LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS WITH PRACTICAL EXERCISES SYLLABUS 2023

I. Legal Ethics
A. Practice of Law
1. Basic Concepts
a) Definition of the Practice of Law
b) Practice of Law as a Privilege, Not a Right
c) Law as a Profession, Not a Business or Trade
2. Qualifications for Admission to the Bar (Bar Matter No. 1153)
3. Continuing Requirements for Membership in the Bar
4. Appearance of Non-lawyers
a) Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A, as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-
SC)
b) Non-lawyers in Courts and/or Administrative Tribunals
c) Proceedings Where Lawyers are Prohibited to Appear as Counsels
5. Prohibited Practice of Non-lawyers and Appearance Without Authority
6. Public Officials and the Practice of Law
a) Prohibitions and Disqualifications of Former Government Attorneys
b) Public Officials Who Cannot Practice Law or Can Practice Law With
Restrictions
7. Lawyers Authorized to Represent the Government
8. The Lawyer’s Oath
B. Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer Under the Code of Professional Responsibility
IN HGC V. TAGAYUNA
On the violation of the CONFLICT OF INTEREST rule, HGC claims that respondents violated the rule
as espoused in the following provisions of the CPR:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his client.

Rule 15.01 A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the
matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.

Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law
shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. In one case, the Court
summarized:

Simply put, IN DETERMINING WHETHER A LAWYER IS GUILTY OF VIOLATING THE RULES

ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST under the CPR, it is essential to determine under the three tests.

Under the FIRST TEST, there is conflict of interest if the lawyer represents both opposing parties in an
issue or claim. Stated differently, "if a lawyer's argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule."[39]
The Court finds that there was no violation under the parameters of this test. Respondents did not represent
conflicting interests—HGC's and BSCDC's interests—here. As found by the IBP, the Law Firm did not
represent BSCDC as counsel in the arbitration case. The arbitration complaint was signed by Atty. Ruben L.
Almadro (Atty. Almadro) as BSCDC's counsel.[40] Atty. Almadro is not part or related to the Law Firm. On the
other hand, Atty. Tagayuna merely signed as president to verify the complaint. [41] Further, evidence show that
the Law Firm and ESP were engaged by HGC for collection purposes only; as determined by the IBP, there is
no proof that the Law Firm handled matters that were related to the arbitration case. [42] Also, it was established
that the Law Firm was no longer retained as counsel at the time of the filing of the arbitration case. The
 Collection Retainership Agreement expired on December 31, 2011 and was never renewed, while the
arbitration case was filed in May 2012. Considering the foregoing, respondents did not represent both
opposing parties (i.e., HGC and BSCDC) in an issue or claim, particularly the arbitration case.

For the SECOND TEST, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of a new relation or engagement
will prevent the lawyer from faithfully performing his duties to a client. The second test is not relevant to
the instant case; the factual circumstances did not include allegations of respondents' acceptance of a new
relation while being counsel of HGC that prevented them from faithfully performing their duties to it. There is
no showing that BSCDC is a new client of the Law Firm.

The THIRD TEST provides that there is conflict of interest if the lawyer, in a new relation, would be
called upon to use against a former client any confidential information he has acquired through their
connection or previous employment. This test specifically applies to situations where the professional
relationship with a former client was already terminated when the lawyer was engaged by a new client. The
Court stated that "for there to be conflicting interests when a former client is involved, the following
circumstances must concur: (a) the lawyer is called upon in his present engagement to make use against a
former client confidential information[,] which was acquired through their connection or previous
employment[;] and (b) the present engagement involves transactions that occurred during the lawyer's
employment with the former client and matters that the lawyer previously handled for the said client." Related
to this, proof must be adduced to show that the former client intended the information to be confidential; mere
relation between attorney and client does not create a presumption of confidentiality.
Indeed, the professional relationship between the Law Firm and HGC expired on December 31, 2011.
However, there is no proof that the Law Firm, in a new matter, used against HGC confidential information
acquired from their previous relation. HGC merely made allegations that respondents represented BSCDC
while being engaged as its counsel. To reiterate, the subject of arbitration are matters not handled by the Law
Firm; the Law Firm was engaged for collection purposes only—this is clear in the Collection Retainership
Agreement as adduced in evidence. In any event, there is no new relation to speak of as BSCDC is not a client
of the Law Firm.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds and affirms that respondents did not violate the conflict of
interest rule.

ON THE CHARGE OF UNLAWFUL WITHHOLDING OF DOCUMENTS, HGC claims that respondents

failed and refused to return documents when due and upon demand. The Court finds the charge to be partly
meritorious.

In this regard, the CPR provides:

CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. It has been consistently
held that any money or property collected for the client coming into the lawyer's possession should be promptly
declared and reported to the client.[47] The Court, however, recognizes that a lawyer is entitled to a lien over funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession for purposes of satisfying the legal
fees and disbursements due to him. Rule 16.03 of the CPR allows this upon prompt notice to the client. This is also
provided in Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The lien covers documents such as titles and other pertinent
papers. In this relation, the Court has long held that a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's
money, as well as properties and documents, for himself by the mere fact that he is owed legal fees. It is essential
that the client consent to the application of his property or funds to the legal fees, in which case the lawyer may
deduct what is due him and return the excess to the client. Absent the client's consent, the lawyer must return the
funds to the client, without prejudice to the filing of a case to recover the unpaid fees.
Respondents state, however, that only a total of four titles are unaccounted for. This is negligible, according to
respondents, considering the voluminous transactions endorsed to the Law Firm and ESP in the performance of the
collection services.
Respondents then claim that they were merely exercising their right to withhold to exercise retaining lien for
unpaid fees. The Court, however, finds that the requisites to exercise lien were not met. As discussed, it is
essential that the CLIENT CONSENT to the application of its property to the unpaid fees because a lawyer
cannot unilaterally appropriate his client's property. Here, there is no proof that HGC consented to the
respondents' withholding of the titles to satisfy the unpaid legal fees. Thus, the COURT FINDS THAT
RESPONDENTS IMPROPERLY EXERCISED ITS RIGHT TO RETAIN HGC'S DOCUMENTS AS LIEN.

Jurisprudence provides that the penalty for a violation of Canon 16 of the CPR ranges from suspension from practice
for six months to two years, or even disbarment, depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court
acknowledges the fact that the documents were already returned to HGC during the pendency of this case. It
remains, however, that respondents committed a violation of Canon 16 of the CPR at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Considering these circumstances, the Court deems it proper to reprimand respondents, specifically Atty.
Tagayuna and Atty. Panopio, with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar offense shall merit a heavier penalty.

IN PARTSCH V. VITORILLO
Atty. Vitorillo is suspended for three years from the practice of law.

The following provisions under the CPR are pertinent:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

One's admission to the Bar is by no means a license to gloss over the loopholes in legislation, to hijack the
legal processes, or to manipulate the technical decisions of those unlearned in law. [30] Among the sworn obligations
of attorneys upon taking the Lawyer's Oath is to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land at all
times, never to waver even if vices of luxury, convenience, and worldly excesses tempt them so.[31]
Of course, accusations remain mere allegations if unsupported by the requisite quantum of proof. In
disciplinary cases involving members of the Bar, substantial evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalty.[32] SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE means "that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." [33] It is "more in keeping with the primodial
purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases." [34]
Records, however, easily establish that Atty. Vitorillo gave in to the indulgent vices of the profession.

The Court finds ATTY. VITORILLO GUILTY OF DECEITFUL CONDUCT proscribed by Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the CPR. In the contract to sell[35] that Atty. Vitorillo himself submitted before the Court, Atty. Vitorillo
expressly named himself as the seller and absolute owner of the subject property.[36] The verity of such contractual
status rests upon a single fact – that Atty. Vitorillo held absolute ownership over the entire 800-square-meter subject
property at the time he offered it for sale to Partsch. The facts at hand reveal that he did not.

Atty. Vitorillo had never denied the grave accusations of his non-ownership in the complaint despite the
opportunity to do so in his comment. His clients may have agreed to compensate Atty. Vitorillo's legal services in
kind, but only to the following extent and subject to the highlighted caveats, per the stipulations in their deed of
partition & assignment[37] executed before the questioned sale:[38]

Atty. Vitorillo failed to show the factual bases of his absolute ownership, i.e., that the 800-square-
meter subject property has already been transferred to him in any legal manner, indicative of a dishonest
intent.

First, deeds of transfer in Atty. Vitorillo's favor, certificates of title in his possession, or at least any
affidavit from the true registered owners constituting him as the new owner of the entire 800-square-meter subject
property would have sufficed as proof. Suspiciously, Atty. Vitorillo was unbothered to provide these despite
repeated requests from Partsch.

Second, the litigated main lot that included the subject property was still unregistered in the names of Atty.
Vitorillo's clients.

This is more so with Atty. Vitorillo, as his assertions of ownership is only derivative from the title of his
clients. Faced with the fact that the cancellation of the free patent over the main lot including the subject property
was still under active litigation, Atty. Vitorillo's statements that he is the owner thereof cannot simply be taken as
bible truth.

Third, even if Atty. Vitorillo's clients truly had in their names the 800-square-meter subject property, only
700 square meters were clearly assigned to Atty. Vitorillo in the Deed of Partition and Assignment.

In all, the Court is inclined to view Atty. Vitorillo's claims of ownership over the 800-square-meter
subject property as specious.

In taking the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Vitorillo swore "to do no falsehood, nor consent to its
commission." Above circumstances show that he broke this honored pledge. There is proof that Atty. Vitorillo
truly misrepresented himself as the subject property's owner to Partsch, who fully relied thereon and readily agreed
to the transaction. What Atty. Vitorillo had was at best an inchoate right, anchored on mere hope that the subject
property shall someday be transferred to his name. A person possessing only expectancies of ownership over a piece
of property cannot and should not legally hold oneself out as the absolute owner thereof.[43] This carries heftier
relevance if such person is one well-versed in law like Atty. Vitorillo.[44]

Furthermore, for Atty. Vitorillo to gaslight Partsch, in that the latter should have been more circumspect in
transacting with real property in the Philippines, is irrelevant in negating Atty. Vitorillo's administrative
transgressions.

The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine private lands is too basic a rule for even non-
attorneys to be unaware of. As a lawyer, Atty. Vitorilllo is presumed to know this. Despite being equipped with
such knowledge, Atty. Vitorillo still marketed the subject property for sale to Partsch, a Swiss national.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for any deceit, gross misconduct in such office, or violation
of the Lawyer's Oath.[45] The Investigating Commissioner recommended the penalty of suspension for two
years, which the IBP-Board of Governors approved.

In light of recent jurisprudence most akin to the present case, the Court increases Atty. Vitorillo's
suspension to three years.

IN ANDAYA V. ATTY. TUMANDA, respondent lawyer therein borrowed P500,000.00 from his
complainant. To convince complainant to part with his money, respondent issued a post-dated check, which the bank
dishonored on its maturity date as the account was closed. Complainant demanded payment, to which respondent
counter-offered his Mercedez Benz. While he executed a deed of absolute sale over the car in favor of complainant,
respondent failed to give complainant the certificate of registration. He did not even turn over to complainant
physical possession over the car. Complainant later learned that the Mercedes Benz already belonged to another
person. The Court saw respondent in bad faith when, aside from issuing a bum check, he sold to a third person the
Mercedes Benz that he had previously sold to complainant. In so doing, respondent committed deceitful conduct and
gross misconduct; showed lack of honesty and good moral character; and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the CPR. Respondent lawyer was suspended for three years.

The Court's reminder to the Bar IN NAKPIL V. VALDES bears reiteration:

 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[48] (Emphasis supplied.)

As regards the reimbursement of the down payment plus interests and damages claimed by Partsch and
disputed by Atty. Vitorillo, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that
raising it in the present case is misplaced:

"This Court will not act as a collection agency from faltering debtors, when the amount of the indebtedness
is indefinite and disputed.

IN VILLAMOR V. ATTY. JUMAO-AS

On December 9, 2020, the Court suspended Atty. Jumao-as from the practice of law for two years for violating
CANON 15, RULE 15.03 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (CPR), which provides:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.

RULE 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

ATTY. JUMAO-AS WAS FOUND TO HAVE REPRESENTED CONFLICTING INTERESTS by

committing the following acts: he facilitated the incorporation of AEV Villamor Credit, Inc. (AEV), complainant
Adelita S. Villamor (Villamor)'s lending company; he persuaded Villamor to borrow money from one Debbie Yu
(Yu) to beef up AEV's capital; he left AEV to join 3 E's Debt Equity Grant Co. (3 E's), a lending company owned by
Yu; he incited a diaspora of AEV's collectors to join 3 E's; he told AEV's collectors to remit their collections to 3 E's
since Villamor owed Yu; and he even sent a demand letter to Villamor, for and in behalf of Yu, demanding that
Villamor pay the amount she owed Yu.

1.To Society
2.To the Legal Profession
3.To the Courts
4.To the Clients
C. Suspension, Disbarment, and Discipline of Lawyers
1. Nature and Characteristics of Disciplinary Actions against
Lawyers
2. Grounds
3. Proceedings (Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended)
D. Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended)
1. Qualifications of a Notary Public
2. Term of Office of a Notary Public
3. Powers and Limitations
4. Notarial Register
5. Jurisdiction of Notary Public and Place of Notarization
6. Competent Evidence of Identity
7. Sanctions

II. Judicial Ethics

A. Sources
1. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
2. Code of Judicial Conduct
B. Qualities
1. Independence
2. Integrity
3. Impartiality
 4. Propriety
5. Equality
6. Competence and Diligence
C. Disqualification of Judicial Officers
1. Compulsory
2. Voluntary
D. Discipline and Administrative Jurisdiction Over Members of the Judiciary
 1. Supreme Court
a) Impeachment
2. Lower Court Judges and Justices
a) Sanctions Imposed by the Supreme Court on Erring Members
of the Judiciary

III. Practical Exercises

A. Demand Letter
B. Deed of Sale of Real Property and Deed of Sale of Personal Property
C. Contract of Lease
D. Special Power of Attorney
E. Verification and Certificate of Non-forum Shopping
F. Judicial Affidavit
G. Notarial Certificates
1. Jurat
2. Acknowledgment
H. Motions
1. Motion for Summary Judgment
2. Motion to Dismiss
3. Motion to Declare in Default
I. Quitclaims in Labor Cases
J. Information in Criminal Cases