CASE SUMMARY
01 Fernandez vs. Sto. Petitioners Fernandez and de Lima are CSC (Civil Service Commission) Directors
Tomas serving at the CSC Central Office in QC. Respondents CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas and
CSC Commissioner Ereneta issued a Resolution by virtue of which petitioner Fernandez
was assigned in Region 5 and de Lima was assigned in Region 3. Petitioners are now
questioning the validity of the Resolution claiming that the Resolution effected the
“abolition” of public offices, something which may be done only by the same legislative
authority which had created those public offices in the first place. The Supreme Court
disagreed and dismissed the petition.
02 Laurel vs. Desierto In this case, petitioner-Public Officer Laurel was the chairman of NCC (National
Centennial Commission, the committee was mandated “to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial ) and CEO of
Expocorp (a corporation created for the execution of different projects under NCC).
He was charged with violation of graft and corrupt practices act due to irregularities in
public bidding and was referred to Ombudsman for investigation. Laurel contended that
he was not a public officer and therefore Ombudsman has no jurisdiction.
Supreme court denied the petition and ruled that he is a public officer and the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over his person.
SC said that a public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law,
by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of
sovereign functions (MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR), its creation by law and not by
contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office. Here, NCC & Expocorp is performing an
executive functions.
DOCTRINE/S
The term “public office” is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the
public. It is essential to note that none of the “changes in organization” introduced by the
Resolution carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of
public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of
sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as
an office.
Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who
public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that
provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: A public office is the right,
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
CASE SUMMARY
03 Request of CJ CJ Panganiban asked the SC to recomputed his years of government service to include
Panganiban his stints as Legal Consultant to the DepEd and to the DepEd secretary and as
Consultant to the Board of National Education. Should these stints be deemed
government service, CJ Panganiban will be credited with an additional 3 years of
government service, making him eligible for the retirement benefits under the law as his
total government service will now increase from 11+ years to 15+ years. The SC granted
CJ Panganiban’s petition to credit 3 additional years of government service, but Justice
Brion dissented, saying that CJ Panganiban’s work as a consultant does not meet the
elements of a valid government service and therefore, should not be credited in favor of
CJ Panganiban.
04 Cornejo vs. Petitioner Cornejo was suspended as the municipal president of Pasay, Rizal. He seeks
Gabriels the reversal of his suspension alleging that he was deprived of an office without due
process of law. On the other hand, Respondents allege that all they did was to comply
with the requirements of the law (see footnore 1; Art. IV of Chap. 57 of the Admin Code).
The issue is WON there is a lack of due process in suspending the Petitioner? The SC
ruled in the negative. The SC held that (see doctrines).
DOCTRINE/S
Ponencia:
The Supreme Court follows the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon retirement
claims of judges and justices.
The law does not require a specific job description and job specification. Thus, the
absence of a specific position in a governmental structure is not a hindrance for the Court
to give weight to CJ Panganiban’s government service as legal counsel and consultant.
J. Brion’s Dissent:
Rendering "government service" within the meaning of the law requires that:
The person occupies, by appointment or by election, a public office that was created by
law, not simply by contract; and
The office requires him to render service in the performance of a governmental function.
• Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by
means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is
purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial
process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative
proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles.
• In certain proceedings of an administrative character the right to a notice and
hearing are not essential to due process of law.
• It is well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the
sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law but is a public trust or
agency.
• (Pinaka-related sa topic) The basic idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as
in the United States, is that of a popular representative government, the officers being
mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office
pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom
he represents.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
05 Mathay vs. CA Then QC Mayor Simon appointed private respondents to positions in the Civil Service A review of the provisions of B.P. 337 shows that the power to appoint rests exclusively
Unit (“CSU”) of the local government of Quezon City, created pursuant to PD No. 51. with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council or
CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing all Civil Service Regional or Field sanggunian through the simple expedient of enacting ordinances that provide for the
Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within one year from issuance of the said Memo, “absorption” of specific persons to certain positions.
all appointments in CSUs created pursuant to the PD. For Quezon City CSU employees,
the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned by the enactment of City Ordinance The power of the city council or sanggunian is limited to creating, consolidating and
No. NC-140, Series of 1990, which established the Department of Public Order and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by local funds.
Safety (DPOS). However, regular and permanent positions in DPOS were not filled due
to lack of funds for the new DPOS and the insufficiency of regular and permanent The Civil Service Commission’s power is limited to approving or disapproving an
positions created. Mayor Simon remedied the situation by offering private respondents appointment.
contractual appointments for June 5, 1991 to Dec 31, 1991. They were renewed by
Mayor Simon (Jan 1, 1992 to June 30, 1992). Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of
Quezon City. On July 1, he renewed the contractual appointments of all private
respondents effective July 1 to July 31, 1992. Upon their expiry, these appointments,
however, were no longer renewed. SC held that: (1) CSC has no authority to direct
petitioner to reinstate private respondents in the DPOS; (2) Even assuming the validity of
Sec. 3 of the Ordinance, the absorption contemplated therein is not possible; and (3) the
standing of CSC to bring this present appeal is questionable.

06 Morfe vs. Mutuc Judge Jesus Morfe filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of a specific provision in
(1968) the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (AGCPA) requiring public officers to submit
sworn statements of assets and liabilities (SALs) on the ground that the requirement is an
oppressive exercise of police power and constitutes an unlawful invasion of the right to
privacy. CFI granted the petition. However, the SC held that though liberty is restricted,
under the Constitution, such is allowable as long as due process is observed. Since
petitioner’s office is a public trust, he is subject to more compulsory revelation. Petition
dismissed.
• While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such
not amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing
the proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the
Constitution the mantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked.
• Due process may be relied upon by a public official to protect the security of tenure
which in that limited sense is analogous to property.

07 Segovia vs. Noel Segovia was appointed justice of the peace until when he was ordered by the Secretary
of Justice to vacate the office. He was already more than 65 years old. Segovia was
replaced by Noel, who was then the auxiliary justice of the peace. Segovia filed a petition
for quo warranto proceedings in the CFI to seek reinstatement as justice of the peace.
CFI ruled in favor of Segovia. Whether or not Segovia should be reinstated to his office.
The SC ruled that he be reinstated because the Act No. 3107 which amended Sec. 203
of the Administrative Code should not be applied retroactively. The re is no manifest
legislative intent to apply the said law retroactively.
A public office cannot be regarded as the property of the incumbent. A public office is not
a contract.
Though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet
the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away by
statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated."
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
08 National Land EO 659 authorized the restructuring of the LRC to the NALTDRA. Garcia (previously Abolition of a position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal
Titles vs. CSC Deputy Register of Deeds III) was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. After abolition,
on 1 Oct 1984, under temporary status for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense
Eventually she was terminated. CSC directed her reinstatement on the ground of the that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
vested right theory. SC reversed this. does not arise.

Abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith
suffers no infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was the abolition carried out by a
legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good faith?

There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute

right to hold it. Except constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its
salary. None of the exceptions to this rule apply to this case.

09 Secretary of DOTC Petitioner DOTC Secretary issued an order directing LTFRB to transfer regional functions Delegated Power to create Public Office
vs. Mabalot to the DOTC-CAR regional office. Respondent Mabalot filed certiorari and prohibition A public office may be created through any of the following modes:
against the order decalring it illegal and without effect. Lower Court issued TRO and WPI. (1) by the Constitution,
DOTC Secretary issued an order establishing the DOTC-CAR regional office as regional (2) by law, or
office of the LTFRB. Respondent assailed the order through a supplemental Petition. (3) by authority of law;
Lower court ruled in favor of the respondent.
Verily Congress can delegate the power to create abolish or merge offices/positions.
Congress has vested power in the President to reorganize executive agencies and
redistribute functions, and particular transfers under such statutes have been held to be
SC reversed and held that the DOTC issuances are valid pursuant to the delegated within the authority of the President.
power from Congress to the President to reorganize agencies and redistribute executive
functions, and such reorganization was made in good faith. It was also did not breach Control
constitutional provisions since the orders are mere designations. Further, offices held in The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
the exercise of primary functions are valid and there is no evidence of double had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
compensation. that of the latter.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

The members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the President
since they are merely his alter ego. Without minimizing the importance of the heads of
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Thus, their acts, “performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.

Reorganization – Good Faith

Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith, and, as a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient.

Designation
To designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional
duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. Or in some cases, a public
CASE SUMMARY
10 Laurel vs. Desierto,
supra
11 Gonzales vs. The Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice.
Hechanova Petitioner assails this on the ground that under the law (RAs 3452 which repealed RA
2207), the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency is prohibited
from importing. Respondents’ argued that the law apply to them because the prohibition
is only against government agencies and not the government itself and that the
government itself is not a government agency. SC held that each and every officer and
employee of our Government, are government agencies and/or agents.
12 Maniego vs. Maniego was appointed as a laborer in the office of a municipal court judge. He was
People convicted by the Court of Appeals of violating Art 210 of the RPC. (Essentially, the
complainant stated that Maniego fixed the complainant’s traffic violation case in
exchange for P10. Maniego prepared the motion for dismissal and the judge approved.)
Maniego contends that he should be acquitted of the charge because he was not a public
officer and his act was not related to his official functions as a laborer. SC held that a
person appointed as a laborer is a public officer within the meaning of article 203 of
the Revised Penal Code. For the purposes of the Penal Code, the standard
distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and "employee” is obliterated.
Where a person, although originally appointed as a mere laborer is, on several
occasions, designated or given the work of preparing motions for dismissal of
traffic cases, he is deemed temporarily discharging such public functions and if in
the performance thereof he accepts, even solicits, a monetary reward, he is guilty of
bribery.
13 Preclaro vs. Preclaro is the Project Manager/Consultant of Industrial Technology Development
Sandiganbayan Institute (ITDI) on contractual basis, who is tasked to supervise the construction of the
ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building. In evaluating the Change Order for the construction, he told
the Project Engineer of the contractor, Engr. Resoso, that the additional expenses are
deductive instead of additive, meaning the contractor shall bear the expenses for the
changes to be made instead of increasing the contract price. However, he intimidated
that he can forget about the deductive provided he gets P200,000.00. He was charged
before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
after he was caught by the NBI in an entrapment. He questions the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because he claims that he is not a public officer for not being appointed
nor elected. See doctrine.
DOCTRINE/S
The individual so invested [with a public office] is a public officer.
Under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a “public official”
whether or not one receives compensation.
each and every officer and employee of our Government, is a government agency and/or
agent.
A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or
employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the
former are those of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which
may have a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government, as
such.
A person appointed as a laborer is a public officer within the meaning of article 203
of the Revised Penal Code. For the purposes of the Penal Code, the standard
distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and "employee” is obliterated.
Where a person, although originally appointed as a mere laborer is, on several
occasions, designated or given the work of preparing motions for dismissal of
traffic cases, he is deemed temporarily discharging such public functions and if in
the performance thereof he accepts, even solicits, a monetary reward, he is guilty of
bribery.
PD 807 provides for the classification of public officers as either career or non-career
service. Non-career-service includes contractual personnel or those whose employment
in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or
job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and
performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a
minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
CASE SUMMARY
14 Azarcon vs. Azarcon, a private individual, was charged with the crime of malversation under Art. 217,
Sandiganbayan RPC. His case was tried in the Sandiganbayan and he was found guilty. However, upon
review by the SC, the ruling of the Sandiganbayan was reversed and set aside by reason
of “lack of jurisdiction” because said private individual never became a “public officer” and
that under the laws on jurisdiction at that time, only public officers and those charged as
“co-principals, accomplices or accessories” of such public officers may be tried by the
Sandiganbayan.
15 Gaspar v CA With the issuance of EO 81-01, Gaspar was appointed to Administrative Officer II from
his prior position of Chief of the Security Section of the Parks Development Office (PDO).
Lanting, then Senior Accounting Clerk of PDO, filed with the Merits System Board (MSB)
a protest against his appointment, contending that she was better qualified for the office.
The MSB revoked Gaspar’s appointment and directed Lanting’s appointment to the
office. Upon Gaspar’s appeal to the CSC, the CSC affirmed the MSB’s judgment, holding
that Lanting is better qualified and more competent for appointment as Administrative
Officer II. The SC SET ASIDE the CSC’s resolution. In a previous case, Luego vs. CSC
and Tuozo, the SC already held that in cases like this, all the CSC is actually allowed to
do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility
or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission
when it acts on an appointment made by the proper authorities.
16 Aguila v Genato Private respondent Borje was elected Director of MOELCI II (an electric cooperative). PD
269 provides that elective officers, except barrio captains and councilors, shall be
ineligible to become officers or directors of any cooperative. A similar provision is also
found in the MOELCI II’s By-Laws. NEA issued a memorandum stating that officials and
employees of electric cooperatives who run for public office, win and assume office, shall
be considered resigned.
Later on, Borje ran for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Ozamis City. He won. Borje requested National Electrification Administration (NEA) that
he may serve the unexpired portion of his term as a member of the BODs. This was
denied by NEA. CFI ruled in favor of Borje saying that he is exempted from the
prohibition of the law. SC ruled otherwise and held that eligibility to an office should be
construed as of a continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of the term
and during occupancy of the office. The fact that Borje may have been qualified at the
time he assumed the Directorship is not sufficient to entitle him to continue holding office,
if during the continuance of his incumbency he ceases to be qualified.
DOCTRINE/S
Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified
therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged
with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the
National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer.
The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best
qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing
authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in an office calls for
both formal and informal qualifications.
Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course,
seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness,
team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best
interests of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be
left to the Head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are
satisfied.
The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of
Office in this regard.
A director of a cooperative who is subsequently elected a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod becomes automatically disqualified from continuing as such director per P.D.
269.
Eligibility to an office is of a continuing nature and must exist both at the commencement
and during one’s occupancy of an office.
CASE SUMMARY
17 Lecaroz v Petitioners are the Mayor of Santa Cruz and his son, the outgoing KB chairman and SB
Sandiganbayan representative of the municipality. In the 1985 KB election, Red won as Chairman.
Subsequently, he was also appointed by Pres. Marcos as SB member and took an oath
before a member of the Batasang Pambansa. However, Mayor Lecaroz refused to
recognize Red as KB and SB member until his appointment was cleared by the
Governor. When Red received his appointment papers, he did not immediately forward
them to the mayor. Months later, when he finally forwarded the documents, Mayor
Lecaroz still refused to let him sit as KB and SB member. During this time (1986-87), the
mayor prepared and approved 26 sets of payroll in favor of his son, Lenlie, in the belief
that the latter was entitled to assume the position of KB and SB member in a holdover
capacity. It was only 3 years later when Red finally received a confirmation of his
appointment from the Aquino Administration.
DOCTRINE/S
The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law
that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that
term but until their successors have been elected and qualified.
An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full
investiture with the office. Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of
oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete.

Red then filed several criminal complaints against petitioners before the office of the
Ombudsman, which later on filed 13 Informations for estafa and one Information for
violation of RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. The court found the petitioners guilty of
all counts of estafa but acquitted Mayor Lecaroz on the charge of violation of RA 3019.
Sandiganbayan ruled that since Red’s appointment was valid, Lenlie could not assume
the positions in a holdover capacity. On appeal to the SC, the court reversed the
conviction and found that Red’s appointment was invalid due to failure to take a valid
oath, thus enabling Lenlie to continue being KB and SB member in a holdover capacity.
As such, Lenlie was entitled to the salaries he received. Also, SC found that absent intent
and malice, petitioners cannot be found guilty of estafa.

18 Flores vs. Drilon Olongapo City Mayor Richard J. Gordon was appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive An incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to RA 7227. Petitioners assail government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his
the constitutionality of Sec13(d) of the said law, arguing that it infringes on Constitutional ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective
and statutory provisions. The Court held that the said provisions is unconstitutional and, official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto
consequently, Richard Gordon’s appointment as Chairman and CEO of SBMA is invalid. cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
The subject proviso violates Section 8, Art IX-B of the Constitution which prohibits the
appointment of an elective official to any public office or position during his tenure. Since
the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office. The Court also held that it infringes on the
appointing authority of the President when the provision states that only one can qualify
for the posts in question (i.e. mayor of Olongapo City). Hence, the President is precluded
from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of
appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against
the very nature itself of appointment. The Court added that since an incumbent elective
official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto
cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
CASE SUMMARY
19 Public Interest Respondent Mr. Magdangal B. Elma was appointed both as Chairman of the Presidential
Center vs. Elma Commission on Good Government (CPCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
(CPLC) by President Estrada. Petitioners filed an original action before the SC raising
that the appointment was unconstitutional for violating ART VII Sec 13 and ART IX-B
Section 7.
The controversy was actually rendered moot by the ouster of Erap and the appointment
of new individuals by Gloria in the subject positions.
Nonetheless, the SC still ruled that that the appointment of Elma was unconstitutional for
violating ART IX-B. As held, said provision allows appointment to two different positions
provided they are not incompatible. But, in this case, the positions
were incompatible because the CPLC as part of his/ her functions must review actions
done by the CPCGG (i.e. conflict of interest). As for ART VII, SC held it was inapplicable
in this case, because it only covers appointments as Cabinet Secretaries,
Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries (e.g. DAR, DA, DOLE) and the two positions is
not a Cabinet Secretary position even if they might be given the same rank (i.e. non
Cabinet position).
20 Liban vs. Gordon This is an MR filed by respondent Gordon of the 2009 Decision which ruled that the
respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of
the PNRC Board of Governors. However, the decision also rendered null and void the
PNRC Charter, which is the subject of this MR. The Court ruled in this MR that PNRC’s
structure is a sui generis, and therefore its charter should not be rendered null and void.
21 Debulgado vs. Mayor Rogelio appointed Victoria, his wife, as the head of the Office of General Services.
CSC There were three other employees who were considered for the position. Before her
promotion, Victoria had been in government service for 32 years. The CSC received a
letter calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor
of his wife. The CSC recalled the approval issued by Director Escobia and disapproved
the promotion of petitioner Victoria upon the ground that the promotion violated the
statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments.
The Court held that It follows that the promotional appointment of Victoria by her
husband, petitioner Mayor, falls within the prohibited class of appointments. Section 59,
Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: it refers
to "all appointments" whether original or promotional in nature
DOCTRINE/S
General Rule is that ART IX-B permits an appointive official to hold more than one office
if allowed by law or the primary functions of his position provided that these requisites are
present:
1. Allowed by law
2. Allowed by primary functions of the positions
3. No incompatibility to the two positions
4. At least one of the position is NOT as Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants
EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION (exception to exception no. 4 in list above)
a. Section 3 ART VII authorizing the VP to become a member of the Cabinet
b. Additional post is exercised in ex officio capacity, there is no additional
compensation and the Additional duties however must not only be closely related to but
must be required by the primary function of the official
Test of incompatibility was laid out in People vs Green wherein if the other office/ position
is subordinate to the other in the sense that one has the right to interfere with the other
(From the original decision kasi walang doctrine in the MR)
• The Philippine National Red Cross Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does
the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman.
Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not
hold a government office or employment, and therefore the Constitutional prohibition.
The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel
actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, re-employment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including,
of course, the prohibition against nepotism
CASE SUMMARY
22 CSC vs. Cortes Maricelle was being appointed as Information Officer V (IO V) of CHR. Her father, Eligio
Mallari, who is a CHR Commisioner abstained from voting and requested the CHR to
render an opinion on the legality of her appointment. CHR Legal Division Chief Atty.
Lamorena rendered an opinion that Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on
nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality
distinct and separate from its members.
CHR Chairperson Quisumbing sent a letter to Maricelle telling her not to assume her
position because her appointment is not yet complete. Upon investigation of CSC-NCR
Field Office, the appointment of Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the rule on
nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions. and that Mallari, her father is considered an appointing authority
(being a member of CHR en Banc). CSC affirmed the nepotic character of Cortes’
appointment. CHR Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge Cardona terminated Cortes. CA
nullified and ordered reinstatement. SCreversed CA. MAricelle's appointment is covered
by the prohibition against nepotism.
23 CSC vs. Dacoycoy A certain George Suan of the Citizens Crime Watch filed a complaint against responded
Gacoycoy for habitual drunkness, misconduct, and nepotism (for appointing his two sons
as driver and utility worker). CSC found him guilty of nepotism and dismissed him from
service. This was reversed by the CA on the ground that it was not respondent himself
who appointed or recommended his two sons. Upon appeal to the SC, the Court held
that CA was wrong because Section 59 of EO 252 because it suffices that the
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the person exercise immediate supervision over the appointee.
In this case, while the recommendation did not come from respondent Gacoycoy himself,
it was made by one Mr. Dacuag who was a subordinate of Respondent Gacoycoy, and
who thereafter placed the two sons of Gacoycoy under the latter’s immediate supervision.
The Court, finding that there was an attempt to circumvent the law, revived the resolution
of the CSC dismissing Dacoycoy.
24 Civil Liberties Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO No. 284 issued by
Union v Executive President Corazon C. Aquino because it allows members of the Cabinet, their
Secretary undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions. They claim that it runs counter to Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that they shall not hold any other office or
employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided by this Constitution. Public
respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in
the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII includes Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which
allows as exception those positions provided by law and as required by the primary
function of their office. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared
EO 284 unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE/S
Nepotism is an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2)
recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.
The rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and
recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a
relative.
By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons
employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the
appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere
presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of
influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
It is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. It suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.
Although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding
of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and
appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
itself.
CASE SUMMARY
25 In Re Rodolfo In this case, the Judge of Ilocos Norte Manzano sent a letter to the Supreme Court
Manzano asking for the issuance of resolution as he was designated by Ilocos Governor as a
member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice , a committee performing an
administrative function (definition in the footnote) and ultimately tasked to insure the
speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and
indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions.
However, Supreme Court denied the request of the Judge and ruled that the members of
the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
26 Public Interest Respondent Mr. Magdangal B. Elma was appointed both as Chairman of the Presidential
Center v Elma, supra Commission on Good Government (CPCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
(CPLC) by President Estrada. Petitioners filed an original action before the SC raising
that the appointment was unconstitutional for violating ART VII Sec 13 and ART IX-B
Section 7.
The controversy was actually rendered moot by the ouster of Erap and the appointment
of new individuals by Gloria in the subject positions.
Nonetheless, the SC still ruled that that the appointment of Elma was unconstitutional for
violating ART IX-B. As held, said provision allows appointment to two different positions
provided they are not incompatible. But, in this case, the positions were incompatible
because the CPLC as part of his/ her functions must review actions done by the CPCGG
(i.e. conflict of interest). As for ART VII, SC held it was inapplicable in this case, because
it only covers appointments as Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant
Secretaries (e.g. DAR, DA, DOLE) and the two positions is not a Cabinet Secretary
position even if they might be given the same rank (i.e. non Cabinet position).
27 Borromeo vs. Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the 24th Judicial District,
Mariano effective 01 July 1914. He duly qualified and took possession of the office on that date.
On 25 Feb 1920, he was appointed Judge of the 21st Judicial Distrcit, and Mariano was
appointed Judge of the 24th Judicial District. Borromeo has since the latter date
consistently refused to accept appointment to the 21st Judicial District.
The issue is WON Borromeo may refuse his appointment to the 21st Judicial District?
The SC ruled in the affirmative. The SC held that (see doctrines).
DOCTRINE/S
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions (Sections 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
General Rule is that ART IX-B permits an appointive official to hold more than one office
if allowed by law or the primary functions of his position provided that these requisites are
present:
-Allowed by law
-Allowed by primary functions of the positions
-No incompatibility to the two positions
-At least one of the position is NOT as Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants
EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION
Section 3 ART VII authorizing the VP to become a member of the Cabinet
Additional post is exercised in ex officio capacity, there is no additional compensation and
the Additional duties however must not only be closely related to but must be required by
the primary function of the official
Test of incompatibility was laid out in People vs Green wherein if the other office/ position
is subordinate to the other in the sense that one has the right to interfere with the other
•The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of
public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things.
oAppointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is
the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no
power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the office.
oIf, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a
particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the
same right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other person could be placed
in the position of this Judge of First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that
an appointment may not be made to an office which is not vacant.
•In our judgment, the language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code,
interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the Governor-
General to force upon the judge of one district an appointment to another district against
his will, thereby removing him from his district.
CASE SUMMARY
28 Conde vs. National Appellant was appointed to several positions in NTC from 1940 to 1946. In 1948, he was
Tobacco Corporation “appointed” as Treasurer, in pursuance with Resolution No. 265 passed by the Board of
Directors. He filed petitions for reconsideration in connection with the reduction of his
annual compensation. The Board of Directors denied. By E.O. No. 372, NTC was
dissolved and a Board of Liquidators was created. Appellant sought a reconsideration of
the resolution reducing his annual compensation. His petitions were denied. After his
retirement, he sought to recover from the latter and/or the Board of Liquidators.
P5,283.33 represented salaries and gratuity differentials he failed to receive as the
computations were based on his reduced compensation of P6,000 per annum. He argues
that the document appointing him as Treasurer was never approved by the President,
thus, it never became legally effective. SC held that the document was in the nature of a
mere notice, thus, it needed no presidential approval.
29 Corpuz vs. CA Corpuz was appointed as MTRCB’s legal counsel. This appointment was not submitted to
MTRCB for approval. Subsequently, MTRCB passed a resolution declaring null and void
appointments of the administrative and subordinate employees of MTRCB because the
past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval the
appointments of administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB before
forwarding them to the CSC. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of MTRCB members
looked into the appointments extended by former Chairman. It resolved to recommend to
the MTRCB the approval of the appointments, except that of CORPUZ. CORPUZ filed a
complaint with the CSC. The CSC ruled in favor of Corpuz ruling that no action to revoke
appointment was filed within reasonable time, hence Corpuz acquired security of tenure.
The CA, however ruled that the appointment was invalid since the appointment of
CORPUZ was not approved by the MTRCB, and he could not invoke security of tenure.
WON CA erred in ruling as such, the SC ruled in the negative. The SC held that the last
act required for the completion of his appointment i.e. the approval by the MTRCB itself,
was not obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCB ultimately disapproved it, his
appointment ceased to have effect and his services were properly terminated. It ruled
also that CORPUZ was a de facto officer.
30 Luego vs. CSC Luego was appointed as Administrative Officer II. CSC revoked his appointment and
appointed Tuoza in his place after finding that Tuozo is better qualified for the position.
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee, the SC ruled in the negative. Both
Luego and Tuozo were qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone
rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except
to affirm the validity of the petitioner’s appointment. CSC had no authority to revoke the
said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better
qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely
in the city mayor
DOCTRINE/S
The term" appointment" is in law equivalent to "filling a vacancy" (6 C.J.S. 89). Appellant
never vacated the position of Treasurer; he did not have to vacate it in order to accept the
position to which he was "appointed."
Where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined
upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the
appointment, the commission, may issue at once.
Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the
commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only when such assent or
confirmation is obtained. In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the
last act required of the appointing power is performed. Until the process is completed, the
appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor invoke security of tenure.
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials resulting in non-
observance of the requirements of the law or rules to complete the appointment does not
render the requirements ineffective and unenforceable.
A public official or employee who assumed office under an incomplete appointment is
merely a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that
he assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void by reason of some
defect or irregularity in its exercise.
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Laws.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law.
CASE SUMMARY
31 Laurel vs. CSC Sangalang filed a letter-complaint with the CSC contesting Laurel’s, Governor of
Batangas, act of designating his brother Benjamin as Acting Provincial Administrator, a
career service position, despite holding non-career service positions of Executive
Assistant and Civil Security Officer. Laurel argues that the prohibition on nepotism does
not apply to designations, only appointments, and that the Provincial Administrator post is
non-career. CSC decided against Laurel. SC affirmed.
DOCTRINE/S
The position of Provincial Administrator is embraced within the Career Service under
Section 5 of P.D. No. 807
The definition of its functions and its distinguishing characteristics as laid down in the
Manual, thus: render indisputable the above conclusion that the subject position is in the
career service which, per Section 5 of P.D. No. 807, is characterized by
(a) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly
technical qualifications,
(b) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, and
(c) security of tenure.
Petitioner’s specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is
nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on
nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. The rule admits
of no distinction between appointment and designation. Designation is also defined as “an
appointment or assignment to a particular office”; and “to designate” means “to indicate,
select, appoint or set apart for a purpose or duty. (SC Cited Black’s Law Dictionary)
CASE SUMMARY
32 CSC vs. Salas Respondent Salas was terminated by BoD for loss of confidence after an investigation ex-
parte by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR. Salas then requested for reinvestigation to
the Chair and the BOD but was denied. He then appealed to MPSB and CSC, whom
denied the appeal, ruling that as a confidential employee by operation of law (Sec 16, PD
1869), Salas was not dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired.
CA reversed.
SC affirmed CA and held that Salas is not a confidential employee. It is the nature of the
position which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining,
or highly technical. Executive declarations like PD 1869 are mere initial determinations
that are not conclusive in case of conflict. Based on Salas’ functions, organizational
ranking, and compensation level, it does not appear that his position is primarily
confidential in character, which necessitates such close intimacy which ensures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
33 Camarines Norte Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator in a permanent capacity prior to
vs. Gonzales the effectivity of the Local Government Code. She was dismissed after being found guilty
of gross insubordination. Ruling on her appeal, the CSC found her guilty and suspended
her for six months. After the suspension period, she was reinstated but the Governor
terminated her services the next day due to lack of confidence. The CSC ordered her
reinstatement and the CA found her termination as illegal. The SC ruled that the LGC
reclassified the position of Provincial Administrator into primarily confidential, a non-
career service position but the court is divided on the effect of such reclassification to her
tenure. The main opinion held that her dismissal is valid.
DOCTRINE/S
CSC Appointments
The power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of
Executive Order No. 292.
Executive pronouncements, such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than
initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict.
Two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential.
- when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has
declared the position to be primarily confidential; and
- in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office
there exists “close intimacy” between the appointee and appointing power which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals
of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
The primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the
declaration of a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is
to exempt these categories from competitive examination as a means for determining
merit and fitness.
Proximity rule
The occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the
predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was, the latter’s
belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures
freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal
of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Where the position occupied is remote
from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant.
The provincial administrator position has been classified into a primarily confidential, non-
career position when Congress, through RA 7160, made the provincial administrator
position coterminous with its appointing authority.
The primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the appointing authority
loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not
“removed” or “dismissed” from office; the employee’s term merely “expires” and the loss
of trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law that results in the termination
of employment.
CASE SUMMARY
34 CSC vs. Darangina Respondent here was appointed in a temporary capacity as director III, Plans and Policy
Services of OMA (Office of Muslim Affairs). At this time, he was not a career executive
service eligible. A new Executive Director of OMA was appointed who replaced him with
another one who is also ineligible. Subsequent appointees were also ineligible.
Respondent contested his replacement and demanded that he is reinstated with
backwages. His reinstatement was denied by the CSC but was ordered by CA.
SC reversed the CA and held that (See doctrines)
DOCTRINE/S
A permanent appointment can issue only to a person who possesses all the requirements
for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility.
The exception to the rule is where, in the absence of appropriate eligibles, he or she may
be appointed to it merely in a temporary capacity.
Such a temporary appointment is not made for the benefit of the appointee. Rather, an
acting or temporary appointment seeks to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official
functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a
permanent appointee.

Where a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his replacement by another non-

eligible is not prohibited.

When a temporary appointee is required to relinquish his office, he is being separated

precisely because his term has expired.

35 De Castro vs. Petitioner was appointed by GMA as AGMO of MMDA. After change in administration, “An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the
Carlos OP issued a memo ordering all non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed,
occupying Career Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position
branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties and discharge their except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.” (despite what appointing official termed
responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been accepted and/or the appointment)
until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated, whichever comes
first, unless they are reappointed in the meantime. Petitioner was reassigned; lost service
car benefits, and was removed from payroll after respondent was permanently appointed
as his replacement. Petitioner instituted quo qarranto proceedings. SC ruled that his
appointment was only temporary as he has not complied with the eligibility requirements.
Therefore, no security of tenure or right to the office. Petition denied.

36 Province of Dato was promoted to Assistant Provincial Warden of CamSur but only on Temporary The CSC does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the
Camarines Sur vs. CA status because he did not have the necessary eligibility, passing the Supervising Security appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. It can only inquire
Guards Exam. After 2 years, he represented that he passed the said exam so Gov. into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position.
Alfelor approved the change of status to Permanent but the same was denied by CSC
because allegedly, Dato did not pass yet. After another 2 years, Dato was charged
criminally and indefinitely suspended. However, shortly after, CSC transmitted a letter
informing Gov. Alfelor that the employment status of Dato has been changed to
Permanent. The Province of CamSur still removed Dato from the list of planitlla. Dato
was acquitted from the charges, hence, Dato initiated a case before the RTC. RTC and
CA rule in favor of Dato. The issue is WON Dato was validly given a permanent status.
SC ruled in the negative.
CASE SUMMARY
37 Romualdez III vs. Petitioner Romualdez held a permanent position in DOT for 12 yrs. Subsequently he was
CA transferred to a temporary position with the PCA. After 1.5 yrs, his appointment was not
renewed. CSC denied his petition to be reinstated. MR denied. SC held that CSC was
correct in rejecting his reinstatement as when Petitioner accepted his temporary
appointment he was thereby effectively divested of security of tenure. Petition dismissed.
38 Sevilla vs. CA Being in government service since 1949, Sevilla’s last appointment was Assistant City
Engineer of Palayan City which he discharged until he was designated Acting City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City by President Marcos in 1981. After the EDSA Revolution,
OIC Mayor Vergara of Cabanatuan City appointed respondent Santos as city engineer of
Cabanatuan City. A few months later, Sevilla was designated by then Minister Rogociano
Mercado of the DPWH as acting district engineer of Pasay City until he was removed
from that office by the new DPWH Secretary. This removal was what precipitated the
present controversy.
Sevilla returned to Cabanatuan City and filed a Quo Warranto against Santos, alleging
that being a presidential appointee, he could not be removed from office by an OIC
mayor. RTC reinstated Sevilla while the CA set aside the RTC’s decision. CA held that
Santos' appointment was valid because it was confirmed by Minister Rogaciano Mercado
of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways. The issue in the present case is whether
or not Sevilla’s appointment was permanent or temporary. The SC held that it was only
temporary, as he was merely designated as acting city engineer of Cabanatuan City. The
designation of petitioner as Acting City Engineering of Cabanatuan City merely imposed
upon him the additional function of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City on top of his
regular duties as City Engineer of Palayan City.
39 Pacete vs. Petitioner was appointed by the President as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
Secretary of CA He assumed office. As his appointment was made during the recess of Congress, it was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session. When the Congress
was already in session, his appointment was unanimously confirmed. The next day, one
of the members of the Commission on Appointments, Senator Ganzon, filed a motion for
the reconsideration (MR) of the confirmation of the appointment, in view of derogatory
information he had received. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition
before the SC. The issue is whether or not his appointment (ad interim appointment with
confirmation duly made) still stands, even though there is an MR filed without being acted
on. SC ruled on the positive, holding that the confirmation must be given force and effect.
SC reiterated its ruling in a similar case that the mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. There was a need
for its being duly approved. A mere MR to a confirmation duly made which is not
approved cannot have the effect of setting aside such confirmation, a principle that is
based not merely on the express language of Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, but a reflection of the interpretation of the CoA speaking
through its Chairman.
DOCTRINE/S
When Petitioner accepted this temporary appointment he was thereby effectively divested
of security of tenure.
A temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office but
makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power.
Thus, the matter of converting such a temporary appointment to a permanent one is
addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority.
An "acting" appointment is merely temporary, one which is good only until another
appointment is made to take its place.
Appointment vs. Designation:
Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who
is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, upon
a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election (i.e.
an incumbent official). A designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
•Mere filing of MR does not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation of an
appointment.
•The vote of a majority of the members of the Commission on Appointments present in
favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to “reopen” the appointment—and,
hence, to “recall” its confirmation—and to require a resubmission of the appointment for
confirmation.
•When in Session: The President nominates, and only upon the consent of the
Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office.
•When in Recess: It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and
perform his function.
CASE SUMMARY
40 Matibag vs. Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of PGMA’s ad interim appointments of
Benipayo respondents, the Comelec Chairman and two Comelec Commissioners. She argued that
the appointment of respondents violates the Constitutional prohibition on temporary
appointments and reappointments of the Comelec’s Chairman and its members. She
also questioned the Chairman’s authority to remove her as Director of Comelec EID and
to reassign her to the Law Department. SC held that the appointments of the
respondents are valid since their ad interim appointments were of a permanent nature.
Also, since their appointments were by-passed by the CoA, the President had the
authority to renew the same. SC likewise upheld the authority of the de jure Comelec
Chairman to reassign petitioner without need to secure approval of Comelec en banc.
41 PLM vs. IAC Dr. Esteban was extended an ad-interim appointment by the President of PLM for the
position of VP for Administration. This was confirmed by the Board of Regents (BOR)
through Resolution No. 485. Notification of Confirmation of Temporary Appointment was
sent to Dr. Esteban for his appointment. Several Notification of Renewal of Temporary
Appointment were also sent following the renewal of his term. In 1975, Dr. Esteban was
sent a memorandum circular terminating Dr. Esteban's appointment as Vice-President for
Administration due to the temporary nature of his appointment. Dr. Esteban appealed to
CSC for the protection of his tenure (2.5 years of service in PLM). CSC flip-flopped in its
decisions but ultimately ruled in favor of Dr. Esteban stating that BOR Resolution No. 485
confirmed the ad-interim appointment rendering it permanent. SC agreed with the holding
of CSC.
DOCTRINE/S
Ad interim appointments to the COMELEC do not violate the Constitutional prohibition
on “temporary appointments” because said appointments are permanent in nature.
Moreover, ad interim appointments to the COMELEC also do not violate the
Constitutional prohibition on “reappointments” if the same are merely by-passed by the
Commission on Appointments (and not explicitly disapproved).
In ad interim appointments to the COMELEC which are not yet approved by the
Commission on Appointments, the rules in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution are
controlling.
In ad interim appointments to the COMELEC which have already been approved by the
Commission on Appointments, the rules in Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Constitution are
controlling.
In Summers v. Ozoaeta, an ad interim appointment is
-one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution,
which provides that 'the President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.'
-It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
-An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its
provisional period has expired. Said appointment is distinguishable from an 'acting'
appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is
issued.
Absence of express indication in the ad in terim appointment that it is temporary, the
appointment issued is considered permanent
In case of conflict between a notification issued by the Secretary and the Resolution of
Board of Regents, the latter is controlling
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
42 Velicaria-Garafil vs. 1. General Rule: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
OP The five Petitioners in this case were appointed to several government positions during the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments
the last four (4) months of the PGMA administration. The PNoy Administration then Exception: (a) temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
issued EO No. 2 which revokes some of the therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety and (b) appointments to the
appointments by PGMA arguing that they were made within the Constitutional ban on Judiciary (De Castro vs JBC)
midnight appointments. As the Petitioners were affected by EO 2, they filed petitions to
question its constitutionality. 2. In order for appointment to not fall within the ban in provision (1 st doctrine, GR)
above, all of the following steps must be completed prior to the ban (i.e. if 4 th is
The CA upheld the constitutionality of EO 2 but asked the Office of the Pres to review completed after ban, appointment is still
their dismissal. Nonetheless, the Petitioners filed this present Petition before the SC invalid, partial completion not accepted):
arguing that what is prohibited by the Constitution to be made during the ban are only the a) Signing of the Appointment papers by the President and Official transmittal of said
acts within the President’s control (see first two steps in the doctrine). They claim their paper preferably thru the Malacañang records office
appointments are valid because the fact that they accepted the appointment within the b) Vacancy
ban is immaterial because their appointment/ commission were issued prior to the ban. c) Receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee
d) Acceptance by appointee thru oath or assumption to office. Appointee must possess
SC upheld EO 2 and dismissal of Petitioners. However, in a tight vote of 8-6, the SC held the qualification and none of the disqualification
that for an appointment to be valid, it must complete all of the process below before the
Constitutional ban (See 2 nd doctrine).

The other camp (dissent) in the SC instead holds that the prohibition applies only to acts
within the President’s control as this prohibition is a check on his power (i.e. accepted the
argument/ interpretation of the Petitioners). Hence, once the President transmits the
appointment prior to the period of the ban, it is valid even though appointee’s acceptance
may occur during the ban. However, even the dissent upheld their dismissal because
step no.2 was not even completed prior to the Constitutional ban upon checking of the
records.

43 PEZA vs. Mercado Respondent was Group Manager for PEZA. She was promoted to the position of Deputy For an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to security
Director General for Policy and Planning on permanent basis, but with the following of tenure, she/he must pass the four stages of the CES examinations, be conferred CES
annotation: NO SECURITY OF TENURE UNLESS HE/SHE OBTAINS CESO OR CSEE eligibility, comply with the other requirements prescribed by the CES Board, and be
ELIGIBILITY. Eventually, petitioner terminated respondent and appointed Wilhelm G. appointed to a CES rank by the President.
Ortaliz, a CESO eligible, as Deputy Director General. The SC upheld her termination,
because (see doctrine) and that respondent, who acquired an MNSA degree in 1993, had
not undergone the second, third and fourth stages of the CES eligibility examinations
prior to her appointment or during her incumbency as Deputy Director General up to the
time her appointment was terminated, she was not a CES eligible. Not being a CES
eligible, she had no security of tenure, hence, the termination was not illegal.
CASE SUMMARY
44 CSC vs.CA Sarsonas and Ortegas were appointed as Assistant Department Managers pursuant to
the resolution of the BOD of CSO. The CSCFO-OP disapproved the temporary
appointments for failure to meet the eligibility requirement for the position for third-level
eligible. The CSC likewise ruled that the position of Assistant Department Manager II
requires CSE eligibility. The CA reversed the ruling of the CSC on appeal. The SC held
that:
 The position of Assistant Department Manager II is not one of those enumerated under
the Administrative Code.
 The CESB has not identified the position to be of equal rank to those enumerated.
 The holder of the position of Assistant Department Manager II is appointed by the
PCSO General Manager, and not by the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, the
position of Assistant Department Manager II in the PCSO is not covered by the third-level
or CES, and does not require CSE eligibility.
45 In Re: Valenzuela The President signed and approved the appointment of Judge Valenzuala and Judge
Vallarta as RTC Judges, days before the presidential elections. Hence, it is within the
constitutional ban pursuant to Section 15, Article VII. Prior to this, (1) the President also
signed the appointment of 8 CA Justices on March 11, 1998 — the day immediately
before the commencement of the ban on appointments and (2) requested for the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) to transmit the final list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court
vacancy." The constitutional issues reached the SC. SC: The appointments of Messrs.
Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice
on May 14, 998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently,
they come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are
considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. Hence, SC
declared the apoointments of J. Valenzuela and Vallarta void.
DOCTRINE/S
In order for a position to be covered by the CES, two elements must concur.
1. The position must either be
a. a position enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7 (3) of
the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service, or
b. A position of equal rank as those enumerated, and identified by the Career Executive
Service Board to be such position of equal rank.
2. The holder of the position must be a presidential appointee.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution — "(t)wo months
immediatey before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term" — the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to
fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Section 15 of Article VII.
Additional Note on Court's analysis:
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments:
(1) those made for buying votes and
(2) those made for partisan considerations.
The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the
Omnibus Election Code.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15 consist of the so-called
"midnight" appointments.
Other provisions:
Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, requires that any vacancy in the Supreme Court "shall be
filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof."
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within ninety days from
the submission of the list.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
46 JBC vs. De Castro everal cases were filed before the Supreme Court as to the actions of the JBC pursuant Article VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution prohibiting the President to make appointments two
to the upcoming retirement of Chief Justice Puno, scheduled on May 17, 2010, which is 7 months before the next Presidential election is not applicable to the Judiciary. Article VIII,
days after the Presidential Election. These petitions pose the question as to whether or Sec. 4 (1) which provides that any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the
not the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his occurrence thereof is mandatory.
retirement. The Court held -- after looking at the Constitutional Commission deliberations
and the rationale of Art. VII Section 15, as well as the structure of the Constitution,
among others -- that the President can appoint the succession of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 since the prohibition against presidential
appointments under Section 15, Article VII, does not extend to appointments in the
judiciary.

47 Corpuz vs. CA, Corpuz was appointed as MTRCB’s legal counsel. This appointment was not submitted to Where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined
supra MTRCB for approval. Subsequently, MTRCB passed a resolution declaring null and void upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the
appointments of the administrative and subordinate employees of MTRCB because the appointment, the commission, may issue at once.
past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval the
appointments of administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB before Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the
forwarding them to the CSC. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of MTRCB members commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only when such assent or
looked into the appointments extended by former Chairman. It resolved to recommend to confirmation is obtained. In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the
the MTRCB the approval of the appointments, except that of petitioner. Thus, he filed a last act required of the appointing power is performed. Until the process is completed, the
complaint with the CSC. The CSC ruled in favor of Corpuz ruling that no action to revoke appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor invoke security of tenure.
appointment was filed within reasonable time, hence Corpuz acquired security of tenure.
The CA, however ruled that the appointment was invalid since his appointment was not
approved by the MTRCB, and he could not invoke security of tenure. WON CA erred in
ruling as such, the SC ruled in the negative. The SC held that the last act required for the
completion of his appointment i.e. the approval by the MTRCB itself, was not obtained, as
a matter of fact, the MTRCB ultimately disapproved it, his appointment ceased to have
effect and his services were properly terminated. It ruled also that Corpuz was a de facto
officer.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
48 Obiasca vs. In This case, respondent was appointed as Administrative Officer II of Tabaco National There being no requirement in EO 292 that appointments should be submitted to the
Basallote High School. However, upon the change of Division’s Superintendent, the petitioner was CSC for attestation within 30 days from issuance, it is doubtful by what authority the CSC
appointed in the same position. The HR deliberately failed to forward the appointment imposed such condition under Section 11, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules. It certainly
papers of the respondent since respondent failed to submit the position description form cannot restore what EO 292 itself already and deliberately removed. At the very least,
duly signed by school principal. that requirement cannot be used as basis to unjustly prejudice respondent.

Respodent protested to CSC Regional Office but the CSC RO ruled against her.
However, this was reversed by CSC and ruled that the appointment is valid. Petitioner
elevated the case to CA in questioning the validity of the appointment of the respondent
as it did not comply with the requirement of Section 9 (h) of PD 807 which requires the
submission of appointment papers within 30 days from issuance. CA ruled against the
petitioner, hence it elevated the case before the SC.

The issue before SC is WON the failure of the appointing authority to submit
respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from issuance made her
appointment ineffective and incomplete. SC said the appointment is valid. SC tried to
reconcile Sec 9 PD 807 versus the amendments in EO 292. EO 292 effectively deleted
the requirement that all appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted to it within
30 days. There being no requirement in EO 292 that appointments should be submitted
to the CSC for attestation within 30 days from issuance, it is doubtful by what authority
the CSC imposed such condition under Section 11, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules. It
certainly cannot restore what EO 292 itself already and deliberately removed. At the very
least, that requirement cannot be used as basis to unjustly prejudice respondent.

49 Velicaria-Garafil vs. The five Petitioners in this case were appointed to several government positions during
OP, supra the last four (4) months of the PGMA administration. The PNoy Administration then
issued EO No. 2 which revokes some of the appointments by PGMA arguing that they
were made within the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments. As the Petitioners
were affected by EO 2, they filed petitions to question its constitutionality.
The CA upheld the constitutionality of EO 2 but asked the Office of the Pres to review
their dismissal. Nonetheless, the Petitioners filed this present Petition before the SC
arguing that what is prohibited by the Constitution to be made during the ban are only the
acts within the President’s control (see first two steps in the doctrine). They claim their
appointments are valid because the fact that they accepted the appointment within the
ban is immaterial because their appointment/ commission were issued prior to the ban.
SC upheld EO 2 and dismissal of Petitioners. However, in a tight vote of 8-6, the SC held
that for an appointment to be valid, it must complete all of the process below before the
Constitutional ban (See 2nd doctrine).
The other camp (dissent) in the SC instead holds that the prohibition applies only to acts
within the President’s control as this prohibition is a check on his power (i.e. accepted the
argument/ interpretation of the Petitioners). Hence, once the President transmits the
appointment prior to the period of the ban, it is valid even though appointee’s acceptance
may occur during the ban. However, even the dissent upheld their dismissal because
step no.2 was not even completed prior to the Constitutional ban upon checking of the
records
General Rule: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments
Exception: (a) temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety and (b) appointments to the
Judiciary (De Castro vs JBC)
In order for appointment to not fall within the ban in provision (1st doctrine, GR) above, all
of the following steps must be completed prior to the ban (i.e. if 4th is completed after
ban, appointment is still invalid, partial completion not accepted):
- Signing of the Appointment papers by the President
- Official transmittal of said paper preferably thru the Malacañang records office
- Receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee
- Acceptance by appointee thru oath or assumption to office. Appointee must possess the
qualification and none of the disqualification
CASE SUMMARY
50 Mantala vs. Petitioner, a private medical practitioner, was given by the Sec. of Health a temporary
Salvador appointment to the then vacant position of Division Chief, Medical Division III, Monitoring
and Evaluation Division of the TB Control Service, Office of Public Health of the DoH.
Private Respondent (PrR) Regino protested alleging that the temporary appointment
should have been given to her because her post, Med. Officer III, is next-in-rank to the
office in question, and that she had been in the service for 35 years. Committee on
Evaluation and Protest ruled in favor of Petitioner. Dr. Regino appealed to the Merit
Systems Board of the CSC. The Board rendered a verdict against Petitioner. The DoH
then appealed the decision to the CSC. 3 weeks later, Sec. Bengzon made Petitioner’s
appointment permanent. CSC ruled in favor of PrR which was then reversed upon MR of
Petitioner upholding Petitioner’s appointment. No appeal was taken. PrR instituted an
action of quo warranto and mandamus in the RTC claiming that having an established
right to the position of Division Chief in question, she should be installed therein. RTC
ruled in favor of PrR.
DOCTRINE/S
●Disciplinary cases, and cases involving "personnel actions" affecting employees in the
civil service — including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and separation," and, of
course, employment status and qualification standards — are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
●These protest cases are decided in the first instance by the head of Department or
agency, subject to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, whose decisions are in
turn subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The latter's decision may, in turn,
be brought to the Supreme Court.
●It was only after the Resolution of November 14, 1990, in Dr. Mantala's favor, became
final and executory by reason of Dr. Regino's failure to take an appeal therefrom — and
evidently to remedy this fatal procedural lapse — that the latter thought of filing her quo
warranto and mandamus action in the Regional Trial Court. Such a stratagem cannot be
allowed to succeed.

The issue is WON the RTC validly assumed jurisdiction over the matter of who is entitled,
under the law and rules governing the civil service?

The SC ruled in the negative. The SC held that (see doctrines).

51 Tarrosa vs. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Ramos. Petitioner The special civil action of quo warranto can only be commenced by the Solicitor
Singson argues that Singson's appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
confirmation to the Commission on Appointments, anchored on the provisions of Sec 6 of unlawfully held or exercised by another." (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 66, Sec.
R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority 6; Acosta v. Flor)
of the Philippines. Respondents claim that (1) Congress exceeded its legislative powers,
an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the Commission, citing Sec 16 of Art VII of the Consti and (2) Bangko
Sentral has its own budget and accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject to
the provisions of the General Appropriations Act. ISSUE: WON the Governor of the BSP
is subject to the confirmation of COA – NO. SC: The instant petition is in the nature of a
quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of Singson and alleges that the latter is
unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a
special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person
claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by
another."
CASE SUMMARY
52 Bongbong vs. Petitioner Antero Bongbong was appointed as a Rural Health Physician in Region 6 but
Parado (1974) took his oath of office as a Municipal Health Officer of Palompon, Leyte (the item which
he replaced). Thereafter, he was transferred to Kananga, Leyte by respondent James
Parado (Provincial Health Officer of Leyte), which he protested. However, he protested
his transfer even though respondent Alfredo Esporlas had been the MHO of Palompon
for almost 1 year. Petitioner filed a mandamus and quo warranto in the CFI who ruled in
favor of petitioner – he was entitled to MHO of Palompon. SC held otherwise. First of all,
petitioner had no standing to file the quo warranto, having failed to establish that he had a
right to the position having been appointed without specifying his place of assignment
and respondent Esporlas already occupying the position. Moreover, since his place of
assignment wasn’t specified, he may be transferred as the exigencies of the service
require. Ordinarily, he has no right to complain against any change of assignment.
DOCTRINE/S
• No individual can bring a civil action relating to the usurpation of a public office without
averring that he has a right to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be
shown that such individual has no such right, the action may be dismissed because there
is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such action
is destroyed as is the case here.
• One whose appointment without any specific designation of place of assignment may be
transferred.

53 Romualdez-Yap Petitioner was the senior vice president of PNB’s Fund Transfer Department. EO 80 was
vs. CSC approved in 1986 authorizing the reorganization of PNB, resulting in the abolition of the
Fund Transfer Department. In 1987, petitioner was notified of her separation from
service. Two years after the said separation, she appealed to the CSC. CSC upheld the
validity of her separation and ruled that her separation was not tainted with bad faith.
Assuming arguendo that there was badfaith, petitioner is now barred from assailing the
same as she did not seasonably assert her right thereto. WON she can be reinstated, the
SC ruled in the negative. The SC considered the petition as an action for quo warranto
which should be brought within one (1) year. Nonetheless, the said action has prescribed
for being filed after more than one year from cause of action.
A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another may bring an action for quo warranto.
An action for quo warranto should be brought within one (1) year after ouster from office;
the failure to institute the same within the reglementary period constitutes more than a
sufficient basis for its dismissal since it is not proper that the title to a public office be
subjected to continued uncertainty.
An exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure to file the action can be
attributed to the acts of a responsible government officer and not of the dismissed
employee.

54 Topacio vs. Ong Petitioner implored OSG to initiate a quo warranto against Ong in the latter’s capacity as 1. The Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo
incumbent Assoc. Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He was contesting based on the natural- warranto where there are just and valid reasons.
born citizenship from the Constitution. There was already a pending RTC case by Ong for
the correction of his Birth Cert, hence OSG informed petitioner that it cannot act on the 2. The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
request until such case is terminated. Petitioner filed this present case with the SC for proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion
Certiorari and Prohibition. However SC dismissed the case because it partakes the to annul or set aside order
nature of a quo warranto proceeding and (doctrine 2). Also, even if treated as a quo
warranto case, it is dismissible because of (doctrine 3). 3. For a quo waranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show a
clear right to the contested office
CASE SUMMARY
55 Mendoza vs. Allas Petitioner Mendoza became part of the Bureau of Customs in 1972, and received
promotions until he became Director III of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service. In 1993, he was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, while
respondent Allas was temporarily appointed to take his old position. In 1994, a letter was
sent to petitioner, stating that he is terminated from the services of the Bureau of
Customs. He filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas, which the court granted. Allas
appealed, but became moot and academic when Allas was appointed as Deputy
Commissioner of Customs Assessment and Operations. When Mendoza filed for motion
for execution of its decision, it was denied because Godofredo Olores was appointed to
take his old position. CA affirmed the decision.
DOCTRINE/S
Quo Warranto
Quo warranto is a demand made by the State upon some individuals or corporations to
show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state
which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise
except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use
or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim
is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege
A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent’s successor in office, even
though such successor may trace his title to the same source

SC Held that a judgment in quo warranto does not bind the successor in office, even
though the successor’s title comes from the same source. It is always directed to a
person, in this case, Allas. Olores had never become part of the case; hence the decision
cannot extend to him. Since Mendoza has reached the age of retirement, he cannot be
reappointed. Neither can he claim from Allas his back wages, nor compel the Bureau of
Customs to pay said back wages.

56 Republic vs. 1. QW and impeachment are distinct in terms of jurisdiction, grounds, applicable rules
Sereno While an impeachment complaint against then CJ Sereno was on-going in the house of and limitation. The existence of the other will not prevent the commencement of the other
Representatives, the Republic thru the Solicitor General filed a Quo warranto (QW) remedy. Hence, the rule against forum shopping will not apply because of the difference
proceeding against her. The main ground raised by the Republic is her failure to submit in cause of action (usurping in QW, commission of offense in impeachment) and reliefs
SALNs during most of her stint in government which would disqualify her from (exclusion from office for QW, removal from office for impeachment).
possessing integrity which was required from members of the Judiciary under the
Constitution. Sereno on the other hand, questioned the jurisdiction of the SC claiming Under the Constitution, it uses the term “MAY 1 be removed from office” thus indicative of
that as an impeachable official, she cannot be removed thru quo warranto. mere possibility, an opportunity or option. Since it denotes option to remove, it admits of
an alternative mode. Moreover, the enumeration of impeachable offenses as absolute is
SC ruled in favor of the Republic holding that she can be removed thru QW even if she is equivalent to saying that it does not mean complete instances of the entire causes of
an impeachable official (see 1 st doctrine). It also ruled that the Republic discharged its removal from offices. To construe the Constitution as limiting only removal thru
burden to prove that Sereno did not file several SALNs hence a violation of the laws itself impeachment would deprive the State a remedy to correct a public wrong arising from the
and of JBC rules during the time of application. Hence, it could not be said that she defective or void appointments.
possessed integrity at time of application thus her ineligibility to be nominated. Thus,
ouster and exclusion from said public office is proper. Nonetheless, her presumably valid 2. Quo warranto is a proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
appointment will give color of tile that confers upon her status of de facto officer. public office. It determines eligibility of the candidate (if elective office) or the appointee.

3. A de facto officer exercises an official duty under color of an appointment or election

thereto while a mere usurper acts without any color of right. The one which gives
colorable title is the presumably valid appointment.
CASE SUMMARY
The opinion of the judge for an election protest was signed and filed on two different
days. On the day it was filed, Judge Baretto ceased to be judge of CFI 11th district, as he
had qualified for, and taken possession of, the position of Secretary of Finance.
SC held that inasmuch as the judge, who wrote and caused to be promulgated the
decision and judgment, was neither a judge de jure nor de facto, said judgment was a
nullity.
58 Torres vs. Ribo Protestant and respondents were opposing candidates for provincial governor of Leyte.
Since protestant is the current provincial governor and the respondents, members of the
provincial board, they were disqualified as members of the provincial board of
canvassers. The COMELEC appointed substitutes provided under Section 159 of the
Revised Election Code. However, the division superintendent of schools and the district
engineer are not available at that time, so they designated their representatives (Tizon
and Pascual) as members. The designations were questioned. SC held that the
substitutes cannot designate their appointment to their representatives since the law
provided an exclusive list and allowing it would take away from the hands of the
Commission on Elections the authority to appoint under section 159.
It was further argued that Tizon and Pascual were at least de facto officers. SC
disagreed. And discussed the conditions to be a de factor officer. (See doctrines). It held
that the conditions did not exist in this case:
Tizon and Pascual did not possess any of these conditions.
They acted without appointment, commission or any color of title to the office.
There was no acquiescence, public or private, in their discharge of the position.
In fact, the very person most greatly affected by their assumption of the office, Bernardo
Torres, was not notified and was unaware of it.
DOCTRINE/S
"JUDGE DE JURE" DEFINED
A judge de jure is one who is exercising the office of a judge as a matter of right. He is an
officer of the law fully vested with all the powers and functions, conceded under the law to
a judge, which relate to the administration of justice within the jurisdiction over which he
presides.
"JUDGE DE FACTO" DEFINED
A judge de facto is an officer who is not fully invested with all of the powers and duties
conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of right. A
judge de facto may be said to be one who has the reputation of being the officer he
assumes to be yet is not a good officer in point of law, that is, there exists some defect in
his appointment or election and in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular
time.
An officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be,
and yet is not a good officer in point of law.
He must have acted as an officer for such a length of time, under color of title and under
such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public and public authorities, as
to afford a presumption of appointment or election, and induce people, without inquiry,
and relying on the supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be, to submit to or
invoke his action.
CASE SUMMARY
59 Monroy vs. CA Petitioner Monroy was the incumbent municipal Mayor of Navotas, Rizal. He filed a Cert.
of Candidacy for 1st district representative (sept 15) and 3 days (sept 18) later withdrew it
(with approval from Comelec). Incumbent Vice-mayor (respondent) took the oath (Sept
21) of office for municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office
upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy based on the Revised Election Code at the
time. The issue is won the petitioner was still the mayor after Sept 15 or if his withdrawal
of certificate of candidacy restored him to his position. SC agreed with the lower courts
and ruled that only the moment and act of filing were considered by the Election Code.
As related to topic, he was also asked to pay for the salaries the private respondent was
supposed to get from Sept 21 onwards. Petitioner relied on Rodriguez v. Tan, where the
Court ruled that the de facto officer can retain the emoluments he got from his stint in
office. SC held that Rodriguez vs Tan was not applicable, and that the general rule that
“the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary
received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into
the office in good faith and under color of title” applies in the present case.
60 Malaluan vs. Malaluan and Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates. Evangelista was proclaimed
COMELEC by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor. However, Malaluan
filed a protest before the RTC which declared him as the duly elected Mayor. Evangelista
appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC which thereafter declared Evangelista as
the winner and awarded damages. COMELEC en banc affirmed. Since the petition is
already moot because the term of Evangelista already expired, the issue on the award of
damages remains. SC ruled that there was grave abuse of discretion when COMELEC
awarded damages.
61 Flores vs. Drilon Olongapo City Mayor Richard J. Gordon was appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to RA 7227. Petitioners assail
the constitutionality of Sec13(d) of the said law, arguing that it infringes on Constitutional
and statutory provisions. The Court held that the said provisions is unconstitutional and,
consequently, Richard Gordon’s appointment as Chairman and CEO of SBMA is invalid.
The subject proviso violates Section 8, Art IX-B of the Constitution which prohibits the
appointment of an elective official to any public office or position during his tenure. Since
the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office. The Court added that since an incumbent elective
official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto
cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. However, the Court held
that acts done by Gordon as SBMA official is not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer. Appointment to SBMA invalid, however, all acts otherwise
legitimate done by him in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto  of SBMA
are hereby UPHELD.
DOCTRINE/S
The de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto
officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get
involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being
lawful officers
The general rule is that rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer
de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even
though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title.
A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must
therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during
the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.
In a question of compensation, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is
decisive. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his
risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of
salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.
Malaluan is a “de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and
had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office.”. It is fallacious to conclude a malicious intention on the part of
petitioner to molest private respondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC
perceived as an erroneous ruling of the trial court. It matters not that it was the trial court
and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different
stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral
contests.
An incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other
government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his
ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective
official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto
cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
De Facto Officer- "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the
public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of
a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because
there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect
or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to
the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such
CASE SUMMARY
62 Menzon vs. Petilla Because no governor had been proclaimed yet in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of
the Department of Local Government (DLG) appointed Petilla, the Vice-Governor, as
Acting Governor while Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP),
as acting Vice-Governor. The Undersecretary of DLG clarified that the the appointment of
Menzon is not necessary as there was no provision for the succession of the Vice-
Governor and that the Vice-Governor (Petilla) could concurrently perform the function of
both Governor and Vice-Governor. Thus, the SP passed Resolution No. 505 resolving
not to recognize Menzon as Acting Vice-Governor. The Undersecretary later clarified that
the appointing authority (DLG Secretary in this case) had the discretion to appoint
Menzon and that Menzon should receive his salaries as Acting Vice-Governor. Menzon
then requested for Petilla and the SP to correct Resolution No. 505 (validate his
appointment as Acting Vice-Governor and pay his salaries).
DOCTRINE/S
Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government,
possesses no power to appoint Menzon, at the very least, Menzon is a de facto officer
entitled to compensation.
Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic
considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him
for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of
Leyte. (In other words, a de factor officer is entitled to compensation.)

Upon the inaction of Petilla and the SP to Menzon’s request, Menzon filed before the SC
a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Pending such petition, Gov. Larazzabal was
officially declared as Leyte’s Governon and the Provincial Treasurer paid Menzon his
salaries. Then, the SC denied Menzon’s petition. As a result, Petilla now directs the
Governor to direct Menzon to pay back the province of emoluments he received. Menzon
filed this MR before the SC. The SC ruled that the temporary appointment is valid as to
rule otherwise would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. The
SC also ruled that Menzon had the right to be paid his salary as Acting Vice-Governor.
MR granted.

63 Corpuz vs. CA, Corpuz was appointed as MTRCB’s legal counsel. This appointment was not submitted to A public official or employee who assumed office under an incomplete appointment is
supra MTRCB for approval. Subsequently, MTRCB passed a resolution declaring null and void merely a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that
appointments of the administrative and subordinate employees of MTRCB because the he assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void by reason of some
past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval the defect or irregularity in its exercise.
appointments of administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB before
forwarding them to the CSC. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of MTRCB members
looked into the appointments extended by former Chairman. It resolved to recommend to
the MTRCB the approval of the appointments, except that of CORPUZ. CORPUZ filed a
complaint with the CSC. The CSC ruled in favor of Corpuz ruling that no action to revoke
appointment was filed within reasonable time, hence Corpuz acquired security of tenure.
The CA, however ruled that the appointment was invalid since the appointment of
CORPUZ was not approved by the MTRCB, and he could not invoke security of tenure.
WON CA erred in ruling as such, the SC ruled in the negative. The SC held that the last
act required for the completion of his appointment i.e. the approval by the MTRCB itself,
was not obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCB ultimately disapproved it, his
appointment ceased to have effect and his services were properly terminated. It ruled
also that CORPUZ was a de facto officer.
CASE SUMMARY
64 CSC vs. Unda Unda was appointed as MENRO by the outgoing mayor of Lanao del Sur. After the 2007
local elections, the new mayor filed a petition to annul the appointment, on the basis that
Unda was a midnight appointee whose appointment was based on a non-existing budget.
The petition was denied by CSCRO-ARMM but was reversed by CSC. On appeal to CA,
the first decision was reinstated. Petitioner appealed to SC, which then declared the
appointment of Unda as invalid since (1) there was prior resolution by SB creating the
position, confirming the appointment, and appropriating funds for the salaries and
benefits to be given to the appointee and (2) LGU did not enact an appropriation
ordinance for the position of the MENRO to which the respondent was appointed.
Nonetheless, SC found that Unda was a de facto officer, and as such, was entitled to the
emoluments of the office.
DOCTRINE/S
An appointment to a position that is optional under the LGC but without the
corresponding appropriation by the relevant sanggunian is ineffectual.
A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging his duties
under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has
possession of the office and discharges the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to
the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees
and other compensations attached to the office.

65 Republic vs. See 56th case See 56th case

Sereno, supra
66 Camarines Norte Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator in a permanent capacity prior to • The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress.
vs. Gonzales, supra the effectivity of the Local Government Code. She was dismissed after being found guilty The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and
of gross insubordination. Ruling on her appeal, the CSC found her guilty and suspended statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the position.
her for six months. After the suspension period, she was reinstated but the Governor • There is no vested right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold office. No
terminated her services the next day due to lack of confidence. The CSC ordered her proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service is not a property right.
reinstatement and the CA found her termination as illegal. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. The rule is that offices in
The SC ruled that the Gonzales enjoys the right of security tenure but only as a primarily government, except those created by the constitution, may be abolished, altered, or
confidential employee. SC ruled that where the trust and confidence has been created anytime by statute.
irretrievably eroded, the Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that • The primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the appointing
he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales is valid. authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is
not “removed” or “dismissed” from office; the employee’s term merely “expires” and the
loss of trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law that results in the
termination of employment.
CASE SUMMARY
67 Baybay Water The present petition the disallowance by COA of the payment of various benefits to
District vs. COA members of the board of directors and officers of petitioner BWD. Among others, the
petitioners contended that even before the Court declared in Davao City Water District v.
Civil Service Commission (1992) that water districts are GOCCs subject to the jurisdiction
of the COA, water districts have already been granting additional benefits to members of
the board of directors, with the approval of the LWUA, and to their officers and
employees and that they continued doing so after the promulgation of the decision of the
case. Thus, they acquired a vested right to these benefits of which they cannot now be
deprived without violating their property rights and the rule on non-diminution of benefits.
Petitioners further invoked management prerogative to justify the grant of allowances and
other benefits to both the board of directors of BWD and its officers and employees.
The Court held that the erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public
officials does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of such
errors. More specifically, where there is an express provision of law prohibiting the grant
of certain benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to an
error committed by public officials in granting the benefit. P.D. No. 198 expressly prohibits
the grant of compensation other than the payment of per diems, as determined by the
LWUA pursuant to P.D. No. 198, to directors of water districts.
68 Pollo vs. David Petitioner was an employee at CSC. Acting on a complaint that one of their employees
was assisting government employees with pending cases before the CSC, respondents
(CSC officers) accessed the work computer of petitioner and copied the contents thereof.
The contents were used in the administrative case against him. He filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA alleging that the contents copied from his computer may not be
used against him because they were obtained in violation of his right to privacy. The CA
and SC disagreed. The SC applied the 2-step determination provided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of O’Connor vs. Ortega.
DOCTRINE/S
Management prerogative refers to the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods,
processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their
work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of work, presupposing the existence
of an employer-employee relationship; Members of water districts’ boards of directors are
not employees of the water districts.
The correct analysis of determining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy of a
government employee involves two steps:
1.Because some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public
that no expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider the operational
realities of the workplace in order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated;
2.Where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on
that expectation for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations
of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under
all the circumstances. Both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be
reasonable.
a.Inception - A search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be “justified at its
inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is
necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file.
b.Scope - The search will be permissible in its scope when “the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the nature of the misconduct.
CASE SUMMARY
69 Camarines Norte Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator in a permanent capacity prior to
vs. Gonzales, supra the effectivity of the Local Government Code. She was dismissed after being found guilty
of gross insubordination. Ruling on her appeal, the CSC found her guilty and suspended
her for six months. After the suspension period, she was reinstated but the Governor
terminated her services the next day due to lack of confidence. The CSC ordered her
reinstatement and the CA found her termination as illegal.
DOCTRINE/S
The primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the appointing authority
loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not
“removed” or “dismissed” from office; the employee’s term merely “expires” and the loss
of trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law that results in the termination
of employment.

The SC ruled that the Gonzales enjoys the right of security tenure but only as a primarily
confidential employee. SC ruled that where the trust and confidence has been
irretrievably eroded, the Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that
he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales is valid.

70 CSC vs Magnaye (Take note of dates) Petitioner Magnaye was first appointed as Utility Worker I by Mayor
Rosales in March 2001. After the May 2001 elections, Mayor Rosales was replaced
Mayor Bendana, and the latter returned Magnaye to his original assignment as Utility
Worker 1 on July 2001. However, on August 13, 2001, Magnaye received from the new
mayor a notice of termination from employment. The termination was effective the next
day, August 14, and the grounds cited were “unsatisfactory conduct” and “want of
capacity”, which are grounds found under the Civil Service Rules. However, the notice of
termination did not specify any of Magnaye’s acts which constituted “unsatisfactory
conduct” nor “want of capacity”.
Our Constitution, in using the expressions "all workers" and "no officer or employee," puts
no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means
that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary
employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary
employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular
employees.
The only difference between regular and probationary employees from the perspective of
due process is that the latter's termination can be based on the wider ground of failure to
comply with standards made known to them when they became probationary employees.

Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC, which dismissed Magnaye’s
complaint. According to the CSC, Magnaye was validly terminate because he did not
enjoy security of tenure as he was still in a 6-month probationary period at the time he
was terminated (from March 2001 to August 2001, which is less than 6 months).

The CA and SC disagreed with the CSC and ruled that Magnaye was illegally terminated.

First, the SC held, citing Section 3 (2), Article XIII of the Constitution and Section 2(3),
Article IX-B of the Constitution, that (see doctrines). Hence, even if within the 6-months
probationary period, Magnaye enjoys security of tenure.

Second, with respect as to whether Magnaye was properly found to have committed
“unsatisfactory conduct” and “want of capacity”, the SC held in the negative. According to
the SC, the Notice of Termination’s failure to specify any of Magnaye’s acts which
constituted “unsatisfactory conduct” nor “want of capacity” made the said notice
ineffective. Under the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, as amended,
the notice of termination must “contain sufficient information which shall enable the
employee to prepare an explanation.”

Finally, the SC also found that: (1) factual findings indicate that the evaluation of
Magnaye’s performance only happened 2 years after his termination was made; and (2)
the new Mayor terminated Magnaye only less than 1 and 1/2 months after the former’s
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
71 BOCEA vs Teves On January 25, 2005, PGMA signed into law RA 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) . Petitioner ●Equal protection (SC lifted its ruling in Abakada case)
contends that the enactment and implementation of the said law are tainted with oThe equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members. Sometimethat has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA
in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC, pursuant to RA9335, started to disseminate [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue generation
Performance Contracts for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-file employees to capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the
sign. Contract provided criteria and procedures for removing from service Officials and revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives
Employees whose collection fall short of the target. (Sec. 25(b) of RA 9335). Officers of and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
BOCEA refused to sign the Contract but some of them were coerced. In addition, Comm. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
Morales exerted heavy pressure on the Collectors, Appraisers, etc. during command distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the
conferences to make them sign the Contract. collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
●Security of tenure and Due process (SC lifted its ruling in Abakada case)
BOCEA: RA9335 violates their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and oClearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and
their respective families’ prejudice. employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that
an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided
OSG: (1) guarantee of security of tenure is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. (2) by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.]
An employee may only be separated upon compliance with substantive and procedural 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls
due process. short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting
the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
The issue is WON RA9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members to: (a) performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The
equal protection of laws; (b) security of tenure; and (c) due process? action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
The SC ruled in the negative. The SC held that (see doctrines).

72 Baybay Water The present petition is about the disallowance by COA of the payment of various benefits
District vs. COA, to members of the board of directors and officers of herein petitioner. Among others, the
supra petitioners contended that even before the Court declared in Davao City Water District v.
CSC (1992) that water districts are GOCCs subject to the jurisdiction of the COA, water
districts have already been granting additional benefits to members of the board of
directors, with the approval of the LWUA, and to their officers and employees and that
they continued doing so after the promulgation of the decision of the case. Thus, they
acquired a vested right to these benefits of which they cannot now be deprived without
violating their property rights and the rule on non-diminution of benefits. Petitioners
further invoked management prerogative to justify the grant of allowances and other
benefits to both the board of directors of BWD and its officers and employees. SC held
that petitioners are not entitled to receive benefits and allowances in excess of those
allowed by P.D. No. 198, guidelines of LWUA, and other applicable laws.
P.D. No. 198 expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of per
diems, as determined by the LWUA pursuant to P. D. No. 198, to directors of water
districts. Practice, without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any
vested right if it is contrary to law.
Unlike P.D. No. 198, 13, the Charter of NAPOCOR expressly granted members of its
board of directors the right to receive allowances in addition to their per diems, subject
only to the approval of the Secretary of Energy. Petitioners cannot thus claim similar
treatment as the board of directors of NAPOCOR.
CASE SUMMARY
73 DBM vs. Leones Respondent Olivia Leones, who was the Municipal Treasurer of Bacnotan, La Union, was
(2010) reassigned to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer, La Union. Because of this, the
Municipality of Bacnotan stopped paying her representation and transportation allowance
(RATA). She unsuccessfully sought administrative relief. Hence, she filed a mandamus
with the RTC against DBM and the Bacnotan mayor – dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. CA affirmed. Then, respondent sought a DBM Opinion, but the
DBM opined that she was not entitled except in 1999 because the succeeding GAAs
required her actual performance of functions (she didn’t because she was reassigned).
The CA, on certiorari, ordered DBM and the mayor to pay her RATA because it is part of
her salary and non-payment constitutes diminution of her salary during reassignment
which is prohibited. Moreover, reliance on the GAAs were erroneous because her
salaries were paid by the local, and not the national, government. The SC agreed that
she was entitled to her RATA, but only because there was no legal basis to stop paying
the same. (see doctrine)
74 Domingo vs. COA Petitioner, in her capacity as DSWD Regional Director of Region V, was requested by the
Regional Auditor to instruct all persons concerned to cease from collecting the
transportation allowance because several government vehicles had already been
assigned to their office for the use of DSWD personnel. Despite the assignment to her of
a vehicle for her official use, petitioner asked for reconsideration of the auditor’s directive,
contending that she should only be disallowed to claim transportation allowance on the
days she actually used a government vehicle. WON a commutable transportation
allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government
vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle, the SC said NO, a
government official, to whom a motor vehicle has been assigned, cannot, at the same
time, claim transportation allowance.
75 Cruz vs. Gangan Petitioner was a TESDA district director. She was on board the LRT (going back to her
station from the Regional Office of TESDA in Taguig) when bag was slashed and her
government issued phone was stolen. She requested relief from accountability but the
resident Auditor, the NGAO II and the COA, ruling that she failed to exercise the degree
of diligence required, denied this. However, SC reversed this.
76 Monroy vs. CA,
supra
DOCTRINE/S
●Statutory law, as implemented by administrative issuances and interpreted in decisions,
has consistently treated RATA as distinct from salary. Unlike salary which is paid for
services rendered, RATA belongs to a basket of allowances to defray expenses deemed
unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, RATA is paid only to certain officials who,
by the nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation expenses.
●Although the Philippines is a unitary State, the present Constitution accommodates
within the system the operation of local government units with enhanced administrative
autonomy and autonomous regions with limited political autonomy. Subject to the
President’s power of general supervision and exercising delegated powers, these units
and regions operate much like the national government, with their own executive and
legislative branches, financed by locally generated and nationally allocated funds
disbursed through budgetary ordinances passed by their local legislative councils.
●For an employee not to fall under the exception in Section 3.3.1 of the National
Compensation Circular No. 67, the functions attached to the new office must be so alien
to the functions pertaining to the former office as to make the two absolutely unrelated or
non-comparable.
A government official, to whom a motor vehicle has been assigned, cannot, at the same
time, claim transportation allowance.
Whether or not the government official used the vehicle assigned to her/his office, is not
an issue, as it is undeniable that he/she could have used the said vehicle whenever
he/she wanted to.
The rules provide that property for official use and purpose shall be utilized with the
diligence of a good father of a family. Extraordinary measures are not called for in
taking care of a cellular phone while in transit.
Cruz followed the correct procedure in notifying the government of the loss. Her
application for relief from accountability is deemed as the notification of the loss of the
subject cellular phone.
In the absence of evidence showing negligence on her part, credit for the loss of the
cellular phone is proper under the law.
The rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary
received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into
the office in good faith and under color of title.
CASE SUMMARY
77 Tupas vs. NHA Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in respondent NHC. It sought a
conduct of certification election however it was refused by the med-arbiter since NHC is a
government-owned and or controlled corporation and its employees are prohibited to
form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. This was
reversed by the BLR and was then set-aside by the Officer-in-Charge. The issue before
the SC is whether the certification election may be allowed or whether the employees of
NHC may form a union for purposes of collective bargaining. SC held that yes. During the
effectivity of the 1973 constitution, it was prohibited but a different rule exists under the
1987 Constitution. Such prohibition is now limited to government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters. Since NHC does not have an original charter, its
employees are covered by the Labor Code. Nonetheless, the SC recognized statutory
developments which now allows the conduct of certification election regardless if the
employee is covered by the Labor Code or the Civil service laws. It said that the
distinction between the two types of government-owned or controlled corporations and
the laws governing employment relations therein were rendered academic by the
statutory developments.
78 SSSEA vs CA SSS Employees Association (SSSEA) staged a strike in front of the SSS office,
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with SSS. The issue is whether members of SSSEA are allowed to
stage strike being government employees. SC held that they are prohibited to stage a
strike. The constitution allows freedom of association and assembly to private and
government employees; however, it does not include freedom of government employees
to strike without legislation from Congress.
DOCTRINE/S
with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph
(5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees."
The civil service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with
original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special
law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.
the Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are
organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the
general corporation law."
Insofar as certification elections are concerned, subsequent statutory developments have
rendered academic even the distinction between the two types of government-owned or
controlled corporations and the laws governing employment relations therein, as
hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor
Code or by the civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.
The right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to strike.
In the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing
their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No.
180
CASE SUMMARY
79 Bangalisan, et al vs Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” to
CA dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the government to implement
measures intended for their material benefit. The Education Secretary issued a Return-to-
Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence, they were charged by the
Secretary with several administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service. CSC
and CA affirmed.
SC held that as a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like
Memo Circ. No.6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work
stoppage against a public employer. In the absence of any express legislation allowing
government employees to strike, employees in the public service may not engage in
strike, walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the private sector.
80 GSIS vs Kapisanan Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa ng GSIS (KMG), a union of rank-and-file employees,
staged a four-day concerted demonstration against GSIS GM Garcia’s management
style. However, the absence of the employees was not covered by a prior approved
leave. GM Garcia initiated administrative charges against the members of KMG for the
disruption of work as a consequence of their mass leaves without notice. KMG opposed
and filed a Petition for Review before the CA. CA ruled in favor of KMG. SC reversed.
DOCTRINE/S
No right to strike
The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions
or associations, without including the right to strike. While the Constitution recognizes the
right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result
in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services.
Substance over form
The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
Why strike is denied
Suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the
public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government
employees.
Clear and Direct Legislative Authority to Strike
To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear and
direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, walkouts
and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private sector..
E.O. 180 enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.
CASE SUMMARY
81 Rabor vs CSC Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered
the government service as a Utility Worker at the age of 55 years. Rabor, upon the
advice of an official to apply for retirement , responded by showing a GSIS certificate with
a notation to the effect that his service is extended for him to complete the 15-years
requirement for retirement. The Davao City Government wrote to the Regional Director of
the CSC requesting advice as to what action should be taken on Rabor’s case. Director
Caward replied by saying that Rabor’s continued employment is is non-extendible. Mayor
Duterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawad’s letter and order him not to work anymore.
Rabor asked Director Cawad for extension of his job until he completed the 15-year
requirement but was denied. Rabor then asked OP for an extension. His request was
referred by OP to CSC and thereafter CSC denied Rabor’s request. Rabor asked for
reconsidered of CSC ruling citing Cena case but was denied. Rabor reiterated his
request to Mayor Duterte but was rebuffed. SC held that CSC and Office of Mayor was
correct in denying the petition for extension, based on the Admin Code and PD 1146.
Petition denied.
DOCTRINE/S
Test of a valid subordinate legislation: All that may be reasonably; demanded is a
showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are
germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute.
SC concludes that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent:
that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically
paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective (and shall be granted for a
period of not exceeding one (1) year )
Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum
Circular No. 27. ((b) … Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he
shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen (15) years)
We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency
concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the
service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without
completing fifteen (15) years of government service

82 Borromeo vs CSC The COA, upon retired CSC Chairman Borromeo’s request for opinion, rendered in a It is axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the
decision that the basis of the computation of Borromeo’s terminal leave pay must include persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved
the allowances received at the time of retirement. However, DBM refused to disburse the in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes.
terminal leave differential (around 100k), arguing that the basis is only the “basic pay”,
excluding allowances. CSC yielded to the DBM decision, leading Borromeo to file the
present petition. In deciding whether or not allowances should be included in the
computation of the terminal leave pay, the SC held that the applicable law to petitioner is
R.A. 910 since retirement benefits of the Judiciary members were extended to
Constitutional Commission members by Administrative Order No. 444.

The SC held that it is clear from RA 910 as amended that the five-year gratuity is based
on highest monthly salary plus transportation, living and representation allowance.
Terminal leave payments are given not only at the same time but also for the same policy
considerations governing retirement benefits. Thus, terminal leave payments must be
governed by the same principle as retirement benefits. COLA and RATA should be
included in computing the terminal leave credits when the officials retire.
CASE SUMMARY
83 Lopez vs CA Private respondent Manapat was a life-long government employee of the City of Manila,
having rendered 35 years of government service. He retired when he reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years. He then claimed retirement benefits from the City
under RA 1616, which provides for the City as the one liable to pay the gratuity and the
amount under this law is significantly higher than that of the RA 660 (also an amendment
law on the retirement pay). The City officials denied the claim primarily arguing that the
city government has the discretion to allow or disallow a claim to retire under RA 1616,
subject to the availability of funds. Manapat brought an action of Mandamus before the
RTC which dismissed his petition. CA reversed the decision.
SC agreed with the CA and held that at the time of Manapat’s second retirement, he had from the retiree by the employer.
complied with the requirements for retirement under each and every one of the 4 modes
of retirement provided in Section 12 of CA 186 as amended. There is nothing in the
statute to suggest that a government employee who happens to satisfy the requirements necessary appropriation ordinance but also the corresponding payment of Municipal
not only of Section 12(e) but also of Sections 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c), must necessarily
retire under 12(e). The interpretation of petitioners is at war with the basic policy purpose
of CA 186 as amended by RA 1616 which is to create an added incentive for qualified
government employees to remain in the service of the government. It further ruled that
the option belongs to private respondent Manapat and not to his employer. SC also
stressed that it became ministerial on the part of petitioner to provide the funds
necessary to pay the retirement gratuity.
84 Rabe vs Flores An administrative complaint was filed by petitioner Narita Rave against respondent Delsa
Flores, Interpreter III of the RTC of Panabo, Davao for “conduct unbecoming a
government employee, acts prejudicial to the interest of the service and abuse of
authority.” It was alleged that Flores took advantage of her position as a court employee
by claiming a stall at the public market when she is not among those awarded the
market’s stalls by the court in a civil case. Also, she is said to have destroyed petitioner’s
stall and brought the materials to the police station of the municipality. Issue is WON
there was a misconduct. SC decided on the affirmative.
85 PAGC vs Pleyto PAGC charged DPWH USec. Pleyto and recommended his dismissal to the OP for failing
to declare his wife’s business interests and financial connections in his SALNs, in
violation of RA 6713 and RA 3019. OP approved the recommendation, to which Pleyto
appealed, claiming that he did not declare his wife’s interests since these were not in
relation to DPWH. He also argued that he should first be allowed to avail of the Review
and Compliance Procedure under RA 6713 before he is charged administratively. CA
granted the appeal, prompting PAGC to file a petition for review before the SC.
Ultimately, SC held that it is bound by “conclusiveness of judgment” since the issues in
this case are identical to those of a prior case also involving Pleyto and his SALNs. In the
prior case, SC found that Pleyto was guilty of simple negligence only, and not gross
misconduct, for failure to declare his wife’s financial interests. SC also ruled that the
Review and Compliance Procedure is not a prerequisite to the filing of administrative
charges for false declarations or concealments in one’s SALN.
DOCTRINE/S
The basic principles for the construction of statutes tell us that a statute must be read in
such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.
Retirement statutes, in case of a real as distinguished from a merely ostensible doubt or
ambiguity, must be so construed as to give meaning and effect to their humanitarian
purposes and so as reasonably to benefit employees who had opted to stay in the service
of the government for so many years.
The option of retiring under Section 12 (c) or Section 12(e) belongs to private respondent
Manapat and not to his employer, the City of Manila. That option cannot be taken away
Mandamus was available to compel not only the enactment and approval of the
funds therefor.
Poverty and pressing financial need could justify stealing, the government would have
been bankrupt long ago—a public servant should never expect to become wealthy in
government”
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the
judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to
be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their
everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character at all times
and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency.
In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there is a breach of duty or
failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable.
An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior
motives and/or purposes, does not qualify as gross misconduct, and is merely simple
negligence.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
86 Marquez vs Petitioners filed administrative complaints against respondents Judge Ovejera and Sheriff The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
Ovejera Collado. Particularly for Collado, she was charged with violation of RA 6713 for her failure opportunities for official corruption, as well as at maintaining a standard of honesty in the
to disclose in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 certain time deposits with the public service. With such disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to
Moncada Women’s Credit Corporation. The OCA recommended found that Collado be monitor the affluence of public officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and
fined in an amount equivalent to her salary for six (6) months, due to her failure to submit balance mechanism to verify their undisclosed properties and/or sources of income.
her SALN for the years 2000 and 2001. However, it did not delve on WON the time
deposits were reflected in her SALN in 2004 and 2005. However, the SC said that she
must be held administratively liable for failure to disclose the interests accrued on the
time deposits in her SALN in 2004 and 2005. Furthermore, they cannot hold Collado
administratively liable for her purported failure to submit her SALN for the years 2000 and
2001 as she was not given an opportunity to be heard on this matter. Penalty was also
reduced.
87 Dela Cruz vs COA Following the ruling of COA to disallow additional compensation or remuneration given to Alternates who sit in for Executive Department Secretaries in their ex-officio capacity as
and received by the concerned officials, and effect the refund of the same-from the time board members of NHA cannot be entitled to receive extra or additional compensation.
of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the consolidated cases of A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines,
Inc., et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al. , petitioners’ reimbursement/requests
for payments were disallowed. (per diem and representation allowances) Petitioners were
board members of NHA acting as alternatives to their secretaries.

Issue is WON board members acting as alternatives to their secretaries can claim
refunds and reimbursement. SC held that petitioners who sit as alternates
cannot be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give
petitioners a better right than their principals

88 PEZA vs COA The PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Españo issued Notices of Disallowances (NDs) on the A public official holding an ex officio position as provided by law has no right to receive
payments of per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board for the period 2001- additional compensation for the ex officio position.
2006. The PEZA Director for finance argued good faith in PEZA's grant of the ex officio
members' receipt of the per diems. The Court found the petition devoid of merit.
1. There is no legal basis for the grant of per diems since R.A. No. 8748, purposely
deleted the last paragraph of Sec. 11 of RA 7916 that authorized the grant of per diems
to PEZA Board members as it was in conflict with the proscription laid down in the 1987
Constitution.
2. PEZA cannot claim that it was not aware of circumstances pointing to the possible
illegality of the disbursements of per diems to the ex officio members of the Board. In
Civil Liberties Union (which was decided in 1991, or a decade before the disallowed
payments), the Court clarified the prohibition under the Constitution.
CASE SUMMARY
89 Posadas vs In 1995, BOR approved the establishment of the Technology Management Center
Sandiganbayan (TMC) under the direct supervision of the Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman. UP
Diliman Chancellor Posadas was nominated to be the director of TMC but he declined
and appointed another. In October 24, 1995, UP Diliman Chancellor Posadas designated
petitioner Dr. Rolando P. Dayco (Dr. Dayco), Vice-Chancellor for Administrative Affairs,
as Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of UP Diliman since he was invited to visit a Chinese
university. On November 7, 1995, Dr. Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as Project Director
of UP TMC effective September 18, 1995 up to September 17, 1996. Dr. Dayco also
signed a consultancy contract with Chancellor Posadas. As evidenced by disbursement
vouchers and admitted by Dr. Posadas, he received his "honoraria" as PROJECT
DIRECTOR (₱30,000.00 per month 9/18/95 until 9/17/96) and consultancy fees (totaling
₱100,000.00) as Project Director and Consultant of the TMC Project until May 1996 when
the Commission on Audit (COA) raised questions on the legality of the said fees. During
this time, he was also receiving his salary from he government. The Sandiganbayan finds
both accused Roger R. Posadas and Rolando P. Dayco GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Section 7(b) of RA 6713. SC affirmed SB
upon finding that the appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director falls within the
prohibition against holding of multiple positions since there is no distinction in Section 7,
Article IX-B as to the employment status, i.e., whether permanent, temporary or
coterminous. Petitioners failed to cite any law to justify Dr. Posadas’ holding of concurrent
positions as Chancellor and TMC Project Director. On the amounts received which
resulted to undue injury to the government: A. MONTHLY SALARY. The disbursement
and payment of the ₱30,000.00 monthly salary as TMC Project Director to Dr. Posadas
was improper, in view of his invalid appointment. Said amount represents the actual
injury to the Government. B.CONSULTANCY FEES. Consultancy is deemed private
practice of profession. Hence, there is a violation of Section 7 (b) of RA 6713. In this
case, Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco entered into the contract for consultancy services for
the TMC Project without prior permission from the University President pursuant to rticle
250 of the University Code. (SEE PROVISIONS in the doctrine)
SC reversed itself upon MR. (SEE DOCTRINE). SC ruled that the appointment was done
90 Santos vs CA In 1992, MeTC judge Santos retired and received his separation pay under RA 910. In
1993, he re-entered the government as Director of MMA. Congress enacted RA 9724
creating MMDA. In the said law, it is stated that benefits of displaced employees with the
creation of RA 1 ¼ of monthly salary. MMDA issued a resolution stating that petitioner is
separated from service. Petitioner wrote a position paper stating that all the years of his
government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the
computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No. 7924. The SC did not agree and
held that the separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence,
the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected.
DOCTRINE/S
This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such
"actual damage" must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. A finding of "undue injury" cannot be based on flimsy and
non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. The Court held
in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan6 that the element of undue injury cannot be presumed even
after the supposed wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the
elements of the crime. Here, the majority assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of
₱30 000.00 monthly as TMC Project Director caused actual injury to the Government.
The record shows, however, that the ₱247 500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident
Auditor disallowed was deducted from his terminal leave benefits. The prosecution also
failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas "unwarranted advantage" as a result of
the appointments in question.
Relevant Provision for 1st decision:
Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:x x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.
SEC. 7. of RA 6713 Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:x x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:x x x x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; or
Article 250 of the University Code, which provides:
Art. 250. No member of the academic staff, officer or employee of the University shall,
For the purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay under Section 11
of Republic Act No. 7924, his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and his
separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the Metropolitan Manila
Authority.
Republic Act No. 7924 allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be
displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the
Metropolitan Manila Authority; The separation pay must relate only to the employment
thus affected.
CASE SUMMARY
91 People vs De De Venecia was prosecuted for electioneering under Sec. 54 of the Revised Election
Venecia Code. The CFI dismissed the case holding that Sec. 54 was repealed by Sec. 29 of RA
2260. But the SC ruled that Sec. 54 is not repealed by Sec. 29. [1st Doctrine] The last
sentence of sec. 29 is an exception to Sec. 54 and at most, an amendment to Sec. 54.
De Venecia’s act of distributing handbills that solicits votes in favor of a candidate is a
violation of Sec. 54.
DOCTRINE/S
Although Sec. 54 prohibits a classified civil service employee from aiding any candidate,
Sec. 29 allows such classified employee to express his views on current political
problems or issues, or to mention the name of his candidate for public office, even if such
expression of views or mention of names may result in aiding one particular candidate.
Electioneering. The distribution by a classified civil service employee of handbills urging
election of a particular candidate is a solicitation of the electors’ vote punishable by
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

92 Debulgado vs. Mayor Rogelio appointed Victoria, his wife, as the head of the Office of General Services.
CSC, supra There were three other employees who were considered for the position. Before her
promotion, Victoria had been in government service for 32 years. The CSC received a
letter calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor
of his wife. The CSC recalled the approval issued by Director Escobia and disapproved
the promotion of petitioner Victoria upon the ground that the promotion violated the
statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments.
Victoria and Rogelio's argument: The prohibition against nepotic appointments is
applicable only to original appointments and not to promotional appointments.
The Court held that It follows that the promotional appointment of Victoria by her
husband, petitioner Mayor, falls within the prohibited class of appointments. Section 59,
Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: it refers
to "all appointments" whether original or promotional in nature
Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary
language: it refers to "all appointments" whether original or promotional in nature.
A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in
comprehensive and unqualified terms.
-Explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any distinction between
differing kinds or types of appointments.
-Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
government, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned
or controlled corporations.
-There is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 (persons employed in a confidential
capacity, teachers, physicians, and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines).

93 CSC vs Cortes Respondent Cortes was appointed Information Officer V by the Commission En Banc of The purpose of Section 59 of the Administrative Code of the Philippines on the rule
the CHR. Her father is a Commissioner but abstained from voting. The CSC held that the against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and recommending
appointment is nepotic. The CA reversed and ordered her reinstatement. In the Supreme authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.
Court, Cortes raises the argument that the appointing authority in this case is the
Commission En Banc and not the individual Commissioners who compose it. The
Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting
did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be
avoided by the prohibition still exists (see doctrine). His mere presence during the
deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast
doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
94 CSC vs Dacoycoy, A certain George Suan of the Citizens Crime Watch filed a complaint against responded Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its
supra Dacoycoy for habitual drunkness, misconduct, and nepotism (for appointing his two sons personnel. In Debulgado,we stressed that "The basic purpose or objective of the
as driver and utility worker). prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to
be a comprehensive one.”
CSC found him guilty of nepotism and dismissed him from service. This was reversed by
the CA on the ground that it was not respondent himself who appointed or recommended The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually
his two sons. Upon appeal to the SC, the Court held that CA was wrong because Section very broad and comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that
59 of EO 252 because it suffices that the appointment is extended or issued in favor of a must be nipped in the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the person exercise said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward
immediate supervision over the appointee. the 'outstanding' civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of
corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order
In this case, while the recommendation did not come from respondent Dacoycoy himself, to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law."
it was made by one Mr. Dacuag who was a subordinate of Respondent Dacoycoy, and
who thereafter placed the two sons of Dacoycoy under the latter’s immediate supervision. Action Before SC: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals by
The Court, finding that there was an attempt to circumvent the law, revived the resolution the Civil Service Commission from a decision of the Court of Appeals ruling that
of the CSC dismissing Dacoycoy. respondent Dacoycoy was not guilty of nepotism, and declaring null and void the CSC’s
resolution dismissing him from service as Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trade in Northern Samar.

095 CSC vs Tinaya Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste appointed Tinaya as municipal assessor but CSC approved
the appointment as temporary only. After said appointment, Tinaya then married the
Mayor Justimbaste’s daughter. After expiration of the temporary appointment, Tinaya was
permanently appointed as municipal assessor by the then Acting Mayor Luban. This new
appointment was initially disapproved by CSC but his mother-in-law, the aforementioned
Mayor Justimbaste, appealed to the CSC RO VIII. CSC conducted an audit and found
that Tinaya’s second appointment violated the rule on nepotism so they recalled such
appointment.
The law requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC, which will ascertain
whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules
pertinent were observed. The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not
concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete. CSC is empowered to
take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions and that such
power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of
applicable provisions of the Civil Service law and regulations.

SC affirmed the CSC actions.

According to the SC, the appointment was made in violation of Chap. 8 of the Civil
Service Law:

Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending
authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. As used in this Section, the word relative
and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.

Applying the foregoing, the SC held that being then the incumbent mayor, Mayor
Justimbaste was the chief of TINAYA and therefore was deemed to have recommended
him to Vice-Mayor/Acting Mayor Luban to be appointed as municipal assessor.
CASE SUMMARY
096 People vs Reyes Private respondent reassigned Ebio, a Customs Operations Chief of MICP from to the
Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as a Special Assistant.
COMELEC filed an information before the RTC alleging a violation of Section 261 (h) of
B.P. Blg 881 which prohibits the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days
before national elections. Upon private respondents motion, RTC dismissed the case. It
was however established the Ebio’s transfer was done within the election period fixed by
COMELEC. The issue in this case is that WON the said transfer during election period
ipso facto makes respondent Maniego liable for an election offense under Section 261 (h)
of B.P. Blg. 881. The SC answered in the negative.
097 Ruiz vs Cabahug Due to technical objections to the capacity of the Allied Technologists, Inc. to practice
architecture and upon the advice of the Sec of Justice, a contract was signed by Ruiz as
President and Panlilio as Architect in behalf of Allied. When the defendants-officials paid
Allied the contract price for the architectural engineering service, they retained 15%,
since Panlilio asserted he is the sole and only architect of Veterans Hospital to the
exclusion of plaintiffs. Under Title II of the contract, at any time prior to 6 months after
completion and acceptance of the work under Title I, the Government may direct Allied to
perform the services specified in Title II. Despite the completion or acceptance, the
Government refused to direct plaintiffs to perform the work. Platintiffs pray that
defendants desist from recognizing Panlilio as the sole architect of Veterans Hospital and
from paying him 15%, and after hearing Ruiz, Herrera and Panlilio be recognized as
architects of Veterans Hospital and defendants be directed to turn over the supervision
called for by Title II. Court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit
involved is one against the Government, which may not sued without its consent. ISSUE:
WON the suit is one against the government. HELD: NO - The suit is properly directed
against the officials and against them alone, not against the Government, which does not
have any interest in the outcome of the controversy between plaintiffs and Panlilio.
DOCTRINE/S
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a government
officer or employee during the election period.
The transfer or detail of a government officer or employee will not be penalized by
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to promote efficiency in the government service.
Two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg.
881, viz:
(1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee within the election period
as fixed by the COMELEC, and
(2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in
accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.
In this case, private respondent effected the transfer during the election period, and he
did not obtain the approval of the COMELEC because the necessary rules on how to get
COMELEC’s approval on the transfer or detail of public officers or employees during the
election period was only took effect on January 15, 1992 (after the transfer. In other
words, private respondent could not be charged with failing to secure the approval of the
COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992 as on that day, the rules of the
COMELEC on the subject were still inexistent.
Where the facts and circumstances show that the Government does not any longer have
interest in the subject matter of the action which the defendants-officials have retained
and refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or entity to which it should be paid,
and plaintiffs do not seek to sue the Government to require it to pay the amount or
involve it in the litigation, the suit is not one against the Government or a claim against it,
but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be
established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and
recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and
interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done.
CASE SUMMARY
098 Festejo vs Defendant Isaías Fernando, the Director of Public Works, caused the irrigation of a canal
Fernando (1954) which passed through a portion of plaintiff Carmen Festejo’s sugar lands. Festejo claims
she did not consent to and expressly objected to the taking of her land. Hence, she filed a
civil complaint against Fernando before the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The Attorney General, on
behalf of Fernando, moved for dismissal on the ground that it was a suit against the State
which has not consented thereto. CFI dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the SC,
Festejo maintained that her suit is not against the State but against Fernando in his
personal capacity. The SC agreed and held that because Fernando exceeded his
authority (and therefore committed a tort) when he deprived Festejo of her property
without due process of law, he is personally liable.
DOCTRINE/S
• Ordinarily an officer or employee committing a tort is personally liable therefor, and
may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage
results from his tortious act.
• An officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts
outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render
himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit.

099 Wylie vs Rarang Petitioners were assistant administrative officer and commanding officer of the U.S. ●The doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that
Naval Base in Subic, respectively. Private Respondent was an employee in the Office of ‘there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard. depends’.
Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station ●All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. It is also
supervised the publication of the “Plan of the Day” (POD) which was published daily by applicable to complained filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
the US Naval Base station. The POD published under the Action Line Inquiry: them in the discharge of their duties.
●However, the Petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious
“x x x I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/ inspectress are (sic) acts in publishing a libellous article.
consuming for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The ●Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of
observation is even more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes crimes in the name of official duty.
and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention 'Auring' who is in herself, a disgrace to ●In this case:
her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. x x x” oPetitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly
recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published, The
The private respondent was the only one who was named “Auring” in the Office of the petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the
Provost Marshal. Private Respondent filed an action for damages. Petitioners contend publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and
that they acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the United cannot be part of official duty.
States Nave, and are, therefore, immune from suit. oThe petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they
caused the private respondent.
The issue is WON Petitioners can be held liable?

The SC ruled in the affirmative. The SC held that (see doctrines).

100 Blaquera vs The respondents are heads of various executive departments (DENR, DSWD, DA) who Petitioners’ contention that the herein respondents be held personally liable for the refund
Alcala authorized the payments of CY 1992 Productivity Incentives without the approval in question is untenable. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, public officers are not
(required by EO 268 issued by President Aquino) of the President. Thus, President personally liable for damages resulting from the performance of official duties.
Ramos issued EO 29, setting the allowed incentives to not more than P1, 000.00 and
directing that the excess be returned to the government. Thus the petitioners Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official
(government employees who received said bonuses) assail the constitutionality of both duties. Absent any showing of bad faith or malice, there is likewise a presumption of
EOs because they violate the provisions of EO 292. The Supreme Court affirmed the regularity in the performance of official duties.
validity of the EOs as valid exercise of the Presidents power to control executive
departments as provided under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. However, as
both the respondents and petitioners are in good faith, the petitioners are allowed to keep
the bonus already paid them for Cy 1992.
CASE SUMMARY
101 MWSS vs. COA The auditor of MWSS disallowed the payment of certain benefits to the MWSS
employees after the enactment of RA No. 6758 in 1989. The COA identified the
petitioners, who are officers of MWSS, as among the certifying/approving officials
personally liable to refund the disallowed benefits amounting to P8.7M.
The SC affirmed the disallowance of benefits to MWSS officials and employees. It ruled
that the MWSS Board of Trustees did not act in good faith and may be held liable for
refund because they approved the said benefits even though these patently contravened
RA No. 6758, which clearly and unequivocally stated that governing boards of the
GOCC’s can no longer fix compensation and allowances of their officials or employees.
The petitioners, who were merely officers involved in day-to-day operations and had
nothing to do with policy-making of MWSS, have no obligation to refund.
102 Vinzons-Chato vs. Petitioner Vinzons-Chato filed an MR of the 2007 SC decision against her. The issue
Fortune before the SC is WON petitioner may be validly sued in her private capacity for acts done
in her duty as CIR. The SC held that petitioner’s acts were in pursuance to her duty which
is owed to the public in general. Hence, since respondent Fortune Tobacco failed to
allege the specific injury it suffered or any bad faith on the petitioner’s acts, it failed to
show how its right to due process or equal protection was violated; It failed to state a
cause of action which warrants the dismissal of its suit for damages against petitioner in
the RTC.
103 Cojuangco vs. CA Cojuangco’s racehorses won races with corresponding cash prizes. The prizes were
withheld by Carrascoso, as Chairman of PCSO, pursuant to the advice of PCGG and the
E.O.2 issued by then Pres. Aquino, freezing all assets of Pres Marcos and his close
friends. Cojuangco filed a case imputing bad faith on the part of Carrascoso. RTC ruled
in favor of Cojuangco, awarding damages personally due from Carrascoso. CA reversed.
SC modified the CA by awarding nominal damages for the violation of Cojuangco’s right
against deprivation of property without due process of law.
104 Garcia vs. Petition for forfeiture was filed by the Ombudsman against Garcia, et al. before the
Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan. Garcia filed a Motion to Dismiss in regard to the petition for forfeiture on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of respondent Sandiganbayan over special civil actions
for forfeiture under RA 1379. Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Dismiss declared
Garcia in default and setting the case for ex parte reception of evidence. MR denied. SC
held that Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case and ROC shall govern on
procedural requirements on cases under RA 1379.
DOCTRINE/S
The officials of the agency cannot be held personally liable for the disallowed benefits
because they had no participation in the approval thereof.
The recipients of the benefits, having acted in good faith because of their honest belief
that the grant of the benefits had legal basis, need not refund the amounts received.
•There are 2 kinds of duties exercised by public officers: (1) duty owing to the public in
general, and (2) duty owing to individuals
•When what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual cannot
have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have
been injured by the action or inaction of the officer, except when the complaining
individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officer's improper
performance or non-performance of his public duty. Hence, an individual cannot have a
particular action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right,
which are the grounds upon which all actions are founded.
To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for
attorney’s fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must
prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still
be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 and that
the authority to file the petition for forfeiture of properties unlawfully acquired after 25
February 1986 is lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman
Considering that R.A. No. 1379 does not provide for the procedure in cases where
motions are filed, the 1997 ROC will apply in a suppletory character.
The subsequent action of the court on a defective motion does not cure the flaw, for a
motion with a fatally defective notice is a useless scrap of paper, and the court has no
authority to act thereon.
CASE SUMMARY
105 Carpio-Morales Bondal and Enciso filed complaints before the Ombudsman (OMB) against Mayor Junjun
vs. CA Binay (Binay Jr.) and other Makati City officials and employees for alleged anomalies in
the Makati City Hall Parking Buildng. The OMB placed them under preventive
suspension, suspending the said individuals. Binay Jr. filed a petition for certiorari against
the OMB before the CA, contending that the OMB does not have basis to suspend him.
CA ruled primarily based on the condonation doctrine, holding that the preventive
suspension should not have been issued, and thus granted Binay Jr.’s prayer for TRO
and WPI.
Carpio-Morales, as OMB, files this petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC,
alleging that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue those writs, and that Binay Jr. cannot
appeal to the CA for it to review the findings of the OMB (RA 6770 Sec. 14). The issue of
condonation was also discussed in the SC, leading to a discussion in the oral arguments
between the Chief Justice and counsel for Binay Jr. SC ruled that the CA has jurisdiction
to issue TROs/WPIs, and to review the OMB’s findings and decisions, contrary to the
unconstitutional provisions in RA 6770 (Par. 2, Sec. 14, RA 6770). As to the
condonation doctrine, SC abandoned the doctrine in view of its lack of legal basis
and incompatibility with the constitutional precept of public office as public trust,
and public accountability, but held the application to be prospective.
106 Fajardo vs. Fajardo was the Special Collecting Officer at the NAIA Customs House. An audit by the
Ombudsman COA revealed that he under-remitted P53,214,258 from January 2000 to October 2002.
An administrative investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman was conducted (while a
separate criminal case was also charged before the RTC-Pasay). Both the Ombudsman
and the CA found petitioner guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. This was affirmed
by the SC, holding that the presumption of regularity was not overturned and that there is
substantial evidence to support the charge. The discrepancy between the "audit sales"
and the actual amount remitted by petitioner is sufficient evidence of dishonesty and
grave misconduct. SC also held that the Ombudsman and the CA are not bound by the
RTC's finding because administrative cases are independent from criminal proceedings.
It mentioned the “threefold liability rule” of a public official or employee.
DOCTRINE/S
Abandonment of the condonation doctrine
The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is
plainly inconsistent with the condonation doctrine (condonation doctrine: the idea that an
elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post). Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.
There is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability
arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos.
•Under the "threefold liability rule," any act or omission of any public official or employee
can result in criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is independent of the
other.
•Unlike in a criminal case where proof beyond reasonable doubt is required,
administrative proceedings only require substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
•The Ombudsman and the CA are not bound by the RTC's finding because as a rule,
administrative cases are independent from criminal proceedings. The dismissal of one
case does not necessarily merit the dismissal of the other.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
107 OCA vs. Enriquez Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of RTC-Manila, was criminally charged before the SB with the Dismissal of criminal action does not foreclose institution of administrative action.
crime of falsification of a public document for allegedly stating in a Certificate of Sale The "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings merely requires such
(COS) that a public auction of three vessels was conducted on May 12, 1986 and that the relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
payment for the sale to the highest bidder was made on the same date. It was found later conclusion.
on that no public auction occurred on that date and the payment was made by the buyer
of the highest bidder to the judgment creditor on May 23, 1986. Simultaneously, Enriquez
was charged administratively by the OCA of the same offense and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service. Granting a demurrer to evidence, SB dismissed the criminal
case, holding that since there was no damage to the parties involved in the sale, the
integrity of the COS was not affected. Enriquez then filed a Manifestation before the OCA
and prayed that the administrative case be likewise dismissed. Nonetheless, OCA
referred the case for investigation.

After investigation, it was submitted that Enriquez was guilty as charged and was
recommended to be dismissed from service. SC found these to be supported by
evidence and ordered the dismissal of Enriquez. The dismissal of the criminal case by SB
did not preclude the institution of administrative charges wherein only substantial
evidence is required to prove guilt.

108 Jorolan vs. Jorolan filed an administrative complaint against Acuzar for grave misconduct. He also
Acuzar filed a criminal complaint against the latter for violation of the Child Abuse Act. Acuzar
was found guilty of grave misconduct. He challenged this ruling through a petition for
certiorari, claiming lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process. The Court held that the
PLEB (the administrative agency in this case) has jurisdiction over the complaint for
grave misconduct, and need not wait for the resolution of the criminal case before
proceeding with the administrative complaint
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It usually refers to transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity
may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but implies
wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment.
Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal
cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings,
only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings.
CASE SUMMARY
109 Tecson vs. Petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner and
Sandiganbayan private complainant Salvacion Luzana agreed to engage in an investment business.
Petitioner asked for a cash advance of P4,000.00, and he said he would not release the
Mayor’s Permit of their business unless the cash advance was given him. Private
respondent agreed to this, but when the business permit was eventually revoked, she
filed an administrative case, a civil case, and a complaint with the Ombudsman against
petitioner. Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner despite the dismissal of the admin and
civil cases, thus this petition. The SC upheld the conviction, ruling that:
110 Ocampo vs. Petitioner Ocampo was the training coordinator of NIACONSULT – a subsidiary of the
Ombudsman National Irrigation Authority. He was given money by the Agricultural Development Bank
of Nepal to conduct training for Nepalese Junior Engineers in the amount of P204,960 –
representing advance payment of 30% of the training fee. Petitioner failed to remit this to
NIACONSULT. Hence, the President, Respondnet Eclipse, filed a complaint with the
Ombudsman. Despite two opportunities (over a year) to file a counter affidavit, Petitioner
failed to do so. The Ombudsman considered as petitioner waiving his right to be heard
and heard the case ex parte with only Respondent Eclipse presenting evidence to
support his claim. The Ombudsman found Petitioner guilty of the charges thrown against
him and recommended his dismissal. Petitioner filed for an MR but this was denied by the
Ombudsman. Hence, Petitioner went to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the
case, he submitted a manifestation saying that the criminal charges of estafa and
falsification against him were dismissed. Hence, petitioner claims that the administrative
case should likewise be dismissed. The Court, ruled that the dismissal of the criminal
complaint will not affect his administrative case because there is a difference in the
quantum of evidence required in a criminal and administrative case - the latter merely
requiring substantial evidence. The Court, looking into the evidence, found that petitioner
is indisputably guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the government. The Court
also found that he was not denied of due process because he waived his right to be
heard when he failed to submit a counter-affidavit despite notice.
DOCTRINE/S
• it is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is
under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This
simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively
liable for a wrongful doing.
o Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the
public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party.
o If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished
criminally.
o Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other
administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the
penal and civil liabilities.
Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the
administrative complaint.
• a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or
employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the complainant. This is because there
is a need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its
agencies and instrumentalities.
The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against
petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in
dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to
prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an
absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though
insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is
preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in
administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering
the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other
CASE SUMMARY
111 OCA vs. Macusi Petitioner in a civil case (Paligan v. Sps. Cornelio) inquired before the MTCC as to the
status of the writ of execution in her case since it has been a year since the same was
issued therein. The judge referred the inquiry to the clerk, and the clerk asked the sheriff
(Macusi) why no report was made as to the writ. Sheriff Macusi said no report was made
because the petitioner never appeared at the Office to coordinate the implementation of
the said writ. Macusi further rationed that he did not report regularly despite the presence
of the rules since he “relied” on the dictates of practicality so as not to waste supplies.”
The RTC found Macusi guilty for violating Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule 141, Section 9 of
the Rules of Court. The OCA agreed with the findings of the RTC, Macusi submitted his
Manifestation and Motion informing the Court that he was deemed resigned from
government service by operation of law when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of City Councilor. The SC ruled against Macusi.
DOCTRINE/S
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service
nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was
this Court's at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of
his case. Respondent's resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he shall still be answerable.

112 Larin vs. Sandiganbayan convicted Larin in a criminal case (violation of Section 268 (4) of the Doctrine: This is an exception to the rule that administrative cases are independent from
Executive Secretary National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019) for his part as Revenue criminal actions for the same act or omission. Where the very basis of the administrative
Specific Tax Officer in allowing tax credits to Tanduay. On the basis of the said case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside
conviction, an administrative charge was filed against him for grave misconduct. He was by this Court upon a categorical and clear finding that the acts for which he was
found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in
penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against
disqualification for reappointment in the government service. him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the
Larin filed a petition in the SC to question his unlawful removal. While the case is pending administrative suit.
in the SC, the SC reversed Larin’s conviction in the criminal case. In the instant petition,
SC revrsed the removal and ordered his reinstatement considering his dismissal already
lacks a valid cause (when the SC already reversed his conviction in the criminal case).
Reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and shall be entitled to full backwages from
the time of his separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the
meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in
which case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such age and entitled thereafter to the
corresponding retirement benefits.
CASE SUMMARY
113 Rubrico vs. Gloria Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by men
Macapagal-Arroyo allegedly belonging to the Air Intelligence and Security Squadron. She was interrogated
for a week and was released after signing as a military asset. Lourdes Rubrico and her
two daughters filed a petition for a writ of amparo before the SC and SC issued the
desired writ, directed the respondents to file a verified written return, and referred the
petition to the CA. CA in turn partially disposed of the case by dismissing the petition
against respondents Razon, Esperon (both commanding officers of PNP and AFP) as
well as Roquero (Superintendent for Cavite Police), Gomez (Police Inspector) and the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), but still ordering AFP and PNP to continue the
investigations and update CA and petitioners on their progress. Upon appeal to SC, as
related to topic, SC discussed WON the concept of command responsibility is applicable
in a petition for a writ of amparo because CA alluded to it in its decision to dismiss the
case against Razon and Esperon - the two generals would have been accountable for
the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP. SC
ruled that hat command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied
under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. And if any, only
limited application and not for purposes of finding criminal liability.
114 Rodriguez vs. Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez was abducted and tortured by Respondents PNP Officers. He
Gloria Macapagal- filed a Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data against the PNP Officers responsible. He also
Arroyo included former PGMA as one of the Respondents. The CA dismissed the petition with
respect to PGMA. Rodriguez appealed to the SC raising, inter alia, the following issue:
WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court also ruled that
the concept of command responsibility applies to a President as the commander in chief
but in this case, Rodriguez was not able to establish that PGMA is responsible or
accountable for his abduction.
DOCTRINE/S
The present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by
his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As formulated,
command responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby
the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for
failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable
for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so
as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
Concurring Opinion: To the extent of (1) answering the question of whether an enforced
disappearance, an extrajudicial killing or threats thereof have taken place and who could
have been the perpetrators of these deeds; (2) determining who has the
immediate duty to address the threat, disappearance, extrajudicial killing or violation of
constitutional right; and in (2) determining the remedial measures that need to be
undertaken—the doctrine of command responsibility may find some relevance to the
present petition.
Nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in
amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances.
Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes
an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best
position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine
CASE SUMMARY
115 Balao vs. Gloira In this case, James Balao was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance
Macapagal-Arroyo (CPA), a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera
Region. He was allegedly abducted by five civilian men. The family of Balao filed a
petition for issuance of Writ of Amparo (WOA) which was granted by RTC La Trinidad
(but denied some prayers by Balao). The WOA includes PGMA, military officials &
executive officials as respondent and ordering them to disclose where James is detained
or confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon
his person.
DOCTRINE/S
The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding
does not by any measure preclude impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleaded—not actually on the basis of
command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.

Both Balaos and the Government elevated the case before the SC. Balaos’ contention
was the abduction of James can only be attributed to the Respondents who have
command responsibility of all the actions of their subordinates and who are the primary
persons in the implementation of the government’s all out war policy.

SC said that command responsibility has no application with WOA. “Command

responsibility,” means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is properly
a form of criminal complicity in contrast with WOA which does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance.

116 Panis vs. CSC Panis contested the appointment of Veloso by the City Mayor of Cebu as Assistant Chief
of Hospital for Administration of the Cebu City Medical Center (CCMC). This position was
a newly-created office by virtue of a City Ordinance passed by the Cebu City LGU to
reorganize the former Cebu City Hospital and rename it as CCMC.
In so protesting the appointment of Veloso, Panis cited the “next-in-rank” rule, arguing
that since he is the one next-in-rank to the aforementioned position, he (instead of
Veloso) should have been appointed to said position.
Next-in-Rank Rule (and its limitations): One who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given
preferential consideration for promotion to the vacant position, but it does not necessarily
follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. There is no vested right granted
the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on the appointing authority to promote the
holder to the vacant position
The "next in rank" rule specifically applies only in cases of promotion

The CSC and ultimately, the SC, ruled against Panis. The SC discussed the “next-in
rank” rule (see doctrine no. 1). According to the SC, the next-in-rank rule does not apply
in this case (see doctrine no. 2) because there was no promotion to speak of in this case.
Instead, this case involves a new office and a position created in the course of a valid
reorganization.
CASE SUMMARY
117 CSC vs. Rebong Richard Rebong,a former Intelligence Agent 1 (IA 1) of 13 years at the Bureau of
Customs applied to the vacant and higher position of Intelligence Officer V (IO V). The
position of IO V required management and supervisory experience from applicants so
Rebong cited his experience as Team Leader (TL) and Field Officer (FO) when he was IA
1. Commissioner Biazon of Customs chose Rebong but CSC disapproved the promotion
because Rebong was illegally designated as Team Leader and Field Officer so he cannot
use this as credits for promotion. CSC explained that the designation was illegal because
a first level employee like an IA 1 cannot be designated to second level positions like TL
and FO per CSC rules. Also, CSC reasoned that his promotion violated the three salary
grade rule
CA and SC both reversed CSC decision and upheld Rebong’s promotion. It ruled that
being a TL and FO are not designations but merely reflective of his duties as IA 1, his
original position. It cannot be said that they are additional duties or are outside of his
regular functions as IA 1. Hence, it did not violate CSC rules and can be credited for
promotion. On the three salary grade rule, SC held he falls under the exceptions due to
superior qualification (long experience and PhD in Public Ad holder). See also doctrines
on the concept.
118 Vinzons-Chato vs. Commissioner Chato issued Revenue Admin Order No. 5-93, "Redefining the areas of
Natividad jurisdiction and renumbering of regional district offices." The order (1) subdivided 19
revenue regions provided under NIRC into 115 revenue districts and renumbered the
resulting RD office (RDOs) and (2) abolished the previous classification of RDOs into
Class A-1, A, B, C, and D and provided that all RDOs shall be treated as the same class.
The Commissioner, citing the "exigencies of the revenue service," issued a Revenue
Travel Assignment Order, directing 90 RD officers to report to new assignments in the
redesignated and renumbered RDOs nationwide. Among those affected was private
respondent Blas, who was ordered to report to RD No. 14 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Petitioner Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas' former post in San Fernando,
Pampanga, now RD No. 21. RTC - Private respondent filed a verified complaint for
"Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and TRO" against the Commissioner and petitioner
Alcantara alleging that the transfer without his consent and his reassignment would
cause his "dislocation" and demotion or "a diminution in rank, status, and span of duties
and responsibilities. RTC issued a TRO and granted the writ of preliminary ISSUE - WON
private respondent’s reassignment is tantamount to demolition? SC - NO. His transfer, as
the Commissioner explained in her opposition to the application for a WPI, did not really
entail any diminution in rank, salary, status and responsibilities.
DOCTRINE/S
Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties to a person already in public
service . Designation is only considered an acting or temporary appointment which does
not confer security of tenure.
Appointment is a discretionary power of the head of the agency. He is in the most
knowledgeable position to decide who can best perform functions of the office. If the
appointee possesses the qualifications required by law, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. It is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom,
convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by the head
of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational structure and
environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function.
As long as appointee is qualified, CSC has no choice to attest and respect appointment.
The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees possess
the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. If they do
then the appointments are approved because the Commission cannot exceed its power
by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority
•The objective of the reassignment, as stated in RAO No. 5-93, is "to strengthen the
decentralization of the Bureau's set-up for the purpose of maximizing tax assessments
and revenue collections, intensifying enforcement of revenue laws and regulations and
bringing the revenue service closer to the taxpaying public."
•Under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to
the Civil Service Commission. Respondent judge should have dismissed the action below
for failure of private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies.
CASE SUMMARY
119 Cuevas vs. Bacal In 1994, respondent Josefina Bacal, who has been conferred Career Executive Service
(2000) (CES) eligibility, was appointed Regional Director of the PAO. After a year, she was
appointed to the rank of CESO III and designated as Acting Chief Public Attorney. This
designation was later confirmed by President FVR. In 1998, petitioner Carina Demaisip
was appointed as “Chief Public Defender” (Chief Public Attorney) vice respondent by
President Estrada. Respondent was appointed again as a Regional Director. Respondent
filed a quo warranto petition questioning her replacement (SC first but was dismissed w/o
prejudice so filed before CA). The CA ruled that respondent is lawfully entitled to the
Office of Chief Public Attorney. The SC, however, disagreed. It held that as respondent
(only CESO III) does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public
Attorney (CESO I), her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent,
and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. Moreover, respondent
did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher
position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to the rank of
CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the rules of the CES
Board. Finally, because respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney
was merely temporary, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional
Director of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered
a demotion, much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution.
120 Gloria vs. De Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) Board of Trustees issued
Guzman Resolution No. 91-026 declaring that "All faculty/administrative employees are also
subject to the required civil service eligibilities". Thus, private respondents, employees of
PAFCA, were issued only temporary appointments because they lacked appropriate civil
service eligibilities. Cerillo, specifically, was issued a one-year temporary appointment as
Board Secretary II (until December 31, 1992). On March 24, 1992, she was relieved as
Board Secretary by reason of loss of confidence, but was designated as "Coordinator for
Extension Services". Col. Loleng informed private respondents that they shall be deemed
separated from the service upon the expiration of their temporary appointments. After the
lapse of their temporary appointments, private respondents filed a petition for Mandamus
and Reinstatement. Respondent Judge ordered the reinstatement of Cerilla to the
position of “Coordinator for extension services”. SC set aside order because Cerilla,
although temporarily extended an appointment as Board Secretary II, was dismissed due
to loss of confidence. She was merely a designee, thus did not acquire any right to the
position. She could also not be reinstated as “Coordinator for Extension Services”
because the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla.
DOCTRINE/S
• The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in
turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence
of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated.
• Security of tenure in the career executive service is thus acquired with respect to
rank and not to position. The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES
does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed—a concept
which is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service—but to the
rank to which they are appointed by the President.
• The rule is that unless an employee is appointed to a particular office or station he
can claim no security of tenure in respect of any office.
Reappointment to the position of Board Secretary II is an act which is discretionary on the
part of the appointing power. Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application for
a writ of mandamus. Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is
essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary power of appointment
cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the
appointing authority.
Thus the questioned order of reinstatement amounts to an undue interference by the
Court in the exercise of the discretionary power of appointment vested in the PSCA Board
of Trustees.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
121 Republic vs. CA Corpuz was the Director while Lopez was the Asst. Dir. of CYRC. They had bad blood CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the DECS Minister’s directive to Lopez was
between them stemming from Lopez’ protest on Corpuz’ appointment as Director. MECS “defective” in the term “detail” was used instead of “reassignment”, which would have
Minister temporarily detailed Lopez to the MECS Legal Office. It was noted that several been the proper terminology.
employees of the CYRC reported harassment by Lopez. Lopez, after not being heard on
his intention to resume his position as CYRC Ass. Dir., returned to CYRC without official SC: Indeed a “detail, is the movement from one Department or Agency to another which
authorization. Among other memos, Corpuz addressed a memo to Lopez requiring him to is temporary in nature (Section 4, Rule VI, Civil Service Rules on Personal Actions and
submit a record of his attendance duly signed by the Chief of the MECS Planning Policies) whereas a “reassignment” is the movement of an employee from one
Service, or an approved application for LoA before he could be entitled to his salary. organizational unit to another in the same Department or Agency (Section 5, ibid.). Be
Lopez filed a mandamus and damages case at the RTC. During pendency of the case, that as it may, the official intent of the directive was clear: to move Respondent Lopez
Laya advised Lopez that his “temporary detail” had been rectified to “temporary away from the CYRC and locate him in the head office, “in the exigencies of the service.”
assignment”. Also, ultimately, then Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing ordered payment of Besides, Minister Laya made proper rectification on 7 August 1985 retroactive to 3
the disputed salaries, but the same was later reconsidered and recalled upon query from September 1984.
Petitioner Corpuz regarding the matter. RTC Makati rendered a Partial Decision ordering
Corpuz to take official cognizance of Lopez’ attendance at the CYRC: to pay his salaries
from April 23 to date, and setting the case for further hearing to determine actual
damages. CA affirmed in toto, but SC reversed. SC ruled that Corpuz was justified in
refusing to take official cognizance of Lopez’ attendance as Assistant Director at the
CYRC and in withholding his salaries corresponding to the period. SC also ruled that she
cannot be held liable in damages for such acts. This is because Lopez returned to the
CYRC at his own instance, w/o any authorization from higher authorities. Corpuz, as
director, officially advised him to secure clearance but he adamantly refused to obey a
directive from his immediate superior. Under the circumstances, Corpuz, as head of
office, was left with no alternative but to withhold recognition of his attendance. As to
damages, Corpuz had not acted in bad faith in seeking clarification of the directives to
pay issued by the Education Department. Also, having acted by virtue of her authority to
administer the affairs of the defunct CYRC, adjudgment of damages against her is
uncalled for as this would virtually be a charge against the Republic of the Philippines,
sovereign state which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
consent.

122 CSC vs. Pacheco The BIR issued a RTAO ordering the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal •Detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a
Division from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando, Pampanga. Pacheo did not movement within the same agency.
report to her new place of assignment and filed a complaint, arguing that her transfer was •Pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a
equivalent to a constructive dismissal. Before the SC, the CSC, through the OSG, reassignment order does not become immediately effective.
contends that the subject RTAO was immediately executory and she should have first •There is no such duty to first report to the new place of assignment prior to questioning
reported to her new place of assignment and then subsequently question her an alleged invalid reassignment.
reassignment. The SC ruled that the lateral movement of Pacheo from Quezon City to
Pampanga within the same agency is undeniably a reassignment. Based on the
Administrative Code, there is no such duty to first report to the new place of assignment
prior to questioning an alleged invalid reassignment. Therefore, Pacheo is within her right
not to report to her new place of assignment before questioning her reassignment.
CASE SUMMARY
123 Fernandez vs. Petitioners Fernandez and de Lima are CSC (Civil Service Commission) Directors
Sto. Tomas, supra serving at the CSC Central Office in QC. Respondents CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas and
CSC Commissioner Ereneta issued a Resolution by virtue of which petitioner Fernandez
was assigned in Region 5 and de Lima was assigned in Region 3. Petitioners are now
questioning the validity of the Resolution claiming that the Resolution effected the
“abolition” of public offices, something which may be done only by the same legislative
authority which had created those public offices in the first place. The Supreme Court
disagreed and dismissed the petition and held that such reassignment is pursuant to
Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. The
reassignment of petitioners here had been effected with statutory authority and not
removal without cause.
124 Teotico vs. Agda Agda was appointed as the Chief Fiber Development Officer of (Fiber Development
Authority) FIDA but he was not assigned to a specific station. Then he was designated
as Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II. However, by virtue of SO No.
219, he was temporarily re-assigned to the central office, “in the interest of service.” Agda
questioned the re-assignment through filing with the CSC who indorsed the same to the
DA for the appropriate action. Agda alleged that the newly-assigned OIC of Region 1 was
cousins with the then Administrator Lanuza, hence in violation of the rule against
nepotism. FIDA Administrator, Teotico, instructed Agda to turnover the key of the vault
containing important documents to Seguritan, OIC of Region 1. Agda refused, alleging
that his complaint concerning SO No. 219 should be resolved first. Agda was cited for
insubordination and was preventively suspended. Agda filed for WPI. RTC ruled in favor
of Agda and issued a reinstatement order. SC reversed.
125 Carino vs. Daoas Cariño was appointed Accountant III in the ONCC. Cariño was later reassigned by Atty.
David Daoas, ONCC Executive Director, to the position of Technical Assistant. Cariño
filed an administrative complaint against Bistoyong. Bistoyong allegedly asked Cariño to
withdraw the case in exchange for reinstatement to her former position, and Bistoyong
threatened to reassign her to the ONCC Region II in Cagayan. Cariño received
memorandum directing her to report to the ONCC Region II office’. The CSC Regional
Director rendered a legal opinion that the reassignment was not in order. Atty. Daoas
and Bistoyong appealed to the CSC. Atty. Daoas then issued a memorandum to Carino,
reprimanding her for her failure to report at the Region II office, and stating that she was
considered AWOL. Cariño was ordered to refrain from reporting for work in Region I and
to comply with her reassignment in Region II. Atty. Daoas issued a Notice/Order of
Separation. CSC issued Resolution No. 97-3754 dismissing the appeal of Atty. Daoas
and ordering them to return Cariño to Region I. Cariño reported back to work only to be
informed, that the CSC resolution appeal was rendered moot and academic by her
having been dropped from the rolls. CSC dismissed Cariño's appeal. MR denied by
CSC. CA denied. SC held that Cariño is justified in not heeding her reassignment order
because of the legal opinion of CSC Regional Director (see doctrine).
DOCTRINE/S
Under Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code,
reassignment is recognized as a management prerogative vested in the Commission
and, for that matter, in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil
service
The term “public office” is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the
public. It is essential to note that none of the “changes in organization” introduced by the
Resolution carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of
public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees.
Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, but as Chief
Fiber Development Officer; he was not appointed to any specific station. He was merely
designated as Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II. Not having been
appointed to any specific station, Agda could be transferred or assigned to any other
place by the head of office where in the opinion of the latter his services may be utilized
more effectively.
The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and re-assignment. If the
employee concerned believes that there is no justification therefore, he "may appeal his
case to" the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the
decision to detail an employee shall be executory.
It is true that the transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the
appointing authority and that it can be done as the exigencies of the public service may
require. The rule proscribes transfers without consent of officers appointed - not merely
assigned - to a particular station.
In this case, petitioner was appointed as Accountant III in Region I (there is a particular
station). Hence, she could not be reassigned to another station or region without her
consent.
CASE SUMMARY
126 Seneres vs. Petitioner Señeres, a Foreign Service Officer III of the DFA, was appointed as NCC
Sabido Director General by President Estrada. Through a Secondment Agreement, it was agreed
by DFA and NCC, with petitioner’s conformity, that DFA seconds him to NCC and NCC
accepts such secondment. At the time that he was second, petitioner had yet to complete
his CES eligibility application process, which was a requisite for the NCC Director
General position. However, before petitioner’s recommendation for an appointment to a
CES rank can be acted upon by President Estrada, Estrada was ousted through People
Power II. Respond Sabido was then appointed as NCC Director General by President
Arroyo.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before the CA, which was later on held by CA as a
quo warranto petition, contesting that since he is already a CES eligible, he cannot be
summarily removed as it will violate his security of tenure. CA held in favor of
respondents. The SC upheld the CA ruling and denied the present petition, ruling that
petitioner was only seconded to the NCC and his claimed appointment as NCC Director
General was merely temporary in nature because he failed to meet the required
qualifications for said position,
127 Balasbas vs. Petitioner Balasbas filed an administrative complaint against respondent Monayao for
Manayao misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement an DENR Order in a prior
land dispute. CSC and CA denied the petition, ruling primarily that such actuation of
respondent relates to her private dealings with the private complainant and has no
bearing at all on the performance of her official duties as a local government employee.
This was also confirmed by the SC, holding that although respondent’s supposed
dishonest acts and misrepresentations committed in relation to a land dispute arising
from her private dealings cast doubt on her fitness to discharge her responsibilities as a
public official, it is evident that petitioner offered nothing more than bare imputations
against the respondent (no substantial evidence). She did not present evidence on the
alleged deed of sale. SC concluded that what remains to be done is to cause the
execution of the DENR Order, and this may be achieved in the same administrative case
or by filing a proper case in court.
128 VIllanueva vs. CA Villanueva, a Legislative Assistant in the HOR, was charged before the DB with Grave
Misconduct, Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct for engaging in an illicit affair with his
boss’s daughter who was also married. The Board found him guilty and dismissed him
from service. Villanueva appealed to the CSC, which then decreased the penalty to
suspension since Villanueva was a first-time offender (wow). HOR then filed a Rule 65
petition for certiorari before CA, which was granted and reinstated the penalty of
dismissal. Villanueva filed a Rule 45 petition before the SC, arguing that CA did not have
jurisdiction over the wrong remedy availed by HOR since a Rule 43 petition for review
should have been filed instead. SC agreed and ruled that CA should have dismissed the
petition outright. But even if the petition was given due course, SC found that Villanueva
is not guilty of grave misconduct since the offense committed was not in relation to the
performance of his official functions. Nonetheless, Villanueva is guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct for his acts. Thus, the proper penalty was merely suspension.
DOCTRINE/S
A secondment is a movement of an employee from one department or agency to another
which is temporary in nature. It may or may not require the issuance of an appointment,
and may involve an increase in compensation and benefits. Acceptance of a secondment
is voluntary on the part of the employee.
Furthermore, a secondment being temporary in nature, the payment of salaries of a
seconded employee shall be borne by the receiving agency and the seconded employee
shall be on leave without pay in his mother agency for the duration of his secondment.
•Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the
performance of duty by the public officer, for it inevitably reflects on the fitness of the
officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.
•Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is an administrative offense which
need not be related to respondent’s official functions,
•While technicalities may be dispensed with in administrative proceedings, “this does not
mean that the rules on proving allegations are entirely dispensed with. Bare allegations
are not enough; these must be supported by substantial evidence at the very least.”
•While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and
employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility,
integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect them against
unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the
effective performance of their duties and functions.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official
or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
CASE SUMMARY
129 Gupilan-Aguilar PNP-CIDG conducted investigation on the lavish lifestyle and and alleged nefarious
vs. Ombudsman activities of certain personnel of the Bureau of Customs, among them are Aguilar and
Hernandez. PNP-CIDG team found out that petitioner Aguilar owns properties, real and
personal, which are not declared in her SALNs. It was also found out that in the span of
four years, petitioner took 13 unofficial trips and would have spent 3.4M. In view these
circumstances, petitioner was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty. The
Ombudsman found the petitioners guilty of the administrative offenses of Grave
misconduct and dishonesty and ordered the dismissal of the petitioners. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied. On appeal to the CA
via petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners asserted that the decision of the
Ombudsman is merely recommendatory and not immediately executory stating the rule
pronounced by the court in the case of Tapiador vs Office of the Ombudsman. CA denied
the petition and affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. SC ruled that Rule 43 remedy
was proper, and that there is substantial evidence to pronounce Aguilar guilty of
dishonesty but not grave misconduct.
DOCTRINE/S
By mandate of law, it behooves every government official or employee to make a
complete disclosure of his or her assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any
questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from non-
disclosure of such matters.
The acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not
conclude the administrative proceedings, nor carry with it relief from administrative
liability. This is because unlike in criminal cases where the threshold quantum of evidence
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, only substantial evidence is necessary in
administrative cases.

130 CSC vs. CA President Guevarra answered NO to the question if he had any criminal or administrative General Rule: The two has concurrent original jurisdiction to decide, investigate and
records in the application form required for a Bond to be secured so that he could decide matters involving disciplinary actions:
represent PUP in financial transactions. VP Cezar as VP of PUP for Administration 1. CSC if case filed against a. government official or employee
endorsed and approved this application form. 2. Secretaries, heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities involving officers and employees under their jurisdiction
Thereafter, Cueva, PUP’s Chief Legal Counsel, filed a complaint directly before the CSC
against the two for gross dishonesty and grave misconduct 1 among others alleging that CSC has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and
two of them knew fully well that the answer should have been YES because they both decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal
have 17 existing cases before the Sandiganbayan. The two explained that they thought
question pertained to final convictions only, hence they answered NO because those
cases are not yet decided upon. CSC thru a resolution found a prima facie finding that
there was a violation of Civil Service Rules and ordered preventive suspension. President
and VP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning CSC’s jurisdiction. CA
ruled that CSC had no jurisdiction because CSC only has original jurisdiction if the
complaint is filed by a private citizen.
Since Cueva is a public employee, he is not a private citizen so it is the Board of Regents
of PUP which has jurisdiction.

SC reversed CA’s decision and ruled that Cueva is a private citizen so CSC has
jurisdiction. But, actually SC held that deciding if he was a private citizen or not is
immaterial because differentiating between a complaint filed by a private citizen and a
fellow private employee has no cogent reason because CSC under Section 12 of Admin
Code has unqualified power to hear and decide administrative cases. Hence, its power
should not be limited just because it is a fellow civil servant who filed the complaint.
CASE SUMMARY
131 Melchor vs. There was an admin complaint for immorality, and a bigamy case, filed by Petitioner
Gironella against Respondent. Both were dismissed. Petitioner filed another admin case before the
Ombudsman against, respondent, her 2 nd husband, and the local civil reg. The
complaint involved the issuance of a falsified death certificate and its use in a judicial
proceeding. Ombudsman found respondent and local civil reg. guilty. Case against the 2
nd husband was dismissed because he was not a public officer. CA acquitted both.
Before the SC, the issue was WoN the action has prescribed and WoN evidence was
sufficient. SC Ruled that the action has not prescribed but evidence was also not
sufficient.
132 In Re: Gregorio Petitioner judges are asking that they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits
Pineda under RA 910 in addition to, or in lieu of, the benefits under RA 1616 or PD 1146 granted
to them. However, the Court denied their petitions, saying that a close scrutiny into the
service record as well as the conduct of each of the judges is necessary. (See doctrine)
The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required age or service only if
satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and
dedication to the public service. The Court has carefully gone over the history of the
petitioners/movants in these cases and found them not entitled to unqualifiedly avail of
the privileges.
133 CSC vs Pililia Rafanan was appointed the GM of Pililia Water District. He reached the age of 65 in that
Water District position and the BOD of PWC wanted to extend his appointment but CSC disallowed it
due to the compulsory retirement age of 65. BOD then just reappointed him to the GM
position with a term coterminous with the appointing authority. CSC still disagreed as it
held that the GM position was reclassified by the amendment of PD 198 by RA 9286 as a
career position and no longer a confidential position (deletion of serve at the pleasure of;
insertion of shall not be removed from office, except for cause and due process).
Appointments of those over 65 only allowed for coterminous or confidential positions. SC
held that the GM position is still confidential and the amendment merely made sure that
the constitutional right of due process was followed/emphasized. As the position is
confidential in nature, it is an exception to the compulsory retirement age under CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15 (1999) Sec 12, Rule XIII.
DOCTRINE/S
Admin offenses do not prescribe.
o Admin offenses, by their very nature, pertain to the character of public officers and
employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the
punishment of the officer or employee, but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our government
The stated period in Par 5 (sec 20 of RA 6770) does not refer to the prescription of the
offense, but to the discretion given to the Office of the Ombudsman on whether it will
investigate a particular administrative offense
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations
in the complaint.
In this case, there may have been some inconsistencies in the entries in the books of the
local civil registrar and those of the NCSO, but these inconsistencies do not prove that
Jimmy Santiago is alive. There is yet the possibility that the error may have been with the
NCSO, and not with the Civil Registry.
For respondent to be administratively liable for the use of a falsified document, it must be
shown that she knew of the falsity of the death certificate yet went on to use it. Petitioner
failed to show clearly that respondent had knowingly introduced in evidence a falsified
document. Nothing on the record reveals that indeed respondent knew of the falsity.
The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee.
However, when in the interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions
to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each
grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of
required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on a case to
case basis.
The tenure of a confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing
authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure. However, the confidential employee may be
appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age of
65 years.
CASE SUMMARY
134 Bautista vs CSC When DBP started to reorganize in 1987, petitioner Bautista was appointed to the
position of Account Officer with SG-20 in the plantilla of DBP. Pursuant to DBM-CCC No.
10 implementing RA 6758, the position of Account Officer with SG-20 was matched with
BEO II with SG-24, as prescribed by the GFIs Index of Occupational Services. Petitioner
Bautista argues that her appointment as BEO II with SG-24 constitutes a demotion
because prior to the reorganization of DBP, she was an incumbent Account Officer with
SG-25. Thus, there was a decrease in her rank and salary from SG-25 to SG-24.
The Court held that there was no demotion because petitioner Bautista was appointed to rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential.
a position comparable to the one she previously occupied. There was even an increase in
her rank and salary. The Court likewise held that Bautista failed to prove that the position
of Account Officer with SG-20 in the plantilla of DBP prior to its reorganization and the
position of Account Officer with SG-25 under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services
are the same.
135 Buklod ng Petitioners are employees of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau created
Kawaning EIIB vs by President Corazon Aquino which serves as the agency primarily responsible for anti-
Exec. Secretary smuggling operations in land and in water, outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs. This bureau was subsequently deactivated by President Estrada through EO
191 and its employees were terminated through EO 223. Hence, Petitioners filed a
petition seeking to nullify the said Eos on the ground that they were deprived of their
security of tenure and that the President had no power to abolish EIIB, and assuming he
has, it was done in bad faith in order to accommodate the creation of Task Force
Aduana. The Court citing Larin held that the President has the power to reorganize
stemming from recurring provisions in the General Appropriations Act and that it was part
of the residual powers of the President recognized in the Local Government Code. The
Court then said that the assailed EOs were valid for being issued in good faith for the
sake of economy. More relevant to the issue, the Court held that dismissal or separation
which occurs as a result of a valid reorganization is likewise valid and the petitioners
cannot invoke security of tenure.
DOCTRINE/S
In this jurisdiction, a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a
general rule, the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for
economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a result of
reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the
movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with
diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a
reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. Consequently,
before a demotion may be effected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. . .


If the 'abolition,' which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no
valid 'abolition' takes and whatever 'abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid
'abolition' as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
CASE SUMMARY
136 Astraquillo vs. Astraquillo, Glang and Melchor were appointed as ambassadors, respectively, in the
Manglapus United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Moscow. All were appointed Chief of Mission
Class I (except Astraquillo, who was named Class II Chief) and came into Foreign
Service "through lateral entry." (Irrelevant: the petitioners were appointed right after the
so-called "EDSA Revolution," and when Vice-President Laurel was Minister of Foreign
Affairs). They were all recommended to be terminated by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
through a memorandum which was “APPROVED by authority of the President.” The 5
cases have been consolidated and jointly considered because they all turn upon a
common legal issue, i.e., the validity of the termination, by authority of the President, of
the petitioners' appointments as "political" or "non-career" members (Philippine
diplomats) of the country's Foreign Service.The Supreme Court affirmed their termination
since they were classified as non-career service officers. The employment of the
petitioners are classified as non-career service since the bases of their entrance are
other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service
(competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications). Implicit reference
to the Civil Service Law and Foreign Service Act which provided for the mode of entrance
of career officers and/or career service corps in DFA, tells us about the existence of non-
career service in DFA. As non-career service officers, their tenure is limited to a period
specified by law, or is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasures.
137 Achacoso vs. Petitioner filed a courtesy resignation from his position as POEA Administrator and he
Macaraig was replaced by respondent Sarmiento. He now claims that his courtesy resignation is
actually involuntary thus there is violation of his security of tenure. The Supreme Court
did not agree. There was a certification from the CSC showing that petitioner has not
participated in a Career Executive Service Development Program (CESDP). Likewise,
the certification showed that he is not a CES eligible and that he was not appointed to a
rank in the CES and is not therefore a member of the Career Executive Service. The SC
held that a person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot
be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed
to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.
138 Lecaroz vs. Petitioners are the Mayor of Santa Cruz and his son, the outgoing KB chairman and SB
Sandiganbayan, supra representative of the municipality. In the 1985 KB election, Red won as Chairman.
Subsequently, he was also appointed by Pres. Marcos as SB member and took an oath
before a member of the Batasang Pambansa. However, Mayor Lecaroz refused to
recognize Red as KB and SB member until his appointment was cleared by the
Governor. The Mayor approved payroll in favor of his son, Lenlie, in the belief that Lenlie
was entitled to assume the position of KB and SB member in a holdover capacity.
The issue is WON the position of Lenlie is already terminated and the SC ruled no. It
ruled that Red’s appointment was invalid due to failure to take a valid oath, thus enabling
Lenlie to continue being KB and SB member in a holdover capacity. As such, Lenlie was
entitled to the salaries he received.
DOCTRINE/S
"Non-career officers" or "political appointees" who have a "tenure coterminous with that
of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasures.”
PD No. 807 or Civil Service Law states that the "career service" is characterized by:
(1) entrance based on merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications;
(2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and
(3) security of tenure.
"non-career service"
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for
the career service; and
(2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that
of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasures, or which is limited to the duration of
a particular project for which purposes employment was made.
The term of a person appointed in an acting capacity is understood at the outset as
without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the appointing authority. When required
to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being removed in violation of his
security of tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent before the
expiration of his term. Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision
on security of tenure.
 The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has
a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided
by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for
that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified.
 An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the
full investiture with the office. Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of
oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
139 Ortiz vs. Petitioner Manuel Ortiz was a COMELEC commissioner who was appointed by Pres. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines
COMELEC Marcos. When Pres. Cory Aquino became president, Ortiz wrote a letter to Pres. Cory his office and renounces the further right to use it.
stating that he (among other commissioners) is placing his position as commissioner “at
your (Pres. Cory) disposal”. After so writing, Ortiz filed for retirement and filed for To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must
retirement benefits. The COMELEC denied the claim for retirement benefits (without show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
stating the reason for denial). Ortiz filed an MR stating that Ortiz did not resign from relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form,
service, to which COMELEC replied that Ortiz indeed “voluntarily resigned” by virtue of express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and
the letter he sent to Pres. Cory. Since he voluntarily resigned, the COMELEC held that its acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
such resignation effectively prevented Ortiz from completing his term of office (which was
supposedly until 1992) and therefore, he is not entitled to retirement benefits under the Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal
law. sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his
position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the
The SC held otherwise, stating that there was no resignation in this case. The SC defined appointing power.
resignation as (See doctrine 1) and explained its elements (see doctrine 2). Based on
these, the SC ruled that (see doctrine 3).

With respect to retirement benefits, the SC held that “the curtailment of his term not
being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner, equity and justice
demand that he should be deemed to have completed his term albeit much ahead of the
date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case should be placed in the same
category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends
upon his superior's loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service entails no
removal but an expiration of his term xxx As he is deemed to have completed his term of
office, petitioner should be considered retired from the service” and therefore entitled to
retirement benefits.
CASE SUMMARY
140 Collantes vs. CA Petitioner was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility on 1996. President Ramos
accorded him the rank of CESO II on 1997. More than a year later, he was appointed as
Usec. for Peace and Order of the DILG. With the change of administration, Petitioner
allegedly received word from persons close to then Pres. Estrada to give up his position
so that the President could unreservedly appoint his key officials. As such, Petitioner
relinquished his post at the DILG. President Estrada appointed Petitioner to the
controversial post of Usec. for Civilian Relations of the DND. His stint was short-lived.
Collantes was supposedly ordered by then Sec. Mercado to renounce his post in favor of
another presidential appointee, General Soriano. In deference to the President’s
prerogative, he resigned from office believing that he will soon be given a new
assignment. Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the government, as
in fact, he received a letter from President Estrada terminating his services effective
1999.
Petitioner requested assistance from the CESB. 2 years after the inaction of CESB,
Petitioner filed a petition for QW and Mandamus alleging that he was constructively
dismissed from work. Eventually CSC ruled in his favor while the CA ruled against. Both
Decisions became final. Respondents allege that Petitioner violated the rule on forum
shopping and the CA Decision constitutes res judicata.
DOCTRINE/S
● While there is indeed a distinction between position and rank, such that a CESO
may be transferred of reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank,
there can be no distinction between resigning from a position and resigning from a rank.
The rank of a CESO is deactivated upon separation from the government service, which
includes the resignation of a CESO from his position.
● CESB clarified this concept of being in the inactive status in its Resolution. (See
below)
● It would be absurd for us to rule that a civil servant who resigns from his position
can compel the President to appoint him to another position. Such a ruling would
effectively derogate the discretion of the appointing authority, as it will give the CESO the
option to choose which position he or she wants, by the simple expediency of resigning
from the position he or she does not want.

Basically, Petitioner contends that the reliefs sought are different, hence, the rule on
forum shopping will not apply and the CA Decision does not constitute res judicata. He
argues that the issues brought in the petition for certiorari and the petition for Quo
Warranto and Mandamus are distinct, and that the Decision of the CA in the latter cannot
constitute res judicata with respect to the former. Petitioner claims that the issues,
remedies, and reliefs in the two cases are different.

(Most relevant to the topic) Petitioner claims that, as a CESO, there is a “great difference
between (1) resigning from one’s position and (2) resigning or relinquishing one’s rank,
as position is different from one’s rank. Position refers to the particular or specific office
from which one may be appointed. Rank, on the other hand, refers not to a particular
position but to the class to which one belongs in the hierarchy of authority in an
CASE SUMMARY
141 Joson vs. Nario CASE SUMMARY: The incumbent Governor of Nueva Ecija, Eduardo L. Joson, had to
take an indefinite sick leave, thus creating a temporary vacancy in his Office. As Vice
Governor, Nario took over as Acting Governor pursuant to the LGC. Nario himself fell ill
shortly afterwards, and so executed a "waiver" of his "right" to the office of Governor, in
favor of Senior Board Member Tomas N. Joson III. Joson III took his oath as Acting Gov.
Having discovered that his illness was not as serious as originally feared and convinced
of his physical fitness to resume work, Nario wrote to Sec. Santos withdrawing his
"Letters of Resignation as Vice-Gov. of Nueva Ecija and Waiver as Acting Gov," and
requesting that they be considered "as without legal force and effect." Acting Gov. Joson
III filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for restraining order. He
obtained a "status quo order." After hearing, Judge Delizo dismissed Joson's petition and
lifted the TRO. Acting Gov. Joson III filed before the SC a petition for review on certiorari.
SC held that the office of Vice-Gov. was not rendered vacant by the voluntary resignation
of the person duly elected thereto. It was not within the power of Nario to dictate the time
of the effectiveness of his resignation, or otherwise impose conditions thereon, but was
the prerogative of the Secretary of Local Governments, as the proper authority to act.
Nario therefore continued as Vice-Gov. despite his tender of resignation and despite his
absence from office for a few days on account of sickness.
142 Gamboa vs. CA CFI Judge Vivencio Ruiz ruled in favor of private respondents Corolla Transportation and
(1981) Bert Villalon in a civil case against petitioners Elis Gamboa, Edmun Weber (minor
assisted by his guardian Fay Weber), and Juan Lopez. An execution sale was conducted.
PRs filed a Motion to Set Aside Sale on Execution which was first denied but granted on
MR on September 18, 1972. Then on October 4, Judge Ruiz tendered his resignation in
compliance with President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction 11 (all appointees should resign).
The President accepted on October 6, but Judge Ruiz was only notified on October 21.
On October 18, the September 18 order was promulgated and filed with the Clerk of
Court. The newly appointed Judge, Arsenio Alcantara, granted petitioners’ Motion to
Annul the September 18 order, saying that Judge Ruiz ceased to be either a de jure or de
facto judge on October 6, hence, the promulgation on October 18 was null and void. PRs’
MRs denied. The CA reversed, granting the PRs’ prayer for the issuance of writs of
certiorari and prohibition, and permanently enjoining the execution sale from being
effected. The SC agreed with the CA and held that strictly interpreting the law, Judge
Ruiz was a de facto officer from October 6 until October 21. However, it was only when
he was notified of the President’s acceptance (October 21) which he may be really said
to be have completed his resignation.
DOCTRINE/S
Mere presentation of resignation does not work a vacancy and a resignation is not
complete until accepted by proper authority and until acceptance by proper authority the
tender or offer to resign is revocable unless otherwise provided by statute
The rule rests on “the obvious dictates of public policy,” Mechem states, stressing
that—”x x ‘As civil officers are appointed for the purpose of exercising the functions and
carrying on the operations of the government, and maintaining public order, a political
organization would seem to be imperfect which should allow the depositories of its power
to throw off their responsibilities at their own pleasure.
In our jurisprudence, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be
operative and effective, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article
238 of the Revised Penal Code.
• One of the ways of terminating official relations is by resignation. To constitute a
complete and operative resignation of public office, there must be an intention to
relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relinquishment and a resignation
implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention
to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and
lawful authority. In Our jurisprudence, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public
officer to be operative and effective, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal
provisions of Article 238 RPC.
• A public officer cannot abandon his office or position before his resignation is
accepted but the incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the
acceptance of his resignation unless he has been duly notified therefor.
• Acts before official notification of acceptance of resignation are de facto.
CASE SUMMARY
143 Quinto vs. Several provisions of law are being assailed as unconstitutional for violation of equal
COMELEC protection and for being overbroad. The said provisions of law deem appointive officials
as resigned upon filing of COCs. However, in the case of elective officials, they are not
considered resigned upon filing of the same. In 2009, the SC held that they are
unconstitutional for violation of equal protection and are overbroad. In this case, an MR
was filed by the COMELEC. The SC reversed its decision and upheld the validity of said
laws. It found substantial distinctions between appointive and elective officials which
warranted the distinction.
144 Estrada vs. After EDSA II, Estrada questioned the legitimacy of Arroyo’s government and claims,
Arroyo inter alia, that he did not resign from his position and that Arroyo is merely an acting
President.
The SC held that whether or not Estrada resigned has to be determined from his acts
and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. The SC applied this “totality test” and used the published diary of
Executive Secretary Angara, the press statement Estrada issued after Arroyo’s oath
taking, and the departure of the Estrada family from Malacañang, to conclude that
Estrada had resigned.
DOCTRINE/S
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation
of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities.
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes
apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional
ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that “[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.” This is
because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan
political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. Political
partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included.
Resignation is a factual question and its elements are: (1) there must be an intent to
resign and (2) the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.
Whether or not Estrada resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
CASE SUMMARY
145 OCA vs. Amor This is an administrative case filed by Judge Contreras of the MTC of Paracale,
Camarines Norte before the OCA against Executive Judge Owen Amor (respondent) of
RTC Daet, Camarines Norte, accusing him of Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave
Misconduct, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service due to several instances of misconduct.
The OCA found the respondent guilty of the charges against him due to implied
admission from his failure to file a comment despit the opportunities afforded to him.
Sc held that the OCA properly found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct and
Insubordination for refusing to comply with the numerous directives of the SC to file a
comment on the administrative complaint against him. Respondent’s automatic
resignation did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction in determining his administrative
liability, which still stands.
146 Republic vs. Winston Singun wrote Regional Director Jose Hipolito signifying his intention to apply for
Singun an 8½ month leave of absence starting 16 November 1999 until 31 July 2000. Director
Hipolito denied the request. Respondent again filed an application for leave of absence
but for a shorter period from 16 November 1999 until 14 January 2000. According to
Director Hipolito, he immediately approved respondent’s application for leave of absence
and resignation and he reiterated said approval in a memorandum also notified Regional
Director Jose T. Soria (Atty. Soria) of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) of his
acceptance of respondent’s resignation. DTI-Regional Office 2 received, Memorandum
Order No. 20 issued by Undersecretary Ordoñez detailing respondent to the Office of the
Undersecretary for Regional Operations effective 17 January 2000. DTI-RO2 received
respondent’s letter informing Director Hipolito that he was reconsidering his earlier letter
of resignation. CSC-RO2 denied respondent’s MR and upheld the resignation of
respondent. CSC reversed and declared respondent’s resignation inoperative and
inefficacious. CA affirmed. SD held that there was no valid resignation as the acceptance
and receipt of approval of the resignation was not received by respondent. Petition
denied
DOCTRINE/S
Grave Abuse of Authority
Defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who, under color of his of ice,
wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an
act characterized with cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.
Dismissal from service
To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and
not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the
office.
In order to differentiate grave misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must
be manifest in the former.
Resignation
It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or an easy way
out to evade an administrative liability or administrative sanction. In this light, the erring
officer’s administrative liability for his acts stands.
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of
the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by
competent and lawful authority.
To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be:
a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term
b) an act of relinquishment; and
c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
Acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective.
The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance.
Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or offer to resign is revocable. Resignation is
not effective where it was withdrawn before it was accepted.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
147 Municipality of Augusto Antonio was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) who was designated as The elements of abandonment are:
San Andres vs. CA a temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP). Following such (1) Intention to abandon and
appointment, he tendered a resignation as regards his position as member of the SB. (2) An overt or “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect
When the appointment as temporary member to the SP was nullified by the Court in a
later decision, he attempted to re-assume his prior membership in the SB. SC held that The elements of resignation are:
although his resignation was not accepted, he could not re-assume membership in the (1) An intention to relinquish a part of the term,
SB having clearly abandoned his position therein. (2) An act of relinquishment, and
(3) An acceptance by the proper authority.
148 Canonizado vs. This is an MR of the prior SC decision declaring Sec. 8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional, Abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention
Aguirre which violated petitioners right to security of tenure and ordered their reinstatement. The of terminating his possession and control thereof.
said provision removed the petitioners from services as Commissioners of NAPOLCOM.
While the said case is pending, petitioner Canonizado was appointed by Pres. Estrada as There are two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon, and
Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the PNP. Hence, the second, an overt or “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect.
respondents herein contended that Canonizado is deemed to have abandoned his claim
for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM since the offices of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by nonuser
Inspector General are incompatible. SC ruled otherwise, holding that by accepting the or acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an
position of Inspector General during the pendency of the present case, Canonizado office.
cannot be deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement to the latter position.
He did not voluntarily leave his post as Commissioner, but was compelled to do so on the Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful
strength of Section 8 of RA 8551. And the rule on incompatibility of duties will not apply to removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by
the case at bar because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two an officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an
offices simultaneously. abandonment of the office.

Where, while desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or
intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a
statute, which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be
deemed an abandonment and the officer may recover the office.

He who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto
vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or
proceeding.

An officer’s selfless and noble aspiration, in accepting his subsequent position, to

continue serving the country, in whatever capacity, deserves to be placed on at least
equal footing with the worthy goal of
providing for oneself and one’s family, either of which are sufficient for the acceptance of
another position during the pendency of his petition.

The “right to live” contemplates not only a right to earn a living, but also a right to lead a
useful and productive life.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
149 Quezon vs. Quezon was Chief Nurse II at ICH when she was granted a study leave for one year to The purpose of the proviso in Sec. 33 of Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules
Borromeo complete her degree in nursing. After the expiration of the period, she filed another four requiring notice is to remind the officer concerned of his impending separation from the
requests for extension (totaling 3 years), but only the first two were approved. Despite the service so he could prepare for such an eventuality. Thus, the written notice is not
disapproval of her latter requests, she did not report for work without authorization for 19 jurisdictional in nature and that the failure to give such notice by the appropriate
months. When she finally reported to ICH, the RHD already appointed a new Chief Nurse government office does not prevent the dropping of the employee concerned from the
as her replacement. Before MSB, Quezon asked for reinstatement, which was initially government service.
granted. Upon MR by RHD, MSB reversed. Quezon appealed to CSC, but decision was The demands of procedural due process are satisfied by giving an employee who has
merely affirmed. She then filed a petition for certiorari before the SC, arguing that MSB’s been “AWOL” the opportunity to contest the legality of his being dropped from the
reversal was null and void since the original decision already attained finality and that she government service upon his return to his post.
was denied due process since she never received written notice of her removal from
service and she was not afforded an investigation. SC dismissed the petition, finding that
MSB’s reversal was valid since its first decision never attained finality due to non-service
to RHD and that Quezon was not denied due process. The requirement of notice is not
jurisdictional and does not prevent the government from dropping an AWOL employee.
Also, Quezon was already given the opportunity to explain when she filed her complaints
before MSB and CSC.

150 In Re: AWOL of Darlene Jacoba, court stenographer, began incurring unauthorized absences. OCA sent
Darlene Jacoba her a letter through Presiding Judge Maliaman asking her for an explanation as to why
she should not be dealt with given her prolonged unauthorized absences. OCA, likewise,
asked the recommendation from the judge whether Jacoba should be dropped from rolls.
According to the judge, Jacoba told the judge that she will be filing her resignation but
she never done so. The issue is WON Jacoba should be dropped from service. SC held
that yes, she should be. SC cited Sec. 35 Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Civil
Service: stating that (See doctrine).
The Supreme Court cannot countenance any act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.
Section 35, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Civil Service: “Officers and employees
who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on
Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from the service after due notice.
x x x”

An employee’s frequent unauthorized absences prejudices public service. (Office of the

Court Administrator vs. Grecia, 246 SCRA 139 [1995])
151 Philippine On July 1993, Petitioner Garrido verbally applied for a 5 month VL from his boss David to Granting of leaves is the discretion of the head of the agency but it must be exercised
Coconut Authority vs. go to Sierra Leone and be engaged as a Consultant for a short period. David did not properly.
Garrido respond clearly and instead asked him to clarify if CSC rules allows such arrangement. In
July 28, Garrido then officially submitted his VL in written form then left for Sierra Leone a
week later.

In Sep, David issued a Memo disapproving the VL. Garrido only read the letter when he
returned to PCA in Dec 1993. He got hospitalized for a brief period then returned again to
PCA to apply for another 5 month VL. However, he was then informed than he was
dropped from the rolls because he was considered AWOL while he was in Africa since
his leave was disapproved. CSC affirmed the dismissal but CA reinstated him due to lack
of prior notice.

SC ruled in favor of Garrido because he cannot be considered AWOL. In this case, the
discretion of David as head of the agency in allowing leaves was not exercised properly.
His two month inaction on the application gave an impression upon David that there was
no impediment for his leave. Hence, there is no basis that Garrido left without an
approved application. Also, when Garrido initially applied verbally, David clearly did not
disapprove the request
CASE SUMMARY
152 Adiong vs. CA Respondent Nuska was appointed to the position of Municipal Local Civil Registrar by
Mayor Batua. When petitioner Adiong became Mayor (I think, not clear in the case ), he
informed all temporary and casual municipal employees of the termination of their
appointment, and required those holding approved permanent appointments to submit
copies of their appointments. Respondent failed to do so, and she was terminated and
replaced by petitioner. Respondent Nuska then sent a letter to petitioner requesting for
her reinstatement and payment of salaries which he failed to act on. CSC and CA ruled in
Nuska’s favor. The petitioner said that Nuska abandoned her office, but the SC ruled
otherwise, saying that (see doctrine) and Nuska’s failure to perform her duties was
involuntary and cannot be considered as acquiescence. In her letter to petitioner, she
claimed that she did not resign and she considered her termination from the service as
illegal. Clearly, there was no abandonment of office.
153 Public Interest Respondent Mr. Magdangal B. Elma was appointed both as Chairman of the Presidential
Center vs. Elma, Commission on Good Government (CPCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal
supra Counsel (CPLC) by President Estrada. He accepted and took the oath of office for CPLC,
but waived compensation. Petitioners filed an original action before the SC raising that
the appointment was unconstitutional for violating ART VII Sec 13 and ART IX-B Section
7. The controversy was actually rendered moot by the ouster of Erap and the
appointment of new individuals by Gloria in the subject positions. Nonetheless, the SC
still ruled that that the appointment of Elma was unconstitutional for violating ART IX-B 1 .
As held, said provision allows appointment to two different positions provided they are not
incompatible. But, in this case, the positions were incompatible because the CPLC as
part of his/ her functions must review actions done by the CPCGG (i.e. conflict of
interest). Cited People vs. Green for laying down test of incompatibility between two
offices. As related to topic of termination, People vs. Green also stated that acceptance
of an incompatible office is the vacation of the other.
154 Angobung vs. Petitioner Angobung won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini,
COMELEC Isabela in the local elections of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private
respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said elections. Sometime in early
September, 1996, private respondent Alban filed with the Local Election Registrar of
Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against petitioner Angobung. The COMELEC en
banc issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951 in relation to the petition for
recall. The Court declared the subject resolution null and void, holding that the Petition
for Recall was signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum
requirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall.
DOCTRINE/S
Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by non-
user or acquiescence.
Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. However,
nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonment where such
nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform.
Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful
removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by
an officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an
abandonment of the office.
People vs Green: Test of incompatibility and effect of accepting an incompatible office:
When there is an inconsistency in the functions of the two such that one office is
subordinate to the other, the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and
repugnant, there is that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of
the one is the vacation of the other. The offices must subordinate, one [over] the other,
and they must, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they are
incompatible at common law. (see ratio for verbatim lifted text)
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of
office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign
power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all
governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper
administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a
fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy.
Only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters may validly initiate
recall proceedings. We take careful note of the phrase, "petition of at least twenty-five
percent (25%)" and point out that the law does not state that the petition must be signed
by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the petition must be "of" or by, at least
25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but
by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters.
CASE SUMMARY
155 Garcia vs. COA Supervising Lineman Vicente of the Bureau of Telecomm. was dismissed pursuant to his
administrative charge for dishonesty in relation to the loss of telegraph poles. Based on
the same facts, a criminal case on qualified theft was filed but the RTC acquitted him
because of his innocence. Vicente was reinstated by virtue of excutive clemency granted
by the President. He filed a claim for back wages with COA. COA denied on the ground
that the clemency did not provide for backwages and that he has not been reinstated in
the service since the records do not show that he had been reinstated in the same
position. SC granted backwages. His automatic reinstatement entitles him to back
wages. (see doctrine)
DOCTRINE/S
(TOPIC) Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of
any criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is
the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive
Department over which the President, as its head, has the power of control.
In Monsanto v. Factoran, we have firmly established the general rule that while a pardon
has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of
the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes.
Exception: However, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms
this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found
guilty of the offense charged.
APPLICATION: Vicente was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently
dismissed from service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of qualified
theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner
by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the
fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. The executive clemency on
petitioner completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which
found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be
inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative
charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant
of the pardon. His automatic reinstatement entitles him to back wages.
(TOPIC as highlighted by Sir) AMOUNT of BACKWAGES: The circumstances of
Vicente’s case impel us to deviate from the general rule previously laid down on the
recovery of back wages for five years as established in jurisprudence. This Court finds it
fair and just to award petitioner full back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally
dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was reinstated. The payment shall be without
deduction or qualification
REASON: This Court cannot help surmising the painful stigma that must have caused
petitioner, the incursion on his dignity and reputation, for having been adjudged, albeit
wrongfully, a dishonest man, and worse, a thief. (law, equity and justice)
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
156 Francisco vs. The facts begins with the adoption of a new rule on impeachment proceedings by the Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
House of 12th Congress wherein the word “initiate” was given a different meaning than filing”. The complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
Representatives controversy began with a resolution of the House of Representatives which directed the thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
Commmittee on Justice to investigate manner of disbursement and expenditures by complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
Chief Justice Davide of the Supreme Court Judiciary Fund. Thereafter, President Estrada the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
filed an impeachment complaint against CJ Davide for culpable violation of the Constitution.
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. This was dismissed for being insufficient in
substance by the Committee on Justice. The following day, another impeachment
complaint was filed, this time by Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella against CJ
Davide based on the results of the legislative inquiry. Several petitions were filed
assailing the constitutionality of the second impeachment on the ground that it violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. The Court, in deciding case, said
that the resolution hinges on the interpretation of the term “initiate.” Hence, the Court
looked into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission as well as considered the
amicus curiae during the oral arguments of the instant petition of the different
Commissioners (Regalado, Bernas and Maambong) who all agreed that the meaning of
“initiate” is “to file the complaint and take initial action on it.” The Court also held that the
rules on impeachment by the House of Representatives cannot contravene the
Constitution and held the same as invalid for giving the word “initiate” a different meaning
than “filing.”

157 Tumulak vs. Egay Petitioner Tumulak received an ad interim appointment from President Osmeña as the
judge of the Justice of the Peace of the municipalities of Gigaquit and Bacuag, Surigao.
When he was about to occupy the post beginning July 1946, he found that respondent
Egay is already occupying the position. Petitioner filed this petition for quo warranto only
in August 1948 when more than one year had already passed from July 1946. The
Supreme Court dismissed the petition holding that (1) the action has already prescribed
(2) WON the one-year limitation applies even to officers whose tenure is protected by the
Constitution, and (3) the one-year period applies not only to quo warranto of corporations
but to public officers as well.
158 Republic vs. See 56th case
Sereno, supra
Constitutional rights may be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one year could be
validly considered as a waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may
prevent.
It is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainty,
and the people’s interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as
practicable.
See 56th case
CASE SUMMARY
159 CSC vs. Clave Respondent Aurora Clave was a GSIS employee (Senior Computer Operator I). She was
charged with an administrative complaint for allegedly cancelling the loan of another
GSIS employee in the GSIS’s Salary Loan System, thus making it appear that there was
no loan granted to said employee. Among her numerous defenses to the administrative
complaint was that she (Clave) has been in service with the GSIS for 28 years already
(length of service).
DOCTRINE/S
Simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month
and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is clear that
length of service may be considered either as mitigating or aggravating depending on the
circumstances of the case.

The GSIS and CSC both found Clave guilty of simple neglect of duty and meted out the
penalty of dismissal from service. However, the CA reversed both, holding that the proper
penalty should only be suspension from office without salary/benefits for one year. The
CA considered Clave’s length of service as a mitigating circumstance, which is allowed
under Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RACCS).
Clave's length of service in the government could not mitigate her liability considering that
the present offense is not her first offense but her third offense. Applying Section 52(B) of
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty of dismissal
imposed by the GSIS and affirmed by the CSC should instead be imposed on Clave.

However, the SC reversed the CA. The SC held that the CA erred in its application of
Section 53 of the RACCS because (see doctrine 2 and 3 below). The SC found that
Clave was already found guilty of simple neglect of duty in two (2) other separate
administrative cases prior to this case. Therefore, applying the rule that (See doctrine 1),
the proper penalty to be imposed on Clave is dismissal.

160 Fernandez vs. (Heads up guys, sobrang daming nangyari sa case, mahirap isummarize lahat, so please ●It is sufficiently evident that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to give a complete
Ombudsman if you have the time, read the whole digest) and truthful report to the PBAC of Jireh Construction’s actual progress and abandonment
of the AB Bridge Project, which could have been a crucial element in awarding the Four
Gov. Cabagnot(Province of Aklan) entered into a contract with Jireh Construction. The Projects to a qualified and capable contractor.
contract pertained to the construction of the Alibagon-Baybay Bridge (Phase II). The oAlso, petitioner had been remiss in his duties to monitor slippages of Jireh
contract also provided for the completion of the AB Bridge Project within 90 calendar Construction’s performance and to take the necessary steps to ensure minimal loss to
days or on 25 Feb 1996. On 28 Nov 1994, Jireh Construction started the AB Bridge the provincial government. Given the short time frame of 45 to 90 days for the completion
Project. On 15 Feb 1995, Petitioenr Fernandez, in his capacity as Provincial Engineer of of the projects, petitioner should have immediately reported the poor performance of
the Province of Aklan, endorsed to Gov. Cabagnot for her approval, a letter of request Jireh Construction to the governor.
from Jireh Construction for a contract time extension of 30 calendar days to complete the oPetitioner could have recommended the takeover of the construction of the projects
AB Bridge Project since the original contract period did not take into account the work and the termination of the contracts to prevent further loss of funds to the province.
stoppage caused by tide variations of the river. ●Brucal v Desierto: gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
Basically, the projects were audited by COA and found that the AB Bridge Project is only inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences
22.89% complete; however, the Summary of Actual Accomplishment and Costing in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even
submitted and certified by Fernandez showed that the AB Bridge Project was already inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property.
almost halfway completed with an accomplishment rating of 48.57%. Moreover, the COA oIn cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
auditors found that the provincial government did not take any action against Jireh flagrant and palpable.
Construction. o(Negligence part) Petitioner, as the provincial engineer who oversees all the
infrastructure projects of the province, has direct knowledge of the status of each
Ombudsman found Fernandez GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. project’s progress. Clearly, he was in a position to inform the PBAC that Jireh
Construction not only had not met the required deadline of the completion of the AB
The issue is WON is guilty of gross neglect of duty and therefore should be dismissed Bridge Project but also had abandoned the project, with only 22.89% completion and not
from service? the 48.57% completion that petitioner had certified. Petitioner gave a false report to the
PBAC when he attested that Jireh Construction had no abandoned project at the time of
The SC ruled in the affirmative. The SC held that (see doctrines). the bidding of the Four Projects.
CASE SUMMARY
161 Ombudsman vs. SUMMARY: Carmelita Doromal, owner and administrator of St. Martha's Day Care
Regalado Center, went to the Davao Office of the Bureau of Immigration to inquire about the
requirement to obtain an accreditation to admit foreign students. She met Regalado,
Immigration Officer I, whose modus operandi is to present to applicants for accreditation
a fake copy of the Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 of the BoI providing an
accreditation fee of P50K to be able to charge the said amount, when the actual fee
required is only P10K. If the applicant cannot afford to pay such a high amount,
Regalado, will tell the applicant that through her efforts, she will be able to reduce the
accreditation fee to P10K. In return, the applicant will have to give an honorarium to
Regalado's boss amounting to at least P30K. Regalado was able to persuade Doromal
and came to inspect St. Martha's. Doromal could not personally come to Regalado's
office, so Diaz and Mae Kristen Tautho went. Diaz carried with an unmarked brown
envelope containing the white envelope with P1,500 as "honorarium." Diaz and Regalado
had an exchange of words.*** Doromal, Diaz, and Tautho filed with the Office of the Omb
for Mindanao a Complaint against Regalado for Grave Misconduct, penalized by Rule IV,
Sec. 52(A)(3) of CSC Resolution No. 991936, and for violation of Sec. 7(d) of R.A. No.
6713. Omb for Mindanao - Found Regalado guilty of Grave Misconduct and violation of
Sec. 7(d) of R.A. 6713, any of which merits her removal from the government service.
She is meted with the penalty of dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalties
of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service. Acting Omb - Approved the Omb for
Mindanao Decision. Omb - Denied Regalado's MR. CA - Affirmed in toto the Omb’s
ruling. Acting on Regalado's MR, CA issued its Amended Decision. On account of
mitigating circumstances, CA modified Regalado's penalty to only 1-year suspension
without pay. Omb - filed present appeal. ISSUE: WON CA erred in meting upon
Regalado reduced penalty of 1-year suspension without pay, in view of the mitigating
circumstances it appreciated in respondent's favor – YES. Respondent violated Sec. 7(d)
of R.A. No. 6713 which penalizes both solicitation and acceptance. Rule IV, Sec. 52(A)(3)
unqualifiedly states that dismissal shall be meted even if it is only the first offense.
162 OCA vs. Ampong Ampong was a Court Interpreter III. In 1996, CSC found Ampong guilty of Dishonesty,
Grave Misconducr, and Conduct prejudicial to the Best interest of the service for having
taken the 1991 Civil Service Exam on behalf of another person. Hence, CSC dismissed
Ampong from service and imposed accessory penalties. The dismissal was affirmed by
the SC. Notwithstanding the dismissal, OCA’s financial management office continued
releasing Ampong’s salary, benefits, and allowances. Judge Infante informed OCA about
the continued payment of salaries. In her comment, Ampong prayed that the SC revisit its
2008 ruling. WON the Ampong had been dismissed from her employment. The SC held,
yes, ampong had been dismissed. Pursuant to immutability of judgment doctrine,
Ampong could no longer seek the August 26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal.
Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty
should be enforced in its full course.
DOCTRINE/S
The fact that an offender was caught for the first time does not, in any way, abate the
gravity of what he or she actually committed. Grave misconduct is not a question of
frequency, but, as its own name suggests, of gravity or weight. One who commits grave
misconduct is one who, by the mere fact of that misconduct, has proven himself or
herself unworthy of the continuing confidence of the public. By his or her very commission
of that grave offense, the offender forfeits any right to hold public office.
The fact that an offender was caught for the first time does not, in any way, abate the
gravity of what he or she actually committed. Grave misconduct is not a question of
frequency, but, as its own name suggests, of gravity or weight. One who commits grave
misconduct is one who, by the mere fact of that misconduct, has proven himself or
herself unworthy of the continuing confidence of the public. By his or her very commission
of that grave offense, the offender forfeits any right to hold public office.
In line with Section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative
disabilities: 1) cancellation of civil service eligibility; 2) forfeiture of retirement benefits;
and 3) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or
government financial institution.
o Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. However, despite Ampong’s
dismissal on the ground of dishonesty, she should be entitled to receive her accrued
leave credits, if any, pursuant to aforementioned provision of the URACCS, which does
not include the forfeiture of the same.
Despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave
credits that they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of
fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have
earned prior to their dismissal.
CASE SUMMARY
163 Lagoc vs. Malaga Malaga filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the petitioners, et. al., before the Ombudsman.
She accused the officials and employees of violating established rules and regulations
(IRR of PD 15948), making it appear that there was open, public and competitive bidding
for the materials and equipment needed for the skywalk construction projects to ensure
that their favored contractor got the projects. The Ombudsman found that there was
collusion to rig the bidding. The CA affirmed.
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The petitioners committed grave misconduct
when they conducted the bid process of and awarded the subject contracts without
compliance with the mandatory twin-publication requirement. The newpapers they
presented for their defense show strong and clear signs of manipulation. It is their duty to
ensure that the rules and regulations for the conduct of bidding for government projects
are faithfully observed.
164 Gloria vs. CA There were strikes where the respondents here allegedly took part of. One of them,
Margallo was dismissed while the others were merely ordered suspended. Upon appeals
to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB), CSC, CA, the penalties were
reduced to a mere reprimand. CA also ordered payment of backwages since after the 90-
day preventive suspension. The payment of compensation is what is being contested by
petitioner in this case.
The issues to be resolved are whether compensation must be paid for the period during
the respondents are under preventive suspensions. SC held yes but only to preventive
suspensions pending investigations.
SC held that yes they are entitled to backwages and compensation since they are
preventively suspended pending appeal and not for the 90-day preventive suspension
pending investigations. See doctrines for reasons and qualifications.
DOCTRINE/S
Misconduct becomes grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established
by substantial evidence.
The penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service.
Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292), there are
two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with
offenses punishable by removal or suspension:
(1) preventive suspension pending investigation (§51)
(2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining
authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated
(§47[4]).
During the preventive suspension pending investigation there is no right of compensation
even if the employee is exonerated
However, unlike preventive suspensions pending investigation which is not a penalty but
only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in
effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed. Therefore, compensation must be paid for the
period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent
CASE SUMMARY
165 CSC vs. Petitioner Magnaye was first appointed as Utility Worker I by Mayor Rosales in March
Magnaye, supra 2001. After the May 2001 elections, Mayor Rosales was replaced Mayor Bendana, and
the latter returned Magnaye to his original assignment as Utility Worker 1 on July 2001.
However, on August 13, 2001, Magnaye received from the new mayor a notice of
termination from employment. The termination was effective the next day, August 14, and
the grounds cited were “unsatisfactory conduct” and “want of capacity”, which are
grounds found under the Civil Service Rules. However, the notice of termination did not
specify any of Magnaye’s acts which constituted “unsatisfactory conduct” nor “want of
capacity”.
DOCTRINE/S
Due Notice
An official who, for one evaluation period, is rated poor in performance, may be dropped
from the rolls after due notice. Due notice shall mean that the officer or employee is
informed in writing of the status of his performance not later than the fourth month of that
rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve his performance within the
remaining period of the semester shall warrant his separation from the service. Such
notice shall also contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare
an explanation

Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC, which dismissed Magnaye’s
complaint. According to the CSC, Magnaye was validly terminate because he did not
enjoy security of tenure as he was still in a 6-month probationary period at the time he
was terminated (from March 2001 to August 2001, which is less than 6 months).
Sufficient time to assess
Inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time.
Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or incompetent requires
enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to observe his
performance.

The CA and SC disagreed with the CSC and ruled that Magnaye was illegally terminated.

First, the SC held, citing Section 3 (2), Article XIII of the Constitution and Section 2(3),
Article IX-B of the Constitution, that even if within the 6-months probationary period,
Magnaye enjoys security of tenure.

(Relevant) Second, with respect as to whether Magnaye was properly found to have
committed “unsatisfactory conduct” and “want of capacity”, the SC held in the negative.
According to the SC, the Notice of Termination’s failure to specify any of Magnaye’s acts
166 Maglalang vs. Maglalang is a casino a teller and he was imposed a 30-day suspension by the Board of Decisions of administrative or quasi administrative agencies which are declared by law
PAGCOR PAGCOR due to an alleged altercation with a customer wherein Maglalang was found final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or
guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer. After the denial of Maglalang’s MR, he upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative
filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 because the penalty imposed on or quasi- judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a
him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings.
outrightly dismissed the petition for the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding
that the CSC has jurisdiction. The issue is WON the direct recourse to CA was proper.
The SC ruled in the affirmative, saying that this case falls under the exception from the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which is “where no administrative
review is provided by law.” Since the suspension was not more than 30 days, it cannot be
appealed to the CSC. Further, Sec. 37 of PD 807 states that decisions of head of
agencies shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than 30
days. Nonetheless, these decisions are still subject to judicial review.
CASE SUMMARY DOCTRINE/S
167 CSC vs. A certain George Suan of the Citizens Crime Watch filed a complaint against responded The Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling,
Dacoycoy, supra Dacoycoy for habitual drunkness, misconduct, and nepotism (for appointing his two sons which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may
as driver and utility worker). CSC found him guilty of nepotism and dismissed him from appeal the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
service. This was reversed by the CA on the ground that it was not respondent himself
who appointed or recommended his two sons. Upon appeal to the SC, the Court held
that CA was wrong because Section 59 of EO 252 because it suffices that the
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the person exercise immediate supervision over the appointee.
In this case, while the recommendation did not come from respondent Dacoycoy himself,
it was made by one Mr. Dacuag who was a subordinate of Respondent Dacoycoy, and
who thereafter placed the two sons of Dacoycoy under the latter’s immediate supervision.
The Court, finding that there was an attempt to circumvent the law, revived the resolution
of the CSC dismissing Dacoycoy.

168 Rodrigo vs. The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor Conrado Rodrigo, entered into an Officials occupying positions of Grade 27 and above, charged with crimes referred to in
Sandiganbayan (with agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Section 4 a. and b. of RA 7975 ( (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and (b) Other
MR) Barangay Caboloan. Reynaldo Mejica, the Planning and Development Coordinator of San offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Nicolas, prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office) are within the original and exclusive
Generation project was 97.5% accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; those below come under the jurisdiction of the regular
Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. On the basis of said report, payment of P452, courts.
825.53 was effected by the Municipal Treasurer, petitioner Alejandro Facundo, to
Philwood Construction. Petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial An official's salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the
Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found that as per COA (Commission nature of his position (and not the salary received)
on Audit) evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project (equivalent
to P291,915.07) was actually accomplished. The Ombudsman approved the filing of an
information against Rodrigo et. al. for violation of “Anti-Graft Law” before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
contend that Mayor Rodrigo occupies a position of Grade 24 based on his salary
received, and is, therefore, beyond the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The SC held that Mayor Rodrigo as Mayor occupies a Salary Grade 27
position by virtue of RA 6758, thus within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as stated
in RA 7975. Petition dismissed.
CASE SUMMARY
169 Lacson vs. Ombudsman formed a panel to investigate the slaughter of 11 members of KBG
Executive Secretary allegedly by elements of the ABRITG headed by PNP officers, including Lacson. Initially
the officers were absolved from criminal liability, but later on it was recommended that
they be indicted for multiple murders. Lacson was charged initially as a principal, but later
amended to an accessory before SB. He questioned the jurisdiction of SB, arguing that
the cases fall under the jurisdiction of RTC because the principal accused does not have
a SG of 27 or higher, as required under RA 7975. SB ordered that the cases be
transferred to RTC-QC, so the prosecutor filed a MR. Pending resolution of the MR, RA
8249 was passed, which defined “expansion” of SB’s jurisdiction. In said law, the word
“principal” was removed, meaning that as long as one of the accused has a SG of 27 or
higher, SB will have jurisdiction over the case. In consideration of this, SB decided to
retain jurisdiction over the case. Lacson then questioned the constitutionality of RA 8249,
alleging that it violated his right to procedural due process and to the equal protection of
laws, and that it was an ex post facto law. SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 8249 but
ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to RTC-QC since the allegations in the
Informations filed did not show an intimate relation between the murders committed and
the discharge of official functions of the PNP officers. Thus, SB had no jurisdiction over
the cases.
170 Garcia vs. Petition for forfeiture was filed by the Ombudsman against Garcia, et al. before the
Sandiganbayan, supra Sandiganbayan. Garcia filed a Motion to Dismiss in regard to the petition for forfeiture on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of respondent Sandiganbayan over special civil actions
for forfeiture under RA 1379. Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Dismiss declared
Garcia in default and setting the case for ex parte reception of evidence. MR denied. SC
held that Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case and ROC shall govern on
procedural requirements on cases under RA 1379.
DOCTRINE/S
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.
Under Sec. 4(b) of RA 8429, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the
official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers
or employees enumerated in Sec. 4(a).
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under RA 8249, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 and that
the authority to file the petition for forfeiture of properties unlawfully acquired after 25
February 1986 is lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman
Considering that R.A. No. 1379 does not provide for the procedure in cases where
motions are filed, the 1997 ROC will apply in a suppletory character.
The subsequent action of the court on a defective motion does not cure the flaw, for a
motion with a fatally defective notice is a useless scrap of paper, and the court has no
authority to act thereon
CASE SUMMARY
171 Defensor- MDS was charged with criminal cases in the Ombudsman. In line with the pending
Santiago vs. criminal case, she was suspended by
Sandiganbayan the Ombudsman from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from
any other government position
she may be holding at present.
The issue is WON the Sandiganbayan may issue a preventive suspension?
The SC ruled in the affirmative. The SC held that (see doctrines).
172 Montoya vs. Petitioner Montoya was preventively suspended by the respondent NCR Regional
Police Director Director pending a Summary Proceedings for Montoya’s Administrative Liability.
Eventually, the NCR Regional Director rendered a decision on the said admin liability
dismissing Montoya from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty. Petitioner
appealed the said decision with the Regional Appellate Board (RAB), which ruled in his
favor. Respondent NCR Regional Director then appealed to the DILG, which affirmed the
RAB ruling. Respondent again filed an appeal with the CSC, which now ruled in his favor.
The issue is WON respondent can appeal the decisions of RAB-NCR and DILG
Secretary, which the SC held in the negative, ruling that (see doctrine). IN this case, It is
beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting as the investigating and
disciplining authority when he rendered his Decision dismissing Montoya from the
service. Mamauag squarely applies in respondent’s case. The NCR Regional Director, in
actively appealing the reversal of his Decision, had inevitably forsaken his impartiality and
had become adversarial. His interest was only in seeing to it that his decision would be
reinstated.
DOCTRINE/S
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent
public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support.
o Sec. 13, RA3019 provides that Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
o Segovia v Sandiganbayan: “The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as
amended—treating of the suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer—may no
longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court. x x x x x x x x x The
provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent
or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service.
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about
it.”
o Bayot v Sandiganbayan: “x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result
of judicial proceedings.
In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension.”
•While Dacoycoy established that the government could appeal the decision exonerating
respondent public officer or employee from administrative charges, it was Mamauag
which specifically required that the government party appealing must be the one
prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the
administrative case.
•It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where his
decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d’être for such doctrine is the
fact that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the
issues without his active participation. When a judge actively participates in the appeal of
his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be judicial and has become adversarial instead.
CASE SUMMARY
173 Ombudsman vs. Respondent was found guilty by the Office of the Ombudsman of the administrative
Vitriolo charges filed against him during his tenure as Executive Director of CHED and was
meted the penalty of dismissal. Respondent appealed to CA, without impleading the
OMB. CA still found him administratively liable, but for a lesser offense, and not of all
offenses filed against him. Therefore CA modified the penalty to suspension for 30 days.
One month after the CA’s decision was rendered, the OMB filed an omnibus motion
before the CA to intervene in the case and seek a reversal of the CA’s decision. CA
denied the motion as it ruled that the OMB was not a party to the appeal, and the motion
was filed out of time. SC held that it already ruled on OMB’s standing to intervene on
appeal in administrative cases resolved by it. Even if not impleaded as a party in the
proceedings, it has legal interest to intervene and defend its ruling in
administrative cases before the CA, which interest proceeds from its duty to act as a
champion of the people and to preserve the integrity of public service. However, SC still
dismissed the OMB’s petition because its motion before the CA was filed out of time and
did not fall under one of the exceptions which would warrant relaxation of procedural
rules.
DOCTRINE/S
It is now settled doctrine that the Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene in appeals
from its rulings in administrative cases, however, it must move for intervention before
rendition of judgment. Otherwise it may be denied unless it falls under the exceptions:
demanded by the higher interest of justice; to afford indispensable parties, who have
not been impleaded, the right to be heard; to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle
once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties; or, because of the grave
legal issues raised.
Even if not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, it has legal interest to
intervene and defend its ruling in administrative cases before the CA, which
interest proceeds from its duty to act as a champion of the people and to preserve the
integrity of public service.