CIVIL LAW SYLLABUS 2023

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

I. Persons
A. When Law Takes Effect Doctrine
B. Ignorance of the Law
C. Retroactivity of Laws
D. Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws
E. Waiver of Rights
F. Presumption and Applicability of Custom
G. Legal Periods
H. Territoriality Principle
I. Conflict of Laws
1. Lex Nationalii
2. Lex Rei Sitae
3. Lex Loci Celebrationis
4. Doctrine of Renvoi
J. Human Relations in Relation to Persons
K. Capacity to Act
1. Restrictions on Capacity to Act
2. Birth and Death of Natural Persons
3. Presumption of Survivorship
L. Surnames
M. Rules Governing Persons Who are Absent

II. Marriage
A. General Principles
1. Essential Requisites
2. Formal Requisites
B. Mixed Marriages and Foreign Divorce
C. Void Marriages (See Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021)
TO RENDER A MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
JURISPRUDENCE DICTATES THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MUST BE CHARACTERIZED BY:
(1) GRAVITY, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(2) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(3) INCURABILITY, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved. Although EXPERT TESTIMONY IS IMPORTANT IN ESTABLISHING THE PRECISE
CAUSE OF A PARTY'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, personal examination of the alleged incapacitated
spouse is not always mandatory as long as the totality of evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. However, the petitioner bears a greater burden in showing gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. Nevertheless, each petition for nullity of marriage must be dealt with on a case-to-
case basis.
With the recent promulgation of TAN-ANDAL V. ANDAL (Tan-Andal), We recognized and addressed the
stringent application of the Molina guidelines which turned out to be antithetical to the way the concept of
psychological incapacity was created. In order to veer away from its misapplication, Tan-Andal presents a
nuanced interpretation of what constitutes psychological incapacity.
In Tan-Andal, the husband, Mario, was diagnosed with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance
abuse disorder with psychotic features. As narrated by Rosanna, the wife, Mario was already financially
irresponsible and would often drink in bars even before their marriage. There were also times when Mario would
be extremely irritable and moody which made Rosanna second-guess their marriage. After their marriage, Mario
remained unemployed. Even worse, his addiction to marijuana was so severe that he went in and out of
rehabilitation center. In one instance, Mario even smoked marijuana in the same room where their daughter was.
He also drove Rosanna's company to bankruptcy after using the company's money to fund his addiction.
Notably, Mario was not personally examined by the psychologist when the latter diagnosed him. Nevertheless, the
psychologist based the diagnosis on the interviews of the wife, daughter, and sister-in-law of Mario, as well as
Mario's personal handwritten history from the rehabilitation center. In determining that Mario is psychologically
incapacitated, We used the following parameters (Tan-Andal guidelines):

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 (1) The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration
of marriage;
(2) Caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that was formed prior to their
marriage; aTHCSE
(3) Caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and
(4) Proven by clear and convincing evidence.
TAN-ANDAL FURTHER ENUNCIATES THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS NOT A MENTAL
INCAPACITY NOR A PERSONALITY DISORDER THAT MUST BE PROVEN THROUGH AN EXPERT
WITNESS. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before their marriage may testify
on the behaviors they have observed from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. Likewise, juridical antecedence of
psychological incapacity may also be proven by ordinary witnesses who can describe the incapacitated spouse's
past experiences or environment growing up, which may have triggered one's particular behavior. In any case, the
gravity of psychological incapacity must be shown to have been caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.
THUS, "MILD CHARACTEROLOGICAL PECULIARITIES, MOOD CHANGES, OCCASIONAL
EMOTIONAL OUTBURSTS" ARE STILL NOT ACCEPTED GROUNDS THAT WOULD WARRANT A
FINDING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
Tan-Andal also modified the requirement on incurability — that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code must now be incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense. 44 Thus, it must be so enduring
and persistent with respect to a specific partner, that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage. 45 Ultimately, the totality of evidence must support a finding of
psychological incapacity.
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES, SEXUAL INFIDELITY OR PERVERSION, EMOTIONAL
IMMATURITY AND IRRESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIKE, DO NOT BY THEMSELVES PROVE THE
EXISTENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
IN SANTOS-MACABATA V. MACABATA
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE provides that a marriage may be declared void on the ground
of psychological incapacity, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Court declared in SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS
that the term "PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY" under Article 36 of the Family Code is
characterized by:
(a) gravity which entails that such "psychological incapacity" must be so grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
(b) juridical antecedence (i.e., the "psychological incapacity" must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage);
and
(c) incurability or, even if it were otherwise indeed curable, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA (MOLINA),
the Court further expounded on these characteristics, and provided guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code. However, the succeeding cases of NGO TE V. YU-TE (NGO TE)
AND KALAW V. FERNANDEZ (Kalaw), among others, criticized the rigidity of the Molina guidelines, which
led to the rejection of certain petitions for the nullification of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
Thus, in Kalaw, citing Ngo Te, although the Court did not abandon the Molina guidelines, the Court declared
that "every court should approach the issue of nullity 'not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts' in recognition of the verity that no case would be on 'all fours'
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every
'trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.'
In view of the foregoing observations, and considering the continued tendency of courts to rigidly
apply the Molina guidelines, the Court meticulously reviewed and revised the Molina guidelines in the case
of Tan-Andal v. Andal (Tan-Andal). The guidelines, as modified by current case law, are summarized below:
(1) THE FIRST MOLINA GUIDELINE states that "[t]he burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence[,] and continuation of
the marriage[,] and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family."
In addition to the foregoing guideline, THE COURT IN TAN-ANDAL EMPHASIZED THAT THERE
IS A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE, AND THAT SUCH PRESUMPTION CAN ONLY
BE REBUTTED BY A CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. Hence, the plaintiff-spouse in an action

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to nullify a valid marriage based on ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS THE BURDEN OF
PROVING HIS OR HER CASE WITH CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
(2) THE SECOND MOLINA GUIDELINE which provides that "the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision" 42 was modified in the Tan-Andal case. In the Tan-Andal
case, the Court categorically abandoned the requirement that psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and proven through expert opinion as the term "psychological incapacity" does not refer
to a mental incapacity or a personality disorder, to wit:
In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically ABANDONS THE
SECOND MOLINA GUIDELINE. “PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY” is neither a
mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert
opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's
personality, called 'PERSONALITY STRUCTURE,' WHICH MANIFESTS ITSELF
THROUGH CLEAR ACTS OF DYSFUNCTIONALITY THAT UNDERMINES THE
FAMILY. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to
understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations.
PROOF OF THESE ASPECTS OF PERSONALITY NEED NOT BE GIVEN
BY AN EXPERT. “ORDINARY WITNESSES” who have been present in the life of the
spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have
consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge
will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume
the essential marital obligations.
Reiterating this Court's pronouncement in Marcos v. Marcos, THE MEDICAL EXAMINATION
BY AN EXPERT OF THE SPOUSE CONCERNED IS NO LONGER REQUIRED as courts may rely on
the TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
(3) THE THIRD MOLINA GUIDELINE entails that "incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the
time of the celebration of the marriage,'" which is also clearly stated in Article 36 of the Family Code. Although
the "psychological incapacity" may not be perceivable at the time of the celebration of the marriage, SUCH
"PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY" MUST HAVE ATTACHED AT SUCH MOMENT, OR PRIOR
THERETO.
(4) THE FOURTH MOLINA GUIDELINE which requires that "[s]uch incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable" has already been ABANDONED.
THE CASE OF TAN-ANDAL CLARIFIES THAT "THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS INCURABLE, NOT IN THE
MEDICAL, BUT THE LEGAL SENSE," and that the requirement of “INCURABILITY” means that "the
incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation
where the couple's respective PERSONALITY STRUCTURES are so incompatible and antagonistic that
the only result of the union would be inevitable and irreparable breakdown of marriage."
(5) THE TAN-ANDAL CASE RETAINS THE FIFTH MOLINA GUIDELINE that requires that
"[s]uch ILLNESS MUST BE GRAVE enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage," but further provides that there must be a clear and convincing evidence showing that
such incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. The Court, in the Molina case, further
elaborates:
Thus, 'mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes. THE ILLNESS MUST BE SHOWN AS
DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY OR INABILITY, NOT A REFUSAL, NEGLECT OR
DIFFICULTY, MUCH LESS ILL WILL.

(6) THE SIXTH MOLINA GUIDELINE identifies the essential marital obligations to be the
obligations "embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision."
The Tan-Andal case affirms that the obligation of the spouses to their children becomes part of their
obligations to each other as spouses and, thus, failure to attend to their obligations to their children may
be a ground to nullify the marriage of the parties. However, it must be clearly shown that such failure
reflects on the capacity of at least one of the spouses.
(7) THE SEVENTH MOLINA GUIDELINE which provides that the interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, is persuasive is retained in the Tan-Andal case.
(8) THE EIGHTH AND FINAL MOLINA GUIDELINE PROVIDES THAT "[T]HE TRIAL
COURT MUST ORDER THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OR FISCAL AND THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL TO APPEAR AS COUNSEL FOR THE STATE. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along

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 with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
Applying the foregoing pronouncements, this Court finds that the petitioner failed to prove and
substantiate by clear and convincing evidence that respondent suffers from such "psychological
incapacity" that prevents him from complying with his marital obligations as contemplated under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Indeed, the respondent has clearly failed to fulfill his essential obligations to his wife and
children when he abandoned his family. Petitioner admits that respondent stopped providing sufficient
support to his family starting June 2002, informed his wife that he will not return to their home, and that
he is in a relationship with another woman, and he continues to hide from his wife and cease all contact
with his family. HOWEVER, THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT SUCH
FAILURE TO FULFILL HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS IS CAUSED BY A
GENUINELY SERIOUS AND INCURABLE PSYCHIC CAUSE WHICH EXISTS PRIOR TO OR AT
THE TIME OF CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES.
Mere disagreements between spouses, uncorroborated by any other evidence, are not necessarily
indicative of the presence of psychological incapacity.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that there are inconsistencies in the information provided in the
report, and the conclusion of the clinical psychologist therein. A thorough reading of the report would show that
the conclusion therein is grounded on general observations nitpicked from certain aspects of respondent's life
and based primarily on petitioner's assessment of his upbringing, none of which are fully supported by the
information provided by respondent's younger brother who grew up with the respondent. Hence, there is doubt
as to whether the report is sufficient evidence to show that the acts of respondent are manifestations of a certain
form of psychological incapacity, and that the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent exists prior to,
or at the time of, celebration of the marriage of the parties.
For failure to show by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is incapable of fulfilling
his essential marital obligations due to a genuinely serious and incurable psychic cause which exists prior
to or at the time of celebration of the marriage of the parties, the Court is compelled to deny the petition.
THE COURT EMPHASIZES THAT A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE IS LIMITED TO CASES WHERE THERE IS A DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY OR
INABILITY TO ASSUME AND FULFILL THE BASIC MARITAL OBLIGATIONS, NOT A MERE
REFUSAL, NEGLECT OR DIFFICULTY, MUCH LESS, ILL WILL, ON THE PART OF THE ERRANT
SPOUSE.
D. Voidable Marriages
E. Effect of Defective Marriages
F. Foreign Marriages
G. Legal Separation
H. Property Relations Between Spouses
1. Donation Propter Nuptias
2. Void Donations by the Spouses
3.Absolute Community of Property Regime
4.Conjugal Partnership of Gains Regime
5.Separation of Property Regime
6.Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
7.Judicial Separation of Property
I. The Family
1. General Principles
J. The Family Home
1. General Principles
K. Paternity and Filiation
1. Concepts of Paternity, Filiation, and Legitimacy
2. Legitimate Children
a) Who are Legitimate Children
b) Proof of Filiation of Legitimate Children
c) Rights of Legitimate Children
d) Grounds to Impugn Legitimacy
3. Illegitimate Children
a) Who are Illegitimate Children
b) Proof of Filiation of Illegitimate Children
c) Rights of Illegitimate Children
d) Grounds to Impugn Filiation
4. Legitimated Children
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 a) Who May be Legitimated
b) How Legitimation Takes Place
c) Grounds to Impugn Legitimacy
5. Adopted Children
a) Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care
Act (RA 11642)
b) Who May Adopt
c) Who May be Adopted
d) Effects of a Decree of Adoption (See Article Nos. 189-190 of the
Family Code)
L. Support
1. What Comprises Support
2. Who are Obliged to Give Support
3. Source of Support
4. Order of Support
M. Parental Authority
1. Concept of Parental Authority
2. Substitute Parental Authority
3. Special Parental Authority
4. Effects of Parental Authority

PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS

I. Classification of Property
A. Immovables
B. Movables

II. Bundle of Rights

A. Ownership
B. Rights of Accession
1. General Principles
2. Accession Industrial
3. Accession Natural
C. Actions to Recover Ownership and Possession of Property
1. Accion Reivindicatoria
2. Accion Publiciana
3. Accion Interdictal
4. Quieting of Title

HEIRS OF MANUEL EÑANO, represented by VIRGILIO A. BOTE, petitioners, vs. SAN PEDRO
CINEPLEX PROPERTIES, INC., respondent
The crux of the controversy points Us to Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, 88
the provisions that govern quieting of title which read:
ARTICLE 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
ARTICLE 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the
real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property.
In an action for quieting of title, the objective is for the competent court to remove the cloud by determining the
rights of the parties so that the ones entitled to the subject property may exercise said rights without fear,
disturbance, or interference from those who have no right over the same. 89 From the foregoing provisions, two
requisites must be established in order that a complaint for quieting of title may prosper. First, the plaintiff must
have a legal or equitable title or interest in the property subject of the complaint. Second, the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding allegedly casting doubt over one's title must be proven to be in truth invalid, void, or
inoperative despite the prima facie appearance of validity.
petitioners failed to prove that they hold a legal or equitable title over the subject property. On one hand, LEGAL
TITLE means registered ownership, where the subject property is registered under the name of the complainant in

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an action to quiet title, which may be evidenced by presenting the certificate of title in the latter's name. On the other
hand, EQUITABLE TITLE denotes beneficial ownership, which is "ownership recognized by law and capable of
being enforced in the courts at the suit of the beneficial owner." Petitioners are neither holders of a legal title nor
equitable title over the subject property.

Similarly, the second requisite was not ascertained since the certificates of title in the name of respondent and the
origin of the same were precisely demonstrated through the chain of transactions which led to respondent's
ownership of the subject property. Therefore, the alleged cloud created by respondent's certificates of title did not
exist. In fact, the genealogy of respondent's certificates of title were evidenced by the presentation of all certificates
of title from the original title in the name of Gliceria, to Spouses Sibulo, then Doña Crisanta Investment, to La Paz
Housing and finally to respondent. These documentary evidence serve as competent proof that respondent's
certificates of title are genuinely valid not just on their face but also on all legal aspects.

With regard to the allegation of fraud, petitioners failed to adduce adequate evidence aside from their mere
allegation of respondent's spurious certificates of title.

It is settled that a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a chain of ownership.
Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership; it is, at best, an indicium of possession in the concept of ownership.
Neither tax receipts nor a declaration of ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of a right to
possess realty when not supported by other effective proof.

Considering that the evidence of petitioners did not satisfy the requisites for quieting of title, their complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.

D. Co-Ownership
1. Distinctions Between Right to Property Owned in Common and Full
Ownership Over the Ideal Share
IN REYES V. SPS GARCIA
Nonetheless, a co-owner may alienate an inchoate portion of the subject property which belongs to him
or her. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides for the rights of the co-owners over a co-owned property, thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, EXCEPT WHEN PERSONAL RIGHTS
ARE INVOLVED. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE PORTION WHICH MAY BE ALLOTTED
TO HIM IN THE DIVISION upon the termination of the co-ownership.
To demand a partition or division of the common property is in accord with ARTICLE 494 of the Civil
Code, that is, NO CO-OWNER SHALL BE OBLIGED TO REMAIN IN THE CO-OWNERSHIP AND THAT
EACH CO-OWNER MAY DEMAND AT ANY TIME PARTITION OF THE THING OWNED IN COMMON
INSOFAR AS HIS OR HER SHARE IS CONCERNED. Petitioner's contention that the subject property, i.e.,
231.5 sqm, would be rendered unserviceable if it would be divided among the co-owners, is without legal merit. It
bears stressing that petitioner's issue is addressed by the provisions of Article 498 in relation with Article 495.
Thus, PETITIONER CANNOT ARGUE THAT A DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SALE BETWEEN
ISIDORO AND THE SPOUSES GARCIA IS WARRANTED OR ELSE, A PARTITION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WOULD RENDER IT UNSERVICEABLE.
Nevertheless, the spouses Garcia, as co-owner of the 231.5 sqm subject property by virtue of the deed of
sale dated August 16, 1989 executed by Isidoro in their favor, cannot claim a specific portion of the subject
property prior to its partition. With the subsistence of co-ownership, the SPOUSES GARCIA ONLY OWNS
ISIDORO'S UNDIVIDED ALIQUOT SHARE of the subject property. The spouses Garcia and all the co-owners
cannot adjudicate to himself or herself title to any definite portion of the subject property until its actual partition
by agreement or judicial decree.
IN CARVAJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS, WHICH WE REITERATED IN HEIRS OF JARQUE V.
JARQUE, We ruled that:
The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in
the lower court is premature, for what must be settled first is the action for partition.
Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite
portion of the inheritance. WITHOUT PARTITION, EITHER BY AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR BY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING, A CO-HEIR
CANNOT DISPOSE OF A SPECIFIC PORTION OF THE ESTATE. For where
there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned
in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of
the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
III. While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the

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 alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of
the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. HE HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL OR ALIENATE A
CONCRETE, SPECIFIC, OR DETERMINATE PART OF THE THING IN COMMON
TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE OTHER CO-OWNERS BECAUSE HIS RIGHT OVER
THE THING IS REPRESENTED BY AN ABSTRACT OR IDEAL PORTION
WITHOUT ANY PHYSICAL ADJUDICATION. An individual co-owner cannot
adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned
in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that
time all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in
the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. What a co-owner may
dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion
that may be allotted to him upon partition. Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his
successional rights.
IN TORRES, JR. V. LAPINID, We upheld the validity of the sale of a co-owned property even when the sale
pertains to an abstract or definite portion of the property, to wit:
IN A CATENA OF DECISIONS, THE SUPREME COURT HAD REPEATEDLY HELD
THAT NO INDIVIDUAL CAN CLAIM TITLE TO A DEFINITE OR CONCRETE PORTION
BEFORE PARTITION OF CO-OWNED PROPERTY. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell
or alienate his ideal share after partition. HOWEVER, IN CASE HE DISPOSES HIS SHARE BEFORE
PARTITION, SUCH DISPOSITION DOES NOT MAKE THE SALE OR ALIENATION NULL AND
VOID. WHAT WILL BE AFFECTED ON THE SALE IS ONLY HIS PROPORTIONATE SHARE,
SUBJECT TO THE RESULTS OF THE PARTITION. THE CO-OWNERS WHO DID NOT GIVE
THEIR CONSENT TO THE SALE STAND TO BE UNAFFECTED BY THE ALIENATION.
As explained in SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V. COURT OF APPEALS:
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a
particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However,
this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically
segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor's undivided
interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee
obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into
the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property
held in common.
Also worth noting is the pronouncement in LOPEZ V. VDA. DE CUAYCONG:
THE FACT THAT THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION PURPORTED TO SELL A
CONCRETE PORTION OF THE HACIENDA DOES NOT RENDER THE SALE VOID, FOR
IT IS A WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT THE BINDING FORCE OF A
CONTRACT MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS FAR AS IT IS LEGALLY POSSIBLE TO DO SO.
"Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I
do it, it shall have as much force as it can have).
Consequently, whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete portion of the co-
owned property, the sale remains validly executed.
Apropos, the fact that the sale executed by Isidoro in favor of the spouses Garcia was made prior to the
partition of the subject property will not render the deed of sale dated August 16, 1989 null and void. Nonetheless,
despite the validity of the sale, the spouses Garcia only acquired ISIDORO'S INCHOATE INTEREST in the
subject property and not a definite portion thereof.
1. Contributions for Expenses
2. Redemption
3. Partition
B. Possession
1. Possession in the Concept of a Holder
2. Possession in the Concept of an Owner
3. Relevance of Good Faith and Bad Faith

One is considered a PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH if he or she buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays its full and fair price before he or she has
notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the same property. 97 Conversely, one is considered a
BUYER IN BAD FAITH when he or she purchases a property despite knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his
or her seller or when he or she has knowledge of facts which should have cautioned him or her to conduct further
inquiry or investigation.

Our pronouncement in Sps. Pudadera v. Magallanes 101 is instructive, to wit:

Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely

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 on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige
him [or her] to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
"However, this rule shall not apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man [or woman] to make such inquiry
or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in [the] vendor or of
sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent [person] to inquire into the status of the title of
the property in litigation." "His [or her] mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his
[or her] willful closing of his [or her] eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in
[the] vendor's title will not make him [or her] an innocent purchaser for value if it later
develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he [or she] had such notice of
the defect had he [or she] acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be
required of a prudent man [or woman] in a like situation." (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
Furthermore, purchasers must continuously possess their status as buyers in good faith from the time
they acquired the property until they register the property under their name. Thus, they must both be buyers and
registrants in good faith. We reiterate Our ruling in Tamayao v. Lacambra:
x x x [T]he prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a
better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith.
Jurisprudence teaches us that "(t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in
right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's lights except where the
second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such
knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her [or him] from availing of her [or his] rights under the law, among
them, to register first her [or his] purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the
second buyer of the first sale defeats his [or her] rights even if he [or she] is first to register the second sale, since
such knowledge taints his [or her] prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the
Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain
priority over the first, he [or she] must show that he [or she] acted in good faith throughout (i.e., in ignorance of the
first sale and of the first buyers rights) — from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him [or her] by
registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession"

4. Rules for Movables

C. Usufruct
1. Rights and Obligations of Usufructuary
2. Classes of Usufruct
3. Extinguishment of the Usufruct
D. Easements
1. Characteristics
2. Kinds of Easements
3. Modes of Acquiring Easements
4. Effects of Easement
5. Extinguishment of Easements

IV. Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership

A. Occupation
B. Tradition
C. Donation
In Republic v. Silim, 41 the Court distinguished four types of donation: (a) pure or simple; (b)
remuneratory or compensatory; (c) conditional or modal; and (d) onerous, viz.:
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple
donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest form.
On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of
rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A
conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future
services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee,
the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is
that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is
the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or
more than the thing donated. 42
In the case at bar, the donation involved is an onerous one since the burden imposed upon the donee is to
build a mental hospital on the donated property. Thus, the provisions of the Civil Code on the rules on
contracts shall govern 43 to wit:
ARTICLE 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts,
and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.

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 Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that all actions upon a written contract shall be brought
within ten (10) years from accrual of the right of action. Petitioner's complaint for revocation of the
donation therefore has not yet prescribed since the cause of action accrued only upon the alleged
failure of the Republic to comply with any or all of the conditions of the donation.
Although the deed of conditional donation contained a stipulation on the automatic revocation of donation
in case of failure of the donee to comply with any or all of the conditions, the estate's complaint for
revocation or action for rescission in behalf of the donor, Rodriguez, is a valid exercise of the latter's right
to determine the propriety of the revocation.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes
the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain
conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in
the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of
the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of
ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be
perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
ESTATE OF SUSANO J. RODRIGUEZ, represented by its ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
VIRGILIO R. VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of conditional donation did not expressly state a period of
restriction on the Republic's right to dispose of the donated property. It simply stated that the Republic
could not lease, let, convey, dispose or encumber the donated property without the prior and express
knowledge of the donor as it was the latter's intention to devote the use of the donated property
exclusively for the mental hospital. 51
Applying by analogy the Roman Catholic Archbishop case, the donor could not unduly restrict the right of
the donee to dispose the donated property perpetually or for an unreasonable period of time. The
prohibition in the deed of donation that the Republic cannot lease, let, convey, dispose or encumber the
donated property without specifying the duration of the restriction should be declared as an illegal or
impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code as it is contrary to public
policy. Although the parties did not agree on the period of validity of the restriction as in Roman Catholic
Archbishop, the same may be viewed as perpetual or permanent which constitutes undue restriction for
unreasonable period of time.

1. Features
2. Classifications
3. Distinctions Between Mortis Causa and Inter Vivos Donations
4. Form
5. Limitations
6. Reduction and Revocation
D. Prescription
1. Distinctions Between Acquisitive and Extinctive Prescription
2. Distinctions Between Extinctive Prescription and Laches
The ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF LACHES are namely:
(1) conduct of the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of
(2) delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation complained of;
(3) delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an
opportunity to sue;
(4) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and
(5) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.

V. Land Titles and Deeds

A. Torrens System
1. General Principles
B. Regalian Doctrine
C. Nationality Restrictions on Land Ownership
D. Original Registration (PD 1529)
1. Who May Apply
2. Decree of Registration
IN REPUBLIC V. TAPAY (EXEMPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY)
The Court agrees with petitioner that a regional trial court has no power to nullify or interfere with

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the decision of a co-equal court pursuant to the law and the doctrine of judicial stability. Applying the doctrine
to this case, petitioner is correct in postulating that the August 14, 1996 Order of RTC Lipa City is void and thus, the
cadastral court's decision in Cadastral Case No. 33 remains valid and subsisting as of this time.
However, the foregoing presupposes that Cadastral Case No. 33 really existed and that there actually
is a decision in that case. Unfortunately for petitioner, aside from the single entry "Cadastral Case No. 33,
LRC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 1305," no other record, including a copy of the decision, exists to
support the theory. Key information, such as the identity of the parties in the case and of the court that rendered the
decision, as well as the outcome thereof, has remained unknown despite the lapse of more than 40 years since the
LRC submitted its report. No one, aside from the Republic, has even come forward to claim any interest arising
from the supposed case. The Court therefore agrees with the CA that the doctrine of judicial stability finds no
application in this case. Practical considerations now demand that the proceedings in the RTC be no longer disturbed
and the August 14, 1996 Order no longer set aside.
This ruling is supported by jurisprudence. IN REPUBLIC V. HEIRS OF STA. ANA, the Republic opposed
the application for registration filed by the heirs of Sta. Ana on the ground that the property was previously the
subject of another registration and that a prior decree of registration had already been issued as reported by the LRA.
HOWEVER, SIMILAR TO THIS CASE, THERE WERE NO AVAILABLE RECORDS OF THE
SUPPOSED PRIOR CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS AND NO OTHER PARTY HAS COME FORWARD
TO CHALLENGE THE HEIRS' OWNERSHIP. Consequently, the Court allowed the registration of the property
since "it would be the height of injustice for the heirs to be held hostage or punished by reason of the plain scarcity
of the records," viz.:
We agree that indeed, there are no available records bearing the so called Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral
Record No. 984 or the decision or decree of registration or title issued therein. The only single entry in the records is
found on page 80 of the LRA Record Book of Cadastral Lots: "a portion of said lot is already covered by a
certificate of title pursuant to the decision rendered in Cad. Case No. 10." But no matter how we look at it, we
cannot deduce therefrom the actual text of the decision, the exact portion of Lot 459 affected, or the parties in whose
favor the supposed title was issued, including the details of this supposed title. For sure, it would be the height of
injustice for respondents to be held hostage or punished by reason of the plain scarcity of the records on file
with the government agencies concerned. It is certainly illegal, immoral, and against public policy and order
for respondents who have been vested with a legal right to be precluded from exercising it, sans any real
remedy under the law.
Although we recognize that a final and executory decision in a land registration case does not ever become
extinct, here, again, the records are simply too scarce for any court of law or the LRA itself to ascertain what
exactly should be executed in terms of the text of the decision,
We therefore fully concur with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the only right and
logical thing to do under the circumstances is to allow the execution of the final and executory Decision dated
October 26, 1967 for registration of the entire Lot 459 filed by the same Julian Sta. Ana and Mercedes Sta.
Ana who are respondents' predecessors-in-interest thereto. Remarkably, no private party has ever come
forward to oppose the claim of ownership invariably asserted by respondents' predecessors-in-interest over
the entire Lot 459 or a portion thereof. In any event, whatever decision, if any, may have been issued over a
portion of Lot 459 in Cadastral Case No. 10, Cadastral Record No. 984, there is no existing title found in the records
pertaining to that portion. Consequently, there can be no double titling to speak of resulting from the order of
execution in LRC Case No. N-5999 (in relation to the Decision dated October 26, 1967), as affirmed in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139385. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Notably, in REPUBLIC V. HEIRS OF STA. ANA, the LRA reported that a prior decree of registration had
already been issued, yet the Court still decided to allow the subsequent registration because there was no way to
verify the truthfulness of the alleged prior case. Considering that it is the decree of registration that binds the land
and quiets the title thereto, and not the decision, the registration should be allowed with much more reason here
where no decree of registration covering the subject land had yet been issued and only the existence of the supposed
decision (which has not yet even attained finality) bars respondents' application.
It is also worth noting that almost 40 years had passed since the trial court determined that respondents are
entitled to a registration decree. One of the respondents even passed away while waiting for it. In Republic v. Heirs
of Sta. Ana, one of the key considerations for allowing the subsequent registration was the fact that a long time had
passed since the trial court ordered the issuance of a registration decree. The Court intimated that to reverse such
decision would run counter to the purpose of land registration, which is to finally settle title to real property. Here, it
is in keeping with the purpose of land registration to finally allow respondents to be granted a registration decree.
As to the rest of petitioner's arguments, We do not agree that res judicata bars respondents' subsequent
application, and that the doctrine of immutability of judgment prevents the nullification of the cadastral court's
decision. First, petitioner failed to establish the elements of res judicata, there being no information about Cadastral
Case No. 33 aside from the single entry in the Book of Cadastral Lots. Second, the August 14, 1996 Order of the
RTC merely effectuated the May 28, 1982 Decision of the RTC; it did not amend the same. Hence, petitioner's
arguments must fail.
In fine, the Court believes that the higher interest of justice will be better served by granting
respondents' prayer for a registration decree. After all, even after the lapse of so many years, no other person
has come forward to dispute their claim.
3. Review of Decree of Registration; Innocent Purchaser for Value (IPV);
Rights of IPV
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 E. An Act Improving the Confirmation Process for Imperfect Land Titles (RA
11573), amending CA 141 and PD 1529 [See Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R.
No. 213207, February 15, 2022]
F. Certificate of Title
G. Subsequent Registration
1. Voluntary Dealings
2. Involuntary Dealings
a) Adverse Claims
b) Notice of Lis Pendens
H. Non-Registrable Properties
I. Dealings With Unregistered Lands
J. Assurance Fund
1. Nature of Assurance Fund
2. Conditions for Compensation from Assurance Fund
3. Prescriptive Period
K. Reconstitution of Title
IN GAOIRAN V. CA
In Spouses Ibias v. Macabeo, citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. the Court described
RECONSTITUTION, thus:
The RECONSTITUTION of a title is simply the RE-ISSUANCE OF A LOST
DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM AND
CONDITION. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the
lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself
does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. THE
PURPOSE OF THE RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE IS TO HAVE, AFTER OBSERVING
THE PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, THE TITLE REPRODUCED IN EXACTLY
THE SAME WAY IT HAS BEEN WHEN THE LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OCCURRED.
Section 109 of PD 1529 provides for the PROCEDURE IN CASE OF LOSS OF AN OWNER'S
DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE:
Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. — In case of loss
or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the
owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the
registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be
filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may,
after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall
contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but
shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall
thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
From the foregoing, it appears that for an order of reconstitution to be issued, it must be clearly
shown that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed. If a certificate of title has not been lost, but is
in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered
the decision had no jurisdiction.
Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in
clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings. 35
As early as the case of STRAIT TIMES, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS, CITING SERRA SERRA
V. COURT OF APPEALS, the Court has held:
[T]hat if a certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of
another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the
decision had no jurisdiction. This was reiterated in Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals and
New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals. In the present case, it is undisputed that the
allegedly lost owner's duplicate certificate of title was all the while in the possession of Atty.
Iriarte, who even submitted it as evidence. Indeed, private respondent has not controverted the
genuineness and authenticity of the said certificate of title. These unmistakably show that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new duplicate, and the certificate
issued is itself void.
Similarly, in Spouses Paulino v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the rule that WHEN THE
OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WAS NOT ACTUALLY LOST OR DESTROYED, BUT
IS IN FACT IN THE POSSESSION OF ANOTHER PERSON, THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE IS VOID

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 BECAUSE THE COURT THAT RENDERED THE ORDER OF RECONSTITUTION HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
The same ruling holds true in the case of BILLOTE V. SOLIS, where the Court pronounced that
"since the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but was in the possession of William, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title.
Hence, the CA was correct in declaring the decision of the RTC as well as the second owner's duplicate
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto a nullity. It is, therefore, the fact of the loss or existence of the owner's
duplicate certificate, and not whether the process prescribed by applicable law was successfully complied with,
that determines the presence or lack of jurisdiction of the trial court."
Otherwise stated, RECONSTITUTION PRESUPPOSES THE EXISTENCE OF AN ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WHICH WAS LOST OR DESTROYED. If there was no loss or destruction as
in the case at bar, there is actually nothing to reconstitute. Here, petitioner clearly alleged in her petition before
the CA that, contrary to the claim of Mary in the reconstitution proceeding, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
T-34540 was not really lost, as the same was surrendered to her by Timoteo and was in her possession all along.
The alleged lost TCT was in fact offered in evidence by petitioner before the CA and private respondents did
not contest the genuineness and authenticity of the same. Thus, with evidence that the first owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. T-34540 was not lost but was actually in the possession of another, the RTC decision
was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
That there was no valid contract of sale executed between Perlita and petitioner is of no moment. The
indelible fact remains that the allegedly lost genuine certificate of title was all the while in the custody of
petitioner. Ergo, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the reconstitution
proceeding.
IN REPUBLIC V. HEIRS OF BOOC
THE RTC FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION
DUE TO PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES.
RA 26, otherwise known as "Special Procedure for Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Torrens
Certificate of Title," on judicial reconstitution of a certificate of title, governs the restoration of a lost or destroyed
certificate of title in its original form and condition. The PURPOSE OF THE RECONSTITUTION IS TO
ENABLE, AFTER OBSERVING THE PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
THE LOST OR DESTROYED TORRENS CERTIFICATE IN THE SAME FORM AND IN EXACTLY THE
SAME WAY IT WAS AT THE TIME OF THE LOSS OR DESTRUCTION.
THE TRIAL COURT CAN ONLY ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER A PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION IF THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES LAID DOWN IN RA
26 HAVE BEEN STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH. IN TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. COURT OF
APPEALS, the Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the requirements and procedures in RA 26 in this
wise:
Republic Act No. 26 entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR
THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR
DESTROYED" approved on September 25, 1946 CONFERS JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY
TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO HEAR AND DECIDE PETITIONS FOR
JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION. The Act specifically provides the SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS
AND MODE OF PROCEDURE that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and
acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These
requirements and procedure are mandatory. THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION MUST
ALLEGE CERTAIN SPECIFIC JURISDICTIONAL FACTS; THE NOTICE OF HEARING
MUST BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE AND POSTED IN PARTICULAR
PLACES AND THE SAME SENT OR NOTIFIED TO SPECIFIED PERSONS.
There are two procedures and sets of requirements under RA 26 which must be observed depending on
the source of the petition for reconstitution. Section 10, in relation to Section 9, provides the procedure and
requirements for sources falling under Sections 2 (a), 2 (b), 3 (a), 3 (b), and 4 (a). On the other hand, Sections 12
and 13 lay down the procedure and requirements for sources falling under Sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3
(d), 3 (e), and 3 (f).
Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26, in particular, state:
SECTION 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f),
3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the
registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property.
The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following:
(A) THAT THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE HAD BEEN LOST OR
DESTROYED;
(B) THAT NO CO-OWNER'S MORTGAGEE'S OR LESSEE'S DUPLICATE HAD BEEN ISSUED,
OR, IF ANY HAD BEEN ISSUED, THE SAME HAD BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED;
(C) THE LOCATION, AREA AND BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY;
(D) THE NATURE AND DESCRIPTION OF THE BUILDINGS OR IMPROVEMENTS, IF ANY,
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 WHICH DO NOT BELONG TO THE OWNER OF THE LAND, AND THE NAMES AND
ADDRESSES OF THE OWNERS OF SUCH BUILDINGS OR IMPROVEMENTS;
(E) THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE OCCUPANTS OR PERSONS IN POSSESSION
OF THE PROPERTY, OF THE OWNERS OF THE ADJOINING PROPERTIES AND ALL
PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ANY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY;
(F) A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE ENCUMBRANCES, IF ANY, AFFECTING THE
PROPERTY; AND
(G) A STATEMENT THAT NO DEEDS OR OTHER INSTRUMENTS AFFECTING THE
PROPERTY HAVE BEEN PRESENTED FOR REGISTRATION, OR, IF THERE BE ANY, THE
REGISTRATION THEREOF HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, AS YET.
All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition
for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the
petition shall be further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description
taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
SECTION 13. The COURT SHALL CAUSE A NOTICE OF THE PETITION, filed under the
preceding section, TO BE PUBLISHED, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PETITIONER, TWICE IN
SUCCESSIVE ISSUES OF THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE, AND TO BE POSTED ON THE MAIN
ENTRANCE OF THE PROVINCIAL BUILDING AND OF THE MUNICIPAL BUILDING OF
THE MUNICIPALITY OR CITY IN WHICH THE LAND IS SITUATED, AT LEAST THIRTY
DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF HEARING. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to
be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein
whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among
other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of
the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the
property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their
claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication,
posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.
THE REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 12, ON THE CONTENTS OF A PETITION, AND
SECTION 13, ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF PETITION, ARE MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL IN NATURE. Hence, NON-OBSERVANCE THEREOF FATALLY AFFECTS THE
WHOLE PROCEEDINGS in all its aspects and renders the same void.
In the case at bench, the petition for reconstitution did not comply with the requirements laid
down in Section 12 of RA 26. Although respondents stated in their petition that MEPZA possesses Lot No.
4749 while the MIAA occupies Lot Nos. 4765 and 4777, they failed to indicate their present addresses.
Despite being aware that the subject lots are in the material possession of the MIAA and MEPZA, respondents did
not stipulate if a building or improvements which do not belong to the Boocs are erected in the subject lots, and
the nature thereof. They also did not state the encumbrances affecting the property, which are the deeds of
absolute sale executed in 1957 and 1958 in favor MCIAA. VERILY, THE PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF SEVERE
INFIRMITIES.
Not only did respondents violate Section 12 of RA 26, they likewise did not strictly adhere to the
procedures on notice of hearing laid down in Section 13 of the said law.
A close scrutiny of the amended notice shows that it did not indicate the number of the lost of destroyed
OCTs. It simply stated "Original Certificate of Title of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777." Consequently, the failure
to identify the exact title number "defeats the purpose of the twin notice and publication requirements
since persons who have interest in the property or who may otherwise be affected by the reconstitution of
the supposed title thereto would not be able to readily identify the said property or could even be misled by
the vague or uncertain title reference."
The amended notice also failed to indicate the following in violation of the in rem character of the
reconstitution proceedings and the mandatory nature of the requirements under RA 26: (a) the names of MEPZA
and MIAA who are the occupants and possessors of the subject lots; (b) the area and the boundaries of the subject
lots; and (c) the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or
objections to the petition.
Undoubtedly, the RTC DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
PETITION DUE TO THESE FATAL DEFECTS IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 12 AND 13 OF
RA 26. As a result thereof, its proceedings, as well as those of the CA, are null and void.
Remarkably, although petitioner overlooked the jurisdictional infirmities in the petition for reconstitution
and failed to incorporate them as additional issues in its petition, the Court still has sufficient authority to pass
upon and resolve the same since they affect jurisdiction. As held in CASTILLO V. REPUBLIC:
We cannot simply dismiss these defects as "technical." Liberal construction of the Rules of
Court does not apply to land registration cases. Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory character

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 of these jurisdictional requirements, the RULES OF COURT DO NOT APPLY TO LAND
REGISTRATION CASES. In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a
statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the mode of proceeding
is mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. When the trial
court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its
aspects. All the proceedings before the trial court, including its order granting the petition for
reconstitution, are void for lack of jurisdiction.
Besides, even if respondents complied with the procedural rules under RA 26, still, the petition for
reconstitution should have been denied.
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT OCTS OF THE SUBJECT LOTS IN THE
NAME OF THE BOOCS EXIST.
Section 2 of RA 26 enumerates in the following order the sources from which reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original certificates of title may be based:
SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which
is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original has been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis
for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. (Emphasis Ours.)
IN REPUBLIC V. TUASTUMBAN, the Court laid down the requirements for an order for reconstitution
to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by
petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the
petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in
force at the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Respondents anchored their petition for reconstitution on Sections 2 (d) and 2 (f) of RA 26. To recall,
respondents attached to their petition the following documentary evidence: (a) decisions of the CFI-Cebu
awarding the subject lots to the Boocs; (b) decrees issued by the cadastral court pursuant to which an original
certificate of title of the subject lots was issued in favor of the Boocs; (c) Register of Deeds' certification; (d)
technical description of the subject lots; and (e) certifications from the Branch Clerk of Court, and Branch Clerks
of Court of Branch Nos. 27, 53 and 54 of RTC of Lapu-Lapu City stating that no application for reconstitution of
original certificate of title for the subject lots was filed before the said trial courts; and (f) sketch plans of the
subject lots.
Respondents also presented the testimony of Ismael on the authenticity of the documentary evidence, and
that the duplicate copy of the certificate of title was lost and/or destroyed.
Unfortunately, however, these pieces of evidence are not adequate proof that certificates of title were in
fact issued to the Boocs, and the same were in force at the time they were lost or destroyed. At best, the CFI-Cebu
decisions and Decree Nos. 531367, 531382 and 531394 only proved that Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777 were
awarded to the Boocs and that the lots were to be registered in their names pursuant to Land Registration Act.
Neither can the Register of Deeds' certification be considered as a competent evidence as it simply states that "the
Original Certificate of Title of Lot No./s. 4749, 4765 and 4777 of Opon Cadastre as per records on file has/have
been lost or destroyed during the last Global War," without even stating the title numbers of the certificates of
title, and the names for which they were issued.
Interestingly, the LRA Report merely corroborated the award of the subject lots to the Boocs pursuant to
the decrees. It did not even state if the certificates of title covering the subject lots were in fact issued to them.
Verily, respondents' failure to present any competent evidence, private or official, indicating the number of the
purported OCTs of the subject lots is a fatal defect which warrants the dismissal of their petition for
reconstitution.
Respondents' non-submission of an affidavit of loss further casts doubt if the certificates of title of the
subject lots in the name of the Boocs exist.
Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 mandates that the owner must file with the proper Registry
of Deeds a notice of loss executed under oath. Here, as early as 1976, respondents knew that the duplicate
certificates of title were already lost. Yet, they did not execute an affidavit of loss or had submitted the same as
evidence if there is one giving rise to serious doubts if the purported certificates of title indeed existed.
The Court cannot give credence and weight to the testimony of Ismael which pertained only to the
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 authenticity and existence of the documentary evidence presented, and that the duplicate of the certificates of title
were lost in 1976. He neither testified as to who among the Boocs possessed the certificates of title nor attested
that he had seen the duplicate thereof. Worse, Ismael's testimony is nothing but a mere sweeping general
statement that the duplicate certificates of title were lost and that they tried to look for the same. He did not
recount in detail who participated in the search and how it was conducted.
Respondents did not also submit any tax declarations relative to the subject lots. While a tax declaration
does not prove ownership, payment of realty tax is an exercise of ownership over the said lots and is the payor's
unbroken chain of claim of ownership over it.
Moreover, respondents are guilty of laches. Lathes is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it. Here, respondents only filed the petition for reconstitution 12 years after they first discovered that the
titles were allegedly lost or destroyed.
All told, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. Respondents failed to comply with the legal
requirements under RA 26 for the petition for reconstitution to be given due course. Furthermore, respondents did
not adduce competent evidence that the OCTs of the subject lots existed and were indeed issued in the name of the
Boocs. To stress, the purpose of the reconstitution of a certificate of title under RA 26 is to have the same
reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form it was when the loss or destruction occurred. Thus, before
any reconstitution may be made, there should be sufficient and competent proof that the title sought to be
reconstituted had actually existed.
On a final note, We have emphasized time and again that the trial courts should be circumspect in
granting a petition for reconstitution. It is the duty of said courts to first examine carefully the petition and its
supporting documents, and ensure that the legal provisions on jurisdictional requirements under RA 26 are strictly
complied. IN REPUBLIC V. SANCHEZ, the Court emphasized that the strict observance of the rules laid down
in the law is necessary to prevent parties from resorting and exploiting reconstitution proceedings to obtain
Torrens title over a parcel of land, to wit:
Reconstitution proceedings under RA 26 has for their purpose the restoration in the original
form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land.
Thus, reconstitution must be granted only upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored was
indeed issued to the petitioner. Strict observance of this rule is vital to prevent parties from exploiting
reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificates of titles over parcels of
land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. The social and economic costs of such
modus operandi cannot be underestimated.
IN REPUBLIC V. SPS. MANALO
IN REPUBLIC V. MANCAO, the Court explained that the -
The JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION OF A TORRENS TITLE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26 means the
restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate attesting the title of a
person to registered land. The PURPOSE OF THE RECONSTITUTION is to enable, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form
and in exactly the same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction. For the judicial reconstitution of an
existing and valid original certificate of Torrens title, SECTION 2 OF RA 26 ENUMERATES THE ACCEPTABLE
BASES, while SECTIONS 12 AND 13 PROVIDE FOR THE PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION:
SECTION 2. ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE SHALL BE RECONSTITUTED FROM SUCH OF THE
SOURCES hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian
thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the
lost or destroyed certificate of title.

SECTION 12. PETITIONS FOR RECONSTITUTION from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f),
3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of this Act, SHALL BE FILED WITH THE PROPER COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, BY THE REGISTERED OWNER, HIS ASSIGNS, OR ANY PERSON HAVING AN
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.
The PETITION SHALL STATE OR CONTAIN, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE FOLLOWING:
(a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed;
(b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same
had been lost or destroyed;
(c) the location, area and boundaries of the property;
(d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of
the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties
and all persons who may have any interest in the property;
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(f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and
(g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet.

All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for
reconstitution shall be ATTACHED THERETO AND FILED WITH THE SAME: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the PETITION
SHALL BE FURTHER BE ACCOMPANIED WITH A PLAN AND TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE
PROPERTY DULY APPROVED BY THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE,
OR WITH A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE DESCRIPTION TAKEN FROM A PRIOR CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE COVERING THE SAME PROPERTY.

SECTION 13. The COURT SHALL CAUSE A NOTICE OF THE PETITION, FILED UNDER THE
PRECEDING SECTION, TO BE PUBLISHED, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PETITIONER, TWICE IN
SUCCESSIVE ISSUES OF THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE, AND TO BE POSTED ON THE MAIN
ENTRANCE OF THE PROVINCIAL BUILDING AND OF THE MUNICIPAL BUILDING OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OR CITY IN WHICH THE LAND IS SITUATED, AT LEAST THIRTY DAYS PRIOR
TO THE DATE OF HEARING. The COURT SHALL LIKEWISE CAUSE A COPY OF THE NOTICE TO
BE SENT, BY REGISTERED MAIL OR OTHERWISE, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PETITIONER, TO
EVERY PERSON NAMED THEREIN WHOSE ADDRESS IS KNOWN, AT LEAST THIRTY DAYS
PRIOR TO THE DATE OF HEARING. Said NOTICE SHALL STATE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE
NUMBER OF THE LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, IF KNOWN, THE NAME OF THE
REGISTERED OWNER, THE NAMES OF THE OCCUPANTS OR PERSONS IN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY, THE OWNERS OF THE ADJOINING PROPERTIES AND ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES,
THE LOCATION, AREA AND BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY, AND THE DATE ON WHICH AN
PERSONS HAVING ANY INTEREST THEREIN MUST APPEAR AND FILE THEIR CLAIM OR
OBJECTIONS TO THE PETITION. THE PETITIONER SHALL, AT THE HEARING, SUBMIT PROOF OF THE
PUBLICATION, POSTING AND SERVICE OF THE NOTICE AS DIRECTED BY THE COURT.

IN SEBASTIAN V. SPOUSES CRUZ, we pointed out that the FOLLOWING REQUISITES MUST BE
COMPLIED WITH FOR AN ORDER FOR RECONSTITUTION TO BE ISSUED:
(a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed;
(b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost
or destroyed certificate of title;
(c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein;
(d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and
(e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in
the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Petitioner claims that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because the second amended petition
contained substantial changes and annexes and yet said petition was not posted and published as required under
Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26.
We disagree.
The revisions merely refer to the substitution of the parties in view of the deaths of the spouses Manalo and
the mention of RA 26 as the applicable law. These are minor matters that simply tend to assist and guide the
RTC in conducting the proceeding. Hence, the earlier posting and publication of the petition for
reconstitution prior to the second amendment were sufficient for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction on the
subject matter of the case.

Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that another posting and publication was necessary in view of the second
amendment, the absence of the same does not divest the RTC of its jurisdiction that it validly acquired in the first
instance. SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT JURISDICTION ONCE ACQUIRED IS NOT LOST UPON THE
INSTANCE OF THE PARTIES BUT CONTINUES UNTIL THE CASE IS TERMINATED. Moreover, the
use of the technical descriptions as embodied in the blue prints and such other documents adduced as bases
for the production of the new title, likewise does not necessitate another posting and publication because
while they were newly mentioned in the second amendment, the same were already available for the court to
scrutinize during the first amendment.

The RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE IS AN ACTION IN REM, WHICH MEANS IT IS ONE DIRECTED

NOT ONLY AGAINST PARTICULAR PERSONS, BUT AGAINST THE THING ITSELF. The ESSENCE
OF POSTING AND PUBLICATION IS TO GIVE NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD that such petition has been
filed and that interested parties may intervene or oppose in the case. This purpose was achieved in this case when
notices on the first and second amendments were duly served upon the parties in interest of the case and proper
posting and publication was made to the original petition for reconstitution. In view of this, we find that the court
validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

VI. Wills and Succession

A. General Provisions
B. Testamentary Succession
1. General Provisions
2. Characteristics of a Will
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 3. Non-Delegability of a Testamentary Power
4. Applicable Law as to Form and Substance of a Will
5. Testamentary Capacity
6. Form of Notarial and Holographic Wills
7. Witnesses to a Notarial Will (Qualification and Disqualifications)
8. Conflict Rules
9. Modes of Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions
a) Effect on the Recognition of a Non-Marital Child
b) Theory of Dependent Relative Revocation
c) Revocation Based on a False Cause
10.Heirs
a) Compulsory Heirs
b) Institution of Heirs
(1) Limitations on the Institution of Heirs
(2) Collective Institution
(3) Proscription Against Successive Institution
(4) Institution Based on a False Cause
c) Substitution of Heirs
(1) Causes of Substitution
(2) Fideicommissary Substitution (Compared With
Testamentary Trusts)
11.Legitime
a) Collation in Connection With the Computation of Legitime
b) Table of Legitime
c) Impairment of the Legitime
d) Presumptive Legitime
12.Preterition
a) Requisites
b) Governing Law
13.Conditional Dispositions and Dispositions
a) Condition Not to Marry
b) Disposicion Captatoria
c) Modal Institution
14.Void Testamentary Dispositions
15.Disinheritance
a) Grounds for Disinheritance
b) Requisites for the Various Grounds for Disinheritance
c) Effects of Reconciliation
16.Legacies and Devises
a) Requisites for Validity
b) Property Not Owned by the Testator
c) Ineffective Legacies/Devises
C. Intestate Succession
1. Relationship
2. Causes of Intestacy
3. Order of Intestate Succession
4. Rule of Proximity and Rule of Equality
a) Exceptions to the Rule of Proximity and Rule of Equality
5. Determination of Heirs
6. Successional Barrier (the “Iron Curtain Rule”) (See Aquino v.
Aquino, G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018, December 7, 2021)
7. Successional Rights of Adopted Children
8. Successional Rights of Adopting Parents
9. Successional Rights of Marital and Non-Marital Children
10.Successional Rights of the Surviving Spouse
11.Successional Rights of Collateral Relatives
D. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession
1. Capacity to Succeed
a) Incapacity by Reason of Unworthiness and Effects of
Condonation
b) Incapacity by Reason of Morality

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 c) Incapacity by Reason of Possible Undue Influence
2. Right of Representation in Testacy and Intestacy
a) Requisites and Limitations
3. Right of Accretion in Testamentary Succession and in Intestacy
a) Requisites and Limitations
4. Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance
a) Form of Repudiation
b) Effects of Repudiation Compared to Predecease and
Incapacity

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

I. Obligations
A. General Provisions
1. Definition
2. Essential Elements
3. Sources of Obligation
B. Nature and Effects of Obligations
1. Breaches of Obligations
2. Remedies for Breach of Obligation
C. Different Kinds of Obligations
D. Extinguishment of Obligations
1. Payment
a) Concept of Payment
b) Payment by Cession vs. Dation in Payment
c) Tender of Payment and Consignation
2. Loss of the
Thing Due
a) Concept of Loss
b) Requisites
c) Force Majeure
3. Condonation
4. Confusion
5. Compensation
a) Requisites
b) Compensation of Rescissible and Voidable Debts
c) Non-Compensable Debts
6. Novation

Novation is a mode of extinguishing an obligation. The Civil Code provides that one of the ways to
novate an obligation is by changing its object, cause, or principal conditions. Thus, Article 1292 of the
Civil Code states:
Article 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitute the
same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new
obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
IN ASIAN CONSTRUCTION V. MERO
ARTICLE 1231 OF THE CIVIL CODE PROVIDES FOR THE DIFFERENT MODES OF
EXTINGUISHING OBLIGATIONS, TO WIT:
ARTICLE 1231. OBLIGATIONS ARE EXTINGUISHED:

(1) By payment or performance;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;

(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;

(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;

(5) By compensation;

(6) By novation. (Underscoring supplied) Other causes of extinguishment of obligations such as annulment,
rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, and prescription, are governed elsewhere in this Code.

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The rules on novation are outlined in the Civil Code as follows:
ARTICLE 1291. OBLIGATIONS MAY BE MODIFIED BY:

(1) Changing their object or principal conditions;

(2) Substituting the person of the debtor;

(3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. (1203)

ARTICLE 1292. IN ORDER THAT AN OBLIGATION MAY BE EXTINGUISHED BY ANOTHER

WHICH SUBSTITUTE THE SAME; IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IT BE SO DECLARED IN
UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, OR THAT THE OLD AND THE NEW OBLIGATIONS BE ON EVERY POINT
INCOMPATIBLE WITH EACH OTHER.
ARTICLE 1293. NOVATION WHICH CONSISTS IN SUBSTITUTING A NEW DEBTOR IN THE
PLACEOF THE ORIGINAL ONE, MAY BE MADE EVEN WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR
AGAINST THE WILL OF THE LATTER, BUT NOT WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE CREDITOR.
PAYMENT BY THE NEW DEBTOR GIVES HIM THE RIGHTS MENTIONED IN ARTICLES 1236 AND
1237.
NOVATION extinguishes an obligation between two parties when there is a substitution of objects or debtors
or when there is subrogation of the creditor. It occurs only when the new contract declares so "in unequivocal
terms" or that "the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other."
FOR NOVATION TO TAKE PLACE, THE FOLLOWING REQUISITES MUST CONCUR:

1) There must be a previous valid obligation.

2) The parties concerned must agree to a new contract.

3) The old contract must be extinguished.

4) There must be a valid new contract.

NOVATION MAY ALSO BE EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. It is express when the new obligation declares in
unequivocal terms that the old obligation is extinguished. It is implied when the new obligation is incompatible with
the old one on every point. The test of incompatibility is whether the two obligations can stand together, each on  
with its own independent existence. the foregoing to the instant case, it is evident that there was neither an express
nor implied novation through the letters exchanged between MERO and Asiakonstrukt.

a) Concept of Novation

TONY N. CHUA, JIMMY N. CHUA, and ERNEST T. JENG, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
and BDO UNIBANK, INC., respondents

A necessary element of novation is the cancellation of the old obligation by the new one, which may be effected
expressly or impliedly. It is never presumed and must be proven as a fact. There is an express novation if the new
obligation unequivocally declares that it extinguishes or substitutes the old obligation; on the other hand, there is an
implied novation if the old and the new obligations are on every point incompatible with each other. The test of
incompatibility is whether the two contracts can stand together, each one having an independent existence. "The
incompatibility must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or
principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to
extinguish the original obligation."

The Court also emphasizes that the issue of novation involves a question of fact, as its resolution necessitates the
factual determination of the requisites of a valid novation.

Here, the Court affirms and adopts the SOJ's and CA's factual finding that the new schedule of payments did
not novate the trust receipt agreement. As the CA has determined that there is no written contract between the
parties stating in unequivocal terms that they were novating the original obligation, it is necessary and proper to
determine whether the new schedule of payments is incompatible with the original obligation under the trust
receipts.

b) Expressed and Implied Novation

(1) Requisites
c) Expromision and Delegacion Distinguished
(1) Consent Required
(2) Effect of Insolvency of New Debtor
d) Legal and Conventional Subrogation
II. Contracts

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 A. General Provisions
1. Definition of a Contract
A contract "is the law between the contracting parties and obligations arising therefrom have the force of law
between them and should be complied with in good faith." As a rule, the courts will refrain from interfering with the
rights of the consenting parties unless it is clearly shown that there existed fraud, mistake, or any other vice vitiating
consent on either or both parties, or that a contract includes any stipulation that is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.

2. Elements of a Contract
IN CABILAO V. TAMPAN
The present controversy hinges on the validity of the Deed of Sale between Lorna and Socorro, which however is
a question of fact. It is well-settled that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As a general rule, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh
the evidence introduced in and considered by the courts below. Factual findings of the lower courts, if supported
by substantial evidence, are accorded great respect and even finality by this Court unless the case falls under any
of the exceptions such as WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT. In
the case at bar, the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the RTC. Hence, this Court is called upon to
reevaluate the factual findings below.
After a judicious review of the records of the case, We sustain the findings of the CA and uphold the validity of
the Deed of Sale between Lorna and Socorro.
Article 1305 of New Civil Code (NCC) provides that a contract is "a meeting of minds between two
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service." The essential requisites are:
(1) consent of the contracting parties;
(2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
(3) cause of the obligation which is established.
In the present case, all the elements of a valid contract are present. In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale validly
transferred the ownership over TCT No. T-59 from Socorro to Lorna in consideration of P10,000.00. Arguing the
absence of consent on her part, Socorro claims that the Deed of Sale is null and void since her signature thereon
was obtained through fraud, or under the guise of a contract of loan. However, the evidence on record belies her
theory.
Reynaldo testified that he was present during the execution of the Deed of Sale where he witnessed Antonieta and
Socorro sign the document. He further testified that Socorro gave Antonieta the owner's duplicate copy of the title
the following day.
More importantly, Atty. Mantilla, who prepared and notarized the Deed of Sale, testified and categorically stated
that Socorro signed the Deed of Sale and received the consideration of P10,000.00 from Antonieta. At that
instance, Socorro handed over a photocopy of the duplicate copy of the title to Antonieta. When asked why
Socorro only handed over a photocopy of the TCT, she answered that the duplicate copy was still with a certain
Leon Danaque because of her outstanding loan with him.
It is a well-settled rule that a duly notarized document enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due
execution, as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. Thus, a party assailing the
authenticity and due execution of a notarized document is required to present evidence that is clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant. Here, Socorro failed to overcome this burden. Aside from her self-serving
allegation that she did not know that she was signing a Deed of Sale, there is nothing else on record that supports
her assertion.
While Socorro claims that she is an illiterate person, she failed to prove this fact. When a party claims that one is
unable to read or is otherwise illiterate, and fraud is alleged, a presumption that there is fraud or mistake in
obtaining consent of that party arises under Article 1332 of the NCC, which provides:
When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and
mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been
fully explained to the former.
However, for Article 1332 to be applicable, the contracting party who alleges fraud or vitiated consent must
establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence. The party must show clear and convincing evidence of
one's personal circumstances and that he or she is unable to read at the time of execution of the contested contract.
Here, there is nothing in Socorro's testimony showing that she cannot read English or that she was illiterate. To
the contrary, the pacto de retro sales that she entered into with Enriqueta and Lelita, respectively, indicate that
she is able to read, affix her signature, freely give her consent and enter into contracts. Thus, the presumption of
fraud did not arise and Socorro had the burden of proving that the Tampans fraudulently secured her signature
under the guise of another loan document which she would usually sign whenever she borrowed money. However,
she failed to do so. In fact, such purported loan documents were not even offered in evidence.
It is also of no moment that the consideration was in the amount of P10,000.00. GROSS INADEQUACY OF
PRICE DOES NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT OF SALE, UNLESS IT SIGNIFIES

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A DEFECT IN THE CONSENT OR THAT THE PARTIES ACTUALLY INTENDED A DONATION
OR SOME OTHER CONTRACT. 50 INADEQUACY OF CAUSE WILL NOT INVALIDATE A
CONTRACT UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN FRAUD, MISTAKE OR UNDUE INFLUENCE. As earlier
stated, fraud was not proven. Hence, the consideration in the amount of P10,000.00 did not invalidate the sale.

a) Essential elements
b) Natural Elements
B. Basic Principles of Contracts
1. Obligatory Force of a Contract
2. Freedom to Stipulate (Autonomy of the Will) and its Limitations
3. Binding Effect of a Contract
4. Privity of Contract
a) Concept
b) Exceptions to the Rule on Privity of Contracts
5. Consensuality of Contracts
a) Concept and Coverage
b) Exceptions
c) Reformation of Instruments
C. Essential Requisites of a Contract
1. Consent
2. Object
3. Cause or Consideration
D. Defective Contracts
1. Rescissible Contracts
2. Voidable Contracts
3. Unenforceable Contracts
4. Void Contracts

III. Natural Obligations

I. Sales
SPECIAL CONTRACTS
A. Definition and Essential Requisites
B. Contract of Sale
in Tamayao v. Lacambra, 66 We reiterated that:
A contract of sale is consensual in nature, and is perfected upon the concurrence of
its essential requisites, thus:
The essential requisites of a contract under Article 1318 of the
New Civil Code are: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation
which is established. Thus, contracts, other than real contracts are perfected
by mere consent which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.
Once perfected, they bind other contracting parties and the obligations
arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties and should be
complied with in good faith. The parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law.
Being a consensual contract, sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance,
subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. A perfected contract of sale imposes reciprocal
obligations on the parties whereby the vendor obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing to the buyer who, in turn, is obligated to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Failure of
either party to comply with his obligation entitles the other to rescission as the power to rescind is implied in
reciprocal obligations.

The Civil Code provides that in a contract of sale, the seller binds himself to transfer the ownership of
the thing sold, 73 and thus consequently, he must have the right to convey ownership of the thing at the time of
its delivery. 74 Settled is the rule that "no one can give what one does not have; nemo dat quad non habet. One
can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller
can transfer legally." 75 In Spouses Sabitsana, Jr. v. Muertegui, 76 We underscored that "mere registration of a
sale in one's favor does not give him [or her] any right over the land if the vendor was no longer the owner of

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 the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Neither could [the
registration] validate the purchase thereof by [the second buyer], which is null and void. Registration does not
vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title
than what he [or she] actually has."

THIS COURT IS AWARE OF ITS PRONOUNCEMENT IN CABRERA that "[a] contract of sale
which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio." Cabrera
involved a sale of a parcel of land between plaintiff and defendant, which at that time, was still held in common
by fourteen (14) other individuals, including defendant therein as evidenced by the original certificate of title.
Notably, despite the existence of the sale involving the said parcel of land, the plaintiff failed to present
evidence that the defendant was authorized by his co-owners to sell the land. Thus, the Court ruled in this case
that without the consent of his co-owners, defendant could not sell a definite portion of the co-owned property.
The Court's pronouncement in Cabrera is instructive on this point, to wit:
The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or abstract
quota" or "proportionate share." On the other hand, the definite portion of the land refers to
specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property.
To illustrate, if a ten-hectare property is owned equally by ten co-owners, the
undivided interest of a co-owner is one hectare. The definite portion of that interest is usually
determined during judicial or extrajudicial partition. After partition, a definite portion of the
property held in common is allocated to a specific co-owner. The co-ownership is dissolved
and, in effect, each of the former co-owners is free to exercise autonomously the rights
attached to his or her ownership over the definite portion of the land. It is crucial that the co-
owners agree to which portion of the land goes to whom.
Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the
consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner
selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should
redound to his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition.
In other words, A CO-OWNER CANNOT SELL A DEFINITE PORTION OF A LAND WITHOUT
THE CONSENT FROM HIS OR HER CO-OWNERS. This is based on the principle that a sale of a portion of
the property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in common, and, therefore, requires the unanimous
consent of the other co-owners. Of course, the law allows co-owner to alienate an undivided interest of the co-
owned property.

1. Contract to Sell
In Diego v. Diego, 61 We held that:
[I]n a contract to sell, title remains with the vendor and does not pass on to the vendee until the purchase price is
paid in full. Thus, in a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure
to pay the price agreed upon is not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. This is entirely different from the situation in a contract of
sale, where non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition. The effects in law are not identical. In a
contract of sale, the vendor has lost ownership of the thing sold and cannot recover it, unless the contract of sale is
rescinded and set aside. In a contract to sell, however, the vendor remains the owner for as long as the vendee has
not complied fully with the condition of paying the purchase price.

IN CABRERA that "[a] contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned
land is null and void ab initio." Cabrera involved a sale of a parcel of land between plaintiff and defendant,
which at that time, was still held in common by fourteen (14) other individuals, including defendant therein as
evidenced by the original certificate of title. Notably, despite the existence of the sale involving the said parcel
of land, the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the defendant was authorized by his co-owners to sell the
land. Thus, the Court ruled in this case that without the consent of his co-owners, defendant could not sell a
definite portion of the co-owned property.
The Court's pronouncement in Cabrera is instructive on this point, to wit:
The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or abstract
quota" or "proportionate share." On the other hand, the definite portion of the land refers to
specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property.
To illustrate, if a ten-hectare property is owned equally by ten co-owners, the
undivided interest of a co-owner is one hectare. The definite portion of that interest is usually
determined during judicial or extrajudicial partition. After partition, a definite portion of the
property held in common is allocated to a specific co-owner. The co-ownership is dissolved
and, in effect, each of the former co-owners is free to exercise autonomously the rights
attached to his or her ownership over the definite portion of the land. It is crucial that the co-
owners agree to which portion of the land goes to whom.
Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the

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 consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner
selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should
redound to his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition.
In other words, a co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of a land without the consent from his or her co-owners.
This is based on the principle that a sale of a portion of the property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in
common, and, therefore, requires the unanimous consent of the other co-owners. Of course, the law allows co-owner
to alienate an undivided interest of the co-owned property.

2. Option Contract
3. Right of First Refusal
C. Earnest Money
D. Double Sales

THE HEIRS OF ZENAIDA B. GONZALES, represented by ARNEL B. GONZALES, petitioners, vs.

SPOUSES DOMINADOR AND ESTEFANIA BASAS AND ROMEO MUNDA, respondents.

The provisions of Article 1544 of the Civil Code on double sale is inapplicable because the spouses Basas were
no longer the owners of the subject property when they transferred the same to Munda
Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in
good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.
In order for the foregoing provision on double sale to apply, the following circumstances must concur:
"(a) the two (or more) sales transactions in the issue must pertain to exactly the same subject matter, and must
be valid sales transactions; (b) the two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (c) the two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful
ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller." 71 Thus, the rule on
DOUBLE SALES "applies when the same thing is sold to multiple buyers by one seller but not to sales of the
same thing by multiple sellers."
In the instant case, the spouses Basas sold the subject property to Zenaida in 1996, and sold the same as well to
Munda on August 25, 1997. However, the foregoing requisites of a double sale are absent because the sale of the
subject property by the Basas to Munda was not a valid sale transaction since by that time, the spouses Basas were
no longer the owners of the property, and thus, they had no right to transfer the same.
Therefore, even if the provision on double sales were to be applied in the instant case, it remains that Zenaida,
the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, had a better right of ownership over the subject property since Munda
failed to acquire the property and register his title in good faith.

E. Risk of Loss
F. Breach of Contract of Sale
1. Recto Law
2. Maceda Law
G. Extinguishment of the Sale
1. Conventional Redemption
2. Legal Redemption
H. Equitable Mortgage
I. Pacto de Retro Sales

II. Lease
A. Kinds of Lease
B. Rights and Obligations of Lessor
C. Rights and Obligations of Lessee

III. Agency

IV. Credit Transactions

A. Loans

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 1. Kinds
2. Interest
B. Deposit
C. Guaranty and Suretyship
D. Real Estate Mortgage
E. Antichresis

V. Compromise

VI. Quasi-Contacts
A. Negotiorum Gestio
B. Solutio Indebiti

VII. Torts and Damages

A. Principles
1. Abuse of Rights
2. Unjust Enrichment
3. Liability Without Fault
4. Acts Contrary to Law
5. Acts Contrary to Morals
B. Classification of Torts
1. Intentional
2. Negligent
3. Strict Liability
C. The Tortfeasor
1. Joint
2. Direct
D. Quasi-Delict vs. Culpa Contractual vs. Culpa Criminal
1. Nature of Liability
E. Proximate Cause
1. Concept
2. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
F. Vicarious Liability
VICARIOUS LIABILITY. The tort doctrine that IMPOSES RESPONSIBILITY UPON ONE PERSON FOR THE
FAILURE OF ANOTHER, with whom the person has a special relationship (such as Parent and Child, employer
and employee, or owner of vehicle and driver), to exercise such care as a reasonably prudent person would use under
similar circumstances.

IN THE CASE OF MAITIM V. AGUILA

MAITIM FAILED TO PROVE THAT SHE WAS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE IN THIS CASE.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In relation to the provision above, ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE PROVIDES THE BASIS
FOR THE CONCEPT OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY in our jurisdiction, to wit:
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who
are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not

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 when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
The responsibility treated of IN THIS ARTICLE SHALL CEASE WHEN THE
PERSONS HEREIN MENTIONED PROVE THAT THEY OBSERVED ALL THE
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY TO PREVENT DAMAGE.
(Underscoring supplied)
JURISPRUDENCE HAS ESTABLISHED THAT UNDER ARTICLE 2180, "WHEN AN INJURY IS
CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, THERE INSTANTLY ARISES A
PRESUMPTION OF LAW THAT THERE WAS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE MASTER OR
EMPLOYER EITHER IN THE SELECTION OF THE SERVANT OR EMPLOYEE, OR IN SUPERVISION
OVER HIM AFTER SELECTION OR BOTH." 40 "The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct
and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
the insolvency of such employee." 41 ETHIDa
Applying these concepts to the present case, the finding of negligence against Santos gave rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of Maitim in the latter's selection and/or supervision of the former.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon Maitim to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of her employee, Santos.
G. Res Ipsa Loquitur
IN THE CASE OF MAITIM V. AGUILA

THE CA COMMITTED NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION.

The petition raises the lone issue of whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it
affirmed the RTC Decision finding Maitim solidarily liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability.
This Court rules in the negative.
First, it must be noted that the RTC correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when it ruled that
Santos should be presumed negligent, and thus, had the burden of proving such presumption otherwise.
The DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR was eruditely expounded upon in the case of Solidum
vs. People as follows:
RES IPSA LOQUITUR is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks
for itself." The DOCTRINE RES IPSA LOQUITUR means that "WHERE THE THING
WHICH CAUSES INJURY IS SHOWN TO BE UNDER THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
DEFENDANT, AND THE ACCIDENT IS SUCH AS IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
THINGS DOES NOT HAPPEN IF THOSE WHO HAVE THE MANAGEMENT USE
PROPER CARE, IT AFFORDS REASONABLE EVIDENCE, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN
EXPLANATION BY THE DEFENDANT, THAT THE ACCIDENT AROSE FROM WANT
OF CARE." It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that as a matter of common knowledge
and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the
absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded
in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or
common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident
itself. x x x" (Underscoring supplied)
IN UPCB GENERAL INSURANCE CO. V. PASCUAL LINER, INC., this Court reiterated the
applicability of res ipsa loquitur in vehicular accidents, wherein it is sufficient that the accident itself be
established, and once established through the admission of evidence, whether hearsay or not, the rule on res
ipsa loquitur already starts to apply.
As applied in the instant case, the fact that Angela was hit by a moving vehicle owned by Maitim
and driven by Santos is undisputed, and the same is supported by the Traffic Accident Investigation
Report dated April 25, 2006. The fact that Angela sustained injuries in her collision with Maitim's vehicle
is also not in question. Thus, since it is clearly established that there was a vehicular accident that caused
injuries, then the rule on res ipsa loquitur shall apply. An inference of negligence on the part of Santos,
the person who controls the instrumentality (vehicle) causing the injury, arises, and he has the burden of
presenting proof to the contrary.
As will be discussed below, this Court finds that the lower courts justly held that Santos failed to
discharge this burden and consequently, the presumption of negligence lodged towards him shall stand.
Ordinarily, driving inside a relatively narrow driveway shared by two houses would not result to
children being hit and their bones fractured. This is because a reasonably prudent man, especially an
alleged experienced driver, would have foreseen that the residents of the houses may exit towards the
common driveway anytime, including young and playful children who may suddenly run across or along
said driveway. Thus, a reasonably prudent man is expected to drive with utmost caution when traversing

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 the said driveway, even if given a "clear" signal by a guard.
In fact, Maitim herself admits that there is a natural tendency to drive at a slow speed when in a
narrow driveway. However, her allegation that Santos was driving at a slow speed, which is admittedly
"natural," contradicts the circumstances surrounding Angela's injury. If Santos truly drove slowly and
with care, he should have been able to have ample opportunity to brake or otherwise steer the vehicle out
of trouble, both of which did not happen in this case. aDSIHc
Moreover, even if a running child were to get hit by a slow-moving vehicle, it is highly unlikely
that the same would result to injuries so severe that it required surgery and afterwards being confined to
a wheelchair for more than two months.
In sum, there is nothing natural about a child getting dragged for three meters and her leg being
completely fractured by a slow-moving vehicle, especially if a reasonably prudent man was driving the
vehicle with care. Thus, both the RTC and CA were right in finding negligence on the part of Santos.
Furthermore, the presumption of negligence on the part of Santos was not overcome by Maitim, who
presented no rebuttal evidence and instead merely alleged that Santos was driving with due care and was not
speeding. THIS COURT HAS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT ALLEGATIONS, ON THEIR OWN,
HAVE NO PROBATIVE VALUE AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS PROOF. Therefore, since Maitim
failed to present any evidence to the contrary, the presumption of negligence on the part of Santos stands and is
deemed conclusive.
H. Damnum Absque Injuria

IN RICO V. UNION BANK OF THE PHILS.

Based on the foregoing, we find the disapproval of Rico's credit card on November 20, 2005 as
justified and done in good faith. Union Bank neither breached its contract with Rico nor acted with willful
intent to cause harm when it revoked Rico's credit card privileges when he failed to pay the minimum amount
due on his SOA dated October 16, 2005. Nobody can be faulted for Rico's alleged humiliation or
embarrassment in Gourdo's Restaurant but himself. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA — THERE CAN BE NO
DAMAGE WITHOUT INJURY WHEN THE LOSS OR HARM WAS NOT THE RESULT OF A
VIOLATION OF A LEGAL DUTY. As held IN BPI EXPRESS CARD V. COURT OF APPEALS:
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered
damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage
is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury
in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, THE
LAW AFFORDS NO REMEDY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM AN ACT WHICH
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A LEGAL INJURY OR WRONG. These situations are often
called DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA.
IN OTHER WORDS, IN ORDER THAT A PLAINTIFF MAY MAINTAIN AN
ACTION FOR THE INJURIES OF WHICH HE COMPLAINS, HE MUST ESTABLISH
THAT SUCH INJURIES RESULTED FROM A BREACH OF DUTY WHICH THE
DEFENDANT OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF — A CONCURRENCE OF INJURY TO THE
PLAINTIFF AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY BY THE PERSON CAUSING IT. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should
be the proximate cause of the injury.
In order for Rico to maintain an action for the injuries which he claims to have sustained, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which Union Bank owed to him. In other
words, there must be a concurrence of injury to Rico and the legal responsibility of the person causing it, i.e.,
Union Bank. "The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured
in contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of
such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury."
It is not enough that Rico merely suffered humiliation or embarrassment as a result of Union
Bank's disapproval of the credit card transaction on November 20, 2005. "It is also required that a
culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the claimant and that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code."
While Rico suffered humiliation or embarrassment from the disapproval of his credit card at Gourdo's
Restaurant in front of his two guests, We are constrained to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA that
Union Bank was grossly negligent in revoking Rico's credit card privileges. Rico failed to convince Us that
Union Bank breached any obligation that would make it answerable for his humiliation or
embarrassment.
Hence, as it was Rico's own action, i.e., his resolve to cancel his flight with Tiger Airways, which was
the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience, We find the award of moral damages by
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 the RTC and the CA clearly unjustified. With the deletion of the award of moral damages, we find no basis for
the award of exemplary damages as it can only be awarded if Rico is entitled to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages. In the same vein, We must delete the award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation as
Rico failed to show that he falls under one of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
I. Defenses
J. Negligence
1. Standard of Care
2. Presumptions of Negligence
K. Damages
1. Kinds of Damages
a) Actual and Compensatory Damages
b) Moral Damages
IN KLM V. DR TIONGCO
THE AWARDS OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARE PROPER.

The BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF KLM AS FOUND BY THE RTC AND THE CA THUS RENDERS
THE SAME LIABLE FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. However, the amounts thereof must be
modified further to be fair, reasonable, and commensurate to the injury sustained by the passenger.

UNDER ARTICLE 2216 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES IS LEFT TO THE
DISCRETION OF THE COURT ACCORDING TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE. The courts must
adhere to the principle that the amount of damages awarded should not be palpably excessive as to indicate that it
was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. [64] It must therefore be fair, reasonable, and
proportionate to the injury suffered.[65]
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES IS PROPER TO ENABLE THE INJURED PARTY TO OBTAIN
MEANS OF DIVERSION OR AMUSEMENT THAT WILL SERVE TO ALLEVIATE THE MORAL
SUFFERING THEY UNDERWENT BECAUSE OF ANOTHER'S CULPABLE ACTION. [66] Here, KLM displayed
indifference to the plight and inconvenience suffered by Dr. Tiongco when he lost his luggage. It made empty
promises that his luggage would be travelling with him and even failed to inform Dr. Tiongco that his suitcase had
been found. Moreover, it did not return the luggage to him even after it was found. Undeniably, KLM's bad faith,
gross negligence, and lack of care warrant the award of moral damages in accordance with ARTICLE 2220 OF
THE CIVIL CODE, to wit:

ARTICLE 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Guided by the foregoing, the Court modifies the award of moral
damages from P1,000,000.00 to P300,000.00 in favor of Dr. Tiongco pursuant to our pronouncement in Kierulf v.
Court of Appeals[67] that "[t]he social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in
awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge
of his or her social and financial standing."

The AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES likewise needs to be modified. Undoubtedly, KLM acted in a
wanton, and reckless manner. Given the surrounding facts and circumstances in the instant case, the Court holds that
the amount of P100,000.00 is sufficient.  

c) Nominal Damages
d) Temperate or Moderate Damages
IN KLM V. DR TIONGCO
KLM LIABLE FOR TEMPERATE, NOT NOMINAL,  
DAMAGES.

Article 2221 of the Civil Code states that NOMINAL DAMAGES may be awarded in order that the plaintiff's
right, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated, or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. They are "recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where
there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown.
On the other hand, ARTICLE 2224 of the same Code states that TEMPERATE DAMAGES OR MODERATE
DAMAGES, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty. Simply put, TEMPERATE DAMAGES ARE AWARDED WHEN THE INJURED PARTY SUFFERED
SOME PECUNIARY LOSS BUT THE AMOUNT THEREOF CANNOT, FROM THE NATURE OF THE CASE,
BE PROVEN WITH CERTAINTY.
Dr. Tiongco incurred pecuniary loss when his suitcase containing his personal belongings was lost during his flight
and was never returned. Unfortunately, he did not present any actual receipt that would have proved the actual
amount due, as mandated under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, so as to entitle him to the award of actual damages.
This, however, does not preclude Dr. Tiongco from recovering temperate damages, and not nominal damages, since
the exact amount of damage or pecuniary loss he sustained was not duly established by competent evidence. Verily,
the Court finds the award of P50,000.00 as temperate damages fair and reasonable in view of the circumstances in

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this case.

e) Liquidated Damages
f) Exemplary or Corrective Damages
2. When Damages May be Recovered
L. Damages in Case of Death
M. Duty of Injured Party

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