1.

5 IF MEANING IS PLAIN, EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO IT IRRESPECTIVE

OF CONSEQUENCES
GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General Clauses Act, 1897 with Notes), 14th ed
Justice G P SinghJustice A K Patnaik

GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General Clauses Act, 1897 with
Notes), 14th ed > GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General
Clauses Act, 1897 with Notes), 14th ed > CHAPTER 1 Basic Principles

CHAPTER 1 Basic Principles

1.5 IF MEANING IS PLAIN, EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO IT IRRESPECTIVE

OF CONSEQUENCES
When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one
meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences.37. The rule stated by
Tindal CJ in Sussex Peerage case is in the following form:

If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of
the lawgiver.38.

The rule is also stated in another form: “When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one
meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself”.39. The results of the
construction are then not a matter for the court,40. even though they may be strange or surprising,41. unreasonable
or unjust or oppressive.42. “Again and again”, said Viscount Simonds, LC, “this Board has insisted that in construing
enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may
follow from giving effect to the language used”.43. As said by Gajendragadkar J:

If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other
hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the
Act.44.

In deciding that a return of income signed by an illiterate person by the pen of his son (Bakalam) was not a valid
return of income for purposes of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act (II of 1946) which required that a return of
income shall be verified and the declaration shall be signed in the case of an individual by the individual himself, SR
Das J observed:

Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear
on the face of the statute.45.

And in holding that the words “any person” in section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 included any
person who may thereafter be an accused, Lord Atkin speaking for the Privy Council said:

When the meaning of the words is plain, it is not the duty of courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions.46.
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1.5 IF MEANING IS PLAIN, EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO IT IRRESPECTIVE OF CONSEQUENCES

Lord Atkin proceeded to add:

It, therefore, appears inadmissible to consider the advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in
the interests of the prosecution or accused.

Similarly, in construing section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as it then stood, and in
holding that persons employed by the father and paid by him who assisted the son in his election, were in relation to
the son mere volunteers and not employed by him, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that such a
construction would give candidates with rich friends or relations an unfair advantage over a poor rival and would,
therefore, be against the spirit of the election law. SR Das J observed: “The spirit of the law may well be an elusive
and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of
the sections of the Act”.47.

The rule applies to fiscal and penal statutes as well. Said Lord Cairns:

If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may
appear to the judicial mind to be.48.

And in construing the word “Butter” in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, the Supreme Court gave
effect to the plain meaning and held that the word included butter prepared from curd; rejecting the contention
based on the rule of strict construction and on the rule that that construction should be adopted which is more
favourable to the subject, Subbarao J said:

But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental principle of interpretation, namely, that the primary test is—the
language employed in the Act and when the words are clear and plain the court is bound to accept the expressed intention
of the Legislature.49.

Similarly, the Supreme Court gave effect to the plain meaning of section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 which lays down a rule of evidence, enabling the court to raise a presumption of guilt in certain
circumstances—“the rule which is a complete departure from the established principle of criminal jurisprudence that
the burden always lies on the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offence charged and the burden never
shifts on the accused to disprove the charge framed against him;”50. and similar view has been taken on section
4(1) of the same Act.51.

The court applied the plain meaning rule in construing sections 223 and 236 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
which contain a prohibition for grant of Probate or Letters of Administration “to any association of individuals unless
it is a company” and held that Probate or Letters of Administration cannot be granted to a society registered under
the Societies Registration Act as a society even after registration does not become distinct from its members and
does not become a legal person like a company. The court observed that “the prohibitions laid down by sections
223 and 236 of the Act are categorical and comprehensive and leave no scope for creative interpretation.”52.

Mere hardship cannot be a ground for not giving effective and grammatical meaning to every word of the provisions
of a statute if the language used therein is unequivocal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that even if the
designation of land in the final development plan lapses under section 20(2) of the Gujarat Town Planning and
Urban Development Act, 1976, for non-acquisition of the land within a period of 10 years, the land can again be
reserved in a town planning scheme as provided under section 40 of the Act, and be acquired again.53.

37. Nelson Motis v UOI, AIR 1992 SC 1981 [LNIND 1992 SC 561], p 1984 : (1992) 4 SCC 711 [LNIND 1992 SC 561];
Gurudevdata VKSSS Maryadit v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 SC 1980 [LNIND 2001 SC 761], p 1991 : (2001) 4
SCC 534 [LNIND 2001 SC 761]; State of Jharkhand v Govind Singh, AIR 2005 SC 294 [LNIND 2004 SC 1208], p 296;
Nathi Devi v Radha Devi Gupta, AIR 2005 SC 648 [LNIND 2004 SC 1268], p 659 : (2005) 2 SCC 271 [LNIND 2004 SC
1268], p 277.
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1.5 IF MEANING IS PLAIN, EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO IT IRRESPECTIVE OF CONSEQUENCES

38. Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 Cl & F 85, p 143. See further Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income-tax
v John Frederick Pamsel, (1891) AC 531, p 542 (HL); Vacher & Sons v London Society of Compositors, (1913) AC 107:
82 LJKB 232 : 107 LT 722 (HL); Pakala Narayanswami v Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47 [LNIND 1939 PC 1], p 51; Corp of
City of Nagpur v Its Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 [LNIND 1960 SC 32], p 679 : 1960 (2) SCR 942 [LNIND 1960 SC
32]; Sri Ram Daya Ram v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 674 [LNIND 1960 SC 308], p 678 : 1961 (2) SCR 890
[LNIND 1960 SC 308]; Collector of Customs v Digvijaysinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd, AIR 1961 SC 1549 [LNIND
1961 SC 172], p 1551 : 1962 (1) SCR 896 [LNIND 1961 SC 172]; Philip John Plasket Thomas v CIT, AIR 1964 SC 587
[LNIND 1963 SC 73], p 592 : 1964 (2) SCR 480 [LNIND 1963 SC 73]; RL Arora v State of UP, AIR 1964 SC 1230
[LNIND 1964 SC 31], p 1244 : (1964) 6 SCR 784 [LNIND 1964 SC 31]; Anandji Haridas & Co Pvt Ltd v Engineering
Mazdoor Sangh, AIR 1975 SC 946 [LNIND 1975 SC 65], p 949 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1975) 3 SCC 862 [LNIND
1975 SC 65]; Govindlal Chagganlal Patel v Agriculture Produce Market Committee, AIR 1976 SC 263 [LNIND 1975 SC
300], p 267 : (1975) 2 SCC 482 [LNIND 1975 SC 300]; UOI v Sankalchand, AIR 1977 SC 2328 [LNIND 1977 SC 268],
p 2374 : (1977) 4 SCC 193 [LNIND 1977 SC 268] : 1977 SCC (Lab) 435; Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v LVA
Dikshitulu, AIR 1979 SC 193 [LNIND 1978 SC 408], p 205 : (1979) 2 SCC 34 : 1979 SCC (Lab) 99; Shivram Anand
Shiroor v Radhabai Shantaram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588 [LNIND 1984 SC 26], p 592 : AIR 1984 SC 786 [LNIND
1984 SC 26]; Ajay Pradhan (Dr) v State of MP, AIR 1988 SC 1875 [LNIND 1988 SC 369], p 1878 : (1988) 4 SCC 514
[LNIND 1988 SC 369]; State of Kerala v Dr SG Savothama Prabhu, JT (1999) 2 SC 41, p 44 : 1999 AIR SC 1195 :
(1999) 2 SCC 622 [LNIND 1999 SC 206]; State of Maharashtra v Nandet Prabhani Operators Sangh, AIR 2000 SC 725
[LNIND 2000 SC 140], p 727 : (2000) 2 SCC 69 [LNIND 2000 SC 140]; State of WB v Scene Screen (Pvt) Ltd, AIR
2000 SC 3089 [LNIND 2000 SC 1318], p 3094 : (2000) 7 SCC 686 [LNIND 2000 SC 1318]; Commissioner of
Agricultural Income-tax, Kerala v Plantation Corp of Kerala Ltd, AIR 2000 SC 3714 [LNIND 2000 SC 1690], pp 3717,
3718; Steel Authority of India Ltd v National Union Water Front Workers, AIR 2001 SC 3527 [LNIND 2001 SC 1870], p
3539 : (2001) 7 SCC 1 [LNIND 2001 SC 1870]; Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v State of Maharashtra, supra;
Ombalika Das v Hulisa Shaw, AIR 2002 SC 1685 [LNIND 2002 SC 255], p 1690; UOI v Hansoli Devi, AIR 2002 SC
3240 [LNIND 2002 SC 569], p 3245; Illachi Devi v Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India, (2003) 8 SCC 413 [LNIND
2003 SC 842], p 426 : AIR 2003 SC 3397 [LNIND 2003 SC 842]; MT Khan v Govt of AP, (2004) 2 SCC 267 [LNIND
2004 SC 16], p 272 : AIR 2004 SC 2934 [LNIND 2004 SC 16]; State of Orissa v Joginder Patjoshi, AIR 2004 SC 1039,
p 1042 : (2004) 9 SCC 278; TN State Electricity Board v Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, AIR 2007 SC 1711
[LNIND 2007 SC 509](paras 18 and 19) : (2007) 6 Scale 26 [LNIND 2007 SC 509]; Promoters & Builders Ass. of Pune
v Pune Municipal Corp, (2007) 6 SCC 143 [LNIND 2007 SC 642], para 11 : AIR 2007 SC 1956 [LNIND 2007 SC 642];
TN State Electricity Board v Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2007) 7 SCC 636 [LNIND 2007 SC 509], paras
20 to 22; Ansal Properties and Industries Ltd v State of Haryana, (2009) 3 SCC 553 [LNIND 2009 SC 164] para 40 :
(2009) 4 JT 174; Lalu Prasad Yadav v State of Bihar, (2010) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2010 SC 304] p.12 para 23 : AIR 2010
SC 1561 [LNINDORD 2010 SC 240].
39. State of UP v Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 [LNIND 1962 SC 127], p 950 : (1963) 1 SCR 1 [LNIND 1962 SC
127] (Subba-rao, J); See further Thakur Amar Singhji v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504 [LNIND 1955 SC 138], p
526 : (1955) 2 SCR 303 [LNIND 1955 SC 36]; Croxford v Universal Insurance Co Ltd, (1936) 1 All ER 151, p 166 (CA);
Om Prakash Gupta v Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, AIR 1982 SC 1230 [LNIND 1982 SC 63], p 1233 : (1982) 2 SCC 61
[LNIND 1982 SC 63]; Jitendra Tyagi v Delhi Administration, AIR 1990 SC 487 [LNIND 1989 SC 483], p 492 : (1989) 4
SCC 653 [LNIND 1989 SC 483]; Nelson Motis v UOI, AIR 1992 SC 1981 [LNIND 1992 SC 561], p 1984 : (1992) 4 SCC
711 [LNIND 1992 SC 561]; Oswal Agro Mills Ltd v Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1993 SC 2288 [LNIND 1993 SC
393], p 2291 : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716; Council of Homoepathic System of Medicine, Punjab v Suchintan, AIR 1994 SC
1761 [LNIND 1993 SC 384], p 1769 : (1993) Supp (3) SCC 99; State of Orissa v Joginder Patjoshi, supra.
40. AW Meads v Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 21, p 23 : 75 IA 185; Pakala Narayanaswami v Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47 [LNIND
1939 PC 1], pp 51, 52; Emperor v Benoari Lal Sarma, AIR 1945 PC 48 [LNIND 1944 PC 32], p 53; CIT, Agri v Keshab
Chandra Mandal, AIR 1950 SC 265 [LNIND 1950 SC 21], p 270 : 1950 SCR 435 [LNIND 1950 SC 21]; Johnson v
Moreton, (1978) 3 All ER 37, p 41 (HL); TN State Electricity Board v Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, AIR
2007 SC 1711 [LNIND 2007 SC 509](para 20) : (2007) 6 Scale 26 [LNIND 2007 SC 509].
41. London Brick Co Ltd v Robinson, (1943) 1 All ER 23, p 26 (HL); Smith v East Elloe RDC, (1956) 1 All ER 855, p 863
(HL).
42. IRC v Hinchy, (1960) 1 All ER 505, pp 508, 512 (HL); Mahalaxmi Mills Ltd, Bhaunagar v CIT, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC
266 [LNIND 1960 SC 115], p 269 (para 7) : (1964) 5 SCR 216; Nasiruddin v State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR
1976 SC 331 [LNIND 1975 SC 306], p 338 : (1975) 2 SCC 671 [LNIND 1975 SC 306]; Duport Streets Ltd v Sirs, (1980)
1 All ER 529, p 541 (HL); Precision Steel and Engineering Works v Premdeva, AIR 1982 SC 1518 [LNIND 1982 SC
138], p 1526 : (1982) 3 SCC 270 [LNIND 1982 SC 138]; Nasiruddin v Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577 [LNIND
2003 SC 112], p 588 : AIR 2003 SC 1593.
43. Emperor v Benoarilal Sarma, AIR 1945 PC 48 [LNIND 1944 PC 32], p 53. See further Ajay Pradhan (Dr) v State of
MP, AIR 1988 SC 1875 [LNIND 1988 SC 369], p 1878 : 1988 (4) SCC 514 [LNIND 1988 SC 369]; State of Maharashtra
v Nandet Prabhani Operators Sangh, AIR 2000 SC 725 [LNIND 2000 SC 140], p 727 : (2000) 2 SCC 69 [LNIND 2000
SC 140]; Easland Combines Coimbatore v CCE, AIR 2003 SC 843 [LNIND 2003 SC 18], p 850 : (2003) 3 SCC 410
[LNIND 2003 SC 18], p 421; Raghunath Rai Bareja v Punjab National Bank, (2007) 2 SCC 230 [LNIND 2006 SC 1098],
(paras 43, 44) : (2007) 1 JT 542 (9th Edn) pp 45 to 49 of this book is referred).