Chapter V: Presumptions in Aid of Construction and Interpretation

Presumptions

In construing a statute, it is presumed that the intention of the legislature is to enact a valid, sensible
and just law and to change the prior law. (V.S.J.C)

This presumption cannot prevail over the clear and explicit terms of the law.

1. Presumption against Unconstitutionality

Laws are presumed to be CONSTITUTIONAL.

To be declared unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the

constitution.

The conflict with the constitution must be clear beyond reasonable doubt.

Reason for this presumption: The Doctrine of Separation of Power.

Under the Doctrine, enjoins on each department a proper respect for the acts of the
other department.

As the joint act of legislative and executive, the law is supposed to have been
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before enactment.

Principles under this presumption:

Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a

clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.

All Laws are presumed to be valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled
by the Court.

The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.

SAMPLE CASES:

1. Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et.al

2. Hon. Alfredo Lim vs. Hon. Felipe G. Paquing and Associated Development Corporation;
and Teofisto Guingona Jr. And Dominador Cepeda Jr. Vs. Hon. Vetino Reyes and
Associated Developmeny Corporation
3. Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim vs. The People of the Philippines, The Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 217, The City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Wilson Cham

1
Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et.al

G.R. No. 90501, August 5, 1991 (200 SCRA 246)

FACTS:

Private respondents were employees of the Petitioner (Aris Phil Inc.).

They filed a protest against the management concerning hazardous and detrimental working
surroundings.

Petitioner dismissed the private respondents for violation of the company rules and regulations.

Private Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter favored.

Private Respondents move for the issuance of writ of execution pursuant to Section 12 of RA 6715

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by said provision to Article 223
of the Labor Code in allowing the execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 12 of RA No. 6715 allowing is unconstitutional? (NO)

RULING:

The questioned law is a valid exercise of Police Power. In the exercise of Police Power, preservation
of the lives of the citizens is the basic duty of the state that is more vital than the preservation of
corporate profits.

The state may authorize immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee. Such an act is designed to temporarily stop a continuing threat of
danger to the life of the employee and his family.

Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a law shall not
be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.

2
Hon. Alfredo S. Lim vs. Hon. Felipe G. Pacquing and Associated Development Corporation

G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995

FACTS:

The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by the Congress on June 18, 1949 and provided
powers to the Municipal Board to regulate jai-alais and other betting activities.

On January 1, 1951, such authority was transferred to the Games and Amusement Board (GAB) by
virtue of Executive Order No. 392.

On September 7, 1971, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the
Mayor to allow and permit Association Development Corporation to establish and operate Jai-Alai in
the city of Manila.

President Marcos issued PD 771 which expressly revoked all franchises and permits issued by the
local governments.

In October 1975, PD 810 was issued granting the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a
franchise to operate.

PD 810 was revoked and canceled by President Aquino through Executive Order 169.

In 1998, Associated Development Corporation tried to operate Jai-Alai which the government
through the GAB intervened and invoked PD 771.

ADC assails the constitutionality of the PD 771 as violative of equal protection and non-impairment
clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD 771 is unconstitutional? (NO)

RULING:

The time-honored doctrine is that all laws are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless
otherwise ruled by the court.

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution states: “Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered, or
amended by any subsequent presidential issuance.

3
Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim vs. People, The Regional Trial Court and Wilson Cham

G.R. No. 149276 September 27, 2002 (390 SCRA 194)

FACTS:

The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by
increasing the penalties for Estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged.

Said amendment is challenged for being violative of the due process clause, right to bail, and the
provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD 818 is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause, right to bail,
and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the
Constitution? (NO)

RULING:

When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality.

To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative one.

The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.

In this case, the petitioner failed to present a clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption
of constitutionality of PD 818.

4
2. Presumption against Injustice

Cardinal Rule: Judge should discover the intent of the lawmaker in passing the law.

Law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice or to go against the
intent of the lawmaker.

Presumption of the good motive of the legislature – to render justice.

When a law is generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a certain case, we may
not be bound. What we can do is to find balance between the word and the will so that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

Principles under this presumption:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the

lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

A law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice.

SAMPLE CASES:

1. Karen E. Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines

2. Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tecla Padua

5
Karen E. Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997 (278 SCRA 27)

FACTS:

Greg Bartelli Northcott, an American Tourist, detained and raped the petitioner Karen Salvacion,
who was then a 12 years old.

After policemen and people living nearby rescued Karen, Greg was arrested and detained in Makati
Municipal Jail.

Recovered from him were: Dollar Check, Cocobank Bank Book, Dollar Account – China Banking
Corporation, ID, Philippine Money, Door Keys, and Stuff Dolls used in seducing the complainant.

Criminal Cases for serious illegal detention and four (4) counts of rape and the corresponding
damages were filed against Greg.

Greg Escaped from Jail.

The Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary attachment and notice of garnishment to China Banking
Corporation where the dollar accounts are maintained.

China Banking Corp. involved Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 to the effect that the dollar
deposits are exempt from attachment.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the complainant. Greg was ordered to pay for moral damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and cost of suit.

A Writ of Execution was issued but China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines
refused to honor the same.

Respondent Central Bank’s reason is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Sec. 8 of RA 6426 as amended by PD 1246
otherwise known as the “Foreign Currency Deposit Act” be made applicable to a foreign transient.
(NO)

RULING:

The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.

To rule that Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 in favor of the foreign guest would result in
injustice especially to the citizen aggrieved by the guest.

This would run counter to the provision of Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “In
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.”

6
Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tecla Padua

G.R. No. L-72873 May 28, 1987 (150 SCRA 259)

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters (Padua Siblings) inherited in equal pro indiviso share a parcel of land in
Tarlac registered in the name of their parents.

In 1963, one of them, sold the land to the Spouses Alonzo for P550 by way of absolute sale. One year
later, another, sold her own share to Spouses Alonzo for P440 by way of “Pacto de Retro Sale”.

By virtue of such agreement, the petitioner occupied two-fifths of the land , representing the
portions sold to them. Subsequently, the petitioner enclosed the land with a fence and in 1975,
allowed their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife to build a semi-concrete house on the enclosed area.

In 1976, one of the co-heirs sought to redeem the area sold but his complaint was dismissed
because he was an American citizen.

A year later in 1977, another co-heir filed a similar claim invoking the same right of redemption
under Article 1088 of the Civil Code.

“Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price
of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.”

The Trial Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having
exercised within one month from notice of the sale in 1963 and 1964. The Trial Court held that
actual knowledge of the sale by the co-heirs satisfied the notice required by the law.

The Respondent Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court citing that the Notice in Writing is
required. Actual notice would not suffice as a substitute.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice
be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. Would
there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint
was filed in 1977?

RULING:

It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be
to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.

Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

7
The purpose is clear enough to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was
given to them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14
years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without
the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.

That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done
this in this case.

Petition is granted. RTC Decision reversed, Trial Court Decision reinstated.

8
3. Presumption against implied Repeals

Well-settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implications is not favored and the courts
must generally assume their congruent application.

Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and accordingly, against implied repeal.

Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi – every statute must be so

interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.

Legislature should be presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes.

In order to effect implied repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law.

Principles under this presumption:

All doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all law on the subject.

In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as

repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in
the terms of the new and old law. Repeal by implication is not favored by law and is
only resorted to in case of irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the
new law and old law.

SAMPLE CASE:

1. Aleli C. Almadovar v. Chairperson Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan, Commission on Audit

9
Aleli C. Almadovar v. Chairperson Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan, Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 213330 November 16, 2015

FACTS:

Isabela Water District (ISAWAD) is a GOCC created pursuant to PD 198 or the Provincial Water
Utilities Act of 1973 (PWU) with the Petitioner as the General Manager.

The Audit Team Leader disallowed the payment of salary increase of the GM and said that it was
paid without legal basis.

Petitioner filed an appeal insisting that her salary increase was proper because LWDs were exempt
from the coverage of the SSL as Section 23 of R.A. No. 9286, a later law, empowered the board of
directors of LWDs to fix the salary of its GM thereby impliedly repealing RA No. 6758.

But the said disallowance was affirmed by the COA Regional Office, COA Central Office, and COA En
Banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s salary increase was proper? (NO)

RULING:

The increase in the salary of the petitioner was correctly disallowed because it contravened the
provisions of the SSL.

The court is not convinced that Section 23 of PD 198 as amended or any of its provisions, exempt
water utilities from the coverage of the SSL.

If congress intended to exempt water utilities from the coverage of the SSL, it could have expressly
provided in the PD No. 198 an exemption clause similar to other GOCCs.

Congress could have amended Sec. 23 of PD 198 to expressly provide that the compensation of the
GM is exempted from the SSL. However, congress did not.

Petitioner claims that RA No. 9286, being a later law, repealed the SSL. The court, however, notes
that RA NO. 9286 did not expressly repeal the SSL.

Neither did RA No. 9286 impliedly repeal the SSL because repeal by implication is not favored by law
and is only resorted to in case of irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the new law
and the old law.

10
4. Repeals of Statute by Implications not favored

Antonio A. Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992 (216 SCRA 500)

FACTS:

Antonio Mecano, Director II of the NBI, was hospitalized for Cholecystitis. On account, he
incurred medical and hospitalization expenses amounting to P40,831.00.

Through a petition for certiorari, he seeks to nullify the COA’s decision denying his claim for
reimbursement said amount under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) as
amended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operates to repeal the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

RULING:

The ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old
code with the new code depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new code.

“Sec. 27. Repealing Clause – All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”

It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act
or acts that are intended to be repealed. It is an example of “General Repeal”.

The failure to add specific repealing clauses indicates that the intent of the legislature was
not to repeal any existing laws, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists
in the terms of the new and old laws. This falls under the category of implied repeals.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication is not

favored.

Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended.

Petition Granted and respondent was ordered to give due course to petitioners’ claim for
benefits.

11
5. Presumptions against Ineffectiveness

It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactment such a meaning as will
render them operative and effective and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.

Principles under this presumption:

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective statute.

SAMPLE CASE:

1. Danilo Paras v. Commission on Elections

12
Danilo Paras v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996 (264 SCRA 49)

FACTS:

The Petitioner is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won in 1994.

The registered voters of the Barangay filed a petition for the recall of the petitioner as Punong
Barangay which the COMELEC resolved to approve.

On the petition signing, 29.3% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
required by law.

Petitioner opposed the conduct of Recall election. He argued that Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No
7160 (Local Government Code) states that “no recall shall take place within one year from the date
of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular election.”

Petitioner insists that the said provision barred the Recall Election scheduled on January 13, 1996
because the SK Election was set on the first Monday of May 1996 and years thereafter.

Citing a previous SC ruling where the court considered SK Election as a regular election, petitioner
maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election.

Hence, no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall
election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SK Election barred the conduct of Recall Election in compliance to Sec. 74 (b) of
the Local Government Code? (NO)

RULING:

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates a period when elective
officials may be subjected to a recall election, that is, during the second year of his office.

If SK election which is set by RA No. 7808 to be held every three years were to be deemed within the
purview of the phrase “regular local election”, then, no recall election can be conducted rendering
“inutile” the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the presumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law. Petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

13
6. Presumptions against Absurdity

Principles under this presumption:

Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the
legislative intention so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.

Presumptions against undesirable consequences were never intended by a

legislative measure.

SAMPLE CASE:

1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. and the Court of Tax
Appeals

14
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. and the Court of Tax Appeals

G.R. No. 28502-03 April 18, 1989 (172 SCRA 364)

FACTS:

ESSO paid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00 and was accordingly granted a tax credit in this
amount by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in August 1964.

However, ESSO was found to have underpaid its 1960 income tax for an amount of P367,994.00.

In July 1964, the commissioner issued a demand letter for the amount and interest from April 1961
to April 1964.

ESSO paid under protest the alleged amount to be due including the computation of the interest as
reckoned by the Commissioner.

It said that the interest should be computed based only on the net amount of P146,961.00 and not
the tax deficiency of P367,994.00. Thus, ESSO asked for a refund on the interest amounting to
P39,787.94.

The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim. Acting on Appeal, the Court of Tax Appeals
ordered the payment to ESSO of its refund claim.

Hence, this appeal by the Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is entitled to a refund for overpaid interest? (YES)

RULING:

The government already had in its hands the amount of P221,033.00 representing the overpayment.

Whatever obligation that ESSO might subsequently incur in favor of the Government would have to
be reduced by that amount, in respect of which no interest should be charged.

Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to
absurd or unreasonable consequences.

Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the legislative intention so as
to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.

Petition for Review Denied.

15
7. Presumptions against Violation of International Law

Presumption against violation of International Law – this presumption is in conformity with

the declaration of principles and state policies in our Constitution. Art 2, secs 1 and 2, which
reads:

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

For instance,

The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals which was ratified by the Philippine
Government in PD 207.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation in 1961.

16