POLITICAL LAW SYLLABUS 2023

POWERS AND STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

I. Preliminary Concepts
A. Nature of a Constitution
1. Parts
2. Manner of Interpretation (Self-Executing and Non-Executing Character)
3. Process of Change (Amendments and Revisions)
B. The Philippines as a State
1. Elements (People, Territory, Government, and Capacity to Enter into Relations With
Other States)
2. Distinction Between Internal and External Self-Determination
C. Fundamental Powers of the State
1. Police Power
2. Eminent Domain
3. Taxation
a) Constitutional Exemption Principles

In LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. CITY OF PASAY, represented by the CITY
TREASURER and the CITY ASSESSOR, respondent

The LRTA, being an instrumentality of the national government, cannot be taxed by local governments

A government instrumentality like LRTA falls under Section 133 (o) of the Local Government Code, which states:

SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. — Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and
local government units. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 133 (o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, as the
former's power to tax is, historically, merely delegated by the latter. While the 1987 Constitution now includes
taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local governments may only exercise such power "subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide." 65

We reiterate our ruling in the 2006 MIAA Case, which succinctly explains the rule on the local governments'
power to tax:

When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is
construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be
clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is
resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national
government instrumentalities.

Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption.
However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local
taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality. As
this Court declared in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.:

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 The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the benefit of the
government itself or its agencies. In such case the practical effect of an exemption is merely to
reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by government in the course of its
operations. For these reasons, provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may be
construed liberally, in favor of non tax-liability of such agencies.

There is, moreover, no point in national and local governments taxing each other, unless a sound and
compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one government pocket to another.

There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering
essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the legislature
clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for sound
and compelling policy considerations. There must be express language in the law empowering local
governments to tax national government instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is
resolved against local governments.

Thus, Section 133 of the Local Government Code states that "unless otherwise provided" in the Code,
local governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities. As this Court held in Basco v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation:

The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner
control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)

This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.

D. Relevance of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies

E. Dynamics Among the Branches of Government
1. Separation of Powers
2. System of Checks and Balances
3. Delegation of Powers
F. State Immunity
1. Basis
2. Exceptions
G. The National Territory
1. Scope (Terrestrial, Aerial, and Fluvial Domains)
2. Archipelagic Doctrine

II. Legislative Department

A. Nature of Legislative Power
1. Derivative and Delegated Power
2. Plenary Character
3. Limitations
a) Substantive - Bill of Rights
b) Procedural - Manner of Passage and Form of Bills
4. Law-Making Distinguished from Law-Execution
a) Filling-Up Details
b) Ascertainment of Facts
5. Exceptions to Non-Delegability
a) Local Governments
b) Presidential Power in Times of War and National Emergency, Including Martial
Law and in a Revolutionary Context
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 c) Fixing Tariff Rates, Quotas, and Other Duties
6. Legislative Power of the People Through Initiative and Referendum
B. Bicameral Congress
1. Senate
2. House of Representatives
a) District Representatives and Mechanics of Apportionment
b) Party-List System
C. Legislative Privileges, Disclosure of Financial and Business Affairs, Prohibitions, Inhibitions, and
Disqualifications
D. Quorum and Voting Majorities
E. Discipline of Members
F. Process of Law-Making
1. Function of the Bicameral Conference Committee
2. Limitations on Legislative Power
a) Limitations on Revenue, Appropriations, and Tariff
b) Presidential Veto and Congressional Override
G. Rules on Appropriation and Re-Alignment
H. Electoral Tribunals and Commission on Appointments
1. Composition
2. Powers and Jurisdiction
I. Powers of Congress
1. Legislative Inquiries and the Oversight Functions
2. Non-Legislative
a) Informing Function
b) Power of Impeachment

III. Executive Department

A. Nature of Executive Power
1. In Relation to the Implementation of Laws (Including Delegated Powers)
2. Express or Implied (Including the Faithful Execution of Laws and Residual Powers)
B. Concept of Presidential Immunity
1. Conduct Covered
2. Waiver and Exceptions
C. Concept of Executive Privilege
1. Types
2. Who May Invoke
D. Qualifications, Election, Term of the President and Vice-President, and Rules on Succession
E. Other Privileges, Inhibitions, and Disqualifications
F. Powers of the President
1. Executive and Administrative Powers
2. Power of Appointment
a) Process of Confirmation by the Commission
b) By-Passed Appointments and their Effects
c) Appointments by an Acting President
d) Scope of Midnight Appointments
e) Recess of Ad-Interim Appointments
f) Power of Removal
3. Power of Control and Supervision

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 a) Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
b) Executive Departments and Offices
c) Local Government Units
4. Emergency Powers
5. Commander-in-Chief Powers
a) Calling Out Powers
b) Declaration of Martial Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Including Extension of Period)
6. Pardoning Powers
a) Scope and Limitations
b) Forms of Executive Clemency
7. Foreign Relations Powers
a) In General
b) To Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans
c) Entry into Treaties or International Agreements
8. Powers Relative to Appropriation Measures
9. Veto Powers

IV. Judicial Department

A. Concept of Judicial Power
B. Judicial Review
1. Requisites
2. Political Questions Doctrine
3. Moot Questions
A case is rendered moot when, because of supervening events, this Court is left with no justiciable controversy to
resolve, and a declaration on it would be of no practical use or value.
Simply put, a moot and academic case ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, and
thus, this Court should refrain from rendering a ruling on the criminal aspect of the petitions.
4. Operative Fact Doctrine
C. Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
D. Appointments to the Judiciary
1. Qualifications of Members
2. Judicial and Bar Council
a) Composition
b) Powers
E. The Supreme Court

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 1. Composition, Powers, and Functions
2. En Banc and Division Cases
3. Administrative Supervision Over Lower Courts
4. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction

V. Constitutional Commissions (COMELEC, COA, CSC)

A. Constitutional Safeguards to Ensure Independence of Commissions
B. Common Provisions
C. Powers, Functions, and Jurisdiction
D. Composition and Qualifications of Members
E. Prohibited Offices and Interests
F. Judicial Review of Final Orders, Resolutions, and Decisions
1. Rendered in the Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Functions
2. Rendered in the Exercise of Administrative Functions

THE CITIZEN IN RELATION TO THE STATE

I. Citizenship
A. Who are Filipinos
B. Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
C. Loss and Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
D. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
E. Foundlings
1. Foundling Recognition and Protection Act (RA 11767)

II. Bill of Rights

A. Private Acts and the Bill of Rights
B. Due Process
1. Procedural and Substantive
IN MIPTI V. PPA
The GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of
the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to every
inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has vividly written:

If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the protection of due process. If
the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated. Whatsoever be the
source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a statute, its unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due
process. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great
guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the procedure prescribed by the law or
affects the very validity of the law itself. THERE ARE TWO COMPONENTS OF DUE PROCESS. THE FIRST, PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS, PERTAINS TO THE PROCEDURES THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST FOLLOW BEFORE IT DEPRIVES
A PERSON OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY; THE SECOND, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, TO THE
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DENIAL OR RESTRICTION ON LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY.
While due process has no exact definition, the standard in determining whether a person was accorded due process is
whether the restriction on the person's life, liberty, or property is consistent with fairness, reason, and justice, and free from
caprice and arbitrariness. This standard applies both to procedural and substantive due process. AS APPLIED TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, THE QUESTION TO BE ASKED IS WHETHER THE PERSON WAS GIVEN SUFFICIENT
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS APPLIED TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS,
THE QUESTION IS WHETHER SUCH DEPRIVATION OR RESTRICTION IS NECESSARY AND FAIR TO THE

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AFFECTED PARTIES.
We will now determine whether these standards, particularly of procedural due process, have been observed when
MIPTI's franchise was revoked and its properties seized. 

Verily, whenever there is an imminent threat to the life, liberty or property of any person in any proceeding conducted by
or under the auspices of the State, his right to due process of law, when demanded, must not be ignored. Here, there is absolutely
no doubt that the minimum standards of fair play and freedom from arbitrariness required by due process have been
disregarded. The manner in which MIPTI's franchise was revoked was so arbitrary and so despotic that it evinces an
obvious lack of regard or respect to the fundamental principle of due process and to the Constitution that guarantees it.
One day, it was business as usual for MIPTI. The following day, it was informed of its violations. The next day, it no
longer has a business. The lack of respect is so flagrant that no person can possibly think that it is justified, or at the very
least, acceptable, even if it was done in the aftermath of martial law.

2. Void-for-Vagueness
3. Judicial and Administrative Due Process

C. Equal Protection
1. Requisites for Valid Classification
2. Standards of Judicial Review
a) Rational Basis Test
b) Strict Scrutiny test
c) Intermediate Scrutiny Test
D. Arrests, Searches, and Seizures
1. Requisites of a Valid Warrant
a) Arrest Warrant
b) Search Warrant
2. Warrantless Arrests and Detention
3. Warrantless Searches
IN UY y SAYAN V. PEOPLE
However, there is a recognized EXCEPTION TO THE NEED OF SECURING A WARRANT BEFORE A
SEARCH MAY BE EFFECTED, that is, a WARRANTLESS SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
ARREST. In such instances, the law requires that there be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. The
process cannot be reversed.
Moreover, SECTION 5, RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT provides for instances when a lawful arrest
may be effected with or without a warrant:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
112.
Briefly, there are three instances when warrantless arrests may be effected. These are: (a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which has just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a
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prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Among the circumstances where a warrantless arrest is allowed, the arrest of the suspect in flagrante delicto imposes
a rigid, if not strict, compliance with its elements. An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two
elements: (a) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
Jurisprudence has also carved out an additional exception to the necessity of securing a search warrant prior to the
conduct of a search. IN CABALLES V. PEOPLE, this Court discussed the validity of warrantless searches on
moving vehicles, to wit:
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the
years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without
warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.
CHECKPOINTS ARE NOT ILLEGAL PER SE.
This case presents us with a situation wherein an individual was arrested during a checkpoint search. Setups of the
military or police checkpoints are considered a variant of searching moving vehicles which are not illegal per se, for
as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists. INSPECTIONS AT CHECKPOINTS ARE NOT VIOLATIVE OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES IF LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:
(a) the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;
(b) simply looks into a vehicle;
(c) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;
(d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
(e) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
CHECKPOINT SEARCHES ARE CONSIDERED VALID AS LONG AS IT IS LIMITED TO A MERE
ROUTINE INSPECTION. However, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an EXTENSIVE SEARCH
instead of a mere routine inspection, such search remains valid as long as the officers who conducted the search
have a REASONABLE OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
WARRANTLESS ARREST AND THE CONCOMITANT SEARCH IN THIS CASE IS VALID.
This Court has ruled in several instances that although as a general rule, motorists as well as pedestrians
passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may also be stopped to allow
authorized personnel to conduct an extensive search when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief
on the part of the law enforcers that either the motorist is a law offender, or that the contents of the vehicle are, or
have been, instruments of some offense.
As may be gleaned from the records of this case, petitioner, who was driving a red motorcycle, passed by
the mobile check point at Purok 4, Sitio Paso, Barangay Mabuhay, San Fernando, Bukidnon, where SPO2 Llorin
was stationed. The motorcycle was then flagged down, and SPO2 Llorin asked petitioner for his OR/CR. However,
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he failed to produce the documents. The police authorities then became suspicious that the motorcycle might have
been stolen considering petitioner's failure to produce the OR/CR. Moreover, upon inspection of the motor vehicle,
the police officers chanced upon a plastic cellophane protruding from the tools compartment. When petitioner
opened the tools compartment, the police officers found a small bundle of dried marijuana placed inside a
transparent cellophane.
The police officers then scrutinized the motorcycle and further found the same transparent cellophane in the
driver seat. Upon opening the driver's seat, the police officers discovered five more bundles of marijuana wrapped
in a cellophane. Immediately after, the police officers brought petitioner to the police station where he was further
interviewed and eventually detained. The marijuana specimen were brought to the laboratory for examination.
Based on the foregoing, while it is true that the root of the encounter of the police officers and the petitioner was due
to the mobile check point in implementation of the COMELEC gun ban, the arrest was not made by reason of the
COMELEC gun ban or any traffic violation. Instead, it was in light of petitioner's failure to present his OR/CR,
which raised suspicions on the part of the police officers, prompting them to inquire further and look into the motor
vehicle, on the theory that petitioner might be committing a crime or the motor vehicle itself is the subject of the
crime already committed. The consequent search conducted by the police officers led to the confiscation of
marijuana from petitioner.

4. Administrative Arrests
5. Exclusionary Rule
E. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

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 1. Private and Public Communications
2. When Intrusion is Allowed
3. Exclusionary Rule
F. Freedom of Speech and Expression
1. Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment
2. Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations
3. Facial Challenges and Overbreadth Doctrine
4. Tests to Determine the Validity of Governmental Regulation
5. State Regulation of Different Types of Mass Media
6. Commercial Speech
7. Unprotected Speech
G. Freedom of Religion
1. Non-Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
2. Benevolent Neutrality and Conscientious Objector
3. Tests to Determine the Validity of Governmental Regulation
a) Clear and Present Danger
b) Compelling State Interest
H. Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel
1. Scope and Limitations
2. Watch-List and Hold Departure Orders
I. Right to Information
1. Scope and Limitations
J. Eminent Domain
1. Concept
2. Public Use
3. Just Compensation
4. Expropriation by Local Government Units
K. Right to Association
1. Scope and Limitations
L. Non-Impairment of Contracts
1. Scope and Limitations
M. Free Access to Courts and Adequate Legal Assistance
N. Custodial Investigation
1. Meaning of Custodial Investigation
2. Rights of a Person Under Custodial Investigation
3. Requisites of a Valid Waiver
4. Exclusionary Doctrine
O. Rights of the Accused
1. Criminal Due Process
2. Bail
3. Presumption of Innocence
4. Right to be Heard
5. Right to Counsel
6. Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation
7. Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
8. Right of Confrontation
9. Right to Compulsory Processes
10.Trial in Absentia

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 P. Right to Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition of Cases
IN PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES EVERY PERSON'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF CASES. ARTICLE III, SECTION 16 STATES:
SECTION 16. ALL PERSONS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
THEIR CASES BEFORE ALL JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.

The Court, IN CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN, laid down the GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING IF
THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES:

FIRST, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the
rationale for both rights is the same, the RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL MAY ONLY BE INVOKED IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST COURTS OF LAW. The RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF CASES, HOWEVER, MAY BE INVOKED BEFORE ANY TRIBUNAL, WHETHER JUDICIAL OR
QUASI-JUDICIAL.
What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy
disposition of cases to be invoked.

SECOND, a CASE IS DEEMED INITIATED UPON THE FILING OF A FORMAL COMPLAINT prior
to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case.
Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations
prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been
inordinate delay.

THIRD, COURTS MUST FIRST DETERMINE WHICH PARTY CARRIES THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars,
and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of
proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is
invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or
clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not
contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the
prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the
complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was
suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

FOURTH, DETERMINATION OF THE LENGTH OF DELAY IS NEVER MECHANICAL. Courts must

consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of
the issues raised.
An EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely
motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite
utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the
proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be
dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the
right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no
longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out
and discussed by the relevant court.

FIFTH, the RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES OR THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
MUST BE TIMELY RAISED. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the
statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of
cases.
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 Applying the guidelines in CAGANG, the Court finds that there is a violation of respondents' right to
speedy disposition of cases.
PERIOD FOR FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION NOT INCLUDED IN THE
DETERMINATION OF INORDINATE DELAY.
Initially, it is VERY CLEAR IN CAGANG that the period taken for fact-finding investigations shall not be
included in the determination of whether there is inordinate delay; the period shall be reckoned from the filing of a
formal complaint.[70] IN OTHER WORDS, INORDINATE DELAY ON CASES FILED WITH THE OMB
PRIMARILY PERTAINS TO THE PERIOD TAKEN FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
In this regard, the Sandiganbayan erred in including the period for fact-finding in its determination
of the period relevant to inordinate delay.

In fine, the OMB's preliminary investigation of the case started from the filing of the complaint on
July 4, 2011 and ended on the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on September 11, 2017.
Again, the period for fact-finding investigations shall not be included in the determination of inordinate delay. Thus,
it took six years, two months, and seven days for the OMB to conduct its preliminary investigation. The question
now is whether this amount of time constitutes inordinate delay.

PROSECUTION BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF; IT FAILED TO SHOW THAT

THE DELAY WAS REASONABLE.
Cagang states that the burden of proof to justify the delay shifts depending on when the right was invoked.
The defense bears the burden if the right was invoked within the periods prescribed by this Court, the Rules of
Court, or the OMB for the conduct of preliminary investigation; the prosecution bears the burden if the right was
invoked beyond the set periods, and it must show that the delay was justifiable under the factors provided in
Cagang.
As the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman then in effect do not provide for the
period within which the preliminary investigation shall be concluded, the periods provided for in Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court shall have suppletory application. [74] Applying Sections 3(f) and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the graft investigation officer shall have 10 days after the investigation to determine probable cause;
then, he has five days from resolution to forward the records of the case to THE OMBUDSMAN, WHO
SHALL ACT UPON THE RESOLUTION WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM RECEIPT.
Here, it is clear that the prescribed periods were not observed. As can be gleaned, the case was submitted
for resolution on November 4, 2013. But looking closely, records show that the last pleading was submitted on June
14, 2012, when respondents submitted their position papers. As there were no further submissions or orders for
parties to submit further pleadings as well as hearings, the case should have been submitted for resolution as early as
June 14, 2012.
It was only on October 5, 2016 when the OMB issued a resolution finding probable cause, which is almost
three years after the case was submitted for resolution, or more than four years from the date the last pleadings were
submitted—clearly way beyond the 10-day period. Further, the Ombudsman herself approved the resolution only on
March 22, 2017, which is almost six months after the issuance of the resolution—again way beyond the five-day and
10-day period respectively prescribed for the transmittal of the records to her office and for her to act upon the
resolution.
The next step is the determination of when respondents invoked their right to speedy disposition of
cases. The timing of invocation affects which side bears the burden of proof to justify the delay. Records show that
the earliest time respondents invoked the right was when respondent Monteros filed a motion for reconsideration of
the OMB October 5, 2016 Resolution. The right was invoked after the lapse of the periods prescribed, resulting to
the burden shifting to the prosecution.
As the prosecution bears the burden, it shall prove that the delay was reasonable. Following the parameters
in Cagang, the prosecution failed to do so. It merely made allegations that the OMB is deluged with cases and that
the instant case is complex. These excuses fail to convince the Court.
While the Court recognizes the reality of institutional delay in government agencies, including the OMB,
this solely does not justify the office's failure to promptly resolve cases before it. [77] The OMB cannot just claim
institutional delay or the "steady stream" of cases reaching its office as an excuse for not resolving cases timely.
After all, the Constitution itself, as enforced and bolstered by The Ombudsman Act of 1989, requires the OMB to
promptly act on complaints filed before it against public officials and government employees. As further stated in
jurisprudence, the allegation of heavy case load of a particular government agency should "still be subject to proof
as to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the importance of the right to speedy disposition of cases as a
fundamental right." The OMB should clearly show that delay is inevitable because of the peculiar circumstances of
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each specific case, which it failed to do so in this case. The OMB here failed to show that this specific procurement
of fertilizer had peculiar circumstances to make delay inevitable.
The Court understands that the instant case is part of the so called "Fertilizer Fund Scam" cases. However,
this does not mean that the case is highly complex that requires a serious amount of time. Records show that the
instant case involves only one transaction: the procurement of fertilizer that was paid in two tranches. There is also
no allegation that respondents here conspired with other government officials involved in the other Fertilizer Fund
Scam cases elsewhere in the country. Further, there are only seven respondents. To add, the OMB was in effect
assisted by the COA in the latter's issuance of the NOD. In fact, it was the primary basis of the Task Force's filing of
the complaint. Likewise, there was no showing that the records of this case were voluminous that would necessitate
a number of years for the conduct of review.
In the cases of JAVIER V. SANDIGANBAYAN[80] and CATAMCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN[81] (Catamco),
which also involve the "Fertilizer Fund Scam," the OMB also posited the same arguments of complexity and
voluminous records. The Court, in ruling that there was inordinate delay, disregarded the OMB's arguments absent
proof as regards the assertions. Similarly in the instant case, the OMB did not show proof of complexity and volume
that would make the delay inevitable and justified.

For the Court, the delay was unreasonable. Six years, two months, and seven days for the
preliminary investigation of a case involving a single transaction and seven respondents is too long a period
for this Court to accommodate.
RESPONDENTS SUFFERED PREJUDICE.
In addition to the discussion, the prosecution must show that respondents did not suffer prejudice as a result
of the delay. In this regard, the prosecution failed to show that respondents did not suffer prejudice. The Court
recognizes that the inordinate delay places the accused in a protracted period of uncertainty which may cause
"anxiety, suspicion, or even hostility."[82] The Court also recognizes that the lengthy delay would result to the
accused's inability to adequately prepare for the case which would result to the deterioration or loss of evidence,
leading to impairment of the accused's defense.
Thus, it is inevitable that respondents in this case suffer the same predicament. Surely, they suffered
anxiety due to the long period of uncertainty while waiting for the resolution of the case. The delay affected their
ability to prepare for their defense. As found by the Sandiganbayan, respondents suffered public humiliation and
embarrassment as a result of the case dragging on for so long. These circumstances constitute the actual
prejudice that respondents have suffered as a result of the delay.
RIGHT WAS TIMELY INVOKED.
Cagang requires that the right to speedy disposition of cases must be timely raised. IN CATAMCO AND
ALARILLA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, the Court, applying Cagang, considered the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the OMB resolution finding probable cause as a timely invocation of the right.
Here, the Court considers the motion for reconsideration [88] filed by Monteros before the OMB
sufficient for purposes of determining whether the respondents' right to speedy disposition had been violated.
Her invocation of the right in the motion is deemed to cover the other respondents as they are co-respondents
in a single case and it assails a single resolution that applies to all of them. In any event, worthy of great
consideration is respondents' immediate filing of the motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan after the
filing of the Information. These circumstances show that respondents did not in any way sleep or waive their
right to speedy disposition of cases.
CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF CASES WAS UNDOUBTEDLY INFRINGED. The Sandiganbayan therefore did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the criminal case against them.
As for respondent Palacio, the Court notes that the instant petition did not assail the Sandiganbayan
September 7, 2018 Resolution that dismissed the criminal case as against her. The instant petition assails only the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions that dismissed the criminal case as against the rest of the respondents. Thus, Palacio's
acquittal still stands.

Q. Right Against Self-Incrimination

1. Scope and Limitations
2. Immunity Statutes
R. Right Against Double Jeopardy
1. Requisites and Limitations

Page 12 of 22
 S. Right Against Involuntary Servitude
T. Right Against Excessive Fines, and Cruel and Inhuman Punishments
U. Non-Imprisonment for Debts
V. Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
W. Writs of Habeas Corpus, Kalikasan, Habeas Data, and Amparo

III. Social Justice and Human Rights

A. Concept of Social Justice
B. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
C. Commission on Human Rights
1. Powers and Functions

IV. Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports

A. Academic Freedom

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

I. Regalian Doctrine

II. Public Trust Doctrine [See Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. Secretary of the DENR, G.R. No. 202897 and
companion cases, August 6, 2019]

III. Nationalist and Citizenship Requirement Provisions

IV. Exploration, Development, and Utilization of Natural Resources

V. Acquisition, Ownership, and Transfer of Public and Private Lands

VI. Concept of Ancestral Domain (Including Ancestral Lands)

VII. Practice of Professions

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ELECTION LAW,

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

I. Law on Public Officers

A. General Principles
B. Modes of Acquiring Title to Public Office
C. Modes and Kinds of Appointment
D. Eligibility and Qualification Requirements

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 E. Disabilities and Inhibitions of Public Officers
F. Powers and Duties of Public Officers
G. Rights of Public Officers
H. Liabilities of Public Officers
3. Preventive Suspension and Back Salaries
4. Illegal Dismissal, Reinstatement, and Back Salaries
I. Immunity of Public Officers
J. Distinguish: De Facto and De Jure Officers
K. Termination of Official Relation
1. Involuntary Retirement [See Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona,
AM. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021]
L. The Civil Service
1. Scope
2. Appointments to the Civil Service
3. Personnel Actions
M. Accountability of Public Officers
1. Types of Accountability
a) Administrative
b) Criminal
2. Discipline
a) Grounds
b) Jurisdiction
c) Dismissal, Preventive Suspension, Reinstatement and Back
Salaries
d) Condonation Doctrine
3. Impeachment v. Quo Warranto [See Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco
Corona, AM. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021]
4. The Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor [Sections 5
to 14, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989”]
a) Functions
b) Judicial Review in Administrative Proceedings
c) Judicial Review in Penal Proceedings
5. The Sandiganbayan
6.
The Sandiganbayan acts as a "trial court" in resolving criminal cases against government officials or employees. 150
"'The Sandiganbayan is a special court tasked to hear and decide cases against public officers and employees, and
entrusted with the difficult task of policing and ridding the government ranks of the dishonest and corrupt.'"

N. Term Limits

II. Administrative Law

A. General Principles
B. Administrative Agencies
C. Powers of Administrative Agencies
1. Quasi-Legislative (Rule-Making) Power
a) Kinds of administrative rules and regulations
b) Requisites for Validity
2. Quasi-Judicial (Adjudicatory) Power
IN DAYRIT V. NORQUILLAS

IT SHOULD BE READ AND UNDERSTOOD TO PROVIDE THAT FIRST-LEVEL COURTS HAVE

JURISDICTION ON EJECTMENT CASES EVEN IF THE LAND IS PUBLIC IN CHARACTER AS LONG
AS THE CASE IS NOT AN AGRARIAN DISPUTE. THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF THE LAND DOES
NOT DIVEST THE COURTS OF JURISDICTION OVER EJECTMENT CASES. HOWEVER, IF THE
EJECTMENT CASE IS FOUND TO BE AN AGRARIAN DISPUTE, THE FIRST-LEVEL COURTS WILL
BE DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CARL, AS AMENDED. The
controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject
land.

Then there is the more recent case of CHAILESE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. V. DIZON [85]
(CHAILESE), which clarifies the jurisdiction of the DARAB over agrarian disputes:
Thence, having settled that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the Court now

Page 14 of 22
proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is
obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are
present:

A. THERE IS AN ALLEGATION FROM ANY ONE OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES THAT THE CASE IS
AGRARIAN IN NATURE; AND

B. ONE OF THE PARTIES IS A FARMER, FARMWORKER, OR TENANT. [86]RA 9700 REINFORCED

THE JURISDICTION OF DAR AS ALREADY PROVIDED IN THE ORIGINAL CARL.

PRELIMINARILY, AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURTS AND THE APPELLATE COURT IN THE
INSTANT CASE, IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT HEREIN
PERTAIN TO FORCIBLE ENTRY. HOWEVER, PURSUANT TO DAVID, IT IS NOT AUTOMATIC
THAT THE MCTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE. THERE IS A NEED
TO DETERMINE IF THE CASE INVOLVES AN AGRARIAN DISPUTE.

From this, the Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry. As
pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, this case meets the two requirements for automatic
referral, as set out by RA 9700 and as summarized in Chailese.[89] Thus, the Court finds that the case is
cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.

The first requirement is the presence of an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is
agrarian in nature. Here, despite the filing of the forcible entry case, respondents have been consistent on
alleging that the controversy is agrarian in nature. In their answer filed before the MCTC, they alleged that
the land in dispute were awarded to them as CARP beneficiaries. [90] The RTC, on appeal, also touched upon
matters of allegations of agrarian dispute in relation with jurisdiction of the courts. [91] The CA also did the
same and in fact dismissed the complaint after finding that the issue of possession was linked to an agrarian
dispute brought by the issuance of CLOAs to respondents. [92] In their comment filed before this Court,
respondents maintain that the case is an agrarian dispute.[93]
As stated by RA 9700, mere allegation of the existence of an agrarian dispute is enough. In this case, this
requirement was met when respondents made consistent allegations of the existence of an agrarian dispute
pursuant to the CLOAs issued to them.

As to the second requirement, Chailese adds that proof must be adduced as to the person's status as farmer,
farmworker, or tenant.[94] In this case, it is undisputed that respondents are farmers of the subject lands.
Indeed, the records did not expressly show any agreement of whatever kind that respondents were farmers of
Angelina's lands. However, the CA and the DAR Secretary (in the exemption from CARP case) here
recognized the status of respondents as farmers. [95] This was not disputed by Angelina. Further, their status as
farmers was cemented by the subsequent award of Angelina's lands to them by virtue of CLOAs. This is also
shown by the cases Angelina initiated regarding the annulment of CLOAs, exemption from CARP coverage,
and this forcible entry case. Thus, the second requirement is met.

In any case, even without the mandate of automatic referral at that time, the MCTC should have dismissed
the case after hearing the parties as the law is clear prior to the amendment that the DAR, through the
DARAB, has jurisdiction on agrarian disputes involving transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries. [96] CLOAs were issued to respondents being
the beneficiaries of CARP. Recipients of CLOAs acquire ownership of the lands awarded. [97] As respondents
entered the subject parcel of lands by virtue of the CLOAs, this entry, despite being characterized by
Angelina as forcible entry, is clearly a controversy relating to and arising from the terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership to agrarian reform beneficiaries.

THE COURT, THEREFORE, AGREES WITH THE CA IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION. THE DAR, THROUGH THE DARAB, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT
CASE FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY FOR BEING AN AGRARIAN DISPUTE.

a) Administrative Due Process

b) Administrative Appeal and Review
c) Administrative Res Judicata
3. Fact-finding, Investigative, Licensing, and Rate-Fixing Powers
D. Judicial Recourse and Review
1. Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction
2. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
IN PRC V. ALO
WHILE THE CA HAS JURISDICTION, ALO FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES, AND THUS, UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES, HER CASE MUST BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
Despite having established that the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the question of giving
due course to the Rule 43 petition is a different issue.
Page 15 of 22
The PRC laments the fact that Alo disregarded its procedural rules as quoted earlier, and that it was not given any
chance to review the decision of the Board. It argues that under the RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence; premature resort to the
courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action.
The Court agrees.
The DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES is grounded on practical reasons,
including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own errors, as well
as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing
them of the laborious and costly resort to courts.
In REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LACAP, this Court explained the rationale behind the DOCTRINE OF
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES as follows:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
COROLLARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS THE
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
Of course, this general rule allows for some exceptions, which have been repeatedly outlined by this Court. The case
of The ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MALOLOS, INC. V. THE HEIRS OF MARIANO MARCOS, citing
previous jurisprudence, provides:
However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions that include situations where the very
rationale of the doctrine has been defeated. The Court has taken many occasions to outline these exceptions,
including its observation in SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., ET AL. V. SELUDO, JR., to wit:
True, THE DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public
interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
However, the records would show that none of these exceptions are present in this case. Alo filed the petition
for review with the CA on May 2, 2013 without any justification or reason on why she did not file an appeal with
the PRC instead, considering that the latter is the proper procedure and it was still within the 15-day reglementary
period. Not only is this a blatant disregard of procedural rules, but also a denial of an opportunity for the PRC to
review the Board's decision and if necessary, correct or modify the same, without resorting to the judiciary and
unnecessarily adding to the courts' already clogged dockets. This is definitely contrary to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and thus, the CA should have dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action.
3. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

The PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES is not without

exception.

Jurisprudence would reveal that the Court has set aside such rule:
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

Election Law
Page 16 of 22
 E. Suffrage
1. Qualifications and Disqualification of Voters
2. Registration and Deactivation of Voters
3. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings
4. Local and Overseas Absentee Voting
5. Detainee Voting
F. Candidacy
1. Qualifications and Disqualifications of Candidates
2. Filing of Certificates of Candidacy
a) Effect of Filing
b) Substitution and Withdrawal of Candidates
c) Nuisance Candidates
d) Duties of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
G. Campaign
1. Premature Campaigning
2. Prohibited Contributions
3. Lawful and Prohibited Election Propaganda
4. Limitations on Expenses
5. Statement of Contributions and Expenses
H. Remedies and Jurisdiction
1. Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy
2. Petition for Disqualification
3. Failure of Election, Call for Special Election
4. Pre-Proclamation Controversy
5. Election Protest
6. Quo Warranto
a) COMELEC
b) Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
c) House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
7. Recall
I. Prosecution of Election Offenses [Exclude: Penal Provisions]

III. Local Government

A. Public Corporations
1. Concept; Distinguished from Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporations

In the 2006 MIAA Case, this Court discussed the definition of a government instrumentality and a
GOCC with regard to the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code). Section 2 (10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines an "instrumentality" as follows:

SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. — x x x

(10) INSTRUMENTALITY refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Emphasis supplied)

The definition of "instrumentality" under the above-quoted provision uses the phrase "includes x x x
[GOCCs]," which means that a government "instrumentality" may or may not be a "GOCC." Obviously,
the term government "instrumentality" is broader than the term "GOCC," which has a separate definition
under Section 2 (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code:

SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. — x x x

(13) GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION refers to any agency

organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That
government-owned or controlled corporations may further be categorized by the Department of
Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for the purpose of the
exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to

Page 17 of 22
such corporations.

The fact that two terms have separate definitions means that while a government "instrumentality" may
include a "GOCC," there may be a government "instrumentality" that will not qualify as a "GOCC."

A close scrutiny of the definition of "GOCC" in Section 2 (13) will show that LRTA would not fall under
such definition. LRTA is a government "instrumentality" that does not qualify as a "GOCC." As
explained in the 2006 MIAA Case:

A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION must be "organized as a

stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.
MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has
no stockholders or voting shares. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3 of the Corporation Code defines a STOCK CORPORATION as one whose "capital
stock is divided into shares and x x x authorized to distribute to the holders of such shares
dividends x x x." MIAA has capital but it is not divided into shares of stock. MIAA has no
stockholders or voting shares. Hence, MIAA is not a stock corporation.

MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. Section 87 of the
Corporation Code defines a NON-STOCK CORPORATION as "one where no part of its
income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or officers." A non-stock
corporation must have members. Even if we assume that the Government is considered as the
sole member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their members. Section 11 of the
MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the
National Treasury. This prevents MIAA from qualifying as a non-stock corporation.

Section 88 of the Corporation Code provides that NON-STOCK CORPORATIONS are

"organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal,
literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and
like chambers." MIAA is not organized for any of these purposes. MIAA, a public utility, is
organized to operate an international and domestic airport for public use.

Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation, MIAA does not qualify as a
government-owned or controlled corporation. What then is the legal status of MIAA within the
National Government?

MIAA IS A GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY vested with corporate powers to perform

efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the
only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

WHEN THE LAW VESTS IN A GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY CORPORATE

POWERS, THE INSTRUMENTALITY DOES NOT BECOME A CORPORATION. Unless
the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus,
MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying
of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under
the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order." 48 (Emphasis in the original)

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the primary test in determining whether an entity is a GOCC is
how it was organized. In other words, the 2006 MIAA Case provides that unless a government
instrumentality was organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, then it must not be considered as a
GOCC as defined in the Administrative Code.

2. Classifications
a) Quasi-Corporations
b) Municipal Corporations
(1) Elements
(2) Nature and Functions
(3) Requisites for Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger
or Dissolution
B. Principles of Local Autonomy

Page 18 of 22
 C. Autonomous Regions and Their Relation to the National Government
D. Local Government Unit (LGU)
1. Powers
Pertinent provisions of the LGC provide, to wit:
TITLE ONE. — BASIC PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER 2. — GENERAL POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
SECTION 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. — Local government units
SHALL HAVE THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH AN
ORGANIZATION that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation
of their development plans, program objectives and priorities; x x x
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 76. Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. — Every local government
unit shall design and implement its own organizational structure and staffing pattern
taking into consideration its service requirements and financial capability, subject to
the minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
TITLE THREE. — THE CITY
CHAPTER 2 — CITY OFFICIALS IN GENERAL
SECTION 454. Officials of the City Government. — (a) There shall be in each city a
mayor, a vice-mayor, Sangguniang Panlungsod members, a secretary to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, a city treasurer, a city assessor, a city accountant, a city budget officer, a city
planning and development coordinator, a city engineer, a city health officer, a city civil
registrar, a city administrator, a city legal officer, a city veterinarian, a city social welfare
and development officer, and a city general services officer.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The Sangguniang Panlungsod may:
(1) Maintain existing offices not mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) hereof;
(2) Create such other offices as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the city
government; or
(3) Consolidate the functions of any office with those of another in the interest of
efficiency and economy.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, from the foregoing provisions, the LGC ITSELF EMPOWERS CITY GOVERNMENTS
TO IMPLEMENT AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CREATE STAFFING
PATTERNS FOR THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE OFFICES. Along the same lines, the LGC also empowers the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to create, through local ordinances, other offices or consolidate the functions of any
office with those of another in the interest of efficiency and economy.
IN GATCHALIAN v. URRUTIA
There is a clear contrary statutory provision expressed in Section 8 (b) (1) (jj) of RA 8526 72 or the
Charter of Valenzuela City. The section specifically provides that the city mayor has the duty to ensure that the
city's executive officials and employees faithfully discharge their duties and functions, and cause to be instituted
administrative or judicial proceedings against any city official or employee who may have committed an
offense in the performance of his official duties. This provision is directly lifted from Section 455 (b) (1) (x) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides, to wit:
Section 455. Chief Executive; Powers, Duties and Compensation. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city
mayor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs,
projects, services, and activities of the city government and in this
connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Ensure that all executive officials and employees of
the city faithfully discharge their duties and functions as provided
by law and this Code, and cause to be instituted administrative or
judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city

Page 19 of 22
 who may have committed an offense in the performance of his
official duties;
The law is clear and explicit.
In this case, Gatchalian, as the city mayor, had the express power to discipline Urrutia, the Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the City Employees Cooperative, when he committed Sexual Harassment acts
against Laron, in accordance with the Local Government Code and the Charter of Valenzuela City.
Furthermore, Section 87 of the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the local chief executive to
impose the appropriate penalty on erring subordinate officials and employees under his or her jurisdiction, to
wit:
Section 87. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — Except as otherwise provided by law, the local chief
executive may impose the penalty of removal from service, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one
(1) year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months' salary, or reprimand and otherwise
discipline subordinate officials and employees under his jurisdiction. If the penalty imposed is suspension
without pay for more than thirty (30) days, his decision shall be final. If the penalty imposed is heavier than
suspension of thirty (30) days, the decision shall be appealable to the Civil Service Commission, which shall
decide the appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.
a) Police Power
b) Eminent Domain
c) Taxing Power
d) Closure and Opening of Roads
e) Legislative Power
(1) Requisites of Valid Ordinance
(2) Local Initiative and Referendum
f) Corporate Powers

In LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. CITY OF PASAY, represented by

the CITY TREASURER and the CITY ASSESSOR, respondent

The following elements in order to qualify as a GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY

WITH CORPORATE POWERS (GICP) or government corporate entity (GCE) can be
distilled, to wit:

(a) agency of the government;

(b) neither a corporation nor agency integrated within the departmental framework;

(c) vested by law with special functions or jurisdiction;

(d) endowed with some if not all corporate powers;

(e) administering special funds; and

(f) enjoying operational autonomy usually through a charter.

As applied in this case, LRTA still clearly qualifies as a GICP/GCE under the definition provided in
Section 3 (n) of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011.

LRTA IS AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT

An AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT refers to "any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein." 52 There is no dispute that LRTA is a
unit of the government. It performs public service, it is attached to the Department of Transportation
(DOTr), and its authorized capital is fully subscribed by the Republic of the Philippines.

LRTA IS NEITHER A CORPORATION NOR IS IT INTEGRATED WITHIN THE

DEPARTMENTAL FRAMEWORK

As previously explained, LRTA is not a GOCC precisely because it is neither a stock nor non-stock
corporation. LRTA is also not integrated within the departmental framework despite being attached to
the DOTr, as will be discussed in detail later.

LRTA IS VESTED WITH SPECIAL FUNCTIONS

LRTA is given the primary responsibility for the "construction, operation, maintenance, and/or lease of
light rail transit systems in the Philippines, giving due regard to the reasonable requirements of the

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 public transportation system of the country."

LRTA IS ENDOWED WITH CORPORATE POWERS

LRTA was specifically created as a "corporate body" that is capable, among others, to prescribe and
modify its own by-laws, to sue and be sued, and to contract any obligation.

LRTA ADMINISTERS SPECIAL FUNDS

LRTA is capitalized by up to P3,000,000,000.00, and is tasked to manage its own revenues to meet its
expenditures, 57 to contract domestic and foreign loans to carry out its operations, and to establish a
sinking fund to redeem bonds it issues.

LRTA ENJOYS OPERATIONAL AUTONOMY THROUGH ITS CHARTER

As held in the 2019 LRTA Case, LRTA exists by virtue of a charter and its powers and functions are
vested in and exercised by its Board of Directors independent of outside interference.

Undoubtedly, in light of the ruling in 2006 MIAA Case and the statutory definition under the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011, We conclude that LRTA IS A GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY
VESTED WITH CORPORATE POWERS to perform efficiently its governmental functions. LRTA is
like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that LRTA is vested with corporate
powers.

LRTA is merely an attached agency to the DOTr.

The City posits a theory that LRTA cannot be a government instrumentality since the latter is allegedly
integrated within the department framework, and is thus inconsistent with the definition of a
government instrumentality in the Administrative Code, to wit:

Obviously, for a government agency to be considered as an instrumentality, it must not be

integrated within a department framework, meaning it must not be included, incorporated or
attached to any department under the executive branch of the government. As it specifically
provided in its charter, LRTA is attached to the Ministry of Transportation and
Communication (now Department of Transportation and Communication, DOTC, for
brevity). This is likewise affirmed in Executive Order No. 210 dated 7 July 1987 amending
E.O. 603 to conform with the reorganization of the DOTC to which the LRTA is attached. 60
(Emphasis in the original)

Section 2 (10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as:

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not

integrated within the department framework vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

g) Ultra Vires Acts

2. Liability of LGUs
3. Settlement of Boundary Disputes
4. Vacancies and Succession of Local Officials
5. Recall
6. Term Limits

PART TWO: PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

I. Sources of Obligations
A. Treaties
1. Concept of Jus Cogens (Peremptory Norms of International Law)
2. Reservations, Withdrawal, Termination, and Rebus Sic Stantibus
B. Customary International Law
1. Elements
2. Obligations Erga Omnes
C. General Principles of Law
D. Application of International Law by Domestic Courts
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 1. Monism
2. Dualism
3. Inverted Monism
4. Harmonization

II. International Legal Person

A. States
1. Elements
2. Recognition of States and Governments
B. Non-State Entities
C. International Organizations
D. Status of Individuals and Corporations

III. Jurisdiction
A. Basis of Jurisdiction
1. Territoriality Principle
2. Nationality Principle
3. Protective Principle
4. Passive Personality Principle
B. Title to Territory
C. Adjacent Maritime Seas
1. Territorial Sea
2. Contiguous Zone
3. Exclusive Economic Zone
4. Continental Shelf
D. Jurisdiction Over Persons and Economic Activity
1. Criminal Jurisdiction
a) General Theory
b) Extradition
2. Civil Jurisdiction
3. Immunity from Jurisdiction
a) Sovereign Immunity
b) Diplomatic and Consular Immunity
4. Areas Not Subject to Jurisdiction of Individual States
a) High Seas
b) Deep Seabed
c) Outer Space

IV. International Responsibility

A. Concept of Imputability of Internationally Wrongful Act or Omission
B. Reparation
C. International Protection of Human Rights (Including Refugees and Stateless
Persons)
1. Remedies Under Treaty-Based Mechanisms
D. International Minimum Standard and National Treatment (Including
Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Properties)
E. Environmental Harm
1. Precautionary Principle
F. International Claims

V. Dispute Resolution
A. Legality of the Use of Force
B. Concept of International and Non-International Armed Conflicts
1. The Role of the International Criminal Court
C. Judicial and Arbitral Settlement
1. International Court of Justice
2. Permanent Court of Arbitration

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