labor, technical support and
maintenance.
 Nov. 11, 2013 – Smartmatic proposed to ―extend‖ the warranty of PCOS machines for 3
years (for 2014-2016 elections) including diagnostics of all existing PCOS machines and
preparations for the elections.
 On Dec. 23, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9222 which approved the
extended warranty for P300M via direct contract.
 After negotiations, it was reduced to P240M.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the resolution adopting the extended warranty is valid.

RULING:

No. Resolution No. 9222 is void for being violative of the GPRA. Alternative methods
of procurement are allowed when (GPRA IRR):
1.) There is prior approval of the head of the procuring entity on the use of
alternative methods of procurement.
2.) The conditions required by law for the use of alternative methods are present.
3.) Procuring entity must ensure that the method chosen promotes economy and
efficiency.
4.) The most advantageous price is obtained.
5.) The conditions required by law are not present (requisite 2). The parameters for
valid direct contracting are found in Section 50, Article XVI of the GPRA. 7 Here,
the 10 year warranty by Smartmatic only provides for a warranty on availability
and access to purchase of parts and services (Smartmatic only warranted a 1
year replacement). Part of the AES procurement project is that Smartmatic must
train COMELEC personnel to service the machines. This, coupled with the
availability of parts (10 years) should mean that COMELEC already has the
means to service the machines. The extended warranty is premature. Lastly, it is
not a continuing contract (extension), it is a new contract, with a new offer and
consideration with a new payment.
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F.
CEZAR, Respondents.

G.R. No. 176162

October 9, 2012

FACTS:

Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were

the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) in 2005.

On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal
Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty,
grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically
the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the
Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending criminal and
administrative cases, despite the fact that Guevarra and Cezar have 17 cases pending
before the Sandiganbayan.

On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) formally charged Guevarra
with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare
Absence of Prima Facie Case. This was denied and Guevarra was subsequently placed
under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days.

Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered
its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions
of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction citing EO 292 (Administrative Code
of 1987) which states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities "shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction" thereby bestowing upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra
and Cezar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

YES, According to the SC, the CSC have original jurisdiction over cases filed to it.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to discipline its
officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal.

Based on the constitution, the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1341, PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or
controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service
and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292

In the case of Camacho v. Gloria, the SC stated that under E.O. No. 292, a complaint
against a state university official may be filed with either the university‘s Board of Regents or
directly with the Civil Service Commission.

This is further emphasized on Sec. 4 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases

stating that ―The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal‖. Also, Sec. 7 of the same rules
further provides that ―Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and
other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over
their respective officers and employees.‖ These rules, according to the SC, are a reasonable
interpretation of EO 292 (Administrative Code).

This concurrent jurisdiction means that if a case is filed to the CSC and the CSC
assumes jurisdiction over the case, then it shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction (The disciplinary tribunal of PUP or its Board of regents in
this particular case). Even if the CSC delegates the investigation to other department or
agency like the disciplinary tribunal, it does not deprive the CSC of its jurisdiction. In the
same way, if the Disciplinary tribunal of PUP or its Board of Regents takes jurisdiction over
the case, it shall be to the exclusion of the CSC.

OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED:

 On the issue that EO 292 expressly mentions ―A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee,‖ the SC held
that a literal interpretation is unreasonable as this would mean that only private citizens
can file directly to the CSC and that government employees could only appeal decisions
to CSC. It is unreasonable as it would be tantamount to disenfranchising government
employees. That is why the SC ruled that even government employees can file directly to
the CSC

 On WON there is distinction between career and non career: NONE. All members of the
civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law.
Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the
CSC.
 GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P. ALDON, and RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 215847

January 12, 2016

FACTS:

Sec. 261 (d) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits coercion of subordinates
by public officers. Sec. 68 empowers the Commission on Elections to administratively
disqualify any candidate who violates these provisions. Later, R.A. 7890 expressly repealed
Sec. 261 (d) and increased the penalty for grave coercion in the RPC if the said felony was
committed in violation of a person‘s right to suffrage.

COMELEC Resolution 9385 set the election period for the May 2013 elections from
January 13, 2013 to June 12, 2013. An administrative complaint was filed against Mayor
Roquero. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) recommended that Governor Javier
preventively suspend Roquero. Roquero filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the SP and Javier. The RTC granted a preliminary injunction. Javier, Vice
Gov Dimamay, and the SP filed for certiorari with the CA which issued a TRO. COMELEC
issued Resolution 9581, prohibiting the suspension of any elected city officer, among others,
during the election period for the May 2013 elections.

The RTC then decided the case in favor of Roquero, ordering Javier not to suspend
Roquero. However, Javier, through an executive order, preventively suspended Roquero.
The SP also suspended Roquero.

Aldon and Raymundo Roquero filed a petition for disqualification with the COMELEC
against Javier on the ground of Sec. 261 (d). After the elections wherein Javier won for
Governor, the COMELEC 2nd division issued a resolution disqualifying Javier and annulling
his proclamation, on the basis of Sec 261 (d). It held that although Sec. 261 (d) has been
repealed, the repeal did not remove coercion as a ground for disqualification under Sec. 68.
Also, there was no implied repeal under the general repealing clause. However, the case
was elevated to the en banc because the voting was 1 in favor, 1 against, and 1 not
participating.

The COMELEC en banc agreed as a matter of internal agreement to submit their

opinion or concur with either of division Commissioners who made their vote. In the en banc,
there was a 4-2-1 vote in favor of disqualification. Hence, Javier was disqualified and his
proclamation annulled.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1.) WON Resolution No. 9581 fixing the 2013 election period from January 13, 2013 until
June 12, 2013, for the purpose of determining administrative and criminal liability for
election offenses, is valid?

2.) WON there was lack of due process?

3.) WON a Commissioner who did not take part in the proceedings before the Division is not
allowed to participate in the en banc proceedings?

4.) WON the internal agreement of the COMELEC en banc was valid?

5.) WON R.A. No. 7890 removed coercion as a ground for disqualification under Section 68
of the Election Code?

RULING:

1. Yes. The Constitution provides that unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special
cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and
shall end thirty days thereafter. The import of this provision is repeated in the Omnibus
Election Code. The 120-day period is merely the default period.

Congress has already defined the elements of elections offenses, some of which may be
committed only during the election period. The power of the COMELEC to fix the election
period, only during which certain offenses may be committed, does not change what the
offense is or how it is committed.

2. No. Disqualification cases are summary in nature and are not criminal prosecution
cases. Being so, the due process requirements are different. Hence, the preliminary
investigation under Sec. 265 of the Omnibus Election Code does not apply.

A formal hearing is not always necessary and the observance of technical rules of
procedure is not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. The essence of administrative
due process is the right to be heard and to be given an opportunity to explain one's side.
Where the Commission hears both sides and considers their contentions, the requirements
of administrative due process are complied with. Hence, it was not necessary that there be
subsequent hearings and the submission of other pleadings and pieces of evidence.

3. No. The rule is that if a Commissioner is inhibited, he would not be allowed to participate.
In this case, the Commissioner who did not participate in the Second Division
proceedings did not inhibit himself. He merely did not participate.

4. Yes. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly provides that the rules are to be
liberally construed and in the interest of speedy disposition of cases, the rules may be
suspended. The COMELEC as a body suspended the requirement of consultation by
dispensing with the preparation of another ponencia by voting on the opinions of the
Commissioners in the Second Division.

Moreover, this method was resorted to because three Commissioners were retiring soon.
There was a need to resolve the cases to prevent further delay. ―Midnight decisions‖ are not
illegal. Judges and quasi-judicial officers may not refuse to do their duties just because there
are about to retire or their term is about to expire.

5. Yes. R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Sec. 261 (d). The effect of this repeal is to remove
Section 261 (d) from among those listed as ground for disqualification under Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code. Contrary to the ruling of the COMELEC, the
harmonization of laws can only be had when the repeal is implied, not when it is express.

Because of this express repeal, there was no basis to dismiss Javier since jurisdiction to
disqualify candidates is limited to those under Sec. 68. Hence, there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC.
 LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,
vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 186739-960

April 17, 2013

FACTS:

Leovegildo Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to
2004. During his term, he organized a multi-sectoral consultative assembly composed of
civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of
regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products. To regulate the
said products, the mayor shall issue a permit to transport after payment of corresponding
fees to the municipal treasurer.

There and then, 221 information for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC were filed against
Ruzol and the municipal administrator Guillermo Sabiduria claiming that the authority to
issue said permit belongs to the DENR.

Ruzol’s defense: As mayor, he is authorized to issue said permits pursuant to RA

7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also those powers that are
necessarily implied from the powers granted as well as those that are necessary,
appropriate or incidental to the LGU‘s efficient and effective governance. LGU is given
powers that are essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants.

RA 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of DENR and LGU, and
the permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage and
control communal forests with an area not exceeding 50 square kilometres. Under the said
law, the municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
fees in accordance therewith. The only kind of document the DENR issues is denominated
―certificate of timber origin‖ and ―certificate of lumber origin.‖ There was no proof of
conspiracy between the two accused.

The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the 221
Transport permits through the PENR officer Rogelio Delgado, Sr., in a multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly.

Sandiganbayan: Acquitted Sabiduria but found Ruzol guilty as charged. under Sec 5
of PD 705 (Forestry Code), the DENR shall be responsible for the protection, development,
management, regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and supervision
of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the taking or use of forest products
therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof.

In RA 7160, it was determined that since the authority relative to salvage forest
products was not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative
authority to issue transport permits remains with the DENR, and thus cannot be exercised by
the LGU.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products
solely with the DENR and no one else.
2. W/N the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are valid.
3. W/N Ruzol is guilty of usurpation of official function.
RULING:
1. No. The Court ruled that the authority to issue transport permits does not remain
exclusively with the DENR. LGU, under LGC of 1991, has ample authority to promulgate
rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products,
provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully
complied with.
2. No, the Court held that the permits issued by Ruzol are invalid for failure to comply with
the procedural requirements set forth by law.

The Court held that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the subject permits
with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges
under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an
appropriate ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed,
as stated by Sec. 444 of the LGC that the authority of the municipal mayor to issue
licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." Needless to say, one
of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue is
generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance."

3. No. Ruzol is not guilty of usurpation of official function for DENR is not the sole
government agency vested with the authority to issue said permits pursuant to the
general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned
from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace
the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance
of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the
official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing
that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in
lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the
DENR.

Contrary to the claim of Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith to regulate and
monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of
untoward illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to
transport was not Ruzol‘s decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the
collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.

As a final note, the Court emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is
placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether in an
official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the
environment is not only a responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and should
freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest denudation, environmental degradation and
plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in
the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.
 BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. V. PROVINCE OF AKLAN

G.R. No. 196870

June 26, 2012

FACTS:
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future,
respondent Province of Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan,
Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan
Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito Marquez to file an application with
respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore
area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated on the possible expansion from
its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to
maximize the utilization of its resources.

After PRA‘s approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued
to the Province Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned
ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along
the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.

On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that
the land use development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational
and institutional and other applicable uses. It was at this point that the Province deemed it
necessary to conduct a series of public consultation meetings.

On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan
of the Municipality of Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization
composed of some 160 businessmen and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong
opposition to the reclamation project on environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.

Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a
notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the
project. Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant Petition for
Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter,
the Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the
respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.

The Petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:

 the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned;
 the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required
by the Local Government Code (LGC).

The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of
DENR-EMB RVI and PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said
government agencies, as well as the recent enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan
and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing the said
project, had ―categorically addressed all the issues‖ raised by the BFI in its Petition. It also
considered the Petition to be premature for lack of cause of action due to the failure of BFI to
fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative

remedies before filing this case?
 2. WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project?

RULING:

1. On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies

The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative
remedies and to observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents.

The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they clarified that
the rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not
applicable where, among others, there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention such as in the instant case. The rule may also be disregarded when it does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy or where the protestant has no other
recourse.

Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC,
provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil
action that may be availed of ―to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by
law‖ and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO ―as an auxiliary remedy prior to the
issuance of the writ itself.‖

The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in
the proper court when any government agency or instrumentality or officer thereof
―unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
xxx in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation
or a right therein, xxx and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.‖ Such proper court may be the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of
Appeals, or the Supreme Court.

Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local importance
raised that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection.

Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus ―permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
court‘s decision‖ and, in order to do this, ―the court may compel the submission of
compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other
means to monitor compliance with its decision.‖

2. On the issue of whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation
for the project

The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for
the project.

The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government
agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance and requires them to secure prior public
consultations and approval of local government units. In Province of Rizal v. Executive
Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the Local Government Code, two requisites
must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance
of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. The
absence of either of such mandatory requirements will render the project‘s implementation
as illegal.

Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities. In one ruling, the Court noted
that such national projects mentioned in Section 27 of the LGC include those that may cause
pollution and bring about climate change, among others, such as the reclamation project in
this case.

Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should ―initiate public
consultations early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders
are taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan‖.

Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRA‘s power to reclaim
land in this case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However, the information
dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to
comply with the requirements under the LGC.

Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the
subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of
Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the
urging and insistence of the Province.
 FIDEL M. BAÑARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAÑARES, EMILIA
GATCHALIAN and FIDEL BESARINO, petitioners,
vs.
ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R.
TEJONES, ANDREA SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA,
ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA ESTORES, EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION,
DANNY ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES
AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo, Rizal, respondents.

G.R. No. 132624

March 13, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Fidel M. Bañares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Bañares, Emilia

Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa filed by
the private respondents. The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch II. After petitioner's arraignment, they then filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that they did not undergo Barangay conciliation with the opposing parties considering
that they live in the same barangay and the amount involved does not exceed Two Hundred
Pesos (Php 200.00).

On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the
sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (referral to Lupon). Roughly two months after,
respondents filed a motion to revive the case on the ground that it already complied with the
conciliation proceedings before the Lupon. Petitioners filed their comment and opposition to
the same alleging that the order dismissing the case had long been final and executory,
hence, respondent's only remedy is to re-file the cases.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality
if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be
revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was
dismissed without prejudice still have jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the
order of dismissal has become final and executory.

RULING:

Petitioners' contentions are meritorious.

A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to
be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. 29 As
distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.

This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final
order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.

The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's
decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the
same.

After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore
becomes outside the court's power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the
case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.

Thus, the regional trial court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and
prohibition and ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995
dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality
and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.

Equally erroneous is private respondents' contention that the rules regarding finality of
judgments under the Revised Rules of Court 40 do not apply to cases covered by the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were
dismissed for failure to submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required
under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code. The said
provision states: Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 41 where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived
only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to
criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.

There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents' view.
Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the
same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to
barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration
to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period
within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.

Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules
of Court applies suppletorily to cases covered by the former: Sec. 22. Applicability of the
regular rules. — The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the
special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not
inconsistent therewith.

Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the
prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion
for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality. 46 Hence, the
principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi, or that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes
as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence 47 applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.

The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our
conclusion that said doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure: The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the
judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law.

It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary
procedure especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle
these cases expeditiously.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the
municipal trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required
under the Local Government Code of 1991 51 may be raised in a motion to dismiss even
after the accused has been arraigned.

It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required
under the law 52 is not jurisdictional in nature 53 and may therefore be deemed waived if not
raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. 54The Court notes that although petitioners could
have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the
failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received
the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their arraignment.

However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against
petitioners on the ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing
thereof in court although said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no
longer be revoked at present considering that the same had already become final and
executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled 55 by the Municipal Trial Court,
nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court.
 PURIFICACION M. VDA. DE URBANO, PEDRO DE CASTRO, AURELIO I. ARRIENDA,
ARNEL U. ARRIENDA, ALBERT U. ARRIENDA, ALICE A. PEDRON and MARILYN C.
BILOG, petitioners,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,
ZACARIAS BELTRAN, JR., MARCIAL SECOQUIAN and CRISPINA DELA
CRUZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 137904

October 19, 2001

FACTS:

In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200-square meter property in Quezon City to the
respondent GSIS to secure a housing loan of P47,000.00. As petitioners failed to pay their
loan when it fell due, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage on October 28, 1983. With a bid of
P154,896.00, GSIS emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction of the property.

In a bid to redeem their property, petitioner Arnel Arrienda wrote on September 26,
1984 to the Acquired Assets Department (AAD) of the GSIS signifying the petitioners‘
intention to redeem their property. Two days after or on September 28, petitioner vda. de
Urbano wrote the GSIS Board of Trustees (the ―Board‖) to inform them of her desire to
redeem the subject property and for advice on the procedure for redemption.3 GSIS
responded on October 16, 1984 advising her to pay the total redemption price of
P154,896.00 on or before the expiry date of redemption on November 18, 1984 in full and in
cash, failing which the property would be offered for sale through public bidding.

On October 29, 1984, petitioner vda. de Urbano requested for more time to redeem
the subject property. In a letter dated January 10, 1985, AAD Manager Marcial Secoquian
informed petitioners that the Board adopted Resolution No. 929 on November 16, 1984
approving the ―sale of the subject property to petitioner Purificacion Urbano for the sum of
P174,572.62, provided that the aforesaid price shall be paid in CASH, within sixty (60) days
from notice of this resolution, failing which, the property shall be sold thru public bidding with
the fair market value of the property as the minimum bid price.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have the right to repurchase?

RULING:

They are not entitled to repurchase as a matter of right. The Board exercised its
discretion in accordance with law in denying their requests and the GSIS cannot be faulted
for petitioners‘ failure to repurchase as it acted upon petitioners‘ application under the
Operation Pabahay. The sale of the subject property to respondent dela Cruz cannot
therefore be annulled on the basis of petitioners‘ alleged right to repurchase.

P.D. 1146 was amended by P.D. 1981 dated July 19, 1985 as follows:

―WHEREAS, the GSIS Board of Trustees should be vested with powers and
authority necessary or proper to ensure a fair and profitable return of the
investments of the funds administered by the GSIS, and, for this purpose, the
GSIS Board of Trustees should be given full and sole responsibility of controlling
and monitoring insurance investments operations and fixing and determining the
 terms and conditions of financial accommodations to its members, including the
power to compromise or release any claim or settled liability to the GSIS;

WHEREAS, it has thus become necessary to amend Presidential Decree No.

1146 to clarify some of its provisions to make it more responsive to the needs of
the members of the GSIS and to assure the actuarial solvency of the Fund
administered by the GSIS during these times of grave economic crisis affecting
the country;

Sec. 7. There is hereby incorporated a new paragraph after the third paragraph of Section
36, which shall read as follows:

―The Board of Trustees has the following powers and functions, among others:
(a) To formulate the policies, guidelines and programs to effectively carry out the
purposes and objectives of this Act;

(f) The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, to compromise or

release, in whole or in part, any claim or settled liability to the System, regardless
of the amount involved, under such terms and conditions as it may impose for the
best interest of the System; . . .‖ (emphasis supplied)

The above laws grant the GSIS Board of Trustees (the ―Board‖) the power, nay, the
responsibility, to exercise discretion in ―determining the terms and conditions of financial
accommodations to its members‖ with the dual purpose of making the GSIS ―more
responsive to the needs of the members of the GSIS‖ and assuring ―the actuarial solvency of
the Fund administered by the GSIS.‖ As mandated by P.D. 1146, this discretion may be
exercised in acquiring, utilizing or disposing of, in any manner recognized by law, ―real or
personal properties in the Philippines or elsewhere necessary to carry out the purposes of
this Act.‖ Contrary to petitioners‘ position, there is no restriction or qualification that the GSIS
should dispose of its real properties in favor only of GSIS members. Based on these laws,
the Board could exercise its discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioners‘ offer to
repurchase the subject property taking into account the dual purpose enunciated in the
―whereas clause‖ of P.D. 1981, i.e., making the GSIS ―more responsive to the needs of the
members of the GSIS‖ and assuring ―the actuarial solvency of the Fund administered by the
GSIS.
 GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Special 17th Division, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RENATO S. DE
VILLA, DEPT. OF INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY JOEY
LINA,*UNDERSECRETARY EDUARDO R. SOLIMAN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10, DIRECTOR
RODOLFO Z. RAZUL, respondents.

G.R. No. 154616

July 12, 2004

Facts:

The Office of the President issued a resolution, dated March 22 2001 (during the
election period) suspending Gov. Calingin for 90 days. 12 days after, he filed before the
Office a motion for reconsideration. On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Soliman of the DILG
issued a memorandum implementing said resolution.

The DILG Memorandum was with the authority of the COMELEC which gave an
exemption to suspend elective officials during the election period from January 2, 2001 to
July 13, 2001.

Calingin filed a petitioner for prohibition before the CA, but the petition was dismissed.
Hence the appeal.

Petitioner contends that the decisions of the Office of the President on cases where it
has original jurisdiction such as those involving a Provincial Governor will become final and
executory only after the lapse of 15 days from the receipt and that filing a motion for recon
would suspend the running of that period. He further contends that the provision in the LGC
saying that decisions of the Office of the President, will not apply to his case.

Issue:

WON the decision is final and executor?

RULING:

Petition was denied. The Court said that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially intended for the case must prevail.

The case involves a disciplinary action against an elective local official. Thus, the
Local Government Code is the applicable law and must prevail over the Administrative Code
which is of general application

Further, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than the
Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with the later law are repealed or modified accordingly.

Since no motion for recon is allowed by law but parties may appeal to the CA and
that the LGC says that the decisions of the Office of the President are executory even
pending appeal, then the decision is final and executory.
 GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the
Office of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.

G.R. No. 142261

June 29, 2000

FACTS:

Gov. Manuel Lapid & 5 other government officials were charged with alleged
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
allegedly having conspired among themselves in demanding & collecting from various
quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per
truckload of sand, gravel or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial
ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for such collection.

The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for misconduct, which
meted out the penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989).

The DILG implemented the said Ombudsman decision.

Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman decision had not yet become
final, petitioner argued that writs of prohibition & mandamus may be issued against the DILG
for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.

Issue:

WON the Ombudsman‘s Decision finding petitioner administratively liable for

misconduct & imposing upon him a penalty of 1yr suspension without pay is immediately
executory pending appeal.

Held:

Sec.27 of RA 6770 provides that ―Any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month‘s salary
shall be final and unappealable.‖

The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contains a similar
provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides: ―where the respondent is absolved
of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of 10 days from receipt thereof by
the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been
filed by him as prescribed in Section 27of R.A. 6770.‖

The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final and
unappealable. The legal maxim ―inclusio unius est exclusio alterus‖ finds application. The
express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear
import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman which impose penalties not enumerated in the said section are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the
instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.

A judgment becomes ―final and executory‖ by operation of law. The fact that the
Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry
with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these
judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.

The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory
only after it has become final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception
to this general rule.

There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies are immediately executory.

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial
agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.

Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will
not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise. Final
order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.

Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.

It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply
to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over
the other. Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is
this law alone which should govern his case.

It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No.
07, mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is
other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary or
fine equivalent to one month salary are still appealable and hence, not final and executory.
 MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169202

March 5, 2010

FACTS:

Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza.

Her Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed ―Rallonza‖ as her
surname, ―Maria Virginia‖ as her given name, and ―Remo‖ as her middle name. While her
marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to
her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied,
she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign
Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use
her husband‘s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the
married name has not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under
the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a
woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage,
divorce, and death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary‘s
ruling. The CA also affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme
Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was
an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her
maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin v Honorable Judge Shari‘a
District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband‘s surname in her expired
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage.

RULING:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her
marriage subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin v
Honorable Judge Shari‘a District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an
obligation, to use her husband‘s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from
continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change
her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. RA 8239,
including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from
using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to
use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband‘s surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband‘s
surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband‘s
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her
maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her
maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband‘s surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or
(4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo‘s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume
her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman‘s
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the
marriage.
 LICHAUCO & COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs. SILVERIO APOSTOL, as Director of Agriculture, and RAFAEL CORPUS, as
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondents.

G.R. No. L-19628

December 4, 1922

FACTS:

Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under the Phil. laws, engaged for several
years in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals, and was desirous of
importing, from Pnom-Pehn, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture
of serum. However, respondent Director of Agriculture refused to admit said cattle except
upon condition that drafts be immunized. Petitioner however contends that the respondent
has no authority over the matter, invoking section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3052. On the other hand, relying upon section 1770 of the
Administrative Code, Admin. Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, and Dept. Order No.
6 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondent maintained its decision.
Hence, the issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not section 1770 (and other similar acts) has been repealed by
implication by Act 3052 and hence cannot be applied with the case at bar?

RULING:

No. The Court ruled that the contention of the petitioner is untenable for the reason
that the invoked section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature while 1770 is a
particular one. Section 1770 is therefore not inconsistent with section 1762 and instead be
considered a special qualification of the latter provision. Moreover, the court emphasized
that ―specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon a
same subject unless it clearly appears that the provision of the two laws are so
repugnant..xxx…The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the
law of the particular subject and the other as the general law of the land.‖ Therefore, Section
1770 of the Administrative Code remains in effect and serves as a supplementary provision
to section 1762, as amended.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.

G.R. No. 156117

May 26, 2005

FACTS:

The Herbieto (D) brothers, Jeremias and David, filed with the MTC a single
application for registration of two parcels of land located in Consolacion, Cebu. They claimed
to be owners having purchased the lots from their parents.

The government (P) opposed the registration arguing that: (1) the Herbieto's (D)
failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by law; (2) their (D) evidence
were insufficient to prove ownership; and (3) the Subject Lots were part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.

The MTC set the initial hearing on September 3, 1999. All owners of the land
adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. A copy of the
Notice was also posted on July 27, 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well
as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu. Finally, the Notice
was also published in the Official Gazette on August 2, 1999 and The Freeman Banat
News on December 19, 1999.

ISSUE:

Did the MTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

No. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to
such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof.
Therefore, the MTC Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of
respondents Jeremias and David (D) as well as the MTC Order declaring its Judgment of
final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without
jurisdiction.
 GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondent.

G.R. No. 195540

March 13, 2013

FACTS:

On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation executed a Real

Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over three parcels of land. The mortgage
secured the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan granted to petitioner. Petitioner failed to
settle its loan obligation, so respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December
13, 2000. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001.
On February 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered.

In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioner‘s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed
properties by tendering a check. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no
longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered and consolidated
in favor of respondent March 9, 2001.

Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages contending that
the 1-year period of redemption under Act 3135 should apply, and not the shorter
redemption period under RA 8791 as applying RA 8791 would result in the impairment of
obligations of contracts and would violate the equal protection clause under the constitution.

The RTC dismissed the action of the petitioner ruling that redemption was made
belatedly and that there was no redemption made at all. The CA affirmed the RTC, thus this
petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the redemption period should be the 1-year period provided under Act
3135, and not the shorter period under RA 8791 as the parties expressly agreed that
foreclosure would be in accordance with Act 3135.

RULING:

No. The shorter period under RA 8791 should apply. The one-year period of
redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. In this case,
the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioner‘s default and
the latter‘s entire loan obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the
mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance
with Act No. 3135, as amended.

Amending Act no. 3135 is Sec 47 of RA 8791, which stated an exception made in the
case of juridical persons which are allowed to exercise the right of redemption only ―until, but
not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale‖ and in no case more than
three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes first.

The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical
persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 3135. The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner
prescribed by the statute, and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective.
 Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to
time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may
change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
 CHAPTER 17
STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
_________________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 186560 November 17, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs. FERNANDO P. DE LEON, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of

Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140,
which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. The application
was approved by GSIS. Thereafter, and for more than nine years, respondent continuously
received his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he failed to receive his monthly pension.

Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not
qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to apply only to justices and
judges; and that having the same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle respondent
to the retirement benefits provided thereunder. Thus, GSIS stopped the payment of
respondent‘s monthly pension.

Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be
compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits
from 2001. He also asked that GSIS and the DBM be ordered to pay him damages. The CA
resolved to grant the petition. Petitioner GSIS is now assailing the Decision of the CA and
the Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration.

GSIS argues, among others, that the CA erred in issuing a writ of mandamus despite the
absence of any specific and clear right on the part of respondent, since he could not even
specify the benefits to which he is entitled and the law under which he is making the claim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for mandamus filed before the CA was improper.

RULING:

NO. The CA itself acknowledged that it would not indulge in technicalities to resolve the
case, but focus instead on the substantive issues rather than on procedural questions.
Furthermore, courts have the discretion to relax the rules of procedure in order to protect
substantive rights and prevent manifest injustice to a party.

The Court has allowed numerous meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural
defects and lapses. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than to promote substantial justice must always be avoided.
Besides, contrary to petitioner‘s posture, respondent has a clear legal right to the relief
prayed for. Thus, the CA acted correctly when it gave due course to respondent‘s petition for
mandamus.
 G.R. No. 128523 September 28, 1998

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and ZENAIDA LIWANAG, respondents.

FACTS:

The case is an appeal from Court of Appeals. GSIS seeks to reverse the decision (dated 26
February 1997) of CA which granted Zenaida Liwanag compensation under PD 626, and set
aside the decision (dated 27 February 1995) of the Employees‘ Compensation Commission
(ECC).

Zenaida Liwanag is the surviving spouse of the late Jaime Liwanag who died on September
14, 1994. Jaime was 48 years old when he died. He served the police force for 27 years. He
was the Senior Superintendent of PNP when he died.

Prior to his death, he was admitted at the Medical Center of Manila. CT Scan showed
Cirrhosis with probable Hepatocellular CA, HB 5A3 positive. Despite medical intervention,
Jaime Liwanag succumbed to Upper GI Bleeding, Cirrhosis Secondary to Hepatitis B;
Hepatocellular Carcinoma.

Zenaida filed a claim with GSIS for compensation benefits. The claim was denied because
allegedly the cause of death was not an occupational disease under the law. Pursuant to
Sec. 5 Rule 18 of PD 626, Zenaida appealed to Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC). GSIS decision was affirmed.

Zenaida filed a Petition before the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in favor of Zenaida. The court
said that Jaime was physically, medically and mentally fit for the service then he got sick. It
was probable that he acquired the illness in the course of his employment with the PNP.
Death benefits must be given to Zenaida.

The case was brought to the Supreme Court. GSIS contends that PNP forgot that the
investigation was only for purpose of determining the line of duty status of the deceased and
if his ailment was work connected. Also, that Hepatitis B cannot be acquired by mere
mingling with other people who test positive for the illness. There was no medical
proof/evidence.

ISSUE:

W/N the legal standard of what constitutes substantial evidence was construed properly?

RULING:

Petition was granted. There is no dispute that Hepatitis B is not in the list. Therefore, the
burden of proving the causal relationship (by substantial evidence) rests on Zenaida. She
failed to do such. She relied only on the PNP reports and nothing more to substantiate her
claims.

PNP Reports were merely sweeping statements. The degree of contact between Jaime and
the employees who had contracted Hepa B was not established. Statements were not based
on medical findings but on a layman‘s point of view. Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial
Relations: "mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence."
General welfare legislations which are construed liberally include labor laws, tenancy laws,
land reform laws, and social security laws. While general welfare legislations are construed
liberally in favor of those intended to be benefited, this principle only holds true when there is
doubt and ambiguity in the law and not when the law itself is clear and free from any doubt.

PD 626 addresses the issue whether a causal relation existed between a claimant‘s ailment
and his working conditions. Causal relation must be proved by substantial evidence (a
reason accepted by the ECC, a quasi-judicial body). The law would have sided with Zenaida
if she was able to substantiate her claims. Apparently, she did not. As mentioned above,
PNP reports were sweeping statements that cannot be admissible in court.
 G.R. No. 148089 March 24, 2006

JAIME M. BARRIOS, substituted by his heirs, ERLINDA BARRIOS and CHRISTIANNE

JOY BARRIOS, Petitioners,
vs. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION), Respondents.

FACTS:

Jaime M. Barrios, now deceased, substituted by his heirs, wife Erlinda and daughter
Christianne Joy, now petitioners herein, was employed on February 1, 1975 as a driver in
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), respondent. On January 16, 1997, he retired as
Driver-Mechanic 3 after rendering twenty-two (22) years of public service. He was then fifty
(50) years old.

From August 5 to 17, 1996, or five months and 11 days before his retirement, Barrios was
confined at the Lung Center of the Philippines due to chronic renal failure and diabetes
mellitus. Prior thereto, he had been suffering from diabetes for fifteen (15) years. After his
discharge from the Lung Center, his condition did not improve. On October 8-31, 1996, he
was treated at the Manila Doctors Hospital for end stage kidney disease secondary to
diabetic nephropathy. On his second day, he began undergoing dialysis.

On September 2, 1997, Barrios filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
a claim for income benefits, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended.
The GSIS denied his claim on the ground that end stage renal disease and diabetic
nephropathy are not among the compensable occupational diseases listed under Annex "A"
of the Decree; and that there is no showing that his job as a driver-mechanic increased the
risk of contracting the ailments.

Barrios filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the GSIS denied the same. He then appealed
to the Employees‘ Compensation Commission (ECC). On January 15, 1998, while the case
was pending in the ECC, Barrios passed away.

On April 17, 1998, the ECC rendered its Decision affirming the GSIS ruling.

The heirs of Barrios then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. The CA denied
said petition as well as the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are entitled to income benefits under P.D. No. 626

RULING:

Yes, the petitioners are entitled to income benefits under P.D. 626. There is a basis for
inferring that the risk of contracting the disease was aggravated by the employee‘s working
conditions, it is but proper that the ECC, tasked with implementing social legislation, adopt a
liberal attitude in favor of petitioners, like the widow and orphan of the late Barrios.

The Court applied the avowed policy of the State to construe social legislation liberally in
favor of the beneficiaries in line with Article 166 of P.D. No. 626.

The Court granted the petition.

 G.R. No. 181525 March 4, 2009
P'CARLO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs. MANUEL TOLENTINO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Manuel Tolentino (herein respondent) is the owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land with
a total area of 44,275 square meters situated at Sta. Isabel, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-114 (T-71693) and TCT No. T-8989.
He is also the administrator of another parcel of agricultural land, approximately 39,274
square meters in area owned and titled in the name of petitioner‘s brother Eliseo V.
Tolentino.

Petitioner P‘Carlo Castillo is an agricultural lessee of said parcels of land under an

agreement that he will till and cultivate the land and pay Tolentino a total of eleven (11)
cavanes per hectare every harvest season.

On April 25, 1995, Castillo wrote a letter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO)
informing the said office of his intention to construct a concrete water reservoir with a total
area of 2,000 square meters together with a one-meter high dike.

Tolentino wrote the PARO informing the office of his opposition to the planned construction
on the ground that it was totally unnecessary as the free-flowing well located at the said
property was already a good source of irrigation and that the said permanent improvement
might create problems in the future development of the property. Tolentino prayed that the
PARO disallow the proposed construction by the lessee Castillo of the concrete water
reservoir and dike.

Castillo, on the other (hand), went ahead with the construction of the reservoir and the dike.

On May 23, 1995, Tolentino filed a complaint for dispossession with a prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Castillo before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.

On June 1, 1995, the Adjudication Board issued a temporary restraining order against
Castillo ordering him or any other person acting under his authority to desist from continuing
with the construction of the water reservoir and dike on the subject landholding.1avvphi1

On January 22, 1999, the Presiding Adjudicator rendered a Decision ordering the ejectment
of Castillo and directing him to remove the concrete reservoir and dike. Upon receipt of the
decision, Castillo filed on February 25, 1999 a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision
and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on March 24, 1999, all of which (were)
denied.

Hence, on September 27, 1999, Castillo filed a Notice of Appeal to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board or DARAB. DARAB dismissed Castillo‘s appeal and
declared the January 22, 1999 Decision final and executory.

Upon Motion for Reconsideration, however, the DARAB reversed its February 7, 2001
decision and issued the assailed Resolution dated August 28, 2002, ordering Tolentino to
maintain Castillo in his peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding
including the 400 square meters home lot assigned to him. Tolentino filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated December 29, 2004 for lack of merit.

Tolentino filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which granted the petition.
Since private respondent lessee Castillo filed the appeal only on September 27, 1999, such
appeal was therefore filed not within the reglementary period. Castillo moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Castillo‘s appeal before the DARAB was timely filed; and,
2. Whether Castillo‘s construction of a water reservoir in the subject leasehold is proper.

RULING:

1. No, the Court of Appeals erred in failing to take into account that September 25, 1999
was a Saturday. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to
run is to be excluded and the date of performance included; if the last day of the period,
as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the time shall not
run until the next working day.

2. No, the petition lacks merit. Section 32 of R.A. No. 3844 specifically requires notice to
and consent of the agricultural lessor before the agricultural lessee may embark upon
the construction of a permanent irrigation system. It is only when the former refuses to
bear the expenses of construction that the latter may choose to shoulder the same. More
importantly, any change in the use of tillable land in the leasehold, e.g. through the
construction of a sizeable water reservoir, impacts upon the agricultural lessor‘s share in
the harvest, which is the only consideration he receives under the agrarian law. This
being the case, before the agricultural lessee may use the leasehold for a purpose other
than what had been agreed upon, the consent of the agricultural lessor must be
obtained, lest he be dispossessed of his leasehold.

Petition denied.
 G.R. No. 147745 April 9, 2003

MARIA BUENA OBRA, petitioner,

vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (Jollar Industrial Sales and Services
Inc.), respondents.

FACTS:

Juanito Buena Obra, husband of petitioner, worked as a driver for twenty-four (24) years and
five (5) months. His first and second employers were logging companies. Thereafter, he was
employed at Jollar Industrial Sales and Services Inc. as a dump truck driver from January
1980 to June 1988. He was assigned to about 4 projects within that time frame.

On 27 June 1988, Juanito suffered a heart attack while driving a dump truck inside the work
compound, and died shortly thereafter. In the Report of Death submitted by his employer to
the Social Security System (SSS), Juanito expired at the Worker‘s Quarters at 10:30 a.m., of
Myocardial Infarction.

Petitioner Maria M. Buenaobra immediately filed her claim for death benefits under the SSS
law. She started receiving her pension in November 1988. Petitioner was, however, unaware
of the other compensation benefits due her under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
or the Law on Employees‘ Compensation. In September 1998, or more than ten (10) years
after the death of her husband, that she learned of the benefits under P.D. No. 626 through
the television program of then broadcaster Ted Failon who informed that one may claim for
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) benefits if the spouse died while working for
the company. Petitioner prepared the documents to support her claim for ECC benefits. On
23 April 1999, she filed with the SSS her claim for funeral benefits under PD 626.

SSS denied the claim of petitioner for funeral benefits ruling that the cause of death of
Juanito was not work-connected, absent a causal relationship between the illness and the
job. Re-evaluation was also denied. Records were then elevated to the ECC.

ECC dismissed the appeal. It ruled that petitioner failed to show by substantial evidence that
her husband‘s cause of death was due to, or the risk of contracting his ailment was
increased by his occupation and working conditions. Commission also declared that
petitioner‘s claim has prescribed.

CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that petitioner‘s filing of her claim for SSS benefits shortly
after Juanito‘s death did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period for filing EC
claims. It interpreted the aforementioned ECC Resolutions to mean that a claimant must
indicate the kind of claim filed before the running of the prescriptive period for filing EC
claims may be interrupted. In the case at bar, petitioner indeed filed a claim with SSS. In
fact, she has been receiving her pension since November 1988. However, she failed to
specify whether the basis of her claim was any contingency which may be held compensable
under the EC Program. CA further states that it must be proven by substantial evidence that
the risk of contracting the disease which caused the death of the member was increased by
the member‘s working conditions.

The appellate court then held that the petitioner‘s cause of action has prescribed. Petitioner‘s
husband died on 27 June 1988. She filed her claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626
or the Law on Employees‘ Compensation only on 23 April 1999, or more than ten (10) years
from his death. The CA applied Art. 1142(2) of the Civil Code (brought within ten (10) years
from the time the right of action accrues: (2) Upon an obligation created by law
ISSUE:

1. WON the claim has prescribed

2. WON the illness of the deceased is work-related

HELD:

1. The claim of petitioner for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, has not yet
prescribed.

The issue of prescription in the case at bar is governed by P.D. No. 626, or the Law on
Employees‘ Compensation. Art. 201 of P.D. No. 626 and Sec. 6, Rule VII of the 1987
Amended Rules on Employees‘ Compensation both read as follows:
―No claim for compensation shall be given due course unless said claim is filed with the
System within three years from the time the cause of action accrued.‖

We agree with the petitioner that her claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be
considered as the Employees‘ Compensation claim itself. This is but logical and reasonable
because the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS is of the same nature
as her claim before the ECC. Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which
Employees‘ Compensation claims are filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner, when
she filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS under the SSS law, she had already
notified the SSS of her employees‘ compensation claim, because the SSS is the very same
agency where claims for payment of sickness/disability/death benefits under P.D. No. 626
are filed.

It is true that under the proviso, the employees‘ compensation claim shall be filed with the
GSIS/SSS within a reasonable time as provided by law. It should be noted that neither
statute nor jurisprudence has defined the limits of ―reasonable time.‖ Thus, what is
reasonable time depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure provide Section 4(b)3 – In any of the foregoing
cases, the employees‘ compensation claim shall be filed with the GSIS or the SSS within a
reasonable time as provided by law.

In the case at bar, we also find petitioner‘s claim to have been filed within a reasonable time
considering the situation and condition of the petitioner. We have ruled that when the
petitioner filed her claim for death benefits under the SSS law, her claim for the same
benefits under the Employees‘ Compensation Law should be considered as filed. The
evidence shows that the System failed to process her compensation claim. Under the
circumstances, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the lapse committed by the
System. It is the avowed policy of the State to construe social legislations liberally in favor of
the beneficiaries. This court has time and again upheld the policy of liberality of the law in
favor of labor.

ART. 4. Construction in favor of labor. – All doubts in the implementation and

interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

Claims falling under the Employees‘ Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill
its essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in
our society.
2. The second issue of whether or not the illness of petitioner‘s husband, myocardial
infarction which was the cause of his death is work-related, must likewise be resolved in
favor of the petitioner.

While it is true that myocardial infarction is not among the occupational diseases listed under
Annex ―A‖ of the Amended Rules on Employees‘ Compensation, the Commission, under
ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977, laid down the conditions under which cardio-
vascular or heart diseases can be considered as work-related and thus compensable

In the case at bar, the petitioner‘s husband‘s heart disease falls under the second condition
of ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977 which states that the strain of work that
brought about the acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within 24
hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship. Petitioner‘s
husband was driving a dump truck within the company premises where they were stacking
gravel and sand when he suffered the heart attack. He had to be taken down from the truck
and brought to the workers‘ quarters where he expired at 10:30 a.m., just a few minutes after
the heart attack, which is much less than the 24 hours required by ECC Resolution No. 432.
This is a clear indication that severe strain of work brought about the acute attack that
caused his death.
 G.R. No. 115858 June 28, 1996

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AIDA ALVARAN, respondents.

FACTS:
November 19, 1988, at around 11:50 in the evening, the deceased P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran
was infront of the Office of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong Police
Station and was talking with another policeman, when another policeman, Pat. Cesar Arcilla,
who had just arrived, immediately got off the car holding his service firearm and approached
the deceased and without saying any word, he fired three successive shots at the surprised
police sergeant which sent him slumped to the ground. The deceased, however, although
critically wounded, drew his side firearm and fired back, twice hitting fatally Pat. Cesar
Arcilla, who was still advancing towards him and uttering "ano, ano." Both fell, fatally
wounded, and were rushed to the Mandaluyong Medical Center, but Sgt. Alvaran was
pronounced dead upon arrival. Pat. Cesar Arcilla, died in the same hospital, the day after.
Previous to that shooting incident, it was learned that the same, stemmed from a family feud,
wherein Sgt. Alvaran's son, stabbed the patrolman's nephew, a day before the shooting. The
presence of Sgt. Alvaran at the Mandaluyong Police Station, that night of November 19,
1988, (when he was supposed to be in the Pasig Provincial Jail, as 2nd Shift Jailer), was to
accompany his son who was to be interviewed at the same and to shed light with regards
that stabbing incident which he got involved (in) a day before. The appellant subsequent filed
a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended. The System [GSIS] denied
the claim. Appellant requested a reconsideration of the respondent's [GSIS] ruling.
Respondent [GSIS], nonetheless, took a firm stand prompting appellant to elevate her case
to this Commission for review. On July 31, 1991, petitioner Commission affirmed the holding
of the GSIS On appeal, respondent Court reversed petitioner Commission

ISSUES:
1. W/N petitioner engaged in ―forum-shopping‖ in filing this petition.
2. W/N the CA erred in holding that the death of Sgt. Alvaran is compensable.

RULING:
1. No. The test therefore in determining the presence of forum-shopping is whether in the
two (or more cases) pending there is identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action
and (c) reliefs sought. Applying the above test, there is no question that there is identity
of cause of action and reliefs sought between this petition and the petition in G.R. No.
115040. The very same decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28487 promulgated by the same Fifth division and by the same ponente is sought to be
set aside in both petitions before this Court. Be that as it may, we should add that to be
more accurate, private respondent should have alleged res judicata, and not forum-
shopping, as defense because the decision in G.R. No. 115040 had already become
final and executory. In fact, it has been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on
July 28, 1994. Forum-shopping applies only when the two (or more) cases are still
pending.
2. Yes. Members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their
functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave,
policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any
distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community. While
it is true that, "geographically" speaking, P/Sgt. Alvaran was not actually at his assigned
post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not also be
denied that in bringing his son as a suspect in a case to the police station for questioning
to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father but as a peace
officer. Thus, his heirs should be compensated.
 G.R. No. 86044 July 2, 1990
VICTORINO TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
LEON VENTURA, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Torres was the leasehold tenant of a 4,000 square-meter parcel of land included in
the Florencio Firme Estate and located at Caloocan, Cabatuan, Isabela. In 1972, when
Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law, petitioner was the tiller of the
aforementioned piece of land and was automatically deemed owner of the property. Under
Presidential Decree No. 27, any form of transfer of those lands within the coverage of the
law is prohibited except as otherwise provided therein.

In 1978, urgently in need of money, petitioner was forced to enter into what is called a
"selda" agreement, with private respondent, wherein he transferred his rights of possession
and enjoyment over the landholding in question to the latter in consideration of a loan in the
amount of P5,000.00 to be paid not earlier than 1980. As part of the agreement, petitioner
signed an "Affidavit of Waiver" whereby he waived all his rights over the property in favor of
private respondent. According to petitioner, it was also agreed upon by them that upon the
payment of the loaned amount, private respondent will deliver possession and enjoyment of
the property back to petitioner.

Two years later or in 1980, petitioner offered to pay the loaned amount but private
respondent asked for an extension of one more year to continue cultivating the land and
enjoying its fruits.

Because of this, the money being offered by petitioner to pay for the loan was utilized for
other purposes. In 1981, though petitioner really wanted to get the property back, he could
not do so because he lacked the necessary funds. It was only in 1985 when petitioner was
able to save enough money to make another offer but this time private respondent
categorically denied said offer and refused to vacate the land. Hence, petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay captain of Magsaysay, Cabatuan, Isabela stating therein that he
mortgaged his land to private respondent and that he already wanted to redeem it. On the
scheduled date of hearing, private respondent failed to appear.

Upon the issuance by the barangay captain of a certificate to file action, petitioner filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for the recovery of possession
of the parcel of land in question. After due trial, the said court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Is the contract valid?

RULING:

No, the contract is void ab initio and must be given no effect at all.

The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree
No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was deemed owner of the land in question. As of that
date, petitioner was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil. As such, he gained
the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his
continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any
valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his
successors.
 G.R. No. 133706 May 7, 2002

FRANCISCO ESTOLAS, petitioner,

vs. ADOLFO MABALOT, respondent.

FACTS:

Sometime in May, 1978, respondent passed on the subject land to the petitioner for the
amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice such was only a verbal mortgage; while
according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. According to Atty. Linda Peralta
investigation, the subject land was just a guarantee for the payment of a loan incurred.

―Meanwhile, according to DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa. In the said Order, the
DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner as
constituting abandonment.

―Thus, on May 3, 1989, respondent appealed the case to the DAR Central Office which, on
August 28, 1990, issued an Order reversing the assailed Order of DAR Regional Director
Antonio M. Nuesa and ordering the petitioner to return the subject land to respondent.
Petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on June 8, 1992.He filed an Appeal with
the Office of the President which was dismissed in a Decision dated August 29,
1994.Petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision was also denied in an
Order dated November 28, 1994.Likewise, petitioner‘s second Motion for Reconsideration
was denied in an Order dated July 5, 1995.‖

ISSUE:

W/N respondent made a valid abandonment of the subject property?

RULING:

No, the transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it should be returned to respondent.
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 prohibits the transfer of the land except by hereditary
succession to the heirs or by other legal modes to the government.
 G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC.,
defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such employee, he was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers‘ Union which had a closed shop agreement with the
Company that membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for
all its permanent employees.

Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to
require as a condition of employment membership in a labor organization, if such
organization is the representative of the employees. However, the provision was later
amended by the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: … ―but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in
any such labor organization‖.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the
Company to dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning
from the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano to file an action to enjoin the
Company and the Union from dismissing him. The Union assails the constitutionality of RA
No. 3350, contending that it infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental freedom to
form associations.

RULING:

No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:

―RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even
when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not
prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to
said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up
with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.‖
 G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970

IGMIDIO HIDALGO and MARTINA ROSALES, petitioners,

vs.
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO,
BERNARDINA MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TEODULA
DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.

Facts:

Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of
sale on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private
co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural
parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.

In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together
with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and
Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is
fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities,
accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution
of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.

In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for
P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek
by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by
respondents-vendees in their favor.

The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share
tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-
emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No.
3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants.
Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by
respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their
respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit
required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they
are working form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by
the vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where
the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the
registration of the deed of sale.

OR

Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants?

Held:

The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants
after its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's
proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share
tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by
fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation
in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or
otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and
will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter
thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute
'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the
letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do
not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.
Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian
court to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Procorpio Hidalgo
for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the observations made.
 G.R. No. 123037 March 21, 1997

TEODORO Q. PEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ALFREDO E. ABUEG
JR., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner and the private respondent (Alfredo E. Abueg) were contenders as a Member of
the House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of Palawan in
the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.

On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner,
averred the elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with
massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes
and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results
of the election.

Private respondent moved to dismiss the case since the petitioner did not specifically allege
the precincts where said irregularities were present. HRET stated that the Protestant failed
to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are included in his
protest; he even failed to allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are located.
Worse, the body of the Petition does not even mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them
is made only in the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised of the
issues which he has to meet and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to determine
which ballot boxes have to be collected. HRET also held that this scattershot allegation is
not allowed in election contests and that ―it is necessary to make a precise indication of the
precincts protested and a specification of the claimed offenses to have been committed by
the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the
election protest of petitioner.

RULING:

No. Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where widespread election, fraud
and irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the
protest. Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form
and substance of the petition constitutes aground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the
petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are
unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other
course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumptions of an elected public official
may, and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.

Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be
exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will.
It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest
degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then
only when it becomes impossible to take any other step.

This Court‘s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only
upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such a
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral
tribunal‘s judgment. There is such showing in the present petition.
 G.R. No. 191771 May 6, 2010

LIBERAL PARTY, represented by its President Manuel A. Roxas II and Secretary General
Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NACIONALISTA PARTY, represented by its President
Manuel B. Villar and NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, allegedly represented by its
Chairman Faustino S. Dy, Jr., Respondents.

FACTS:

The COMELEC released resolution No. 8646 to set the deadline for the submission of
petitions for registration of political parties for the May 2010 elections. Said deadline was set
on August 17, 2009

However, despite the deadline, the NP and NPC, two separate political parties, who
intended to form a coalition, only filed their petition on February 12, 2009. They contend that
they do not fall under the deadline because ―Coalition‖ is not mentioned in the resolution.

The COMELEC granted the petition.

ISSUE:

W/N a ―collation‖ comes within the definition of a ―political party‖ so as to apply the deadline
set by the COMELEC for the submission of petitions for registration of political parties to the
former

RULING:

Yes. Admittedly, Resolution No. 8646 simply states that August 17, 2009 is the ―[L]ast day
for filing petitions for registration of political parties,‖ without mentioning ―organizations and
coalitions‖ in the way that the three entities are separately mentioned under Section 2(5),
Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules. Resolution
No. 8646, however, is simply a listing of electoral activities and deadlines for the May 10,
2010 elections; it is not in any way a resolution aimed at establishing distinctions among
―political parties, organizations, and coalitions.‖

The Court further rules that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its
own deadline in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we
emphasize that the matter of party registration raises critical election concerns that should
be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic
system. The COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the
standards and procedures the Constitution and our laws impose.
 G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen, but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as
citizen of United States of America. Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was
granted and he subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. On
November 2009, Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said election. But
prior from his declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua,
one of the contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando was not a citizen of the
Philippines, with a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Arnando‘s
nationality is USA-American and a certified true copy of computer-generated travel record
that he has been using his American passport even after renunciation of American
citizenship. A division of the COMELEC ruled against Arnando but this decision was
reversed by the COMELEC en Banc stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one
of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. Meanwhile, Maquiling petition that should be declared
winner as he gained the second highest number of votes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one‘s qualifications to run for public office.

RULING:

Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one‘s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one‘s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position which makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not
a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political
rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one‘s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public
office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.
Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
It is a continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Therefore, the Court
held Arnando disqualified for any local elective position as provided by express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Popular vote does not
cure this ineligibility of the candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements set by the
Constitution are nugatory.

Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as reiterated in the case of

Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is
produced. Hence among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who garnered the
highest votes should be declared as winner.
 G.R. No. 194143 October 4, 2011
SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR. Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOAN V. ALARILLA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the mayoralty race during the May 10,
2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Private respondent was proclaimed the
winner.

Petitioner filed a Petition with the COMELEC questioning the proclamation of private
respondent on the following grounds: (1) massive vote-buying; (2) intimidation and
harassment; (3) election fraud; (4) non-appreciation by the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machines of valid votes cast during the said election; and, (5) irregularities due to
non-observance of the guidelines set by the COMELEC.

The COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order setting the preliminary conference on August
12, 2010 and directing the parties to file their Preliminary Conference Briefs at least one (1)
day before the scheduled conference.

On August 11, 2010, private respondent filed her Preliminary Conference Brief.. Petitioner
filed his Brief on the day of the scheduled preliminary conference.

Petitioner and his counsel failed to appear during the actual conference on August 12, 2010.
On even date, private respondent‘s counsel moved for the dismissal of the case. The
COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed petitioner‘s protest on the ground that the latter belatedly
filed his Brief in violation of the COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs.

The COMELEC en banc contending that it was only on August 16, 2010 that he received a
copy of the Order of the COMELEC which set the preliminary conference on August 12,
2010. The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground
that petitioner failed to file a verified motion in violation of Section 3, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

ISSUE:

W/N the COMELEC En Banc erred in denying petitioner‘s MR

RULING:

Yes. The Court finds no justifiable reason why the COMELEC 2nd Division hastily dismissed
petitioner‘s election protest. There is no indication that the COMELEC 2nd Division made
prior verification from the proper or concerned COMELEC department or official of
petitioner‘s allegation that he did not receive a copy of the subject Order. Fairness and
prudence dictate that the COMELEC 2nd Division should have first waited for the requested
certification before deciding whether or not to dismiss petitioner‘s protest on technical
grounds.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was not verified, the
COMELEC en banc should have considered the merits of the said motion in light of
petitioner‘s meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of the date set for the
preliminary conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of one‘s claim or defense.
 G.R. No. 192280 January 25, 2011
SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time,
Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post in 2007
and in 2007.

Olandria, one of the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC
was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC,
Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty.
Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from
running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim that
an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.

RULING:

Yes, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn
COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the
imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific
wording of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68.

Laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally construed in
favor of eligibility. Competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is
personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.

The purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.
 G.R. No. L-9124 July 28, 1958

BERNARDO HEBRON, petitioner,

vs.
EULALIO D. REYES, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent were elected mayor and vice-mayor respectively of the
Municipality of Carmona in the province of Cavite in the general elections of 1951. On May
1954, petitioner was preventively suspended by the Office of the President due to certain
administrative charges lodged against him. During that period, respondent was directed to
assume the office of Acting Mayor. Since petitioner remained suspended for more than a
year and 7 months and there was no action on the administrative case, an action for quo
warranto was instituted on the ground that respondent was illegally holding and has
unlawfully refused to surrender the office.

ISSUE:

W/N a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may
be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines regardless of the
procedure set forth in Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code

RULING:

No. The suspension was illegal because the President has no original power to
suspend a local official. The Chief Executive must observe the mandatory procedure
for disciplinary actions over municipal officials to be exercised by the Provincial Board
provided in Secs. 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code and the National
Government may conduct an investigation only as a means to ascertain whether or not
the Provincial board should take action.
 G.R. No. 184428 November 23, 2011

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts:

Respondent San Miguel Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture

and sale of fermented liquor, produces as one of its products "Red Horse" beer which is sold
in 500-ml. and 1-liter bottle variants. On January 1, 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8424 or
the Tax Reform Act of 1997 took effect. It reproduced, as Section 143 thereof, the provisions
of Section 140 of the old National Internal Revenue Code as amended by R.A. No. 8240
which became effective on January 1, 1997. Part of Section 143 of the Tax Reform Act of
1997 reads: The excise tax from any brand of fermented liquor within the next three (3)
years from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8240 shall not be lower than the tax which was
due from each brand on October 1, 1996. The rates of excise tax on fermented liquor under
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) hereof shall be increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1,
2000.

Thereafter, on December 16, 1999, the Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations
No. 17-99 increasing the applicable tax rates on fermented liquor by 12%. This increase,
however, was qualified by the last paragraph of Section 1 of Revenue Regulations No. 17-99
which reads: Provided, however, that the new specific tax rate for any existing brand of
cigars, cigarettes packed by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquors shall not
be lower than the excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000.

For the period June 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004, respondent was assessed and paid
excise taxes amounting to P2,286,488,861.58. Respondent, however, later contended that
the said qualification in the last paragraph of Section 1 of Revenue Regulations No. 17-99
has no basis in the plain wording of Section 143 and filed before the BIR a claim for refund
or tax credit of the amount of P60,778,519.56 as erroneously paid excise taxes for the period
of May 22, 2004 to December 31, 2004. Later, said amount was reduced to P58,213,294.92
because of prescription.

On September 26, 2007, the CTA Second Division granted the petition and ordered
petitioner to refund P58,213,294.92 to respondent or to issue in the latter‘s favor a Tax
Credit Certificate for the said amount for the erroneously paid excise taxes. The CTA held
that Revenue Regulations No. 17-99 modified or altered the mandate of Section 143 of the
Tax Reform Act of 1997. The CTA En Banc affirmed the Decision.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 1 of Revenue Regulations No. 17-99 is an invalid administrative

interpretation of Section 143 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997.

RULING:

Yes. Section 143 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 is clear and unambiguous. It provides for
two periods: the first is the 3- year transition period beginning January 1, 1997, the date
when R.A. No. 8240 took effect, until December 31, 1999; and the second is the period
thereafter. During the 3-year transition period, Section 143 provides that "the excise tax from
any brand of fermented liquor...shall not be lower than the tax which was due from each
brand on October 1, 1996." After the transitory period, Section 143 provides that the excise
tax rate shall be the figures provided under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Section 143 but
increased by 12%, without regard to whether the revenue collection starting January 1, 2000
may turn out to be lower than that collected prior to said date. Revenue Regulations No. 17-
99, however, created a new tax rate when it added in the last paragraph of Section 1
thereof, the qualification that the tax due after the 12% increase becomes effective "shall not
be lower than the tax actually paid prior to January 1, 2000."

It bears reiterating that tax burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed
beyond what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes being construed
strictissimi juris against the government. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails as said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

As there is nothing in Section 143 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 which clothes the BIR with
the power or authority to rule that the new specific tax rate should not be lower than the
excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000, such interpretation is clearly
an invalid exercise of the power of the Secretary of Finance to interpret tax laws and to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the effective enforcement of the Tax Reform
Act of 1997.
 G.R. No. 169899 February 06, 2013

PHILACOR CREDIT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

FACTS:

Philacor was assessed deficiency documentary stamp tax. According to the CIR, Philacor
was liable for the issuance of promissory notes by buyers of appliances in favor of the
appliance dealers and the subsequent assignment in its favor of promissory notes by the
dealers. Philacor opposed, saying that the law did not include assignees of promissory notes
as persons liable for DST. Court held that Philacor was not liable for the issuance of the
notes, since our law expressly limited to specific persons the liability for DST. The persons
primarily liable for the payment of the DST are the persons: (1) making; (2) signing; (3)
issuing; (4) accepting; or (5) transferring the taxable documents, instruments or papers. The
buyers of the appliances made, signed and issued the documents subject to tax, while the
appliance dealer transferred these documents to Philacor which likewise indisputably
"accepted" them. "Acceptance," however, is an act that is not applicable to promissory
notes, but only to bills of exchange. Though it would seem that Philacor was the ultimate
beneficiary of the notes, this fact does not make it liable for DST since liability for the DST is
determined from the document itself – examined through its form and face – and cannot be
affected by proof of facts outside it.

ISSUE:

WON tax laws must be construed strictly against the state

RULING:

The settled rule is that in case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. The reason for this ruling is not hard to grasp taxes, as
burdens which must be endured by the taxpayer, should not be presumed to go beyond
what the law expressly and clearly declares.
 G.R. No. 104171 February 24, 1999

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs. B.F. GOODRICH PHILS., INC. (now SIME DARBY INTERNATIONAL TIRE CO., INC.) and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent BF Goodrich Philippines Inc. was an American corporation prior to July
3, 1974. As a condition for approving the manufacture of tires and other rubber products,
private respondent was required by the Central Bank to develop a rubber plantation. In
compliance therewith, private respondent bought from the government certain parcels of
land in Tumajubong Basilan, in 1961 under the Public Land Act and the Parity Amendment
to the 1935 constitution, and there developed a rubber plantation.

On August 2, 1973, the Justice Secretary rendered an opinion that ownership rights of
Americans over Public agricultural lands, including the right to dispose or sell their real
estate, would be lost upon expiration on July 3, 1974 of the Parity Amendment. Thus, private
respondent sold its Basilan land holding to Siltown Realty Phil. Inc., (Siltown) for P500,000
on January 21, 1974. Under the terms of the sale, Siltown would lease the property to
private respondent for 25 years with an extension of 25 years at the option of private
respondent.

Private respondent books of accounts were examined by BIR for purposes of determining its
tax liability for 1974. This examination resulted in the April 23, 1975 assessment of private
respondent for deficiency income tax which it duly paid. Siltown‘s books of accounts were
also examined, and on the basis thereof, on October 10, 1980, the Collector of Internal
Revenue assessed deficiency donor‘s tax of P1,020,850 in relation to said sale of the
Basilan landholdings.

Private respondent contested this assessment on November 24, 1980. Another assessment
dated March 16, 1981, increasing the amount demanded for the alleged deficiency donor‘s
tax, surcharge, interest and compromise penalty and was received by private respondent on
April 9, 1981. On appeal, CTA upheld the assessment. On review, CA reversed the decision
of the court finding that the assessment was made beyond the 5-year prescriptive period in
Section 331 of the Tax Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner‘s right to assess has prescribed.

RULING:

Applying then Sec. 331, NIRC (now Sec. 203, 1997 NIRC which provides a 3-year
prescriptive period for making assessments), it is clear that the October 16, 1980 and March
16, 1981 assessments were issued by the BIR beyond the 5-year statute of limitations. The
court thoroughly studied the records of this case and found no basis to disregard the 5-year
period of prescription, expressly set under Sec. 331 of the Tax Code, the law then in force.

For the purpose of safeguarding taxpayers from any unreasonable examination,

investigation or assessment, our tax law provides a statute of limitations in the collection of
taxes. Thus, the law or prescription, being a remedial measure, should be liberally construed
in order to afford such protection. As a corollary, the exceptions to the law on prescription
should perforce be strictly construed.
 G.R. No. 120324 April 21, 1999
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Philex Mining agreed to manage and operate the Baguio Gold‘s mining claim,
known as the Sto. Nino mine. The mine suffered continuing losses over the years which
resulted to petitioner‘s withdrawal as manager of the mine and in the eventual cessation of
mine operations. In the course of managing and operating the project, Philex made
advances of cash and property which remains unpaid. Philex, as the guarantor, also paid the
creditors of Baguio Gold. Since Baguio Gold was unable to pay, Philex wrote-off in its books
its receivables from Baguio Gold comprising the advances and payment made to the
creditors. Philex also claimed as deduction in its ITR these bad debts written-off. The BIR
disallowed the deduction. The CTA, CA, and SC agreed with the BIR. The SC ruled that (1)
the advances are not actually debts but are investments because the agreement to manage
and operate the Sto. Nino mine is a joint venture between Philex and Baguio Gold, and (2)
the payment to creditors is not also deductible because Philex paid them even though they
are not yet due and demandable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is correct in its contention that tax liability and VAT
input credit/refund can be subjected to legal compensation.

RULING:

No, petition was denied.

The Supreme Court has already made the pronouncement that taxes cannot be
subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer
are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a
tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes
are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity.

Philex‘s claim is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are
the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary
hindrance. Evidently, to countenance Philex‘s whimsical reason would render
ineffective our tax collection system.

Philex is not allowed to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it
has a pending tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not
yet been granted. It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is
compulsory rather than a matter of bargain. Hence, a tax does not depend upon the
consent of the taxpayer.If any payer can defer the payment of taxes by raising the
defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversely
affect the government revenue system. A taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes
when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or that the
collection of the tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the
government. Moreover, Philex's theory that would automatically apply its VAT input
credit/refund against its tax liabilities can easily give rise to confusion and abuse,
depriving the government of authority over the manner by which taxpayers credit and
offset their tax liabilities.

"The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it
should be exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a
taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill
the 'hen that lays the golden egg.' And, in the order to maintain the general public's
trust and confidence in the Government this power must be used justly and not
treacherously."
 G.R. No. 117359 July 23, 1998
DAVAO GULF LUMBER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation, a licensed forest concessionaire possessing a Timber

License Agreement granted by the Ministry of Natural Resources (Now DENR), purchased
from various oil companies refined and manufactured oils as well as motor and diesel fuels
for its exploitation and operation.

Selling companies paid and passed the specific taxes imposed under Sec. 153 and 156 of
the 1997 NIRC to petitioner as purchaser who in turn filed before CIR a Claim for Refund for
P120, 825 representing 25% of the specific taxes actually paid based on Insular Lumber Co.
v. CTA and Sec. 5 of RA 1435 and complied with its procedure.

Then, petitioner filed before CA a Petition for Review: Favored petitioner to a partial refund
P2,923 (excluding those that have prescribed) and based on the rates deemed paid under
RA 1435 (NOT higher rates actually paid under the NIRC)

Insisting that the basis be the higher rate, petitioner elevated the case to the CTA who
affirmed the CA's decision

ISSUE:

W/N the basis should be the higher rates prescribed by Sec. 153 and 156 of the 1997 NIRC

RULING:

NO. A tax cannot be imposed unless it is supported by the clear and express language of a
statute; On the other hand, once the tax is unquestionably imposed, a claim of exemption
from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken. Section 5, RA 1435 as a tax exemption, must be construed strictissimi
juris against the grantee.
 G.R. No. L-65230 December 23, 1992
PROVINCE OF TARLAC, petitioner,
vs. HON. FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, Presiding Judge, Branch LXIII, Regional Trial
Court, and TARLAC ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Tarlac Enterprises Inc is the owner of the following properties: a parcel of land in Mabini,
Tarlac, an ice drop factory in said land, and a machinery shed and other machinery also in
the same property. These properties were declared for purposes of taxation in the Provincial
Assessor‘s Office under Tax Declaration Nos. 8778, 8897, 8898, 8899.

The Provincial Treasurer found that real estate taxes for the years 1974 until 1982 in the
amount of P532,435.55 including penalties were not yet paid. Therefore, the Provincial
Treasurer Jose Meru filed a complaint praying that the company pay the said sum as well as
damages. His last written demand was made on December 3, 1982 but the defendant
company refused and continues to refuse payment. Hence, the Tarlac Provincial Treasurer,
Jose Meru filed a complain on January 14, 1983 praying that the company be ordered to pay
the sum of P532,435.55 representing the accrued real estate taxes, as well as damages and
the costs of the suit.

The company filed a motion to dismiss but the lower court denied the motion. An MR of said
order was subsequently filed but it was likewise denied by the lower court. Thereafter,
petitioner set the auction sale of the private respondent's properties to satisfy the real estate
taxes due. This prompted the private respondent to file a motion praying that petitioner be
directed to desist from proceeding with the public auction sale. The lower court issued an
order granting said motion to prevent mootness of the case considering that the properties to
be sold were the, subjects of the complaint.

The company then filed an answer saying that under Section 40(g) of PD46 in relation to PD
551, it was exempt from paying said tax. The court rendered the decision dismissing the
complaint. It ruled that P.D. No. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying the
real property taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a franchise to generate, distribute and
sell electric current for light. The court held that in lieu of said taxes, private respondent had
been required to pay 2% franchise tax in line with the intent of the law to give assistance to
operators such as the private respondent to enable the consumers to enjoy cheaper rates.

Citing the case of Butuan Sawmill, Inc v. City of Butuan, the court ruled that local
governments are without the power to tax the electric companies already subject to franchise
tax unless their franchise allows the imposition of additional tax.

The Province of Tarlac filed an MR of said decision but the lower court denied said motion.
Hence, the present recourse by petitioner province.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent Tarlac Enterprises, Inc, is exempt from the payment of real
property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of PD 464 in relation to PD 551 as amended.

RULING:

No. The SC does not agree with the lower court that the phrase "in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatever nature" in the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 551
expressly exempts private respondent from paying real property taxes. As correctly
observed by the petitioner province, said proviso is modified and delimited by the phrase "on
earnings, receipts. income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale" which specifies
the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in view of the imposition of
the franchise tax. Said enumerated items upon which taxes shall not be imposed, have no
relation at all to, and are entirely different from real properties subject to tax.

If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchise grantees from paying real property
tax and to make the 2% franchise tax the only imposable tax, then said enumerated items
would not have been added when PD 852 was enacted to amend P.D. No. 551. The
legislative authority would have simply stopped after the phrase "national or local authority"
by putting therein a period. On the contrary, it went on to enumerate what should not be
subject to tax thereby delimiting the extent of the exemption.
 G.R. No. 90776 June 3, 1991

PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, Represented by MAYOR NICOMEDES F.
PATENIA, respondent.

FACTS:

Philippine Petroleum Corporation is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of

lubricated oil base stocks which is a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at
Malaya, Pilillia Rizal, conducting its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of
municipality of Pilillia, Rizal and is in continuous operation up to the present. PPC owns and
maintains an oil refinery including 49 storage tanks for its petroleum products in Malaya,
Pililla, Rizal. Under section 142 of NIRC of 1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are
subject to specific tax. Respondent municipality of Pilillia, Rizal through municipal council
resolution no. 25-s-1974 enacted municipal tax ordinance no. 1-s-1974 otherwise known as
―The Pililla Tax Code Of 1974‖ on June 14, 1974 which took effect on July 1, 1974. Sections
9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business, except for those which fixed
taxes are provided in the local tax code on manufacturers, importers, or producers of any
article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distiller, rectifiers,
repackers and compounders of liquors distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the
schedule found in the local tax code, as well as mayor‘s permit sanitary inspection fee and
storage permit fee for flammable, combustible or explosive substances, while section 139 of
the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and interests on unpaid taxes, fees or charges.
Enforcing the provisions of the above mentioned ordinance, the respondent filed a complaint
on April 4, 1986 docketed as civil case no. 057-T against PPC for the collection of the
business tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor‘s permit fee
and sanitary permit inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the
last named fees starting 1985.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality may validly impose taxes on petitioner‘s business.

RULING:

No. While section 2 of PD 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products,
said decree did not amend sections 19 and 19 (a) of PD 231 as amended by PD 426,
wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers,
importers, producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on
business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of tax on business
of manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy, it
should have been expressly stated in PD No. 436.

The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present
constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC no. 26-73
would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances.
Under section 5, article X of the 1987 constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may
be established by congress can define and limit such power of local governments.

The storage permit fee being imposed by Pilillia‘s tax ordinance is a fee for the installation
and keeping in storage of any flammable, combustible or explosive substances. In as much
as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the Municipality of Pilillia but by petitioner
PPC, same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is
envisioned in section 37 of the same code.
 G.R. No. 172087 March 15, 2011

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner,

vs.
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), represented herein by HON. JOSE
MARIO BUÑAG, in his official capacity as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Public Respondent,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, who are persons acting for, in behalf, or under the
authority of Respondent. Public and Private Respondents.

FACTS:

PAGCOR was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A on January 1,
1977. Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-B (supplementing P.D. No. 1067-A) was
issued exempting PAGCOR from the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of
five percent (5%) of the gross revenue. Thereafter, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1399 was
issued expanding the scope of PAGCOR's exemption.

To consolidate the laws pertaining to the franchise and powers of PAGCOR, P.D. No.
1869 was issued. PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed in June 1984 through P.D. No.
1931, but it was later restored by Letter of Instruction No. 1430, which was issued in
September 1984. On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424 otherwise known as the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 provides that
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall pay corporate income tax,
except petitioner PAGCOR, the Government Service and Insurance Corporation, the Social
Security System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. The particular amendment that is at issue in
this case is Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs that
are exempt from payment of corporate income tax.

Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
validity and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, in particular:

Section 4, Section 5, and Section 6, were alleged to be violative of Section 28 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, which section vests in Congress the exclusive authority to fix the rate of
taxes, and of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution on due process, as well as of Section
26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which section provides for the "no amendment rule"
upon the last reading of a bill. Sections 8 and 12 were alleged to be violative of Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, or the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and Section 28
(1), Article VI of the Constitution; On September 1, 2005, the Court dismissed all the
petitions and upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337. On the same date, respondent
BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-2005, specifically identifying PAGCOR as one
of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Is Republic Act 9337 constitutional insofar as it excluded PAGCOR from the enumeration of
GOCCs exempt from the payment of corporate income tax?
RULING:
YES. The original exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax was not made pursuant
to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions so that the law may operate only on
some and not on all. Instead, the same was merely granted due to the acquiescence of the
House Committee on Ways and Means to the request of PAGCOR.

The argument that the withdrawal of the exemption also violates the non-impairment clause
will not hold since any franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.

However, the Court made it clear that PAGCOR remains exempt from payment of indirect
taxes and as such its purchases remain not subject to VAT, reiterating the rule laid down in
the Acesite case.
 G.R. No. 159471 January 26, 2011

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner corporation, a VAT-registered taxpayer engaged in mining, production, and sale of

various mineral products, filed claims with the BIR for refund/credit of input VAT on its
purchases of capital goods and on its zero-rated sales in the taxable quarters of the years
1990 and 1992. BIR did not immediately act on the matter prompting the petitioner to file a
petition for review before the CTA. The latter denied the claims on the grounds that for zero-
rating to apply, 70% of the company's sales must consists of exports, that the same were not
filed within the 2-year prescriptive period (the claim for 1992 quarterly returns were judicially
filed only on April 20, 1994), and that petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to
support its claim for refund/credit.

The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that CTA failed to consider the following: sales to
PASAR and PHILPOS within the EPZA as zero-rated export sales; the 2-year prescriptive
period should be counted from the date of filing of the last adjustment return which was April
15, 1993, and not on every end of the applicable quarters; and that the certification of the
independent CPA attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary of suppliers‘
invoices or receipts examined, evaluated and audited by said CPA should substantiate its
claims.

ISSUE:

Did the petitioner corporation sufficiently establish the factual bases for its applications for
refund/credit of input VAT?

HELD:

No. Although the Court agreed with the petitioner corporation that the two-year prescriptive
period for the filing of claims for refund/credit of input VAT must be counted from the date of
filing of the quarterly VAT return, and that sales to PASAR and PHILPOS inside the EPZA
are taxed as exports because these export processing zones are to be managed as a
separate customs territory from the rest of the Philippines, and thus, for tax purposes, are
effectively considered as foreign territory, it still denies the claims of petitioner corporation for
refund of its input VAT on its purchases of capital goods and effectively zero-rated sales
during the period claimed for not being established and substantiated by appropriate and
sufficient evidence.

Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. It is regarded as in derogation of the
sovereign authority, and should be construed in strictissimi juris against the person or entity
claiming the exemption. The taxpayer who claims for exemption must justify his claim by the
clearest grant of organic or statute law and should not be permitted to stand on vague
implications.
 G.R. No. 179961 January 31, 2011

KEPCO PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner KEPCO Philippines is a VAT-registered independent power producer engaged in

the business of generating electricity. Kepco filed an application for zero-rated sales, which
was approved. It filed a claim for tax refund covering the unutilized VAT payments
attributable to its zero-rated sales transactions. The claim was denied. On appeal to the
CTA, the court denied it for failure to comply with the substantiation requirement regarding
the invoices or official receipts Kepco issued. Kepco lifted the issue to the Supreme Court
arguing that under Section 113 (A) of the 1997 NIRC, invoices and official receipts are used
interchangeably for purposes of substantiating input VAT.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the invoices and official receipts can be interchangeably used

RULING:

No. Under the law, a VAT invoice is necessary for every sale, barter or exchange of goods
or properties while a VAT official receipt properly pertains to every lease of goods or
properties, and for every sale, barter or exchange of services. In other words, the VAT
invoice is the sellers best proof of the sale of the goods or services to the buyer while the
VAT receipt is the buyers best evidence of the payment of goods or services received from
the seller. Even though VAT invoices and receipts are normally issued by the supplier/seller
alone, the said invoices and receipts, taken collectively, are necessary to substantiate the
actual amount or quantity of goods sold and their selling price (proof of transaction), and the
best means to prove the input VAT payments (proof of payment). Hence, VAT invoice and
VAT receipt should not be confused as referring to one and the same thing. Certainly,
neither does the law intend the two to be used alternatively
 G.R. No. 185556 March 28, 2011

SUPREME STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs. NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME INDEPENDENT UNION (NMS-IND-
APL), Respondent.

FACTS:

On July 27, 2005, respondent filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground that petitioner violated certain provisions of the
CBA. The parties failed to settle their dispute. Consequently, the Secretary of Labor certified
the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code.

Respondent alleged eleven CBA violations, enumerated as follows: (1) denial to four
employees of the CBA- provided wage increase, (2) contracting-out labor, (3) failure to
provide shuttle service, (4) refusal to answer for medical expenses incurred by three
employees, (5) failure to comply with time-off provision, (6) visitors free access to company
premises, (7) failure to comply with reporting time-off provision, (8) dismissal of an employee
supposedly due to disease, (9) denial of paternity leave benefit to two employees, (10)
discrimination and harassment, and (11) non-implementation of COLA in Wage Order Nos.
RBIII-10 and 11.

Out of the eleven issues raised by respondent, eight were decided in its favor; two (denial of
paternity leave benefit and discrimination of union members) were decided in favor of
petitioner; while the issue on visitors free access to company premises was deemed settled
during the mandatory conference. Petitioners appeal to the CA was dismissed.

According to the CA, petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding that it violated certain provisions of the CBA.With regard to wage
increase, The CA concluded that, based on the wording of the CBA, which uses the words
"general increase" and "over and above," it cannot be said that the parties have intended the
anniversary increase to be given in lieu of the CBA wage increase. The CA declared that the
withdrawal of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 from the employees who were not
minimum wage earners amounted to a diminution of benefits because such grant has
already ripened into a company practice. Based on the principle of liberal construction of the
CBA, the CA likewise sustained the NLRCs rulings on theissues pertaining to medical
expenses, the shuttle service, time-off for attendance in grievance meetings/hearings, and
time-off due to brownouts. Finally, the CA affirmed the NLRCs finding that Madayags
dismissal was illegal. It emphasized that the burden to prove that the employees disease is
of such nature or at such stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months rests on
the employer, who failed to prove such.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in affirming the NLRC?

RULING:

It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the
parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. If the terms
of CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. Moreover, the CBA must be construed liberally rather
than narrowly and technically and the Court must place a practical and realistic construction
upon it. Any doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor should be
resolved in favor of labor. Upon these well-established precepts, the CAs findings and
conclusions on all the issues are sustained, except the issue pertaining to the denial of the
COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 and 11 to the employees who are not minimum wage
earners, which respondent avers as a diminution of benefits.
 G.R. No. 125297 June 6, 2003

ELVIRA YU OH, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Elvira Yu Oh purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc. Due to
her failure to pay the purchase price, Solid Gold filed civil cases against her for specific
performance. On September 17, 1990, Yu Oh and Solid Gold, through its general manager
Joaquin Novales III, entered into a compromise agreement to settle said civil cases. The
compromise agreement, as approved by the trial court, provided that Yu Oh shall issue a
total of ninety-nine post-dated checks in the amount of P50,000.00 each, dated every 15 th
and 30th of the month starting October 1, 1990 and the balance of over P1 million to be paid
in lump sum on November 16, 1994 which is also the due date of the 99 th and last postdated
check. Yu Oh issued ten checks at P50,000.00 each, for a total of P500,000.00, drawn
against her account at the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), Grace Park, Caloocan City
Branch. Novales then deposited each of the ten checks on their respective due dates with
the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). However, said checks were dishonored by
EBC for the reason "Account Closed." Dishonor slips were issued for each check that was
returned to Novales.

ISSUE:

Whether or not notice of dishonor is dispensable in the case at bar.

RULING:

It is essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she
could pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period
prescribed by law and omission or neglect on the part of the prosecution to prove that the
accused received such notice of dishonor is fatal to its cause. Thus, absent a clear showing
that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and was given the opportunity to
make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, we cannot with moral
certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to prove that
petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal.
 G.R. No. 168115 June 8, 2007

VICENTE ONG LIM SING, JR., petitioner,

vs.
FEB LEASING & FINANCE CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:
 FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (FEB) leased equipment and motor vehicles to
JVL Food Products with a monthly rental of P170,494.
 At the same date, Vicente Ong Lim Sing, Jr. (Lim) an executed an Individual Guaranty
Agreement with FEB to guarantee the prompt and faithful performance of the terms and
conditions of the lease agreement.
 JVL defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals resulting to arrears
of P3,414,468.75 and refused to pay despite demands.
 FEB filed a complaint for damages and replevin against JVL, Lim and John Doe.
 JVL and Lim admitted the existence of the lease agreement but asserted that it is in
reality a sale of equipment on installment basis, with FEB acting as the financier.
 RTC: Sale on installment and the FEB elected full payment of the obligation so for the
unreturned units and machineries the JVL and Lim are jointly and severally liable to pay
 CA granted FEB‘s appeal as it is a financial lease agreement under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8556 and ordered JVL and Lim jointly and severally to pay P3,414,468.75.

ISSUE:

W/N JVL and Lim should jointly and severally be liable for the insured financial lease

RULING:

Yes. CA affirmed.
 Contract of adhesion is as binding as any ordinary contract.
 The Lease Contract with corresponding Lease Schedules with Delivery and Acceptance
Certificates is, in point of fact, a financial lease within the purview of R.A. No. 8556..
 FEB leased the subject equipment and motor vehicles to JVL in consideration of a
monthly periodic payment of P170,494.00. The periodic payment by petitioner is
sufficient to amortize at least 70% of the purchase price or acquisition cost of the said
movables in accordance with the Lease Schedules with
Delivery and Acceptance Certificates.
 JVL entered into the lease contract with full knowledge of its terms and conditions.
 Lim, as a lessee, has an insurable interest in the equipment and motor vehicles leased.
 In the financial lease agreement, FEB did not assume responsibility as to the quality,
merchantability, or capacity of the equipment. This stipulation provides that, in case of
defect of any kind that will be found by the lessee in any of the equipment, recourse
should be made to the manufacturer. ―The financial lessor, being a financing company,
i.e., an extender of credit rather than an ordinary equipment rental company, does not
extend a warranty of the fitness of the equipment for any particular use. Thus, the
financial lessee was precisely in a position to enforce such warranty directly against the
supplier of the equipment and not against the financial lessor. We find nothing contrary
to public policy in such a contractual arrangement
 G.R. No. 171872 June 28, 2010

FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:

On 15 January 2002, petitioner Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. (petitioner) filed with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Batangas a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Manila
Southcoast Development Corporation (respondent).

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule.
However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received
petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February
2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was
only on 6 August 2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of
petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly,
respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration.
In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August
2004. In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial
compliance with procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioner‘s Motion for
Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have
resolved the motion based on the merits.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA committed grave error in affirming the ruling of RTC that the three-day notice
rule was violated

RULING:

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is
proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the
adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority.

Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to
facilitate... the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.
 G.R. No. 161368 April 5, 2010

MEDISERV, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former 13th Division) and LANDHEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.

FACTS:

Mediserv, Inc. executed a real estate mortgage (REM) in favor of China Banking Corporation
as security for a loan. Mediserv defaulted on its obligation and the REM was foreclosed. At
the public auction sale, Landheights Development Corporation emerged as the highest
bidder for the subject property.

Landheights filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila an ―Application for
Possession of Real Estate Property Purchased at an Auction Sale.‖ A TCT was issued in its
favor. Subsequently, Landheights sought to recover possession of the subject property. It
filed a verified complaint for ejectment against Mediserv before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila (MeTC) which favored Landheights.

Mediserv appealed the decision to the RTC of Manila which reversed and set aside the order
of the MeTC and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for Ejectment.

Landheights filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
petition because the written authority to sign the verification and certification on non-forum
shopping, as well as the copies of the complaint and answer, are not attached.

Landheights filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently submitted a Secretary‘s

Certificate stating that the Board of Directors affirms the authority to file the Petition for
Review. Hence, the CA reinstated the petition for review.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted without and/or in excess of jurisdiction in
reinstating the petition.

RULING:

No. The SC held the CA did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the petition and that
Landheights has substantially complied with the verification and certification requirements.

The Court held that the failure to submit proof of the representative's authority to sign the
verification/certification on non-forum shopping on the corporation's behalf was rectified
when the required document was subsequently submitted to the CA. In said case, petitioner
submitted the original of the Barangay Council Resolution authorizing the succeeding
Punong Barangay Periander R. Bañez to file the amended petition and to sign the
certification as an attachment to its motion for reconsideration. In line with the foregoing
jurisprudence, the Court finds that this act constitutes substantial compliance.

In any case, the Court finds that the ends of substantive justice is better served by the
resolution of the issue on whether or not there was a valid compromise concerning the
boundary dispute between Ormoc City and the Municipality of Kananga, rather than dismiss
the same on procedural technicality.
 G.R. No. 168313 October 6, 2010

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO BARZA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 61, FIRST UNION GROUP ENTERPRISES and
LINDA WU HU, Respondents.

FACTS:

First Union (FU) borrowed from BPI PHP 5,000,000.00 and $ 123,218., evidenced by PNs.
Linda and her spouse Eddy Tien executed a Real Estate Mortgage against 2 condo units to
secure the loan. Linda also agreed to be solidarily liable with FU for obligations with BPI.
However, FU was eventually unable to pay its loan upon maturity. BPI initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings with the Sheriff of RTC Pasig against the 2 condo units to satisfy
the solidary obligation. The properties were eventually sold at a public auction, with BPI as
highest bidder. After applying the proceeds, FU still owed BPI PHP 4,742,949.. Also, the
dollar loan remained unpaid and has already amounted to 175,324. 35. BPI filed a complaint
for collection of sum of money in RTC Makati, with the complaint‘s verification and certificate
of non-forum shopping signed by Ma. Cristina Asis and Kristine Ong (CK). However, no
Secretary‘s Certificate or Board Resolution was attached to evidence Asis‘ and Ong‘s
authority to file the complaint.

FU and Linda filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules, stating that BPI failed to attach to the complaint the necessary board resolution
authorizing CK to institute collection action against FU and Linda. BPI opposed, stating that
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping established CK‘s authority to file complaint
and proof of their authority could be presented during trial. BPI further alleges that a
complaint can only be dismissed under Sec. 5, Rule 7 if there was no certification against
forum shopping. BPI also states that the provision does not even require that the person
certifying should show proof of authority to do so.

Instead of a board resolution, BPI attached a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
Zosimo A. Kabigting (Zosimo), Vice-President of BPI. This authorized CK or any lawyer from
the Benedicto Versoza Gealogo and Burkley Law Offices to initiate any legal action against
FU and Linda.

FU countered, citing Public Estates Authority v. Elpidio Uy, stating that ―an initiatory pleading
which does not contain a board resolution authorizing the person to show proof of his
authority is equally guilty (sic) of not satisfying the requirements in the Certification against
Non-Forum Shopping. It is as if though (sic) no certification has been filed.‖

RTC granted FU and Linda‘s Motion to Dismiss. Upon appeal, CA decided that BPI failed to
comply with the procedural requirements on non-forum shopping, stating that the
requirement that a petition should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to
corporations since the Rules of Court do not distinguish between natural and civil persons.
The CA did not question the authority of CK as bank representatives, however BPI failed to
show through an appropriate board resolution the proof of authority as representatives.

BPI now goes to the SC, arguing against CA‘s interpretation of Shipside vs. CA, stating that
the SC actually excused Shipside‘s belated submission of its Secretary‘s Certificate and held
that it substantially complied with the rule requiring the submission of a verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping as it did, in fact, make a submission. BPI was in fact, ―in a
better position‖ as it also submitted the SPA signed by Zosimo. BPI also cited GMC vs.
NLRC, where the SC held that GMC‘s belated submission was considered in substantial
compliance with the Rules.

ISSUE:

Whether BPI was in substantial compliance with the Rules through its submission of the
Board Resolution with SPA

RULING:

No. In ruling for FU and Linda, the SC emphasized the need to abide by the Rules, pointing
out that the verification of a complaint and attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping
are requirements that are basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. The
SC did not find any reason for it to generally apply the ―liberal jurisprudential exception‖ held
in the Shipside case to excuse the failure to submit a Board Resolution. The rule for the
submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, proper in form and substance, remains to
be a strict and mandatory rule. A liberal application has to be justified by ample and sufficient
reasons that maintain the integrity of, and do not detract from, the mandatory character of
the rule. Citing Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association and
Mediserv v. Court of Appeals, the SC stated that it will only allow the liberal interpretation of
the rules if special circumstances or compelling reasons which will make the strict
application of the Rules inequitable exist, and even then the SC will look for a reasonable
attempt at (substantial) compliance with the rules.
 G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON
y ANDRADE, respondents.

FACTS

On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina
Munson y Andrade, filed a Petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly
alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption,
their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under
and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same
petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor adoptee
to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with
religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and
friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents' residence.

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of
name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner
reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change
of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings.

Trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related
to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be
entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the giver or
proper name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted
separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to
193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles
364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name,
must correspondingly be complied with.

ISSUE:

W/N respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if
the adoptee in a petition for adoption.

RULING:

No. Par (1) of Art. 189 of the Family Code provide one of the legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee‘s surname
to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of
adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not
prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee‘s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
 CHAPTER 18
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES
_________________________________________________________________________

BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. E. M.

RAMOS AND SONS, INC., RESPONDENT. [G.R. No. 131481, March 16 : 2011];
&
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PETITIONER, VS. E. M. RAMOS AND SONS,
INC., RESPONDENT. [G.R. No. 131624]

FACTS:

 Several parcels of unirrigated land which form part of a larger expanse originally owned
by the Manila Golf and Country Club was aquired by EMRASON for the purpose of
developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes".

 The Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act No. 2264,
otherwise known as the "Local Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1
entitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for
Violation Thereof." EMRASON applied for an authority to convert and development its
property into a residential subdivision. Then Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite
passed Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A approving EMRASON's application.

 The actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay because the property
was mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of
Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation.

 On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land
classification, acquisition and distribution. Then came the Aquino government's plan to
convert the tenanted neighboring property of the National Development Company (NDC)
into an industrial estate to be managed through a joint venture scheme by NDC and the
Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall conversion package called for providing the
tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the NDC property, with three hectares each.
However, the size of the NDC property turned out to be insufficient for both the demands
of the proposed industrial project as well as the government's commitment to the tenant-
farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was
thus tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby areas. The DAR earmarked
for this purpose the subject property of EMRASON. DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent
out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest from
EMRASON.

 EMRASON filed with the DARAB separate petitions to nullify the notices. The Legal
Division of DAR rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of
acquisitions, observing that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to Department of
Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP. Supposedly, this was
pursuant to a DOJ Opinion rendered by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarifying
that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no
longer covered by CARP.

 Region IV DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the Office of the
Agrarian Reform Secretary. DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao issued an order affirming the
 Notices of Acquisition  MFR denied -> Appeal to the Office of the President

 Appeal dismissed by OP because EMRASON’s property has supposedly remained

agricultural in classification and thus within the coverage of the CARP because it failed to
comply with the mandatory requirements and conditions of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 1
and 29-A, specifically, among others, the need for approval of the
National Planning Commission through the Highway District Engineer, and the Bureau
of Lands before final submission to the Municipal Council and Municipal Mayor, and
there was a certification of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) in 1981 and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB) in 1992 that
the property is agricultural  MR denied  Petition for Review with the CA

 DAR had already prepared Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute
the subject property to farmer-beneficiaries. However, a writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of
the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property, filed a Manifestation and
Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed to intervene as an indispensable
party.

 CA ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already

converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the
effectivity of the CARL. The appellate court reasoned mainly that ―…the municipality,
conformably with its statutory-conferred local autonomy, had passed a subdivision
measure, I.e., Ordinance No. 1, and had approved in line thereto, through the medium of
Ordinance No. 29-A, [EMRASON's] application for subdivision, or with like effect
approved the conversion/classification of the lands in dispute as residential. Significantly,
the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite, in his letter of September 23, 1988 to
[EMRASON], clarified that such conversion conforms with the approved development
plan of the municipality‖.

Petitioner‘s arguments:
 DAR:
 The subject property could be compulsorily acquired by the State from EMRASON
and distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries under the CARP since it was still
agricultural land when the CARP became effective on June 15, 1988. Ordinance Nos.
1 and 29-A, approved by the Municipality of Dasmariñas on July 13, 1971 and July 9,
1972, respectively, did not reclassify the subject property from agricultural to non-
agricultural. The power to reclassify lands is an inherent power of the National
Legislature under Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, as amended, which, absent a specific delegation, could not be
exercised by any local government unit (LGU). The Local Autonomy Act of 1959 - in
effect when the Municipality of Dasmariñas approved Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A -
merely delegated to cities and municipalities zoning authority, to be understood as the
regulation of the uses of property in accordance with the existing character of the land
and structures. It was only Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, which extended to cities and municipalities
limited authority to reclassify agricultural lands.
 Even conceding that cities and municipalities were already authorized in 1972 to issue
an ordinance reclassifying lands from agricultural to non-agricultural, Ordinance No.
29-A of the Municipality of Dasmariñas was not valid since it failed to comply with
Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 of the
Municipality of Dasmarinas, and Administrative Order No. 152, which all required
review and approval of such an ordinance by the National Planning Commission
(NPC). Subsequent developments further necessitated review and approval of
 Ordinance No. 29-A by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC),
which later became the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
 Reliance by the Court of Appeals on Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian
Reform is misplaced because the lands involved therein were converted from
agricultural to residential use by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, issued pursuant
to the authority delegated to the President under Section 71, et seq., of the Public
Land Act.

 Buklod:
 Prior to Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, there were already laws implementing agrarian
reform, particularly: (1) Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, in effect since August 8, 1963, and subsequently amended by
Republic Act No. 6389 on September 10, 1971, after which it became known as the
Code of Agrarian Reforms; and (2) Presidential Decree No. 27, otherwise known as
the Tenants Emancipation Decree, which took effect on November 19, 1972.
Agricultural land could not be converted for the purpose of evading land reform for
there were already laws granting farmer-tenants security of tenure, protection from
ejectment without just cause, and vested rights to the land they work on.

 EMRASON failed to comply with Section 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, which
provided that the conversion of land should be implemented within one year,
otherwise, the conversion is deemed in bad faith. Given the failure of EMRASON to
comply with many other requirements for a valid conversion, the subject property has
remained agricultural. Simply put, no compliance means no conversion. In fact,
Buklod points out, the subject property is still declared as "agricultural" for real estate
tax purposes. Consequently, EMRASON is now estopped from insisting that the
subject property is actually "residential."

 Land reform is a constitutional mandate which should be given paramount

consideration. Pursuant to said constitutional mandate, the Legislature enacted the
CARP. It is a basic legal principle that a legislative statute prevails over a mere
municipal ordinance.

Respondent‘s arguments:
 EMRASON:
 The subject property is exempt from CARP because it had already been reclassified
as residential with the approval of Ordinance No. 29-A by the Municipality. EMRASON
cites Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co where this Court
ruled that a municipal council is empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959.
EMRASON avows that the Municipality of Dasmariñas, taking into account the
conditions prevailing in the area, could validly zone and reclassify the subject property
in the exercise of its police power in order to safeguard the health, safety, peace,
good order, and general welfare of the people in the locality. EMRASON describes
the whole area surrounding the subject property as residential subdivisions (i.e., Don
Gregorio, Metro Gate, Vine Village, and Cityland Greenbreeze 1 and 2 Subdivisions)
and industrial estates (i.e., Reynolds Aluminum Philippines, Inc. factory; NDC-
Marubeni industrial complex, San Miguel Corporation-Monterey cattle and piggery
farm and slaughterhouse), traversed by national highways (i.e., Emilio Aguinaldo
National Highway, Trece Martirez, Puerto Azul Road, and Governor's Drive).
EMRASON mentions that on March 25, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Cavite passed Resolution No. 105 which declared the area where
subject property is located as "industrial-residential-institutional mix."
  Ordinance No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmariñas is valid. Ordinance No. 29-A is
complete in itself, and there is no more need to comply with the alleged requisites
which DAR and Buklod are insisting upon. EMRASON quotes from Patalinghug v.
Court of Appeals that "once a local government has reclassified an area as
commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail."

 Ordinance No. 29-A, reclassifying the subject property, was approved by the
Municipality of Dasmariñas on July 9, 1972. Executive Order No. 648, otherwise
known as the Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC
Charter) - which conferred upon the HSRC the power and duty to review, evaluate,
and approve or disapprove comprehensive land use and development plans and
zoning ordinances of LGUs - was issued only on February 7, 1981. The exercise by
HSRC of such power could not be applied retroactively to this case without impairing
vested rights of EMRASON.

 There is no absolute necessity of submitting Ordinance No. 29-A to the NPC for
approval. Based on the language of Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959,
which used the word "may," review by the NPC of the local planning and zoning
ordinances was merely permissive. EMRASON additionally posits that Ordinance No.
1 of the Municipality of Dasmariñas simply required approval by the NPC of the final
plat or plan, map, or chart of the subdivision, and not of the reclassification and/or
conversion by the Municipality of the subject property from agricultural to
residential. As for Administrative Order No. 152 dated December 16, 1968, it was
directed to and should have been complied with by the city and municipal boards and
councils. Thus, EMRASON should not be made to suffer for the non-compliance by
the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas with said administrative order.

 Since the subject property was already reclassified as residential with the mere
approval of Ordinance No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmarinas, EMRASON did
not have to immediately undertake actual development of the subject property.
Reclassification and/or conversion of a parcel of land are different from the
implementation of the conversion.

 Buklod members are not farmer-tenants of the subject property. The subject property
has no farmer-tenants because, as the Court of Appeals observed, the property is
unirrigated and not devoted to any agricultural activity. The subject property was
placed under the CARP only to accommodate the farmer-tenants of the NDC property
who were displaced by the NDC-Marubeni Industrial Project. Moreover, the Buklod
members are still undergoing a screening process before the DAR-Region IV, and are
yet to be declared as qualified farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property. Hence,
Buklod members tailed to establish they already have vested right over the subject
property.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject property could be placed under the CARP.

RULING:

SC affirms the Court of Appeals and rules in favor of EMRASON.

 CARP coverage limited to agricultural land

 Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 particularly defines the coverage of
 the CARP, to wit: SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture:
Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and
below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARL: (d) All private lands
devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or
that can be raised thereon. Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down
the definition of agricultural land that is subject to CARL to "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land." The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To
be exempt from the CARL, the subject property should have already been reclassified
as residential prior to said date.

 The Local Autonomy Act of 1959

 The Local Autonomy Act of 1959, precursor of the Local Government Code of 1991,
provided: SEC. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city
councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils. - x x x
Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. — Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal
Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the
approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and
municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters
pertaining to planning and zoning.
 The Court observes that the OP, the Court of Appeals, and even the parties
themselves referred to Resolution No. 29-A as an ordinance. Although it may not be
its official designation, calling Resolution No. 29-A as Ordinance No. 29-A is not
completely inaccurate.
 Ortigas & Co. case, the Court found it immaterial that the then Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong declared certain lots as part of the commercial
and industrial zone through a resolution, rather than an ordinance,
because:Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local
Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations" for the municipality. Clearly, the law
docs not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance.
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly
is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word
"regulation" under the provision. As a matter oi' fact the same section
declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding x x x."
 While the subject property may be physically located within an agricultural zone under
the 1981 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmarinas, said property retained its
residential classification. According to Section 17, the Repealing Clause, of the 1981
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmarinas: "AH other ordinances, rules or
regulations in conflict with the provision of this Ordinance are hereby repealed: Provided,
that rights that have vested before the effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired."
 Ayog v. Cusi, Jr.: That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by
the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and
twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested
rights in constitutional law.
 The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not
 impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except
in a legitimate exercise of the police power"
 A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or
transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or
contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally
to Ihose already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will
have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of
the people, x x x.

 EMRASON mentions Resolution No. 105, Defining and Declaring the Boundaries of
Industrial and Residential Land Use Plan in the Municipalities of Imus and Parts of
Dasmariflas, Carmona, Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Gen. Trias, Silang, Tanza, Naic, Rosario,
and Trece Martires City, Province o[ Cavite, approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Cavite on March 25, 1988. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan determined that "the lands
extending from the said designated industrial areas would have greater economic value
for residential and institutional uses, and would serve the interest and welfare for the
greatest good of the greatest number of people."50 Resolution No. 105, approved by the
HLURB in 1990, partly reads: Tracts of land in the Municipality of Carmona from the
People's Technology Complex to parts of the Municipality of Silang, parts of the
Municipalities of Dasmariñas, General Trias, Trece Martires City, Municipalities of Tanza
and Naic forming the strip of land traversed by the Puerto Azul Road extending two
kilometers more or less from each side of the road which are hereby declared as
industrial-residential-institutional mix. (Emphases supplied.)
 There is no question that the subject property is located within the afore-described
area. And even though Resolution No. 105 has no direct bearing on the classification
of the subject property prior to the CARL - it taking effect only in 1990 after being
approved by the HLURB - it is a confirmation that at present, the subject property and
its surrounding areas are deemed by the Province of Cavite better suited and
prioritized for industrial and residential development, than agricultural purposes.
 CARP exemption:
 Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to
what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" arc only those lands which are "arable and
suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands."
 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots
were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval
of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in
question continue to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a
snail's pace, x x x The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision
may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these
lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
 BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN,
and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.

G.R. No. 159618

February 1, 2011

FACTS:

In 2000, the RP, through Charge d‘Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is ―subject to ratification, acceptance or approval‖ by the
signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by
then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect
certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and

ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least
declared as without force and effect.

ISSUE:

1. Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in

concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome
Statute?
2. Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3
of all the members of the Senate?

RULING:

The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact,
the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the
Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to ―be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions
[of the signatory states].‖ the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of
states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are
unwilling or unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-

Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for
lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to
follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the
Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international
agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party
to the Rome Statute.
 The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest
days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.

Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the
President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation
is, as Bayan would put it, ―executive altogether.‖ The right of the President to enter into or
ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 179431-32

June 22, 2010

FACTS:

COMELEC issued resolution giving due course to CIBAC‘s Manifestation of Intent to

participate in the party-list election.

Respondents, President and chairman Villanueva submitted the certified Certificate

of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. Pia Derla submitted a 2nd
Certificate of Nominees including Lokin, Jr (petitioner) as party-list nominees as she affixed
her signature as ―acting secretary-general‖ of CIBAC.

The nomination of petitioners was unauthorized. Respondents filed with the

COMELEC a ―Petition to expunge from the records and/or for disqualification,‖ seeking to
nullify the certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contented that Derla had misrepresented
herself as ―acting secretary-general‖, and not even a member of CIBAC.

Resolution filed by the COMELEC First division granted the petition and ordered the
Certificate filed by Derlato be expunged from the records, and declared respondents‘ group
as the true nominees of CIBAC.

COMELEC en banc affirmed the Division‘s findings as the commission reiterated that
Derla was unable to prove her authority to file a certificate, whereas respondents presented
evidence that Villanueva deputized CIBAC secretary to submit the Certificate of Nomination
pursuant to CIBAC‘s Constitution and bylaws.

The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution, prompting Lokin Jr. (petitioner)
to file Petition for Certiorari for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
issuing the said Resolution. The petitioner wants to be recognized as the legitimate
nominees and representative of CIBAC party-list.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the authority of Secretary of CIBAC to file the part‘s Certificate of
Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial
courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction;
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and
recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.

RULING:

1. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the
nomination of party-list representatives. The present dispute stemmed from an intra-
corporate matter, their submissions even recognize the COMELEC‘s constitutional
power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall. More specifically, as one of its constitutional functions,
the COMELEC is also tasked to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present t heir
platform or program of government.‖ Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include
 the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts." The Court also declared that the COMELEC‘s power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

2. No error because it is indicated clearly in the law that Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List
Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for
a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for atleast ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. Pia Derla, who is not even a
member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and clearly not qualified to
attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the COMELEC.
Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary
requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members of the
party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the
affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is
registered with COMELEC.
 LEXBER, INC, petitioner,
vs. CAESAR M. and CONCHITA B. DALMAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 183587

April 20, 2015

FACTS:

Lexber is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of housing, construction,

and real estate development. Among those who availed of Lexber‘s housing projects are
respondent Spouses Dalman, who bought a house and lot under a contract to sell in
Lexber‘s Regal Lexber Homes at Tuba, Benguet.

Because of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and other external factors, Lexber‘s
financial condition deteriorated. It was forced to discontinue some of its housing projects,
including the one where the Spouses Dalman‘s purchased property is located.

As Lexber could no longer pay its creditors, it filed a petition for rehabilitation with
prayer for the suspension of payments on its loan obligations. Among its creditors are the
Spouses Dalman who are yet to receive their purchased house and lot, or, in the alternative,
a refund of their payments which amounted to P900,000.00.

In an order dated June 12, 2007, the trial court gave due course to Lexber‘s
rehabilitation petition and appointed Atty. Rafael Chris F. Teston (Atty. Teston) as
rehabilitation receiver. It further ordered Atty. Teston to evaluate Lexber‘s rehabilitation plan
and recommend the necessary actions to be taken.

The Spouses Dalman filed a motion for reconsideration from this order and argued
that consistent with Rule 4, Section 1114 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), the trial court should have dismissed outright the rehabilitation
petition because it failed to approve the rehabilitation plan within 180 days from the date of
the initial hearing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition shall be automatically dismissed after the lapse of 180
days from the date of the initial hearing.

RULING:

No. The Court held that the lapse of the 180-day period for the approval of the
rehabilitation plan should not automatically result to the dismissal of the rehabilitation
petition.

Section 11. Period of the Stay Order – The stay order shall be effective from the date
of its issuance until the dismissal of the petition or the termination of the rehabilitation
proceedings.

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon
the lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court
may grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling
evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall
the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months
from the date of filing of the petition.

The records of the present case show that on May 4, 2007, Lexber filed a motion for
the extension of the period for the approval of the rehabilitation plan. However, the trial court
never issued a resolution on this motion. Instead, on June 12, 2007, it issued an order giving
due course to the petition. The records also reveal that after the initial hearing, the trial court
had to conduct additional hearings even after the lapse of the 180-day period.

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that Lexber could not be faulted for
the non-approval of the rehabilitation plan within the 180-day period. A petitioner-corporation
should not be penalized if the trial court needed more time to evaluate the rehabilitation plan.
Notably, in the present case, Lexber filed a motion for the extension of the 180-day period.
However, the trial court did not issue a resolution on this motion. Instead, it issued an order
giving due course to the petition, which also fell within the 18-month limit prescribed under
the law.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and
ESTER MIRA BREHM,petitioners-appellees,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-18566

September 30, 1963

FACTS:

Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary
assignment at Subic Bay. He married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter
Elizabeth. The spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth. The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court adjudged
minor Elizabeth is freed from all obligations to her natural father and the child of the
petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm, on the ground that Elizabeth has always
been under the care and support of Gilbert and his declared intention of permanently
residing herein. The Solicitor General claimed that it was error for the Court in adjudging
Elizabeth. On appeal however, the court find otherwise.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Brehm is qualified to adopt Elizabeth.

RULING:

No, Brehm is disqualified to adopt Elizabeth.

According to Art. 335, it clearly states that non-resident aliens cannot adopt. It is
therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the
negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated.
On the other hand, Art. 338, can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with
the mandatory provisions of Art. 335.

In the instant case Brehm is clearly a non-resident alien by his own testimony.
Therefore he is disqualified to adopt Elizabeth. The decision appealed from was reversed,
and Brehm‘s Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira was denied.
 LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION,
EMDEN ENCARNACION and HORATIO AYCARDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 117188

August 7, 1997

FACTS:

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized on

February 8, 1983, as the association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand
Villas. It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein
respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). For unknown reasons,
however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws. In July 1989, Soliven, the president of
LGVHAI inquired about the status of the association. Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of
the legal department of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically
dissolved for two reasons. First, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the
Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user of the corporate charter because HIGC
had not received any report on the association‘s activities. These developments prompted
the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a complaint with the HIGC. After some time, the HIGC
ruled in favor of LGVHAI revoking the Certificates of Registration of Loyola Grand Villas
Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. and Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South)
Association, Inc. as hereby revoked or cancelled and that the receivership terminated and
that the receiver is ordered to render an accounting and turn-over to LGVHAI all assets and
records of the Association under his custody and possession. Hence, petitioner now raises
the issue of certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from its
incorporation results in its automatic dissolution?

RULING:

Under the Corporation Code, a private corporation commences to have corporate

existence and juridical personality from the date the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) issues a certificate of incorporation under its official seal. There was no showing that
the registration of LGVHAI had been validly revoked, it continued to be the duly registered
homeowners‘ association in the Loyola Grand Villas. It has been held that automatic
corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on time was never the intention of the
legislature. Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is
the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 of the Corporate
Code reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the
word ―must‖ in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the second paragraph of
the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to incorporation. This provision in the
same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the
by-laws ―within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of
incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.‖ It necessarily follows that failure
to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the ―demise‖ of the corporation.
 In re application of MARIO GUARIÑA for admission to the bar.

G.R. No. L-1179

January 8, 1913

FACTS:

 Relying on Sec. 2 of Act No. 1597, Mario seeks to be exempted from taking the bar
examinations as he is the provincial fiscal of Batanes.
 Said provision states: Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of
the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and
regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Code: Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or
at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the
position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or
associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-General, assistant
attorney in the office of the Attorney-General, prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila,
assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney
for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing
such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
 Per records, he had previously failed to pass the bar exams. He got an average of 71%
but the passing grade for the bar is 75%. SC held that it would contravene their duties to
the public and to the bar if he would be admitted to the bar despite failing the prerequisite
exam.
 Mario claims that he is entitled to be admitted to the bar without taking the bar exams
and can be granted upon motion before the SC and proof that he holds said position.
The clause "may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without and examination" should be construed so as to mean "shall." It is contended that
this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.

ISSUE:

Whether the word ―may‖ in said provision should be construed as ―shall‖

RULING:

In order to determine that the word ―may‖ in a statute is to be construed as either

mandatory or permissive, there is a need to look at the legislative intent of the statute as well
as its language. The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the
light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of the
legislator to enact a law mandatory in its character. If it can, then it should be given a
mandatory effect. Applying these principles, SC was inclined to give the law a mandatory
effect; however, such construction is precluded by the provisions of the Act of Congress,
particularly, Sec. 9.
 Prior to said Act, the court had power and jurisdiction with regards to admission of
bar candidates as provided in the Organic Act No. 136 and Act No. 190. Said acts give
vested authority to the court to pass upon the character and qualifications of bar candidates.

Per Black on Interpretation of Laws, it says that in case that if there is an ambiguous
statute, the courts assumes that the legislator intended to enact a just and valid law and is
not in conflict with the Constitution.

In this case, to construe may as mandatory would run contrary to the Act of
Congress. The intent was to leave within the court‘s discretion to admit someone to the bar
without taking the bar exams the officials mentioned in said act.

Mario was not and never a practicing lawyer in any jurisdiction prior to his
appointment of provincial fiscal and he failed the bar exams. His appointment to such
position is not satisfactory proof that he has the necessary qualifications, hence his
application to be exempted from taking the bar exams and admitted to the bar was denied.

Although he was only 4 points short and was also the Governor of Sorsogon, the SC
gave him a special exam instead.
 TIMOTEO CACHOLA, Petitioner, v. ANDRES CORDERO, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. L-5780

February 28, 1953.

FACTS:
 This is a petition originally instituted in this Court for the purpose of compelling the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to dismiss the election
protest (Civil Case No. 1024) filed by the respondent, Andres Cordero, against the
petitioner, Timoteo Cachola, on the ground that the respondent Judge had failed to
decide said case within six months after its presentation on November 28, 1951, the
motion to dismiss having been filed by the petitioner on June 2, 1952.
 The protest involves the position of municipal mayor. Section 177 of the Revised Election
Code provides that "the court shall decide the protest within six months after it is
presented in case of a municipal office."
 The petitioner contends that this provision is mandatory, thereby leaving the respondent
Judge with no alternative except to dismiss the protest in accordance with petitioner‘s
motion filed on June 2, 1952, or six months and five days after the filing of Civil Case No.
1024.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 177 of the Revised Election Code is directory

RULING:

Section 177 of the Revised Election Code, while directory in nature, of course enjoins
the court to speed up the termination of election contests, and urges the parties to cooperate
in this direction. The law, consistent with public interest, authorizes the court to dismiss a
protest that drags on beyond the statutory period where either of the parties, or both, may be
shown to be guilty of bad faith, with a design to frustrate the purposes of the law and the just
administration of justice.

In the case at bar the Court is not prepared to hold that the delay in the termination of
the protest was due to wilful dilatory maneuvers of either the protestant or the protestee. It is
true that the protestant (respondent Cordero) filed motions for continuance which were
granted by the respondent Judge, but the first was without objection on the part of the
protestee (petitioner Cachola) and the second was with the latter‘s conformity.

The petition was dismissed.

 PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., respondents.

G.R. No. L-63318

August 18, 1984

FACTS:

Respondent NTC promulgated a decision (NTC decision) dated November 22, 1982
which approved a revised schedule of rates (translation: phone bills went up) which was
within the limits of P.D. No. 217, the law which regulated the telephone industry. Petitioner,
Philippine Consumer Foundation (PCF) filed this petition seeking to annul this decision.

On November 25, 1983, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision annulling the
NTC decision. This decision interpreted the following phraseology of Section 2 of P.D. No.
217 as mandatory: ―The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications,
through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the
herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this
purpose, pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated‖ (italics supplied).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 is mandatory.

RULING:

The basic canon of Statutory Construction is that the word used in the law must be
given its ordinary meaning, unless the contrary intent is manifested. The phrase ―may be
promulgated‖ cannot be construed to mean ―shall‖ or ―must‖. Section 2 must therefore be
interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary and not mandatory on the
part of the delegate, NTC.

What is mandatory however, is the immediate implementation of the policies

declared in P.D. No. 217. Note that both words ―shall‖ and ―may be‖ are used in the same
section which demonstrates that the ordinary, usual or normal distinction between these
words is preserved.

It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 217 [which is a special law] only repeals
pertinent portions of Act 3436 and the Public Service Act [which is a general law regulating
all manner of public franchises] and that the Board of Communications, the immediate
predecessor of the NTC was adequately served by their own rules of procedure. This meant
that the acts complained of by NCF, i.e. the fixing of provisional rates without public hearing
(Section 16 of the public service act), was a valid act.

The decision of November 25, 1983 was reconsidered and set aside and the petition
was dismissed.
 The Director of Lands, Petitioner
vs. Court of Appeals and Teodoro Abistado, substituted by Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, Respondents.

G.R. No. 102858

July 28, 1997

FACTS:

Teodoro Abistado, private respondent, Filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 square meters of land under P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and
assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. During
the pendency of the case, Teodoro Abistado died and was substituted by his children -
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, who were all
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, ad litem ( act in which a lawsuit has a
representative in behalf of children not capable of representation.)

Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction in compliance
with the mandatory provision requiring publication of initial public hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation. Records show that applicants failed to comply with P.D. No. 1529
Section 23 (1) requiring publication of notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation. Initial public hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which granted the application and
ordered the registration of title to Teodoro Abistado, since publication in a newspaper of
general Circulation is merely procedural, hence dispensable. The Director of Land,
represented by the Solicitor General, elevated this case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Director of Land is correct that the publication of Notice of Initial
hearing in a Land Registration Case is mandatory.

RULING:

Yes. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 shall be followed requiring a publication once both
in the Official Gazette and newspaper of general circulation. The Land Registration Case is
an in Rem proceeding, meaning the applicant must prove his title over the land against all
persons concerned, who might have interest to right in the property and should effectively be
invited in the court to prove why the title should not be granted.

Such provision used the term "shall" which indicated that it is mandatory.
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation, or equivocation, there is room only for application.

Thus. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Lower Court dismissing the petition
for registration of Land Title to the respondents.
PHILIPPINE REGISTERED ELECTRICAL PRACTITIONERS, INC. (PREPI), represented
by BEN ROSETE, HERMINIO S. RAMIREZ, CASIANO PAULINO, NONATO
VILLANUEVA, JR., RENATO AME, MARIO BLAS, SAMUEL BRAVO, AMOR CRUZ,
FRANCISCO DULLER, BENITO ESPAÑOL, PABLO FERNANDEZ, WILFREDO
GORRICHO, GRACIANO LAPID, LUISITO MAGANA, FERNANDO MALABANAN,
MARTIN MARTINEZ, EDGARDO MERIDA, ARNEL PALILIO, GAUDIOSO SEURA,
ZENON TUBIO, MARIANO YAPE, AND NILO MONTALBAN, petitioner,
vs.
JULIO FRANCIA, JR., in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION, MEDERICO T. CORTEZ, in his capacity as CHAIRMAN
OF THE BOARD OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, and HONORABLE REBECCA
SALVADOR, JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH
1, respondents.

G.R. No. 87134

January 20, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of professional electrical engineers, associate

electrical engineers, assistant electrical engineers, and master electricians. It is represented
in this case by several of its officers and members. They assailed the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986 issued by the Board of Electrical Engineering (BEE),
adopting guidelines for the implementation of Continuing Professional Education (CPE)
Program for Electrical Engineers. It requires every electrical engineer to earn credit units of
CPE before his license could be renewed.||| Petitioner questioned the authority of the BEE to
issue the subject Resolution, and the constitutionality of said Resolution. Sec. 3 of RA
184 mandated the Board to recommend proper measures for the maintenance of good
ethics and standards in the practice of electrical engineering in the Philippines. The same is
supported by Sec. 6(a) of PD 223. Petitioner argues that PRC and BEE have only visitation
powers as stated in the said provision. The RTC as affirmed by the CA, decided that the
board had the authority to promulgate the questioned resolution pursuant to Section 3, RA
no.184. That the latter law is not limited to the power of inspection and visitation as petitioner
contends. It includes the power to formulate policies and programs as may be necessary to
improve the practice of a profession.

ISSUE:

Whether the Board of Electrical Engineers in the light of the provisions of R.A. No.
184, had the authority to issue the questioned resolution.

RULING:

Yes, The Court found that BEE had the authority to issue the resolution.

The court found that the objective of the resolution is to upgrade the knowledge and
skills of electrical engineers. And that Section 3 of RA no 184 mandates the Board to
recommend to the PRC the adoption of ―measures as may be deemed proper for the
maintenance of good ethics and standars on the practice of electrical engineering in the
Philippines…‖. Moreover, Section 6(a) of PD no 223 gives various professional boards the
power ―to look from time to time into conditions affecting the practice of the profession….‖ It
said that the members of a Board may personally or through subordinate employees of the
Commission conduct ocular inspection or visit industrial, mechanical, electrical or chemical
plants or works, hospitals, clinics and other engineering works. . ."On this point, petitioner
now insists that the authority of the Board is limited to the conduct of ocular inspections. But
nothing in said provision in any way imposes such an interpretation. The Board in fact may
even do away with ocular inspections, as can be gleaned from the use of the word "may,"
implying that the conduct of ocular inspections is merely directory and not mandatory. For
sure, conducting ocular inspections is only one way of ensuring compliance with laws and
rules relative to the professional practice of electrical engineering. But it certainly is not the
only way.
 AUGUSTUS GONZALES and spouses NESTOR victor and MA. LOURDES
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,
vs. QUIRICO PE, Respondent

G.R. No. 167398

August 9, 2011

FACTS:

Respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of construction materials and

had been transacting business with petitioner Spouses Nestor Victor Rodriguez and Ma.
Lourdes Rodriguez.

The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) awarded two contracts in
favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez for the following projects, namely, construction of
―Lanot-Banga Road and concreting of ―Lauaan- Pandan Road. In 1998, respondent agreed
to supply cement for the construction projects of petitioner Spouses Rodriguez. Petitioner
Nestor Rodriguez availed of the DPWH‘s prepayment program for cement requirement
regarding the Lanot-Banga Road, Kalibo Highway project.

Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez gave Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No.
6563066 to respondent, which was signed by co-petitioners (his wife Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez
and his business partner Augustus Gonzales), but leaving the amount and date in blank. The
blank LBP check was delivered to respondent to guarantee the payment of 15,698 bags of
Portland cement valued at P1,507,008.00, covered by Official Receipt No. 1175,5 issued by
respondent (as owner of Antique Commercial), in favor of petitioner. However, a year later,
respondent filled up blank LBP Check No. 6563066, by placing P2,062,000.00 and June 30,
1999, corresponding to the amount and date.

On December 9, 1999, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint for Declaration of

Payment, Cancellation of Documents and Damages against respondent with the RTC,
Branch 31, Iloilo City, docketed as Civil Case. According to them, after having paid
respondent the amount of P2,306,500.00, which is P139,160.00 more than the amount of
P2,167,340.00 (representing the value for 23,360 bags of cement taken for the Kalibo
project), they were cleared of any liability. On January 6, 2000, respondent filed an Answer.
The LBP check was dishonored for being ―drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).‖ By way
of compulsory counterclaim, he sought recovery of the balance of P2,062,000.00, with
interest at 24% from January 29, 1999 until fully paid as actual damages. In a Decision
dated June 28, 2002, the trial court, applying Section 1410 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law. RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent.
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. In an Order dated August 5, 2002, the trial court gave
due course to respondent‘s appeal. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss
Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of Execution, stating that respondent‘s appeal should be
dismissed as the same was not perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful
fees. Trial court dismissed respondent‘s appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Orderseeking to set aside
the RTC Order. CA granted the respondents‘ prayer for Temporary Restraining Order.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 24, 2004, which,
however, was denied by the CA. Hence, petitioner filed this present petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC and allowing
respondent to belatedly pay the required appellate docket and other legal fees.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the required appeal
fees within the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule. In
reversing the ruling of the trial court, the CA cited Yambao v. Court of Appeals as justification
for giving due course to respondent‘s petition and ordering the belated payment of docket
and other legal fees. In Yambao, the CA dismissed therein petitioners‘ appeal from the RTC
decision for failure to pay the full amount of the required docket fee. Upon elevation of the
case, the Court, however, ordered the CA to give due course to their appeal, and ruled that
their subsequent payment of the P20.00 deficiency, even before the CA had passed upon
their motion for reconsideration, was indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply
with the Rules.

The ruling in Yambao is not applicable to the present case as herein respondent
never made any payment of the docket and other lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so,
simultaneous with his filing of the Notice of Appeal. Although respondent was able to file a
timely Notice of Appeal, however, he failed to pay the docket and other legal fees, claiming
that the Branch Clerk of Court did not issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the
part of the respondent rendered his appeal with the CA to be dismissible and, therefore, the
RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002, to be final and executory. Respondent‘s claim that his
nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees should be treated as mistake and excusable
negligence, attributable to the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, is too superficial to warrant
consideration. This is clearly negligence of respondent‘s counsel, which is not excusable.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not
have guarded against. an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. The CA took cognizance
over the case, based on the wrong premise that when the RTC issued the Order dated
August 5, 2002 giving due course to respondent‘s Notice of Appeal and directing the Branch
Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the CA, it ipso facto lost
jurisdiction over the case. Section 9,28 Rule 41 of the Rules explains that the court of origin
loses jurisdiction over the case only upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time by the
appellant and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Withal, prior to the
transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, the RTC may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the prevailing party, as in this case, the issuance
of the writ of execution because the respondent‘s appeal was not perfected. Moreover,
Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules states that the CA may dismiss an appeal taken from the
RTC on the ground of non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the 15-day
reglementary period.

Since respondent‘s appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period,
it was as if no appeal was actually taken.
 CHAPTERS 19-23

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES •

AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL • APPLYING LEGAL METHOD
• LEGAL METHOD AND THE RULE OF LAW
_________________________________________________________________________

 Cheng v Sps. Sy
 Association of Southern Tagalog
 Tan v CA
Electric Cooperatives, Inc. v. Energy
Regulatory Commission  Zulueta v Asia Brewery

 Board of Trustees of the Government  Republic v CA

Service Insurance System v. Velasco  Palanca v CA

 Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio  Javier v. COMELEC

Masigasig, Inc. v Military Shrine  Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. v

Services Banko Sentral Monetary Board

 In re: Petition for assistance in the  Manlangit v Sandiganbayan

Liquidation of Intercity Savings and  Zamora v Heirs of Izquierdo

Loan Bank  GSIS v COA
 COMELEC v Co  Remman Enterprises, Inc. v
 Quirog v Aumentado Professional Regulatory Board or Real

 CSC v Pililla Water District Estate Service

 Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v CA  Mecano v COA

 Sps. Gauvian v CA  Berces v Guingona

 Heirs of Banaag v AMS Farming Corp.  Erectors Inc. v NLRC

 Co v CA  City of San Pablo, Laguna v Reyes

 ABS-CBN v CTA  Juan v People

 Romualdez v CSC  Giron v COMELEC

 Manuel L. Quezon University v NLRC  In re: Estate of Johnson

 People v Delos Santos  Kare v Platon

 People v Nepomuceno, Jr.  Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos

 People v Buado  Imbong v Ochoa

 People v Samonte  Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v Central

 Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. v Bank

Caballeda  Southern Cross Cement Corp. v

 Rufina Patis Factory v Alusitain Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp

 Subido, Jr. v Sandiganbayan  Nilo v CA

 Juliano-Llave v Republic  Yambot v Tequero

Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory
Commission

G.R. No. 192117 September 18, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioners are engaged in the distribution of electricity. On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832
or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 was
enacted. The law imposed a cap on the recoverable rate of system loss that may be charged
by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers. The IRR of R.A. No. 7832 required every
rural electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), on or before 30
September 1995, an application for approval of an amended Power Purchase Agreement
(PPA) Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included in
its schedule of rates.

On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)
was also enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC). The ERC issued an Order which provides that rural electric
cooperatives should only recover from their members and patrons the actual cost of power
purchased from power suppliers. The ERC also ordered BATELEC, et al. to refund their
respective over-recoveries to end-users. In addition, the ERC also adopted the new
"grossed-up factor mechanism" in the computation of the over-recoveries of the electric
cooperatives to be remitted to their consumers.

Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the said orders but the ERC denied the same.
On appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the ERC Orders. Hence, this petition. BATELEC I,
et al. aver that these ERC Orders are invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the
U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive application.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-submission to the
U.P. Law Center and for their retroactivity?

HELD:

The petition is partly meritorious. Procedural due process demands that administrative rules
and regulations be published in order to be effective. In Tanada v. Tuvera, the Supreme
Court articulated the fundamental requirement of publication, thus: "We hold therefore that
all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation."

There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an

interpretative regulation does not require publication in order to be effective. The applicability
of an interpretative regulation "needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no
real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed." It "adds nothing to
the law" and "does not affect the substantial rights of any person." Second, a regulation that
is merely internal in nature does not require publication for its effectivity. It seeks to regulate
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the general public. Third, a letter of
instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or guidelines to be followed
by subordinates in the performance of their duties does not require publication in order to be
effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers
are interpretative regulations. Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the policy
guidelines. As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law
Center in order to be effective.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court recognized the basic rule "that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective effect unless
explicitly stated so." A law is retrospective if it "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already past." The policy guidelines of
the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are not retrospective.
The policy guidelines did not take away or impair any vested rights of the rural electric
cooperatives. Furthermore, the policy guidelines of the ERC did not create a new obligation
and impose a new duty, nor did it attach a new disability.

However, the grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it serves
as an additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied by rural electric
cooperatives in the implementation of the PPA. In light of these, the grossed-up factor
mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 or its IRR. It is also not merely internal
in nature. The grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR by providing an additional
numerical standard that must be observed and applied in the implementation of the PPA.
The grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an administrative rule that should be
published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective.

As previously stated, it does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor
mechanism was published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective and
may not serve as a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the over-
recoveries arising from the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid. Furthermore,
the application of the grossed-up factor mechanism to periods of PPA implementation prior
to its publication and disclosure renders the said mechanism invalid for having been applied
retroactively.
Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System v. Velasco

G.R. 170463 February 2, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them
under preventive suspension for 90 days, for their alleged participation in a demonstration
held by GSIS employees. In a letter, respondent Molina requested the GSIS Senior Vice
President for the implementation of his step increment. The SVP denied the request citing
GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 issued by petitioner GSIS Board which approved the new
GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and regulations, and the adoption of the
supplemental guidelines on step increment and promotion. Respondents also asked that
they be allowed to avail of the employee privileges under GSIS Board Resolution
No. 306 approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees.
Respondents‘ request was again denied because of their pending administrative case. Later,
petitioner GSIS Board issued Resolution No. 197 approving the policy recommendations.
Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS
employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also sought to restrain and
prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372. The trial court granted
respondents‘ petition for prohibition. Petitioners filed an MR. The trial court denied
petitioners‘ motion, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-108389 (lies with
the CSC and not with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19.
2. Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board or its President
and General Manager exercising quasi-legislative and administrative functions in Pasay
City is outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Manila, Branch 19.

HELD:
The petition was denied. Petitioners argue that the CSC, not the trial court, has jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 03-108389 because it involves claims of employee benefits. Petitioners
point out that the trial court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the SC or, if it related to
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the SC. It may also be filed in the
CA whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it
is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the CA.
The case is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Respondents prayed that the trial court declare all acts emanating from
Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the
said resolutions. Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents‘
petition for prohibition.

Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the wrong territorial
jurisdiction because the acts sought to be prohibited are the acts of petitioners who hold their
principal office in Pasay City, while the petition for prohibition was filed in Manila.

Section 18 of BP 129 provides that The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a
branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to
be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all
suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal. The petition for prohibition filed by
respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the SC, the CA, the
Sandiganbayan or the RTC, as the case may be. It is also a personal action because it does
not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since
respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the
petition could properly be filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is sanctioned by
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v Military Shrine Services

G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

Facts:

President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending
Proclamation No. 423, (which reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military
reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres
Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio) which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for
a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is
under the administration of herein respondent MSS-PVAO. Again, on 7 January 1986,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423,
which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions
of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President
Marcos made a handwritten addendum.

President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which
substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1
and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said
lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730. Memorandum Order No.
119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating TFB, primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

Members of petitioner filed a Petition with the COSLAP, which prayed for the following:
1. the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of
Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476;
2. the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and
3. the Land Management Bureau‘s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot
to its bona fide occupants.
COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and declaring the portions of land in
question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting. COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an
integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the
President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising
legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive
enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced
Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President
Aquino‘s legislative power had ceased.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed
Decision granting MSS-PVAO‘s Petition.

Both NMSMI and WBLOAI appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for
Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum
of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.

HELD:

No. Applying the foregoing ruling (above link in Tanada vs Tuvera) to the instant case, this
Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the
law.
.
In re: Petition for assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank

G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009

Facts:

The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on
June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank)... alleging that, inter alia,
said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss
to depositors, creditors and the general public.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due course.[2]
Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted as the
therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank.

In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 was enacted, Section 12 of which provides:

SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the
preferences established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets
reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the proper court,... reasonable
liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of receivership/liquidation
proceedings and collect payment therefor from available assets.

PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and
Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses

P3,795,096.05;

The provision of P700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this distribution
and the winding-up of the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.

The write-off of assets in the total amount of P8,270,789.99,... The write-off of liabilities in
the total amount of P1,562,185.35,... The Final Project of Distribution of Intercity Savings
and Loan Bank... to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated in the
project of distribution for creditors who shall have a period of three (3) years from date of last
notice within which to claim payment therefor.

Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable laws,
rules and regulations

By Order of July 5, 2006,[6] Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion except the
above-quoted paragraphs 5 and 6 of its prayer,

Issues:

whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity

Bank creditors to surplus dividends,

Ruling:
it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter to... prevailing jurisprudence and
unduly prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid their principal
claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.

PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals[7] before which respondent Stockholders of Intercity
Bank (the Stockholders) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing principally that the proper
recourse should be to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari... since the
question involved was purely one of law.[8]

By Resolution of October 17, 2007,[9] the appellate court dismissed the appeal, sustaining in
the main the position of the Stockholders. Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied
by Resolution dated January 24, 2008,[10] PDIC... filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
COMELEC v Co

G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009

FACTS:

Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed
with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-
highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:

I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively.

II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of

the equal protection of the law.

III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

The RTC agreed with the respondents‘ contention that the challenged proviso retroactively
applied the three-term limit for barangay officials. The COMELEC takes the position that the
assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160
(the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be
considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been
specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term
limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied
retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there
is no vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid
objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contended proviso violated the one-subject one-title rule.

HELD:

No, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one
subject-one title rule.

First, the title of RA No. 9164, "An Act Providing for

synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act No.
7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991," states the
law‘s general subject matter – the amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and
SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK
elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials
and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which
defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold office.
This natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject
expressed in the title of the law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public
they represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the law‘s provisions.
Term limitation therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the
legislators and the public.

Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the
title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional
requirement contemplates.
Quirog v Aumentado

G.R. No. 163443 November 11, 2008

FACTS:

On May 28, 2001, Bohol Provincial Governor Rene L. Relampagos permanently

appointed Liza M. Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head of the Office of the
Bohol Provincial Agriculture (PGDH-OPA). The appointment was confirmed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in Resolution No. 2001-199 on June 1, 2001. In the Order dated
June 28, 2001, the Director of CSCROVII invalidated Quirog's appointment as PGDH-OPA
upon finding that the same was part of the bulk appointments issued by then Governor
Relampagos after the May 14, 2001 elections allegedly in violation of Item No. 3(d) of CSC
Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001. The Order pointed out that the prohibition
against the issuance of midnight appointments was already laid down as early as February
29, 2000 in CSC Resolution No. 000550. On December 10, 2001, incumbent Bohol
Governor Erico B. Aumentado filed an amended Motion for Reconsideration. He insisted that
Quirog's appointment was a midnight appointment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is a midnight appointment.

HELD:

No. the CSCROVII disapproved Quirog's appointment for non-compliance with Item No. 3 of
CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001. Item No. 3 refers to the disapproval of
appointments unless certain requisites are complied with. It cannot also be said that Quirog's
appointment was a midnight appointment. The constitutional prohibition on so-
called midnight appointments, specifically, those made within two (2) months immediately
prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. The
appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment. For it is beyond
dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the
subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that
she was only permanently appointed to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the
Acting Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately shows that the filling up of the position
resulted from deliberate action and a careful consideration of the need for the appointment
and the appointee's qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial
Agriculturist since June 2000 all the more highlights the public need for said position to be
permanently filled up.
CSC v Pililla Water District

G.R. No. 190147 March 5, 2013

Facts:

Paulino J. Rafanan was first appointed General Manager on a coterminous status under
Resolution No. 12 issued on August 7, 1998 by the Board of Directors (BOD) of respondent
Pililla Water District (PWD). On October 4, 2001, petitioner issued Resolution No.
011624 amending and clarifying Section 12, Rule XIII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15,
s. 1999. On April 2, 2004, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9286 was approved and signed into law.
On June 16, 2004, the BOD approved Resolution No. 19, Series of 2004, which
reads:cralawlibraryEXTENSION OF SERVICES OF MR. PAULINO J. RAFANAN AS
GENERAL MANAGER OF PILILLA WATER DISTRICT. On April 8, 2005, the BOD issued
Resolution No. 09, Series of 2005 reappointing Rafanan as General Manager on
coterminous status. Said reappointment was signed by Chairman Paz and attested by the
CSC Field Office-Rizal. Pililla Mayor Leandro V. Masikip, Sr. questioned Rafanans
coterminous appointment as defective and void ab initio considering that he was appointed
to a career position despite having reached the compulsory retirement age. Petitioner issued
Resolution No. 080942 invalidating the coterminous appointment issued to Rafanan as
General Manager on April 8, 2005 on the ground that it was made in violation of Section 2 of
R.A. No. 9286. Petitioner further observed that the appointment was issued to circumvent
the denial of the several requests for extension of service of Rafanan.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a conflict between RA 9286 and PD 198.

Held:

No. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9286 merely tempered the broad discretion of
the BOD. A coterminous employment falls under the non-career service classification of
positions in the Civil Service, its tenure being limited or specified by law, or coterminous with
that of the appointing authority, or at the latter‘s pleasure. Under R.A. No. 9286 in relation to
Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987, the coterminous appointment of the General Manager of a water district is based on
the majority vote of the BOD and whose continuity in the service is based on the latter‘s trust
and confidence or co-existent with its tenure. The term of office of the BOD members of
water districts is fixed by P.D. No. 198.
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v CA

G.R. No. 126120 December 4, 2000

FACTS:
Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San
Juan with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for
residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was
issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent
(Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey building for
Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint
which sought the demolition of the constructed car sales company to against Hermoso as it
violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas &
Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD:
Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any
standing contract. Hence, petition is denied. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to
regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may
reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to
future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or
vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of
police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be
read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the
Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.
Sps. Gauvain v CA

G.R. No. 97973 January 27, 1992

FACTS:

In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on the decision
made by herein respondent Court of Appeals – sustaining the right of private respondent Pe
to repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started when respondent Pe was granted
parcel of lands acquired through free patent, however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB;
developed it into commercial complex. Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot;
Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem such property within one year period; DBP
sold it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA
affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint against CA,
alledging, among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re. the five-year period in
foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead relied on the
ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court which was applied retroactively. Hence,
the issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the foreclosure
sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles and instead applied
retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?

HELD:

Yes. At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still
the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar. However,
the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby rendering a
decision in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme Court sustained the claims of
the petitioners. The Court said that though they are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8
of the Civil Code, the Court also stressed that: “while our decisions form part of the law of
the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that “laws shall have
no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided””. Moreover, the Court emphasized
that “when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively xxx.” Therefore, respondents cannot rely on the
Belisario ruling because it should be applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in
its decision regarding this case. Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set aside.
Heirs of Banaag v AMS Farming Corp.

G.R. No. 187801 September 13, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioners were the owners and/or heirs of the owners of several parcels of land located at
Sampao Kapalong, Davao Del Norte. These lands were leased to AMS Farming Corp from
1970 to 1995 and introduced thereon necessary improvements and infrastructures. When
the lease contract expired, a MOA was executed extending the term of the lease until Sept
30, 2002. The lands were covered by the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the CARP. In
determining the value of the raw lands, the matter was referred for Summary Administrative
Proceedings for the fixing of just compensation to the office of RARAD. Just compensation
for the lands was awarded to the petitioners as landowners, while just compensation for the
crops and improvements was awarded to AMS. On appeal with the DARAB central office,
the same was denied for their due being an improper remedy. In the same order, RARAD
issued a Writ of Execution. LBP applied for an injunction with the DARAB, seeking in the
main, to restrain the enforcement of the RARAD Consolidated Decision and to elevate its
appeal to the DARAB.

Injunction granted but in a Consolidated Decision dated October 17, 2005, the RARAD
dismissed the petitioners‘ claim. Petitioners sought reconsideration but their motion was
denied by RARAD. The petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the RARAD expressing their
desire to appeal its Consolidated Decision dated October 17, 2005 to the DAR Secretary,
but was denied due course on the ground of wrong venue and absence of a certification on
non-forum shopping. Motion for reconsideration was denied again. Consequently, the
Consolidated Decision dated October 17, 2005 was entered in the books of entries of
judgment. Unrelenting, the petitioners filed on June 22, 2007, before the RTC of Tagum City,
Davao Del Norte against AMS for the determination of the rightful owner of the standing
crops and improvements planted and/or built on the subject lands. AMS moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of forum shopping. Petition to dismiss was granted.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence this petition. AMS on
the other hand ought the petition to be dismissed since it does not indicate order what rule
was filed and that it is not sanctioned by any modes of appeal under the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

1) WON non-indication of what rule the petition was filed ipso facto merit the outright the
dismissal of the petition.

2) WON petitioners are guilty of Forum Shopping.

HELD:

1) The fact that the present petition did not specify the rule by which it was filed does not
ipso facto merit its outright dismissal. As ruled in Mendoza v. Villas, the Court has the
discretion to determine whether a petition was filed under Rule 45 or 65 of the Rules of Court
in accordance with the liberal spirit permeating the Rules of Court and in the interest of
justice. Clearly, direct recourse to the Court, as in the instant case, is allowed for petitions
filed under Rule 45 when only questions of law are raised. There is a question of law if the
issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of
the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a
certain set of facts. A perusal of the arguments in the petition shows that the only question
posed is with respect to the jurisdiction of the DARAB over the determination of ownership of
standing crops and improvements introduced by the lessee of an agricultural land placed
under CARP coverage. The question is evidently one of law as it invites the examination and
interpretation of the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and that
of the Civil Code provisions on lease vis-à-vis the lease contract between the petitioners and
AMS. It does not require a calibration of any evidence for its resolution.

2) Petitioners did not commit forum-shopping. The test to determine whether forum-shopping
exists is whether the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. Res judicata, on the other hand, means a
matter or thing adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment. Its
requisites are: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must
be one on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and (4) between the first and second actions, there must be
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The third element of res judicata is
palpably wanting in this case because DARAB, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
ownership over standing crops and improvements between a landowner and a lessee. This
is the clear import of the above-stated doctrines declaring that the right of a lessor and
lessee over the improvements introduced by the latter is not an agrarian dispute within the
meaning of the CARL. Consequently, there is no doubt that the DARAB cannot adjudicate
the ownership over standing crops and improvements installed by AMS in the subject
agricultural parcels of land and as such, the DARAB Consolidated Decisions dated October
17, 2005 and December 11, 2006 cannot serve as res judicata to Civil Case No. 3867 filed
by the petitioners with the RTC.
Co v CA

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

FACTS:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of
his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co
delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated
Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The check was
deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason
given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional
Trial Court which found him liable. Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought
exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have
relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by
this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) — i.e., that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This
was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4)
years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987,
the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice. The contention was rejected by the Court of Appeals. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the law may be applied retroactively.

HELD:

No. The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although
in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being)
the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'" When the
accused-appellant committed the act, there exists no law punishing the act. Thus applying
the prospectivity of laws, the court cannot held the accused guilty.
ABS-CBN v CTA

G.R. No. L-52306 October 12, 1981

FACTS:

The ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (herein shall be called the ―Company‖) was
engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business with the Philippines. Under Section 24 (b) of
the National Revenue Code, a withholding tax of 30% (RA 2343). It was implemented
through Circular No. V-334. Pursuant to the foregoing, ABS-CBN dutifully withheld and
turned over to the BIR the amount of 30% of one-half of the film rentals paid by it to foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. The last year that ABS-
CBN withheld taxes pursuant to the foregoing Circular was in 1968. RA 5431 amended
Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30 % to 35 % and revising the
tax basis from ―such amount‖ referring to rents, etc. to ―gross income.‖ The following was
implemented by Circular No. 4-71. Petitioner requested for a reconsideration and withdrawal
of the assessment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent can apply General Circular No. 4-71 retroactively and issue a
deficiency assessment against petitioner.

HELD:

Any rulings or circulars promulgated by the CIR have no retroactive application when it
would be prejudicial to taxpayers. The retroactive application of Memorandum Circular No.
4-71 prejudices ABS-CBN since:

1. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was
also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965.

2. ABS-CBN was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations
because it had already remitted all film rentals and no longer had any control over them
when the new Circular was issued.
Romualdez v CSC

G.R. Nos. 94878 May 15, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner was appointed and served as a Commercial Attache of the Department of Trade
continuously for twelve years from September, 1975 to August 30, 1987. On September 1,
1987, he was transferred to the respondent PCA whereby he was extended an appointment
as Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and Market Development. 1 The nature of
his appointment was "reinstatement" and his employment status was "temporary," for the
period covering September 1, 1987 to August 30, 1988. His appointment was renewed for
another six months from September 1, 1988 to February 28, 1989 also on a "temporary"
status and subject to certain conditions to which petitioner agreed. When his appointment
expired on February 28, 1989, the Governing Board did not renew the same so he was
promptly informed thereof by the Acting Chairman of the Board of the PCA, Apolonio V.
Bautista. Petitioner appealed to respondent CSC. He requested reinstatement to his
previous position in PCA, CSC denied his petition. Thus this petition. Here, the petitioner
invokes CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, S. 1989.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can be reinstated to his old office.

Held:

No. The appointment extended to petitioner by respondent PCA as PCA Deputy

Administrator for Industrial Research and Market Development was temporary. Although
petitioner was formerly holding a permanent appointment as a commercial attache, he
sought and accepted this temporary appointment to respondent PCA. His temporary
appointment was for a definite period and when it lapsed and was not renewed on February
28, 1987, he complains that there was a denial of due process. This is not a case of removal
from office. Indeed, when he accepted this temporary appointment he was thereby
effectively divested of security of tenure. 6 A temporary appointment does not give the
appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the
appointing power. The circular cannot be given retrospective effect as to apply to the case of
petitioner who was separated from the service on February 28, 1989.
Manuel L. Quezon University v NLRC

G.R. No. 141673 October 17, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU) is a private educational institution which

established a retirement plan for its employees as early as June 26, 1967. Noemi B. Juat,
now 68 years of age, worked for almost twenty nine (29) years and started as a part-time
instructor of the petitioner, Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), from June 16, 1965 until
her compulsory retirement on March 31, 1994. Believing that she was entitled to a higher
amount of retirement benefits, private respondent engaged the services of the University of
the Philippines, Office of Legal Aid to prosecute her claim for deficiency. On September 20,
1996 private respondent through counsel sent a letter of demand to MLQU President August
Sunico, demanding the payment of the deficiency plus interest at the rate of 12% a year from
the date of retirement. On October 3, 1996, petitioner replied, alleging that private
respondent was not entitled to receive retirement benefits as she was only a part-time
employee of MLQU, much less to the payment of deficiency. On June 7, 1994, a letter was
received by private respondent Azurin, informing him that he was being retired under Article
III, Section (a) of the MLQU Retirement Plan. petitioner failed and refused and continuously
refuse to heed complainants demand for the payment of his valid claim, prompting private
respondent to institute a complaint against petitioner asking for the payment of deficiency of
retirement benefits and attorneys fee.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents are entitled to the retirement benefits provided for under Republic Act
No. 7641, even if the petitioner has an existing valid retirement plan.

HELD:

Yes. The law, Republic Act No. 7641, intends to give the minimum retirement benefits to
employees not entitled thereto under collective bargaining and other agreements. Its
coverage applies to establishments with existing collective bargaining or other agreements
or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are less than those prescribed under the
proviso in question. Republic Act No. 7641 is a curative social legislation. By their nature,
curative statutes may be given retroactive effect, unless it will impair vested rights. Republic
Act No. 7641 has retroactive effect to include in its coverage the employees services to an
employer rendered prior to its effectivity. It applies to employees in the employ of employers
at the time the law took effect and who are eligible to benefits under that statute.
People v Delos Santos

G.R. No. 121906 April 5, 2000

Facts:

On September 12, 1995, accused-appellant Felipe delos Santos was sentenced to the
supreme penalty of death by Branch 95 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City for raping his stepdaughter Nhanette Delos Santos
on September 12, 1994. The sentence was affirmed by this Court on September 17, 1998
and judgment was entered on October 12, 1988.

On January 5, 2000, accused-appellant, citing People v. Medina (300 SCRA 98 [December

11, 1998]) and People v. Gallo (G.R. No. 124736, September 29, 1999) filed, with leave of
Court, a motion to re-open the case so as to reduce the penalty imposed upon him from the
death penalty to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant argues that the information filed
against him failed to state that he is the step-father of the victim, hence, his relationship with
the victim may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance to justify the imposition of the
death penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the law maybe applied retroactively.

HELD:

The Court enunciated the Garcia doctrine, the same must be applied retroactively to the
instant case, in consonance with our ruling in People v. Gallo where the court declared that:
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal retains
control over a case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend the execution of a final judgment
or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

Moreover, our ruling in Garcia forms part of our penal statutes, pursuant to Article 8 of the
Civil Code which provides that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the land." And since Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same," the Garcia doctrine must perforce, be
given retroactive effect in this case, said ruling being favorable to accused-appellant, who is
not a habitual criminal.
People v Nepomuceno, Jr.

G.R. No. 130800 June 29, 1999

Facts:

Accused-appellant Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr., (hereafter NEPOMUCENO) was charged

before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with parricide. The crime of parricide was alleged
to have been committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The two cases were
consolidated, Nepomuceno entered a plea of not guilty in each case. On 20 November 1996,
judgment was rendered finding NEPOMUCENO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide and sentencing him to suffer a prison term of forty years of reclusion perpetua.
On 24 September 1997, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Presidential Decree No. 1866, Section 1, Paragraph 2, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8294, and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal
injection. Nepomuceno asks for the reversal of the challenged decision because the trial
court erred in convicting him on the basis of evidence by inference and in ruling that
circumstantial evidence showed that the accused had animus possidendi of the unrecovered
firearm. He also asserts that this Court must allow the benefit of R.A. No. 8294 to take
retroactive effect so as to acquit him of the crime of qualified illegal possession of firearm.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 8294 may act retroactively in his case

Held:

Yes. Being clearly favorable to NEPOMUCENO, who is not a habitual criminal, the
amendment to the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 by R.A. No. 8294 should
be given retroactive effect in this case. It must be underscored that although R.A. No. 7659
had already taken effect at the time the violation of P.D. No. 1866 was allegedly committed
by NEPOMUCENO, there is nothing in R.A. No. 7659 which specifically reimposed
the death penalty in P.D. No. 1866. Without such reimposition, the death penalty imposed in
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 for aggravated illegal possession of firearm shall remain
suspended pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution. Conformably
therewith, what the trial court could impose was reclusion perpetua.
People v Buado

G.R. No. 170634 January 8, 2013

FACTS:

The accused was charged with two counts of rape, he pled not guilty to each of the
amended informations. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty, so does the Court of
Appeals. He is to be punished by death penalty, thus this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing death penalty to the accused.

HELD:

No. In reviewing rape convictions, the Court has been guided by three principles, namely: (a)
that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the complainant to prove
but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving only two persons, the rapist and the victim,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the
evidence for the Prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the Defense. The RTC as the trial court
and the CA as the intermediately reviewing tribunal did not overlook or disregard any fact or
circumstance of significance. Instead, they correctly appreciated the evidence, and rightly
concluded that the accused committed the rapes of his own daughters.
People v Samonte

G.R. No. 126048 September 29, 2000

FACTS:

On June 13, 1993, at about 1:00 AM, a shooting incident occurred along Rizal Street, Old
Albay District, Legazpi City, resulting in the death of one Siegfred Perez.[2 Herein
accused-appellant PO2 Rodel Samonte, a policeman detailed in the Mayors Office of
Legazpi City, was one of the suspects in the fatal shooting of Perez. On June 15, 1993,
Prosecution witnesses SPO4 Ruben Morales and Police Inspector Ricardo Gallardo
confronted accused-appellant in the City Mayors Office and confiscated the latters service
revolver. Thereupon, accused-appellant informed Inspector Gallardo that there is another
revolver, a caliber .38 paltik in his house which he (Samonte) allegedly recovered from the
culprit (apparently referring to Siegfred Perez) on June 13, 1993. Charges of Murder and
Illegal Possession of Firearms were separately filed against accused-appellant. The accused
pleaded not guilty. The trial court convicted the accused-appellant of aggravated or qualified
illegal possession of firearms as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph 2 of P.D.
No. 1866. However, on June 6, 1997, P.D. No 1866 was amended by R.A. 8294 which
became effective on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication in Malaya and Philippine
Journal on June 21, 1997.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 8294 may be applied retroactively.

HELD:

Yes. While the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in the present case had been
committed on June 13, 1993, we should give retroactive application to RA 8294 which
considers the use of an unlicensed firearm in the killing of the victim as a mere aggravating
circumstance, as it is advantageous to accused-appellant. Even granting that a simple case
of illegal possession of firearms may be permitted against accused-appellant, the same must
still fail, for the prosecution neglected to show any proof that the questioned firearm was
unlicensed.
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. v Caballeda

G.R. No. 156644 July 28, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the sugar milling business and petitioner Renato Cabati is
URSUMCO‘s manager. Respondent Agripino Caballeda (Agripino) worked as welder for
URSUMCO from March 1989 until June 23, 1997 with a salary of P124.00 per day, while
respondent Alejandro Cadalin (Alejandro) worked for URSUMCO as crane operator from
1976 up to June 15, 1997 with a salary of P209.30 per day. On April 24, 1991, John
Gokongwei, Jr., President of URSUMCO, issued a Memorandum5 establishing the company
policy on “Compulsory Retirement” (Memorandum) of its employees. The memorandum
provides: All employees corporate-wide who attain 60 years of age on or before April 30,
1991 shall be considered retired on May 31, 1991. Henceforth, any employee shall be
considered retired 30 days after he attains age 60. Subsequently, on December 9,
1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7641 was enacted into law, and it took effect on January 7,
1993, amending Article 287 of the Labor Code. On April 29, 1993, URSUMCO and the
National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor organization and the recognized sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all the monthly and daily paid employees of
URSUMCO, of which Alejandro was a member, entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA). Article XV of the said CBA particularly provided that the retirement
benefits of the members of the collective bargaining unit shall be in accordance with law.
Agripino and Alejandro (respondents), having reached the age of 60, were allegedly forced
to retire by URSUMCO. Both filed respective Complaints for illegal dismissal, damages and
attorney‘s fees. They alleged that his compulsory retirement was in violation of the
provisions of Republic Act 7641 and, was in effect, a form of illegal dismissal.
LA declared URSUMCO guilty of illegal dismissal; NLRC reversed and held that Alejandro
voluntarily retired because he freely submitted his application for retirement together with his
birth and baptismal certificates. Moreover, he had his clearance processed and he received
the amount of P33,476.77 as retirement benefit. Nevertheless, the NLRC found that since
Alejandro‘s retirement benefit was based merely on fifteen (15) days salary for every year of
service, such benefit should be recomputed to conform to the provisions of Art. 287 of the
Labor Code as amended. With respect to Agripino, the NLRC held that URSUMCO‘s claim
that Agripino was a mere casual employee was obviously designed to avoid paying Agripino
his retirement benefit. CA declared that URSUMCO illegally dismissed the respondents
since the Memorandum unilaterally imposed upon the respondents compulsory retirement at
the age of 60 and found that there is no existing CBA or employment contract between the
parties that provides for early compulsory retirement.

ISSUES:

Whether R.A.7641 can be given retroactive effect;

HELD:
The issue of the retroactive effect of R.A. 7641 on prior existing employment contracts has
long been settled. In Enriquez Security Services, Inc. v. Cabotaje, the Court held: RA 7641 is
undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection measure
and as a curative statute that — absent a retirement plan devised by, an agreement with, or
a voluntary grant from, an employer — can respond, in part at least, to the financial well-
being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor. There should be
little doubt about the fact that the law can apply to labor contracts still existing at the time the
statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only from the date of the
law‘s enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started.
This doctrine has been repeatedly upheld and clarified in several cases.
Pursuant thereto, this Court imposed two (2) essential requisites in order that R.A. 7641 may
be given retroactive effect: (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still in the employ of
the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the
requirements for eligibility for such retirement benefits under the statute It is evident from the
records that when respondents were compulsorily retired from the service, R.A. 7641 was
already in full force and effect. The petitioners failed to prove that the respondents did not
comply with the requirements for eligibility under the law for such retirement benefits. In sum,
the aforementioned requisites were adequately satisfied, thus, warranting the retroactive
application of R.A. 7641 in this case.
Rufina Patis Factory v Alusitain

G.R. No. 146202 July 14, 2004

FACTS:

In March 1948, Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis Factory owned and
operated by petitioner Lucas.After close to forty three years or on February 19, 1991,
Alusitain admittedly tendered his letter of resignation. On May 22, 1991, Alusitain executed a
duly notarized affidavit of separation from employment and submitted the same on even date
to the Pensions Department of the Social Security System. On January 7, 1993, Republic
Act No. 7641 (R.A. 7641), AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 287 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, BY PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE
SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RETIRMENT PLAN IN THE
ESTABLISHMENT, took effect. Sometime in 1995, Alusitain, claiming that he retired from
the company on January 31, 1995, having reached the age of 65 and due to poor health,
verbally demanded from petitioner Lucas for the payment of his retirement benefits. By his
computation, he claimed that he was entitled to P86,710.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 6741 may be applied retroactively.

HELD:

No. Alusitain failed to prove that he was an employee of petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took
effect, thus his claim for retirement benefits thereunder must be disallowed. Other than his
bare and self-serving allegations and the sworn statement of his daughter which, as
reflected above, cannot be relied upon, he has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he
was employed with petitioner Rufina Patis Factory at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. He did
not produce any documentary evidence such as pay slips, income tax return, his
identification card, or any other independent evidence to substantiate his claim.
Subido, Jr. v Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 122641 January 20, 1997

FACTS:

The petitioners were charged with Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized by Article 124
of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, contending that in view
of the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975 on 6 May 1995, amending 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons of the
accused. The prosecution filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash on 28 September 1995.
It contended that it was clear from 4(b) of R.A. No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons of the accused considering that
the basis of its jurisdiction xxx is the position of the accused in the government service when
the offense charged was committed and not the nature of the offense charged, provided the
said offense committed by the accused was in the exercise of his duties and in relation to his
office. The fact then that accused Subido was already a private individual was of no moment.
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners Motion to Quash. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied. Thus, this petition. The petitioners, contends to
apply 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the law in force at the time of the
filing of the information in criminal case. They submit that under the new law, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and their persons because at
the time of the filing of the information, petitioner Subido was already a private individual,
while the classification of petitioner Parinas position was lower than grade 27.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7075 should apply to the case.

HELD:

No. R.A. No. 7975 took effect on 16 May 1995, or one year, ten months and twenty-one
days after the alleged commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 22825 before
the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners overlook the fact that for purposes of 4 of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, the reckoning point is the time of the commission of the crime.
Juliano-Llave v Republic

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition and under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur.In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was
indicated as divorced. Private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. It
was further alleged that since Zorayda and deceased were married when the NCC was
already in effect, the subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio since divorce is not
allowed under the NCC. Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted
under Muslim law. Instead of filing an Answer, Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss. The trial
court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity. Thus, Estrellita filed acertioraripetition before the SC questioning the denial of her
Motion to Dismiss which was referred to and subsequently denied by the CA. This prompted
Estrellita to file a petition for review on certiorari before the SC (GR No. 126603) Subsequent
to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence
but she asked for postponement. Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case,
Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision, reasoning that Estrellita had long
been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her
answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603 The RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.
On appeal to the CA, Estrellita argued that she was denied due process as the RTC
rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 126603. The CA denied the appeal as she was given ample opportunity to
be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Estrellita was denied due process

Whether or not the marriage of Estrellita and Tamano was bigamous

HELD:

Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her
pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to
dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal
suit before the RTC of Quezon City. Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was
deprived of her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even
actively participated in the trial to defend her interest. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit
in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
public respondent from further proceeding in the case. In fact, the trial court respected the
CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again
require Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any
order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous
requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to
present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait
first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to
benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed
by way of divorce under PD 1083,the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD
1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
"marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any
part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083
does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites."

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage
of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
Cheng v Sps. Sy

G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against
respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC) in payment of their loan both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having
been drawn against a closed account. Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on
January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme
Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal
cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where the nature of the order
dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure
of the prosecution to identify both the accused .
HELD:
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not
apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of
procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact
that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants‘ rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Tan v CA

G.R. No. 136368 January 16, 2002

FACTS:

On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale
over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into
another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or
repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4,
1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals
denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude
an equitable mortgage. RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:
1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby
declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this
decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the
complaint was filed, until paid;
3)xxx.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the
decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the
appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and issued the
corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct.
21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that
the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired. On June 10, 1996, the RTC
allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption
period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13,
1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the
petitioner?

HELD:

From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of
judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The
date when the judgments or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date
of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution
and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has
become final and executory.
SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a
portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only
be filed in the proper court after its entry.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of
judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive
right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this
Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the
subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the
rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he
faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the
redemption.
Republic v CA

G.R. No. 141530 March 18, 2003

FACTS: In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1998,
the government embarked on several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail (CFT)
projects. One of these projects was the construction of the Tejeros Convention Center and
the founding site of the Philippine Army on the 3,497 sq. m. property of respondent Fe
Manuel located in Tejeros, Rosario, Cavite. The said property was declared by the National
Historical Institute (NHI) as a historical landmark in its Resolution No. 2 dated April 19, 1995.
To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the government, through the National
Centennial Commission (NCC), filed on December 4, 1997 a complaint for expropriation
against respondents Fe Manuel and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank). The land was mortgaged by Fe Manuel to Metrobank and was extrajudicially
foreclosed by the latter on November 20, 1997. Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no
objection to the expropriation as long as just compensation was paid. Presiding Judge
Christopher Lock of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 88, dismissed the
complaint for expropriation on the ground of lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, in its resolution dated March 15, 1999, for having been filed out of
time. It also denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration in its January 13, 2000 resolution.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals
should not have applied to its case the amendment made to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on September 1, 1998.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines
before the Court of Appeals was filed out of time.

HELD: Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for having
been filed out of time because the prevailing rule at that time provided that the 60-day period
for filing a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision or
order. The period is interrupted when a motion for reconsideration is filed but it starts to run
again from receipt of the denial of the said motion for reconsideration. Based on this
amendment, respondent Court of Appeals ruled that the filing of the petition for certiorari was
14 days late. However, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended
by Bar Matter No. 803 effective September 1, 1998, was recently amended by A.M. No. 00-
2-03-SC effective September 1, 2000. The recent rule no longer provides that the 60-day
period shall be reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution. Instead, it
provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration. The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is
procedural or remedial in character. It does not create new or remove vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled
that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested
rights in rules of procedure.
Palanca v CA

G.R. No. 106685 December 2, 1994

Facts:
Petitioner Palanca, as vendor, and Jose Sanicas, as vendee, entered into a Contract to Sell
on Installment of a parcel of land. Under the terms of the contract, Jose agreed to pay
Palanca the amount of P9,851.00 as down payment and the balance of P88,659.00 in 120
monthly installments with 14% interest per annum on the outstanding balance. Jose further
agreed to pay the annual real property taxes, and that should he fail to pay the said taxes,
he would have to pay a yearly surcharge or penalty of 50% of the taxes due plus 12%
compounded interest per annum. Respondent Edgardo later assumed the account of his
brother Jose and he designated the latter as his authorized representative in dealing with
petitioner. Paragraph 11 of the contract contained escalator clause: That it is further agreed
and understood by the VENDEE that in the event of monetary fluctuation, the unpaid
balance account of the herein VENDEE on the aforecited subdivision lot shall be increased
proportionately on the basis of the present value of P6.72 to $1.00 US dollar. Respondent
tendered supposed balance payment (44k), but petitioner rejected it, which prompted the
former make a judicial consignment of the amount. Petitioner justified his refusal by
asserting the escalator clause in paragraph 11 of the contract (155k).

Issue:
Whether or not the contract has been visited by an "extraordinary inflation" as to trigger the
operation of Article 1250.

Held:
No, the Court holds that while the contract may contain an "escalator clause‖ still the
autonomy of the parties to provide such escalator clauses may be limited by law. Article
1250 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is not the basis herein, but R.A. No. 529, as
amended, as a ground for violation of said clause. In the case at bench, the clear
understanding of the parties is that there should be an upward adjustment of the purchase
price the moment there is a deterioration of the Philippine peso with the U.S. dollar. This is
the "monetary fluctuation" contemplated by them as would justify the adjustment, and not
"extraordinary inflation" described in Art.1250. Thus, the petition is DENIED.
Javier v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 215847 January 12, 2016

Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter
contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter‘s men. Seven suspects, including respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were
to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent‘s proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question
the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private
respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner
thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by
a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same
Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner
without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before
this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had
seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision
now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to
annul the said decision on the basis that it should have been decided by COMELEC en
banc.

The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned
down in cold blood and in broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was
abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution. Respondents moved to dismiss the
petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

Issues:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being
dead and the respondent missing.
2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to
promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the
winner in the election?
Held:
1. No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their
separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are
larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the
legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic
and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. The Supreme Court is
not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government.
The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not
always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has
been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times
when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be
resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right,
though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
2.No. The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution. Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all
member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. Section 3
provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may
be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all
election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision. We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all
contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full
authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related
thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en
banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had
been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-
proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has
resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the
election. The respondent‘s theory would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation
proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in
division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the
Commission en banc.
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. v Banko Sentral Monetary Board

G.R. No. 192986 January 15, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner "Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non- profit, non-stock
corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money
lending issues. R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines on
June 15, 1948, empowered the CB-MB to, among others, set the maximum interest rates
which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations, within limits
prescribed by the Usury Law. On March 17, 1980, the Usury Law was amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different
maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits,... provided that the changes are effected
gradually and announced in advance. On June 14, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos signed
into law R.A. No. 7653 establishing the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to replace the CB.
Issues:
Whether under R.A. No. 265 and/or P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB had the statutory or
constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for all kinds of credit
transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit beyond the limits prescribed in... the
Usury Law;... b)
If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No. 905, which
removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest
rates
Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB Circular No.
905.
Held:
The petition must fail.
The foregoing rules were further clarified in Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals,[56] as follows:
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of interest, if proper,
and the applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall
apply only to loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, as... well as to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum
under Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies "when the transaction involves the payment of
indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in... the
performance of obligations in general," with the application of both rates reckoned "from the
time the complaint was tiled until the [adjudged] amount is fully paid." In either instance, the
reckoning period for the commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be... subject
to the condition "that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each
case, on the award of interest.
Manlangit v Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 158014 August 28, 2007

Facts:

On October 16, 1998, petitioner, as Officer-in-Charge for Information, Education and

Communication of the Pinatubo Commission, received ₱176,300 to fund the 6th Founding
Anniversary Info-Media Activities of the Commission. A few months thereafter, he resigned
without accounting for the fund. On April 12, 2000, Artaserxes L. Sampang, then Executive
Director of the Commission, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint
against petitioner for violation of Articles 217 4 and 218 of the Revised Penal Code. The
petitioner averred that he had no intention to appropriate the funds for himself. He failed to
submit on time the liquidation report because of the following reasons: a) a new
management took over, and reorganized the Commission causing some organizational
confusion; b) he resigned and had to look for another employment; and c) he had some
personal and family problems. He said that he submitted his liquidation report on July 12,
2000 and settled the account. In a letter dated August 12, 2001, 8 Undersecretary Mario L.
Relampagos of the Department of Budget and Management Task Force Mt. Pinatubo
informed Ombudsman Aniano Desierto that petitioner had already rendered an accounting
and requested the withdrawal of the case. After the Ombudsman rested its case, petitioner,
with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. He insisted that there was no criminal delay
on his part since there was no demand from the COA for an accounting. Further, the
sanction provided in the COA circular for failure to render account was simply the
withholding of wages.

Issue:

Whether or not a demand is necessary for a conviction of a violation of Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Held:

No. Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an
accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where
none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft
into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it
must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that
its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application. As shown by
the foregoing provisions of COA Circular No. 90-331, petitioner was required to render an
account of the fund disbursed for the Commission‘s Info-Media Activities within 20 days after
the end of the year. In this case, he should have submitted his liquidation report not later
than January 20, 1999 since the fund was issued on October 16, 1998. Article 218 penalizes
the accountable officer‘s failure to render an account within a period of two months after
such accounts should be rendered. Clearly, petitioner‘s submission of his liquidation report
on July 12, 2000 was beyond the two-month period allowed by the provision.
Zamora v Heirs of Izquierdo

G.R. No. 146195 November 18, 2004

Facts:

Sometime in 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation
whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units located at 117-B General
Luna Street, Caloocan City. They agreed on the following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month;
the leased premises is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, representing
the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease wherein the rental was
increased from P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per month. In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His
wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children (two of whom have their own families), herein
petitioners, continued to reside in the apartment unit. However, they refused to pay the
increased rental and persisted in operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.
petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System
(MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since a written consent from the owner
is required for such installation, she requested respondents' attorney-in-fact to issue it.
However, the latter declined because petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and
violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a portion thereof for
photocopying business and allowing three families to reside therein. Respondents,
represented by Anita Punzalan, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 49,
Caloocan City, a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners. MTC
rendered a Judgment in favor of respondents and against petitioners, the RTC rendered the
same.

Issue:

Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC when they
rendered the decision.

Held:

No. In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa,
conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between the parties herein.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the complaint does not only allege, as a cause of action,
the refusal of respondents' attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the installation of water
facilities in the premises, but also petitioners' violation of the terms of the lease, specifically
their use of a portion therein for their photocopying business and their failure to pay the
increased rental.

Petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section
19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Section 19(a) permits the filing of
such pleading only when the ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter
of his/her complaint "to the Lupon for conciliation" prior to its filing with the court.
GSIS v COA

G.R. No. 162372 October 19, 2011

Facts:

On May 30, 1997, Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as "The Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997" (the GSIS Act) was enacted and approved, amending
Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, expanding and increasing the coverage and
benefits of the GSIS, and instituting reforms therein. On October 17, 2000, pursuant to the
powers granted to it under Section 41(n) of the said law, the GSIS Board of Trustees, upon
the recommendation of the Management-Employee Relations Committee (MERCOM),
approved Board Resolution No. 326 wherein they adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty
Incentive Plan (ELIP). Dimagiba, the corporate auditor of GSIS, communicated to the
President and General Manager of GSIS that the GSIS RFP was contrary to law. However,
the GSIS Legal Services Group opined that the GSIS Board was legally authorized to adopt
the plan since Section 28(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended by Republic Act
No. 4968 has been repealed by Sections 3 and 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291. Pursuant to
legal opinion of the General Counsel dated August 7, 2001, Board Resolution No. 360 dated
Nov. 21, 2000 as amended by No. 6 dated Jan. 16, 2001 approving the Employees Loyalty
Incentive Plan (ELIP) is null and void for being directly in conflict with Section 28(b) of CA
No. 186 as amended by RA 4968 which bars the creation of supplemental retirement
scheme and of Section 41 (n) of RA 8291 which speaks of an early retirement plan or
financial assistance. On January 30, 2002, GSIS, together with some of the petitioners
herein, gave notice to the COA CAO I that it was appealing the 21 Notices of Disallowance it
had received from Dimagiba on various dates. It amended. this Notice of Appeal the
following day, to include all GSIS officials and employees held liable and accountable under
the said disallowances.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 8291 amended the GSIS Act of 1997, and Commonwealth
Act No. 186 or the Government Service Insurance Act as amended by Republic Act No.
4968.

Held:

No. The Court does not subscribe to petitioner‘s interpretation of this law. This is because,
unless the intention to revoke is clear and manifest, the abrogation or repeal of a law cannot
be assumed. The repealing clause contained in Republic Act No. 8291 is not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the statutes that are intended to be
repealed. It is actually a clause, which predicated the intended repeal upon the condition that
a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior laws. Since Republic Act No. 8291
made no express repeal or abrogation of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 186 as
amended by the Teves Retirement Law, the reliance of the petitioners on its general
repealing clause is erroneous. The failure to add a specific repealing clause in Republic Act
No. 8291 indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Thus the plan
issued is null and void.
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

G.R. No. 197676 February 4, 2014

Facts:
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was
signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to
professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and... supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers,
appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment,
real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) through... the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection
(BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now
transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES)... created under the new law.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July
21, 2010 by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber
of Real Estate and Builders' Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and...
unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article
VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the... title
thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate
trade and business to the Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of
subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it
violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers' most basic
ownership... rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of
the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause
as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the exempted group
mentioned... since both are property owners dealing with their own property.
Issues:
Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;
Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under
Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;
Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;
Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of
real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process; and
Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural or
juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to their own
property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.[3]
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
The Constitution[4] requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power the
existence of an actual controversy between litigants. An actual case or controversy involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims... susceptible to judicial
resolution.[5] The controversy must be justiciable definite and concrete touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law.[6] In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other;
that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to
be an actual and... substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon
a hypothetical state of facts.[7] An actual case is ripe for adjudication when the act being...
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a... reasonable and not a
technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every
end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that... object. Mere details
need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.[10] (Emphasis
supplied.)
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service
practitioners in the social, political, economic development and progress of the country by
promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic activity and enhancing... government
income from real property-based transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture through
proper and effective regulation and supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible
and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of... practice
and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate
industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law's primary goal of
developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real
estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally...
competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." Since the marketing
aspect of real estate development projects entails the performance of those acts and
transactions defined as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it
is... logically covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real estate
service sector.
Mecano v COA

G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission
on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner‘s claim on the ground
that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec.
Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted
in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S.
1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that ―the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on
the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987
operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner‘s claim for
benefits.

RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear
showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate
the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the
first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first
enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.
Berces v Guingona

G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against
respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter.
Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at
the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local
Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed
―stay of execution‖. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of
the President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that
Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed. ―Stay of execution‖ applied.

RATIO:
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an ―appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becoming final or executory.‖ As worded, there is room to construe said provision as
giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to
order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such
intention.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal,
a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
Erectors Inc. v NLRC

G.R. No. 104215 May 8, 1996

Facts:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver
in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month.
Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he
renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was
approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos
that the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they
executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105
and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.
On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports
Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance
of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were
increased to $231.
Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment
contract. He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract
and the amount paid to him.
On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages
and non-payment of overtime pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec
4(a) of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."
Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of
Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC
dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint
filed by Burgos.

Held:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private
respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential
Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the
Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law
or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of
the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.
City of San Pablo, Laguna v Reyes

G.R. No. 127708 March 25, 1999

FACTS:

After the Escudero franchise under Act No. 3648 was transferred to MERALCO, PD. 551 wa
s enacted and provides that the franchise tax shall be 2% of the gross receipts in lieu of all t
axes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on ear
nings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.

Pursuant to the enactment of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
San Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56, otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the Cit
y of San Pablo imposing a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of 50% of 1% of th
e gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized d
uring the preceding calendar year within the city.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was violation of nonimpairment clause when the City of San Pablo imp
osed a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGC upon MERALCO considering that under PD 5
51 the tax paid is in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any na
tional or local authority on savings or income

HELD:

No. The phrase in lieu of all taxes have to give way to the peremptory language of the Local
Government Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemptions, privileges, a
nd that upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code all exemptions except only as pro
vided therein can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the local tax.

There is further basis for the conclusion that the nonimpairment of contract clause cannot be
invoked to uphold Meralco‘s exemption from the local tax. Legislative franchise under Act N
o. 3648 provided that the franchise is granted upon the condition that it shall be subject to a
mendment, or repeal by the Congress of the United States. Also, under the 1935, the 1973 a
nd the 1987 Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be granted except under the condition t
hat it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the National Assembly when the
public interest so requires. With or without the reservation clause, franchises are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power; they are also subject to alterat
ion by the power to tax, which like police power cannot be contracted away.
Juan v People

G.R. No. 132378 January 18, 2000

Facts:

Petitioners were separately accused in Criminal Cases for violation of Section 261-(o) of the
Omnibus Election Code before the Regional Trial Court. Barangay Chairman Juan, and Bgy.
Kagawad De Jesus were charged [with] willful and unlawful use of VHF radio transceiver, an
equipment or apparatus owned by the barangay government of Talipapa, Novaliches,
Quezon City, for election campaign or for partisan political activity. And Barangay Kagawads
Carreon and Galguerra were charged with willful and unlawful use of a tricycle owned by the
same barangay government in their political campaigns. On April 3, 1997, respondent court
issued an Order, directing the immediate suspension from office of all the accused for a
period of sixty (60) days from service of this Order. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court‘s discretion to order petitioners‘ suspension from office. Thus this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), or Sec. 60
of R.A. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) confer upon a Regional Trial Court,
before which a criminal case for violation of Sec. 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code is
pending, the power and authority to order the preventive suspension from office of the
accused therein upon the filing of a valid Information against him.

Held:

Yes. It is evident from Section 32, BP 129, as amended by Section 2 of RA 7691, that the
jurisdiction of first-level courts — the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts — does not cover those criminal cases which by specific
provision of law are cognizable by regional trial courts. rue, the cases against petitioners
involve violations of the Election Code; however, the charges are not unidimensional. Every
law must be read together with the provisions of any other complementing law, unless both
are otherwise irreconcilable. It must be emphasized that petitioners were incumbent public
officers charged with the unauthorized and unlawful use of government property in their
custody, in the pursuit of personal interests. The crime being imputed to them is akin to that
committed by public officers as laid down in the Revised Penal Code. Certainly, petitioners‘
acts constitute fraud against the government; thus, the present case is covered by Section
13 of RA 3019.
Giron v COMELEC

G.R. No. 188179 January 22, 2013

Facts:

Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing
Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. The
present Petition also seeks to prohibit the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
further implementing the aforesaid sections of the Fa1r Election Act, on the ground that
these provisions would enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them
to disburse public funds from the time they file their certificates of candidacy until after the
elections. On the one hand, petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of
Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which specifically requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Petitioner avers that these
provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political
ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after
the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67
(Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section
26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the "one subject-one title" rule.

Held:

No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The
purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule.
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a
technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every
end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details
need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
In re: Estate of Johnson

G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918

Facts:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated
amount of P231,800. The will was written in the testator‘s own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the
provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and
hence could not have been proved under section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a
petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of
this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of
Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the
laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his father‘s will

Issue:
Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition

Held:
No. Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week
publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in
view of the statute concerned which reads as ―A will made within the Philippine Islands by a
citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of
the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of
these Islands‖ the ―state‖, being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is
excluded from the phrase (because during this time, Philippines was still a territory of the
US).
Kare v Platon

G.R. No. L-35902 October 28, 1931

Facts:
The petitioner filed a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Albay contesting the
election of one of the respondents, Francisco Perfecto. The respondent Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Albay entered an order on which required the petitioner to give two kinds
of bond in order that proper proceedings might be taken on his motion of protest. These two
kinds of bond were personal bond for P3,000 and a cash bond of P2,000 to be deposited
with the provincial treasurer of Albay within the time specified in the order. These sums were
later changed so that the cash bond was for P1,500 and the personal bond for P3,500.

Issue:
Whether or not the court has the right to choose in which form the petitioner would give his
payment, through bond or through cash deposit.

Held:
Court will require a personal bond. Cash deposit on discretion of the petitioner. Section 482
of the Election Law states that ―Before the court shall entertain any such contest or counter-
contest or admit an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give
bond in an amount fixed by the court with two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he
will pay all expenses and costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in
court in lieu of such bond.‖ The Supreme Court held that while the respondent judge holds
that the court may require either a bond or a cash deposit, the petitioner maintains that it is
to him alone the choice is given to file a personal bond or to make a cash deposit in lieu
thereof. The Supreme Court ruled that the court may only require a personal bond, and that
the contestant may make a cash deposit in lieu thereof.
Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

Facts:
sometime in the last quarter of 1985... the officers of a civic organization known as the
Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of
renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the
chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,
a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the
solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. Based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against
petitioner Martin Centeno for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation
Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that... the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense,
claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or
public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction
of a chapel. This was denied by the trial court, and petitioner's motion for reconsideration
having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued. The said trial court rendered judgment
finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of
P200.00.
Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its
finding that they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should not
have been criminally liable were it not for... the existence of Presidential Decree No. 1564...
appealed to the Regional Trial Court... the Regional Trial Court... affirmed the decision of the
lower court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act committed
which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno to
suffer an increased penalty of... imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied by the court.[6]
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for
contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious
purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what... the law
does not include, it excludes; (2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to State regulation solicitations made
for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of... religion
guaranteed under the Constitution.
Issue:
whether solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit of Presidential Decree No.
1564
Held:
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the
Solicitation Permit Law), provides as follows:
"Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the
Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as... provided in the
Integrated Reorganization Plan.
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be
construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the
negative.
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim "expressio unius est exclusion alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others.
The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had... the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned.
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the
words "charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other.
these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public
welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never...
intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there
is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
"religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it
is true that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the
converse is not equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious"
in the legal sense of the term.
Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations
for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually
all penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by
implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations.
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. The word
"charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise definition, and each case
involving a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own, particular
facts and circumstances.
Imbong v Ochoa

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Facts:

The increase of the country‘s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and
the legislative‘s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples‘ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated
differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current
laws on contraception, women‘s health and population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality
of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that
the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of
―responsible parenthood‖ and ―reproductive health‖ are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.

Issue:

Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

Held:

No. Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country‘s population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is
to reduce the number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners‘
contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject”
rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the
rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.”

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
―reproductive health‖ and ―responsible parenthood‖ are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of
Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be ―so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.‖

Considering the close intimacy between ―reproductive health‖ and ―responsible parenthood‖
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving ―sustainable human development‖ as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally
sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to
certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order
issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which
have been herein declared as constitutional.
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v Central Bank

G.R. No. L-8888 November 19, 1957

Facts:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported
sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per
cent totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it
sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included
the Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the term
"chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.

Issue:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of
exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

Held:
No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in mind
the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the opinion
and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include
"cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter
is ready for human consumption; the former is not.
On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by
substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively,
the amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar. The appellant's cocoa beans had
been imported during January - October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree which is
after September 3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62,.
Southern Cross Cement Corp. v Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp

G.R. No. 158540 July 8, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation.
Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an
association of domestic cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from
Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has
caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and
employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the
imposition a definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the
Safeguard Measures Act.

The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to
determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray
Portland cement

Tariff Commission‘s report: The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious
injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general
safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement

After reviewing the report, then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II (DTI Secretary) disagreed
with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was no serious injury to the local
cement industry caused by the surge of imports. In view of this disagreement, the DTI
requested an opinion from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the DTI Secretarys scope of
options in acting on the Commissions recommendations.

Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that Section
13 of the SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commissions negative
finding, or finding that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed.

DTI then denied application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray Portland
cement

Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days later, it filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside
the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. On the other hand, Southern
Cross filed its Comment arguing that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over
Philcemcors Petition, for it is on the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that the SMA conferred
jurisdiction to review rulings of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard
measure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the case which is concerned with imposition of
safeguard measures

HELD:
CTA has jurisdiction. Under Section 29 of the SMA, there are three requisites to enable the
CTA to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i) there must
be a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party
adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be in connection with the
imposition of a safeguard measure. The first two requisites are clearly present. The third
requisite deserves closer scrutiny.
Contrary to the stance of the public respondents and Philcemcor, in this case where the DTI
Secretary decides not to impose a safeguard measure, it is the CTA which has jurisdiction to
review his decision. The reasons are as follows:

First. Split jurisdiction is abhorred. The law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with
the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review without
mention of any other court that may exercise corollary or ancillary jurisdiction in relation to
the SMA.

Second. The interpretation of the provisions of the SMA favors vesting untrammeled
appellate jurisdiction on the CTA.

A plain reading of Section 29 of the SMA reveals that Congress did not expressly bar the
CTA from reviewing a negative determination by the DTI Secretary nor conferred on the
Court of Appeals such review authority. Respondents note, on the other hand, that neither
did the law expressly grant to the CTA the power to review a negative determination.
However, under the clear text of the law, the CTA is vested with jurisdiction to review the
ruling of the DTI Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. Had
the law been couched instead to incorporate the phrase the ruling imposing a safeguard
measure, then respondents claim would have indisputable merit. Undoubtedly, the phrase in
connection with not only qualifies but clarifies the succeeding phrase imposition of a
safeguard measure. As expounded later, the phrase also encompasses the opposite or
converse ruling which is the non-imposition of a safeguard measure.

Third. Interpretatio Talis In Ambiguis Semper Fienda Est, Ut Evitur Inconveniens Et

Absurdum.

Even assuming arguendo that Section 29 has not expressly granted the CTA jurisdiction to
review a negative ruling of the DTI Secretary, the Court is precluded from favoring an
interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity. Adopting the respondents
position favoring the CTAs minimal jurisdiction would unnecessarily lead to illogical and
onerous results.
Nilo v CA

G.R. No. L-34586 & L-36625 April 2, 1984

Facts:

Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of riceland at Barrio San Roque,
San Rafael, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares. Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the
agricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65. On February 22,
1967, petitioner filed a petition in C.A.R. Case No. 1676 with the Court of Agrarian Relations
electing the leasehold system. On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian flied an ejectment suit against
petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844.
Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the ejectment suit was but an act of reprisal
and retaliation because he elected the leasehold system/ The Court of Agrarian Relations
found that there was a bona fide intention to cultivate the land personally. The petitioner
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations. The Court found no justification to unduly interfere with the desire of
Gatchalian to personally cultivate his own land. The respondent Court of Appeals denied the
motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive application.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive application

Held:

Yes. The issue of whether or not Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended
Section 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844, repealing as a consequence "personal cultivation"
as a cause for dispossession, should be given retroactive effect has spawned controversy.
The court agrees with the petitioner-tenant that the law in question is social legislation. But
social justice is not for tenants alone.
Yambot v Tequero

G.R. No. 169895 March 23, 2011

FACTS:

An article from the Philippine Daily inquirer headlined a report written by Contreras, herein
referred to as the petitioner regarding the mauling incident that happened between RTC
Judge Cruz and Mendoza, an administrative officer assigned at Makati RTC. Such article
was referred to by Judge Cruz as false and malicious so the latter filed a libel case against
the writer, particularly the line that states that the said judge still has a pending sexual
harassment case filed at the SC. It appeared that the sexual harassment being referred to by
the Petitioner was based from a Court Petition for cancellation of contempt order by one
Paredes- Garcia. She appended an affidavit executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly show
the proclivity of Judge Cruz for seducing women who became objects of his fancy, stating
that she also suffered the same infirmities. The SC later on granted the petition for
cancellation of contempt order but the administrative case against the Judge was not passed
upon.

Subsequently, the RTC of Makati approved a resolution finding probable cause against the
PDI employees hence an information was filed them. The petitioners appealed to the DOJ
and the CA who dismissed the same hence the said Petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Prosecutor erred in finding probable cause to charge the PDI employees
with libel.

HELD:

Yes. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit
or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead. The elements of libel are (a) imputation of a discreditable act or
condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and, (d) existence of malice. The glaring absence of maliciousness in the news article
negates the existence of probable cause that the PDI staff has committed libel. The article in
question merely reported the statement of Mendoza that there was allegedly a pending case
of sexual harassment against Judge Cruz, the said article did not report the existence of the
alleged sexual harassment suit as a confirmed fact. Judge Cruz never alleged, much less
proved, that Mendoza did not utter such statement.The questioned portion of the news
article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is insufficient to establish the
element of malice in libel cases.The Court held that malice connotes ill will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed,
and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown
that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. The pointed the absence of malice
on the part of the PDI employees.