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LAST MINUTE NOTES IN POLITICAL LAW

(BASED ON THE PONENCIAS OF JUSTICE CAGUIOA)

1. BOTE v. SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES

• The Bill of Rights was intended to preserve and guarantee the life, liberty, and property of
persons against unwarranted intrusions of the State. In the absence of government interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State, or its agents.
Stated differently, the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private individuals, or in cases
where there is no participation by the State either through its instrumentalities or persons acting
on its behalf.

• There is no dispute that Bote, at the time of the incident, was a municipal mayor—a government
official. However, the records are bereft of any indication that, during the incident, he was acting
as such, or on behalf of or upon authority of the State. Indeed, as factually found by the CA, Bote
was acting as a private individual or in his personal capacity, and the incident arose from
a private dispute between Bote and SPCPI involving a private property. While his wrongful acts
may give rise to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities at the same time, each must be
determined in accordance with applicable law.

• Here, it is clear that the private character of Bote's acts makes the Bill of Rights inapplicable.
Thus, while SPCPI can continue to insist that Bote violated its rights through his alleged illegal
and oppressive acts, SPCPI cannot invoke Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution to
sustain an administrative case against Bote. SCPCI may find redress through a civil or criminal
suit, but not through an administrative one.

2. PEOPLE v. SAPLA; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE

• Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive
warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to
an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to
a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.” Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search
that goes beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle necessitates probable cause on the part
of the apprehending officers.

• The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that in situations involving warrantless
searches and seizures, "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped
information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."

• To be sure, information coming from a complete and anonymous stranger, without the police
officers undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their own, cannot reasonably produce
probable cause that warrants the conduct of an intrusive search. In fact, as borne from the
cross-examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the authorities did not even personally receive and examine
the anonymous text message. The contents of the text message were only relayed to them by a
duty guard, whose identity the police could not even recall. Simply stated, the information
received through text message was not only hearsay evidence; it is double hearsay.

• Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possibly arise
from double hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped information. Therefore,

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with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search,
considering that the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely
on an unverified and anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant
Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

• Neither can the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla be considered a valid stop and frisk
search. The Court has explained that stop and frisk searches refer to 'the act of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.' Thus, the
allowable scope of a 'stop and frisk' search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for
weapons." The search conducted by the authorities on accused-appellant Sapla went beyond a
protective search of outer clothing for weapons or contraband. Moreover, the Court has held that
information from an informant is mere suspicion that does not validate a stop and frisk search.

• Neither can the Court consider the search conducted on accused appellant Sapla as a valid
consented search. In the instant case, the totality of the evidence presented convinces the Court
that accused-appellant Sapla's apparent consent to the search conducted by the police was not
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be
seriously denied that accused-appellant Sapla was subjected to a coercive environment,
considering that he was confronted by several armed police officers in a checkpoint. In fact, from
the testimony of PO3 Mabiasan himself, it becomes readily apparent that accused-appellant
Sapla's alleged voluntary opening of the sack was not unequivocal. When PO3 Mabiasan asked
accused-appellant Sapla to open the sack, the latter clearly hesitated and it was only "[a]fter a
while [that] he voluntarily opened [the sack]. At most, accused-appellant Sapla's alleged act of
opening the blue sack was mere passive conformity to a warrantless search conducted in a
coercive and intimidating environment. Hence, the Court cannot consider the search conducted as
a valid consented search.

3. VALMORES v. ACHACOSO; FREEDOM OF RELIGION

• Respondents suggest that the "sacrifices" of other students of the common faith justified their
refusal to give petitioner Valmores exceptional treatment. This is non-sequitur. Respondents brush
aside petitioner Valmores' religious beliefs as if it were subject of compromise; one man's
convictions and another man's transgressions are theirs alone to bear. That other fellow believers
have chosen to violate their creed is irrelevant to the case at hand, for in religious discipline,
adherence is always the general rule, and compromise, the exception.

• While in some cases the Court has sustained government regulation of religious rights, the Court
fails to see in the present case how public order and safety will be served by the denial of
petitioner Valmores' request for exemption. Neither is there any showing that petitioner Valmores'
absence from Saturday classes would be injurious to the rights of others. Precisely, the 2010
CHED Memorandum was issued to address such conflicts and prescribes the action to be taken
by HEIs should such circumstance arise. What is certain, as gathered from the foregoing, is that
respondents' concerted refusal to accommodate petitioner Valmores rests mainly on extra-legal
grounds, which cannot, by no stretch of legal verbiage, defeat the latter's constitutionally-
enshrined rights. That petitioner Valmores is being made by respondents to choose between
honoring his religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his
religious freedoms. As the final bulwark of fundamental rights, this Court will not allow such
violation to perpetuate any further.

4. COTESCUP v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

- Power of Judicial Review
• The political question doctrine is "no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from

-­

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judicial inquiry or review" under the expanded definition of judicial power of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Section 1, Article VIII thereof authorizes courts of justice not only "to
settle actual case controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable"
but also "to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

• In determining whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government, the Court is guided
primarily, by the Constitution, and secondarily, by existing domestic and international law,
which set limits or conditions to the powers and functions conferred upon these political
bodies. Thus, when a case is brought before the Court with serious allegations that a law or
executive issuance infringes upon the Constitution, as in these consolidated cases, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the Court to settle the dispute. In doing so, the Court is
"not judging the wisdom of an act of a coequal department, but is merely ensuring that the
Constitution is upheld." And, if after said review, the Court does not find any constitutional
infringement, then, it has no more authority to proscribe the actions under review.

• Moreover, that the assailed laws and executive issuances did not involve the exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial function is of no moment. Contrary to the Solicitor General's
assertion, it has long been judicially settled that under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the
writs of certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, any act of any
branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.

• The following requisites must first be complied with before the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review, namely: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of
constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the
very lis mota of the case. Of these four, the most important are the first two requisites.

• An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute since the courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues
through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," and a question is ripe when the act being challenged has a direct effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
that an act had been accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court
may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to himself as a result of the challenged action.

• Legal standing refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.
- Enrolled Bill Doctrine
• Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment.

• Jurisprudence will show that the Court has consistently adhered to the enrolled bill doctrine.
Claims that the required three-fourths vote for constitutional amendment has not been

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obtained, that irregularities attended the passage of the law, that the tenor of the bill approved
in Congress was different from that signed by the President, that an amendment was made
upon the last reading of the bill,144 and even claims that the enrolled copy of the bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted by the conference
committee, had all failed to convince the Court to look beyond the four corners of the enrolled
copy of the bill.

• As correctly pointed out by private respondent Miriam College, petitioners' reliance

on Astorga is quite misplaced. They overlooked that in Astorga, the Senate President himself,
who authenticated the bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect
there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. Without such attestation, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the Court was constrained to consult the entries in the
journal to determine whether the text of the bill signed by the Chief Executive was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress.

• In stark contrast to Astorga, this case presents no exceptional circumstance to justify the
departure from the salutary rule. The K to 12 Law was passed by the Senate and House of
Representatives on January 20, 2013, approved by the President on May 15, 2013, and, after
publication, took effect on June 8, 2013. Thus, there is no doubt as to the formal validity of
the K to 12 Law.
- Undue delegation of legislative power
• In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power,
the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate must be set
forth therein. The sufficient standard test, on the other hand, mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented.

• Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in
all essential terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to
the DepEd, CHED and TESDA. The fact that the K to 12 Law did not have any provision on
labor does not make said law incomplete. The purpose of permissible delegation to
administrative agencies is for the latter to "implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by 'filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide." With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the legislature has found it necessary to entrust to administrative agencies, who are supposed to
be experts in the particular fields assigned to them, the authority to provide direct and
efficacious solutions to these problems. This is effected by the promulgation of supplementary
regulations, such as the K to 12 IRR jointly issued by the DepEd, CHED and TESDA and the
Joint Guidelines issued in coordination with DOLE, to address in detail labor and management
rights relevant to implementation of the K to 12 Law.
- Police power of the State
• Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for
nullity must be clear beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for the Court to nullify the assailed
laws, petitioners must clearly establish that the constitutional provisions they cite bestow upon

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them demandable and enforceable rights and that such rights clash against the State's exercise
of its police power under the K to 12 Law.
- Non-self-executing constitutional provisions
• As defined, "a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action."

• The sections found under Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution are not self-executing
provisions. Sections 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of Article II, Section 13 of Article XIII, and Section
2 of Article XIV, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respectively, are non-self-executing. The
very terms of these provisions show that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but merely guidelines for legislation. And the failure of the legislature to pursue the
policies embodied therein does not give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

• Petitioners cannot claim that the K to 12 Law and/or any of its related issuances contravene or
violate any of their rights under the foregoing constitutional provisions because these
provisions simply state a policy that may be "used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws." They
do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. K to 12 Law and its related
issuances cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners' bare allegations that they violate
general provisions of the Constitution which are mere directives addressed to the executive and
legislative departments. If these directives are unheeded, the remedy does not lie with the
courts, but with the power of the electorate in casting their votes.
- The K to 12 Law does not violate substantive due process and equal protection of the laws
• It is established that due process is comprised of two components, namely, substantive due
process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and
competent tribunal.

• Substantive due process, the aspect of due process invoked in this case, requires an inquiry on
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his property.
Hence, two things must concur: (1) the interest of the public, in general, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, requires the intervention of the State; and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on
individuals. Here, the K to 12 Law does not offend the substantive due process of petitioners.

• Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common goal, was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason. This, petitioners' failed to sufficiently show.

• Equal protection clause does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be
treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as
such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law,
concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the
classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.

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5. PNOC v. NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION; EMINENT DOMAIN

• Because the right of eminent domain is a power inherent in sovereignty, it is a power which need
not be granted by any fundamental law. Hence, Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" is
not a grant, but only a limitation of the State's power to expropriate.

• It has been held that, as an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains
primarily to the legislature. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government. However, the power to expropriate is not exclusive to Congress. The latter may
delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public
entities. In the hands of government agencies, local governments, public utilities, and other
persons and entities, the right to expropriate is not inherent and is only a delegated power. In
fact, even as to municipal corporations, it has been held that they can exercise the right of
eminent domain only if some law exists conferring the power upon them. Hence, with the right of
eminent domain not being an inherent power for private corporations, whose right to expropriate
is granted by mere legislative fiat, the delegate's exercise of the right of eminent domain is
restrictively limited to the confines of the delegating law. The scope of this delegated legislative
power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in
strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.

• Therefore, with respondent NGCP's power to expropriate being a mere delegated power from
Congress by virtue of R.A. No. 9511, respondent NGCP's exercise of the right of eminent domain
over the subject property must conform to the limits set under the said law. Section 4 of R.A. No.
9511 is clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity. Respondent NGCP is allowed to exercise the
right of eminent domain only with respect to private property.

6. PADPAO v. COMELEC
- Moot and Academic
• An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because
the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already
been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to
be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.

• There are recognized exceptions to the rule; thus, the Court has seen fit to decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

• The present case falls within the fourth exception. For this exception to apply, the following
factors must be present: (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration; and. (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same action.
- Resolution No. 10015 does not violate the equal protection clause and the non-impairment
of contracts clause.

• As to the violation of the non-impairment clause, petitioner's claim cannot be countenanced.

The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article III of the Constitution is limited in
application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes

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the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those
agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. In this
case, PSAs' contracts with their clients are not affected in any manner by the requirement of
having to obtain from the COMELEC written authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms
outside of their residence or place of work and in public places, during election period. All that
PSAs must do is to secure such authority.

7. CITY OF BATANGAS v. SHELL; VALID ORDINANCE

• Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Moreover, substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable.

• Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, police power primarily rests with the State. In furtherance of the State's policy to
foster genuine and meaningful local autonomy, the national legislature delegated the exercise of
police power to local government units (LGUs) as agents of the State. Such delegation can be
found in Section 16 of the LGC, which embodies the general welfare clause. Since LGUs
exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is incumbent upon them to act in
conformity to the will of their principal, the State. Necessarily, therefore, ordinances enacted
pursuant to the general welfare clause may not subvert the State's will by contradicting national
statutes.

• It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the
laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide
application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the
declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances
which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every
power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the
ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.

• The Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates
unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water which, by virtue of
the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting the Assailed
Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the
Assailed Ordinance ultra vires. Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null
and void. Thus, it becomes unnecessary to still determine if it complies with the other substantive
requirements for a valid ordinance - i.e., that the ordinance is fair and reasonable. In any case, it
bears emphasizing that the measure of the substantive validity of an ordinance is the underlying
factual basis for which it was enacted. Hence, without factual basis, an ordinance will necessarily
fail the substantive test for validity.

8. PTRI ET. AL v. COURT OF APPEALS; STATE IMMUNITY

• In the instant case, it is not disputed that PTRI is an unincorporated national government agency.
Hence, being an unincorporated government agency that exercises a governmental function,
ordinarily, the PTRI enjoys immunity from suit. Further, the employees of PTRI acting in their
official capacity likewise enjoy this immunity from suit, as "public officials may not be sued for
acts done in the performance of their official functions or within the scope of their authority.”
However, needless to say, the rule on State immunity from suit is not absolute. The State may be
sued with its consent. The State's consent to be sued may be given either expressly or impliedly.

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• Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. As held in Department of
Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission, "the general law waiving the immunity of
the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government 'consents and
submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.”' Applying the
foregoing, it is not disputed that PTRI entered into a Contract of Works for the Rehabilitation of
Electrical Facilities of PTRI Main Building and Three Pilot Plants with B.A. Ramirez. It is
likewise not disputed that the cause of action of E.A. Ramirez's Complaint is the alleged breach
of the subject Contract. In other words, PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving liability
arising from a contract. Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunity from suit finds
application.

• Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be subjected to suit when the
State enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the
level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

• In the instant case, not only did PTRI descend to the level of a contracting party by entering into
the subject Contract, under the subject Contract itself, which contemplated a situation wherein
legal action may arise from the execution of the agreement and incorporating provisions on the
procedures to be undertaken in settling legal disputes, PTRI also manifested unequivocally its
consent to be subjected to suit with respect to disputes arising from the subject Contract. Further,
the subject Contract was clearly not executed in the exercise of PTRI's governmental function of
aiding the textile industry.

9. PANGILINAN v. CAYETANO; TREATY WITHDRAWAL (not a ponencia but a very important

case)

• The extent of legislative involvement in withdrawing from treaties is further determined by

circumstances attendant to how the treaty was entered into or came into effect. Where legislative
imprimatur impelled the president's action to enter into a treaty, a withdrawal cannot be effected
without concomitant legislative sanction. Similarly, where the Senate's concurrence imposes as a
condition the same concurrence for withdrawal, the president enjoys no unilateral authority to
withdraw, and must then secure Senate concurrence.

• Thus, the president can withdraw from a treaty as a matter of policy in keeping with our legal
system, if a treaty is unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute.
However, the president may not unilaterally withdraw from a treaty: (a) when the Senate
conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or (b) when the
withdrawal itself will be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter
into a treaty, or an existing law which implements a treaty.

10. NICOLAS-LEWIS v. COMELEC; FREEDOM OF SPEECH (not a ponencia but an important

case per Atty. Loanzon)

• A facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a
proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by
means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms. Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even constitutionally-
protected rights. On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.

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• Facial invalidation of laws is generally disfavored as it results to entirely striking down the
challenged law or statute on the ground that they may be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. Hence, an on-its-face invalidation of the law has
consistently been considered as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be used "sparingly and only as
a last resort.” The allowance of a review of a law or statute on its face in free speech cases is
justified, however, by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of
which should not at all times be abridged.

• The determination of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech has
always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint. The
paramount consideration in the analysis of the challenged provision, therefore, is the nature of the
restraint on protected speech, whether it is content-based or otherwise, content-neutral. A
content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule, while courts will
subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

• Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as amended by R.A. No. 10590, is an impermissible content-
neutral regulation for being overbroad, violating, thus, the free speech clause under Section
4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The questioned provision is clearly a restraint on one's
exercise of right to campaign or disseminate campaign-related information. Prior restraint refers
to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination. Undoubtedly, the prohibition under the questioned legislative
act restrains speech or expression, in the form of engagement in partisan political activities,
before they are spoken or made.

The restraint, however, partakes of a content - neutral regulation as it merely involves a regulation
of the incidents of the expression, specifically the time and place to exercise the same. It does not,
in any manner, affect or target the actual content of the message. It is not concerned with the
words used, the perspective expressed, the message relayed, or the speaker's views. More
specifically, the prohibition does not seek to regulate the exercise of the right to campaign on the
basis of the particular message it conveys. It does not, in any manner, target the actual content of
the message. xxx Simply put, regardless of the content of the campaign message or the idea it
seeks to convey, whether it is for or, otherwise against a certain candidate, the prohibition
was intended to be applied during the voting period abroad.

• The fact that the questioned regulation applies only to political speech or election-related speech
does not, by itself, make it a content-based regulation.

• Being a content-neutral regulation, we, therefore, measure the same against the intermediate
test, viz.: ( 1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) such governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of the free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on the alleged freedom of
expression is no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.

• The restriction must not be broad and should only be narrowly-tailored to achieve the purpose. It
must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to make speech. In this
case, the challenged provision's sweeping and absolute prohibition against all forms of expression
considered as partisan political activities without any qualification is more than what is essential
to the furtherance of the contemplated governmental interest. On its face, the challenged law
provides for an absolute and substantial suppression of speech as it leaves no ample alternative
means for one to freely exercise his or her fundamental right to participate in partisan political
activities.

• We cannot accept the OSG's argument that the prohibition was intended to apply to candidates
only, whose exercise of the right to campaign may be regulated as to time, place, and
manner. Again, the overbroad language of the questioned provision, i.e., "any person" is

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prohibited to engage in any partisan political activity within the voting period abroad, betrays
such argument. The general term "any person" should be understood to mean "any person" in its
general sense as it was not clearly intended to be restricted to mean "candidates only.”

• A facial invalidation of the questioned statute is warranted to counter the "chilling effect" on
protected speech that comes from its overbreadth as any person may simply restrain himself from
speaking or engaging in any partisan political activity anywhere in order to avoid being charged
of an electoral offense. Indeed, an overbroad law that "chills one into silence" should be
invalidated on its face.

• The challenged provision, whether on its face or read with its IRR, constitutes a restriction on free
speech that is greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest it aims
to achieve. Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189 should be struck down for being overbroad as it does
not provide for well-defined standards, resulting to the ambiguity of its application, which
produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech and expression, and ultimately, resulting
to the unnecessary invasion of the area of protected freedoms. Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as
amended by R.A. No. 10590, is unconstitutional for violating Section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

“When the time is right, the Lord will make it happen.”