CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO

JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

 
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

G.R. No. 217910 September 3, 2019

Jesus Falcis III v Peritio et. al;

Civil Registrar General
FACTS:

Falcis filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

According to him, there is no necessity to limit marriage as only between a man and woman.

Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are supposedly UNCONSTITUTIONAL for:

Article 1 depriving Falcis of his right to liberty without substantive due process of the law; and
Article 2 denying the existence of individuals belonging to religious denominations that believe in same-sex marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere passage of the Family Code create a controversy reviewable by the court.

RULING:

NO. The point at which a legal issue matures into an actual case or controversy is at the pre-occurrence of an overt act.

By the mere enactment of the enactment of the questioned law of the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.

This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently
adjudicate the issues.

Here, no factual antecedents existed prior to the filing of the petition apart from the passage of the Family Code.

Falcis would have the Court impliedly amend all such laws, through a mere declaration of unconstitutionality only two
articles in a single statute.

For instance, the Family Code contains provisions that favor the husband and the wife on certain matters, including the
property relations between spouses.

Falcis has never:

-applied for a marriage license
-visited the [premises of the Civil Registrar or anyone acting under its authority.
-showed that he asked the Civil Registrar General to exercise any kind of discretion

PETITION DISMISSED.
The Court cannot do what Falcis wants without arrogating legislative power unto itself and violating the principle of
separation of powers.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty

AM No. 10-10-4-SC

FACTS:

On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated with
Justice Mariano del Castillo as its ponente.  Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s
counsel on various grounds but most notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case
plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes,
but have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the intent of the original works.
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2)
Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in Internation Law published by the Cambridge
University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International
Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006.  Thereafter, news
regarding the plagiarism by the Supreme Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote
letters to the Chief Justice expressing discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.

On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of
plagiarism by issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University
of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court” signed overall 37 faculty members.   In said article, the faculty expressly gave their
dismay saying that the court had the hopes of relief from those “comfort women” during the war
“crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court
of the Land.” 

In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another
person’s work as one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.”  Hence, it was argued
that since the decision in the Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine,
is allowing dishonesty to be promulgated.  Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the
Vinuya case undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of
the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo.
In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of
words used were such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence of
the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.  Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause on why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating
therein that their intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but rather to
defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the
words used therein as “focusing on constructive action.”  Also, it was alleged that the respondents are
correct in seeking responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus,
rectifying their issuance of the article.  Furthermore, the respondents argued that the article in
question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a democracy, and an exercise
of academic freedom.

ISSUES:
                Whether or Not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons and
Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
Yes.  The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-signatories in the
questioned article is not sufficient in reasoning why they should not be disciplined as members of the
Bar.
“…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language
in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
“On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of
fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.”
“In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on
any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously
propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This
Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the
same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All
lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of
the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the
Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this
sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school
to which they belong.”
The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11
and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate
the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.”
DISSENTING OPINION
Sereno, J.:
                The Court’s act in directing the law professors to furnish the Show Cause Resolution is like the little boy who
exclaimed that the emperor has no clothes in the Danish story be made to explain why he should not be punished for his
keen observation which is an act of prematurely judging them guilty.  The Court’s act of labelling Justice del Castillo’s act
as not plagiarism is what makes this contempt case grave.  It should not be the place of the Court to seek revenge against
those who have the courage to say what is wrong with it. 
The Resolution requiring the Show Cause Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle
that could hardly be characterized as judicious.  This knee-jerk response from the Court stares back at its own face, since
this judicial act is the one that is totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.
 
Carpio, J.:
The Show Cause Resolution by the respondents is sufficient and there is no need to admonish or warn them of the use of
disrespectful language.  The Court adheres to the clear and present danger test and it appears that the evil consequences
of the statements are absent and it does not exhibit that irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even
destroy the courts and their members.  There is only contempt when the article is taken apart, contrary to the practice of
the Court which is to read with contextual care making sure that disparaging statements are not taken out of context.
 C. 8920, 28 September 2011
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI
v
. ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNGA.
 A lawyer who insulted a judge inside a courtroom completely disregardsthe latter’s role, stature and position in our justice system.

FACTS:
On July 24, 2008, during a hearing on the motion for reconsideration of
acase, respondent Atty. Mechor A. Battung acted disrespectfully by shouting while arguing his motion. Petitioner, Judge
Rene Baculi, had advised respondent to tone down his voice but the respondent consistently
kept shouting, evenwhen he was warned that he would be cited for direct contempt. Aftereventually being cited for direct
contempt and was imposed a fine of P100.00, the respondent left.

However, while other cases were being heard, respondent re-entered the court and shouted “Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” He was escorted out of the courtroom and was again cited for direct
contempt for the second time. Respondent also uttered the same lines when he saw petitioner at the hall of the
courthouse afterwards and even challenged the latter to a fight. He was then escorted out of the building.

Based on the tape of the incident and the transcript of stenographic notes, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

Investigative Commissioner Jose dela Rama, Jr. found that the respondent was the one who shouted first at the
complainant, despite the latter’s claim that he was provoked by the
petitioner. The Commissioner further stated that the respondent failed to observe Rule11. 03, Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language orbehaviour before the courts. The IBP Board of
Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Melchor A. Battung is guilty of violating Rule 11.03,Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for insulting a judge in his courtroom.

HELD:

Petition
GRANTED.

The Supreme Court agrees with the finding of the IBP that the respondent did violate Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. By shouting at the petitioner, Atty. Battung clearly disrespected the former in the presence of
litigants and their counsels and court personnel.

Furthermore, the respondent even threatened the judge that he will file a case of gross ignorance of the law against the
latter.  The respondent’s actions are found not only against the person, the position and the stature of petitioner but also
against the court whose proceedings were disrupted. As an officer of the court, it is the duty of Atty. Battung to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts. 

A lawyer who insulted a judge inside a court room completely disregard’s the latter’s role, stature and position in
our justice system. Respects for the courts guarantee the stability of the judicialinstitution and without such, the courts wo
uld be resting on very shakyfoundations and will thus, lose the confidence from the people. By
threateningto a file a case against the judge, Atty. Battung seems to erode publicconfidence in the petitioner’s
competence.

However, incompetence is a matterthat, even if true, should be handled with sensitivity in the manner that is provided

under the Rules of Court, and not how the respondent handled thesituation. 

The respondent’s actions, being scandalous and offensive to theintegrity of the judicial system, clearly showed a violation

of the Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.

G.R. No. 199825 July 26, 2017

Oca vs. Custodio,

Remedial Law
property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter
into or upon such real property, for
the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession
given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful
interference with the processes or
proceedings of a
court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this
Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or
an officer of a court, and acting
as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly
served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue,
of a person or property in the
custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a
court held by him [or her].[119]
(Emphasis
supplied)
Indirect contempt is only punished
after a written petition is filed and an
opportunity to
be heard is given to the party
charged.
 In the case at bar, petitioners
were charged with indirect contempt
through "disobedience
of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a
court."
The wording of the Order is
clear that the amounts do not
pertain only to the
matriculation fees but to all
collectibles, all fees, and all
accounts.
 Regarding petitioners’ defense
that they were denied due
process deserves little
consideration. Petitioners had
attended hearings and had filed
several pleadings showing
that they were given several
opportunities to present their position
on the matter. All these
were considered before the trial court
rendered its orders
Laurita Custodio filed a complaint
against St. Francis School and
petitioner alleging that
petitioner was never qualified to sit
in the Board of Trustees. This case
was dismissed. She
then again filed a complaint against
petitioners for violating the
Corporation Code, seeking to
disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro.
Magbanua as members and trustees
of the school and to declare
their act as President and Treasurer
as void. Custodio then was placed as
administrator of the
school.
The RTC then assigned and
designated a person called Reynante
to collect all fees and
accounts together with Custodio.
Petitioners opposed this order and
refused to turn over the
money that they were holding at the
time.
Custodio filed the Petition to Cite
Respondents in Contempt of Court
under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. The RTC found
petitioners guilt of Indirect Contempt
for failing to comply
with its order.
FACTS:
Laurita Custodio filed a complaint against St. Francis School and petitioner alleging that petitioner was never qualified to
sit in the Board of Trustees.
This case was dismissed. She then again filed a complaint against petitioners for violating the Corporation Code, seeking
to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as members and trustees of the school and to declare their act as President
and Treasurer as void. Custodio then was placed as administrator of the school.
The RTC then assigned and designated a person called Reynante to collect all fees and accounts together with
Custodio. Petitioners opposed this order and refused to turn over the money that they were holding at the time.
Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The RTC found
petitioners guilt of Indirect Contempt for failing to comply with its order.

Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity. It
constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties’ litigant or their witnesses
during litigation.

"All courts are given the inherent power to punish contempt.

This power is an essential necessity to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to enforce the due administration of
justice and the court's mandates, orders, and judgments. It safeguards the respect due to the courts and, consequently,
ensures the stability of the judicial institution.

There are two (2) types of contempt of court:

(i) direct contempt and

(ii) (ii) indirect contempt.

Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before [it]."

It includes:
(i) disrespect to the court,
(ii) offensive behavior against others,
(iii) refusal , despite being lawfully required, to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition.

It can be punished summarily without a hearing.

Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71,Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her] official duties or in his [or her] official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who,
after being dispossessed or ejected from any real

Remedial Law property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt
under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of
a court held by him [or her].[119] (Emphasis supplied)

Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given to the party
charged.

In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court." The wording of the Order is clear that the amounts do not pertain
only to the matriculation fees but to all collectibles, all fees, and all accounts.

Regarding petitioners’ defense that they were denied due process deserves little consideration. Petitioners
had attended hearings and had filed several pleadings showing that they were given several opportunities to present their
position on the matter. All these were considered before the trial court rendered its orders.
GR No. 199825 2017-07-26

BRO. BERNARD OCA v. LAURITA CUSTODIO

Facts:

St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle brothers on July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita
Custodio (Custodio), petitioner Cirila N. Mojica (Cirila), petitioner Josefina Pascual (Josefina), Monsignor Felix Perez, and
Brother Vernon Poore.[7] These five (5) incorporators served as St. Francis School's Board of Trustees until the latter two
(2) passed awa

St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle brothers on July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita
Custodio (Custodio), petitioner Cirila N. Mojica (Cirila), petitioner Josefina Pascual (Josefina), Monsignor Felix Perez, and
Brother Vernon Poore.[7] These five (5) incorporators served as St. Francis School's Board of Trustees until the latter two
(2) passed away
Without a written agreement, the La Salle brothers agreed to give the necessary supervision to establish the school's
academic foundation

Cirila, Josefina, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua wanted to expand the scope of La Salle's supervision to include A matters
relating to the school's finances, administration, and operations

This case was dismissed.[18] Custodio was subsequently removed from the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum
Administrator

Custodio filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal but eventually withdrew her appeal to file a new suit instead

On October 3, 2002, Custodio again filed a complaint against petitioners for violating the Corporation Code

She sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as members and trustees of the school and to declare void all their
acts as President and Treasurer, respectively.

She likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction to enjoin the remaining board
members from holding meetings and to prevent Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua from discharging their functions as
members, trustees, and officers of St. Francis School.

October 8, 2002, the Regional Trial Court heard Custodio's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.[25]

Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002. She alleged that after the hearing for the Temporary
Restraining Order,... the counsel for petitioners went to St. Francis School to instruct several parents not to acknowledge
Custodio's administration as she had been removed... and that her complaint had been dismissed. The parents were also
allegedly directed to pay the students' matriculation fees exclusively to petitioner

This meeting allegedly caused 15 teachers to hold a strike, which nearly disrupted classes and caused parents to request
the early dismissal of their children for fear that violence would ensue.[27] Custodio reiterated her prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order. She moved that the hearing be converted into an injunction hearing or that a status quo order be
issued to allow her to continue functioning as school director and curriculum administrator... the Regional Trial Court
issued an Order designating Reynante to act as school cashier "with authority to collect all fees" and, together with
Custodio, "to pay all accounts."[31] The trial court also directed all parties in the case to submit a report on and to turn
over to Reynante all money previously collected, thu

On February 21, 2003, petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance. They alleged that they partially
complied with the October 21, 2002 Order by submitting an accounting on the tuition fee collections and by turning over to
Reynante a manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64 payable to St. Francis School.[35] The amount allegedly
represented the school's matriculation fees from October to December 2002.[36] However, they alleged that Reynante
refused to accept the check and required that the amount be turned over in cash or in a check payable to cash. Thus,
petitioners placed the check in the custody of the Regional Trial Court for safekeeping

Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that only she and Reynante were authorized to pay the
outstanding accounts of St. Francis School. Petitioners allegedly made salary payments to four (4) employees who had
resigned

On March 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued another Order[41] directing petitioners to fully comply with its earlier
order to submit a report and to turn over to Reynante all the money they had collected:

Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying, among
others, that the trial court issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the amounts which were not covered in
its October 21, 2002 Order.

On August 5, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying all motions raised in petitioners' Manifestation,
Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion and declared that they had not complied with the March 24, 2003 Order:[

La Salle served Custodio a notice dated January 4, 2003, that they were terminating the Memorandum of Agreement with
St. Francis School.
On August 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated
October 9, 2002 and issuing a status quo order[47] allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and
curriculum administrator.[48] The trial court ruled in favor of Custodio when it found that petitioners had already
established another school, the Academy of St. John (Academy of St. John) in Sta. Clara, General Trias, Cavite

Petitioners filed their Motion for Clarification.[51] They alleged that the bulk of the money ordered to be turned over to
Custodio and Reynante was allotted to St. Francis School's teachers' retirement fund. Considering that it must be
preserved, petitioners raised several queries. They wanted to know if Custodio and Reynante would use the money for
other purposes other than for the teachers' retirement benefit and if Custodio and Reynante would be required to file a
bond to guaranty its safekeeping and exclusive use as teacher's retirement compensation. Finally, they asked who would
be held liable in case of Custodio and Reynante's unlawful use of this fund.[

On September 2, 2003, Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court[53] under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.[54] She likewise prayed that an order be issued reiterating the Orders dated October 21, 2002, March 24,
2003, and August 5, 2003.

In response to petitioners' Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued an Order dated October 8, 2003[56] clarifying that
the retirement fund was to be held in trust by Custodio and Reynante. It also directed Custodio and Reynante to file a
bond of P300,000.00 each.[57] Later, it ordered petitioners to comply with the mandate in the March 24, 2003 and August
5, 2003 Orders and directed them to disclose to the court the total amount of the fund deposited and reserved for
teachers' retirement benefit and its bank detail

On October 10, 2003, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals to question the Regional
Trial Court's Orders[60] dated August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. Eventually, this was elevated to this
Court and was docketed as G.R. No. 174996.

Meanwhile, trial commenced for the contempt case. Custodio presented as her lone witness, Joseph Custodio (Joseph),
St. Francis School's finance and property resource development administrator. Petitioners did not present any witness

In its Decision[63] dated February 6, 2008,... found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for failing to comply with the
Orders dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003 and ordered them to jointly and severally pay a fine of P30,000.00

In its May 25, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Decision.[67] It found that it was sufficiently
established that petitioners did not remit all the money they had previously collected despite the trial court's October 21,
2002 Order, which they admitted to be lawfu

The Court of Appeals ruled that defying the trial court orders amounted to contumacious conduct, which "tended to
prejudice St. Francis School's operations due to lack of operational funds.

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in its Resolution dated December 19, 2011.

Petitioners held that to be cited for contempt, the contemnor must be guilty of willful disobedience.[76] However, they did
not disobey the trial court orders.[77] They insisted that they had complied in good faith because the trial court October
21, 2002 Order only pertained to the school's matriculation fees and not any other fees.[78] They claimed that the October
21, 2002 Order was a response to Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which only requested that
the matriculation fees be turned over to Reynante.[79] Thus, they averred that it was reasonable for them to conclude that
the subject of the turnover was the matriculation fees only.[8

In its March 5, 2012 Resolution, this Court denied the Petition on the ground that the issues raised were factual in nature
and petitioners failed to raise any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.[90]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[9

Issues:

First, whether petitioners are guilty of willful disobedience;Second, whether petitioners can refuse to follow the orders of
the Regional Trial Court on the premise that their legality is being questioned in this Court; andFinally, whether Alejandro
N. Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual are equally guilty of indirect contempt despite the fact that they are not parties to the
complaint.

Ruling:

This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect contempt. There is a
contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the Regional Trial Court Orders.

In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court."

The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts do not pertain only to the matriculation fees but to all
collectibles, all fees, and all accounts. It also states that petitioners were to render a report and turn over all the amounts
they had previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees were to be handed over.

This Court finds that the subsequent trial court orders did not unduly expand the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order as
petitioners argue. The October 21, 2002 Order itself already directed that all fees be turned over to Reynante.

Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4) other employees who had already resigned, violating the
court order that only Reynante and Custodio were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts of St. Francis School.
[132]Thus, it cannot be said that Custodio inserted a surreptitious prayer for the turnover of funds not included in the
October 21, 2002 Order. She simply stated that petitioners failed to substantially comply with the October 21, 2002 Order
and specified the other amounts that petitioners needed to turn over.[133] When she prayed for the turnover of the other
amounts, she merely sought petitioners' compliance of the trial court October 21, 2002 Order.

The trial court reiterated this in its March 24, 2003 Order and specified more particularly the amounts that needed to be
remitted.

However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with the March 24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed a
Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying that the trial court exclude the
other amounts, which were allegedly not included in the October 21, 2002 Order

The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion in its August 5, 2003
Order for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC).[137] The trial court noted that
petitioners still had not complied with its March 24, 2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report and turn over
all the money they had collected.[1

Their defense that they were denied due process deserves little consideration. Petitioners had attended hearings and had
filed several pleadings showing that they were given several opportunities to present their position on the matter. All these
were considered before the trial court rendered its orders.

This Court notes that petitioners' justification for refusing to turn over the stated amounts was that, the amounts
constituted teachers' retirement fund, which consequently did not belong to St. Francis School and was not covered by the
assailed Orders.[149] However, the trial court lent credence to Joseph's testimony that the amounts deposited in the
Special Savings Accounts were funds for the operations of the school petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial
court orders just because they opined that they were invalid. It is not for the parties to decide whether they should or
should not comply with a court order. Petitioners did not obtain any injunction to stop the implementation of the trial court
orders nor was there an injunction to prevent the trial court from hearing and ruling on the contempt case.[152] Petitioners'
stubborn refusal cannot be excused just because they were convinced of its invalidity. Their resort to the processes of
questioning the orders does not show that they are in good faith.

Petitioners likewise cannot invoke the principle of judicial courtesy.

n the two (2) cases involved, there are two (2) separate issues. In G.R. No. 174996, the issue was whether the orders of
the trial court were valid. In this indirect contempt case, the issue is whether petitioners willfully disobeyed the orders of
the trial court. Although this Court may find the orders invalid in G.R. No. 174996, the petitioners may still be cited in
contempt for their contumacious refusal and defiance of the trial court orders. Therefore, the finding of indirect contempt
will not render moot this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 174996

In this case, petitioners were given several opportunities to comply with the trial court orders. Even after the trial court
clarified which funds to turn over, they still refused to obey. While petitioners questioned the legality of these orders, they
are immediately executory. Moreover, the parties do not have the power to determine for themselves what should and
should not be excluded from the orders. Their failure to turn over the amounts showed petitioners' defiance and disregard
for the authority of the trial court.

Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other
party."[160] A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a
forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.[

Principles:

Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity.[110] It
constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties['] litigant or their witnesses
during litigation."

All courts are given the inherent power to punish contempt.[112] This power is an essential necessity to preserve order in
judicial proceedings and to enforce the due administration of justice and the court's mandates, orders, and judgments.
[113] It safeguards the respect due to the courts and, consequently, ensures the stability of the judicial institution.

There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and (ii) indirect contempt.

Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before [it]."[117] It includes: (i) disrespect to the court, (ii) offensive behavior against others, (iii) refusal, despite being
lawfully required, to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition. It can be punished
summarily without a hearing.[118]Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her] official duties or in
his [or her] official transactions;(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for
the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a
person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him [or her].

Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given to the party
charged.[120]

In intra-corporate controversies, all orders of the trial court are immediately executory

Questioning the trial court orders does not stay its enforcement or implementation. There is no showing that the trial court
orders were restrained by the appellate court.

Judicial courtesy is exercised by suspending a lower court's proceedings although there is no injunction or an order from a
higher court.[153] The purpose is to avoid mooting the matter raised in the higher court.[154] It is exercised as a matter of
respect and for practical considerations.[1

However, this principle applies only if the continuation of the lower court's proceedings will render moot the issue raised in
the higher court
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other
party."[160] A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a
forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.[161]

This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i) to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its
orders; and (ii) to compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform.[162]

The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are
punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to
preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders.
Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved
is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil
and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in
accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the
summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply
to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular
criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal
proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are
preserved.Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are
proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As
otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party
to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is
one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a
special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the
punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or
criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings . . .In general, civil contempt proceedings
should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be
protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.Contempt is not
presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the
prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption,
although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must
amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt
proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden.

Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court order, judgment, or decree which he or she
refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and the preservation of a right of a private party,
who is the real party in interest in the proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to compel obedience to
the order. Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
necessary to prove it

While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is
more civil than criminal.

The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of the
trial court orders in the intra-corporate controversy because petitioners refused to comply. Hence, this is a civil contempt
case, which does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
only.

A. C. No. 7330 June 14, 2016

Judge Gregorio D Pantanosas, Jr. vs Atty Elly L Pamatong

FACTS:
Atty Pamatong was appearing as counsel in civil case jeard in the court of petitioner, Judge Gregorio Panatanosa.
During one hearing petitioner Judge had supposedly asked respondent to remove his copia ( Headwear worn by Muslims)
while inside the courtroom, to which respondent demurred citing religious grounds and embarrassment because of his
bald pate.
Petitioner Judge obligated but with the warning that he would no longer allow it the next time. Pamatong then filed
a motion for inhibition where he “excoriated” the Judge for supposedly being corrupt. “In my 30 years of law practice, I
never encountered a judge who appears to be as corrupt as you are, thereby giving me the impression that you are
disgrace to the judicial system of the land who does not deserve to be a member of the Philippine Bar at all”, a part of the
lawyer’s motion read.
Pantanosas refuted all of Pamatong’s allegations and denied his motion for inhibition. He also filed a disbarment
complaint against the lawyer before the SC, citing the language he used in his motion.

ISSUE:

WON Atty Pamatong violated the lawyers oath and Code of Professional Responsibility on his statement towards Judge
Pantanosas.

RULING:

That the slanderous remarks cited above were inserted in no less than a public record, i.e., Motion for Inhibition, makes
matters even worse. Even granting that the bribery charges were true, such personal attacks against the person of
complainant Pantanosas should have been reserved for a different forum and certainly not included in a motion filed
before a court of law. To be sure, a lawyer is obliged to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language before
the courts.48 As a supposed officer of the court, such behavior exhibited by respondent Pamatong only serves to betray
his utter lack of reverence towards the courts, which promotes nothing but the degradation of the administration of justice.

The records also disclose that a news article detailing the events that precipitated the bribery charge against complainant
Pantanosas was published on September 15, 2006 with the participation of respondent Pamatong. At the outset, it bears
stressing that lawyers should refrain from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case.49ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Here, respondent Pamatong had no reason to divulge his grievances before the public as he had already lodged a
complaint against complainant Pantanosas with the OCA on September 12, 2006.

After a judicious examination of the records and the submissions of the parties, we find no cogent reason to disagree with
the findings of the IBP in its Resolution dated December 15, 2012.42 

However, we modify the penalty accordingly for the reasons to be discussed below.

It cannot be overemphasized that it is the sworn duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, "not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." 43 It is
precisely for this reason that the Lawyer's Oath enjoins all members of the bar to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts44 in order not to erode the faith and trust of the public in the judiciary.

Moreover, such action by respondent Pamatong of resorting to the press was highly irresponsible and is contrary to his
duty to submit grievances against judges to the proper authorities only. 52 Clearly, respondent Pamatong was motivated
solely by improper motives in connection with the TRO application in Civil Case No. 2006-176.

As regards the recommended penalty of the IBP of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years, we note that, in
similar situations, we had imposed a suspension of less than three (3) years.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be
scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the
Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a
lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts
and trust in judicial administration.

In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to
pursue the client's cause through fair and honest means.
From the foregoing, we therefore deem it proper to reduce the period of suspension from three (3) years, as
recommended, to two (2) years only.

In closing, we find it befitting to reiterate that lawyers have the right, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. 56 However, closely
linked to such rule is the cardinal condition that criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety.57 To that end, the duty of a lawyer to his client's success is wholly subordinate to the administration of
justice.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

True, lawyers must always remain vigilant against unscrupulous officers of the law. However, the purification of our justice
system from venal elements must not come at the expense of decency, and worse, the discrediting of the very system
that it seeks to protect.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Elly L. Pamatong from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of
this Decision. We STERNLY WARN the respondent that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more
severe sanction.
MACAPAGAL VS YOUNG

FACTS:

Judge Macapagal complained about a letter sent by Young before her court in November 2011 implemented the writ of
possession evicting the informal settlers whom the lawyer argued were not actually parties to the case.

In the letter, Young warned: “With all due respect, but much to our regret, we wish to make manifest that we
will be compelled to file an administrative complaint against you before the Office of the Court
Administrator as well as a criminal complaint for ‘knowingly rendering an unjust judgment’ if you should
persist in your stubborn actuation of implementing the writ of possession/writ of demolition against non-
parties to the expropriation case.”

The SC shrugged off Young’s claim that he did not intend to threaten the judge, given the wording of the letter and the
insinuation that she was driven by a “desire to please and gratify” the city mayor.

Young’s admission that he wanted to “courteously warn” Macapagal against acting unfavorably “indubitably demonstrate
how [he] failed to observe the respect due to the Court and to judicial officers,” read the decision penned by Associate
Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa.

“While lawyers have the right, both as officers of the court and as citizens, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges, such criticism, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety,” it added.

ISSUE

WON Atty Young violated CPR for threatening the Judge Macapagal for implementing the writ of possession evicting the
informal settlers whom the respondent argued were not actually parties to the case.

RULING

YES. the Court agrees with the Board that Atty. Young violated Canon 11 of the CPR, it deems it appropriate to lower the
penalty to reprimand, considering that this is his first offense and in view of his advanced age. [42] In determining the
penalty to be imposed, the Court considers the facts and factors which may serve as mitigating circumstances, such as
the respondent's acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, respondent's
advanced age, humanitarian and equitable considerations, among others. [43]
The Supreme Court (SC) has reprimanded abogado Walter Young for threatening Parañaque City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 195 Judge Aida Estrella-Macapagal with criminal and disciplinary cases if she proceeded to implement a
writ of possession and demolition against his informal settler clients.

The SC did not impose a harsher penalty because this was Young’s first offense and because of his advanced age,
feelings of remorse and family circumstances.

In a recent 9-page decision, the SC 2nd Division found Young guilty of violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and issued a stern warning that a repetition of the offense would be dealt with more severely.

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
 
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself
on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its
proferrence. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the
copies.

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse Court processes.

Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess
in the trial, while the witness is still under examination.

Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to
impersonate another.

Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.

Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument,

and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.
 B. Delay in handling a case

A.C. No. 5054/ A.C. No. 6484 March 2, 2021

SOLEDAD NUÑEZ vs ATTY ROMULO L RICAFORT

FACTS:
On different occasions, three different administrative disciplinary complaints were filed against Atty Romulo
Ricafort. All of which involved serious breaches of his fiduciary duties to his clients, in his first administrative case, the
Court took into account his previous case and decided to disbar him. In his third administrative case, the Court considered
the fact that Ricafort practiced law despite his indefinite suspension and once again imposed a disbarment penalty.

In 2019, Ricafort filed a before the SC for Clemency and Compassion. This plea came 17 years after his indefinite
suspension from his first case, and when he was already 70 years old. He stated that he has atoned for his indiscretion.

ISSUE:
Should judicial clemency be granted in favor of Ricafort.

Ruling:
A.C. No. 9919 July 19, 2017

DR. EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR. COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RESPONDENT

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter runs contrary to Canon 1 which
requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 which prohibits the undue delay of a case by
misusing court processes.

FACTS:

Atty. Baclig filed a complaint in representation of Lamorena, et.al against Alicias and Paa before
RTC of Vigan City. It appears, however, that later, an amended complaint for reconveyance,
annulment of deeds and quieting of title was filed by Lamorena, et. al. against Alicias and Paa before
the MTCC in Vigan City. However, it was not Atty. Baclig who acted as counsel in this case.

On May 14, 2013, the complainant filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Baclig
alleging that Atty. Baclig consented to false assertions when his clients allegedly made false
statements in their amended complaint and knowingly filed an action which was already barred
by res judicata and laches.

On the other hand, Atty. Baclig contended that the allegations in the subject complaint contained
absolutely privileged communication, which insulates him from liability. Also, the issues as to
whether or not the assertions in the subject complaint are false statements and whether or not the
RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action are yet to be decided; hence, the
complaint against him holds no water.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Baclig administratively liable

RULING:

Yes. While Atty. Baclig's pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him
as an attorney, it is ruled that he resorted to forum shopping for while the case before the MTCC
was pending, Atty. Baclig consented to the filing of another complaint before another forum, i.e.,
RTC. Such cases deal with the same parties and same reliefs. Thus, a ruling in one case would resolve
the other, and vice versa.

Moreover, regardless of the fact that Atty. Baclig did not act as counsel in the case before the MTC,
it would not exempt him from culpability. Atty. Baclig did not categorically deny the allegations of
complainant regarding the commission of forum shopping. Moreover, it is surprising that he was
able to answer the 10 causes of action raised by complainant, except the issue on forum shopping.
Hence, he is deemed to have admitted that he has knowledge of the pendency of a similar complaint
before the MTC when a complaint before the RTC was filed.

In this regard, We emphasize that the filing of another action concerning the same subject matter
runs contrary to Canon 1 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the CPR. Canon 1 of the CPR requires a
lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 prohibits the undue delay of a case by misusing
court processes.
Facts:
Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the Solano Municipal Jail was charged with the
murder of Renato Suba, a detainee at the Solano Municipal Jail. he Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with
his co-accused, Dela Cruz; Calingayan and others all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering Renato.
The defense adduced that Renato (deceased) hung himself in his detention cell.  Sandiganbayan find the Petitioner guilty
for the crime of murder because Crisostomo as jail guard was in such a position that he could have seen or heard the
killing. 
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Crisostomo for the crime even there is no direct evidence that will
show the participation of Crisostomo on the alleged crime.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
In this case, the prosecution had the burden to prove first, the conspiracy to murder Renato, and second, Crisostomo's
complicity in the conspiracy. The prosecution must prove that Renato's death was not the result of suicide but was
produced by a deliberate intent to kill him with the attendant circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder. Since
Crisostomo had no direct hand in the killing of Renato, the conviction could only be sustained if the murder was carried
out through a conspiracy between Crisostomo and his co-accused, the inmates. It must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt that Crisostomo's action and inaction were all part of a scheme to murder Renato.
The "deafening silence" of all of the accused does not necessarily point to a conspiracy. In the first place, not all of the
accused remained silent. Calingayan put himself on the witness stand. Calingayan further claimed that the Solano police
investigated him and his handwritten statements were taken the morning following Renato's death. Secondly, an accused
has the constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

Crisostomo continues to assail the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. He raises the following issues:

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME OF MURDER CHARGED AGAINST
CRISOSTOMO WHO IS A SENIOR POLICE OFFICER 1 (SPO1) AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
INFORMATION AGAINST HIM.

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION, WHETHER THE

SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT CRISOSTOMO IS GUILTY OF HAVING CONSPIRED IN THE MURDER OF
RENATO DESPITE THE SANDIGANBAYAN'S ADMISSION IN ITS DECISION THAT THERE IS NO DIRECT EVIDENCE
THAT WILL SHOW THE PARTICIPATION OF CRISOSTOMO IN THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. 5

The Court's Ruling

The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. However, the prosecution failed to prove Crisostomo and
Calingayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, we acquit Crisostomo and Calingayan.

Crisostomo's Guilt was not Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Prosecution Failed to Prove Crisostomo's Involvement in the Killing

In convicting Crisostomo, the Sandiganbayan cited the following circumstantial evidence:

1. The deceased, Renato Suba, was brought to the police station on the night of February 13, 1989 for investigation for
allegedly hitting the head of a certain Diosdado Lacangan; and that after investigation, the deceased was brought to the
detention cell (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 5-11).

2. On the following day at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the deceased was visited by his brother, Rizalino Suba; that the
deceased asked his brother to bring him a blanket, toothbrush, clothes and foods (ibid, pp. 13-14).
3. Rizalino Suba left the municipal jail on February 14, 1989, at almost 5:20 p.m., while his other brother, Rolando,
brought the things to the deceased in jail; and that Rolando left their house at about 5:30 p.m. and came back at 6:00
o'clock in which Rizalino asked him (Rolando) if he (Renato Suba) was able to finish the food that he sent and he
answered in the affirmative (ibid, pp. 16, 18-19).

4. At that time, the deceased was in good health and in good condition and that he was not complaining anything about
his body; and that the deceased was then 26 years old, single and had finished advance ROTC and worked in a logging
concession (ibid, pp. 16-18).

5. Accused Mario Calingayan saw the deceased still alive lying down after 6:00 p.m. when he was about to take a bath;
and that after taking a bath, he (witness) went to his cell and played cards with his three (3) cellmates (whose names he
could not recall) for about four (4) hours (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, pp. 16-17).

6. At around 9:00 o'clock of the same day, Mr. Baldovino, a barangay councilman, informed them that they should go to
the municipal building as per request of the policemen; that Rizalino Suba, first asked his uncle David Suba and Manuel
Rollo, a barangay councilman, to accompany him; that they arrived at the municipal building at 9:10 p.m. and they saw
that the deceased was already lying dead on the cement floor outside the cell 1 in the municipal building (tsn, hearing of
April 21, 1994, pp. 20-22).

7. Accused Mario Calingayan was detained with five (5) others at the second cell among four (4) cells in the jail; that the
deceased, Renato Suba, was detained alone at the third cell (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, pp. 6-7).

8. The four (4) cells, although having their own separate doors, made of iron grills and equipped each with a padlock,
were always open; that it was up to them whether to close the doors; that the keys of the padlocks are held by the guard;
and that any detention prisoner could go to any cell inside the prison (ibid, pp. 7-8, 21, 23).

9. There was a common door located in front, leading inside to the cells which no one could enter because it is padlocked,
except with the jail guard's permission; and that the comfort room is located in the 4th cell which is not equipped with a
padlock so that if you want to go to the comfort room, you do not anymore need the key in the office of the jail guard (ibid,
p. 22).

10. There is only one guard assigned in the cells and accused Edgar Crisostomo was the one who was rendering duty at
the time of the death of the victim (ibid, pp. 9, 13).

11. There was no other person who was admitted on February 12, 13 and 14, 1989, and there was no instance when
Suba was brought out of the prison cell from the time he was detained on February 14, 1989 (ibid, p. 29).

12. The persons who were detained together with the deceased at the time of his death were released without any
investigation having been conducted by the local police (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 28-29).

13. The apparent inconsistency in the list of detainees/prisoners dated February 20, 1989 (Exhibit "I") and the police
blotter (Exhibits "J" and "J-1") whereby in the former there were eight prisoners on February 14, 1989 including the victim
but only six were turned over by accused Crisostomo to the incoming jail guard after the death of the victim; the list
contains nine (9) detainees/prisoners on February 15, 1989 which includes the victim, who was then dead, while the
police blotter shows that only six prisoners were under their custody. Why the apparent inconsistency?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

14. Accused Mario Calingayan's claim that he was detained on February 12, 1989, which is contrary to the master list of
detainees showing that he was detained only on February 14, 1989 (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, p. 19).

15. Accused Mario Calingayan's allegation that when Renato Suba was brought outside, he saw that he hanged himself
with a thin blanket (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, pp. 12-13) which was what the policemen also told the brother of the
victim (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 23-24).

16. After the prosecution rested its case and after co-accused Mario Calingayan was finished with his testimony in court,
accused Edgar Crisostomo jumped bail and up to this day had remained at large (Rollo, pp. 297-298, 305).

17. The fact that accused Dominador C. Dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo and Rolando M.
Norberte are also still at-large.26
First, while Crisostomo as jail guard had in his possession the keys to the main door and individual cells, there is no proof
that Crisostomo allowed an outsider inside the prison. Calingayan, the sole witness for the defense, testified that no new
detainee was admitted from 13 to 14 of February 1989. 34 The NBI Report35 relied upon by the Sandiganbayan confirms
Calingayan's testimony that nobody entered the jail and that Renato's only companions inside the jail were the six
inmates.36

There is also no proof that Crisostomo purposely left the individual cells open to allow the inmates to attack Renato who
was alone in the third cell. Calingayan, who was detained ahead of Renato, 37 testified that while each of the four cells had
a padlock, the cells had always been kept open.38 The inmates had always been allowed to enter the cells and it was up to
the inmates to close the doors of the cells.39 The inmates could freely go to the fourth cell, which was the inmates' comfort
room so that they would no longer ask for the key from the jail guard every time the inmates would use the comfort room. 40

Second, the Sandiganbayan should not have absolutely relied on the NBI Report 41 stating that Crisostomo as jail guard
was in such a position that he could have seen or heard the killing. The prosecution failed to establish that
Crisostomo actually saw and heard the killing of Renato.

Based on Calingayan's testimony, it was not impossible for Crisostomo not to have actually seen and heard the killing of
Renato. On cross-examination, Calingayan testified that all of the cells were in one line. 42 Crisostomo's office was at the
left side of the cells about 15 meters away from cell number two, the cell where Calingayan was detained. 43 Hollow blocks
from the floor to the ceiling separated each of the four cells. 44 With the partition, an inmate in one cell could not see what
was happening in the other cells. 45 Calingayan further testified that Renato's body was in a dark place, 46 as it was lighted
from outside only by a bulb "at the alley," "at the corridor." 47

Since Renato's body was found in cell number four, this would make the distance between Crisostomo's office and the
crime scene more than 15 meters. Crisostomo could not have had a full view of cell number four because of the distance
between Crisostomo's office and cell number four, the partitions of the four cells and poor lighting in the jail.

Calingayan's description of the jail, the cells, the location of Renato's body and Crisostomo's actual position was not
contradicted by the prosecution. There is no other evidence on record that describes the layout and conditions of the jail
at the time of Renato's death.

The prosecution had the burden to present evidence that Crisostomo indeed saw and heard Renato's killing and
Crisostomo consented to the killing as part of the plan to kill Renato. The absence of such evidence does not preclude the
possibility that Renato was covertly killed and the sounds were muffled to conceal the crime from Crisostomo, the jail
guard. Or Crisostomo as jail guard was simply negligent in securing the safety of the inmates under his custody. If
Crisostomo were negligent, this would be incompatible with conspiracy because negligence denotes the absence of intent
while conspiracy involves a meeting of the minds to commit a crime. 48 It was the prosecution's burden to limit the
possibilities to only one: that Crisostomo conspired with the inmates to kill Renato. The prosecution failed to do so.

Third, the prosecution was not clear as to the implication of the discrepancies between the list of "detainees/prisoners"
and police blotter to the conspiracy to murder Renato. The prosecution did not even pinpoint which of the two documents
is the accurate document. The prosecution merely asked: why the apparent inconsistency? 49

Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions or
suspicions.50 The inconsistency between the two documents without anything more remains as merely that - an
inconsistency. The inconsistency does not even have any bearing on the prosecution's conspiracy theory. The NBI Report
and Calingayan's testimony stated that six inmates were with Renato inside the jail. This was also the same number of
inmates turned over by Crisostomo to the incoming jail guard after Renato's death. 51

The alleged motive for Renato's killing was to avenge the attack on Lacangan who was then in a serious condition
because Renato hit him on the head with a piece of wood. No evidence was presented to link Crisostomo to Lacangan or
to show what compelling motive made Crisostomo, a jail guard, abandon his duty and instead facilitate the killing of an
inmate under his custody. Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the crime. 52 However,
motive becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or
inconclusive.53 Motive is thus vital in this case.

Clearly, the Sandiganbayan had no basis to convict Crisostomo because the prosecution failed to produce the evidence
necessary to overturn the presumption of innocence. The insufficiency of evidence was the same reason why the National
Police Commission dismissed the administrative case for grave misconduct (murder) against Crisostomo on 24 October
1990.54 The circumstances in this case did not constitute an unbroken chain that would lead to a reasonable conclusion
that Crisostomo played a role in the inmates' supposed preconceived effort to kill Renato. Thus, Crisostomo must be
acquitted.

The "deafening silence" of all of the accused does not necessarily point to a conspiracy. In the first place, not all of the
accused remained silent. Calingayan put himself on the witness stand. Calingayan further claimed that the Solano police
investigated him and his handwritten statements were taken the morning following Renato's death. 55 Secondly, an
accused has the constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.56

A judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. 57 The circumstantial evidence in this case is not sufficient to create a prima facie case to
shift the burden of evidence to Crisostomo. Moreover, Calingayan's testimony inured to Crisostomo's favor. The supposed
waiver of presentation of evidence did not work against Crisostomo because the prosecution failed to prove Crisostomo's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 19780 convicting appellant EDGAR
CRISOSTOMO and co-accused MARIO B. CALINGAYAN is hereby REVERSED. EDGAR CRISOSTOMO and co-
accused MARIO B. CALINGAYAN are ACQUITTED of the crime of murder and ordered immediately released from
prison, unless held for another lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to report to this Court compliance within
five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. No costs.

SPOUSES WILLIAM AND TERESITA ADECER VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL AKUT

(Ac No. 4809, May 3, 2006)

FACTS:

Originally, there was a criminal case in which Spouses, William and Teresita Adecer (complainants) were charges with
committing a crime (Other Deceits) punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Atty. Emmanuel Akut was their legal
counsel in the criminal case. The spouses Adecer accuses Atty. Akul for being negligent.

First, despite Atty. Akut’s receipt of a copy of the Decision and the consequent running of the fifteen (15)-day period to file
a petition for probation, respondent went out of town without contacting complainants to give them proper legal advice.

Furthermore, Atty. Akut’s admission that complainants were [1] under the impression that they first had to pay off their civil
liabilities prior to filing a petition for probation and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) days from their counsel’s
receipt of a copy of the decision to file their petition, proves that Atty. Akut failed to give complainants timely legal advice.

Atty. Akut explained that he was out of his office most of the time because; he and his wife were always out of town
looking for faith healers to cure the malignant brain tumor of his wife, who eventually succumbed to the cancer. Allegedly,
after attending the "important" hearings, he immediately went out of town seeking faith healers. Spouses Adecer were
then imprisoned and while serving sentence filed a administrative case with prayer of disbarment and reimburse them of
expenses with interest and damage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Akut is guilty of negligence?

HELD:
Yes, Atty. Akut failed to exercise the proper diligence in dealing with the case of his clients. Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.02 – A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect alegal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Atty.Akut explained that he was in town to attend some “important hearings” but was out of town most of the time. He also
attempted to deceive the court by stating without qualification that he was out of town, and uttered words that some of his
cases are moreimportant and gave more immediate attention among others. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full
attention, skill, and competence, regardless of his impression that one case or hearing is more important than the other.
Atty. Akut was given a copy of the decision while he was in town. He can addressed his client’s need during that time, he
is primarily responsible for filing the vital pleading that would have made possible for his clients to avail of probation, such
act of omission of

Atty. Akut is a culpable act of negligence for which he must be held liable.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
 
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency
of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, former Senior State Prosecutor | Adm. Case No.
7006 | 9 October 2007
Facts:
Administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5144: People
v. Luis Plaza. Plaza was accused of murdering a policeman. Criminal case was originally raffled to
the sala of Judge Buyser. Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that
evidence presented was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide but not murder.
Counsel for Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail, but Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo (who
was in charge of the case) objected thereto on the ground that the original charge of murder was not
subject to bail (Rules of Court). Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the case because of the
“harsh insinuation” of Bagabuyo that he “lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate” by
allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail.
Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amount of bail at P40,000. Instead of availing of
judicial remediess, Bagabuyo caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting the
bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, “Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out.”
In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is non-bailable, but admitted that a judge
could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is
weak. He claims that the former judge found the evidence to be strong. He stated that he was not
afraid to be cited for contempt because it was the only way for the public to know that there are
judges displaying judicial arrogance.
RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the writer of the article) to explain why he should not be cited for
indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court with its presiding
judge with its lies and misrepresentations. Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him in
contempt of court, sentencing him to 30 days in jail (he posted a bail bond and was released).
Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS and
again, attacked the integrity of Judge Tan. In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan a liar,
ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying
the law.
RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why he should not be held in contempt and be
suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 11.05
and Rule 13.02). Bagabuyo denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that he was
approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order. He justified his response to the
interview (at the instance of his friend) as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of
speech and that it was made without malice.
RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from the practice of law for 1
year. In accordance with the Rules of Court, the case was transmitted to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which recommended the implementation of the RTC’s order of suspension.

Issue:
Was the respondent be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held:
Yes, the respondent was guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Canon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers. Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial
arrogance in the published article and when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law and
that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of the law.

Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities.
Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 when he caused the holding of a press conference and submitted to a
radio interview to air out his grievances against Judge Tan.
Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Bagabuyo violated Rule 13.02 when he
made statements in the article, which were made while Criminal Case No. 5144 was still pending in
court.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath (Lawyer’s Oath), a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. As a senior state
prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and
maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers.

The Court find the Respondent guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a
STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
TERESITA P. FAJARDO,
Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C.
ALVAREZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016
FACTS:
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo
(Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer
of San Leonardo, Nueva
Ecija. She hired respondent Atty.
Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to
defend her in criminal and
administrative cases before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Teresita alleged that
Atty. Alvarez
was then working in the Legal Section
of the National Center for Mental
Health. He asked for
P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.
However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his
appearance before
the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign
any pleadings.
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he
had friends connected with the Office of
the Ombudsman
who could help with dismissing her case
for a certain fee. Atty. Alvarez said that
he needed to
pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his
friends and acquaintances working at the
Office of the
Ombudsman to have the cases against
Teresita dismissed.
However, just two (2) weeks after
Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the
Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution and
decision recommending the filing of a
criminal complaint
against Teresita, and her dismissal from
service, respectively. Teresita then
demanded that Atty.
Alvarez return at least a portion of the
amount she gave. Atty. Alvarez
promised to return the
amount to Teresita; however, he failed
to fulfill this promise. Teresita sent a
demand letter to
Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Alvarez violated the
Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR.
RULING: YES.
We find that respondent violated the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility
when he communicated to or, at the very
least, made it appear to complainant that
he knew
people from the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help them get a
favorable decision in
complainant's case.
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all
times, integrity and dignity in the
practice of their
profession.
Respondent violated the oath he took
when he proposed to gain a favorable
outcome for
complainant's case by resorting to his
influence among staff in the Office
where the case was
pending.
Thus, respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1,
Rules 1.01, and
1.02 prohibit lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
Respondent's act of ensuring that the
case will be dismissed because of his
personal
relationships with officers or employees
in the Office of the Ombudsman is
unlawful and
dishonest. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires
lawyers to always
"uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession."
In relation, Canon 13 mandates that
lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of
his [or her] cause and
refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the
court."
TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016
FACTS:
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva
Ecija.
She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and
administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Teresita alleged that Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for
Mental Health. He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.
However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign
any pleadings. Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee.
Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances
working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita dismissed. However, just
two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her
dismissal from service, respectively. Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a
portion of the amount she gave. Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he
failed to fulfill this promise. Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Alvarez violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR.
RULING: YES. We find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he
knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in
complainant's case.
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their profession.
Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for
complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where the case was
pending.
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02 prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct. Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his
personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and
dishonest.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession."
In relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
court."