A Criticism of the case of

Republic v. Manalo

Requirement for the Degree of Juris Doctor

A Research Proposal by

Lawrence Xavier T. Daluro

Chapter 1

Background of the study

Introduction

The study seeks to identify some points of critique in the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Manalo v. Court of Appeals. More particularly, the proponent seeks to
identify the specific effects of the said decision to marriages of Filipinos and foreigners
under the system of marital relations established in Philippine law.

Marriage in the Philippines

 Under the legal framework of Philippine law, marriage is given great respect and
accorded significant legal protection.1 The cultural and religious background of Filipinos, and
our concept of marriage, is readily reflected in the laws that govern it. Tradition generally
dictates that marriage be celebrated as a religious (usually Roman Catholic) ritual—this being the
most socially acceptable in most conservative communities in the Philippines. However, recent
years have seen a growth in the practice and acceptance of civil weddings.2

As a part of Philippine society, the practice of marriage is an interesting phenomenon in

that it produces not just the union of two individuals, but also two families.3 As a result, the role
that older family members play in marriage of succeeding generations is quite significant, given
the possibility of bettering or injuring the social standing of the household.

In 1987, during the administration of former President Corazon “Cory” Aquino,

Executive Order No. 209 was enacted by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers.
This law, now known as the Family Code, sought to strengthen marriage as a cornerstone of
Philippine society. The law clearly and more restrictively delineated what marriages would be
recognized by the state, as under Art. 3 and 4, on the varied requisites of marriage. Concomitant
to this, the State also granted married couples rights which other persons would not be afforded,
such as the successional rights of a widowed woman. The clearest picture of restrictive
delineation in the Family Code is in Article 1 of the Code, which states that:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.

Thus, the State took it upon itself to characterize the legal significance of marriage, the
parties who could partake of this “special contract,” and created a statutorily defined purpose
for marriage. This, the Code Commission envisioned, would bring to life the Constitutional
recognition of the importance of family to the State as a whole. In particular, Art. II, Sec. 12 and
Art. XV, Secs. 1-4 recognizes the importance of family. These constitutional provisions state that:

1Divorce and separation in the Philippines Trends and correlates, Abalos B, Jeoffrey, Demographic
Research, Vol. 36 (JANUARY - JUNE 2017), pp. 1515-154
2 Id

3 Id

2
 Article II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Art. XV., Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

Art. XV., Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.

Art. XV., Sec. 3. The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood;

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;

(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affects them.

Art. XV., Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State
may also do so through just programs of social security.

While it is clear that the law prioritizes the preservation of marriage as a policy of the
state, it is not silent in cases where marital relations are no longer amicable. This is particularly
clear where the deterioration of marital relations is of such a degree so as to affect the
development of the child; in this case, the State takes custody of the child, under the doctrine of
parens patriae. Under this doctrine, the state imposes the duty upon itself to intervene in failed
and failing marriages for the purpose of safeguarding the children of that marriage, so that the
extant discord in the marital relation will not negatively impact the emotional, mental, and
physical well-being of the child.

3
 The Supreme Court has previously state that “The prerogative of parens patriae is inherent
in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties.”4

It should be readily apparent that marriage as a special contract impacts more than just
the parties to it. There are people whose very lives and well-being are readily threatened by
marital discord. Thus, the state has a deep-seated interest in preserving the health and viability
of marital relations, since the children resulting from this marriage are quite literally the future.
This interest is reflected in the role that the state takes in regulating both the formation and
dissolution of marriage.5

The doctrine of international comity and the Prohibition in the Family Code whereby a Filipino
can initiate divorce proceedings in another country

As the old adage goes, “Love knows no bounds.” So it is that the framers of the Family
Code understood that marriages could and would occur between a Filipino citizen and a
foreign national. In recognition of this, the law, in Art. 26, provides as follows:

“Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,37 and
38.”

This provision is in consonance with the principle of lex loci celebrationes, and reflects the
principle that marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
were celebrated.6 In case of doubt of the validity of marriage, the Supreme Court, in its ruling in
the case of Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, declared that the general principle in the
interpretation of marital laws was that every “intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony.”7 This is seen reflected in the legal presumption that persons dwelling together,
holding themselves out to the public to be husband and wife, are in fact married, because in the

4 Cabanas v. Pilapil, G.R. No L-25843, [July 25, 974] 157 PHIL 97-102
5 Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, Borten, Laurence Drew, Columbia Law Review, Vol.
102, No. 4 (May, 2002), pp. 1089-1128
6 Garcia v Recio, G.R. No. 138322, [October 2, 2001], 418 PHIL 723-739

7 Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appels, G.R. No 135216, [August 19,1999], 371 Phil 693-713

4
 “common order of society,” this is the case, and to live contrary to this is to live “in the constant
violation of decency and of law.”8

As long as love and intimacy last, couples remain together; however, when those
factors are no longer present, the relationship takes a turn for the worse, and more often than
not, ends.9 In these cases, Philippine law grants parties to such a marriage three (3) distinct
remedies: a Declaration of Nullity of Voidable Marriages, an Annulment of Void Marriages, and
Legal Separation. Studies have shown, however, that not many Filipinos avail make use of these
remedies, on account of their prohibitive costs, the lengthy and tedious proceedings involved,
and the general uncertainty as to whether or not the petition will be granted.10 Beyond these,
however, foreign spouses married to Filipinos can avail of remedies within their own nations’
respective jurisdictions—such as divorce, a kind of remedy from marriage which has yet to be
fully developed in the Philippines. The issue arises then: Since divorce is not recognized in the
Philippines, what is the effect of a divorce in a foreign country on the legal status of the Filipino
under Philippine law?

In answer to this, Art. 26 (2) provides that:

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law”

This principle has been recognized in jurisdprudence as well. In the case of Paula
Llorente v. Court of Appeals and Alicia Llorente, the court recognized the validity of the foreign
divorce obtained abroad by the decedent Lorenzo Llorente, a US citizen. However, it prohibited
a Filipino spouse from acquiring such divorce, since no such option exists under Philippine
law.11

The Doctrine in Republic v. Manalo

This, however, has changed. In the case of Republic v. Manalo, the Supreme Court held
that the foreign divorce initiated by a Filipino spouse may be recognized as valid and
subsisting in the Philippines, as to such Filipino spouses’ marital status and legal capacity to
contract marriage.

8 Ibid.
9 Individualize Marriages and the Interogation of Resources, Lauer, Sean R. and Yodanis, Carrie, Journal of
Marriage and Family, Vol. 73, No. 3 (June 2011), pp. 669-683
10 Supra 2

11 Llorente v Llorente, G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

5
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa

The Supreme Court x x x aims to adopt a liberal construction of statutes. By

liberal construction of statutes is meant that method by which courts from the
language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing laws, are
able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however,
between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a
law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been
embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of
judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite
division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive,
the legislative, and the judicial.12

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that the public policy against absolute divorce
remains in force. At present, there exists no legal mechanism under Philippine law through
which a Filipino may secure a divorce decree upon his own initiative. Accordingly, it is the
Court's duty to uphold such policy and apply the law as it currently stands until the passage of
an amendatory law on the subject.13

As members of the Court, ours is the duty to interpret the law; this duty does not carry
with it the power to determine what the law should be in the face of changing times, which
power, in turn, lies solely within the province of Congress.14

Article 26(2) had not been crafted to dilute the Philippines' policy against absolute
divorce. In fact, this perceived possible dilution is precisely what prompted the majority of the
Committee members to vote for the deletion of Article 26(2) in the initial version of the Family
Code found in EO 209. As the deliberations indicate, the exception provided in Article 26(2)
is narrow, and intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a foreign
national obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving the latter stuck in a
marriage without a spouse15

In Van Dorn, a case decided prior to the enactment of the Family Code, an American
citizen sought to compel his former Filipina wife to render an accounting of their alleged conjugal

12 Tañada v. Yulo, G.R. No. 43575, [May 31, 1935], 61 PHIL 515-522
13 Manalo v Cort of Appeals, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
14 Id.

15 Minutes of the 146th joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees dated July 12, 1986

6
business in Manila. The American citizen argued that he retained the right to share in the
proceeds of the disputed business, as the divorce decree issued by the Nevada District Court
cannot be given effect in the Philippines. Ruling against the American citizen, the Court held that
the divorce decree issued by a United States court is binding against him as an American
citizen.9As a residual effect of such divorce, the American citizen no longer had standing to sue
as the husband of his former Filipina wife.16

In Orbecido, a Filipino citizen sought permission to remarry before the courts, claiming
that his former Filipina wife had obtained a divorce decree against him from an American
court after she had become a naturalized American citizen. The Court held that the effects of the
divorce decree should be recognized in the Philippines since it was obtained by the former
wife as an American citizen in accordance with her national law, and that as a consequence,
the Filipino husband should be allowed to remarry pursuant to Article 26(2). In so ruling, the
Court laid down elements for the application of Article 26(2).17

Still, in Dacasin, a Filipino wife secured a divorce decree against her American husband
from an Illinois court. The decree awarded sole custody over the parties' daughter in favor of the
Filipino wife. While the parties subsequently executed a Joint Custody Agreement, the Filipino
wife refused to honor the agreement, prompting the American husband to seek redress before
the Philippine courts. The Court held that the Illinois divorce decree is binding on the American
citizen, and that the latter cannot be permitted to evade the terms of the custodial award. Citing
the nationality principle, the Court stressed that "a foreign divorce decree carries as much
validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdictionas it does in the jurisdiction of the
alien's nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce."18 It bears stressing that the issue
raised in Dacasin was the enforceability of the Joint Custody Agreement against the American
husband, and not the validity of the foreign divorce decree as against the Filipino wife.

Thus, rather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign divorce
decrees in the Philippines, I believe that the Court's rulings in Van Dorn,
Orbecido and Dacasin merely clarify the parameters for the application of the nationality
principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code, and the exception thereto found in Article 26(2)
the Family Code. These parameters may be summarized as follows:

1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the prohibition against
absolute divorce. As a consequence of such prohibition, a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino citizen cannot be enforced in the Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to

16 Vandorn v. Romillio, G.R. No. L-68470, October ,1985

17 Orbecido v Republic, G.R.No. 154380, October 5, 2005
18 Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010

7
 permit a Filipino citizen to invoke foreign law to evade an express prohibition under
Philippine law.

2. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign national may be extended to
the Filipino spouse, provided the latter is able to prove (i) the issuance of the divorce decree,
and (ii) the personal law of the foreign spouse allowing such divorce. This exception, found
under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, respects the binding effect of the divorce decree on the
foreign national, and merely recognizes the residual effect of such decree on the Filipino
spouse.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and
precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar
as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This
results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married
to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very
likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the
absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or
injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute
divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino
wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under
our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce
should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.19

The recognition afforded to foreign divorce under Article 26(2) is extended only as a
means to recognize its residual effect on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national laws. The provision was not intended to grant any
preferential right in favor of Filipinos in mixed marriages, but intended merely to recognize
the operation of foreign divorce on foreigners whose national laws permit divorce.

These movements towards the passage of a divorce law illustrate that the difficulty
which results from the absolute prohibition against marriage is being addressed by the 17th
Congress through a statute specifically crafted for the purpose. That the legislature has seen it
necessary to initiate these proposed laws is a clear delineation of the Court's role — that is, to
simply apply the current law and not for it to indulge in judicial legislation.

Thesis statement

19 Private International Law, Salonga, R. Jovito, 1995

8
 The doctrine in Republic v. Manalo whereby a Filipino citizen was allowed to directly
initiate a divorce—and subsequently have the same recognized as a foreign divorce decree—is
in contravention of the Article 26 of the Family Code.

Statement of the Problem

The study seeks to inform the judicial community, the bench, and future generations
the effect of a judicial decision which directly contravenes a statutory creation by the
legislature.

Objectives

To determine:

First, Whether or not the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v. Manalo
is a form of judicial legislation, in clear abandonment of the legislative intent behind Article 26
of the Family Code

Second, to determine the effects of this ruling on the implementation of the general
principle in favour of marriage, on the Legislative and Executive.

Third, and finally, to identify the effect of this ruling on marriages within the
Philippine jurisdiction and under Philippine law.

Significance of the study

The study intends to inform the legal community of the applicability of the decision in
our jurisdiction with regard to divorce. The study wants to determine the validity of divorce
and its effects in Philippines society.

Chapter 2

Review of Related Literature

Introduction

This chapter will discuss the various works related to the subject matter, and further

discuss the jurisprudence initially outlined in the first chapter.

Importance of marriage

9
 In Bove v. Pinciotti, the US Supreme Court held Marriage is not at most a civil contract,

but is at least a civil contract. That is to say, it is a special kind of contract, and the regular laws

on obligations & contracts do not govern it. It is a status and a kind of fealty to the State. 20

Because of the extraordinary characteristics of the contact of marriage, it is unsurprising that

the state places great importance on its existence and preservation as a cornerstone of basic

community. Thus interpreted in the Philippine setting, once a man and a woman enter into a

special contract of marriage, their legal status changes, and a special law will govern their

actions. This law is the Family Code, which outlines the rights and responsibilities of the man

and woman as husband and wife.

The courts went further in Ancheta v. Ancheta, clarifying the position of the court in the

importance of marriage under the Constitution—that is, as an essential building block of our

nation. Thus it is that the laws of the country are heavily and intentionally aimed toward

strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that

marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.

The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of

families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the

family members alone. Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should

stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that

the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital

duties and obligations.21 The state, as a party in a contract of marriage, can employ means and

methods to ensure its success.

Seeing the state has a personal stake in the contract of marriage, it can create the terms

and conditions which will ensure its longevity and health. No individual can unilaterally alter

or create stipulations which are not aligned with the law or public policy. In Anonymous v.

Anonymous, the court held that privately imposed conditions that would alter the marriage

20 Bove v. Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942)

21 Ancheta v. Ancheta, Gr. 145370, March 4, 2004

10
 status are not recognized by the State – conditions to marriage interest of the state.22 If a person

would be allowed to alter the contract of marriage, outside of and beyond the basic

requirements of law, inevitably, abuse and deterioration in marital relations is bound to arise.

The premium with which the contract of marriage is viewed cannot be downplayed, and the

state clearly takes a proactive role in the preservation of the healthfulness of marital relations.

Even so, there are still people who do not regard marriage with the same sanctity that

the state appears to demand by its actions. In McClurg v. Terry, the court held that marriages

in jest are not valid—thus, the intention of the parties must be ascertained, for the contract of

marriage to be given effect. 23 The nature of the contract of marriage cannot be down played by

the parties entering it. It is clear that marriage, being such a fundamental structure in society,

cannot be reduced to a mere joke, and parties should be held to its obligations and

responsibilities when it is perfected.

As a mechanic to promote marriages the state may implement legislative measures

designed to benefit those who are married. In State v. Walker, the court held that it is a

generally accepted doctrine that the legislature may impose restrictions upon marital relations

as laws on propriety and social order demand, as long as such regulations are not

prohibitory.24 The state can impose conditions with a view toward safeguarding marriage from

malicious intent and damaging conflict. One such law is Republic Act No. 10354 or the

Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012.

Doctrines related Article 26 of the Family Code

Under the Nationality Principle,25 what governs the capacity of a Filipino citizen with

regard to marriage and family relations is Philippine law, even when he is outside of the

Philippines, permanently or temporarily. This means that despite obtaining a valid divorce in a

22 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49 NYSd 314

23 McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225
24 State v Walker, 36 Kan. 297

25 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons

are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

11
foreign country, the divorce decree cannot be recognized, since Philippine law does not

recognize the existence of divorce.

An example of the application of this prohibition is People v. Schneckenburger,

involving a Filipino citizen who secured a foreign divorce in a country that allowed the same,

and then later remarried in the Philippines. In that case, the court ruled the accused is still liable

for bigamy, since Philippine law does not recognize the divorce obtained by a Filipino citizen

from a foreign county.26

Thus, it is only when a Filipino citizen changes his nationality, renouncing Filipino

citizenship, that he may have such a decree recognized. This was made clear in the case of

Garcia v. Recio, where respondent, originally a Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an

Australian citizen, obtained a divorce decree from his marriage to a Filipina, and subsequently

contracted marriage again in the Philippines. Upholding the validity of the foreign divorce

decree, the Supreme Court expounded that before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.27 A divorce

obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be a written act or

record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country, which, under the Rules of

Court,28 courts are not required to take judicial notice of.29 Thus, like any other fact, it must be

alleged and proven.

In Corpus v. Sto. Thomas, similarly concerning a Filipino citizen naturalized abroad,

the Supreme Court held that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino

spouse. However the foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the

alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a

26 People v Schneckenburger, GR no. L-48183, November 10, 1941

27 Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.
28 Garcia v Recio, GR no. 138322, October 2, 2001

29 Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 6, 2000, p. 7.

12
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of

Court30 which provides for means by which foreign judgments31 may be given effect under law.

However, this recognition is not unhampered by the mandate of the Nationality

Principle. In Bayot v. CA and Schneckenburger v. Corpuz, the Supreme Court took oaccasion to

clarify that, in order for a decree of foreign divorce decree to be valid and binding, the party

obtaining the divorce decree must no longer be a Filipino citizen. Thus, in light of the country's

policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point to allow recognition of a foreign decree of

divorce is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.32

Effect of divorce in the Philippines

When divorce is effected, the substantial rights and obligations attendant to the

marriage cease. In the case of Van Dorn v Romillio, when divorce was properly applied for and

granted upon petition of the foreign spouse, the marital relation is deemed terminated. Thus,

since the foreign spouse no longer has any rights unde the marriage, he is estopped by his own

representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.33

Limitations of Judicial Authority

The Supreme Court is granted the power of judicial review by no less than the

Constitution of the Republic itself, under Article VIII, Sec. 1 thereof.34 In line with this power,

30 SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
31 Corpuz v Sto Thomas, GR no. 186571, August 11, 2010

32 Bayot vs CA, G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

33 Vandorn vs Romillio, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

34 Art. VIII Section 1: The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such Lower Courts

as may be established by law.J udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether

13
Supreme Court is given the authority to interpret the law and declare laws inconsistent with the

Constitution to be null and void.35

This authority, granted by the Constitution some thirty years ago now, is necessarily

broad, to address the many disputes the Court was bound to face throughout the years of its

existence. However, the cornerstone of a democratic government is limitation of authority, and

Judicial Review of the Supreme Court is no exception. Chief among the limitations of judicial

review is the principle of Judicial Legislation. The Miriam Webster dictionary defines this as

legal interpretations created by the pronouncements of a judge, who departs from the strict

interpretation of a law according to the manifest intention of the legislature. In Tañada v.

Yulo, the court explained that The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands aims to adopt a

liberal construction of statutes—by which is meant that the method by which courts determine

the intent of laws ought to derive from the language used, the subject matter, and the purposes

of those framing laws, with the purpose of discovering the true meaning behind the enactment

thereof. There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of

a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought

to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise

or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
35 SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate

Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court
are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations,
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is
not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc.

14
of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers

among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.36

Chapter 3

Introduction

The ultimate objective of this research is to determine the effect of the case of Republic

v. Manalo, and the various issues which revolve around the case, and to determine the

dangers it poses to the current structure of marriage under Philippine law. In addition, this

research will synthesize the material cited in the Review of Related Literature in order to

enlighten the reader about the fundamental principles behind the extant system of law that

thedecision in Republic v. Manalo patently threatens.

Qualitative

This research will principally focus on the material laid out in the Review of Related

Literature, using the framework of marital relations outlined by them, in consonance with the

Philippine Constitution and the Family Code. The proponent will consider the decision of the

Court in Republic v. Manalo in light of this framework, to determine its compatibility with the

system of family law in the Philippines. This study shall also consider the interpretation of

family law according to various preeminent jurists to present different perspectives on the

matter.

Expectation

The proponent expects that this paper will contribute a new level of insight concerning

the issue of divorce under Philippine law. The proponent also hopes that through this work,

greater thought will be given to the exercise of the power of judicial review by courts,

particularly when this exercise reaches into aspects of judicial legislation.

36 Tañada v. Yulo, G.R. No. 43575, [May 31, 1935], 61 PHIL 515-522

15