CASE DIGESTS FOR BASIC LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS CHAPTER 3 – LAWYER’S DUTIES TO THE COURTS

SUPREME COURT, EN BANC

A.C. No. 5161 April 14, 2004
ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

FACTS:
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her
siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein
respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of
land.

In a Complaint-Affidavit filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali
charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres of the following:

(1) The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury
committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear
that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully
well that the same was false.

(2) The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of
complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas
contract worker.

The respondent, on a reconstitution hearing, allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false
testimony in court, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and
circumstances of the case.

The respondent presented the reconstituted deed to the RD to enable them to profit by selling the land

However, the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take
advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-
law.

Investigating Commissioner of IBP suggested disbarment

ISSUE:
W/N ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent, should be disbarred.

HELD:

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The Supreme Court found respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He
must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of
Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty.

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent’s acts or omissions constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or
suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice

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In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo. [A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC]

FACTS:
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya
Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et
al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano
del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these
books to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as
an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and c.
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used
inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works
advocated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

HELD:

No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to
judicial bodies.

No Plagiarism

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another person’s language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as one’s own. The passing off of the work of another as one’s own is thus an
indispensable element of plagiarism.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another
person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

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This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed
decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s
researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del
Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.

But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.

On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313
SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict
rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in
cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.

On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately

According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background
facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme
Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme
Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to
conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.

No Misconduct

Justice Del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud
or corruption.

No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo)

The error of Justice Del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a
highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her
error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise
her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part
cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice Del Castillo was
grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a
long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to
assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the
justice is in control in the writing of the draft.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillo’s researcher also explained, most legal
references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in
internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items
that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a
smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need.

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She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted
these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed
report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general
shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not
fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting
paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief
editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers
use everyday in their work.

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FACTS:

Respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his
Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and
decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had
been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the
months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up
to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.

Judge bonifacio sanz maceda, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, filed an ex-parte
motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court but the Ombudsman denied the motion. Thus, he filed a
petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the
Supreme Court. Maceda contends that he had been granted an extension of 90 days to decide the
aforementioned cases. He also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case since
the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control
and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court

2. Assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

3. Can the Ombudsman subpoena the Supreme Court and its personnel?

HELD:

1. JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE

COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON —
The office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by a judge even
if the charged is unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

2. JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. —

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In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to
his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into
the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by
the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of
the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR

OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. — Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether
said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary
records to make such a determination… In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or
other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman
must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether
said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

3. OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. —

No. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to
submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is
evident in this case. Administratively, the question before us is this: should a judge, having been
granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his
certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this
Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for
appropriate action.

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CASE DIGESTS FOR BASIC LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS CHAPTER 3 – LAWYER’S DUTIES TO THE COURTS

Nestle Phils. V. Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez (minister of labor and employment and the Union of Filipino
Employees) G.R. Nos. 75209, 30 September 1987

FACTS:
The Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union, intensified the intermittent
pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of Padre Faura gate of the SC building.
They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with
food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene. They waved their red streamers and
placards with slogans, and took turns berating the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

On October of the same year, Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipino Employees, had been
called in order that the picketers might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately
since their act constituted direct contempt of court and that the court will not entertain their petitions
as long as the pickets were maintained. Atty. Espinas, apologized to the Court for the above-described
acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated.

The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but
equality a violation of a constitutional right to have (both parties) their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Espinas violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for contempt
of court for the intensified picketing in front of the Supreme Court due to the latter’s alleged delays in
serving justice to his client’s case.

HELD:
No. As provided under Canon11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the Courts and to Judicial Officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.”

Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the
pickets the untenability of their acts and posture

However, the Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and
punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any
case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as
impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."

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It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no
demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the
other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts.

Nestle Phils. V. Sanchez (minister of

labor and employment and the Union
of Filipino Employees)
G.R. Nos. 75209, 30 September 1987
FACTS:
The Union of Filipino Employees and
Kimberly Independent Labor Union ,
intensified the intermittent
pickets they had been conducting
since June 17, 1987 in front of Padre
Faura gate of the SC building.
They constructed provisional shelters
along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen
and littered the place with
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food containers and trash in utter

disregard of proper hygiene. They
waved their red streamers and
placards with slogans, and took turns
berating the court all day long with the
use of loud speakers.
On October of the same year, Atty.
Espinas, counsel of the Union of
Filipino Employees, had been called
in order that the picketers might be
informed that the demonstration must
cease immediately since their
act constituted direct contempt of
court and that the court will not
entertain their petitions as long as the
pickets were maintained.

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The Court En Banc issued a resolution

giving the said unions the opportunity
to withdraw graciously and
requiring the union leaders and their
counsels to appear before the Court
and then and there to SHOW
CAUSE why they should not be held
in contempt of court. Atty. Espinas,
was further required to SHOW
CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in
behalf of the union leaders concerned,
apologized to the Court for the
above-described acts, together with
an assurance that they will not be
repeated. He prayed for the

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Court’s leniency considering that the

picket was actually spearheaded by the
leaders of the “Pagkakaisa
ng Manggagawa sa Timog
Katagalogan” (PAMANTIK), an
unregistered loose alliance in the
Southern
Tagalog , and not by either the Union
of Filipino Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union.
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had
explained to the picketers that any
delay in the resolution of their
cases is usually for causes beyond the
control of the Court and that the
Supreme Court has always
remained steadfast in its role as the
guardian of the Constitution.
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To confirm for the record that the

person cited for contempt fully
understood the reason for the citation
and that they will abide by their
promise that said incident will not be
repeated, the Court required the
respondents to submit a written
manifestation to this effect, which
respondents complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Espinas violated
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for contempt
of court for the intensified picketing in
front of the Supreme Court due to the
latter’s alleged delays in
serving justice to his client’s case.
RULING:
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CASE DIGESTS FOR BASIC LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS CHAPTER 3 – LAWYER’S DUTIES TO THE COURTS

No.
As provided under Canon11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
“A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the Courts and to
Judicial Officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.”
The SC accepted the apology and
explanation of Atty. Espinas and at
this time, forego the imposition of
the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described earlier.
The Court provides : Grievances, if
any, must be ventilated through the
proper channels, that is, through
appropriate petitions, motions or other
pleadings in keeping with the respect
due to the Courts as
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impartial administrators of justice

entitled to "proceed to the disposition
of its business in an orderly

In Re: De Vera, 385 SCRA 285 (2003) A.C. No. 6052 December 11, 2003

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IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM
BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.

FACTS:

According to petitioners, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly
attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder
law. They add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his client’s
funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having
actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention
held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Law.

ISSUES:

Whether to disqualify or qualify respondent De Vera to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao
Region.

HELD: (per issue raised by the petitioners)

Being found guilty of indirect contempt during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder
law referring to the Court’s Decision dated 29 July 2002 in his statements on the Philippine Daily
Inquirer’s circulation. The ruling of the Supreme Court then cannot serve as a basis to consider
respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not
involve moral turpitude.

In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines 46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,4 the Court defines
moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals”. In this
case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion on a public interest issue can be
considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity.

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing
law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court
finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at
the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these
explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who
alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor.

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Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from
Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did
not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED.

FOODSPHERE, INC. v. ATTY. MAURICIO, JR.

(A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009)

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FACTS:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO," filed
a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr. due to the following grounds: (1) grossly
immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating
prosecutors.

On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela
City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives
were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a
colony of worms inside the can.

Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD).
Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.

The Cordero family sued the company for P150,000 for damages, but the companies did not agree to
the demands. The Cordero’s thereafter threatened to resort to the media, if their demands are not met.
Eventually, the Corderos forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the
BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent Atty. Mauricio being the counsel of the
Corderos, acted as a witness who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN.

However, the respondent who is involved in various media productions such as being a writer/columnist
of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television
program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG
BAYAN aired over DZBB. Atty. Mauricio, in many cases utilized these media outlets to place the said
company in a bad light by declaring to the masses the liver spread of worms.

The complainant, then, filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at the time of the
filing of the present administrative complaint.

Despite his receipt of the Order addressed to him to desist from ―further publishing, televising and/or
broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of
vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products, respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out
with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his columns.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, Atty. Mauricio has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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HELD:
Yes. Atty. Mauricio has violated the code of professional responsibility. His recourse to the Media, even
after being told to desist from such was a clear violation of Rule 13.03 of Canon 13, ―A lawyer shall not
make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party‖. His action has put not only the company Foodsphere and CDO in a bad light, but has
also degraded the dignity and authority of the legal system. Besides the above, he has also violated
Canon 1.01 by engaging in deceitful conduct taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance
his own interests, and Canon 8, when he used abusive and offensive language in his dealings.

CANONS violated by the respondent:

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.

Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party."

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

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