Rahul’s

a blue print of success

INTERPRETATION OF STATUES

In the words of SALMOND, interpretation means the process by which the Courts seek
to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of the authoritative
forms in which it is expressed. Interpretation is the process which is being used to
ascertain the real meaning of an Act along with the intention of the legislature.

Why do we need Interpretation of Statutes

1. It is of importance because of the inherent nature of legislation as a source of law.

2. The process of making a statute and when the question is asked in the court takes
place separately from each other therefore interpretation of Act serves as the bridge of
understanding between the two.

Often the concept of Interpretation and Construction are used interchangeably. But
infact there is a difference between the two. Interpretation is the art of finding out the
true sense of any form of words. Construction refers to drawing conclusions regarding
the subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text. Such conclusions are
drawn from elements known and given in the text. Such conclusions drawn by
“Construction” are in spirit though not within the letter of the law. Where the court
adheres to the plain meaning of the language used by the legislature, it is called
“Interpretation”. Where the court has to decide whether the wording was meant to cover
the situation before the court, it is called “Construction”. Interpretation of a legal
provision is always independent of the facts of any given case; the application of a
statutory provision would always depend on the exact facts of a given case.

Cross has explained “Interpretation is the process by which the Courts determine the
meaning of statutory provisions for the purpose of applying it to the situation before
them.”

Whereas Blackstone “The most fair and rational method for interpreting a statue is by
exploring the intention of the legislature through texts, the subject-matter, the effect
and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law.”

In Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT. AIR 1965 SC 1636, it was observed that the “it is
judicial experience that in matters of law involving questions of construing statutory
or Constitutional provisions, two views are often reasonably possible and when
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 judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views,
the process of decision making is often very difficult and delicate.”

In Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT (2003)5 SCC 590; it was held that the rules of
interpretation would come into play only if there is any doubt with regard to the
express language used. Where the words are unequivocal, there is no scope for
importing any rule of interpretation.

In RMDC v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, the question of interpretation of the term ‘Prize
Competition’ as defined in Section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act 1955 had arisen.
It was observed that when a question arises as to the interpretation to be put on an
enactment “what the Court has to do is to ascertain ‘the intent of them that make it’,
and that must of course be gathered from the words actually used in the statue.”

By interpreting the law, the judiciary primarily makes the intention of the legislature
clear by expounding the express or implied meanings of the words used, by looking at
them in the light of the scheme and object of the statute.

Legislation is that source of law which consists in the declaration of legal rules by a
competent authority. When judges by judicial decisions lay down a new principle of
general application of the nature specifically reserved for the legislature, they may be
said to have been legislated, and not merely declared the Law which is their only
function.

In DR Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner AIR 1977 SC 842, it was held

that Courts must avoid the danger of a prior determination of the meaning of a provision
based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme. They are
not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. While
interpreting a provision, the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it.

The Supreme Court in VK Reddy v. state of AP (2006 (2) JT 361) observed that, ‘the
judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of law-maker merely for an
exhibition of judicial valour’. Similarly, the Court cannot direct the legislature to make
a particular law as this is clearly illegal, for judges cannot legislate.

Thus, Courts have to function within the established parameters and Constitutional
bounds. Courts have to be careful to see that they do not overstep their limits because
to them is assigned the sacred duty of guarding the Constitution. Policy matters, fiscal,

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educational, or otherwise are thus best left to the judgment of the executive. It needs to
be remembered that courts cannot run the government.

THE LITERAL OR GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATION

According to this rule, the words are given their ordinary and natural meaning and if
the meaning of such words is clear they should be given effect to whatever is their
consequence. So, the ordinary, natural popular or literal meaning of the words has to
be taken into consideration. It is the general rule of interpretation that judges are not
at liberty to add to or to take away from the letters of law. They have to limited to the
language of the law. Courts cannot read anything into statutory provision which is plain
and unambiguous.

The basis of this principle is that the object of all interpretation being to know what the
legislature intended, whatever was the intention of the legislature has been expressed
by it through words which are to be interpreted according to the rules of grammar. This
has been called the safest rule because the legislature's intention can be deduced only
from the language through which it has expressed self. If the language of a statute is
plain, the only duty of the court is to give effect to it and the court has no business to
look into the consequences of such interpretation. The court is under an obligation to
expound the law as it exists and leave the remedy to the legislature if harsh conclusions
result from such exposition. Similarly, the court should give technical meaning to a
technical word. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or
popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical
meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context
or in the object of the state to suggest the contrary.

In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 the appellant, a citizen
of India, on arrival at an airport did not declare that he had brought gold with him. Gold,
found in his possession during search in violation of government notification. He was
charged under Section 8, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant pleaded
that his trial under the Act of 1947 was violative of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution
relating to double jeopardy as he was already punished for his act by way of confiscation
of his gold. It was held that the Sea Customs Authority is not a court or a judicial
tribunal and the adjudging of confiscation or the increased rate of duty of penalty under

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the Sea Customs Act was not a prosecution. Consequently, his trial under the Act of
1947 was valid.

In Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh AIR 1954 SC 749, the Election Tribunal
set aside the election of the appellant under section 123 (7) of Representation of the
People Act, 1951 on the grounds that the appellant had employed more persons than
prescribed for electioneering purposes and that the salary of these persons exceeded the
maximum election expenditure permissible under the law. The contention of the
appellant was that all those persons who had campaigned for him in the election were
in the employment of his father and were thereby receiving salaries from his father by
virtue of their employment. As far as he was concerned, he had not made payments to
them exceeding the permissible limit. The Supreme Court, following the grammatical
interpretation said that the meaning of section 123 (7) of the Act of 1951 was quite clear
and therefore as far as these campaigners were concerned they were merely volunteers
campaigning for the appellant.

In M/s. Patel Brothers v. State of Assam and others AIR 2017 SC 383 the
Supreme Court held that Section 84 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 made only
Section 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings under VAT Act.
The apparent legislative intent, which can be clearly evinced, is exclude other provisions
including Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) Limitation Act stipulates that in
the absence of any express provision in a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of
the Limitation Act would apply. If the intention of the legislature was to make Section
5, or for that matter, other provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings
under the VAT Act, there was no necessity to make a specific provision like Section 84
thereby making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to such
proceedings inasmuch as these two sections would also have became applicable by
virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is, thus, clear that the legislature intended
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, out of Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act
applicable under the VAT Act thereby excluding the applicability of the other provisions.
In the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, the main question was the
interpretation of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held that use
of word “shall” leaves no discretion to police officer to hold preliminary enquiry before
recording an FIR. Use of the expression “information” without any qualification also
denotes that police has to record information despite he being unsatisfied by its
reasonableness. So here, the court interpreted the literal meaning of the words used.

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In Keshavnanda Bharti v. State of Kerela, it was held that a word gets its ‘colour’ in the
context in which it is used. The word gathers its meaning not only in the context that it
has been used but from the words used in similar conditions.

The rule is based on the principle that “a simple preposition needs no expositor”. If the
narrower interpretation fails to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, wider
interpretation should be adopted.

This rule can be read and understood under the following heads: a. Statutes must be
construed according to their plain, literal and Grammatical Meaning. If there is
inconsistency between purpose of the statute and the grammatical meaning of the
words, then the grammatical sense must be modified to avoid inconvenience. The words
must be attributed with the natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in
relation to the subject-matter with reference to which and the context in which they
have been used in the statute.

In selecting the ordinary meaning of a word exact meaning should be preferred to loose
meaning unless the context directs otherwise. In this regard, secondary meaning should
not be confused with loose meaning. Technical words must be construed in the technical
sense only. In dealing with matters regarding the general public, statutes are presumed
to use words in their popular sense. Omissions are not likely to be inferred. When a
matter which should have been, but has not been, provided for in a statute cannot be
supplied by courts as to do so would amount to legislation and would not be
construction.

The rule enunciates that the words and language used in a statue should be interpreted
literally and without adding or subtracting anything into it. The words used by the
legislature must be construed in the light of their ordinary, natural and grammatical
meaning. The true intention of the legislature can be safely derived by applying this rule.
That’s why this rule is called as ‘the safest rule’ because it is always safe to give the
words used their natural, plain and grammatical meaning. The literal meaning should
be preferred when it is clear. The Courts have to content themselves by accepting the
grammatical interpretation as the real intention of the legislature. In absence of
ambiguity, the plain meaning must be given effect to irrespective of its consequences.

In Jugal Kishore v. Raw Cotton Co. [AIR 1955 SC 376], it was held that the cardinal
rule of construction of statues is to read the statute literally, i.e. by giving to the words
used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning.

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The law that a minor’s agreement is void was settled by the Privy Council on a literal
construction of section 11 of Contract Act.

THE MISCHIEF RULE

This rule of interpretation was laid down in the case of Heydon’s Case, in which it was
held four things are to be considered:-

• What was the common law before the making of the Act.
• What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
• What remedy the parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of
commonwealth
• The true reason of the remedy.

This principle is used by the courts to interpret the intention of the legislators. This
aims at finding the mischief and defect in the statute and then providing for remedy for
the same. The main advantage of this rule is that it closes the loopholes in the law and
helps to develop the law. This rule allows the judges to change the meaning of the law
with the view to ensure administration of justice. This rule gives most discretion to the
judges and is suited to the ambiguous cases.

In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India AIR 1957 SC 628 the Parliament

enacted the Prize Competitions Act 1955, the petitioner who were engaged in
promoting and conducting prize competitions in different States of India contended
mainly that the conditions laid down in Section 4 and 5 of the Act and Rules 11 and
12 is made thereunder encroached upon the fundamental right to carry on business
guaranteed by Article 19 (6) of the Constitution and that these amounted to a
prohibition and not merely a regulation of the business. Further, the phrase prize
competition as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act would include not only competitions
in which success depends on chance but also those in which would depend to a
substantial degree on skill and therefore, as the impugned law constituted a single
inseverable element must fall in entirely respect of both kinds of competitions.
Rejecting this, the Supreme Court held that Section 2 (d) of the Act should be
construed keeping in mind the historical background of the Act and the mischief that
was intended to be suppressed. It was held that the State Legislatures moved the
Parliament to enact a legislation under Article 252 with the sole object of regulating
and controlling prize competitions of a gambling nature. Had there been an intention
on the part of the State Legislatures to regulate even those competitions in which
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 success lay substantially on skill, they could themselves have effectively done so
without resorting to the special jurisdiction under Article 252. Further, the use of
the word control in the resolutions of the State Legislatures would not seem
appropriate if it was intended that Parliament should legislate on competitions
involving skill. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the competitions which were
sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those in which success
does not depend to any substantial degree of skill.

In Alamgir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1959 SC 436 the appellant was charged under
Section 498, Indian Penal Code which reads : Whoever takes or entices away any woman
who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, from
that man, or from any person having the care of her on behalf of that man, with intent
that she may have illicit intercourse with any person or conceals or detains with that
intent any such woman, shall be punished with. In the present instance, the married
woman was living with the appellant voluntarily. The question was whether he was
detaining her. The Supreme Court observed that the section contemplates four classes
of cases, viz taking or enticement or concealment or detention. Since the first three
categories are inapplicable in the present instance, the liability of the accused depended
on whether the married woman was being detained by him. It was held that the provision
sought to remedy the mischief of depriving the husband of the company of his wife and
consequently, it was enacted with the object of protecting the rights of the husband.
Therefore, consent or willingness of the wife in depriving her husband of her company
is irrelevant and the appellant was responsible for commission of the offence.

In Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 the appellant was
convicted under Section 292, Indian Penal Code for selling an obscene book titled Lady
Chatterley's Lover. He contended that the prosecution had a duty to prove guilty mind
against him which in this case is the knowledge that the book contained obscene
material. Further, he argued that when there is a very large number of books in a book
shop, the shopkeeper is not expected to go through each book to see as to whether some
books contain obscene literature, the Supreme Court held that there was no ambiguity
in the language of the enactment and that the meaning of Section 292 is clear and
precise.

In the case of Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the mischief rule was applied
to the construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India, observing that it was to
cure the mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of the inter-state

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trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any
provincial barrier that the Constitution makers adopted Article 286 in the Constitution.

THE GOLDEN RULE

This rule is the modification of the principle of grammatical interpretation. According to

this rule, ordinarily the words used in the statute should be given their natural meaning
but if it leads to inconvenience, hardship or injustice, the courts must modify the
meaning to such an extent so as to remove such inconvenience or injustice. So as this
rule solves all problems this is known as Golden Rule. This rule is based on the
assumption that the legislature does not intend certain objects and any construction
leading to any of such objects deserves to be rejected.

The golden rule is a modification of the principle of grammatical interpretation. It says

that ordinarily the court must find out the intention of the legislature from the words
used in the statute by giving them their natural meaning but if this leads to absurdity,
repugnance, inconvenience, hardship, injustice or evasion, the Court must modify the
meaning to such an extent and no further as would prevent such a consequence. On
the face of it, this rule solves all problems and is, therefore, known as the golden rule.
Further, since the literal meaning is modified to some extent, this approach is called the
modifying method of interpretation. This rule, therefore, suggests that consequences or
effects of an interpretation deserve a lot more importance because these are clues to the
true meaning of a legislation. There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend
certain objects and any construction leading to any of such objects deserves to be
rejected. The court when faced with more than one possible interpretation of an
enactment is entitled to take into consideration the result of each interpretation in a bid
to arrive at the true intention of the legislature.

There may be cases where even though literal interpretation may include certain
consequences not intended by the legislature, the court shall not so interpret because
some lawful justification is available far doing so. Similarly, an Act may be construed
within a limited scope even though the language does not specifically so provide. In
certain other situations, a statute may be given a restricted interpretation on the basis
of the object of it although the grammatical construction would carry its operation for
beyond. Whenever, more than one construction are possible, that which seems
reasonable will be given effect to. The Court will try to avoid unreasonable, inconvenient
and anomalous results. When the consequence of an interpretation is manifest injustice

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the court will generally hesitate to give effect to it. Similarly, a construction leading to
an absurd conclusion will be rejected. The duty of the court is to suppress all evasions
for the continuance of the mischief which the statute is supposed to control.

In State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum AIR 1963 SC 1604 the respondent made
an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for reference to the
civil court within six months from her knowledge of the award regarding compensation
whereas the section says that such reference would be made within six months from
the date of the award. Holding that the application was within time, the Supreme Court
held that unless an award of compensation comes to the knowledge, either actually or
constructively, how can a reference, if any, be made against the award. Therefore, justice
and fair play required that the counting of the limitation period must begin from the
date of knowledge of the award.

In the case of Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, the supreme court
held that the expression “landless person’’ used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Brij
Kishore, the supreme court held that the expression “landless person’’ used in Section
14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made provision for grant of land to persons,
was limited to “landless laborers’’. A landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture
but having no agricultural land. The Court further said that “any landless person” did
not include a landless businessman residing in a city. The object of the Act was to
implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at distribution of land to landless
labors who were verged in agriculture.

HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

This rule of interpretation is adopted in those cases where arises a conflict between two
or more statutes or between the two provisions of the same statute. The rule follows
the principle that every statute has some purpose for which it is enacted, so it should
be read as a whole. So the enactment which makes the enactment a consistent whole
should be the aim of the courts and a construction which avoids inconsistency should
be adopted.

When two or more provisions of the same statute are repugnant, the court will try to
construe the provisions in such a manner, if possible, as to give effect to both by
harmonising them with each other. The court may do so by regarding two or more
apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with separate situations or by holding that

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one provision merely provides for an exception of the general rule contained in the other.
The question as to whether separate provisions of the same statute are overlapping or
are mutually exclusive may, however, be very difficult to determine. The basis of the
principle of harmonious construction probably is that the legislature must not have
intended to contradict itself. This principle has been applied in a very large number of
cases dealing with interpretation of the Constitution. It can be assumed that when the
legislature gives something by one hand it does not take away the same by the other.
One provision of an Act does not make another provision of the same Act useless. The
legislature cannot be presumed to contradict itself by enacting apparently two
conflicting provisions in the same Act.

In State of Bombay v. FN. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 while deciding upon the
constitutionality of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, enacted by the Bombay
Legislature, whereby restrictions on production and sale of liquor were put. The SC
observed that the expression possession and sale occurring in Entry 31 of List II are to
be read without any qualification. Under that entry the State Legislature has the power
to prohibit possession, use and sale of intoxicating liquor absolutely. The word import
in Entry 19 of List I standing by itself does not include with sale or possession of the
article imported into country by a person residing in the territory into which it is
imported There is therefore there is no real conflict between Entry 31 of List II and Entry
19 of List I.

In T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka , while interpreting Articles 29 and 30 of

the Constitution the SC observed that when constitutional provisions are interpreted, it
has to be borne in mind that the interpretation should be such as to further its mischief.
They cannot be read in isolation and have to be read harmoniously to provide meaning
and purpose. They cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders another provision
redundant.

The Supreme Court laid down following rules of harmonious construction in the case
of CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers:-

1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and
they must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in
another unless the court, despite all its efforts, is unable to find a way to reconcile
their differences. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in

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 contradictory provisions, the courts must interpret them in such as way so that
effect is given to both the provisions as much as possible.
3. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to
a useless number or dead is not harmonious construction.

In M.S.M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha, the petitioner, an editor of a newspaper, was asked
to show cause as to why should he not be punished for a breach or privilege of the
House guaranteed by Article 194 (3) of the Constitution for publishing a speech made
in the state Legislative Assembly without expunging certain remarks as directed by the
Speaker.

In a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, he argued that the proposed action
against him would be contrary to the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that expediency demanded
that Articles 19(1) (a) and 194 (3) had to be harmoniously interpreted. To give effect to
both these provisions, it was necessary to hold that fundamental right of freedom of
speech and expression under Article 19(1) (a) was subject to the privileges of houses
guaranteed by Article 194(3). The petition was, therefore, dismissed.

BENEFICAL CONSTRUCTION

A beneficial statute confers benefit on individuals if any provision is ambiguous so that

is capable of two meanings, one of which would preserve the benefit and another which
would take it away, the meaning which preserves it should be adopted. The basis of this
rule is that the courts should be generous towards the persons on whom benefits has
been conferred by the statute. It involves giving widest meaning to statute.

The Supreme Court held in the case of Spring Meadows Hospital v. H. Ahluwalia, that if
the parents have hired the services of a hospital for the benefit of their child they and
the child can maintain independent actions against the hospital for deficient services.

In Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohammad Quasium, the Supreme Court held that the rights
of maintenance of children below two years of age and the mother under Section 125 of
the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 are independent of each other and any
subsequent legislation like the Muslim Women (Protection of rights on Divorce) Act,
1986 could not affect the same in absence of clear provision to the effect.

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 NOSCITUR A SOCIIS RULE

The rule of ‘noscitur a sociis’ is based on the maxims: “A man is known by the company
he keeps” and “Birds of a feather, flock together”. The rule says that words used in an
Act of Parliament derive their meaning with reference to words found in immediate
connection with them.

Maxwell in ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ says that ‘when two or more words are clubbed
together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were,
their colour from each other i.e., the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to
a less general.’

Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis. The philosophy behind the rule is that the meaning of the doubtful word may be
ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. The word ‘noscitur’
means to know and ‘sociis’ means the association or society.

In State of Karnataka v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 68 the question of interpreting

the word powers as appearing in Article 194 (30) of the Constitution was involved. This
word has been used in the company of words 'privileges' and immunities of a House of
a Legislature. The Supreme Court observed that the word must take its meaning from
the associated words, and thus interpreted it must mean such powers of a house as are
necessary for the conduct of its business and not legislative powers.

In Pradeep Agarbatti Ludhiana State of Punjab, AIR 1998 SC 171 the word
perfumery' had to be interpreted in entry 16 of schedule of the Punjab General Sales
Tax Act, 1948 which reads 'cosmetics, perfumery and toilet goods, excluding tooth paste,
tooth powder, kumkum and soap. Applying the noscitur a sociis rule the Supreme Court
ruled that the word could mean only such articles are the cosmetics and toilet goods
and therefore, this cannot mean dhoop and agarbatti.

EJUSDEM GENERIS

The expression ejusdem generis means of the same kind. Normally general words should
be given their natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires
otherwise. But when a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the
general word may be given a restricted meaning of the same category. The general
expression takes its meaning from the preceding particular expressions because the
legislature by using the particular words of a distinct genus has shown its intention to

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that effect. This principle is limited in its application to general word following less
general word only If the specific words do not belong to a distinct genus, this rule is
inapplicable. Consequently, if a general word follows only one particular word, that
single particular word does not constitute a distinct genus and therefore, dem generis
rule cannot be applied in such a case. Exceptional stray instances are, however,
available where one word genus have been created by the courts and the general word
following such a genus given a restricted meaning. If the particular words exhaust the
whole genus the general ward following these particular words is construed as
embaracing a large genus. The principle of ejusdem generis is not a universal
application. If the context of a legislation rules out the applicability of this rule, it has
no part to play in the interpretation of general words. The basis of the principle of
ejusdem generis is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in
unrestricted sense, it would not have bothered to use particular words at all.

In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1167 through the Fruit
Products Order, 1955, issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955,
was made obligatory that the percentage of fruit juice in a fruit syrup should be twenty
five. The appellant argued that the order did not apply to its product Rooh Afza even
though it contained fruit juices because clause 2 (d) () of the Order includes squashes,
crushes, cordials, barley water, barrelled juice and ready-to-serve beverages or any
other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp and that the expression any other
beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp should be construed ejusdem generis. The
Supreme Court rejected the contention and held that the rule had no application here
because the things mentioned before the general expression any other beverages
containing fruit juices or fruit pulp did not fall under a determinable genus. Further,
the context makes it clear that all beverages containing fruit juice are intended to be
included.

Noscitur rule is wider than Ejusdum generis rule: It is to be noted that noscitur a
sociis, rule is wider than the ejusdum generis rule, rather the later is an application of
the former. In fact, the doctrine of ejusdum gener is only an illustration or specific
application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis. In noscitur rule the words clubbed
together in a provision of a statue susceptible of having analogous meaning are
understood to be used in their cognate sense and take their colour from each other.

INTRINSIC AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

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 ▪ Internal Sources are always referred together with each other i.e., as a whole.

▪ No provision in a statue can be referred in isolation.

▪ Parliament legislates for a definite purpose and that purpose can be ascertained
by referring to various internal aids.

▪ The whole set up and context of the Act becomes important to know the true
meaning of the provisions and the intention of the legislature.

▪ The major internal aids to which recourse can be taken are:

(i) Title (x) Explanation

(ii) Preamble (xi) Illustration

(iii) Marginal Notes (xii) Schedules

(iv) Proviso (xiii) Definition Clauses

(v) Parliamentary history (xiv) Foreign laws and decisions

(vi) Bills (xv) consolidating statute and previous law.

(vii) Committee reports

(viii) Text books

(ix) Dictionaries

Title

The title although part of the Act is in itself not an enacting provision and though useful
in case of ambiguity of the enacting section, it is ineffective in controlling their clear
meaning. Every Act is given a title to carve out its own identity just like men are given
their names to identify them. All the Acts have both the short title and long title.

The long title which often precedes the Preamble has to be distinguished from the short
title. The long title when taken along with the preamble is a good guide to the object,
scope and purpose of the reference is not a useful aid to construction.

The Long Title describes the Act and does not merely identify the Act like Short Title.
Long Title is part of the Act. Long Title can be used to ascertain the scope and purpose

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of the Act. Long Title is admissible as an aid to Construction. Long title cannot override
the clear meaning of the Act.

Number of sections relating to a particular topic are normally grouped together in the
form of chapters and prefixed by headings. The view is now settled that the Headings or
Titles prefixed to sections or group of sections can be referred to for understanding
various parts of the Act. But conflicting views exist regarding the weight to be given to
headings or titles. According to one view, Headings/Titles: a. Can be referred for
understanding the doubtful expressions b. Cannot be used to restrict the plain words
of the provision Headings/Titles of one group of sections cannot be used to interpret
another group of sections

Preamble

A preamble is very much part of the statue and is put in the beginning of an Act to
define the necessity and purpose behind the enactment. The Courts have always leant
in favour of admissibility of the preamble as an aid to construction of a statue.

The Preamble expresses the scope, object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively
than the Long Title. The Preamble may specify the : a. Reasons for making the statute;
b. Evil (any wrong thing) which the Act expects to rectify. c. The doubts which the Act
intends to settle. The Preamble of a Statute is a part of the enactment and can
legitimately be used for construing the Statute. If the wording of the statute gives rise
to doubts, the Preamble can and ought to be referred to, in order to arrive at the proper
construction. The Preamble does not over-ride the plain provision of the Act

A preamble is often described as a ‘key to open the minds of the makers of the Act.’ The
makers of the Act give the preamble as an abridged statement of the objects, purposes
and grounds for making of the Act. While interpreting, preamble is favoured by the
Courts more than the long title as it gives a deeper and broader scenario of the Act.

Marginal Notes

A Marginal note is the side heading given to every section of a statute which summarizes
the effect of the whole section. The Marginal notes are not considered part of the
provision so they cannot be considered as legitimate aid to construction of the provision
of the section.

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Although there are differences of opinion, the majority view is that “Marginal Notes
attached to a section of the Act cannot be used for understanding the scope of the
section. Notes are only explanatory in nature and do not dilute the rigor of the main
provision. Notes cannot control the meaning of the section if the language used in it is
clear. In exceptional cases, Marginal notes can be referred for understanding the
section. Marginal notes attached to articles of constitution are held as part of the
constitution and therefore can be used for interpreting the Articles.

Proviso

A proviso generally carves out an exception to the general rule enacted in the main
section, and it prevails over the provisions of the section and controls its meaning. The
whole section is read subject to the proviso. In other words, we can say that the role of
a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an
exception to it.

A proviso should be read with the main provision and its object should be found out by
the court. The main part of an enactment cannot be construed without reference to the
proviso. The proviso removes ambiguity of the main section of the enactment. It is
therefore, an accepted rule of interpretation that the section and the proviso. The proviso
removes ambiguity of the main section of the enactment. It is therefore, an accepted
rule of interpretation that the section and the proviso must be read as a whole. What is
the effect of proviso. Does it qualify the main provisions of an Enactment? The normal
function of a ‘proviso’ is: a. To remove something from the main provision; or b. To
qualify something contained in the main provision. A proviso is not interpreted as a
general rule. Where the main provision is not clear, a ‘proviso’ can be looked into to
ascertain the meaning and scope of the main provision. When the main provision is
clear, a ‘proviso’ cannot expand or limit it. A ‘proviso’ to a particular section is applicable
only to the filed covered by such section but not to any other field.

Explanation

An Explanation is added to a section to explain the meaning of words used in a section

and to clarify the intention of the legislature by removing the doubts which might arise
if the explanation was not given. An explanation is appended with a definite purpose
and care should always be taken to construe the explanation consistent with that

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purpose. The explanation does not limit or expand the meaning of the section but only
tries to remove the doubts or confusion, if any.

An Explanation is sometimes added to a section to explain the meaning of words

contained in the section. Explanation should be read so as to clear any ambiguity in the
section. Explanation cannot be read so as to widen the ambit of the section.

Objects of adding an Explanation to a Statutory Provision 1. To explain the meaning

and true intention of the Act. 2. To clarify any vagueness in the main provision. 3. To
provide additional support to the dominant object of the Act 4. To fill up the gap, if any,
in the main provision in order to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. 5. It
cannot take away a statutory right given by main provision. 6. It cannot act as a
hindrance to the interpretation of the Act.

Distinction between Proviso, Exception and Saving Clause

A. Exception - It is intended to restrain main provision to particular case(s).

B. Proviso – It is used to remove special cases from the general provision and deal with
them separately. Plaintiff has to plead for exclusion under exceptions, whereas
defendant has to raise a defense under a proviso. In India no distinction is made
between Exceptions and Proviso either in criminal or civil proceedings.

C. Saving Clause – It is used to preserve certain rights or privileges already existing. It

does not give any new rights.

Illustrations

An illustration is an example or instance added to a section to make clear the meaning

and scope of the section. The illustration are example based on the day to day
transactions of life which make it easy to understand the legal provision in simple and
commonsense meaning. The legal provisions and terminology tend to become abstract
or technical, hence the illustrations try to simplify the meaning by giving he examples
of daily life instances.

Illustrations are attached to the sections. Illustrations do not form part of a section.
Illustration form part of a statute. Illustrations are relevant in understanding the text of
the section and they should not be readily rejected as conflicting with the text of the
section. Illustrations cannot have the effect of modifying the language of the section and
cannot curtail or expand the scope of the section
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Schedules

The statutes are usually divided into parts and Schedules for the purpose of convenience
and easy comprehension of the scheme and layout of the Act. The schedules are
generally put at the end of the Acts and contain the details which are left or cannot be
included in the main Section. Schedules may also contain transitory provisions which
remain in force till the main provisions of the Act are brought into operation and force.

The schedules form part of statute to which they are appended. They often contain
details and prescribed forms for working out the provisions of the statute. Their contents
are taken into consideration by the Courts while interpreting the provisions of the
statue.

Schedules attached to the Act forms part of the Statute. Schedules often contain details
and forms for working out the policy underlying the sections of the statute. Schedules
are used to avoid excessive details to being included in sections of the Act. Schedules
can be used for construing the Act. Schedules cannot over-ride plain provisions of the
Act. In case of conflict between schedule and the main provisions of the Act, the main
provisions shall prevail.

Definition Clause

The terms and expression used in the statute are generally defined in the beginning of
the statute. The definition clause is inserted to avoid the unnecessary repetition of the
definition every time the word or expression is used in the statue. The definition of a
term given in the definition clause qualifies the entire statue and that term is understood
subject to the definition given in the beginning, ‘unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context’.

In Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998)8 SCC1, it was

observed that in construing the meaning of the definitions, the Courts has not only to
look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the subject of such
words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the
use of the words ‘under those circumstances’.

The function of a definition is to given should not be uncertain and vague. In doing so,
it has to be remembered that the meaning given should not contradict or supplant the
word or phrase it defines.

Definitions are normally given in the statute to explain the meaning of certain words or
phrases used in it. When a definition to a particular word or phrase is given in the Act,
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then such meaning alone shall be considered in interpreting any section of the Act which
uses that word or phrase. Courts cannot ignore the statutory definition and try to
extract true meaning of the word in some other way. It is only when a statute does not
contain the definition of a particular word or phrase, it becomes the duty of court to
ascertain the meaning of such words.

Purpose of Definitions

1. To provide a key to the proper interpretation of the Act;

2. To shorten the language of the Act by avoiding frequent repetitions of the meaning of
same words. A. Restrictive Definition When the definition of a word starts with ‘MEANS’,
it is said to be restrictive. Such definition is exhaustive that is to say, scope of such
definition cannot be enlarged beyond what is expressly stated in such definition. A
definition which begins with the words “means and includes” can also said to be
exhaustive. The definition of company as given in Sec.2(20) is restrictive as it provides
that “Company means a Co incorporated under CA,2013 or previous company law’

Extensive Definitions

When the definition of a word starts with ‘INCLUDES’, it is said to be extensive. The
scope of such definition is not restricted to what is expressly stated in it. The definition
of body corporate as given in Sec.2(11) is extensive as it provides that “Body Corporate
includes a company incorporated outside India” The word ‘include’ is generally used in
interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in
the body of the statute. Definitions which starts with the phrases ‘to apply to and
include’ or ‘is deemed to include’ are also said to be extensive. The words ‘deemed to
include’ are used to bring something within the word so defined, which according to its
ordinary meaning is not included within it.

Ambiguous Definitions

Normally definitions are used in the Act to clarify meaning of certain words used. But
sometimes, the definition section may itself be ambiguous and may have to be
interpreted in the light of other provisions of the Act and having regard to the ordinary
meaning of the word so ambiguously defined. A Definition is not to be read in isolation.
It must be read in the context of the phrase which it defines. Sometimes the ambiguity
in the definition arises because of its bad drafting and the court may have to recast it
to bring out its clear meaning.

Definitions contrasting with context

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When a word has been defined in the interpretation clause that definition governs
whenever that word is used in the body of the statute. But where the context makes the
definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, a defined word when used in
the body of the statute may have to be given a meaning different from that contained in
the interpretation clause. Therefore, all definitions given in an interpretation clause are
normally enacted subject to the qualification i.e., ‘unless the context otherwise requires’.
Even in the absence of an express qualification to that effect, such a qualification is
always implied. Definitions with multiple meanings – When a word is defined to bear a
number of inclusive meanings, the sense in which the word is used in a particular
provision must be ascertained from the: a. Context of the scheme of the Act; b. The
language of the provision; c. The object intended to be served.

Parliamentary History

At the time of passage of an Act, the Parliamentary history of the legislation as the
necessity of the Act, the Bills presented, the debates etc. have been treated by the
English Courts and the Supreme Court of India as not to be admissible as an aid to the
construction. However, this rule of exclusion of parliamentary history has been
circumscribed by the Supreme Court and in few cases has been consulted in resolving
ambiguities.

Bills

There are many stages in the passage of an Act and the process is initiated by the
introduction of a bill in the legislature which is debated extensively before its passage
into an Act. The debates on a Bill are not admissible for construction of the Act.

Committee Reports

Before the framing of the Bill, usually the matter is referred to a committee to consider
it in detail and give its report thereon. Very recently, the Criminal Law Amendment Act,
2013 (Anti-Rape Law) was passed based on the recommendations of the JS Verma
Committee Report.

Text Books

The Courts, while construing and enactment, may refer to the standard textbooks to
clear the meaning. But the Courts are not bound to accept the view taken by the author
in a particular case and is always free to take the help of other materials. So, it is the
discretion of the Court either to accept or reject the view taken in the textbook.

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The Supreme Court has taken the help from various Indian and foreign textbooks to
ascertain the true position of law. It has frequently referred to Manusmriti,
Arthshashtra, Yagnvalkya smriti and other books. In the famous case of Keshavananda
Bharti, a large number of textbooks were referred.

Dictionaries

When a word used in the statue is not defined therein or its meaning is not clear, the
courts may refer to the Dictionary meaning of that word. A word bears different
meanings in different contexts and the construction in consonance with the long
standing practice is permissible. If the term is defined in the Act, then it is not
permissible to refer to its general meanings as defined in the Dictionaries. Also
dictionary meaning of a word is not referred when a plain reading of the provision brings
out what was intended.

When a word is not defined in the Act, then it is permissible to refer dictionaries to find
out the general sense in which a word is understood in common parlance. In selection
one meaning out of several meanings given in a Dictionary, consideration shall be given
to the context in which the words appear in the Act. Meaning of technical and legal
words shall be construed in technical and legal sense. Dictionary meaning cannot be
adopted if it will make some existing words redundant or will require reading of some
additional words. Meaning of a word given in judicial decisions, on statutes of same or
similar subject, have more weight than the meaning furnished by dictionaries.

Foreign Laws and Decisions

Sometimes various domestic Acts and Laws are influenced by the foreign laws,
international treaties or conventions. For a clear constriction a precedent foreign statute
may be referred. For example in National Insurance Co Ltd. v. Swarn Singh, AIR 2004
SC 1531, in interpreting Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, its precedent
English Statute was referred to give it a beneficent interpretation.

Decisions given by courts: a. In foreign countries following the same jurisprudence (legal
system) as India; b. On laws similar to Indian Laws. Can be used lawfully for understand
the Indian Acts.

First importance shall be given to the: i. Language of the Indian Statutes; ii.
Circumstances under which Indian Statute is enacted; iii. Indian conditions where the
Statute is to be applied. In other words, the statutory construction must be home-spun
even if hospitable to alien thinking.

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Apart from the link of English Common Law and Jurisprudence and similarity of
political thought, the use of English Language as authoritative text of Indian Statutes
is another factor which obliges the Indian Courts in taking recourse to foreign
precedents of English Speaking Countries.

In cases concerning an International Convention, foreign decisions are more readily

used for guiding the Court.

Consolidating Statutes & Previous Law

Consolidating Statutes are indicated by expressions such as “An Act to consolidate” in

the preamble to such Act. e. In case of purely consolidating statutes the presumption is
that such a statute is not intended to alter the law. Therefore it is relevant to refer the
previous law and judicial decisions interpreting the previous law, to understand the
corresponding provisions in the consolidating Act. f. The primary rule of construction of
a consolidation Act is to examine the language used in the Act itself without any
reference to previous law. It is only when the consolidation Act gives no guidance to its
proper interpretation that it is permissible to refer the repealed enactments for guidance.
g. A Consolidating Act may further be an amending Act indicated by expressions such
as “An Act to consolidate and amend”. In such cases, it may not be appropriate to refer
the provisions of repealed enactment when the consolidating statute deals with the same
subject in different terms.

Historical Setting

History of the external circumstances which led to the passing of an Act is of much
significance in understanding such Act. b. History in general and parliamentary history
in particular all are relevant in understanding the Act. c. One should also consider
whether the present Act was intended to alter the previous Act or leave where it stood
before. d. Historical evolution of a provision in the statute is also sometimes a useful
guide to its construction. e. Like any other external aid, the inferences from historical
facts and surrounding circumstances must give way to the clear language employed in
the Act itself.

Earlier & Later Acts & Analogous Acts

Analogous Acts h. Where there are different statutes dealing with same or similar
subject, they shall be taken and construed together as one system and as explanatory
of each other. i. The above rule applies: a. Even if such different statutes are made at
different times; b. Even if some of such different statutes are expired; c. Even if one

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statute is not referring to other statute. • If two Acts are to be read together then every
part of each Act has to construed as if contained in one composite Act. • If there is some
clear discrepancy then it is necessary to hold that later Act has modified the earlier Act.

Later Act Explained by Earlier Act. When a Statute is repealed and re-enacted and
words in the repealed statute are reproduced in the new statute, such words should be
given same meaning in the new act as that of the meaning given by judiciary to such
words in repealed Act. However, when the new legislation, although re-enacting many
provisions from earlier statutes, contains a good deal of fresh material and deals with a
subject on which social views have drastically changed, it may not be proper to rely on
the earlier authorities for construing the new legislation. Further, when there is no
ambiguity in the re-enacted statute, it may not be permissible to refer the previous
legislation or decisions rendered there under. C. Earlier Act explained by Later Act. Not
only Later Act be construed in the light of Earlier Act, sometimes Later Act also furnishes
some insights to interpret the earlier Act, if: a. They both deal with same or similar
subject; and b. The Earlier Act is ambiguous.

Reference to Repealed Act Where a part of the Act has been repealed, then such part
may still be considered for understanding the un-repealed part. This is because;
repealed part now becomes a history of the Act.

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