GENERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION

LITERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION

A statute often contains a "definitions" section, which explicitly defines the most important terms used in that statute.
However, some statutes omit a definitions section entirely, or fail to define a particular term. The literal rule, which
is also known as the plain meaning rule, attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a
term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself. According to this rule, when a
word does not contain any definition in a statute, it must be given its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning. If the
word is clear, it must be applied, even though the intention of the legislature may have been different or the result is
harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of what the law means. This is the oldest of the
rules of construction and is still used today, primarily because judges are not supposed to legislate. As there is
always the danger that a particular interpretation may be the equivalent of making law, some judges prefer to adhere
to the law's literal wording. When the words of a Statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably
susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences.
MISCHIEF RULE

Judges in statutory interpretation use the Mischief Rule in order to discover legislature's intention. It essentially asks the
question: By creating an Act of Parliament what was the "mischief" that the previous or existing law did not cover
and this act covers. Lord Coke in Sir John Heydon’s Case developed this rule, 1584, where it was stated that there
were four points to be taken into consideration when interpreting a statute:

1. What was the common law before the making of the act?
2. What was the "mischief or defect" for which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
4. What is the true reason of the remedy?

The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to
effectively decide on Parliament's intent. Legislative intent is determined by examining secondary sources,
such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding statutes. The rule was further
illustrated in the case of Smith v Hughes, 1960, where under the Street Offences Act 1959, it was a crime for
prostitutes to "loiter or solicit in the street for the purposes of prostitution". The defendants were calling to men in
the street from balconies and tapping on windows. They claimed they were not guilty as they were not in the
"street." The judge applied the mischief rule to come to the conclusion that they were guilty as the intention of the
Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes.

This rule is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning rule, in that it can only be used
to interpret a statute and only when the statute was passed to remedy a defect in the common law. This rule
has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule cannot be applied. As seen In Smith v
Hughes, the mischief approach gave a more sensible outcome than that of the literal approach.

Advantages
1. The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to the Golden or Literal
rules.
2. It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.

Disadvantages

1. It is seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common law was the primary source of
law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.
2. It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary, which is argued to be undemocratic.
3. In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king and were therefore well qualified in
what mischief the act was meant to remedy, however, such is not the case any more.

GOLDEN RULE
This rule of statutory interpretation allows a shift from the ordinary sense of a word(s) if the overall content of the document
demands it. This rule is a modification of the literal rule. It states that if the literal rule produces an absurdity, then
the court should look for another meaning of the words to avoid that absurd result. The grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute as it allows to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words
used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be
collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case it allows the
language to be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience. 

This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where there is some ambiguity
or absurdity in the words themselves. For example, imagine there may be a sign saying, "Do not use lifts in case of
fire." Under the literal interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However,
this would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously to prevent people from
using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby. This was illustrated in the case of  Lee vs Knapp 1967
QB where the interpretation of the word "stop" was involved. Under Road Traffic Act, 1960, a person causing an
accident "shall stop" after the accident. In this case, the driver stopped after causing the accident and then drove off.
It was held that the literal interpretation of the word stop is absurd and that the requirement under the act was not
fulfilled because the driver did not stop for a reasonable time so that interested parties can make inquiries from him
about the accident.

The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to principles of public
policy, even where words have only one meaning. Bedford vs Bedford, 1935, is another interesting case that
highlighted the use of this rule. It concerned a case where a son murdered his mother and committed suicide. The
courts were required to rule on who then inherited the estate, the mother's family, or the son's descendants. The
mother had not made a will and under the Administration of Justice Act 1925 her next of kin, i.e. her son, would
inherit her estate. There was no ambiguity in the words of the Act, but the court was not prepared to let the son who
had murdered his mother benefit from his crime. It was held that the literal rule should not apply and that the golden
 rule should be used to prevent the repugnant situation of the son inheriting. The court held that if the son inherits the
estate that would amount to profiting from a crime and that would be repugnant to the act. 

Thus, the Golden rule implies that if a strict interpretation of a statute would lead to an absurd result then the
meaning of the words should be so construed so as to lead to the avoidance of such absurdity. A further corollary to
this rule is that in case there are multiple constructions to effect the Golden rule the one, which favors the assessee,
should always be taken. This rule is also known as the Rule of Reasonable Construction. 
Advantages

1. This rule prevents absurd results in some cases containing situations that are completely unimagined by the
lawmakers.
2. It focuses on imparting justice instead of blindly enforcing the law.

Disadvantages

1. The golden rule provides no clear means to test the existence or extent of an absurdity. It seems to depend on the
result of each individual case. Whilst the golden rule has the advantage of avoiding absurdities, it therefore has the
disadvantage that no test exists to determine what is an absurdity.
2. This rule tends to let the judiciary overpower the legislature by applying its own standards of what is absurd and
what it not.

PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
The purposive approach focuses on what Parliament intended when passing the new law. The purposive approach: the court
looks at the purpose of the statute and interprets the words to bring about that purpose.

In the case of Jones v Tower Boot Co. (1997), the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the physical and verbal abuse of a
young black worker by his workmates fell within ‘the course of employment’ under Section 32 of the Race Relations Act
1976. The employer had argued that these actions fell outside the course of the workmate’s employment, because such
behavior was not part of their job. The Employment Appeal Tribunal could not therefore be held responsible to the young
black worker for his workmate’s behavior. The Court of Appeal using the purposive approach to interpret Section 32
reversed this decision. Parliament’s intention when enacting the Race Relations Act was to eliminate discrimination in the
workplace and this would not be achieved by applying a narrow construction to the wording.

The purposive approach provides scope for judicial law making because the judge is allowed to decide what he/she thinks
Parliament intended the Act to say rather than what the Act actually says.

TEXTUALISM
Textualism is a theory of statutory interpretation that holds that a statue's original meaning as evidenced in its text should
govern how judges interpret the statute, as opposed to alternative methods of statutory interpretation such as inquiring into
historical sources in attempt to discover the intent of the legislative body that approved the statute.
Textualism is consistent with the Plain Meaning Rule, which says that interpreters of statutes ought to interpret what a
statute says according to its "plain meaning".
"Textualism" can also refer to a set of practical techniques used by some noted jurists to nail down the meaning of a statute
through close consideration of its text.

CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
The contextual approach to statutory interpretation requires the court to consider a broad range of factors such as the text of
the provision to be interpreted, the legislative scheme within which the provision appears and other indicia of legislative
intent. If the various factors point to differing conclusions the court must weigh the competing factors and test possible
interpretations against plausibility, efficacy and acceptability.
PRINCIPLES OF HARMONIUS CONSTRUCTION
Generalia Specialibus non-derogant
Where there is a special provision specifically dealing with a subject, a general provision, howsoever widely worded must
yield to the former.  This principle is expressed by the maxim Generalia Specialibus non-derogant. 

The Supreme Court in Venkataramana Devaru Vs State of Mysore, AIR 1958, applied the aforesaid rule of construction. In
that case the Supreme Court applied the rule to resolve conflict between Article 25 (2)(b) and 26 (b) of the Constitution. It
was held that the right of every religious denomination or any Section thereof to manage its own affairs in matter of religion
is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institution of
a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. 

In State of Gujarat Vs. Ramji Bhai, AIR 1979 Supreme Court taking note of the principle observed as follows:
“Generalia Specialibus non derogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It means that the general provisions must
always yield to the special provisions.” 

Thus, it is well settled that if a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general
provision. In the event of conflict between a general and a special provision, the latter must prevail. Differently stated the
principle is that general words in a Statute should not be held to repeal or rip up a specific provision upon a particular
matter. A general rule though stated in wide terms must be taken to be not interfering with matters covered by a special
provision. 

Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat

This rule furthers to establish that Court shall presume the constitutionality of a provision and prefers an interpretation in
favour of the competence of the legislature or other authority laying down a rule of law. Linguistically, this Latin maxim
suggests: That the thing may rather have effect than destroyed.
Avtar Singh vs State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 1107 166 - Appellant was convicted of theft of electricity under Section 39
of Electricity Act, 1990. He contented that the proceeding were illegal because they were not initiated by any of the persons
as mandated by Section 50 of the act. It was held that under this principle, the requirement of Section 50 should be given
effect.

Corporation of Calcutta vs Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 661 170 -

Under a. 413 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, no person shall without a license granted by the Corporation of Calcutta,
keep open any cinema house for public amusement in Calcutta. Under s. 548(2), for every license under the Act, a fee may
be charged at such rate as may from time to time be fixed by the Corporation. In 1948, the appellant (Corporation) fixed fees
on the basis of annual valuation of the cinema house. The respondent, who was the owner and licensee of a cinema theater,
had been paying a license fee of Rs. 400 per year on that basis. In 1958, the appellant, by a Resolution, changed the basis of
assessment of the fee.

Under the new method the fee was to be assessed at rates prescribed per show according to the sanctioned seating capacity
of the cinema house; and the respondent had to pay a fee of Rs. 6,000 per year. The respondent, therefore moved the High
Court for the issue of a writ quashing the resolution and the application was allowed.

In the appeal to the Supreme Court the appellant contended that (i) the levy was a tax and not a fee in return for services and
(ii) Section 548(2) does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation; While the respondent contended that (i) the levy
was a fee in return for services to be rendered and not a tax, and as it was not commensurate with the costs incurred by the
Corporation in providing the services, the levy was invalid; (ii) if s. 548 authorized the levy of a tax, as distinct from a fee in
return for service rendered, it was invalid, as it amounted to an illegal delegation of legislative functions to the appellant to
fix the amount of a tax without any guidance for the purpose and (iii) the levy was invalid as violating Article 19(1) (f) and
(g) of the Constitution.

HELD:

(i) The charge was not a fee but a tax.

(ii) The word "fee" in s. 548 must be read as referring to a tax as any other reading would make the section
invalid, and in interpreting a statute; it ought to be made valid if possible. 
(iii) While interpreting any provision/law if there are two interpretations possible: one which is intra vires
while another which is ultra vires, then former interpretations shall always prevail over the latter.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

This maxim is given to gauge the intent of the legislature. If the words of the Statute are plain and its meaning is clear then
there is no scope for applying the rule.
This rule applies when a provision is clearly set out which is in contrast with the other provision, which is not clearly set out
in the statute. Were both the provisions clearly set out in the statute then harmonious construction had to be applied. To
elaborate further on this, look into Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh. In the preceding judgment, question before the
Supreme Court was whether the Tribunal could allow an amendment to the original petition whereby a new charge could be
introduced. S. 83(3) provided for amending the petition to include the particulars while a general provision was laid out in
Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Both the provisions, express and implied should operate on the same subject matter. If the subject matter of both the
provisions is different this rule has no application.
Limitation of this rule is: If the alternative provision is clearly set out then this rule is not applied. As stated above, this rule
is employed to gauge the intention of the Parliament which if, is clear from the words used should be applied.
Part IV of the Motor Vehicles Act provided for obtaining ‘permit’ by the government to enter into a commercial practice
with the other private players. Later Part IVA was inserted into the Motor Vehicles Act whereby through a ‘scheme’ only
government could obtain the permit to ply vehicles, which could be claimed as a matter of right. To this, petitioners used the
said doctrine and contested – Since the provision for scheme is clearly set out in Part IVA, it by virtue of Expressio Unius
Est Exclusio Alterius excludes the ‘permit’ under Part IV of the Act. Negating this contention Court observed:

It is a maxim for ascertaining the intention of the legislature. Where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear,
there is no scope for applying the rule. Section 42(3) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, is plain in its terms. It contemplates that
the Government has to apply for permits under Section 42(1) to run buses as a commercial enterprise. That being so, the
maxim cannot be resorted to for ascertaining the intention of the legislature and implying a prohibition against the
Government applying for permits under Chapter IV.
When two provision or statutes are to be interpreted wherein, one provision or statute clearly sets out unequivocally what it
aspires to achieve while the other is silent. In such a situation if the question arises, ‘what if by import, statute/provision
which is silent on a specified subject matter is to be tacitly read or interpreted with the one which has been clearly
specified’, what rule of interpretation should be resorted to? This is the perfect situation in which the rule of Expressio
Unius Est Exclusio Alterius is applied. (The class discussions were more extensive than this. Please refer to your notes
too)
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Noscere means to know and sociis means association. Thus, Noscitur a Sociis means knowing from association. Thus, under
the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" the questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its association
with other words within the context of the phrase. This means that words in a list within a statute have meanings that are
related to each other. If multiple words having similar meaning are put together, they are to be understood in their collective
meaning. According to Maxwell, "this rule means that when two or more words susceptible to analogous meaning are
clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other,
i.e. the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general". 

This doctrine is broader than the doctrine of Ejusdem Generis because this rule puts the words in context of the whole
phrase and not just in relation to the nearby words. The language of the phrase can be used as a guide to arrive at the true
meaning of the word.

When this doctrine is not used:

While ascertaining the meaning of a clause or sentence by contrasting it to a prior clause or sentence in the same provision
or different provision in the same statute or different statute, this rule is not resorted to.
When this doctrine is used (Class discussion on this question was more extensive)
This rule is used to interpret the word/words with reference to words found in immediate connection with them i.e. when
two or more words, which are susceptible of analogous meaning, are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in
their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colours from each other the meaning of the more general is restricted to a
sense analogous to the less general.
It is a well settled rule of construction that where the legislature uses the same expression in the same statute at two places or
more, then the same interpretation should be given to that expression unless the context requires otherwise.
EJUSDEM GENERIS
The Ejusdem Generis, or ‘of the same genus’ rule, is similar though narrower than the more general rule of noscitur a sociis.
It operates where a broad or open-ended term appears following a series of more restrictive terms in the text of a statute.
Where the terms listed are similar enough to constitute a class or genus, the courts will presume, in interpreting the general
words that follow, that they are intended to apply only to things of the same genus as the particular items listed. According
to this rule, when particular words pertaining to a class or a genus are followed by general words, the general words are
construed as limited to the things of the same kind as those specified by the class or the genus.  The meaning of
an expression with wider meaning is limited to the meaning of the preceding specific expressions. However, for this rule to
apply, the preceding words must for a specific class or genus. Further, this rule cannot be applied in the words with a wider
meaning appear before the words with specific or narrow meaning.  In UP State Electricity Board vs Harishankar, AIR
1979, SC held that the following conditions must exist for the application of this rule – 

 The statue contains an enumeration of specific words

 The subject of the enumeration constitutes a class or a category
 The class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration
 A general term is present at the end of the enumeration
 There is no indication of a different legislative intent

If the words were intended to be given its natural meaning then no restrictive interpretation should be given by resorting to
the principle of Ejusdem generis.
In Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, A was the widow of a tenant of certain premises and she had vacated such premises.
Finding the premises vacant, B (read government) requisitioned the premises under S. 6(4) (c) of the Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948, for the public purpose of housing a government servant. A contended that under the Explanation to
the said provision there would be deemed to be a vacancy when the tenant ‘ceases to be in occupation upon termination of
his tenancy, eviction or assignment or transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises or otherwise’ and the
words ‘or otherwise’ should be used Ejusdem generis with the words immediately preceding them.
It was contended by the appellant that the words ‘or otherwise’ should be read Ejusdem generis with the words preceding it
and not otherwise. The Court rejecting her claim held that when the Legislature intends to give a broader meaning to the
words used in the provision then Court couldn’t restrict its operation by applying the principle of Ejusdem generis. Court
further observed that:
‘The rule of Ejusdem generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following particular and
specified words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature is presumed to use the general
words in a restricted sense; that is to say, as belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific words. Such a
restricted meaning has to be given to words of general import only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation
requires it.’
For the application of this principle, there must be a distinct genus or category running through the words. If that is not
there, this rule cannot be applied
In Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal, the respondents was working with the Electricity Board and was sent on Deputation to
work with the Public’s Work Department after working for two years with the Board. At PWD, he was promoted to the
designation of Assistant Engineer. Later, PWD sent him back to work with the Board where he was allowed to join as a
Foreman. He contested for his seniority and argued that the others who were junior to him were promoted to Assistant
Engineer while he was made to work as a Foreman, which was violative of his right under Article 14 of the Constitution.
State Electricity Board objected to this writ on the ground that SEB is not a State under Article 12 of the Constitution and
therefore the writ is not maintainable before the High Court. However, High Court allowed the writ and held SEB as a State.
It is against this order of the High Court SEB has approached the apex court. On the point whether SEB is a State, lawyer for
the Board submitted:

Mr. Desai urged that, on the face of it, the Board could not be held to be covered by the authorities named therein, viz., the
Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and local authorities, and
the expression "other authorities", if read Ejusdem generis with those named, cannot cover the board which is a body
corporate having a separate existence and has been constituted primarily for the purpose of carrying on commercial
activities.
Agreeing with the argument put forth by SEB, apex court observed that the authorities listed under Article 12 don’t belong
to the same genus and hence applicability of the principle of Ejusdem generis is ill found. Court in this regard observed:
In Art, 12 of the Constitution, the bodies specifically named are the Executive Governments of the Union and the States, the
Legislature of the Union and the States, and local authorities. We are not able to find any common genus running through
these named bodies, nor can these bodies be placed in case single on any rational basis. The doctrine of Ejusdem generis
could not therefore, be applied to the interpretation of the expression "other authorities" in this article.
The Court held SEB not to be State under Article 12 of the Constitution.
In another case similarly the Privy Council held that there is no room for the application of the principle of Ejusdem generis
in the absence of any mention of a genus, since the mention of a single species. In Article 12 of the Constitution, the bodies
specifically named are the Executive Governments of the Union and the States, the Legislatures of the Union and the States,
and local authorities. We are not able to find any common genus running through these named bodies, nor can these bodies
be placed in one single category on any rational basis. The doctrine of Ejusdem generis could not, therefore, be applied to
the interpretation of the expression ‘other authorities’ in the Article.’
This principle is applied when the specific words are preceded by the general words and not the other way round i.e.
general words precede the specific words
In Thankur Amarsinghji v. State of Rajasthan, a law was enacted by the Rajpramukh for resuming the lands from the
Jagirdars and Bhoomichars under the Act. Appellant was the person whose land was resumed under the said law and he was
aggrieved and approached the Supreme Court claiming that the said law was violative of his rights under Article 14 of the
Constitution. State took the defence that it had the competence to enact such law and such law is covered by the then Article
31A of the Constitution and the land occupied by both, Jagirdars and Bhoomichars is an ‘estate’ under the said Article.
It was contested by the Appellants that ‘jagir’ under which State argues to rope in both Jagirdaars and Bhoomidars should be
read Ejusdem generis with ‘other similar grants’ under Clause (2) to Article 31 A and therefore existence of ‘grant’ is
quintessential for a law to attract shield of Article 31 A which isn’t the case with the Bhoomichars. If that is allowed then,
going by the scheme of the said provision it would mean that a specific provision which precedes a general provision is
given interpreted in the light of the general provision, which appears to be unwarranted under the rule of Ejusdem generis.
It is always a general provision, which is preceded by a specific provision interpreted in the light of the specific provision
and not the other way round.
More than one species should exist in the genus for the applicability of this principle.
In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, State of Bombay requisitioned a premise for housing a member of the foreign consulate
under S. 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act of 1948. S. 6(4) (a) reads:
The State Government may, by order in writing, requisition the premises for the purpose of a State or any other public
purpose, and may use or deal with the premises for any such purpose in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient".
Appellate Judges of the Bombay High Court resorted to the principle of Ejusdem generis and read ‘any other public
purpose’ with the ‘purpose of the State’ and held that housing a member of the foreign consular is not the purpose of the
State but Union and hence such requisition was invalid. Supreme Court analysing the order of the Bombay High Court
observed:
The reasoning by which the learned appellate Judges of the Bombay High Court reached their conclusion is shortly this.
There can be no public purpose, which is not a purpose of the Union or a purpose of the State. There are only these two
categories to consider under the statute, as the words "any other purpose" in the particular context should be read Ejusdem
generis with "the purpose of the State". The provision of accommodation for a member of the foreign consulate staff is a
"purpose of the Union" and not a "purpose of the State.
Holding the inapplicability of the rule of Ejusdem generis, it was held that more than one species should be there in the
genus and observed:
With great respect, we are constrained to say that the Ejusdem generis rule of construction, which found favour in the court
below for reaching the result that the words "any other public purpose" are restricted to a public purpose, which is also a
purpose of the State, has scarcely any application. Apart from the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits,
and general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their
intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before the rule
can be applied.
Thus the apex court allowed the appeal.
CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO EST OPTIMA ET FORTISSIMA LEGE
Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima et Fortissima Lege
The basis of this rule is notorious practice and the failure of the legislature to correct the practice by amendment.
Following rules could be gauged while perusing discussion arising in the case of Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxmi
Narayan:
1. In the case of ancient statute they are to be interpreted, as they would have been when they were passed.
2. As a limitation on the applicability of this principle, if the words of the statute are capable of comprehending new
facts and situations without abrogating the intention with which the provision was enacted, such interpretation
should be allowed to sail through.
In Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxmi Narayan, Mr. Laxmi Narayan Chopra – the first respondent, carries on business as
motor coach builder under the name of ‘Chopra Motors’ having his factory in the suburb of Calcutta. In his factory a number
of ‘Universal Electric Motors’ are operated for the purpose of working electric drills. Within a distance of 100 feet from his
factory, there is a Post and Telegraph Wireless Station, which besides functioning as a coast station communicating with
ships at sea, handles public messages in large volume from Darjeeling, Shillong, Gauhati, Agartala and New Delhi. In 1953,
sever electrical interference was observed in the said station and experts attributed the same to local induction from the first
respondent’s factory. A notice was served by the Senior Electric Inspector under S. 34(2) (b) of the Electricity Act of 1910
asking the first respondent to show cause as to why an action under the said provision be not taken against him.
 S. 34(2): If at any time it is established to the satisfaction of the appropriate government-
(b) That any electric supply lines or other works for the generation transmission, supply or use of energy are
attended with danger to the public safety or to human life injuriously affect any telegraph line,
That appropriate Government may, by order in writing, specify the matter complained of and require the owner or
user of such electric supply lines or other works to remedy it in such manner as shall be specified in the order, and
may also in like manner forbid the use of, and the supply of energy to, any electric supply line or works until the
order is complied with or for such time as is specified in the order.
S. 3(1) (4) of the Telegraph Act of 1885 reads:
‘Telegraph line’ means a wire or wires used for the purpose of a telegraph with any casing, coating, tube or pipe
enclosing the same and any appliances and apparatus connected therewith for the purpose of fixing or insulating the
same.
Issue which was raised in this case was: Whether telegraph line would also encompass electric lines used for the purpose of
wireless telegraph within it or not? But for it to qualify under S. 34(2)(b), S. 3(1)(4) lays down that ‘telegraph line’ means a
wire or wires used for the purpose of telegraph and there in wireless telegraph lines wires aren’t used. In the telegraph post,
electric lines were used which were wireless and for it to qualify as a ‘telegraph line’ under the Telegraph Act of 1885,
existence of wire or wires appears inevitable. Appellant contested that the ‘electric lines’ are wide enough to include
‘telegraph line’ without wires, as the contemporary developments in science couldn’t have been envisaged by the legislature
when the Telegraph Act was enacted in 1885. But a wider interpretation is permissible as it isn’t contrary to the intention of
the legislature while enacting the Telegraph Act. Respondents argued by relying on the judgment of the division bench of
the High Court that the rule of contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo lege should be applicable which means that
contemporary exposition is best and strongest in law.
Court also quoted Sutherland’s Statutory Interpretation, and observed:
‘As a general rule it may be stated that the legislative intent should be determined as of the time the legislation goes
into effect. But surrounding circumstances and situations occurring after the enactment of the statute may be of
great or even conclusive assistance in determining a meaning, which was intended to be conveyed. Legislative
standards are generally couched in terms, which have considerable breadth. Therefore a statute may be interpreted
to include circumstance or situations which were unknown or did not exist at the time of the enactment of the
statute.’
Two limitations, which appear while applying the digressive principle to the Contemporanea Expositio, are:
a. If the facts and situation couldn’t be couched in the words of the statute.
b. If the intent of the Legislature appear otherwise.
To the question that this rule is applied only in the ancient statutes and not on the modern statute, court rejected this
principle and observed:
The legal position may be summarized thus: Thus maxim contemporanea exposition as laid down by Coke was
applied to construing ancient statutes but not to interpreting Acts which are comparatively modern. There is a good
reason for this change in the mode of interpretation. The fundamental rule of construction is the same whether the
Court is asked to construe a provision of an ancient statute or that of a modern one, namely, what is the expressed
intention of the Legislature. It is perhaps difficult to attribute to a legislative body functioning in astatic society that
its intention was couched in terms of considerable breadth so as to take within its sweep the future developments
 comprehended by the phraseology used. It is more reasonable to confine its intention only to the circumstances
obtaining at the time the law was made. But in a modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine
the intention of a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the law was made, for a
modern legislature making laws to govern a society which is fast moving must be presumed to be aware of an
enlarged meaning the same concept might attract with the march of time and with the revolutionary changes
brought about in social economic political and scientific and other fields of human activity. Indeed, unless a
contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations,
if the words are capable comprehending them. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned judges of the High
Court that the maxim contemporanea expositio could be invoked in construing the word ‘telegraph line’ in the Act.

Reddendo Singula Singulus

The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. Where a complex sentence has more than
one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right construction to render each to each, by reading the provision
distributively and applying each object to its appropriate subject. A similar principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and
to other parts of speech. A typical application of this principle is where a testator says 'I devise and bequeath all my real and
personal property to B'. The term devise is appropriate only to real property. The term bequeath is appropriate only to
personal property. Accordingly, by the application of the principle reddendo singula singulis, the testamentary disposition is
read as if it were worded 'I devise all my real property, and bequeath all my personal property, to B'.

*what follows are notes excerpted from an online source. We have not covered this in class, but it is helpful
nevertheless to know this as a general, common sense rule of interpretation.

Reddendo Singula Singulis: The phrase, reddenda singula singulis, indicates that different words in one part of a section or
statute are to be applied respectively to the other portions or sentences to which they respectively relate, even if strict
grammatical construction should demand otherwise. Where several words importing power, authority and obligation are
found at the commencement of a clause containing several branches, it is not necessary that each of those words should be
applied to each of the different branches of the clause; it may be construed reddenda singula singulis, the words giving
power and authority may be applicable to some branches, those of obligation to others. Where a sentence contains several
antecedents and several consequents, they are to be read distributively. That is, the words are to be applied to the subjects to
which they appear by context most properly to relate and to which they are most applicable. The method of construction
applied in a sentence: If anyone shall draw or load any sword or gun the word 'draw' is applied to 'sword' only and the word
'load' to 'gun' only, the former verb to the former noun, and the later to the latter, because it is impossible to load a sword or
draw a gun, and so of other application of different sets of words to one another. 31 The rule was used in Quim v. Lowell
Electric Light Corporation . The method of limiting the effect of expressions, which are obviously too wide to be construed
literally, is most frequently adopted when the 'opening words of a section are general, while the succeeding parts of it branch
out into particular instances. 32 According to Sutherland the difficult problems of interpretation involved in the rule of
reddendo singula singulis, may be almost entirely eliminated by careful drafting. If sentences are short and contain but a
single subject and a single object, this problem will be resolved. In the case of Bishop v. Deakin33 Sec. 59(1) of the Local
Government Act 1933. provided for disqualification from acting as an elected member of a local authority, if the candidate
has within five year before the date of election or since he was elected been convicted of an offence and imprisoned for three
months at least, without the option of a fine. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for more than
three months. All action was brought for a declaration that he was disqualified from acting as a member of the local
authority. Clauson J. observed that the sections provided for two disqualifications and two definitions: a) What is to be a
qualification for election; and b) What is to be a disqualification for being member after election. By applying the first
definition to (a) and the second to (b) (based on the rule of reddeno singula singulis) he held that a conviction within five
years before election, disqualified the person from election, and that conviction after election disqualified him from
continuance in office. He said; "If the section is to be read as providing that a person is disqualified from being a councilor if
he was convicted within five years before his election, it may well be that he is so disqualified when he acts as a councilor at
a date later than 5 yrs. from the date of conviction. In that case the effect of disqualification operating would be that he
would cease to be a councilor, but he would be eligible a once for re-election to the vacant office, the five years having
expired before the new election. All difficulty can be avoided by applying the well-known method of construction
commonly known as Reddendo singula singuiis, and applying the first disqualification mentioned to the first case dealt with,
a construction which so far as I can see, infringes no rule of syntax or grammar. The result reached seems to be quite
sensible, namely, that conviction with five years before the day of election, disqualifies from election, and conviction after
election disqualifies from continuance in office.