1.

A. Doctrine: As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the

inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death -
not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the
partition, nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no
interruption between the end of the decedent's ownership and the
start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Dolores Hacbang vs. Atty. Basilio Alo, GR. No.
191031, October 5, 2015

C. Facts: Bishop Hacbang was survived by his parents, Basilio and

Maria Hacbang, and his siblings, leaving properties behind. In his
will he instituted half of his estate to his parents and the other half
to Dolores. The will was accepted for probated but was archived
before the proceeding was completed.
D. Issue: W/N the ownership of properties passes to the heirs even
without completing the probate. (No)
E. Held: Article 777 of our Civil Code provides that the inheritance
vests immediately upon the decedent’s death without a moment’s
interruption. Heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed with
specific properties do not require Court adjudication to identify
which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already
identified these. From the very moment of the testator’s death,
title over these particular properties vests on the heir, legatee, or
devisee.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Costs against the petitioners.

2.
A. DOCTRINE: Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the
pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, while an
heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another
person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new
certificate of title covering specific property in his/her name, a final
order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the
final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first
be had. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Salitico vs. Heirs of Felix, GR. No. 240199, April 10,
2019

C. Facts: A complaint for Specific Performance with Damages

(Complaint) filed on February 15, 2011 by the petitioners Sps.
Salitico against the Heirs of Resurreccion. By virtue of a last will,
the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda,
Resurreccion, as a devisee. Resurreccion, as the new owner of
the subject property, executed a document entitled
Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa, which transferred ownership over the
parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter
then took physical possession of the subject property. Recaredo,
the administrator of the estates, demanded Spouses Salitico to
vacate the lot, because such transaction was claimed to be
premature, during the probate proceedings.

D. Issue: W/N an heir may dispose of his/her inheritance provided it

does not cause preterition. (Yes)

E. Held:  Article 777 operates at the very moment of the

decedent's death meaning that the transmission by succession
occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, at that
precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired
ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time
of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution." Thus, there is
no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her hereditary share
immediately after such death.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated October 19, 2017 and Resolution dated June 7, 2018 of
the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division and Former Special Twelfth
Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 105166 are PARTIALLY
REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents
Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix to DELIVER the owner's duplicate
copy of Owner's Certificate of Title No. P-1908 to the petitioners Sps.
Salitico.

With respect to the petitioners Sps. Salitico's prayer compelling the

Register of Deeds to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of
title in their favor, for the reasons stated above, the said prayer
is DENIED.

3.

1. DOCTRINE:  A marriage contracted by any person during

subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse. (Civil Law)

B. Case Title: Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic, GR. No. 230751, April 25,
2018
C. Facts: Estrellita filed before the RTC of Tarlac City a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband. Wilfredo was a
member of the PC and was declared MIA. He filed this case because
she needs to claim benefits. OSG claims that the RTC should have
dismissed the case, arguing that a petition for presumption of death is
only for the purpose of re marrying, not claiming benefits.

D. Issue: W/N Article 41 only applies to the purpose of remarriage.

(Yes)

E. Held: The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed

by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the
application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of
death established therein is only applicable for the purpose
of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court
declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans'
Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their
consideration.

4.

A. DOCTRINE: Article 167 as couched, clearly shows that Congress

did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely
legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides
that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the
lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate
parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate
descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was
crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was
intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by
nature or adoption. (Civil Code)

B. Case Title: Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. SSS, GR. No. 192531,

November 12, 2014

C. Facts: John was adopted Cornelio Colcol. He was a seaman that

qualifies him to be enrolled under the government's Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, an accident occurred on
board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his
untimely death the following day. Bernardina, his biological mother filed
for death benefits, that was denied by the SSS. Cornelio is also found to
be dead, by virtue of a death certificate.

D. Issue: W/N Bernardina is a qualified beneficiary. (Yes)

E.Held: The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all

parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by
adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not
distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or
assistance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010

Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case
No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is
hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary
of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina
P. Bartolome.
 5.

A. DOCTRINE: The principle of transmission as of the time of the

predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by
other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of
the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed
as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the
donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death
of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are
deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948). (Civil Law)

B. Case Title: Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia,

GR. No. 184148, June 9, 2014

C. Facts: Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime.

The first marriage was with Encarnacion Silverio. During the
subsistence of this marriage, their parents acquired the above-
mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother Francisca
Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however,
their parents failed to register the same. Pedro Calalang entered into a
second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. Pedro Calalang filed an
application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of
Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming
sole and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing
the fact that he had three children with his first spouse. As a result, on
September 22, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2871 in favor of Pedro Calalang only.

Respondents argue that it belonged to the conjugal partnership of the

first marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio.

D. Issue: W/N the property belongs to the conjugal property of the

second marriage. (No)
E.Held: The Court cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that
the disputed property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground that
the title was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira
Berba [Calalang]." The property belongs to the estate of the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The

Decision dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008
of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-M-91, or
the Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property
filed by the respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of
Malolos, Bulacan, on June 10, 1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

6.

A. DOCTRINE : Under the Civil Code, when the brothers and sisters of
a deceased married sister survive with her widower, the latter shall be
entitled by law to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters to the other half1 The Civil Code likewise states that this
successional right of the legal heirs is vested in them from the very
moment of the decedent's death. (Civil Law)

B. Case Title: Treyes vs. Larlar, GR. No. 232579, Sept. 8, 2020

C.Facts: When Rosie died, his husband self-adjudicated all the

properties of the estate for himself. However, Rosie left seven siblings,
whom all are asking a part of the estate. Treyes, Rosie’s husband
contended that they should be judicially declared as heirs before they
can partake in succession.
D. Issue: W/N there is a need for determination of Heirship, before
successional rights kick in. (No)

E.Held: Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the

legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over
the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding.

Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil

action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear
that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review

on Certiorari under Rule 45 is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
August 18, 2016 and Resolution dated June 1, 2017 promulgated by
the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, Nineteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP
Case No. 08813 are hereby AFFIRMED.

7.

A. DOCTINE: The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in

Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion
sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of
the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or
legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.
On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the
condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to
succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate;
and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is
similar to a resolutory condition. (Succession)

Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an

obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition
unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention
of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal and not conditional. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA, GR. No. 113725, June 29,
2000

C. Facts: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of

testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of
the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee
of parcel of land surveyed and lodged in the Bacolod Cadastre. The
plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-
heirs to reconvey/return the lot to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza, the cancellation of title in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of
the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

D. Issue: W/N there is modal institution based on the codicil. (Yes)

E.Held: The institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in

the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New
Civil Code is the provision of law in point. The manner of institution of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of

the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-
35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

8.

1. DOCTRINE: Philippine Law does not recognize common law

marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. (Civil Law)

B. Case Title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario Adriano, GR. No. 182894,
April 22, 2014

In 1992, As none of the family members was around, Valino

(concubine) took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial
expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario (legal wife) learned about the
death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that
she delay the interment for a few days but her request was not heeded.
The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of
the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Adriano’s were not
able to attend the interment. The family claimed that they be
indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred
to the family plot.

C. Issue: W/N Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano. (No)

D. Held: It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty
to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner. Art. 308. Of the Civil Code
provides: No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or
exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294
and 305.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

9.

A. DOCTRINE :"Article 800 of the Civil Code. The law presumes that
every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time
of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of
the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will
was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity
of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."

B. Case Title: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte, GR.

No. 157451, December 16, 2005

C. Facts: Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in

English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but
acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the
entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause,
and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on
the left-hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second
page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the
attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin. The
allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds
that testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the
alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility and the
signature of Placido Valmonte was procured by fraud.
.

D. Issue: W/N the will can be allowed for probate. (Yes)

E.Held: Article 839, of the Civil Code states the instances when a will
may be disallowed. We stress that the party challenging the will bears
the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution.
The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only
upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately, in
this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no
evidence of fraud was ever presented. In determining the capacity of
the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines in Articles 798 800. It must be noted that despite
his advanced age, testator was still able to identify accurately the kinds
of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their
locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient
that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. There being no showing
of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

10.

A. DOCTRINE: NCC Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is
of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time
of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of
the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will
was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity
of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

B. Case Title: Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489,
April 11, 2012
C. Facts: Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last
will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss
Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13,
1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G.
Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that
the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her
signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and then on the
left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all

her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife
Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine
Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April
27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance
of Letters of Administration in his Favor. Rosie Mateo, one of the
petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to as “magulyan” or
forgetful, because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen
then start looking for it. Moments later, hence she was mentally
incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.

D. Issue: W/N Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her

last will and testament for having been forgetful. (No)

E. Held: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a

person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As provided
under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary
that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury, or other cause.It shall be sufficient if the testator was
able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act. Furthermore, Rosie’s conclusion that Paciencia was
magulyan was only based on her personal assessment in contrast to
Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when
the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the
Will.

The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the

testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are
truthful and intelligent. Lastly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15,

2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.

11.

A. DOCTRINE: One of the decisive characteristics of a

donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered
void if the donor should survive the donee.(Reyes v. Mosqueda)

B. Case Title: Danilo Aluad vs. Zenaido Aluad, GR. No. 176943,
October 17, 2008

C. Facts: Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad and respondent

Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde
Aluad and Crispin Aluad On November 14, 1981, Matilde
executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real
Property Inter Vivos" in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria
covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband
Crispin. On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to
respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will
and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to
Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to
 respondent.The RTC declared the plaintiffs as rightful owners but
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it holding
that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis
causa not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not,
comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the
Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and
had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with
Article 805 of the Civil Code.
.

D. Issue: W/N the Deed of Donation complied with the formalities of

a will. (No)

E. Held: The phrase in the earlier quoted Deed of Donation "to

become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits
of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not
intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’
mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime. Matilde retained
ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose
them. That the donation is mortis causa is fortified by Matilde’s
acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said
properties which remained under her name; appropriated the
produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued
under her name. The donation being then mortis causa the
formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not,
as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses
following Article 805 of the Civil Code. Further, the witnesses did
not even sign the attestation clause the execution of which clause
is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will
and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the
pages of the will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Testamentary Succession (Arts 782-795 NCC)

-Characteristics of a Will
-Testamentary Capacity
-Holographic Wills (Arts 796-803)
-Qualifications and Disqualifications as witnesses

CASES:

1.

A. DOCTRINE: Wills that are executed abroad can be probated here in

the Philippines even if it has not yet been probated and allowed in the
country it was executed

- Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.

Requisites for probate and allowance of will

(a) the jurisdictional facts;

Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his

residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate
he left in such province.

(b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent;

(c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and

(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
having custody of it.

It does not require that a will executed abroad must have already been
probated and allowed in the country it was executed.
Probate of a will that is presented for the first time before a competent
court is different from Reprobate of a will already probated abroad

Reprobate is governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.

In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the

foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas, GR. No.

169144, January 26, 2011

C. Facts: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S.

citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as
the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and
in the U.S. Private respondent Ernesto filed with the RTC a petition for
the probate of Ruperta’s will and for the former’s appointment as special
administrator of her estate. Petitioners, nephews of Ruperta (the
nephews), opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed
it. The RTC allowed the will to be probated in the Philippines. This was
affirmed by CA.  Hence petitioners files this instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to this Court.

D. Issue: W/N a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in

the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed. (Yes)

E.Held:  Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who
is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.

Moreover, our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of

a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and
character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for
whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts
refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution. Hence our laws do not
prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. 

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court
of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

2.

A. DOCTRINE: The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1)

primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory
heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other
compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary
compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who
succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents
and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring
compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or
the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the
surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs. (Succession)

B.Case Title: Amelia Arellano vs. Francisco Pascual, GR. No. 189776,
December 15, 2010
C. Facts: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999
leaving his siblings as heirs, namely: a) petitioner Amelia who is
represented by her daughters; b) Agnes c) Nona d) Francisco and
Miguel Pascual. In a petition for “Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate
and Issuance of Letters of Administration,” filed by the respondents
before the RTC of Makati, there is an allegation that the donation to
petitioner is an advance of her legitime. The said property is now
registered under the name of the petitioner. Provisionally passing,
however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedent’s estate,
the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the
presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold
that it is subject to collation; An appeal to the CA was made,
questioning the order of the trial court to include the property subject of
the donation as part of the advance inheritance of the petitioner.

D.Issue: W/N the property subject of the donation is subject of collation.

(No)

E. Held: The decedent left no compulsory heir who is entitled to

legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing
was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to
petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
“stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There
being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject
to collation. The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a
mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations
made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it
is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative
title by the testator during his lifetime. The purposes of collation are to
secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible,
and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that in
officious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there
are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the
legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded. The decedent’s remaining estate should
thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives,
herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to Art. 1003 and 1004 of
the NCC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner,
Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr.
is set aside.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin,

Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to
conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining
what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever
remains of it equally among the parties.

3.

A. DOCTRINE: The law prohibits reciprocal succession between

illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even
though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems
that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from)
another... illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of
the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers
and... sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the
prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration.
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and... legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when
all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if
begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing
before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We
submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate
brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood
brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the... half-
blood, they shall share equally. (Succession)

Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive

presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that
no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. On the
other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption
of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence
to the contrary. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Josefa Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa vs. Heirs of

Marciana Rustia Vda. De Damian, GR. No. 155733, January 27, 2006

C. Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and

without descendants. Petitioners and respondents are their respective
relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. 

The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa and

Guillermo were never married. According to petitioners, Guillermo
proposed marriage to Josefa. They eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in
the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa as
one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo with
five other children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another
son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon and Felisa’s union is in dispute.

D. Issue: W/N the absence of a marriage contract is absolute proof that

marriage did not take place. (No)
E.Held: Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence
of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact
took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence
may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not
necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be
enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate
of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport
issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less
than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the
titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to
Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was
presented by petitioners.

Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they

primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo
Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually,
the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not
but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The
assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is

hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the

intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall
pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who
survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full-
or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at
the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and
 grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the
trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa

Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares
shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr.
(who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares
shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates

of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as
may be determined by the trial court.

4.

A. DOCTRINE: Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition

for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate
heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that
they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution. (Civil Law)
B. Case Title: Lolita D. Enrico vs. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, GR.
No. 173614, September 28, 2007

C. Facts: The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed

with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio
and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were
married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents. On
May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the
requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later.
They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man
and a woman who have been living together for at least five years
without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was
not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the
marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date
of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio
could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional
ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness
which made its performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together
as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly;
hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license.
She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in
the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal
Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of
the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living
who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

D. Issue: W/N the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Eulogio and Lolita (No)
E.Held: Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective
March 14, 2003, covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order.
The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does
not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs
can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed
in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is
ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of
the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

5.

A. DOCTRINE: Private respondents must not be barred from proving

filiation because the law provides that filiation of an illegitimate child is
established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission by means of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument. Action for recognition may be brought by the
child during his/her lifetime. However, action must be based upon open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. (Family)

B.Case Title: Michael C. Guy vs. CA, GR. No. 163707, September 15,
2006
C. Facts: Karen Oanes Wei, a minor by and through her mother
Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration before the
RTC of Makati. Respondents alleged that they are duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati on
October 29, 1992, leaving an estate of P10,000,000.00 consisting of
real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. Respondents are a asking for an appointment of a
regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate.
They also want to appoint Michael C. Guy as Special Administrator of
the Estate. Petitioner is praying for the dismissal of the petition for the
reason that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be
settled without securing letters of administration. He argued that private
respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei.

D. respondents from claiming their Successional Rights. (No)

E.Held: Private respondents cannot be bar from claiming successional

rights. To be valid and effective, waiver must be couched clearly and in
unequivocal terms to leave no doubt with regards to the intention of a
party in giving up a right or benefit legally pertains to. Waiver cannot be
attributed to a person if it not explicitly and clearly evinces intent to
abandon a right. This case has no waiver of hereditary rights.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742
affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution
dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.

6.
 A. DOCTRINE: Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily
to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of
the inheriting ascendant. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Mendoza vs. Delos Santos, GR. No. 176422. March
20, 2013

C. Facts: The subject parcel of land in this case was in the name of
respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-
half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings. Petitioners who are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza
(Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga) alleged that the
properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that
were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to
Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse
Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria; but thereafter went to
Gregoria when Leonor died after. Gregoria died intestate, and
thereafter, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto
herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor
and Gregoria. 

Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved
by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them,
applying Article
D. Issues:

1. W/N the CA grievously erred in holding that the subject properties are
not reservable properties, coming as they do from the family line of the
petitioners Mendozas. (NO)
2. CA grievously erred in holding that the petitioners Mendozas do not
have a right to the subject properties by virtue of the law on reserva
troncal. (NO)

E. Held: The CA is correct. Based on the circumstances of the

present case, Article 891 on Reserva Troncal is not applicable.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was
received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;

(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the

property;

(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law; and

(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be

reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the
first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the
property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute
originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who
received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have
been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by
gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does not give anything in return. At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the
properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.

Petitioners, Mendoza et al cannot be considered

reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree
of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the
degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the
property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners
are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First
cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios. 

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio

and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to
the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties
came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and
nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the
prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November
16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This
Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of
Gregoria.

Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the
determination of ownership of the properties in question.

7.

A. DOCTRINE: Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is not voidable if the party

is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party's
consent is vitiated but is unenforceable as an unauthorized contract.
However, the consent may be proven to have been acquired by
preponderance of evidence such as acts showing they were aware of
the contract and did nothing to oppose it. (Remedial Law)

The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition requires an SPA if an heir is signing

in representation of the other co-heirs otherwise it will be
unenforceable. However, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is not
unenforceable in the case at bar given the circumstance of the case
showed the co-heirs were aware or consented to the signing. (Remedial
Law)
B. Case Title: Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. vs. Heirs of Liberato M.
Ureta, GR. No. 165748, September 14, 2011

C. Facts: Alfonso Ureta had 14 children, including, Policronio. The

children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to validity of the
Extrajudicial Partition. On October 1969, in order to reduce the
inheritance taxes, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale in favor of
his children including Policronio. Since the sales were only made for
taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso
continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. On
October 11, 1972, Alfonso died and his children acted as the
administrator of his father’s estate. On November 22, 1974, Policronio
died. The subject land under the deed of sale was never taken
possession by Policronio nor his heirs. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s
heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the
lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were
previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado,
Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. On July 30,
1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the
July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. Believing that the six parcels
of land belonged to their late father, and excluded from the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle
but despite earnest efforts, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession over the subject
land.

D. ISSUE: W/N the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid. (No)

E.HELD: The Deed of Sale entered between Alfonso and Policronio is

void for being an absolutely simulated sale. No actual consideration or
money was given and there was no actual intent to enter into a sale. It
was merely to avoid tax purposes The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
did not need an SPA because partition among heirs is not legally
deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of
ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but
rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that
an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives
the inheritance. Partition is not an act of strict dominion which requires
an SPA. In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the
heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written
memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions
effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved.

In the case of Badillo v. Ferrer, the court held a deed of extrajudicial

partition is not voidable by lack of parties to give consent but
unenforceable as an unauthorized contract in 1403(1). However, the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not unenforceable but, in fact, valid,
binding and enforceable against all the Heirs of Policronio. because of
several circumstances which show they gave their consent to Conrado
to sign on their behalf such as that Extra-Judicial Partition was signed
on 1989 but the siblings only came to know about it 1995, 5 years after,
and Conrado didn’t inform his siblings during such span; Conrado
retained possession of land
under the Extra-Judicial Partition; 1 year after the sale, the Heirs of
Policronio executed an SPA to have the land under the Extra-Judicial
Partition be the subject of mortgage. Such acts show the Heirs of
Policronio were aware of the said Partition and the vitiation of consent is
a mere afterthought

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition

in G.R. No. 165930 is GRANTED. The assailed April 20, 2004 Decision
and October 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71399, are hereby MODIFIED in this wise:

(1) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989,

is VALID, and

(2) The order to remand the case to the court of origin is

hereby DELETED.
 8.

A. DOCTRINE: NCC ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic

will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

B. Case Title: Enrique S. Lopez vs. Diana Jeanne Lopez, GR. No.
189984, November 12, 2012

C. Facts: Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will
and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of
letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition
contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed
and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. 

The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with the
required statement in the attestation clause as to the number of pages
used upon which the will is written. While the acknowledgment portion
stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it
has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it
disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in
accordance with law.

D. Issue: W/N the discrepancy between the number of pages in the

attestation clause and the actual number of pages in the will that would
warrant its disallowance. (Yes)

E.Held: The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly,

Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide that the attestation must
state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The
purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages. Here, the will actually consists of 8 pages
including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained
by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of
evidence aliunde.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

9.

A. DOCTRINE: The so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or
difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The later
decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line
with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any
part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the
will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its
confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or
absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation
eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
(Evidence)

B. Case Title: Testate Estate of the Late Alipio Abada vs. Alipio Abaja,
GR. No. 147145, January 31, 2005

C. Facts: Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray
("Toray") died sometime in September 1943.  Both died without
legitimate children. Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings,
Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that in an Order dated
16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already
submitted the case for decision.  Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a
Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that
there is substantial compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law
directs and that the petitioner through his testimony and the deposition
of Felix Gallinero was able to establish regularity of the execution of the
said Will and further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or
substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada
dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed probate.

D. Issue: W/N Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of

whether the will of Abada is written in a language known to Abada (Yes)

E.Held: Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not

indicate that it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator. 

There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the

testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter
that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further
argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show
that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish
language used in the will.  However, Alipio testified that Abada used to
gather Spanish-speaking people in their place.  In these gatherings,
Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This
sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.

We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada's will. 

Abada's will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three
other persons.  It is reasonable to conclude that there are three
witnesses to the will.  The question on the number... of the witnesses is
answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for
presentation of evidence aliunde.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12

January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644.
 10.

A. DOCTRINE: What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite

the existence of omissions is that such omissions must be supplied
by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence. “However, those omissions which cannot be
supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation
of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.”

An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause

indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the will.
However, as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied
in the Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is
composed of four pages, the Acknowledgment included. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Margie Santos Mitra vs. Perpetua Sablan- Guevarra,

GR. No. 213994, April 18, 2018

C. Facts: Margie Santos Mitra filed a petition for the probate of the
notarial will of Remedios Legaspi. Mitra alleged she is a de facto
adopted daughter of Legaspi and Legaspi left a notarial will
instituting Mitra along with Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan-
Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and
devisees.

Perpetua Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio Sablan opposed the petition.

They aver that the will was not executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law since the last page of the will which
contained the Acknowledgment was not signed by Legaspi and her
instrumental witnesses. Further the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages upon which the will was written. The number of pages
was however supplied by the Acknowledgment portion.

D. Issue: W/N the failure to sign the last page of the will is fatal to the
will’s validity. (No)
E.Held: It is a skewed stance in insisting that the testator Legaspi and
the instrumental witnesses should have signed on the last page of the
subject will. When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to
subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end
thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends. As the
probate court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not
contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the
Acknowledgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 22,2013 and Resolution dated August 15, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93671 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128 of Caloocan City in SP.
Proc. Case No. C-3450 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. The case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

11.

A. DOCTRINE: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the

number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will
whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not
contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any
one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all
three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Felix Azuela vs. CA, GR. No.122880, April 12, 2006

C. Facts: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial

will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was opposed by Geralda
Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the
decedent. According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with
several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is
that the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public, Petronio
Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng
Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”

D. Issue: W/N the will is fatally defective as it was not properly

acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code. (Yes)

E. Held: The will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation

can those words be construed as an acknowledgment.

An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in

going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his
act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signore
actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has
attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it

does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an
affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document
was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.

Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat,
the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of
Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely
subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof,
much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental
witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal
safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent
of the testator.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

Conflict Rules (Arts. 825-827)

CASES:

1.

A. DOCTRINE: NCC Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad

produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed
by law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
prescribes.”

B. Case Title: Salud Teodoro Vda. De Perez vs. Hon. Zotico A. Tolete,
GR. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

C. Facts: Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-
Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a successful
medical practice in New York, USA.

On August 23, 1979, Dr. Jose executed a last will and testament,
bequeathing to his wife “all the remainder” of his real and personal
property at the time of his death “wheresoever situated.” In the event he
would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children
and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He
appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr.
Rafael Jr. as substitute executor.

In his will, Dr. Jose provided that should he and his wife die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of their deaths, the presumption is that he died first.

Four days later, Dr. Evelyn executed her own last will and testament,
containing the same provisions as that of her husband. Likewise, she
provided that should she and her husband died under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of their deaths, it should be presumed that he died first.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Jose and his entire family perished when they
were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Jr. as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate
proceedings for the probate thereof in the Surrogate Court of the
County of Onondaga, New York. The wills were admitted to probate and
letters testamentary were issued in his favor.

On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn,
filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the
two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also
asked that she be appointed as special administratrix of the estate of
the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel,
Bulacan. She was granted letters of special administration and posted
bond in the amount of PHP 10,000.00. As special administratrix, Salud
consolidated the assets of the Cunanan spouses, including the bank
deposits of Dr. Jose.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose opposed and asked to be notified
of the proceedings as heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. But their status as
heirs were disputed by Salud, who said that they were only collaterals
and not heirs as “heirship is only by institution” under a will or by
operation of the law of New York. Since the will of Dr. Jose provided a
presumption that he predeceased his wife, his estate passed on to his
wife, Dr. Evelyn. Salud, being the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn, thus inherited
the estate of the Cunanan spouses.

The Cunanan heirs soon asked that the RTC proceedings be nullified
and that the appointment of Salud as special administratrix be set
aside. They also asked that Dr. Rafael Sr., brother of Dr. Jose, be
appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses. They alleged that the Cunanan heirs and Salud had entered
into an agreement in the United States “to settle and divide equally the
estates.”

RTC issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills,

recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix,
requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property
received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending
incidents moot and academic.  The RTC Judge reasoned out that
petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and
allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills
were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence
of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the
foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines.

Salud’s motion for reconsideration was granted. In another order, the

RTC Judge held that the documents presented did not establish the law
of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills but granted a
motion to submit additional evidence to prove the law of New York.
However, the RTC Judge ruled that the probate of two wills in a single
proceeding is not procedural.

D. ISSUE : W/N the two wills probated outside the philippines may be
reprobated in the Philippines. (Yes)
F. Held: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were
American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines: Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which

have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the
due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws
of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the
first and law requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which
the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that
our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts
should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best
evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is
probated or denied probate.

The separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly

There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view
that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and
therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate
probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal
and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the
rules shall be “liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”

A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only

result in the delay in the administration of justice.

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In the
case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since
the two will contains essentially the same provisions and pertain to
property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical
considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a
number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent

Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit
evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan
spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to
the probate proceedings.

2.

A. DOCTRINE: A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the

testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to
probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.).  An owner's intention to confer title
in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime
for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent:
she needed to generate income from the house on account of the
physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
(Succession)

B.Case Title: Carmen Cañiza vs. CA, GR. No. 110427, February 24,
1997

C. Facts: Being then 94 years of age, Carmen Cañiza was declared

incompetent by judgment of the RTC in a guardianship proceeding
instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. The latter was
appointed as the legal guardian of her person and estate. Cañiza was
the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. In relation thereto, she
through her Evangelista commenced a suit to eject spouses Pedro and
Leonora Estrada from said premises. In the complaint, it was alleged
that Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question and that
out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses to temporarily
reside in her house, rent-free. In the answer, the respondents declared
that in consideration of their faithful service, they had been considered
by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a
holographic will where she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and
lot in question. The MTC ruled in favor of Cañiza. The RTC, however,
reversed this decision. The CA upheld the RTC decision. In so ruling, it
said that while said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the
proper court, could not be the basis of respondents' claim to the
property, it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Cañiza that
respondents are to continue in their occupancy and possession so
much so that Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to
have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the
respondents out. To this, Caniza alleges error on the part of the CA for
relying on a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will which is irrelevant
to this case.

D. Issue: W/N CA erred in taking into consideration the alleged will of

Cañiza in deciding the issue. (YES)

E.Held: The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by
Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession
thereof and legally incapacitated Evangelista from evicting them
therefrom since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
This must fail. A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the
testator's death, it may be changed or revoked and until admitted to
probate, it has no effect whatever. No right can be claimed thereunder,
the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court". An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance is not inconsistent with the
former's taking back of possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient. In the case at bar, there was sufficient cause for the
owner's resumption of possession. She needed to generate income
from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her,
arising from her extreme age.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 — affirming the Regional Trial
Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari — is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case
No. 3410 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private
respondents.

3.

A. DOCTRINE: In other words, can we not say that the destruction of

the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's
belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was
valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is
our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the
principle of "dependent relative revocation". (Succession)

B.Case Title: Testate Estate of the deceased Mariano Molo vs. Luz
Molo, GR. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951 (DOCTRINE OF
DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION)

C. Facts: Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and

another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause
which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced
heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The
oppositors’ to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a
petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but
subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its
due execution. 

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the
1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had
already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite
the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus
effectively nullified the 1918 will.

D. Issue: W/N the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in
the subsequent disallowed 1939 will. (Yes)
E.Held: The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v.
Naval that a subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous
will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in
accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that
the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in
1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of
dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke
a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as
substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some
reason.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs

against the appellants.

4.

A. DOCTRINE: The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
may be rendered nugatory. (Succession)

B.Case Title: Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Edmund Santibañez,

GR. No. 149926, February 23, 2005

C. Facts: First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim

Santibañez entered into two (2) loan agreement. The amount was
intended for the payment of (2) two unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor
and one (1) unit of a Rotamotor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC.
Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as one of the heirs,
was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving
heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a
Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for
Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume
the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the
tractor respectively taken by them.

Meanwhile, Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was

executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all
its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

UBP asserted that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs; the unconditional signing of the joint
agreement estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she
cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement
had been signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no
longer necessary to present the same before the probate court for
approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of
those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and
the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S.
Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to
re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.

D.Issue: W/N obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs

as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code. (No)

E.Held: Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as

parties thereto “have agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein
after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.” The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event,
that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective
share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of
the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The
partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not
receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability
cannot be given any force and effect.

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned
with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.

5.

A. DOCTRINE: Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of
preterition:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of

the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.

B.Case Title: Iris Morales vs. Ana Maria Olondriz, GR. No. 198994,
February 3, 2016

C.Facts: Alfonso Juan Olondriz Sr. died and was survived by his widow
and children. Believing that the decedent died intestate, the heirs filed a
petition to partition the estate. However, Iris Morales filed a separate
petition alleging that the decedent left a will. Morales prayed for the
probate of the will. Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Olondriz,
an illegitimate son of the decedent. Morales moved to suspend the
intestate proceeding to give way to the probate however, heirs moved
to dismiss the probate proceedings due to preterition. After
postponements, at the instance of Morales, reception of evidence for
the evidentiary hearing was scheduled but she failed to appear,
effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue of
preterition.

Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Olondriz is an heir of

the decedent, was clearly omitted from the will; and that based on the
evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited.

D.Issue: W/N there was preterition because Francisco allegedly

received a house and lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.
(Yes)

E.Held: The will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir,

legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a
compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show
otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of
his preterition. During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the
opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received donations inter
vivos and advances on his legitime from the decedent. However,
Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her
right to present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for
reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will,
either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father,
son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the
estate without expressly being disinherited tacitly depriving the heir of
his legitime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

6.

A. DOCTRINE: In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a

donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
(Puig V. Penaflorida)
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was
immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of
donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of
the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the
donee the absolute owner of the property donated. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Jarabini Del Rosario vs. Asuncion Ferrer, GR. No.
187056, September 20, 2010

C. Facts: Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a

document entitled “Donation Mortis Causa” in favor of their two children,
Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini del Rosario
covering the spouses’ 126-square meter lot and the house on it in equal
shares. Few months after the death of Guadalupe, Leopoldo, the donor
husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in
subject property to their daughter Asuncion. 

He died in June 1972. In 1998 Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of 
the deed of donation mortis causa. Asuncion opposed
the petition, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and
interests in the property to her. After trial, the RTC rendered a
decision finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos. On
Asnuncion’s appeal to the CA, the latter rendered a decision reversing
that of the RTC. It held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the
probate of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally attack
Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in Asuncion’s favor.

D. Issue: Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s

donation was a donation mortis causa. (Yes)

E.Held: It was a donation inter vivos. The fact that the document in
question was denominated a sa donation mortis causa is not controlling
if a donation by its terms is inter vivos. In Austria
Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that “irrevocability” is a quality
absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa,
where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the act. In the present
case, the donors plainly said that it is”our will that this Donation Mortis
Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving
spouse.” The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even
clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect
the irrevocability of the donation. Thus, given that the donation was
indeed inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and
interests in the property to Asuncion is void.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the

assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and REINSTATES in toto
the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.

Heirs (Arts 840-885)

CASES:

1.

A. DOCTRINE: Wills that are executed abroad can be probated here in

the Philippines even if it has not yet been probated and allowed in the
country it was executed

- Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.

Requisites for probate and allowance of will

(a) the jurisdictional facts;

Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his

residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate
he left in such province.
(b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent;

(c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and

(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
having custody of it.

It does not require that a will executed abroad must have already been
probated and allowed in the country it was executed.

Probate of a will that is presented for the first time before a competent
court is different from Reprobate of a will already probated abroad

Reprobate is governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.

In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the

foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas, GR. No.

169144, January 26, 2011

C.Facts: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S.

citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as
the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and
in the U.S. Private respondent Ernesto filed with the RTC a petition for
the probate of Ruperta’s will and for the former’s appointment as special
administrator of her estate. Petitioners, nephews of Ruperta (the
nephews), opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed
it. The RTC allowed the will to be probated in the Philippines. This was
affirmed by CA.  Hence petitioners’ files this instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to this Court.
D. Issue: W/N a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in
the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed. (Yes)

E.Held:  Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who
is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.

Moreover, our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of

a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and
character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for
whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts
refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution. Hence our laws do not
prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. 

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court
of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

2.

A. DOCTRINE: compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2)

secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those
who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs;
legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The
secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the
absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are
secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are
those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary
compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are
concurring compulsory heirs. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Amelia Arellano vs. Francisco Pascual, GR. No. 189776,
December 15, 2010

C. Facts: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999

leaving his siblings as heirs, namely: a) petitioner Amelia who is
represented by her daughters; b) Agnes c) Nona d) Francisco and
Miguel Pascual. In a petition for “Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate
and Issuance of Letters of Administration,” filed by the respondents
before the RTC of Makati, there is an allegation that the donation to
petitioner is an advance of her legitime. The said property is now
registered under the name of the petitioner. Provisionally passing,
however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedent’s estate,
the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the
presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold
that it is subject to collation; An appeal to the CA was made,
questioning the order of the trial court to include the property subject of
the donation as part of the advance inheritance of the petitioner.

D. Issue: W/N the property subject of the donation is subject of

collation. (No)

E. Held: The decedent left no compulsory heir who is entitled to

legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing
was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to
petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
“stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There
being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject
to collation. The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a
mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations
made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it
is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative
title by the testator during his lifetime. The purposes of collation are to
secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible,
and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that in
officious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there
are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the
legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded. The decedent’s remaining estate should
thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives,
herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to Art. 1003 and 1004 of
the NCC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner,
Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr.
is set aside.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin,

Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to
conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining
what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever
remains of it equally among the parties.

3.

A. DOCTRINE: The law prohibits reciprocal succession between

illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even
though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems
that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from)
another... illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of
the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers
and... sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the
prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration.
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and... legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when
all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if
begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing
before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We
submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate
brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood
brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the... half-
blood, they shall share equally. (Succession)

Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive

presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that
no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. On the
other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption
of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence
to the contrary. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Josefa Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa vs. Heirs of

Marciana Rustia Vda. De Damian, GR. No. 155733, January 27, 2006

C. Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and

without descendants. Petitioners and respondents are their respective
relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. 

The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa and

Guillermo were never married. According to petitioners, Guillermo
proposed marriage to Josefa. They eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in
the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa as
one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo with
five other children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another
son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon and Felisa’s union is in dispute.

D. Issue: W/N the absence of a marriage contract is absolute proof that

marriage did not take place. (No)

E.Held: Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence,

its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.
Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity
issued to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as
Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo
Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,"
more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are
public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.

Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they

primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo
Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually,
the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not
but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The
assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is

hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the

intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall
pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who
survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full-
or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at
the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the
trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa

Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares
shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr.
(who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares
shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates

of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as
may be determined by the trial court.

4.

A. DOCTRINE: Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition

for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate
heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that
they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution. (Civil Law)

B. Case Title: Lolita D. Enrico vs. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, GR.

No. 173614, September 28, 2007

C. Facts: The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed

with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio
and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were
married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents. On
May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the
requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later.
They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man
and a woman who have been living together for at least five years
without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was
not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the
marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date
of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio
could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional
ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness
which made its performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together
as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly;
hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license.
She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in
the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal
Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of
the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living
who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

D. Issue: W/N the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Eulogio and Lolita (No)

E. Held: Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective

March 14, 2003, covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order.
The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does
not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs
can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed
in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is
ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of
the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

5.

A. DOCTRINE: Private respondents must not be barred from proving

filiation because the law provides that filiation of an illegitimate child is
established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission by means of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument. Action for recognition may be brought by the
child during his/her lifetime. However, action must be based upon open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. (Family)

B. Case Title: Michael C. Guy vs. CA, GR. No. 163707, September 15,
2006

C. Facts: Karen Oanes Wei, a minor by and through her mother

Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration before the
RTC of Makati. Respondents alleged that they are duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati on
October 29, 1992, leaving an estate of P10,000,000.00 consisting of
real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. Respondents are a asking for an appointment of a
regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate.
They also want to appoint Michael C. Guy as Special Administrator of
the Estate. Petitioner is praying for the dismissal of the petition for the
reason that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be
settled without securing letters of administration. He argued that private
respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei.

D. Issue: W/N the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private

respondents from claiming their Successional Rights. (No)

E.Held: Private respondents cannot be bar from claiming successional

rights. To be valid and effective, waiver must be couched clearly and in
unequivocal terms to leave no doubt with regards to the intention of a
party in giving up a right or benefit legally pertains to. Waiver cannot be
attributed to a person if it not explicitly and clearly evinces intent to
abandon a right. This case has no waiver of hereditary rights.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742
affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution
dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.

6.

A. DOCTRINE: Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily

to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of
the inheriting ascendant. (Succession)

B. Case Title: Mendoza vs. Delos Santos, GR. No. 176422. March
20, 2013

C. Facts: The subject parcel of land in this case was in the name of
respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-
half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings. Petitioners who are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza
(Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga) alleged that the
properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that
were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to
Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse
Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria; but thereafter went to
Gregoria when Leonor died after. Gregoria died intestate, and
thereafter, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto
herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor
and Gregoria. 

Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved
by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them,
applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal. The RTC
granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal,
Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance but on appeal to the CA,
however, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners and also denied their motion for
reconsideration. 

D. Issues:

1. W/N the CA grievously erred in holding that the subject properties are
not reservable properties, coming as they do from the family line of the
petitioners Mendozas. (NO)

2. CA grievously erred in holding that the petitioners Mendozas do not

have a right to the subject properties by virtue of the law on reserva
troncal. (NO)

E.Held: The CA is correct. Based on the circumstances of the present

case, Article 891 on Reserva Troncal is not applicable. The persons
involved in reserva troncal are:

(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was
received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;

(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the

property;

(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law; and

(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be
reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the
first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the
property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute
originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who
received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have
been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by
gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does not give anything in return. At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the
properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.

Petitioners, Mendoza et al cannot be considered

reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree
of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the
degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the
property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners
are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First
cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios. 

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio

and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to
the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties
came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and
nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the
prepositus and relatives within the third degree.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November

16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This
Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of
Gregoria.

Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the
determination of ownership of the properties in question.

7.

A. DOCTRINE: Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is not voidable if the party

is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party's
consent is vitiated but is unenforceable as an unauthorized contract.
However, the consent may be proven to have been acquired by
preponderance of evidence such as acts showing they were aware of
the contract and did nothing to oppose it. (Remedial Law)

The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition requires an SPA if an heir is signing

in representation of the other co-heirs otherwise it will be
unenforceable. However, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is not
unenforceable in the case at bar given the circumstance of the case
showed the co-heirs were aware or consented to the signing. (Remedial
Law)

B. Case Title: Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. vs. Heirs of Liberato M.

Ureta, GR. No. 165748, September 14, 2011

C. Facts: Alfonso Ureta had 14 children, including, Policronio. The

children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to validity of the
Extrajudicial Partition. On October 1969, in order to reduce the
inheritance taxes, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale in favor of
his children including Policronio. Since the sales were only made for
taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso
continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. On
October 11, 1972, Alfonso died and his children acted as the
administrator of his father’s estate. On November 22, 1974, Policronio
died. The subject land under the deed of sale was never taken
possession by Policronio nor his heirs. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s
heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the
lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were
previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado,
Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. On July 30,
1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the
July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. Believing that the six parcels
of land belonged to their late father, and excluded from the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle
but despite earnest efforts, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession over the subject
land.

D. ISSUE: W/N the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid. (No)

E.HELD: The Deed of Sale entered between Alfonso and Policronio is

void for being an absolutely simulated sale. No actual consideration or
money was given and there was no actual intent to enter into a sale. It
was merely to avoid tax purposes The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
did not need an SPA because partition among heirs is not legally
deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of
ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but
rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that
an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives
the inheritance. Partition is not an act of strict dominion which requires
an SPA. In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the
heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written
memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions
effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved.

In the case of Badillo v. Ferrer, the court held a deed of extrajudicial

partition is not voidable by lack of parties to give consent but
unenforceable as an unauthorized contract in 1403(1). However, the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not unenforceable but, in fact, valid,
binding and enforceable against all the Heirs of Policronio. because of
several circumstances which show they gave their consent to Conrado
to sign on their behalf such as that Extra-Judicial Partition was signed
on 1989 but the siblings only came to know about it 1995, 5 years after,
and Conrado didn’t inform his siblings during such span; Conrado
retained possession of land under the Extra-Judicial Partition; 1 year
after the sale, the Heirs of Policronio executed an SPA to have the land
under the Extra-Judicial Partition be the subject of mortgage. Such acts
show the Heirs of Policronio were aware of the said Partition and the
vitiation of consent is a mere afterthought

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition

in G.R. No. 165930 is GRANTED. The assailed April 20, 2004 Decision
and October 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71399, are hereby MODIFIED in this wise:

(1) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989,

is VALID, and

(2) The order to remand the case to the court of origin is

hereby DELETED.

8.

 A. DOCTRINE: Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which

provides:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in

respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another,
the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the
will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the
person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest, by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.

B. Case Title: Heirs of Jose Ma. Gepuela vs. Menez- Andres, GR.
Nos.173636 and 173770, Jan. 13, 2016

C. Facts: Basilia was the widow of Pedro Cruz, with whom she had five
children, namely, Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita and Isagani. Basilia
executed a Huling Habilin,[4] where she named her daughter Benita's
children Hernita, Nelia, Rosemarie, Angel and Gracita as voluntary
heirs to ten percent (10%) of the free portion of her estate. Basilia's
Huling Habilin was admitted into ante-mortem probate on March 1,
1957. Her daughter Luz Cruz Salonga (Luz) was appointed
Administratrix of Basilia's... estate on August 18, 1976.When Basilia
died, she left behind considerable properties, including a 36/72 pro
indiviso share in a 5,492 square meter property in San Juan, then
province of Rizal. This property was covered by TCT No. 95524 and co-
owned with some of Basilia's children and grandchildren.

D. Issue: W/N Hernita et al. could still redeem the 36/72 pro indiviso
share. (No)

E. Held: Hernita, et al. cannot claim a stake over a specific property

of the decedent. Even assuming that res judicata would not bar
Civil Case No. 65327, Hernita, et al.'s claim of a right to redeem
Basilia's disputed share would still not prosper.

As voluntary heirs to the free portion, Hernita, et al. have no right to

claim any specific property of the estate, such as the contested 36/72
pro indiviso share in the property, until after the estate had been settled
and distributed, in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No. 173636

is GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of the CA affirming with
modification the Regional Trial Court's Decision are SET ASIDE. The
Petition in G.R. No. 173770 is DENIED for lack of merit.

Preterition / Void testamentary / Disinheritance

CASES:
1.

A. DOCTRINE: Article 749 of the New Civil Code is clear on the

point, thus:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid,
it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
 property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in

a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor

shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments.

B.Case Title: J.L.T. Agro vs. Antonio Balansag, GR. No. 141882,
March 11, 2005

C. Facts: Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first

with Antonia Baena and had two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After
her death, he married Milagros Teves and they
had four children namely: Maria Teves, Jose Teves, Milagros Teves
and Pedro Teves. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a
Compromise Agreement. When Antonia died an action for partition was
instituted where the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement
which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. On
the basis of the compromise agreement, the CFI declared a tract of land
known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common
by Don Julian and his two children of the first marriage. The property
was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa
and Emilio likewise were given otherproperties at Bais, including
the electric plant, the “movie property,” the commercial areas, and the
house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties
wasretained by Don Julian.

D. Issue: W/N the future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and

reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. (No)
E.Held: Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones,
which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with
respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is
partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly

valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would
become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of
his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him
under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a
bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being
the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was
inchoate. Evidently, at the time of the execution of the supplemental
deed in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the
property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his
heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30

September 1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

2.

A. DOCTRINE: NCC Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes

place:

When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take
place only with respect to the property of which the testator has not
disposed;

Allowance for a permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers

property inherited by the State by virtue of intestate succession.
The article does not cure a void testamentary provision which
did not institute an heir. Accordingly, the article cannot be applied to
dispose of herein decedent’s properties. We are not unmindful of
our ruling in Palad, et al. v. Governor of Quezon Province, et al.
where we declared, thus:

Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition
of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable
for more than 20 years, is not violated by the trust constituted by
the late Luis Palad; because the will of the testator does not interdict the
alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income
of said two parcels be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and
operation of the high school. Said Article 870 was designed “to give
more impetus to the socialization of the ownership of property and to
prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian
troubles.”

The trust herein involved covers only two lots, which have not been
shown to be a large landholding. And the income derived therefrom is
being devoted to a public and social purpose – the education of the
youth of the land. The use of said parcels
therefore, is in a sense socialized. There is no hint in the record that the
trust has spawned agrarian conflicts. In this case, however, we reach a
different conclusion as the testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation
or mortgage of her properties which were definitely more than the two
(2) properties in the aforecited case. The herein testatrix’s large
landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust
because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her
even in the afterlife. (Succession)

B.Case Title: Orendain vs. Trusteeship of the estate of Doña Margarita

Rodriguez, GR. No. 168660, June 30, 2009

C.Facts: Decedent Dona Margarita Rodriguez died leaving a last will

and testament. The will admitted to probateby virtue of the order of the
Court of First Instance which approved the project of partition presented
by the executor of Dona Margarita’s will. At the time of her death, the
decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was
completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes,
as provided in her will. Some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s
testamentary dispositions contemplated the
creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties for
distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will. Almost four decades
later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of
Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the
decedent’s will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedent’s estate,
which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years.

ISSUE: W/N the trusteeship in Dona Margarita’s properties can be

dissolved applying Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code (No).

Held: Apparent from the decedent’s last will and testament is

the creation of a trust on a specific set of properties and the
income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained
that the decedent intended any of the trust’s designated beneficiaries to
inherit these properties. The decedent’s will did not institute any heir
thereto.

Plainly, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners’ motion to dissolve

and ordering the disposition of the properties in Clause 10
according to the testatrix’s wishes. As regards these properties,
intestacy should apply as the decedent did not institute an heir therefor.
Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 960 of the Civil Code,
provides: Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by
the provision of a will or by operation of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No.
51872 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trust approved by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 is
DISSOLVED. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4
in SP. PROC. No. 51872 to determine the following:
1. the properties listed in Clause 10 of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s will,
constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not
been disposed of as yet; and
2. the intestate heirs of Doña Margarita Rodriguez, with the nearest
relative of the decedent entitled to inherit the remaining properties.

3.

A. DOCTRINE: Tt is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of

the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by
law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that...
intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law,
morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic

will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the
will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. (Succession)

B.Case Title: Dy Yieng Seangio vs. Hon. Amor Reyes, GR. No.
140371-72, November 27, 2006

C.Facts: On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition

for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio
and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-
Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy
Yieng Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is
found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically... suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.

D.Issues: W/N the document executed by Segundo can be considered

as a holographic will.
E.Held: Issue on preterition can be clearly deduced from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of
the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act
of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere

disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic
will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of
Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa issue on preterition
the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
preterited in the will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October
14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and
hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of
Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is
hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate
proceedings.

4.

A. DOCTRINE: The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the

Civil Code

"Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children
of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."

"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond

the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." Invoked by
petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that
among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession),
no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship
by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit equally with a
first cousin of the half-blood but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-
degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the
fourth degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in
succession to a fifth-degree relative.

B.Case Title: Ofelia Bagunu vs. Pastora Piedad, GR. No. 140975,
December 8, 2000

C.Facts: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or

ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-
degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first
cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in the settlement of the
estate of Piedad.

D.ssue: W/N intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth

civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would
justify her intervention. (No)

E.Held: By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a

decedent is, by operation of law, “raised to the same place and degree”
of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent.
The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he
represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to
whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. In
the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending,
never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of
representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or
aunts. The right of representation does not apply to
“other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree” (to which group
both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order
of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants,
secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse,
and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the
decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of
nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or
aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of
the Code, is an absolute rule.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED.

xxx