G.R. No.

L-44546 January 29, 1988

RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA
ASEJO,

FACTS:

 Petitioner and Private respondents are half siblings born to Felisa Azul however, Petitioner was
born to the (1st husband) BernabeAdille, while respondents were born to (2 nd husband)
ProcopioAsejo.
 The land in question located in Albay Legaspi City, belongs to their mother who, during her
lifetime, sold the subject property in pacto de retro sale to third person with 3 years period to
repurchase, however she died before she was able to redeem the property. So his son, Rustico,
repurchased the entire property and obtained a title thereto in his name alone by executing sn
affidavit that he is the only heir of Felisa.
 After some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-brothers and sisters, filed present case for
partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he
redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria
Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that, —
 RTC ruled in favor of Rustico, declaring him as sole owner of the property
 CA reversed

ISSUE: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?

HELD:
NEGATIVE.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. The redemption
of the entire property by one co-owner shouldering the expenses therefor does not put to end the
existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement
from the remaining co-owners. Redemption of property entails necessary expense as provided in Art.
488 of the Civil Code.
The fact that Pet. Secured titled over the parcel in his name does not terminate the existing co-
ownership. Registration of property is not means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of
existing title if there is one.
Thus Pet. Becomes the trustee of the property co-owned as provided in Art. 1456.
Since there was fraud in the registration of the property since he pretended to be the sole heir to the
property in his affidavit of extrajudicial settlement.
Prescription:
As a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation of the
co-ownership. The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions:
1) A co-owner repudiates the co-ownership
2) Such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to other co-owners
3) The evidence thereon is clear and conclusive
4) He has been in possession through OCEN possession of the property for the period required
by law.
Prescription as an affirmative defense must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
otherwise it is deemed waived.
Prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the
petitioners' act of defraudation
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the
petitioners' act of defraudation.
[G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003]
LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge,
RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, respondents.

FACTS:

 Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-
law. The lot was registered with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia
Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita
Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.
 On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6)
co-owners in her favor.
 Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently
refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for
recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan
City sometime in September 1995.
 MeTC ruled in favor of private respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of
5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale  having been established as a forgery.
 RTC affirmed MeTC
 CA dismissed

ISSUE: Whether the sale is valid.

HELD:

Yes. Sale is valid only up to 5/6 portion of the lot.

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-
indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of
his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owner.

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion thereof. All the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportion share in the
entire land or thing.

Art. 493-undivided interest

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of the petitioner’s
lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered
into by the co-owners, her right to the 1/6 of the property must be respect. Partition needs to be
effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such
partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of
5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
G.R. No. L-39299 October 18, 1988
ISAAC, SEVERINO, MARIA, TELESFORA, FELISA, SERAPIO, SIMEON and MACARIA all surnamed
PANGAN, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:
 Leon Hilario owns a parcel of land in Bulacan, upon his death it was inherited by his three
children, Felisimo, Catalina, and Silvestra. Felisimo waived thus Catalina and Silvestra are now
the exclusive co-owners. However, his great grandchildren, the grandchildren of Silvestra
successfully registered the land in their names.
 Teodora opposed alleging that as the daughter of Catalina and being the grandchild of Leon, she
is entitled to ½ of the property and the rest of the ½ will go to the heirs of Silvestra.
 RTC was dismissed Teodora’s opposition on the ground that her rights have been forfeited by
PRESCRIPTION as the heirs of Silvestra have been in adverse possession for more than 30 years
in the concept of owner.
 CA reverses the ruling, allowing Teodora to ½ of the property, stating that the other co-owners
held it in trust and tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership.
ISSUE:
Whether Teodora’s failure to assert her right, allowed the statutory period to lapse, thus enabling the
petitioners to perfect their claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription and so exclude her from her
share in the subject property.

Held:
NEGATIVE.

Possession by the co-owner will not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owner, but in fact, are
beneficial to all of them. As long as co-ownership is recognized an action to compel partition will not
prescribed and may be filed at any time against the actual possessor by any of the co-owner. However
when there is express repudiation he can acquire sole title to it after the lapse of the prescribed
prescriptive period. From that moment, question involved will be of ownership and not just mere
partition.

Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. The trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of cestuique trust;
2. Such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to other cestuique trust;
3. Evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.

The rejection of the co-owners' claim is usually manifested by a formal legal action, to make the
prescriptive period start to run against the claimant. Thus—
1) Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to property, or for
recovery of ownership thereof, held in possession by the former, may constitute an act of
repudiation of the trust reposed on him by the latter.
2) The issuance of the certificate of title  would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any
trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years, open and adverse possession as owner would
certainly suffice to vest title by prescription.
3) An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes
within 10 years. And it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective
assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitation is counted.
4) The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners repudiated the trust
relation in 1956 upon the filing of the complaint for recovery of possession  against private
respondents so that the counterclaim of the private respondents contained in their
amended answer wherein they asserted absolute ownership of the disputed realty by
reason of the continuous and adverse possession of the same is well within the 10-year
prescriptive period. 
5) There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator of property
causes the cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the apparent beneficiaries and
gets a new certificate of title in his own name. 
HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON G.R. No. 161720

FACTS:

 In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory heirs, namely: Flores
Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica
Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.
 In 1960, Restars eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a Joint Affidavit, executed with one Helen
Restar, caused the cancellation of TD in Restars name covering the lot located at Barangay
Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was among the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of a new
Tax Declaration in his name.
 Flores died on June 10, 1989.
 November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restar’s old Tax
Declaration and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration in his name.
 On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores sisters Dolores et al who had in the meantime died,
together with Flores surviving sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares,
filed a Complaint against Flores heirs for partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of
documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Aklan.
 RTC held that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the
co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by prescription.
 CA reversed the decision of the trial court, it finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to
prove that their possession of the lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it
from a separate conveyance to them by Restar.

ISSUE: May a co-owner in adverse possession acquire the property exclusively by prescription?

HELD:
AFFRIMATIVE.
ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
x xx
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may
acquire ownership thereof by prescription [21] where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership,
and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership. [22]
 
The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed
the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner − which length of
possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly
supported by substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary
prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.

ART. 1117. Acquisitive Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
 
Prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. 
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.

ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Epitacio, Paclano, Fidel, Virgilio, Galileo, surnamed Delima, Bibiano, Olimpio, Purificacion, all
surnamed Bacus (petitioners) vs. CA, Galileo Delima (+), substituted by his legal heirs: Flavianavda. De
Delima, Lily Delima-Arias, Helen Niadas, Antonio, Dionisio, Irenea, Ester, Fely, all surnamed Delima
(respondents) G.R. No. L-46296, Sept. 24, 1991

Facts:
 LinoDelima acquired a lot in Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Estate Lands in Cebu by sale on
installments from the government. He later died in 1921, leaving his only heirs three brothers
and a sister, namely Eulalio, Juanita, Galileo, and Vicente. After Lino’s death, the TCT of the
property in question was issued in the name of “Legal Heirs of Lino De Lima, deceased,
represented by Galileo Delima”.
 Galileo, now substituted by his legal heirs, executed an affidavit of Extra-Judicial Declaration of
Heirs. Because of this, the previous TCT was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of
Galileo alone, excluding his brothers and sister. Galileo declared the lot in his name for taxation
purposes and paid the taxes from 1954-1965.
 The petitioners, who are surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita, filed with CFI-Cebu an action for
reconveyance and/or partition of the property and an annulment of the TCT, with damages
against their uncles Galileo and Vicente. Vicente was named as a respondent because he refused
to join with the petitioners in their action.
 The TC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, rendering ¼ of the land to Vicente
Delima, ¼ to the heirs of Juanita (the Bacuses), ¼ to the heirs of Eulalio, ¼ to the heirs of Galileo;
the cancellation of the TCT under Galileo’s name; turnover of the respective shares of the fruits
of the lot, P170/year from 1958 to the present time with legal interest; partition of the lot
within 60 days from the day the decision was rendered; defendants are condemned to pay the
costs of suit.
 The respondents were unsatisfied with the decision and appealed to the CA, who reversed the
RTC’s decision and upheld Galileo’s claim over the other siblings’, with the reason that they have
already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that Galileo
paid the remaining balance of the purchase price and realty taxes.

ISSUE: WON petitioners’ action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law

HELD:
AFFIRMATIVE.
Their action is already barred. Art. 494 of the NCC provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand, at any time, the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for
a certain period of time, not exceeding 10 years, shall be valid. This term may be extended for a new
agreement. A donor/testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed 20 years, neither
shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner/co-heir against his co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of
the properties and denies the others any shares therein, the question involved is no longer of partition
but of ownership. In such a case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner
for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription. The act of Galileo in executing a TCT under his
name, making him appear as the new owner of the property, effectively denies or repudiates the
ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, thus the statute of limitations started to run for the
purposes of the action instituted by the latter in seeking a declaration of existence of the co-ownership
and of their rights thereunder. The action for reconveyance prescribes after 10 years, and it runs from
the date of issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse titles for purposes of the statute
of limitations is counted. The lapse of 10 years of adverse possession by Galileo was sufficient to vest
title in him by prescription.
MARIATIGUE VS CA (GR No. L-57062, January 24, 1992)

FACTS:
 LupoMariategui had contracted 3 marriages when he was alive.
1st wife: EusebiaMontellano
Children: 4 (Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo)
2nd wife: FlavianaMontellano
Daughter: Cresenciana
3rd wife: Felipa Velasco
Children: 3 (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina)
 At the time of his death without a will, LupoMariategui left certain properties which he acquired
when he was still unmarried.
 Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
where they adjudicated to themselves Lot 163. Registration was awarded to the heirs who
thereafter subdivided the lots.
 Lupo’s children on his 3rd marriage then filed a complaint in the lower court claiming that the
extrajudicial partition and subdivisions of the lot deprived them of their share to their common
father’s estate.
 Thereafter, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action
and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of
natural children. Trial court dismissed the motion, together with their complaint and
counterclaim.
 Upon appeal, CA held all children of LupoMariategui as entitled to equal shares in the estate of
the deceased. They directed the adjudicates to execute a deed of reconveyance to the children
of 3rd marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui.

HELD:
NEGATIVE.
Private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners
had registered in their names the lots involved.
The allegations in the complaint alleged that the nature of the complaint is one of partition. Since the
Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased, then
the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this
case.
Prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition
so long as the heirs, for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner. Furthermore, an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches.
In the case, valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Even
assuming that registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition.
BETTY LACBAYAN vs BAYANI SAMOY G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011

FACTS:

 Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite
respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to
respondent’s son. In short, they have an illicit affair.
 During their relationship, they, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a
manpower services company which acquired five parcels of land that were registered in
petitioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly as husband and wife.
 When their relationship turned sour, they decided to divide the said properties and terminate
their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.
 Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties
will go to respondent.
 However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement,
Samoy refused.
 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties.
 Petitioner’s contention: She claimed that they started to live together as husband and wife in
1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real
properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.
 Respondent’s contention: He purchased the properties using his own personal funds.
 RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent. 

ISSUES:
1. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership.
2. Whether respondent is stopped from repudiating the co-ownership over the subject realties.

HELD:

1. NEGATIVE.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Until and unless this issue of co-
ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case,
does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a
determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties.

2. AFFIRMATIVE.
Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to
amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of
an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his
own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over
the said properties.
LEONOR B. CRUZ vs TEOFILA CATAPANG G.R. No. 164110 February 12, 2008

FACTS:
 Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land
covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.
 Sometime in 1992, Teofila Catapang, with the consent of Norma Maligaya as one of the
aforementioned co-owners, built a house on a lot adjacent to the subject parcel of land.
 The house built by Catapang intruded on a portion of the co-owned property.
 In September 1995, Cruz learned about the intrusion and made several demands for Catapang
to demolish and vacate the part of the structure encroaching upon their property.
 Catapang refused and disregarded the demands of Cruz, therefore Cruz then filed a complaint
for forcible entry against Catapang before the MCTC of Taal, Batangas.
 MCTC decided in favor of Cruz, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient
to justify defendant’s construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in
question.
 RTC affirmed MCTC’s decision.
 CA reversed and held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because
respondent’s entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma
Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a
cause of action for forcible entry. CA€further held that petitioner’s remedy is not an action for
ejectment but an entirely different recourse with the appropriate forum. After petitioner’ s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution, she filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-
owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case.

HELD:
NEGATIVE.
A co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-
ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-
owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.

Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of
the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent
to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-
ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.

Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in
the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent
of the other co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as
respondent, in the thing owned in common. Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal
of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into
the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification through strategy or
stealth.

Respondent’s entry into the property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret
and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to
stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-
owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the
consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed
house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned
property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry
 
SPS SANTOS V HEIRS OF LUSTREAUGUST 6, 2008

FACTS:
 Lustre owned a lot which she mortgaged & later on sold to Natividad Santos who subsequently
sold it to her son Froilan for which a TCT was issued in his name.
 Lustre’s heirs Macaspac & Maniquiz filed w/ RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Complaint for
Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages
against Froilan Santos.
 Lustre’s other heirs filed a Complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of
Absolute Sale against spouses Santos, Froilan Santos, R Transport Corp, Cecilia Macaspac with
the same RTC. Macaspac was impleaded as defendant in the 2 nd case because she refused to
join the other heirs as plaintiffs.
 Alleging that the plaintiffs’ right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCT had long
prescribed and was barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, also on the ground of
litis pendentia.
 RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.
 CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

issued in her name.

ISSUES:
1) Whether it is automatic that a co-owner represents other co-owners in an action concerning the
co-owned property for the benefit of all.
2) Whether prescription or laches apply?

HELD:

1) NEGATIVE.
Plaintiffs in both cases are the heirs of Lustre; they are therefore co-owners of the property.  However,
the fact of being a co-owner does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff is acting for the benefit of the co-
ownership when he files an action respecting the co-owned property. 
Co-owners are not parties inter se in relation to the property owned in common. The test is whether the
“additional” party, the co-owner in this case, acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in
the former action. Macaspac filed the 1 st case seeking the reconveyance of the property to her, and not
to Lustre or her heirs. This is a clear act of repudiation of the co-ownership which would negate a
conclusion that she acted in privity with the other heirs or that she filed the complaint in behalf of the
co-ownership. In contrast, respondents were evidently acting for the benefit of the co-ownership when
they filed the 2nd case wherein they prayed that TCT Lustre be reinstated, or a new certificate of title be
issued.

2) NEGATIVE.
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a
fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not
prescribe. Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee
of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based
on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies only if there
is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against
him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit
for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. It follows then that the respondents’ present action
should not be barred by laches. Laches is a doctrine in equity, which may be used only in the absence of,
and never against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an
imprescriptible legal right.