MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION

and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL
G.R. No. 122156, 03 February 1997
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
decided to sell through public bidding shares of the Manila Hotel. There were two entities who participated in the
bidding: Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel (MHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy the shares at ₱ 41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the shares at ₱ 44.00 per share. Eventually, MHC
matched the bid price of Renong Berhad at ₱ 44.00 per share. MHC even sent a manager’s check to GSIS which the
latter refused. Apprehensive about the GSIS’ refusal, MHC filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the
Supreme Court.
MHC invokes Paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (commonly known as the “Filipino First
Policy”) where it states that in grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. In the same vein, MHC submits that Manila Hotel
has become a part of the national patrimony for its importance in the national Filipino heritage. Also, the ownership
of shares by the GSIS shows that they are engaged in the hotel business, which makes them part of the national
economy. Thus, the aforementioned constitutional provision can be invoked. Further, MHC should be considered
the preferred bidder since the bidding rules provide that the shares must be awarded to qualified bidders in case
the highest bidder cannot be awarded the same, provided that the qualified bidders matched the highest bid.
On the other hand, GSIS maintains that Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution cannot be invoked because it is
not self-executing and would require an implementing legislation. Granting that the said provision is self-executing,
the Manila Hotel cannot be considered a part of the national patrimony because it only refers to lands of public
domain, waters, minerals, etc. Further, granting that Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, GSIS is not
selling its land or the building, but its shares of ownership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution may be invoked as a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not Manila Hotel can be considered part of the national patrimony in order for the aforementioned
provision to be applicable.
RULING
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It admits that a provision which lays down the basic principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, the Court also held that a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without aid of an enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus, a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature or extent of right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is mandatory, positive command, which is
complete in itself and requires not further implementing laws for its enforcement. Thus, it may be invoked by MHC
in the present case.
2. The Court also ruled in the affirmative. It held that national patrimony includes the national resources of the
Philippines, which necessarily includes those which are considered cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Since, Manila
Hotel itself has become a landmark of many events in the Philippine history, with its existence impressed with public
interest. Thus, the contested constitutional provision is applicable.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
GSIS, MHC, Committee on Privatization, and the Office of Government Corporate Counsel were directed to CEASE
and DESIST the selling of shares to Renong Berhad, and to ACCEPT the matching offer of Manila Prince Hotel Corp.
[CASE DIGEST] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (G.R. No. 133250)
July 9, 2002

FACTS:

Through PD No. 1084, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was tasked by former president and dictator Ferdinand
Marcos, to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell
any and all kinds of lands. As a result, an amendment was made on a previous contract with Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). Prior to PEA, CDCP was tasked to reclaim certain forshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The amended contract now directed CDCP to transfer to PEA all the development
rights, title, interest and partitipation of CDCP in the reclamation.

Under former President Cory Aquino, titles of parcels of land reclaimed under Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) were transferred to PEA. These covered three reclaimed islands known as the
“Freedom Islands.”

PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to develop the Freedom
Islands, notably the reclamation of an additional 250 ha of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete
the plan. The JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding. Former President Fidel Ramos then
approved the JVA.

Controvery broke out when then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denouced the JVA as the grandmother of all
scams. The Senate conducted a joint investigation and concluded that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands. Moreover, the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands were
void, and that the JVA itself was illegal.
In his capacity as taxpayer, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He argued that the government will lose billions of
pesos in the JVA. He sought for the public disclosure of the renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Constitutional right of
the people to information on matters of public concern.

He also alleged that the JVA is against the Constitutional prohibition on the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to public corporations.

A year after the filing of the petition, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA).
Former President Estrada signed the Amended JVA.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the amended JVA violates the Constitution. -- YES.

2. Whether information on ongoing negotiations may be disclosed to the public. -- NO.

HELD:
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157. 84 ha have been reclaimed. The rest are still
submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Under the agreement, AMARI will shoulder the reclamation of the
freedom island and it will get 70% of the usable area. AMARI wil acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 ha of
reclaimed land wich will be titled in its name.

PD No 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or
concession to qualified parties.

However, at this time, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass after PEA
had already reclaimed it. However, the additional 592.15 ha are still submerged and forming part of the Manila Bay.
There is also no legislative or presidential act regarding these remaining areas.

Also, the mere physical act of reclamation of PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. It still needs the
authorization of DENR, which classifies lands of public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the
President’s approval.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of
the public domain.

PEA is also mandated to call for a public bidding. Only if this failed that a negotiated sale is allowed. The failure of
the public bidding involving only 407.84 ha is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 ha.

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot
acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Ownership of PEA of the said lands of public domain does not convert them to private lands. Jurisprudence holding
that there is conversion to private land upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title does not
apply to government units like PEA.

The rationale behind ban on corporation acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of public domain is to
equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm" and to
prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings spawn social unrest. In practice, this ban
strengthens limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area by simply stting up a corporation to
acquire more land.
On the right to information:
The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of
powers. In this case, the information demanded by Chavez is privileged information rooted in the separation of
powers.
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FRENZEL v. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
Ponente: J. CALLEJO Sr.

Doctrine: Void for being against public policy; - a contract which violates the Constitution and the
laws is void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It does not produce any legal effect.
FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent who was
married to Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for New Guinea Airlines. On the
other hand, private respondent Ederlina P. Catito was married to Klaus Muller, a German national.
She worked as a masseuse in the King’s Cross nightclub in Sydney, Australia. The two met when
Alfred went on a vacation in Sydney. They met again and this time, Alfred was able to convince
Ederlina to stop working and to go back to the Philippines. When she returned to the Philippines,
she was given money by Alfred to put up a beauty salon. Later on, he also gave money to her to
be able to purchase a house and lot in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Since he was
aware that aliens were prohibited to purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina as the sole
vendee. Later also, they opened two bank accounts with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. In addition, there were subsequent purchases of other real
and personal properties. These were made on the anticipation on the part of Alfred that he and
Ederlina will get married soon. However, this failed to materialize because of the fact that Ederlina
was still married to Klaus. Ederlina failed to secure a divorce from Klaus. This exasperated Alfred
and eventually their relationship started to fade. Thus, Alfred filed a complaint before the RTC of
Davao City for recovery of real and personal properties. He demanded from Ederlina that she
return all the money that were used to purchase the properties and also the properties which were
bought, especially the house and lot and three other lots. However, the complaint of Alfred was
dismissed by the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfred is entitled to recover the said properties.
RULING: No.
The contention of petitioner Frenzel that to bar him from recovering the properties would be in
violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment holds no water. It must be
remembered that a contract which violates the Constitution and the laws is void and vests no
rights and creates no obligations. It does not produce any legal effect. His

reliance on Article 22 is misplaced because in this case, the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or the parties are in pari delicto. This is founded on the general principles of public
policy. It must be remembered that Alfred knew all along that he was disqualified from purchasing
lands. His contention that he entered into the transaction because he was expecting that he and
Ederlina will get married in the future is not a valid one. He also knew that he cannot get married
to Ederlina because he still had a valid existing marriage with Teresita Santos
G.R. No. 166097 July 14, 2008
BOARD OF MEDICINE, DR. RAUL FLORES (now DR. JOSE S. RAMIREZ), in his capacity as Chairman of the
Board, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, through its Chairman, HERMOGENES POBRE (now
DR. ALCESTIS M. GUIANG), Petitioners,
vs.
YASUYUKI OTA, Respondent.

FACTS:
Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national with a medical degree, sought a license to practice medicine in the
Philippines. Despite meeting requirements and submitting proof of reciprocity with Japan, the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) denied his application. Ota filed a petition alleging arbitrary action by the
PRC and the Board of Medicine, asserting a violation of the Medical Act of 1959. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ruled in Ota's favor, stating that he complied with Japanese laws, and the PRC had a ministerial duty
to issue the license. The PRC and the Board appealed, arguing lack of practical reciprocity proof and
discretionary nature of their regulatory power. The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent has the right to practice medicine in the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical boardexaminations, merely
requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusivedocumentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his country’s existing laws permit citizens of the
Philippines to practice medicine under thesame rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. Nowhere
in said statutes is it stated thatthe foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of
medicine in said countryare practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be
proven that aFilipino has been granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said country
beforea foreign applicant may be given license to practice in the Philippines. It is enough that thelaws in
the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiringrespondent to prove first
that a Filipino has already been granted license and is actuallypracticing therein unduly expands
the requirements provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D.No. 223
g.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO

OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

FACTS:
A Demolition Notice, signed by one of the petitioners, was received by the private respondents, officers
and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association Incorporated. They only had three (3) days within
which to vacate the premises in question in order to make way for a “People’s Park.” Respondents thus
filed a letter complaint with the CHR asking the Commission to stop the demolition. The CHR ordered the
petitioners to desist from demolishing said stalls pending the resolution of the CHR as regards the
complaint filed by the respondents. The Commission also ordered the disbursement of financial assistance
to those affected. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss with the CHR, questioning the latter’s
jurisdiction. The CHR subsequently cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition despite
the order to desist. The CHR also denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and their subsequent motion for
reconsideration. The petitioners thus filed a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a TRO and PI with the
Supreme Court which was initially dismissed but was subsequently reinstated wherein the SC also issued
a TRO against CHR. The SC ruled that the CHR was not intended by the Constitutional Commission to be
a quasi-judicial body. The SC revisited the records of the ConCom and held that the definition of human
rights that was to be covered by the CHR are those that pertain to civil and political rights, and not the
broad definition of human rights that the CHR claims to have jurisdiction over (i.e. business rights, right to
just wage…etc.), as the CHR was instituted primarily in response to the atrocities committed during the
Marcos regime. The SC also added that the constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures should not be construed to confer jurisdiction on it to issue a restraining order or writ
of injunction (“resolution to desist demolition”) – these should be sought by the CHR from the proper
courts. Lastly, the CHR does have jurisdiction to cite petitioners in contempt, but is only applicable to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules.
DOCTRINE
On the mode of judicial review of Prohibition, The SC held that prohibition is not moot simply because the
hearings in the proceedings sought to be restrained have been terminated where resolution of the issues
raised still to be promulgated. The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 901580) has already
been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy
for an act already accomplished. Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its
resolution in CHR Case No. 901580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also
prevent CHR from precisely doing that. On the Commission on Human Rights Jurisdiction Section 18,
Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to
“investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights” (Sec. 1). The Constitutional Commission delegates however, envisioned a Commission on
Humans Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations,
particularly those that pertain to civil and political rights
1. The delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the
CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that “Congress
may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation.” In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the
order for the demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia of the private respondents cannot fall
within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights” intended by the
Constitution. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules
of Court.” Accordingly in this case, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its
power “to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court.”

1 The following were the various and specific civil and political rights that the delegates mentioned in the
ConCom while discussing the provision creating the CHR: freedom from political detention and arrest,
prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearances, salvagings,
hamlettings and collective violations.

The CHR contempt power, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify,
the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said
body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in
pursuing its investigative work. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued ‘by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. FACTS 1. 9
July 1990 - A “Demolition Notice” signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor was sent to the private respondents, the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated. a. In the notice, the respondents were given a grace period of 3 days to vacate
the questioned premises of North EDSA
2. Prior to the notice, the private respondents were already informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stall
will be removed to give way to a “People’s Park.”
3. The private respondents’ group thus filed a letter-complaint with the Commission on Human Rights
against the petitioners. a. They asked the CHR to send a letter to Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. of Quezon City
to stop the demolition.
4. 23 July 1990 - the CHR issued an order directing the petitioners to “desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution…of the complaint…” and ordered the petitioners to appear
before the CHR.
5. 1 August 1990 - convinced that the petitioners carried out the demolition and based on CHR’s own
ocular inspection, the CHR ordered in its resolution on the said date the disbursement of financial
assistance of not more than PHP 200,000 in favor of the private respondents and again directed petitioners
to desist from further demolition with the warning that the CHR will cite them in contempt if they violate the
same
6. 10 September 1990 - Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with the CHR, questioning the latter’s
jurisdiction as well as the following allegations: a. The case came about due to the alleged violation by the
petitioners of the Interagency Memorandum of Agreement where Metro Manila mayors agreed on a
moratorium on the demolition of the dwellings of POOR dwellers in Metro Manila; b. The said agreement
revealed that the moratorium referred is a moratorium on the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
c. The complainants ARE NOT poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs and even the CHR
admitted that the complainants are indeed vendors; d. That the complainants were occupying government
land, particularly the EDSA corner North Avenue sidewalk; e. That the mayor of Quezon City had the sole
and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a business establishment should be allowed to
operate based on law and ordinances; and f. The petitioners also manifested that they would bring the
case to court.
7. The supplemental MTD of the petitioners contained the statement that the CHR’s authority should be
understood as being confined to only the investigation of violations of CIVIL AND POLITICAL rights and
that “the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil nor political rights but their privilege to engage
in business”
8. 25 September 1990 - the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition and
imposed a PHP 500.00 fine on each of them.
9. 1 March 1991 - the CHR issued an order denying petitioners’ MTD and supplemental MTD where the
CHR opined that it was not the intention of the Con Com to create only a paper tiger limited to only
investigating civil and political rights but that it should be considered a quasi-judicial body equipped with
the proper legal measures for the protection of human rights
10. Anent this, the CHR also added that “the right to earn a living is a right essential to one’s right to
development, to life and to dignity…”
11. 25 April 1991 - the CHR also denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
12. Thus the petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a TRO and PI with the Supreme Court
which was initially dismissed but was subsequently reinstated wherein the SC also issued a TRO against
CHR, directing them to CEASE and DESIST from further hearing the assailed resolution.
ISSUES AND RULING

WHETHER OR NOT THE CHR HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

THE BUSINESS RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS.
NO. The powers and functions of the Commission on Human Rights are defined by the 1987 Constitution 2
and the SC disagrees the claim of the CHR that the intention of the members of the ConCom is to make
CHR a quasi-judicial body, nor in the CHR’s claim that the human rights it seeks to protect are broad in
scope. 

Carino v. CHR: “xxx the CHR xxx was not meant by fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency xxx. The most that may be conceded xxx in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil
and political rights.” The Court held that this cannot be likened to a judicial function of a court of justice or
even a quasijudicial agency. The Court also determined what the ConCom meant of the term “human
rights” in the constitutional provision instituting the CHR. o Based on a symposium on human rights in the
PH sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, the scope of the term “human rights” can be
understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social, economic, cultural, political, and civil
relations, however, the Court concluded that not all these broad concepts were contemplated by the
framers of the Constitution in creating the CHR  Mr. Garcia: “xxx otherwise, if we cover such a wide
territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task xxx”  Garcia also stated that
only those that pertain to civil and political rights were to be considered in the provision, in response to the
Marcos regime atrocities.  He also identified six areas where this CHR would act effectively:  Protection
of rights of political detainees  Treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures  Fair and public trials
 Cases of disappearances  Salvagings and hamletting  Other crimes committed against the religious o
Thus the final outcome is a provision empowering the CHR to “investigate on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights  Civil rights have been
defined as those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or in a wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government.  Political rights
are said to refer to the right to participate directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right o hold public office, the right of petition and in general the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-à-vis the management of government.
The Court concludes that the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation.” In this case, the Supreme
Court concluded that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia of 2
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violation involving civil
and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10) Appoints its officers and employees in accordance with law;
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

the private respondents cannot fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and
political rights” intended by the Constitution. The Court also took judicial notice of the fact that the vendors
were on a busy national highway and there is a consequent danger to life and limb that cannot be ignored.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CHR HAS JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE A FINE ON/ CITE IN CONTEMPT THE
PETITIONERS.
YES with reservations. The CHR is constitutionally authorized to adopt its own guidelines and rules and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the ROC. However, this power to cite in
contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigative powers.

The power to cite in contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the CHR
or against those who unduly withhold relevant information or decline to honor summons etc. in pursuing its
investigative work.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CHR HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE “ORDER TO DESIST.”
NO. The Court considers the “order to desist” as a semantic interplay for a restraining order which is NOT
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that the CHR does not possess.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. CHR, it has been held that the constitutional provision directing the
CHR to “provide preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged xxx” may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for if that
were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. As has been repeatedly held, jurisdiction
is conferred by law. Not being a court of justice, the CHR has no jurisdiction to issue such writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order may only be issued by the judge of any court in which the action
is pending or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS HAS BECOME
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
NO. It is true that a prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain and not intended to provide a remedy for
an act already accomplished. However, the Commission in this case has yet to promulgate its resolution in
the assailed case. Thus this petition has been intended, among other things, precisely to prevent the CHR
from doing that.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CHR HAS JURISDICTION TO DISBURSE AN AMOUNT AS FINANCIAL AID
TO THE VENDORS. This is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus
standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with
the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

DISPOSITIVE WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on
Human Rights is hereby PROHIBITED from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 901580 and from
implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this
Court is made permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED

DISSENTING OPINION: PADILLA, J. Justice Padilla is of the opinion that the threatened demolition was a
prima facie case of human rights violation because in involves an impairment of the civil rights of the
respondents. Thus, he is of the opinion that: 

The CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain the status quo pending its investigation of a case
involving an alleged human rights violation

That such order may be necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights which the
CHR intends to investigate. The threatened demolition of the stalls as well as the temporary shanties
owned by private respondents are prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves the
impairment of civil rights of said respondents. Human rights demand more than lip service and thus
positive action and results are what count. He submits that the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look
into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE,

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN RODOLFO P.
DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R. POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T.
FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO P.
NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R. RAQUENO,
MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D. SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER,
MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T. MENDOZA,
FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS,
SALLY B. BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S.
ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS,
ACHILLES J. PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA S.
GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL
I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO, FEDERICO L. CASTILLO,
MELITA J. CAÑEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D.
FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA
G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H. CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L.
CUE, EVELYN C. CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N.
EDDING, VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA,
NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS, PERCIVAL
H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA
P. UNICA, respondents.

DECISION

FACTS: Respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine. They passed the Physician
Licensure Examination conducted in Feb. of 1993 by the Board of Medicine. Petitioner PRC then released
their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly, the Board observed
that the grades of the 79 successful examinees from Fatima college in the 2 most difficult subjects in the
medical licensure exam (Bio-chem & OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high: 11 Fatima
examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and 10 got 100% in OB-Gyne; and another 11 got 99% in Bio-
Chem, and 21 scored 99& in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from
Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got marks of lower than 90%. This was a
record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. In June 1993, the
Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physician of all the examinees from the
Fatima College. The PRC asked the Fr. Beinvenido Nebres, an expert mathematician and authority in
statistics and the NBI to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in the subjects and to investigate
whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the Feb. 1993 examination, respectively. Fr. Nebres reported
that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to
each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the
2 subjects. On the other hand, the NBI reported “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees leads
to the conclusion that they gained early access to the test questions.” On July 5, 1993, respondents filed a
special civil action (SCA) for mandamus, with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (PMI) with the
RTC. Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, charging respondents with “immorality, dishonest
conduct, fraud, and deceit” in connection with the 2 subjects. It recommended that the tests results of
respondents be nullified. The RTC issued granted the PMI and ordered the petitioners to administer the
physician’s oath to respondents and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC. Petitioners then filed a SCA
for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the petition and nullified and set aside the writ of PMI.
Respondents then elevated the case to the SC. To prevent the PRC from proceeding with the
administrative case, the respondents moved for the issuance of a TRO, which the lower court granted. The
petitioners’ then filed with the SC, which referred the matter to the CA, a petition for certiorari to annul the
orders of the trial court. The CA granted the TRO. The appellate court rationated that the respondents
complied with all the statutory requirements for admission in to the licensure examination for physicians in
Feb. 1993.

ISSUE: WON the respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus.

HELD: No!
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
 whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. Sec. 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
outlines 2 situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a rights or
office to which the other is entitled. On the existence of a duty of the Board of Medicine to Issue
Certificates of Registration as Physicians under RA 2382. For mandamus to prosper, there must be a
showing that the officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.
Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the performance of the

G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986

DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as President of National
University, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.

Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.

FACTS:

Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU) barred them from
enrolling in the said university.

NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was alleged that,
Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises;
that such mass actions were violative of school policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred
bad grades;
that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll;
that it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners were denied due process by the school.

HELD:

YES. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which school policies
or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled from. NU failed to show
that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial-type one) to determine Guzman et al’s
liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.

Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to freely
choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al
were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except
for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and
only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed a sanction upon the students
without due investigation – such act is illegal.

The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process, and these are:

1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.