Aris (Phils.) Inc. vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 905501.

August 05, 1991]

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:

On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by

management’s failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working
surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance
conference. Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner with NLRC of NCR. After due trial, Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered
to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt private respondents to their former
respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without
loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6) months.
Private respondents filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution pursuant to
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715. Petitioner and complainants filed their own Appeals.

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A.
No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending
at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given
retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending cases
would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would
also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of
reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provision under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is constitutional.

HELD:

YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. The validity of the questioned law is not only
supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor
General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an
employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State,
basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the
preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital
than the preservation of corporate profits. Then, by and pursuant to the same power,
the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop,
although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a
continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated
employee and its family.

Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC can validly be given retroactive
effect. They are procedural or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the
authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. There
are no vested rights in rules of procedure. A remedial statute may be made applicable
to cases pending at the time of its enactment.

Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]

Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No.
409).

On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to
regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed
Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit
The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-
Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other
Purposes.”
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos.
The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To
Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On
Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in
Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai.
The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked
Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC
assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment
clauses of the Constitution.

HELD:

NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

RATIO:

Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even

suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent
law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).

Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s
franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not being
final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the
Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting
ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be
put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997)
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural
Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E.
SALVACION, petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and
GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,respondents.

Ponente: TORRES, JR.

FACTS:

Respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured the 12-
year old petitioner Karen Salvacion to go with him in his apartment where the former
repeatedly raped latter. After the rescue, policemen recovered dollar and peso checks
including a foreign currency deposit from China Banking Corporation (CBC). Writ of
preliminary attachment and hold departure order were issued. Notice of Garnishment
was served by the Deputy Sheriff to CBC which later invoked R.A. No. 1405 as its
answer to it. Deputy Sheriff sent his reply to CBC saying that the garnishment did not
violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a
garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the
subject deposits in custodia legis. CBC replied and invoked Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli are exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. Central Bank of the
Philippines affirmed the defense of CBC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Sec. 8 of RA 6426 amended
by PD 1246 otherwise known as the “Foreign Currency Deposit Act” be made
applicable to a foreign transient.

HELD:

NO. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as
it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances.

RATIO:

[T]he application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

“Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro.” Simply stated, when
the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would
respond to the vehement urge of conscience. It would be unthinkable, that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused
Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent.

Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank
Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This
situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-72873. May 28,
1987)
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

Ponente: CRUZ

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his
undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con
Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions
sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their
consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of
the enclosed area.

One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed
the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within
thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil
Code.

HELD:

YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint
for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These
are the justifications for this exception.

While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts]
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so,
[courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to
the law maker’s will.

Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992)

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to
the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC).
Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim
on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was
not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on
Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the
issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety
the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that
the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its
entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:

NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for
benefits.

RATIO:

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject,
that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be
a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was
to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise,
at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the
time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are

not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari
materia.

Paras vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996)

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: FRANCISCO

FACTS:

Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the
petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for
recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the
petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding of recall election, petitioner
filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction, insisting that the
recall election is barred by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of
Local Government Code (LGC) which states that “no recall shall take place within one
(1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election“.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections,
where the recall election is for Barangay post.

HELD:
NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

RATIO:

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government
unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of
recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local
elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the
said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected
through a recall election.

It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code
to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by
the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.

By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated
under the same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.

CONCURRING OPINION:

DAVIDE:

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in
by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and
who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of
age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to
the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424,
Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified
to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then
may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local).

CIR vs ESSO Standard Eastern (G.R. No. L-28502-03. April 18, 1989)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
respondents.

Ponente: NARVASA

FACTS:

Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. It was granted a tax credit
by the Commissioner accordingly on 1964. However, ESSOs payment of its income tax
for 1960 was found to be short by P367,994.00. The Commissioner (of Internal
Revenue) wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together with
interest thereon for the period from 1961 to 1964. ESSO paid under protest the amount
alleged to be due, including the interest as reckoned by the Commissioner. It protested
the computation of interest, contending it was more than that properly due. It claimed
that it should not have been required to pay interest on the total amount of the
deficiency tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount of P146,961.00—representing the
difference between said deficiency, P367,994.00, and ESSOs earlier overpayment of
P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax credit). ESSO thus asked for a refund.
The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the
Court of Tax Appeals which ordered payment to ESSO of its refund-claim representing
overpaid interest.

The Commissioner argued the tax credit of P221,033.00 was approved only on year
1964, it could not be availed of in reduction of ESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year
1960; as of that year, 1960, there was as yet no tax credit to speak of, which would
reduce the deficiency tax liability for 1960. In support of his position, the Commissioner
invokes the provisions of Section 51 of the Tax Code.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the interest on delinquency should be applied on the full tax deficiency
of P367,994.00 despite the existence of overpayment in the amount of P221,033.00.

HELD:

NO. Petition was denied. Decision of CTA was affirmed.

RATIO:

The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as 1960, the
Government already had in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 representing excess
payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner
subsequently acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the
Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO That acknowledgment of the
erroneous payment came some four (4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts
from its actuality. The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the
moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the
obligation to reimburse.The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the
moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the
obligation to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount paid to him
results from the mistake, not from the payee’s confession of the mistake or recognition
of the obligation to reimburse.

A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.

Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative
intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
Ursua vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996)
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ponente: BELLOSILO

FACTS:

Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in
receiving the copy of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was
discovered and reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the
petitioner be accordingly charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating
Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some
modification of sentence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of
Commonwealth Act No. 142.

HELD:

NO. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was
reversed and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged
RATIO:

[A]n alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly
and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a
man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the
use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained
in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a
statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not
constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is
prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly
against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain
rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON
(DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.

FACTS:

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a

“Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s
Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the
necessary publications of said Order and the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing
Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for
the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of
delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law
because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No.
6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution,
and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .

HELD:

NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation.
Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.

RATIO:

Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was
left to some future law.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of
registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars,
in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and
voters’ identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not
fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the
order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

PUNO, concurring and dissenting

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide
insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I
cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are
legally defective and cannot implement the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on
and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO
earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right
to campaign for constitutional amendments.

[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under
the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so
understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on
people initiative.

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a
scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view
that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority,
holds that:

(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the “initiatory” Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to “be directly proposed by the people
through initiative,” there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is
“incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.”

(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, “insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.”

I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the
required number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the
Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent
and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution.
Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures.
However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority’s two other rulings.