SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Segura vs Segura

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as
the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under
the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for
the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution
in 1941. 

It is recalled that following the execution of the deed of partition, the owners named therein sold the entire land
to Emiliano Amojido who, after the vendors had failed to exercise their right of repurchase, executed an
affidavit of consolidation in his favor on November 28, 1946. He subsequently obtained a transfer certificate of
title in his name, but this contained the following annotation: 

This land is subject to any claim that may be presented by any heir or any other person
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of Gertrudes Zamora, within two years from date
of the Extra-judicial Settlement and distribution of the estate. 12

As a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell, the buyer can as a consequence acquire no
more than what the seller can legally transfer. The deed of partition being invalid as to the other heirs, the
vendors could dispose only of their respective shares in the land, or one-third only of the property and not the
other two-thirds as well which did not belong to them.

To repeat, the general rule is that no one can give what he does not have — nemo dat quod non habet. Hence,
even if it be assumed that Amojido had bought the land in good faith from the parties to the extrajudicial
partition, only so much of their share could be validly acquired by him, with the rest of the property remaining
under the ownership of the six excluded co-heirs In other words, Amojido became pro indiviso co-owner of the
land with the other six heirs, who retained title to their respective shares although he had possession of the
entire property. The portion pertaining to the herein appellants should be deemed held by Amojido under an
implied trust for their benefit

There is no question that an action for reconveyance of property held in implied trust is
imprescriptible.17 However, this is true only as long as the trustee continues to acknowledge the title of
the cestui que trust, or, otherwise stated, provided he does not repudiate such title." 18 The moment he does
so, the prescriptive period will begin to run and may eventually operate to divest the real owners of their right to
the property after the lapse of the applicable statutory period. Under the provision above-quoted, that period is
fixed at ten years, whether the claim be based upon an obligation created by law under Article 1144 or covered
by Article 1134 on rights over immovable property.

It is noted that when Amojido secured the registration of the land in his name following the deed of sale
executed in his favor by the parties to the extrajudicial partition, his certificate of title carried an express
reservation of whatever rights might pertain to the other heirs. This annotation constituted an
acknowledgement of the possibility that a portion of the land might not belong to him and the commitment that
he would be holding such part as impliedly conveyed to him in trust by and for its true owners. However, when
Amojido himself sold the land to Mirope Mascareñas vda. de Elison on March 13, 1953, the transfer certificate
of title issued in her name no longer carried the said encumbrance. By the deletion of this annotation, Mirope,
as the new transferee, repudiated as of the date of registration the claim of the other heirs to their shares in the
property. From then on her assertion of ownership over the whole land became adverse even as against the
appellants herein. And as the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of her exclusive title to the land,
such rejection was binding on the said heirs and started as against them the period of prescription.

The record does not show when TCT No. T-19396 in the name of Mirope Mascareñas vda. de Elison was
issued, but it can be conjectured that this was done before February 14, 1957, when she sold the land to
Mildred Elison vda. de Javelosa. On the assumption that the land was registered in the name of Mirope in 1953
following her purchase without acknowledgement of the co-heirs' rights, the 10-year prescriptive period would
have started from that year. Suspended on May 28, 1956, when the first complaint was filed, it began running
again on February 16, 1958, 30 days after it was dismissed, and was completed after seven more years in
1965, two years before the second complaint was filed in 1968. Hence, that complaint was barred by
prescription, as correctly held by the trial court, although the different starting point it used, erroneously, was
1941, date of the extrajudicial partition.

Heirs of Fran vs Salas

FACTS: Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants. She left
real and personal properties wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor.
Jesus Fran filed a petition for the probate of Remedios' last will and testament. The petition alleged that
Rosario Tan is not physically well. The court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.

Private respondents, filed a manifestation alleging that they needed time to study the petition. However, private
respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of
Probate (sic) of the Will" wherein they expressly manifested that they have no objection to the will.

The petition thus became uncontested.

During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the requisite evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts.
The probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the testatrix and appointing petitioner
Fran as executor.

Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all the devisees
and legatees was submitted, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion
M. Espina. Said legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit receipt of a copy of the
Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing. After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court
ordered the administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings
closed.

Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu was converted to a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. Branch XVII (Davao City) of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided over by
herein respondent Judge, was transferred to Cebu City and renumbered as Branch VIII. (so napalitan yung
judge na humahawak ng case then yung private respondents biglang naisipang kontrahin yung unang decision
ng court—oppose to the allowance of the will)

Private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the probate
judgment and asked the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance
of the will.

Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, respondent Judge issued an Order setting for hearing the said
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus and to Reconsider the
26 February 1980 Order setting it for hearing on 17 April 1980, but the respondent Judge denied it for lack of
merit

Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to restrain respondent Judge from reopening the
case.

Respondent Judge issued the impugned order declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void, and
converting the same into an intestate proceeding.
The availability of the will since 18 September 1972 for their examination renders completely baseless the
private respondents' claim of fraud on petitioner Fran's part in securing the withdrawal of their opposition to the
probate of the will. If indeed such withdrawal was conditioned upon Fran's promise that the private
respondents would be shown the will during the trial, why weren't the appropriate steps taken by the latter to
confront Fran about this promise before certifications of conformity to the project of partition were filed?

Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of said promise constitutes fraud, such fraud is not of
the kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion for reconsideration or a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 37 and Rule 38, respectively, of the Rules of Court, or even a separate action for
annulment of judgment. It is settled that for fraud to be invested with, sufficiency, it must be extrinsic or
collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised during the trial which resulted in such judgment. 48

In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to set aside or attack the
validity of a final judgment:

(1) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be filed within sixty (60)
days after learning of the decision, but not more than six (6) months after such decision is
entered;

(2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by collateral attack, assuming that
the decision is void for want of jurisdiction;

(3) By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code, assuming that the
decision was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 can not be applied. 49

It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their right to file a petition for relief from judgment, it
appearing that their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-two (22) days after the rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days
after the court issued the order approving the Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their
conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.

Private respondents did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack.

The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle it, had
inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the same aside, by mere motion, on the
ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the
due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of
fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding. 50 We wish also to advert to the related doctrine
which holds that final judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there would be
a wavering of trust in the courts. 51 In Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen, 52 this Court had the occasion to state the
rationale of this doctrine, thus:

Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of
litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the
solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.

This is so even if the decision is incorrect 53 or, in criminal cases, the penalty imposed is erroneous. 54

Equally baseless and unmeritorious is private respondents' contention that the order approving the Project of
Partition and closing the proceedings is null and void because the Project of Partition did not contain a notice
of hearing and that they were not notified of the hearing thereon. In truth, in her own certification 55dated 5
September 1973, private respondent Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she "received a copy of the Project
of Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the above-entitled proceeding, and that she has no objection to the
approval of the said Project of Partition." The notice of hearing she referred to is the Notice of Hearing For
Approval of Project of Partition issued on 6 August 1973 by the Clerk of Court. 56 Private respondent Espina
was lying through her teeth when she claimed otherwise.

The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not a ground for the re-
opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution should have been filed. In De Jesus vs.
Daza, 57 this Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the
probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer that
possession to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a separate action for the recovery of
the shares would be in order. As We see it, the attack of 10 September 1973 on the Order was just a clever
ploy to give asemblance of strength and substance to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting
therein a probate court committing a series of fatal, substantive and procedural blunders, which We find to be
imaginary, if not deliberately fabricated.