PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v HON. SIMEON N. FERRER, et. al.

G.R. No. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972

FACTS:

Two separate information were filed against private respondents Feliciano Co and Nilo
Tayag, including five others for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act. Feliciano Co
moved to quash the information on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On
the other hand, Nilo Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that
(1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the
title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws.

Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15,
1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed.

ISSUE:

Is the Anti-Subversion Act unconstitutional because it is a bill of attainder and that is vague
and overbroad?

RULING:

No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence
is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against
bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures
to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. Were the Anti-
Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as
the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is
that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that
the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party,
knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power.

The argument that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad because section 2 merely speaks of
"overthrow" of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful, means, misconceives
the function of the phrase "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a
legislative declaration; the definitions of and the penalties prescribed for the different acts proscribed
are stated in section 4 which requires that membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, to
be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas"
clause makes clear that the overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by force and violence but
also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means." The absence of this qualification in section 2
appears to be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberate omission.
 MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA v HON. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA
G.R. No. 141375, April 30, 2003

FACTS:

A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By
agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint session of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga. However, no
amicable settlement was reached. To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the
RTC of Ormoc City on September 2, 1999 a Complaint. Munipality of Kananga file a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Does the RTC have original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a
municipality and an independent component city?

RULING:

Yes. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent
component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly
then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the
LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be
used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Section 19(6) of this
law provides:
“Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

“(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.”

Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the
settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the
same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to
Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly
withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a
case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other
courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
 ELPIDIO M. SALVA, et. al. v HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL, et. al.
G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas,

Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) before
the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution
No. 345, series of 1997, both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of 1998. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of
barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and
accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under Sections
9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. On
the other hand, Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding
the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution,
on February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to
decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao.

The trial court denied the ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According to the trial court, the temporary
restraining order/injunction sought by petitioners is directed only to COMELEC Resolution No.
2987. The trial court ruled that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the
COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Is the conduct of a plebiscite not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply

ministerial or administrative in nature which the RTC may take jurisdiction?

RULING:

Yes. Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
"SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

The issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC
that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise
of discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties
of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the
election laws. Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct
of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari
by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
 ARTEMIO INIEGO v. The HONORABLE JUDGE GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, and
FOKKER C. SANTOS
G. R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006

FACTS:

This petition for certiorari arose from a complaint for quasi-delict and damages filed by
respondent Santos against Jimmy T. Pinion, a truck driver which figured in a traffic accident that
involved respondent’s jitney, and against petitioner Iniego, as owner of the truck and employer of
Pinion.

Petitioner questions, among other things, the jurisdiction of the RTC over the cause of action
of the case claiming that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of
pecuniary estimation; hence, the jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either the municipal courts or
the Regional Trial Courts, depending on the value of the damages claimed. He argues further in
actions for damages capable of pecuniary estimation, the total amount of damages claimed by the
private respondent must exceed P400,000.00 in order that it may fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTC, however, the moral and exemplary damages claimed by private respondent should be excluded
from the computation for jurisdictional purposes because the said moral and exemplary damages
arose, not from the quasi-delict, but from the petitioners refusal to pay the actual damages.

ISSUE:

Should moral and exemplary damages be excluded from the computation of damages?

RULING:

The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for
all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for
damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.

All claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court
regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2,
Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have
against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section provides that where the claims in all such
joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be
the test of jurisdiction.

Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of action
or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case
at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and
exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.
 PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN v. STANDARD
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE
G.R. No. 140746; March 16, 2005

FACTS:

The case arose out of a vehicular incident involving a passenger bus owned by Pantranco
North Express and a passenger jeepney owned by Martina Gicale, which left the latter’s jeepney
having been rear ended. The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard, the
insurer of the jeepney, paid only P8,000.00, leaving Martina Gicale to shoulder the balance
of P13,415.00. Thereafter, Standard and Martina, demanded reimbursement from petitioners
Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents to file with
the Regional Trial Court a complaint for sum of money, which was decided in their favor. This
decision was also affirmed by the CA, hence this petition.

Petitioners assert in the main that the RTC has no jurisdiction considering that the respective
causes of action of the respondents do not arise out of the same transaction, nor are there common
questions of law or facts between them, hence, their individual claims do not come within the
jurisdictional value of the court.

ISSUE:

Does the RTC have jurisdiction?

RULING:

Yes. In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting
the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are
negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the
same cause of action against petitioners.

The issue of whether respondents claims shall be lumped together is determined by paragraph
(d) of Section 5, Rule 2. This paragraph embodies the totality rule as exemplified by Section 33 (1)
of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others, that where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions.

As previously stated, respondents cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same
transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims. Respondent Standards
claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00.
Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all other
cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy,
amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction
over the instant case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken
effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994. Hence, jurisdiction remains with the RTC.
 IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, v. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL
G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages against petitioners.
The respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount
of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 litigation
expenses; and costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the
amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00,
because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and it held that the total claim of respondent
amounted to P420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro
Manila.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

Yes. Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is instructive: “2. The exclusion of the term
damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section
33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the
claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.”

In the instant case, the complaint is for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of
petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason
of petitioner’s utterance while they were at a police station. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by
law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the
complaint, that respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being
claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely
incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the
complaint.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, v
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO.
G.R. No. 155573 April 24, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner corporation, filed through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint for

libel against Benipayo. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be
criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be
criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case
should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.

While the RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his
appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office
when delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the
Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.

RULING:

Yes. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is
explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus: ‘‘The criminal and
civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.’’

The Court declared herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and
civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately
with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the
jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or
modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over
defamations in writing or by similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over
offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation
cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office. The broad and general
phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249, cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC.
 THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS v HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 129, Caloocan City, and MA. LEONISA GENOVIA
AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 171208 September 7, 2007

FACTS:

COMELEC filed a criminal case against Genovia Aguirre for violation of an election offense
under the Omnibus Election Code. Allegedly, Aguirre votes in substitution for another during the SK
Election. However, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction since the penalty imposed
therein is imprisonment for not less than 1 year but not more than 6 years. As such, it should be
properly lodged before the MTC. In its opposition, COMELEC argued that the RTC has jurisdiction
over all criminal cases for violation of the Code, except those relating to failure to register or failure
to vote.

ISSUE:

Which tribunal has jurisdiction over election offenses?

RULING:

The RTC. Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the regional trial courts have
exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.

It bears emphasis that Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdictions of various courts. Hence, it may, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by a specific court. Section 268 of Omnibus Election Code is one
such and must thus be construed as an exception to BP Blg. 129, the general law on jurisdiction of
courts.

In fine, while BP Blg. 129 lodges in municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts and
municipal circuit trial court’s jurisdiction over criminal cases carrying a penalty of imprisonment of
less than one year but not exceeding six years, following Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code,
any criminal action or proceeding which bears the same penalty, with the exception of the therein
mentioned two cases, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts.
 TEAM PACIFIC CORPORATION v JOSEPHINE DAZA
G.R. NO. 167732, July 11, 2012

FACTS:

Team Pacific Corporation (TPC) is a domestic corporation engaged in assembling and

exporting semi-conductors devices. Its principal place of business is located in the municipality of
Taguig and consequently it paid local business taxes thereon. Allegedly, there has been erroneous
computation of its local business tax for the year 2004 made by its municipal treasurer Josephine
Daza. TPC filed a written protest demanding refund to the treasurer but the same remain unheeded.
As such, TPC filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the RTC. On the other hand, Daza prayed
that the case be dismissed for a wrong remedy.

ISSUE:

What is the proper remedy from the denial of an assessment protest by a local treasurer?

RULING:

The proper remedy of the Corporation is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

TPC erroneously availed of the wrong remedy in filing a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to
question Daza’s inaction on its letter-protest. The rule is settled that, as a special civil action,
certiorari is available only if the following essential requisites concur: (1) it must be directed against
a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Daza cannot be said to be performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function in assessing TPC s

business tax and/or effectively denying its protest as then Municipal Treasurer of Taguig. For this
reason, Daza’s actions are not the proper subjects of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari which is the
appropriate remedy in cases where a the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. Thereafter, the
proper remedy from the RTC decision is to appeal the same before the Court of Tax Appeals.
 LUZ YAMANE v BA LEPANTO CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION
GR No. 154993 October 25, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation is a duly organized condominium corporation
constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act. The Corporation received a Notice of Assessment
signed by the City Treasurer stating that the Corporation is "liable to pay the correct city business taxes, fees
and charges,” The Notice of Assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of the business taxes assessed.
Through counsel, the Corporation responded with a written tax protest which was subsequently rejected by the
City Treasurer. From the denial of the protest, the Corporation filed an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
From this Decision of the RTC, the Corporation filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals. Initially, the petition was dismissed outright on the ground that
only decisions of the RTC brought on appeal from a first level court could be elevated for review under the
mode of review prescribed under Rule 42. However, the Corporation pointed out in its Motion for
Reconsideration that under Section 195 of the Local Government Code, the remedy of the taxpayer on the
denial of the protest filed with the local treasurer is to appeal the denial with the court of competent
jurisdiction. Persuaded by this contention, the Court of Appeals reinstated the petition.
The appellate court reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business
taxes to the City of Makati. Upon denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, the City Treasurer elevated the
present Petition for Review under Rule 45. The City Treasurer claims that the Corporation had filed the wrong
mode of appeal before the Court of Appeals when the latter filed its Petition for Review under Rule 42.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC, in deciding an appeal taken from a denial of a protest by a local treasurer exercises
"original jurisdiction" or "appellate jurisdiction."
RULING:
The Local Government Code does not expressly confer appellate jurisdiction on the part of regional
trial courts from the denial of a tax protest by a local treasurer. On the other hand, Section 22 of B.P. 129
expressly delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, confining as it does said appellate
jurisdiction to cases decided by Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Unlike in the
case of the Court of Appeals, B.P. 129 does not confer appellate jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts over
rulings made by non-judicial entities.
From these premises, the proper remedy of the Corporation from the RTC judgment is an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 to the Court of Appeals. However, this is subject to two important qualifications. First, in
this particular case there are nonetheless significant reasons for the Court to overlook the procedural error and
ultimately uphold the adjudication of the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Appeals in this case. Second,
the doctrinal weight of the pronouncement is confined to cases and controversies that emerged prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA).
Republic Act No. 9282 definitively proves in its Section 7(a)(3) that the CTA exercises exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local
tax cases original decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their originally or appellate jurisdiction.
Moreover, the provision also states that the review is triggered "by filing a Petition for Review under a
procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.” Republic Act
No. 9282, however, would not apply to this case simply because it arose prior to the effectivity of that law. To
declare otherwise would be to institute a jurisdictional rule derived not from express statutory grant, but from
implication. The jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of a case should be clearly conferred and should not
be deemed to exist on mere implications.
The characteristic of all procedural rules is adherence to the precept that they should not be enforced
blindly, especially if mechanical application would defeat the higher ends that animates our civil procedure the
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The Court of Appeals could very well
have treated the Corporation's Petition for Review as an ordinary appeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v HON. MARIA THERESA DELA TORRE-YADAO, et. al.
GR No. 162144-54 November 13, 2012

FACTS:

The combined forces of the Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, Traffic Management Command ,
Criminal Investigation Command and National Capital Region Command killed 11 suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed charges of murder against the police officers involved
before the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the
rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

The parents of two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing that they were minors.
Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the informations to show such minority and
asked respondent Executive Judge to recall the assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle
them to a family court. The request for recall was denied. Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the
prosecution’s motion for re-raffle to a family court on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applies
only to living minors.

ISSUE:

Whether the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of family courts

RULING:

Section 5 of R.A. 8369 vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which
in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a minor. Thus: ‘‘a) Criminal cases where one or
more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or
where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability
which the respondent may have incurred.’’

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason, when
the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases,
for instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in
hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.

Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved
to a family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder
cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would
appear as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents
who had become the real private offended parties.
 FELIPE N. MADRIAN v FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN
G.R. No. 159374, July 12, 2007

FACTS:

Felipe N. Madrian and Francisca R. Madrian were married and have three sons and a
daughter: Ronnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo and Krizia Ann. After a bitter quarrel Felipe allegedly left
their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta.
Rosa, Laguna.

Thus Francisca filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in
the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to
Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their
mothers care. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of
the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the
custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject
to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court
ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on
custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Felipe challenges the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in
the family courts under RA 8369.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
involving custody of minors.

RULING:

Yes. In Thornton v. Thornton, the Court ruled that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody
of minors. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case
here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed
by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which states under Section 20 thereof that ‘‘A verified
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court.
The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.’’

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
involved.
 MARCELO LEE, et. al. v COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.
G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001

FACTS:

Private respondents filed two separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in
the records of birth of petitioners. The petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous
entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of Keh
Shiok Cheng as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is allegedly the
petitioners true birth mother. Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu
Chuan, the mistress of Lee Tek Sheng, gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek
Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners
mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
After Keh Shiok Chengs demise, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children,
including those of petitioners, be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Chengs death that was to
be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents
curiosity, if not suspicion. Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National
Bureau of Investigation to conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of
all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the
records of birth of petitioners.
This prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in petitioners records of birth with the lower courts. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the
legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy
was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed. Judge Veneracion issued an
Order denying the motion to dismiss. The court found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance
and the same is given due course. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition. The
petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as
Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy
of his children only after his death.

ISSUE:

Do the respondents have a cause of action to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family
Code?

RULING:
No. Article 171 provides:
The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code now Art. 170 of the Family Code is not well
taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because
this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being
neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
 SUSAN NICDAO CARIO v SUSAN YEE CARIO
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, Susan
Nicdao Cario and the second was on November 10, 1992, with Susan Yee Cario with whom he has
cohabitated for almost ten years. Santiago became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who
spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Susan Nicdao was
able to collect a total of P146,000.00, while Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00.

Susan Yee filed a case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao praying, that she
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits. She argued that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage, and that the previous marriage was void ab initio for having been contracted
without the requisite marriage license. Susan Nicdao failed to file an answer hence she was declared
in default. The Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, granted the petition in
favor of Susan Yee.

ISSUE:

Is Susan Yee entitled to one half of the death benefits?

RULING:

No. Article 40 of the Family Code states that prior and separate declaration of nullity of a
marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other
than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed
to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do
is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which
his or her rights flow is in fact valid. The court will rule on the status of the marriage involved and
proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence.

The marriage of Susan Nicdao and Santiago was found to be void ab initio due to having been
performed without the requisite marriage license. Also, his marriage to Susan Yee is also void for
having been contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage. The first marriage has not been
judicially dissolved prior to the subsequent marriage. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of
the previous marriage of the deceased and Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with Susan Yee.

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime is
governed by the provisions of Articles 147, for the first marriage, and 148 for the second marriage of
the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. Susan Yee failed to present proof
to that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone
and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. On the other hand, Susan Nicdao is entitled to
one half of the proceeds due to the presumption of co-ownership. The remainder passes to Santiago’s
other heirs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v CARLITO I. KHO et.al
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007

FACTS:

On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed
before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of
Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in
behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth
certificates. In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship
of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the deletion of the word "married"
opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania
Inchoco, were allegedly not legally married. The same request to delete the "married" status of their
parents from their respective birth certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira. With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date
of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date
appearing in their marriage certificate.

ISSUES:

Is the failure to implead Juan Kho and Epifania Kho as respondents a ground to deny the
petition?

RULING:

No. A petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a
person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that
the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. The
petition in this case was duly published, hence the parents need not be impleaded. There is no dispute
that the trial court’s Order setting the petition for hearing and directing any person or entity having
interest in the petition to oppose it was posted as well as published for the required period; that
notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the
local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public
prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and
Epifania.
 MA. CHRISTINA TORRES BRAZA V. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. NO. 181174, DECEMBER 4, 2009

FACTS:

Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Sicad Braza were married on January 4, 1978. Pablo died in a
vehicular accident in Indonesia. Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick
Alvin Titular Braza as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina made inquiries and obtained Patrick's birth
certificate and a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April
22, 1998. She filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition to correct the entries in the birth record
of Patrick in the Local Civil Register contending that he could not have been legitimated by the
supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid
and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo. She further prayed to submit Parick to
DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and the declaration of nullity of the legitimation
of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo as bigamous On Patricks Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court
was granted and dismissed the petition without prejudice.

ISSUES:

Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to
nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn
Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a
DNA test.
 MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
FACTS:

Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other. Marinay met Maekara and got married without the first
marriage being dissolved. Marinay eventually left Maekara and she were able to reestablish her
relationship with Fujiki.

In 2010 a judgment was obtained from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar to annotate
the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

ISSUES:

Is the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) applicable in this case?

RULING:

Yes. A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of
the Civil Code provides that "laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting
its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require re-
litigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state.

Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the
rules of evidence. Hence, there is no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines have no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
 PEOPLE V. AZARRAGA
G. R. Nos. 187117 and 187127 October 12, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner filed two (2) Informations against private respondent John Rey Prevendido for
Violation of Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The cases were raffled to Branch 36, a designated special court
pursuant to R.A. 9165, presided by Judge Victor E. Gelvezon. Soon after, however, Judge Gelvezon
disclosed that Coreen Gemarino, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) operative who
conducted the entrapment operation against private respondent, had close family ties with him. Thus,
Judge Gelvezon issued an Order inhibiting himself from trying the case. The cases were then
reassigned to the other special court, Branch 25, presided by Judge Evelyn E. Salao.

Judge Salao also issued an Order whereby she inhibited herself for the reason that Coreen
Gemarino was a cousin; thus, the cases were endorsed to the Office of the Executive Judge for
reassignment. The entire records of the cases to were forwarded to Branch 37 presided over by public
respondent which is not a special court for drug cases.

Public respondent filed a motion questioning the jurisdiction of public respondent to hear the
cases, citing Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165. Respondent judge denied the motion and set the hearing on the
motion for admission to bail. The former moved for reconsideration but denied alleging that under
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Branch 37 itself became a special court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent judge has jurisdiction over the drug cases in criminal case despite his
assignment to a regular court.

RULING:

The petition, however, must fail.

The Court did not commit any violation of R.A. 9165 when it issued the assailed guidelines.
Rather, it merely obeyed Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that the
rules promulgated by this Court should provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, in conformity with the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. As this Court stated in San
Ildefonso Lines v. Court of Appeals, there must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum
that procedural rules are designed not to defeat, but to safeguard, the ends of substantial justice.

Petitioner grounds its assertion on Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165, which states:

Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing
Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving
violations of this Act.
In conclusion, the two sets of guidelines are examples of this Courts foresight and prudence
in the exercise of its rule-making power. These guidelines were issued to prevent or address possible
scenarios that might hinder the proper administration of justice.
 REYES v. RTC OF MAKATI
G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2018

FACTS:

Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes are two of the four children of the spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of
Zenith Insurance Corporation, a domestic corporation established by their family. Spouses Reyes
died. Pedro’s estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs and partition appear to have been
made with Anastacia’s estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith.

Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission against
Oscar. The complaint stated that it is a derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo
C. Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE.

Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit that it is not a
bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the
deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. The RTC denied the
motion. Oscar filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to the CA and prayed that the
RTC Order be annulled and set aside and that the trial court be prohibited from continuing with the
proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the RTC Order and denied the petition. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUES:

Whether the complaint being a derivative suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a
special commercial court.

RULING:

NO.
To resolve it, we rely on the judicial principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

P.D. No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC acting as a special
commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:

SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over corporations, partnership, and other forms of associations registered
with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

a.) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board of directors, business associates,
its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations
registered with the Commission.
 b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among
stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise
or right to exist as such entity; and

c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of

such corporations, partnerships, or associations.
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely
conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud
refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of action.
Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly
supported by the required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud
purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy
within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts but are
mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as
illegal and fraudulent were not explained nor elaborated on.

Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by corporate officers
will bring the case within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction,
there must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporation’s nature, structure, or powers were used
to facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme.
 MA. LUTGARDA CALLEJA V. JOSE PIERRE PANDAY
G.R. NO. 168696 FEBRUARY 28, 2006

FACTS:

Panday et al. filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto. They alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition
with the trial court, they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John
Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators
and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers
which supposedly belonged to respondents.
The RTC issued an order transferring the case to RTC in Naga City as the respondents are
residents of Naga City. However, the executive judge of RTC Naga City refused to hear the case as
improper venue is not a ground for transferring quo warranto cases. Tabora, a plaintiff, filed a
motion to dismiss on improper venue and lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC denied the motion as under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss
is among the prohibited pleadings. On the other hand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order
8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts
specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate dispute.

ISSUES:

Does the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Norte has jurisdiction over the instant case?

RULING:

No. Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried
in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is
undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus,
pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court
designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the
petition for quo warranto filed by herein respondents.

Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over
respondent’s petition for quo warranto. The case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate
dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned
administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial
Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.

Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the
transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58
could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
 MANUEL LUIS GONZALES V. GJH LAND, INCORPORATED
G.R. NO. 202664 NOVEMBER 20, 2015

FACTS:

Manuel and Francis Gonzales filed a complaint for Injunction with damages against GJH
Land before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. They sought to enjoin the sale of the shares they allegedly
bought from S.J. Global. Essentially, petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares
were already paid by them in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc., but were nonetheless offered for
sale on July 29, 2011 to the corporation's stockholders, hence, their plea for injunction.

The case was raffled to Branch 276 which is not a special commercial court. The said court
issued a temporary restraining order and subsequently granted a writ of preliminary injunction.

GJH then filed a motion to dismiss pointing out lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as
the court is not a special commercial court as the case involves intra-corporate controversy. The court
granted the motion to dismiss advancing the ratio in Calleja v. Panday.

ISSUES:

Is the RTC branch 276 of Muntinlupa City correct in dismissing the case as it is not
designated as a special commercial court?

RULING::

No. The present controversy lies in the procedure to be followed when a commercial case has
been properly filed in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court but is,
however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that station.

As a basic premise, a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject matter
is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the
law itself. The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do
with the question of jurisdiction.

The erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a
matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not
negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario,
the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276
should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case;
thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated Special
Commercial Court in the station, i.e.,Branch 256.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 122256, October 30, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of Land Linoan, Montevista, Davao
del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A.
No. 6657). Private respondent’s certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. Private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the
Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Private
respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24, 717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed
its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter’s Revised Rules of Procedure, before
recourse to the RTC could be had.

ISSUES:

Whether in cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal
from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner
can resort to the RTC under section 50 of R.A. No. 6657.

RULING::

No. Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No.
6657]. The provisions of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases
involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657
as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this
distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of
eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. In accordance
with it, the private respondent’s case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the
latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners. It would subvert this original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for
the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the
RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CORAZON M. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. 180384, March 26, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed cases for determination of just
compensation against Villegas and heirs of Noel before RTC Br. 32 of Dumaguete City, the
designated Special Agrarian Court of Negros Oriental. The subject lands were located in Guihulngan
City and Bayawan City, which are outside the regular territorial jurisdiction of RTC Br. 32. As such,
RTC, Br. 32 dismissed both cases. LBP’s motion for reconsideration were also dismissed, prompting
it to file petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that RTC Br. 32
has jurisdiction over all cases of determination of just compensation within the province of Negros
Oriental, regardless of whether or not the properties are outside its regular jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Regional Trial Court, acting as Special Agrarian Court, has jurisdiction over
just compensation cases involving agricultural lands located outside its regular jurisdiction but within
the province where it is designated as an agrarian court under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1998.

RULING:

Yes. "Jurisdiction" is the court’s authority to hear and determine a case. The court’s
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law. In this case, the law
that confers jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts designated by the Supreme Court in every
province is Republic Act (R.A.) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Sections
56 and 57 are the relevant provisions.

The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for a province
has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation in that province. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that
Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases: (1) all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (2) the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under R.A. 6657.

By "special" jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power in addition to or over and
above the ordinary jurisdiction of the RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural
lands located outside their regular territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province
where they sit as Special Agrarian Courts. Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the
designated Special Agrarian Court for the province of Negros Oriental, it has jurisdiction over all
cases for determination of just compensation involving agricultural lands within that province,
regardless of whether or not those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.
 PEOPLE V. EFREN MATEO Y GARCIA
GR NO. 147678-87, JUL 07, 2004,

FACTS:

On October 30,1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, were filed against
appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial
court and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUES:

Whether the case should be directly forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of the express
provision in the constitution on automatic appeal.

RULING:

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but
involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave
rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution Article VIII,
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher."

The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659,[10] as well as procedural rules contained
in Section 3 of Rule 122,[11] Section 10 of Rule 122,[12] Section 13 of Rule 124[13] and Section 3
of Rule 125[14] of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision
is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a
marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are
convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the
recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the
determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face
with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct
mandate to review factual issues.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has
it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to
the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be
overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate
the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative
of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
 ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS. NLRC
G.R. NO. 130866 SEPTEMBER 16, 1998, EN BANC,

FACTS:

Arcayos was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for misappropriating funds
which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the
dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a case against St. Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). St. Martin Funeral Homes contention is that the respondent is not an
employee due to the lack of an employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on
St. Martin’s monthly payroll.

The labor arbiter ruled in favor of St. Martin, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-
employee relationship between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a
situation. The Arcayos appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and remanded
the case to the labor arbiter. St. Martin filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the
NLRC. Now, St. Martin appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:

Whether St. Martin appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme Court.

RULING:

Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose
decisions are then appealable to the Office of the President. However, the new rules do not anymore
provide provisions regarding appellate review for decisions rendered by the NLRC.
However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such decisions from the
NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance system and the perceived intention of the
legislative body who enacted the new rules.

“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies
on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the
purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”
St. Martin Funeral rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should
have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of
courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.
 TERESITA FABIAN V. ANIANO DESIERTO ET AL.
G.R. NO. 129742 SEPTEMBER 16, 1998
FACTS:

Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District (FMED), and private respondent
Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. After misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents,
Fabian eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against Agustin in a letter-
complaint. The Graft Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent
guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law. On a motion for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative
charges.

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that in all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court .

ISSUE:

Is Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act, providing for an appeal before the Supreme Court for
administrative disciplinary cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman, constitutional?

RULING:

No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control
over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
 FERDINAND R. MARCOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014

FACTS:

On 17 December 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG), filed a Petition for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the
forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0141.

Respondent Republic, through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought the declaration of Swiss bank accounts totaling USD 356 million (now USD 658 million), and
two treasury notes worth USD 25 million and USD 5 million, as ill-gotten wealth. The Swiss
accounts, previously held by five groups of foreign foundations, were deposited in escrow with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), while the treasury notes were frozen by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).

Respondent also sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy corporations and entities
established by nominees of Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as
real and personal properties manifestly out of proportion to the spouses lawful income. This claim
was based on evidence collated by the PCGG with the assistance of the United States Justice
Department and the Swiss Federal Police Department. The Petition for Forfeiture described among
others, a corporate entity by the name Arelma, Inc., which maintained an account and portfolio in
Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for the same purpose of hiding ill-
gotten wealth.

Petitioners contend that the sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction to render a summary
judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether the Sandiganbayan exercises competent jurisdiction over the case involving a summary
judgment.

RULING:

Yes. It is the law itself that determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the rules,
summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact that call for the
presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise
issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then
summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial to a
determination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. When
the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then summary judgment is called for.

Guided by the principles above indicated, we hold that under the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar, summary judgment is proper. The Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in
granting the corresponding 2004 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by respondent. The latter is
well within its right to avail itself of summary judgment and obtain immediate relief, considering the
insufficient denials and pleas of ignorance made by petitioners on matters that are supposedly within
their knowledge.

CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO and REYNALDO G. MEJICA,

vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125498. February 18, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator. On 15 June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas,
represented by Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented
by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan. There were anomalies found by the
provincial auditor regarding the said project.

On 10 January 1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the
Ombudsman against petitioners. Likewise impleaded were Larry Lu and Ramil Ang, President and
General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively, of Philwood Construction.

On 10 June 1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa approved the filing of an information
against petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.

On 28 July 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan granted said motion in an Order dated 22 April 1996.

On 7 November 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a memorandum

recommending that the charges against petitioners be maintained. The Ombudsman approved said
memorandum.

Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether the Sandiganbayan exercises competent jurisdiction over the said case.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the
determination of the Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. In a recent decision, this Court, quoting Young vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, stated the rationale for this rule:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the court will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal
of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints
filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
 PANFILO M. LACSON v THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, ET.AL.
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

FACTS:

On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The
incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who, at the time
of the “rub out” was then the PNP Chief, among others, as the ones responsible. They were accused
of multiple murders. The case reached the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate
motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They aver that the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (par a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975 also known as “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The
Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended”.

They contended that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where
one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher,
or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended information has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and
none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

ISSUE:

Can the Sandiganbayan take cognizance over the case?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused's officials functions.

Hence, the multiple murder charge against Lacson et al falls under Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249.
Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office
in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the
Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public officers and
employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their
office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

However, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal
accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,
the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim
and then killed the latter while in their custody. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA
AMANTE
G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009

FACTS:

Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and was able to get hold of a
cash advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar
expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost
two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of
violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445.

Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT
AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) is an incomplete proceeding and the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said
criminal case becauset Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary
grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.

The OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the
time relevant to the case; she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP,
the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the
salary grade of city local officials/heads.

ISSUE:

Is the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case involving a sangguniang panlungsod

member where the crime charged is one committed in relation to office, but not for violation of RA
3019, RA 1379 or any of the felonies mentioned in chapter ii, section 2, title vii of the revised penal
code?

RULING:

Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions
thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan among others.
 Hence, by simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, Amante, being a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in
relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 BARRIGA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 161784-86, April 26, 2005

FACTS

The Dinah Barriga (Municipal Accountant) and Virginio Villamor (Municipal Mayor) were
charged with malversation of funds. The information was thenamended charging them with illegal
use of public funds wherein they allegedly connived andcollaborated in using the said public fund to
a public purpose different from which it wasintended or appropriated. Such criminal case was filed
with the Sandiganbayan.Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the criminal case
filed againsther considering that her position only holds a salary grade 24 and that she is not
anaccountable officer to be charged with such.

ISSUE:

Does Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the criminal case filed?

RULING:

Yes. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249, which amended Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No.1606, the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public
officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories enumerated at the
time of the commission of such crimes. There are two classes of public office-related crimes under
subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first, those crimes or felonies in which the
public office is a constituent element as defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the
offense is such that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the office; second,
such offenses or felonies which are intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated by
the public officer or employee while in the performance of his official functions, through improper or
irregular conduct.

Two of the felonies that belong to the first classification are malversation defined and
penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal use of public funds or property
defined and penalized by Article 220 of the same Code. The public office of the accused is a
constituent element in both felonies.

We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the public office of the accused
Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor is a constituent element of malversation and illegal use of
public funds or property. Accused mayors position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended
Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her co-accused, the municipal mayor, in
committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as SG 24
and as such is not an accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive
original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her. It must be stressed that a public officer who is
not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private
individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public
officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or
illegal use of public funds or property.
 CARRIAGA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 180010, July 30, 2010

FACTS:

Cariaga, a municipal treasurer with a Salary Grade of 24, was charged before the Regional
Trial Court with three counts of malversation of public funds and was convicted of the same.

He filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he intended to appeal the trial courts decision to the
Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon.

ISSUE:

Which court has jurisdiction over the appeal?

RULING:

That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

in all cases involving:

xxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions

corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over

final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided. x x x
 GILDA C. ULEP v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No 183373, January 30, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner was a government employee serving as money order teller with a salary grade
lower than grade 27. She was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds. Subsequently,
she was convicted and filed a notice of appeal to the trial court.

The trial court forwarded the above mentioned case to the Court of Appeals. The CA,
however, dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It held that malversation belongs
to the classification of public office-related crimes. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that the appellate court should have
ordered the transfer of the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan instead of dismissing her appeal
outright.

ISSUE:

Should the Court of Appeals transfer the case to the Sandiganbayan?

RULING:

Yes. Failure to do so would cause grave injustice to the petitioner. It is the duty of the trial
court to forward the records of the case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that
the RTC judge concerned ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the
great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary grade lower than
27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should have known
the law and the rules of procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA
and when they should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and
carefully observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this where a person’s liberty was at
stake.
 ANGELITO P. MAGNO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171542, APRIL 16, 2011

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder against several accused, including Magno, who were public officers working under
the National Bureau of Investigation.

During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance
and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on
behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman. The RTC issued an Order, ruling that the Ombudsman is
proper, legal and authorized entity to prosecute the case.

The respondents, through the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy, filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA

Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the
power to hear and decide that question is with the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Does Sandiganbayan have appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs decision?

RULING:

Yes. The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs decision not to
allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN v. CA AND
JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR
G.R. Nos. 217126-27 November 10, 2015
FACTS:

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas
"Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers
and employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing them of Plunder and violation of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall
Parking Building.

Thereafter, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-

finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted.
Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint against Binay, Jr., et
al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents
(OMB cases).

After such, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases. In liue of the
investigation, the Ombudsman upon the recommendation of the 2 nd Special Panel, issued the subject
preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than
six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.

Then, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation. At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for
a TRO. Hence, the filing of this action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining
the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman

RULING:

YES.

The Court ruled that the CA could validly issue a TRO to enjoin the implementation of a
preventive suspension order by the Ombudsman.

In the case of Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, the Court instructed that
“It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited
and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do
not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not
oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as
other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt
the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it
proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from
issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had
the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely
ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1),
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main case.
 VICENTE S. ORAP vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN represented by HON. JUSTICES
MANUEL R. PAMARAN BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ, and ROMEO M. ESCAREAL, et
al.,
G.R. No. Nos. L-50508-11 October 11, 1985
FACTS:

Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor
Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information, duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison,
then Chief Special Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan. Likewise charged was Melanio B. Fernandez,
petitioner's Clerk of Court.

The gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions
unlawfully and feloniously received and took various sums of money from several persons in
connection with Criminal Case No. 2032 of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem entitled, "People vs.
Pepito F. Iglesias", for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries
and damage to property.

Before his scheduled arraignment in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed a motion to quash
the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and
that, corollary, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged.

After due hearing, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner
verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied. Hence, the
instant recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a
complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with a violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of a prima facie case, proceed to file the corresponding information
before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same?

RULING:

The ruling of herein respondent Sandiganbayan that the Tanodbayan has such authority is
affirmed.
From the reading of P.D 1607, the tanodbayan could act as a prosecutor. The authority of the
Tanodbayan, as prosecutor is primary and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17
and 19 of P.D. 1607, as follows:

SEC. 17.Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.-There is hereby created in the Office of the
Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor composed of a Chief Special
Prosecutor, an Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor, and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who
shall have the same qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and L who shall be appointed
by the President; ...
 The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special
Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
cognizable, by the Sandiganbayan: to file informations therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein Provided, however that the Tanodbayan may upon recommendation
of the Chief Special Prosecutor, designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as Special Prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any additional compensation except such
allowances, per diems and travelling expenses as the Tanodbayan may determine in accordance with
existing laws, rules and regulations.
SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.-If the Tanodbayan has reason to
believe that any public official employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting
criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the
Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding
criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the
proper administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the Tanodbayan shall make the
appropriate recommendations to the administrative agency concerned.
Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the
Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct
and control the prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court
personnel lie outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee
could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of
proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such
nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the
Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the
people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of
integrity and efficiency in the government service."

We have carefully scrutinized the informations in question and we find the same to have
complied with the substantial and formal requirements of the law. They carry the certification of the
investigating prosecutor as to the existence of a prima facie case. They also bear the approval of the
Chief Special Prosecutor, as required by Section 11 of PD 1606.

As petitioner is charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, 3the said
court validly acquired jurisdiction over the informations in question.
 BAGUNU v. AGGABAO
GR No. 186487, August 15, 2011

FACTS:

The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to
Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty.
Samson Binag. Atty. Binag applied for a free patent 1over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands
(now Lands Management Bureau). Atty. Binag then sold the subject land (third sale) to the
petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states
that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent
application.

The respondents filed a protest against the petitioners free patent application. The
respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael
Bautista.

The DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free
patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ruled that in
determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are
controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to
the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous
description of the lot sold as Lot322. DENR Secretary affirmed.

ISSUE:

May the DENR exercise primary jurisdiction in this case?

RULING:

Yes. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior
to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended
until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed out
and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
salutarily served.

The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular
courts area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular
courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public
character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the
disposition and management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.
 SMART, et al. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMISSION (NTC)
GR No. 151908, August 12, 2003

FACTS:

Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications

Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating
rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Therafter, the NTC issued a
Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures
to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units.

Petitioners filled an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-
2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, alleging, among
others, ,that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid
call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines.

Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied respondent’s motion to
dismiss. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision on the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case.

ISSUE:

Whether the NTC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

NTC has jurisdiction over the case. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-
making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative

agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle
applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative
power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was
held:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial
review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no
application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-
making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative
agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion
doctrine.
 LINTANG BEDOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009

FACTS:

As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao,
Bedol discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOC’s performance of its
ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the city and municipalities in the
province. At that time, Bedol also was charged with the burdensome and gargantuan duty of being
the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring
province of Maguindanao. Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor.
Later on, Bedol appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for
Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for
Maguindanao. Due to certain ‘observations’ on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain
parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged
fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area. He was already informed of the resetting of
the canvassing, but failed to appear despite prior knowledge. Bedol explained before the Task Force
during its fact finding activity that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia
were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the
first time such an excuse was given by him, and no written report was ever filed with the
Commission regarding the alleged loss. Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative
proceedings and due to failure and refusal to submit a written explanation of his absences, Bedol was
issued a contempt charge by COMELEC. Bedol was later arrested by members of the Philippine
National Police on the basis of an Order of Arrest issued by the COMELEC after he repeatedly failed
to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao. Bedol questioned the
COMELEC’s legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the
contempt charges. Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt by COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Is the initiation and issuance of contempt order within the constitutional powers of the
COMELEC?

RULING:

Yes. The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of
paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. The powers and functions of the
COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be
classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the
COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election
laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and
regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article
IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.

The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or

administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of
judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect
to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to
determine those questions, he acts judicially.

The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad
enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio.
Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code
explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court.