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December 1992 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1992 > December 1992
Decisions > G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992 - ANTONIO A. MECANO
v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT:

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992.]

ANTONIO A. MECANO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; KINDS OF REPEALS. — The

question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a
subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may
expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision
which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and
portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a
statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,
identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all
others are implied repeals.

2. ID.; ID.; REPEALS BY IMPLICATION; NECESSITY OF A CLEAR

INDICATION OF LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE TO REPEAL. — The fact that a
later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an
earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the
prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a
continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of
legislative purpose to repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds on the
premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in
enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal
must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the
later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for,
the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the
time of the first enactment.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CATEGORIES THEREOF. — There are two categories of

repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the
same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, The later act to the
extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The
second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two
statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent
and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or
harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot
he enforced without nullifying the other. The second category of repeal —
the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the
whole subject matter. This is only possible if this revised statute or code
was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect
system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to
repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the
former statute. When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a
repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from
the revised act are deemed repealed. Furthermore, before there can be
an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the
legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IMPLIED REPEAL OF SECTION 699 OF THE
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE BY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987;
CASE AT BAR. — Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new
Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the
old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not
found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the
leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for
sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others. Moreover, the COA
failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter
of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be
no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature
being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION AND

INTERPRETATION OF LAWS; WEIGHT OF OPINIONS OF THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE ON STATUTES IN PARI MATERIAL; CASE AT BAR. — According
to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear
is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of
the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the
enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the
weight that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy
inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the implementation
of this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA
relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case of Sison v.
Pangramuyen that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement and
implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This principle is
subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the
courts upon a showing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or
mistake. It has been held that Opinions of the Secretary and
Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in
pari materia.

6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REPEALS BY IMPLICATION NOT

FAVORED. — Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that
repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. This Court, in a case, explains the
principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored, and
will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended.
As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge
of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any
former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the
two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing
necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces
the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is
beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make
all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be
reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier." cralaw virtua1aw library

7. LABOR CODE; ARTICLE 173 THEREOF; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION;

PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION THEREUNDER NOT A BAR TO RECOVERY OF
BENEFITS UNDER SEC. 699 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. —
Regarding respondent’s contention that recovery under this subject
section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees’
Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence
of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation
and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by
P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under
this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section
669 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are
administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies
of the government."

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the
decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th
Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in
the total amount of P40,831.00.

Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was

hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account
of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of
which he is claiming from the COA.

On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim

(Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his expenses on
the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC,
the pertinent provisions of which read: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in

performance of duty. — When a person in the service of the national
government or in the service of the government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as
thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of
Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby
occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such
case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical
attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the
injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first
against vacation leave, if any there be.

x x x

"In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of

some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion
authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees." chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated

June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice, along with the comment, bearing
the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, "recommending
favorable action thereof." Finding petitioner’s illness to be service -connected,
the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th

Indorsement dated November 21, 1990, returned petitioner’s claim to Director
Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th
Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied
upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion
No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the
Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the
latter." cralaw virtua1aw library

On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew
Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under
a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s
claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992,
however denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC
has been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason
that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative
Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director
Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice

Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February
7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court if he so desires." cralaw virtua1aw library

On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed
or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was brought for the
consideration of this Court. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on
the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further
maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the Employees’
Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he would still not be
barred from filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of
whether or not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
would decide the fate of petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.

The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or
supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The COA
claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can
be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code.
Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the
Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that
employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the
Employees’ Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow
simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the same
contingency would be unfair and unjust to the government.

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a

subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly
repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and
specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are
intended to be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing
clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is
repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of

whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code
with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of
the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions)
of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly." cralaw virtua1aw library

The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing
clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. 5 Rather,
it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73,
S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not
to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 6 This latter situation
falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later
date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. 7 Hence, before
there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the
lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one.
The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the
same from the time of the first enactment. 9

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions
in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict,
The later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law. 10

Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two

statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized;
and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot he enforced
without nullifying the other. 11 cralawnad

Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor
attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as
the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law,
military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still
others.

Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes
on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact,
there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the
nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact that
Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that
the same section had been repealed. It further maintained that to allow the
particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in force argues
against the Code itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas
clause of the 1987 Code, which states: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new

Administrative Code which incorporates in a unified document the major
structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and

x x x"

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the

Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that
of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the
prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of
the old one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative
purpose to repeal. 13

We come now to the second category of repeal — the enactment of a statute

revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only
possible if this revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject
to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent
statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject
matter of the former statute. 14 When both intent and scope clearly evince the
idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted
from the revised act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can
be an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the
legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act. 16

According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears
clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the
many changes that transpired in the government structure since the
enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight
that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as
the body which had been entrusted with the implementation of this particular
provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in
administrative law enunciated in the case of Sison v. Pangramuyen 17 that in
the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be
loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not
hold water. This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may
be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the decision is vitiated by
fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that Opinions of the
Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of
statutes in pari materia. 19

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes

by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency
and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 21

This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by

implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that
the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to
interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later
act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for
the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be
used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can
be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22

Regarding respondent’s contention that recovery under this subject section

shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173,
Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance
Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly
provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 669 of the Revised
Administrative Code xxx whose benefits are administered by the system
(meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government." cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition;

respondent is, hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim for
benefits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,

Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.

Endnotes:

1. As amended by R.A. No. 1232 dated June 7, 1955.

2. Rollo, pp. 26-30.

3. School Dist. No. 45 v. Board of County of Comira, 141 Kan. 108.

4. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 289 (1986).

5. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13

SCRA 377 (1965).

6. CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE 631 (1940 ed.).

7. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L. Ed. 351

(1935).

8. Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991).

9. Supra, note 7.

10. Supra, note 4.

11. Villegas v. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971).

12. Valera v. Tuason, 80 Phil 823 (1948).

13. Jalandoni v. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261 1974).

14. People v. Almuete, 69 SCRA 410, 414 (1976).

15. People v. Benuya, 61 Phil. 208 (1916).

16. Supra, note 9.

17. 84 SCRA 364 (1978).

18. Jaculina v. National Police Commission, 200 SCRA 489 (1991);

Greenhills Mining Co. v. Office of the President, 163 SCRA 350
(1988).

19. Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova, 145 SCRA

385 (1986).

20. National Power Corporation v. Hon. Zain B. Angas, G.R. Nos.

60225-26, May 8, 1992; Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771
(1991); Maddumba v. Government Service Insurance System, 192
SCRA 281 (1990); Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 164 SCRA 18 (1988); De
Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983).

21. U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208 (1916).

22. Smith, Bell & Co. v. Estate of Maronilla, 41 Phil. 557 (1916).

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G.R. No. 84731 December

16, 1992 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. SALVADOR BIENDO

G.R. No. 94470 December

16, 1992 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. FRED JACOLO

G.R. No. 95441 December

16, 1992 - CARLOS O. ELIDO,
SR. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100880 December

16, 1992 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. LEONARDO CLAUDIO

G.R. No. 102004 December

16, 1992 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. DANTE DABON

G.R. Nos. 94188-89

December 17, 1992 - PEOPLE
OF THE PHIL. v. MANUEL BATIS

G.R. No. 73535 December

18, 1992 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. JESUS CAMAHALAN

G.R. No. 82606 December

18, 1992 - PRIMA PARTOSA-JO
v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL

G.R. Nos. 92144-49

December 18, 1992 - PEOPLE
OF THE PHIL. v. RESURRECCION
CARIÑO

G.R. No. 92387 December

18, 1992 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. NELSON L. MENDOZA
 A.M. No. 91-6-007 December
21, 1992 - REQUEST OF JUDGE
ALEX Z. REYES

Adm. Matter No. 92-5-009-

CTA December 21, 1992 - IN
RE: ALEX Z. REYES

G.R. No. 93073 December

21, 1992 - REPUBLIC PLANTERS
BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100294 December

21, 1992 - BENITO A. TIATCO v.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. Nos. 102409-10

December 21, 1992 - PEOPLE
OF THE PHIL. v. FELIPE DE
GUZMAN

G.R. No. 93986 December

22, 1992 - BENJAMIN T. LOONG
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ET AL.

G.R. No. 98120 December

22, 1992 - FILOMENA R.
MANCITA v. CEFERINO P.
BARCINAS

G.R. No. 104139 December

22, 1992 - LYDIA M. PROFETA v.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON

A.M. No. R-668-P December

21, 1992 - HORACIO M.
PASCUAL v. GERRY C. DUNCAN

G.R. No. 65230 December

23, 1992 - PROVINCE OF
TARLAC v. FERNANDO S.
ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 91015 December

23, 1992 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. DAQUILLO L. MIANA

G.R. No. 105717 December

23, 1992 - JOSE L. ONG, JR. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ET AL.

G.R. No. 50837 December

28, 1992 - NARCISO
BUENAVENTURA v. COURT OF
APPEALS

G.R. No. 106094 December

28, 1992 - PSCFC FINANCIAL
CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91115 December

29, 1992 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. PACALSO K. MAT-AN
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